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stringlengths 56
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Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, key)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_array_iterator_key(getThis(), return_value TSRMLS_CC);
} /* }}} */
void spl_array_iterator_key(zval *object, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73029 - Missing type check when unserializing SplArray
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 49,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannel(Image *image,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
LayerInfo* layer_info,const size_t channel,
const PSDCompressionType compression,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*channel_image,
*mask;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickBooleanType
status;
channel_image=image;
mask=(Image *) NULL;
if (layer_info->channel_info[channel].type < -1)
{
/*
Ignore mask that is not a user supplied layer mask, if the mask is
disabled or if the flags have unsupported values.
*/
if (layer_info->channel_info[channel].type != -2 ||
(layer_info->mask.flags > 3) || (layer_info->mask.flags & 0x02))
{
SeekBlob(image,layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_CUR);
return(MagickTrue);
}
mask=CloneImage(image,layer_info->mask.page.width,
layer_info->mask.page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
mask->matte=MagickFalse;
channel_image=mask;
}
offset=TellBlob(channel_image);
status=MagickTrue;
switch(compression)
{
case Raw:
status=ReadPSDChannelRaw(channel_image,psd_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,exception);
break;
case RLE:
{
MagickOffsetType
*offsets;
offsets=ReadPSDRLEOffsets(channel_image,psd_info,channel_image->rows);
if (offsets == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
status=ReadPSDChannelRLE(channel_image,psd_info,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,offsets,exception);
offsets=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(offsets);
}
break;
case ZipWithPrediction:
case ZipWithoutPrediction:
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
status=ReadPSDChannelZip(channel_image,layer_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,compression,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,exception);
#else
SeekBlob(image,offset+layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_SET);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateWarning,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn",
"'%s' (ZLIB)",image->filename);
#endif
break;
default:
SeekBlob(image,offset+layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_SET);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),TypeWarning,
"CompressionNotSupported","'%.20g'",(double) compression);
break;
}
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
DestroyImage(mask);
SeekBlob(image,offset+layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_SET);
ThrowBinaryException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage",
image->filename);
}
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
MagickPixelPacket
color;
layer_info->mask.image=CloneImage(image,image->columns,image->rows,
MagickTrue,exception);
layer_info->mask.image->matte=MagickFalse;
GetMagickPixelPacket(layer_info->mask.image,&color);
color.red=layer_info->mask.background == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange;
color.green=color.red;
color.blue=color.red;
color.index=color.red;
SetImageColor(layer_info->mask.image,&color);
(void) CompositeImage(layer_info->mask.image,OverCompositeOp,mask,
layer_info->mask.page.x,layer_info->mask.page.y);
}
DestroyImage(mask);
}
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/148
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 73,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int pdf_width(struct pdf_doc *pdf)
{
return pdf->width;
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiceTurnSyncOnHelper::OnEnterpriseAccountConfirmation(
SigninChoice choice) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Enterprise.UserSigninChoice", choice,
DiceTurnSyncOnHelper::SIGNIN_CHOICE_SIZE);
switch (choice) {
case SIGNIN_CHOICE_CANCEL:
base::RecordAction(
base::UserMetricsAction("Signin_EnterpriseAccountPrompt_Cancel"));
AbortAndDelete();
break;
case SIGNIN_CHOICE_CONTINUE:
base::RecordAction(
base::UserMetricsAction("Signin_EnterpriseAccountPrompt_ImportData"));
LoadPolicyWithCachedCredentials();
break;
case SIGNIN_CHOICE_NEW_PROFILE:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction(
"Signin_EnterpriseAccountPrompt_DontImportData"));
CreateNewSignedInProfile();
break;
case SIGNIN_CHOICE_SIZE:
NOTREACHED();
AbortAndDelete();
break;
}
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringURLAttrAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
TestObjectV8Internal::reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringURLAttrAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserLauncherItemController::Launch(int event_flags) {
DCHECK(!app_id().empty());
launcher_controller()->LaunchApp(app_id(), event_flags);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<WebContentsImpl> WebContentsImpl::CreateWithOpener(
const WebContents::CreateParams& params,
RenderFrameHostImpl* opener_rfh) {
TRACE_EVENT0("browser", "WebContentsImpl::CreateWithOpener");
FrameTreeNode* opener = nullptr;
if (opener_rfh)
opener = opener_rfh->frame_tree_node();
std::unique_ptr<WebContentsImpl> new_contents(
new WebContentsImpl(params.browser_context));
new_contents->SetOpenerForNewContents(opener, params.opener_suppressed);
FrameTreeNode* new_root = new_contents->GetFrameTree()->root();
if (opener) {
blink::WebSandboxFlags opener_flags = opener_rfh->active_sandbox_flags();
const blink::WebSandboxFlags inherit_flag =
blink::WebSandboxFlags::kPropagatesToAuxiliaryBrowsingContexts;
if ((opener_flags & inherit_flag) == inherit_flag) {
new_root->SetPendingFramePolicy({opener_flags, {}});
}
}
blink::FramePolicy frame_policy(new_root->pending_frame_policy());
frame_policy.sandbox_flags |= params.starting_sandbox_flags;
new_root->SetPendingFramePolicy(frame_policy);
new_root->CommitPendingFramePolicy();
if (params.created_with_opener)
new_contents->created_with_opener_ = true;
if (params.guest_delegate) {
BrowserPluginGuest::Create(new_contents.get(), params.guest_delegate);
}
new_contents->Init(params);
return new_contents;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 144,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int do_print(const char *path_p, const struct stat *st, int walk_flags, void *unused)
{
const char *default_prefix = NULL;
acl_t acl = NULL, default_acl = NULL;
int error = 0;
if (walk_flags & WALK_TREE_FAILED) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: %s\n", progname, xquote(path_p, "\n\r"),
strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
/*
* Symlinks can never have ACLs, so when doing a physical walk, we
* skip symlinks altogether, and when doing a half-logical walk, we
* skip all non-toplevel symlinks.
*/
if ((walk_flags & WALK_TREE_SYMLINK) &&
((walk_flags & WALK_TREE_PHYSICAL) ||
!(walk_flags & (WALK_TREE_TOPLEVEL | WALK_TREE_LOGICAL))))
return 0;
if (opt_print_acl) {
acl = acl_get_file(path_p, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
if (acl == NULL && (errno == ENOSYS || errno == ENOTSUP))
acl = acl_get_file_mode(path_p);
if (acl == NULL)
goto fail;
}
if (opt_print_default_acl && S_ISDIR(st->st_mode)) {
default_acl = acl_get_file(path_p, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
if (default_acl == NULL) {
if (errno != ENOSYS && errno != ENOTSUP)
goto fail;
} else if (acl_entries(default_acl) == 0) {
acl_free(default_acl);
default_acl = NULL;
}
}
if (opt_skip_base &&
(!acl || acl_equiv_mode(acl, NULL) == 0) && !default_acl)
return 0;
if (opt_print_acl && opt_print_default_acl)
default_prefix = "default:";
if (opt_strip_leading_slash) {
if (*path_p == '/') {
if (!absolute_warning) {
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Removing leading "
"'/' from absolute path names\n"),
progname);
absolute_warning = 1;
}
while (*path_p == '/')
path_p++;
} else if (*path_p == '.' && *(path_p+1) == '/')
while (*++path_p == '/')
/* nothing */ ;
if (*path_p == '\0')
path_p = ".";
}
if (opt_tabular) {
if (do_show(stdout, path_p, st, acl, default_acl) != 0)
goto fail;
} else {
if (opt_comments) {
printf("# file: %s\n", xquote(path_p, "\n\r"));
printf("# owner: %s\n",
xquote(user_name(st->st_uid, opt_numeric), " \t\n\r"));
printf("# group: %s\n",
xquote(group_name(st->st_gid, opt_numeric), " \t\n\r"));
}
if (acl != NULL) {
char *acl_text = acl_to_any_text(acl, NULL, '\n',
print_options);
if (!acl_text)
goto fail;
if (puts(acl_text) < 0) {
acl_free(acl_text);
goto fail;
}
acl_free(acl_text);
}
if (default_acl != NULL) {
char *acl_text = acl_to_any_text(default_acl,
default_prefix, '\n',
print_options);
if (!acl_text)
goto fail;
if (puts(acl_text) < 0) {
acl_free(acl_text);
goto fail;
}
acl_free(acl_text);
}
}
if (acl || default_acl || opt_comments)
printf("\n");
cleanup:
if (acl)
acl_free(acl);
if (default_acl)
acl_free(default_acl);
return error;
fail:
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: %s\n", progname, xquote(path_p, "\n\r"),
strerror(errno));
error = -1;
goto cleanup;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MetricsWebContentsObserver::OnVisibilityChanged(
content::Visibility visibility) {
if (web_contents_will_soon_be_destroyed_)
return;
bool was_in_foreground = in_foreground_;
in_foreground_ = visibility == content::Visibility::VISIBLE;
if (in_foreground_ == was_in_foreground)
return;
if (in_foreground_) {
if (committed_load_)
committed_load_->WebContentsShown();
for (const auto& kv : provisional_loads_) {
kv.second->WebContentsShown();
}
} else {
if (committed_load_)
committed_load_->WebContentsHidden();
for (const auto& kv : provisional_loads_) {
kv.second->WebContentsHidden();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 140,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext3D::paintToCanvas(const unsigned char* imagePixels, int imageWidth, int imageHeight, int canvasWidth, int canvasHeight, CGContextRef context)
{
if (!imagePixels || imageWidth <= 0 || imageHeight <= 0 || canvasWidth <= 0 || canvasHeight <= 0 || !context)
return;
int rowBytes = imageWidth * 4;
RetainPtr<CGDataProviderRef> dataProvider(AdoptCF, CGDataProviderCreateWithData(0, imagePixels, rowBytes * imageHeight, 0));
RetainPtr<CGImageRef> cgImage(AdoptCF, CGImageCreate(imageWidth, imageHeight, 8, 32, rowBytes, deviceRGBColorSpaceRef(), kCGImageAlphaPremultipliedFirst | kCGBitmapByteOrder32Host,
dataProvider.get(), 0, false, kCGRenderingIntentDefault));
CGRect rect = CGRectMake(0, 0, canvasWidth, canvasHeight);
CGContextSaveGState(context);
CGContextSetBlendMode(context, kCGBlendModeCopy);
CGContextSetInterpolationQuality(context, kCGInterpolationNone);
CGContextDrawImage(context, rect, cgImage.get());
CGContextRestoreGState(context);
}
Commit Message: Set the access qualifier of two methods to query frame specific info of BitmapImage to protected.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90505
Patch by Huang Dongsung <[email protected]> on 2012-08-12
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Following 4 methods are protected.
size_t frameCount();
NativeImagePtr frameAtIndex(size_t);
bool frameIsCompleteAtIndex(size_t);
float frameDurationAtIndex(size_t);
So, 2 methds also should be protected because the frame info is only specific of
BitmapImage.
bool frameHasAlphaAtIndex(size_t);
ImageOrientation frameOrientationAtIndex(size_t);
On the other hand, this patch amended GraphicsContext3DCG.
- static_cast<BitmapImage*>(image)->frameHasAlphaAtIndex(0)
+ image->currentFrameHasAlpha()
This patch does not affect PNG, JPEG, BMP, and WEBP because those images
have only 0 indexed frame.
Thus, GIF, and ICO are affected. However, an above query to get Alpha
is for the image that is created by image->nativeImageForCurrentFrame(), so it
is proper to use image->currentFrameHasAlpha() instead of
image->frameHasAlphaAtIndex(0).
No new tests, because it is hard to test. We need an animated GIF that
one frame has alpha and another frame does not have alpha. However, I
cannot find the animated GIF file that suffices the requirement.
* platform/graphics/BitmapImage.h:
(BitmapImage):
* platform/graphics/cg/GraphicsContext3DCG.cpp:
(WebCore::GraphicsContext3D::getImageData):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125374 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pgm_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int length,
register const u_char *bp2)
{
register const struct pgm_header *pgm;
register const struct ip *ip;
register char ch;
uint16_t sport, dport;
u_int nla_afnum;
char nla_buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
register const struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
uint8_t opt_type, opt_len;
uint32_t seq, opts_len, len, offset;
pgm = (const struct pgm_header *)bp;
ip = (const struct ip *)bp2;
if (IP_V(ip) == 6)
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp2;
else
ip6 = NULL;
ch = '\0';
if (!ND_TTEST(pgm->pgm_dport)) {
if (ip6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: [|pgm]",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_src),
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_dst)));
return;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: [|pgm]",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst)));
return;
}
}
sport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_sport);
dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_dport);
if (ip6) {
if (ip6->ip6_nxt == IPPROTO_PGM) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s.%s > %s.%s: ",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_src),
tcpport_string(ndo, sport),
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_dst),
tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: ",
tcpport_string(ndo, sport), tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
}
} else {
if (ip->ip_p == IPPROTO_PGM) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s.%s > %s.%s: ",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src),
tcpport_string(ndo, sport),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst),
tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: ",
tcpport_string(ndo, sport), tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
}
}
ND_TCHECK(*pgm);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "PGM, length %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_length)));
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x ",
pgm->pgm_gsid[0],
pgm->pgm_gsid[1],
pgm->pgm_gsid[2],
pgm->pgm_gsid[3],
pgm->pgm_gsid[4],
pgm->pgm_gsid[5]));
switch (pgm->pgm_type) {
case PGM_SPM: {
const struct pgm_spm *spm;
spm = (const struct pgm_spm *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*spm);
bp = (const u_char *) (spm + 1);
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&spm->pgms_nla_afi)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "SPM seq %u trail %u lead %u nla %s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&spm->pgms_seq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&spm->pgms_trailseq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&spm->pgms_leadseq),
nla_buf));
break;
}
case PGM_POLL: {
const struct pgm_poll *poll_msg;
poll_msg = (const struct pgm_poll *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*poll_msg);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "POLL seq %u round %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&poll_msg->pgmp_seq),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&poll_msg->pgmp_round)));
bp = (const u_char *) (poll_msg + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_POLR: {
const struct pgm_polr *polr;
uint32_t ivl, rnd, mask;
polr = (const struct pgm_polr *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*polr);
bp = (const u_char *) (polr + 1);
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&polr->pgmp_nla_afi)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
ivl = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
rnd = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
mask = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "POLR seq %u round %u nla %s ivl %u rnd 0x%08x "
"mask 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&polr->pgmp_seq),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&polr->pgmp_round), nla_buf, ivl, rnd, mask));
break;
}
case PGM_ODATA: {
const struct pgm_data *odata;
odata = (const struct pgm_data *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*odata);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ODATA trail %u seq %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&odata->pgmd_trailseq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&odata->pgmd_seq)));
bp = (const u_char *) (odata + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_RDATA: {
const struct pgm_data *rdata;
rdata = (const struct pgm_data *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*rdata);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RDATA trail %u seq %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&rdata->pgmd_trailseq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&rdata->pgmd_seq)));
bp = (const u_char *) (rdata + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_NAK:
case PGM_NULLNAK:
case PGM_NCF: {
const struct pgm_nak *nak;
char source_buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN], group_buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
nak = (const struct pgm_nak *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*nak);
bp = (const u_char *) (nak + 1);
/*
* Skip past the source, saving info along the way
* and stopping if we don't have enough.
*/
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&nak->pgmn_source_afi)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, source_buf, sizeof(source_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, source_buf, sizeof(source_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
/*
* Skip past the group, saving info along the way
* and stopping if we don't have enough.
*/
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, group_buf, sizeof(group_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, group_buf, sizeof(group_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
/*
* Options decoding can go here.
*/
switch (pgm->pgm_type) {
case PGM_NAK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NAK "));
break;
case PGM_NULLNAK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NNAK "));
break;
case PGM_NCF:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NCF "));
break;
default:
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%s -> %s), seq %u",
source_buf, group_buf, EXTRACT_32BITS(&nak->pgmn_seq)));
break;
}
case PGM_ACK: {
const struct pgm_ack *ack;
ack = (const struct pgm_ack *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*ack);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ACK seq %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ack->pgma_rx_max_seq)));
bp = (const u_char *) (ack + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_SPMR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "SPMR"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "UNKNOWN type 0x%02x", pgm->pgm_type));
break;
}
if (pgm->pgm_options & PGM_OPT_BIT_PRESENT) {
/*
* make sure there's enough for the first option header
*/
if (!ND_TTEST2(*bp, PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|OPT]"));
return;
}
/*
* That option header MUST be an OPT_LENGTH option
* (see the first paragraph of section 9.1 in RFC 3208).
*/
opt_type = *bp++;
if ((opt_type & PGM_OPT_MASK) != PGM_OPT_LENGTH) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[First option bad, should be PGM_OPT_LENGTH, is %u]", opt_type & PGM_OPT_MASK));
return;
}
opt_len = *bp++;
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_LENGTH option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
opts_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
if (opts_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad total option length %u < 4]", opts_len));
return;
}
bp += sizeof(uint16_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " OPTS LEN %d", opts_len));
opts_len -= 4;
while (opts_len) {
if (opts_len < PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Total option length leaves no room for final option]"));
return;
}
opt_type = *bp++;
opt_len = *bp++;
if (opt_len < PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad option, length %u < %u]", opt_len,
PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN));
break;
}
if (opts_len < opt_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Total option length leaves no room for final option]"));
return;
}
if (!ND_TTEST2(*bp, opt_len - 2)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|OPT]"));
return;
}
switch (opt_type & PGM_OPT_MASK) {
case PGM_OPT_LENGTH:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_LENGTH option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " OPTS LEN (extra?) %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)));
bp += sizeof(uint16_t);
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_FRAGMENT:
if (opt_len != 16) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_FRAGMENT option, length %u != 16]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " FRAG seq %u off %u len %u", seq, offset, len));
opts_len -= 16;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NAK_LIST:
bp += 2;
opt_len -= sizeof(uint32_t); /* option header */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NAK LIST"));
while (opt_len) {
if (opt_len < sizeof(uint32_t)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Option length not a multiple of 4]"));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
opt_len -= sizeof(uint32_t);
opts_len -= sizeof(uint32_t);
}
break;
case PGM_OPT_JOIN:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_JOIN option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " JOIN %u", seq));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NAK_BO_IVL:
if (opt_len != 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_NAK_BO_IVL option, length %u != 12]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BACKOFF ivl %u ivlseq %u", offset, seq));
opts_len -= 12;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NAK_BO_RNG:
if (opt_len != 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_NAK_BO_RNG option, length %u != 12]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BACKOFF max %u min %u", offset, seq));
opts_len -= 12;
break;
case PGM_OPT_REDIRECT:
bp += 2;
nla_afnum = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (nla_afnum) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (opt_len != 4 + sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_REDIRECT option, length %u != 4 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
opts_len -= 4 + sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (opt_len != 4 + sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_REDIRECT option, length %u != 4 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
opts_len -= 4 + sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " REDIRECT %s", nla_buf));
break;
case PGM_OPT_PARITY_PRM:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PARITY_PRM option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PARITY MAXTGS %u", len));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_PARITY_GRP:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PARITY_GRP option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PARITY GROUP %u", seq));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_CURR_TGSIZE:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_CURR_TGSIZE option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PARITY ATGS %u", len));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NBR_UNREACH:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_NBR_UNREACH option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NBR_UNREACH"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_PATH_NLA:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PATH_NLA [%d]", opt_len));
bp += opt_len;
opts_len -= opt_len;
break;
case PGM_OPT_SYN:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_SYN option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " SYN"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_FIN:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_FIN option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " FIN"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_RST:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_RST option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RST"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_CR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " CR"));
bp += opt_len;
opts_len -= opt_len;
break;
case PGM_OPT_CRQST:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_CRQST option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " CRQST"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_PGMCC_DATA:
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
nla_afnum = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (nla_afnum) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PGMCC DATA %u %s", offset, nla_buf));
break;
case PGM_OPT_PGMCC_FEEDBACK:
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
nla_afnum = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (nla_afnum) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PGMCC FEEDBACK %u %s", offset, nla_buf));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " OPT_%02X [%d] ", opt_type, opt_len));
bp += opt_len;
opts_len -= opt_len;
break;
}
if (opt_type & PGM_OPT_END)
break;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [%u]", length));
if (ndo->ndo_packettype == PT_PGM_ZMTP1 &&
(pgm->pgm_type == PGM_ODATA || pgm->pgm_type == PGM_RDATA))
zmtp1_print_datagram(ndo, bp, EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_length));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pgm]"));
if (ch != '\0')
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13018/PGM: Add a missing bounds check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ib_uverbs_add_one(struct ib_device *device)
{
int devnum;
dev_t base;
struct ib_uverbs_device *uverbs_dev;
int ret;
if (!device->alloc_ucontext)
return;
uverbs_dev = kzalloc(sizeof *uverbs_dev, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!uverbs_dev)
return;
ret = init_srcu_struct(&uverbs_dev->disassociate_srcu);
if (ret) {
kfree(uverbs_dev);
return;
}
atomic_set(&uverbs_dev->refcount, 1);
init_completion(&uverbs_dev->comp);
uverbs_dev->xrcd_tree = RB_ROOT;
mutex_init(&uverbs_dev->xrcd_tree_mutex);
kobject_init(&uverbs_dev->kobj, &ib_uverbs_dev_ktype);
mutex_init(&uverbs_dev->lists_mutex);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&uverbs_dev->uverbs_file_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&uverbs_dev->uverbs_events_file_list);
spin_lock(&map_lock);
devnum = find_first_zero_bit(dev_map, IB_UVERBS_MAX_DEVICES);
if (devnum >= IB_UVERBS_MAX_DEVICES) {
spin_unlock(&map_lock);
devnum = find_overflow_devnum();
if (devnum < 0)
goto err;
spin_lock(&map_lock);
uverbs_dev->devnum = devnum + IB_UVERBS_MAX_DEVICES;
base = devnum + overflow_maj;
set_bit(devnum, overflow_map);
} else {
uverbs_dev->devnum = devnum;
base = devnum + IB_UVERBS_BASE_DEV;
set_bit(devnum, dev_map);
}
spin_unlock(&map_lock);
rcu_assign_pointer(uverbs_dev->ib_dev, device);
uverbs_dev->num_comp_vectors = device->num_comp_vectors;
cdev_init(&uverbs_dev->cdev, NULL);
uverbs_dev->cdev.owner = THIS_MODULE;
uverbs_dev->cdev.ops = device->mmap ? &uverbs_mmap_fops : &uverbs_fops;
uverbs_dev->cdev.kobj.parent = &uverbs_dev->kobj;
kobject_set_name(&uverbs_dev->cdev.kobj, "uverbs%d", uverbs_dev->devnum);
if (cdev_add(&uverbs_dev->cdev, base, 1))
goto err_cdev;
uverbs_dev->dev = device_create(uverbs_class, device->dma_device,
uverbs_dev->cdev.dev, uverbs_dev,
"uverbs%d", uverbs_dev->devnum);
if (IS_ERR(uverbs_dev->dev))
goto err_cdev;
if (device_create_file(uverbs_dev->dev, &dev_attr_ibdev))
goto err_class;
if (device_create_file(uverbs_dev->dev, &dev_attr_abi_version))
goto err_class;
ib_set_client_data(device, &uverbs_client, uverbs_dev);
return;
err_class:
device_destroy(uverbs_class, uverbs_dev->cdev.dev);
err_cdev:
cdev_del(&uverbs_dev->cdev);
if (uverbs_dev->devnum < IB_UVERBS_MAX_DEVICES)
clear_bit(devnum, dev_map);
else
clear_bit(devnum, overflow_map);
err:
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&uverbs_dev->refcount))
ib_uverbs_comp_dev(uverbs_dev);
wait_for_completion(&uverbs_dev->comp);
kobject_put(&uverbs_dev->kobj);
return;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltAddTextString(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr target,
const xmlChar *string, int len) {
/*
* optimization
*/
if ((len <= 0) || (string == NULL) || (target == NULL))
return(target);
if (ctxt->lasttext == target->content) {
if (ctxt->lasttuse + len >= ctxt->lasttsize) {
xmlChar *newbuf;
int size;
size = ctxt->lasttsize + len + 100;
size *= 2;
newbuf = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(target->content,size);
if (newbuf == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, target,
"xsltCopyText: text allocation failed\n");
return(NULL);
}
ctxt->lasttsize = size;
ctxt->lasttext = newbuf;
target->content = newbuf;
}
memcpy(&(target->content[ctxt->lasttuse]), string, len);
ctxt->lasttuse += len;
target->content[ctxt->lasttuse] = 0;
} else {
xmlNodeAddContent(target, string);
ctxt->lasttext = target->content;
len = xmlStrlen(target->content);
ctxt->lasttsize = len;
ctxt->lasttuse = len;
}
return(target);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: message_send_chat_otr(const char *const barejid, const char *const msg, gboolean request_receipt)
{
xmpp_ctx_t * const ctx = connection_get_ctx();
char *state = chat_session_get_state(barejid);
char *jid = chat_session_get_jid(barejid);
char *id = create_unique_id("msg");
xmpp_stanza_t *message = xmpp_message_new(ctx, STANZA_TYPE_CHAT, barejid, id);
xmpp_message_set_body(message, msg);
free(jid);
if (state) {
stanza_attach_state(ctx, message, state);
}
stanza_attach_carbons_private(ctx, message);
stanza_attach_hints_no_copy(ctx, message);
stanza_attach_hints_no_store(ctx, message);
if (request_receipt) {
stanza_attach_receipt_request(ctx, message);
}
_send_message_stanza(message);
xmpp_stanza_release(message);
return id;
}
Commit Message: Add carbons from check
CWE ID: CWE-346 | 0 | 68,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned venc_dev::venc_stop_done(void)
{
struct venc_msg venc_msg;
free_extradata();
venc_msg.msgcode=VEN_MSG_STOP;
venc_msg.statuscode=VEN_S_SUCCESS;
venc_handle->async_message_process(venc_handle,&venc_msg);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int iscsi_login_tx_data(
struct iscsi_conn *conn,
char *pdu_buf,
char *text_buf,
int text_length)
{
int length, tx_sent, iov_cnt = 1;
struct kvec iov[2];
length = (ISCSI_HDR_LEN + text_length);
memset(&iov[0], 0, 2 * sizeof(struct kvec));
iov[0].iov_len = ISCSI_HDR_LEN;
iov[0].iov_base = pdu_buf;
if (text_buf && text_length) {
iov[1].iov_len = text_length;
iov[1].iov_base = text_buf;
iov_cnt++;
}
/*
* Initial Marker-less Interval.
* Add the values regardless of IFMarker/OFMarker, considering
* it may not be negoitated yet.
*/
conn->if_marker += length;
tx_sent = tx_data(conn, &iov[0], iov_cnt, length);
if (tx_sent != length) {
pr_err("tx_data returned %d, expecting %d.\n",
tx_sent, length);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 30,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniformMatrix2fv(GLint fake_location,
GLsizei count,
GLboolean transpose,
const volatile GLfloat* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (transpose && !feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glUniformMatrix2fv", "transpose not FALSE");
return;
}
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniformMatrix2fv",
Program::kUniformMatrix2f,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
api()->glUniformMatrix2fvFn(real_location, count, transpose,
const_cast<const GLfloat*>(value));
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uiserver_decrypt (void *engine, gpgme_data_t ciph, gpgme_data_t plain)
{
return _uiserver_decrypt (engine, 0, ciph, plain);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void event_epilog(UNUSED_ATTR void *context) {
vendor->send_async_command(VENDOR_DO_EPILOG, NULL);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver::OnLoadedResource(
const page_load_metrics::ExtraRequestCompleteInfo&
extra_request_complete_info) {
if (was_hidden_)
return;
if (extra_request_complete_info.was_cached) {
cache_bytes_ += extra_request_complete_info.raw_body_bytes;
} else {
network_bytes_ += extra_request_complete_info.raw_body_bytes;
}
if (extra_request_complete_info.resource_type ==
content::RESOURCE_TYPE_MAIN_FRAME) {
DCHECK(!main_frame_timing_.has_value());
main_frame_timing_ = *extra_request_complete_info.load_timing_info;
}
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 140,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void overloadedMethodCMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (((info.Length() == 1) && (info[0]->IsObject()))) {
overloadedMethodC1Method(info);
return;
}
if (((info.Length() == 1))) {
overloadedMethodC2Method(info);
return;
}
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "overloadedMethodC", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
exceptionState.throwTypeError("No function was found that matched the signature provided.");
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *OMXNodeInstance::findBufferHeader(OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
if (buffer == 0) {
return NULL;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mBufferIDLock);
ssize_t index = mBufferIDToBufferHeader.indexOfKey(buffer);
if (index < 0) {
CLOGW("findBufferHeader: buffer %u not found", buffer);
return NULL;
}
return mBufferIDToBufferHeader.valueAt(index);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nm_ip4_config_new (int ifindex)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (ifindex >= -1, NULL);
return (NMIP4Config *) g_object_new (NM_TYPE_IP4_CONFIG,
NM_IP4_CONFIG_IFINDEX, ifindex,
NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: group_sched_in(struct perf_event *group_event,
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx,
struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
struct perf_event *event, *partial_group = NULL;
struct pmu *pmu = ctx->pmu;
u64 now = ctx->time;
bool simulate = false;
if (group_event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
return 0;
pmu->start_txn(pmu, PERF_PMU_TXN_ADD);
if (event_sched_in(group_event, cpuctx, ctx)) {
pmu->cancel_txn(pmu);
perf_mux_hrtimer_restart(cpuctx);
return -EAGAIN;
}
/*
* Schedule in siblings as one group (if any):
*/
list_for_each_entry(event, &group_event->sibling_list, group_entry) {
if (event_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx)) {
partial_group = event;
goto group_error;
}
}
if (!pmu->commit_txn(pmu))
return 0;
group_error:
/*
* Groups can be scheduled in as one unit only, so undo any
* partial group before returning:
* The events up to the failed event are scheduled out normally,
* tstamp_stopped will be updated.
*
* The failed events and the remaining siblings need to have
* their timings updated as if they had gone thru event_sched_in()
* and event_sched_out(). This is required to get consistent timings
* across the group. This also takes care of the case where the group
* could never be scheduled by ensuring tstamp_stopped is set to mark
* the time the event was actually stopped, such that time delta
* calculation in update_event_times() is correct.
*/
list_for_each_entry(event, &group_event->sibling_list, group_entry) {
if (event == partial_group)
simulate = true;
if (simulate) {
event->tstamp_running += now - event->tstamp_stopped;
event->tstamp_stopped = now;
} else {
event_sched_out(event, cpuctx, ctx);
}
}
event_sched_out(group_event, cpuctx, ctx);
pmu->cancel_txn(pmu);
perf_mux_hrtimer_restart(cpuctx);
return -EAGAIN;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
{
int ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_ULONG l;
BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
*ret = 0;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t1 == NULL)
goto err;
t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t2 == NULL)
goto err;
if (dh->q) {
if (BN_cmp(dh->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
else if (BN_cmp(dh->g, dh->p) >= 0)
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
else {
/* Check g^q == 1 mod p */
if (!BN_mod_exp(t1, dh->g, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_is_one(t1))
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
}
if (!BN_is_prime_ex(dh->q, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL))
*ret |= DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME;
/* Check p == 1 mod q i.e. q divides p - 1 */
if (!BN_div(t1, t2, dh->p, dh->q, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_is_one(t2))
*ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
if (dh->j && BN_cmp(dh->j, t1))
*ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE;
} else if (BN_is_word(dh->g, DH_GENERATOR_2)) {
l = BN_mod_word(dh->p, 24);
if (l != 11)
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
}
#if 0
else if (BN_is_word(dh->g, DH_GENERATOR_3)) {
l = BN_mod_word(dh->p, 12);
if (l != 5)
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
}
#endif
else if (BN_is_word(dh->g, DH_GENERATOR_5)) {
l = BN_mod_word(dh->p, 10);
if ((l != 3) && (l != 7))
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
} else
*ret |= DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR;
if (!BN_is_prime_ex(dh->p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL))
*ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME;
else if (!dh->q) {
if (!BN_rshift1(t1, dh->p))
goto err;
if (!BN_is_prime_ex(t1, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL))
*ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return (ok);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RTCPeerConnection::didRemoveRemoteStream(MediaStreamDescriptor* streamDescriptor)
{
ASSERT(scriptExecutionContext()->isContextThread());
ASSERT(streamDescriptor->owner());
RefPtr<MediaStream> stream = static_cast<MediaStream*>(streamDescriptor->owner());
stream->streamEnded();
if (m_readyState == ReadyStateClosed)
return;
ASSERT(m_remoteStreams->contains(stream.get()));
m_remoteStreams->remove(stream.get());
dispatchEvent(MediaStreamEvent::create(eventNames().removestreamEvent, false, false, stream.release()));
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const KURL& Document::firstPartyForCookies() const
{
return topDocument()->url();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void imapd_check(struct backend *be, int usinguid)
{
if (backend_current && backend_current != be) {
/* remote mailbox */
char mytag[128];
proxy_gentag(mytag, sizeof(mytag));
prot_printf(backend_current->out, "%s Noop\r\n", mytag);
pipe_until_tag(backend_current, mytag, 0);
}
else {
/* local mailbox */
index_check(imapd_index, usinguid, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Layer::SetDoubleSided(bool double_sided) {
DCHECK(IsPropertyChangeAllowed());
if (double_sided_ == double_sided)
return;
double_sided_ = double_sided;
SetNeedsCommit();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(getopt)
{
char *options = NULL, **argv = NULL;
char opt[2] = { '\0' };
char *optname;
int argc = 0, options_len = 0, len, o;
char *php_optarg = NULL;
int php_optind = 1;
zval *val, **args = NULL, *p_longopts = NULL;
int optname_len = 0;
opt_struct *opts, *orig_opts;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|a", &options, &options_len, &p_longopts) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Get argv from the global symbol table. We calculate argc ourselves
* in order to be on the safe side, even though it is also available
* from the symbol table. */
if (PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER] &&
(zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER]), "argv", sizeof("argv"), (void **) &args) != FAILURE ||
zend_hash_find(&EG(symbol_table), "argv", sizeof("argv"), (void **) &args) != FAILURE) && Z_TYPE_PP(args) == IS_ARRAY
) {
int pos = 0;
zval **entry;
argc = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_PP(args));
/* Attempt to allocate enough memory to hold all of the arguments
* and a trailing NULL */
argv = (char **) safe_emalloc(sizeof(char *), (argc + 1), 0);
/* Reset the array indexes. */
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(Z_ARRVAL_PP(args));
/* Iterate over the hash to construct the argv array. */
while (zend_hash_get_current_data(Z_ARRVAL_PP(args), (void **)&entry) == SUCCESS) {
zval arg, *arg_ptr = *entry;
if (Z_TYPE_PP(entry) != IS_STRING) {
arg = **entry;
zval_copy_ctor(&arg);
convert_to_string(&arg);
arg_ptr = &arg;
}
argv[pos++] = estrdup(Z_STRVAL_P(arg_ptr));
if (arg_ptr != *entry) {
zval_dtor(&arg);
}
zend_hash_move_forward(Z_ARRVAL_PP(args));
}
/* The C Standard requires argv[argc] to be NULL - this might
* keep some getopt implementations happy. */
argv[argc] = NULL;
} else {
/* Return false if we can't find argv. */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
len = parse_opts(options, &opts);
if (p_longopts) {
int count;
zval **entry;
count = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(p_longopts));
/* the first <len> slots are filled by the one short ops
* we now extend our array and jump to the new added structs */
opts = (opt_struct *) erealloc(opts, sizeof(opt_struct) * (len + count + 1));
orig_opts = opts;
opts += len;
memset(opts, 0, count * sizeof(opt_struct));
/* Reset the array indexes. */
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(Z_ARRVAL_P(p_longopts));
/* Iterate over the hash to construct the argv array. */
while (zend_hash_get_current_data(Z_ARRVAL_P(p_longopts), (void **)&entry) == SUCCESS) {
zval arg, *arg_ptr = *entry;
if (Z_TYPE_PP(entry) != IS_STRING) {
arg = **entry;
zval_copy_ctor(&arg);
convert_to_string(&arg);
arg_ptr = &arg;
}
opts->need_param = 0;
opts->opt_name = estrdup(Z_STRVAL_P(arg_ptr));
len = strlen(opts->opt_name);
if ((len > 0) && (opts->opt_name[len - 1] == ':')) {
opts->need_param++;
opts->opt_name[len - 1] = '\0';
if ((len > 1) && (opts->opt_name[len - 2] == ':')) {
opts->need_param++;
opts->opt_name[len - 2] = '\0';
}
}
opts->opt_char = 0;
opts++;
if (arg_ptr != *entry) {
zval_dtor(&arg);
}
zend_hash_move_forward(Z_ARRVAL_P(p_longopts));
}
} else {
opts = (opt_struct*) erealloc(opts, sizeof(opt_struct) * (len + 1));
orig_opts = opts;
opts += len;
}
/* php_getopt want to identify the last param */
opts->opt_char = '-';
opts->need_param = 0;
opts->opt_name = NULL;
/* Initialize the return value as an array. */
array_init(return_value);
/* after our pointer arithmetic jump back to the first element */
opts = orig_opts;
while ((o = php_getopt(argc, argv, opts, &php_optarg, &php_optind, 0, 1)) != -1) {
/* Skip unknown arguments. */
if (o == '?') {
continue;
}
/* Prepare the option character and the argument string. */
if (o == 0) {
optname = opts[php_optidx].opt_name;
} else {
if (o == 1) {
o = '-';
}
opt[0] = o;
optname = opt;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(val);
if (php_optarg != NULL) {
/* keep the arg as binary, since the encoding is not known */
ZVAL_STRING(val, php_optarg, 1);
} else {
ZVAL_FALSE(val);
}
/* Add this option / argument pair to the result hash. */
optname_len = strlen(optname);
if (!(optname_len > 1 && optname[0] == '0') && is_numeric_string(optname, optname_len, NULL, NULL, 0) == IS_LONG) {
/* numeric string */
int optname_int = atoi(optname);
if (zend_hash_index_find(HASH_OF(return_value), optname_int, (void **)&args) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(args) != IS_ARRAY) {
convert_to_array_ex(args);
}
zend_hash_next_index_insert(HASH_OF(*args), (void *)&val, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
} else {
zend_hash_index_update(HASH_OF(return_value), optname_int, &val, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
} else {
/* other strings */
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(return_value), optname, strlen(optname)+1, (void **)&args) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(args) != IS_ARRAY) {
convert_to_array_ex(args);
}
zend_hash_next_index_insert(HASH_OF(*args), (void *)&val, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
} else {
zend_hash_add(HASH_OF(return_value), optname, strlen(optname)+1, (void *)&val, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
}
php_optarg = NULL;
}
free_longopts(orig_opts);
efree(orig_opts);
free_argv(argv, argc);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int credssp_recv(rdpCredssp* credssp)
{
wStream* s;
int length;
int status;
UINT32 version;
s = Stream_New(NULL, 4096);
status = transport_read(credssp->transport, s);
Stream_Length(s) = status;
if (status < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "credssp_recv() error: %d\n", status);
Stream_Free(s, TRUE);
return -1;
}
/* TSRequest */
if(!ber_read_sequence_tag(s, &length) ||
!ber_read_contextual_tag(s, 0, &length, TRUE) ||
!ber_read_integer(s, &version))
return -1;
/* [1] negoTokens (NegoData) */
if (ber_read_contextual_tag(s, 1, &length, TRUE) != FALSE)
{
if (!ber_read_sequence_tag(s, &length) || /* SEQUENCE OF NegoDataItem */
!ber_read_sequence_tag(s, &length) || /* NegoDataItem */
!ber_read_contextual_tag(s, 0, &length, TRUE) || /* [0] negoToken */
!ber_read_octet_string_tag(s, &length) || /* OCTET STRING */
Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < length)
return -1;
sspi_SecBufferAlloc(&credssp->negoToken, length);
Stream_Read(s, credssp->negoToken.pvBuffer, length);
credssp->negoToken.cbBuffer = length;
}
/* [2] authInfo (OCTET STRING) */
if (ber_read_contextual_tag(s, 2, &length, TRUE) != FALSE)
{
if(!ber_read_octet_string_tag(s, &length) || /* OCTET STRING */
Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < length)
return -1;
sspi_SecBufferAlloc(&credssp->authInfo, length);
Stream_Read(s, credssp->authInfo.pvBuffer, length);
credssp->authInfo.cbBuffer = length;
}
/* [3] pubKeyAuth (OCTET STRING) */
if (ber_read_contextual_tag(s, 3, &length, TRUE) != FALSE)
{
if(!ber_read_octet_string_tag(s, &length) || /* OCTET STRING */
Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < length)
return -1;
sspi_SecBufferAlloc(&credssp->pubKeyAuth, length);
Stream_Read(s, credssp->pubKeyAuth.pvBuffer, length);
credssp->pubKeyAuth.cbBuffer = length;
}
Stream_Free(s, TRUE);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 58,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFlexibleBox::applyStretchAlignmentToChild(RenderBox* child, LayoutUnit lineCrossAxisExtent)
{
if (!isColumnFlow() && child->style()->logicalHeight().isAuto()) {
if (!hasOrthogonalFlow(child)) {
LayoutUnit heightBeforeStretching = needToStretchChildLogicalHeight(child) ? constrainedChildIntrinsicContentLogicalHeight(child) : child->logicalHeight();
LayoutUnit stretchedLogicalHeight = heightBeforeStretching + availableAlignmentSpaceForChildBeforeStretching(lineCrossAxisExtent, child);
ASSERT(!child->needsLayout());
LayoutUnit desiredLogicalHeight = child->constrainLogicalHeightByMinMax(stretchedLogicalHeight, heightBeforeStretching - child->borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight());
if (desiredLogicalHeight != child->logicalHeight()) {
child->setOverrideLogicalContentHeight(desiredLogicalHeight - child->borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight());
child->setLogicalHeight(0);
child->forceChildLayout();
}
}
} else if (isColumnFlow() && child->style()->logicalWidth().isAuto()) {
if (hasOrthogonalFlow(child)) {
LayoutUnit childWidth = std::max<LayoutUnit>(0, lineCrossAxisExtent - crossAxisMarginExtentForChild(child));
childWidth = child->constrainLogicalWidthByMinMax(childWidth, childWidth, this);
if (childWidth != child->logicalWidth()) {
child->setOverrideLogicalContentWidth(childWidth - child->borderAndPaddingLogicalWidth());
child->forceChildLayout();
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LineWidth::fitBelowFloats()
{
ASSERT(!m_committedWidth);
ASSERT(!fitsOnLine());
LayoutUnit floatLogicalBottom;
LayoutUnit lastFloatLogicalBottom = m_block->logicalHeight();
float newLineWidth = m_availableWidth;
float newLineLeft = m_left;
float newLineRight = m_right;
while (true) {
floatLogicalBottom = m_block->nextFloatLogicalBottomBelow(lastFloatLogicalBottom);
if (floatLogicalBottom <= lastFloatLogicalBottom)
break;
newLineLeft = m_block->logicalLeftOffsetForLine(floatLogicalBottom, shouldIndentText());
newLineRight = m_block->logicalRightOffsetForLine(floatLogicalBottom, shouldIndentText());
newLineWidth = max(0.0f, newLineRight - newLineLeft);
lastFloatLogicalBottom = floatLogicalBottom;
if (newLineWidth >= m_uncommittedWidth)
break;
}
if (newLineWidth > m_availableWidth) {
m_block->setLogicalHeight(lastFloatLogicalBottom);
m_availableWidth = newLineWidth + m_overhangWidth;
m_left = newLineLeft;
m_right = newLineRight;
}
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static double filter_bicubic(const double t)
{
const double abs_t = (double)fabs(t);
const double abs_t_sq = abs_t * abs_t;
if (abs_t<1) return 1-2*abs_t_sq+abs_t_sq*abs_t;
if (abs_t<2) return 4 - 8*abs_t +5*abs_t_sq - abs_t_sq*abs_t;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 56,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ib_cm_notify(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id, enum ib_event_type event)
{
int ret;
switch (event) {
case IB_EVENT_COMM_EST:
ret = cm_establish(cm_id);
break;
case IB_EVENT_PATH_MIG:
ret = cm_migrate(cm_id);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ext4_can_truncate(struct inode *inode)
{
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 1;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return 1;
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
return !ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink(inode);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset(unsigned long field)
{
if (field >= max_vmcs_field || vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
return -1;
return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gsicc_get_device_class(cmm_profile_t *icc_profile)
{
return gscms_get_device_class(icc_profile->profile_handle);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UrlmonUrlRequestManager::OnReadComplete(int request_id,
const std::string& data) {
DCHECK_NE(request_id, -1);
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << " id: " << request_id;
DCHECK(LookupRequest(request_id) != NULL);
++calling_delegate_;
delegate_->OnReadComplete(request_id, data);
--calling_delegate_;
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << " done id: " << request_id;
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char * xmlThrDefTreeIndentString(const char * v) {
const char * ret;
xmlMutexLock(xmlThrDefMutex);
ret = xmlTreeIndentStringThrDef;
xmlTreeIndentStringThrDef = v;
xmlMutexUnlock(xmlThrDefMutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 107,340 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int brcmf_setup_wiphy(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct brcmf_if *ifp)
{
struct brcmf_pub *drvr = ifp->drvr;
const struct ieee80211_iface_combination *combo;
struct ieee80211_supported_band *band;
u16 max_interfaces = 0;
bool gscan;
__le32 bandlist[3];
u32 n_bands;
int err, i;
wiphy->max_scan_ssids = WL_NUM_SCAN_MAX;
wiphy->max_scan_ie_len = BRCMF_SCAN_IE_LEN_MAX;
wiphy->max_num_pmkids = BRCMF_MAXPMKID;
err = brcmf_setup_ifmodes(wiphy, ifp);
if (err)
return err;
for (i = 0, combo = wiphy->iface_combinations;
i < wiphy->n_iface_combinations; i++, combo++) {
max_interfaces = max(max_interfaces, combo->max_interfaces);
}
for (i = 0; i < max_interfaces && i < ARRAY_SIZE(drvr->addresses);
i++) {
u8 *addr = drvr->addresses[i].addr;
memcpy(addr, drvr->mac, ETH_ALEN);
if (i) {
addr[0] |= BIT(1);
addr[ETH_ALEN - 1] ^= i;
}
}
wiphy->addresses = drvr->addresses;
wiphy->n_addresses = i;
wiphy->signal_type = CFG80211_SIGNAL_TYPE_MBM;
wiphy->cipher_suites = brcmf_cipher_suites;
wiphy->n_cipher_suites = ARRAY_SIZE(brcmf_cipher_suites);
if (!brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_MFP))
wiphy->n_cipher_suites--;
wiphy->bss_select_support = BIT(NL80211_BSS_SELECT_ATTR_RSSI) |
BIT(NL80211_BSS_SELECT_ATTR_BAND_PREF) |
BIT(NL80211_BSS_SELECT_ATTR_RSSI_ADJUST);
wiphy->flags |= WIPHY_FLAG_NETNS_OK |
WIPHY_FLAG_PS_ON_BY_DEFAULT |
WIPHY_FLAG_OFFCHAN_TX |
WIPHY_FLAG_HAS_REMAIN_ON_CHANNEL;
if (brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_TDLS))
wiphy->flags |= WIPHY_FLAG_SUPPORTS_TDLS;
if (!ifp->drvr->settings->roamoff)
wiphy->flags |= WIPHY_FLAG_SUPPORTS_FW_ROAM;
if (brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_FWSUP)) {
wiphy_ext_feature_set(wiphy,
NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_4WAY_HANDSHAKE_STA_PSK);
wiphy_ext_feature_set(wiphy,
NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_4WAY_HANDSHAKE_STA_1X);
}
wiphy->mgmt_stypes = brcmf_txrx_stypes;
wiphy->max_remain_on_channel_duration = 5000;
if (brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_PNO)) {
gscan = brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_GSCAN);
brcmf_pno_wiphy_params(wiphy, gscan);
}
/* vendor commands/events support */
wiphy->vendor_commands = brcmf_vendor_cmds;
wiphy->n_vendor_commands = BRCMF_VNDR_CMDS_LAST - 1;
if (brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_WOWL))
brcmf_wiphy_wowl_params(wiphy, ifp);
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_data_get(ifp, BRCMF_C_GET_BANDLIST, &bandlist,
sizeof(bandlist));
if (err) {
brcmf_err("could not obtain band info: err=%d\n", err);
return err;
}
/* first entry in bandlist is number of bands */
n_bands = le32_to_cpu(bandlist[0]);
for (i = 1; i <= n_bands && i < ARRAY_SIZE(bandlist); i++) {
if (bandlist[i] == cpu_to_le32(WLC_BAND_2G)) {
band = kmemdup(&__wl_band_2ghz, sizeof(__wl_band_2ghz),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!band)
return -ENOMEM;
band->channels = kmemdup(&__wl_2ghz_channels,
sizeof(__wl_2ghz_channels),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!band->channels) {
kfree(band);
return -ENOMEM;
}
band->n_channels = ARRAY_SIZE(__wl_2ghz_channels);
wiphy->bands[NL80211_BAND_2GHZ] = band;
}
if (bandlist[i] == cpu_to_le32(WLC_BAND_5G)) {
band = kmemdup(&__wl_band_5ghz, sizeof(__wl_band_5ghz),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!band)
return -ENOMEM;
band->channels = kmemdup(&__wl_5ghz_channels,
sizeof(__wl_5ghz_channels),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!band->channels) {
kfree(band);
return -ENOMEM;
}
band->n_channels = ARRAY_SIZE(__wl_5ghz_channels);
wiphy->bands[NL80211_BAND_5GHZ] = band;
}
}
wiphy_read_of_freq_limits(wiphy);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()
The lower level nl80211 code in cfg80211 ensures that "len" is between
25 and NL80211_ATTR_FRAME (2304). We subtract DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN (24) from
"len" so thats's max of 2280. However, the action_frame->data[] buffer is
only BRCMF_FIL_ACTION_FRAME_SIZE (1800) bytes long so this memcpy() can
overflow.
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
Cc: [email protected] # 3.9.x
Fixes: 18e2f61db3b70 ("brcmfmac: P2P action frame tx.")
Reported-by: "freenerguo(郭大兴)" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 67,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void smbXcli_conn_received(struct tevent_req *subreq)
{
struct smbXcli_conn *conn =
tevent_req_callback_data(subreq,
struct smbXcli_conn);
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
NTSTATUS status;
uint8_t *inbuf;
ssize_t received;
int err;
if (subreq != conn->read_smb_req) {
DEBUG(1, ("Internal error: cli_smb_received called with "
"unexpected subreq\n"));
smbXcli_conn_disconnect(conn, NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR);
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return;
}
conn->read_smb_req = NULL;
received = read_smb_recv(subreq, frame, &inbuf, &err);
TALLOC_FREE(subreq);
if (received == -1) {
status = map_nt_error_from_unix_common(err);
smbXcli_conn_disconnect(conn, status);
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return;
}
status = conn->dispatch_incoming(conn, frame, inbuf);
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/*
* We should not do any more processing
* as the dispatch function called
* tevent_req_done().
*/
return;
}
if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_RETRY)) {
/*
* We got an error, so notify all pending requests
*/
smbXcli_conn_disconnect(conn, status);
return;
}
/*
* We got NT_STATUS_RETRY, so we may ask for a
* next incoming pdu.
*/
if (!smbXcli_conn_receive_next(conn)) {
smbXcli_conn_disconnect(conn, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PopupMenuStyle PopupContainer::menuStyle() const
{
return m_listBox->m_popupClient->menuStyle();
}
Commit Message: [REGRESSION] Refreshed autofill popup renders garbage
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=83255
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=118374
The code used to update only the PopupContainer coordinates as if they were the coordinates relative
to the root view. Instead, a WebWidget positioned relative to the screen origin holds the PopupContainer,
so it is the WebWidget that should be positioned in PopupContainer::refresh(), and the PopupContainer's
location should be (0, 0) (and their sizes should always be equal).
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
No new tests, as the popup appearance is not testable in WebKit.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.cpp:
(WebCore::PopupContainer::layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect): Variable renamed.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showPopup): Use m_originalFrameRect rather than frameRect()
for passing into chromeClient.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showInRect): Set up the correct frameRect() for the container.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::refresh): Resize the container and position the WebWidget correctly.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.h:
(PopupContainer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@113418 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 108,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isofile_connect_hardlink_files(struct iso9660 *iso9660)
{
struct archive_rb_node *n;
struct hardlink *hl;
struct isofile *target, *nf;
ARCHIVE_RB_TREE_FOREACH(n, &(iso9660->hardlink_rbtree)) {
hl = (struct hardlink *)n;
/* The first entry must be a hardlink target. */
target = hl->file_list.first;
archive_entry_set_nlink(target->entry, hl->nlink);
/* Set a hardlink target to reference entries. */
for (nf = target->hlnext;
nf != NULL; nf = nf->hlnext) {
nf->hardlink_target = target;
archive_entry_set_nlink(nf->entry, hl->nlink);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 50,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewWin::OnKillFocus(HWND focus_wnd) {
if (m_hWnd == focus_wnd) {
SetMsgHandled(false);
return;
}
model_->OnWillKillFocus(focus_wnd);
ClosePopup();
GetSelection(saved_selection_for_focus_change_);
model_->OnKillFocus();
ScopedFreeze freeze(this, GetTextObjectModel());
DefWindowProc(WM_KILLFOCUS, reinterpret_cast<WPARAM>(focus_wnd), 0);
SelectAll(true);
PlaceCaretAt(0);
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __xmlStructuredError(void) {
if (IS_MAIN_THREAD)
return (&xmlStructuredError);
else
return (&xmlGetGlobalState()->xmlStructuredError);
}
Commit Message: Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 107,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
{
kvm_iommu_unmap_guest(kvm);
#ifdef KVM_CAP_DEVICE_ASSIGNMENT
kvm_free_all_assigned_devices(kvm);
#endif
kfree(kvm->arch.vioapic);
kvm_release_vm_pages(kvm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int setup_dev_symlinks(const struct lxc_rootfs *rootfs)
{
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
int ret,i;
struct stat s;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(dev_symlinks) / sizeof(dev_symlinks[0]); i++) {
const struct dev_symlinks *d = &dev_symlinks[i];
ret = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/dev/%s", rootfs->path ? rootfs->mount : "", d->name);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= MAXPATHLEN)
return -1;
/*
* Stat the path first. If we don't get an error
* accept it as is and don't try to create it
*/
if (!stat(path, &s)) {
continue;
}
ret = symlink(d->oldpath, path);
if (ret && errno != EEXIST) {
if ( errno == EROFS ) {
WARN("Warning: Read Only file system while creating %s", path);
} else {
SYSERROR("Error creating %s", path);
return -1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u32 rds_tcp_write_seq(struct rds_tcp_connection *tc)
{
/* seq# of the last byte of data in tcp send buffer */
return tcp_sk(tc->t_sock->sk)->write_seq;
}
Commit Message: net: rds: force to destroy connection if t_sock is NULL in rds_tcp_kill_sock().
When it is to cleanup net namespace, rds_tcp_exit_net() will call
rds_tcp_kill_sock(), if t_sock is NULL, it will not call
rds_conn_destroy(), rds_conn_path_destroy() and rds_tcp_conn_free() to free
connection, and the worker cp_conn_w is not stopped, afterwards the net is freed in
net_drop_ns(); While cp_conn_w rds_connect_worker() will call rds_tcp_conn_path_connect()
and reference 'net' which has already been freed.
In rds_tcp_conn_path_connect(), rds_tcp_set_callbacks() will set t_sock = sock before
sock->ops->connect, but if connect() is failed, it will call
rds_tcp_restore_callbacks() and set t_sock = NULL, if connect is always
failed, rds_connect_worker() will try to reconnect all the time, so
rds_tcp_kill_sock() will never to cancel worker cp_conn_w and free the
connections.
Therefore, the condition !tc->t_sock is not needed if it is going to do
cleanup_net->rds_tcp_exit_net->rds_tcp_kill_sock, because tc->t_sock is always
NULL, and there is on other path to cancel cp_conn_w and free
connection. So this patch is to fix this.
rds_tcp_kill_sock():
...
if (net != c_net || !tc->t_sock)
...
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28
net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8003496a4684 by task kworker/u8:4/3721
CPU: 3 PID: 3721 Comm: kworker/u8:4 Not tainted 5.1.0 #11
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: krdsd rds_connect_worker
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3c0 arch/arm64/kernel/time.c:53
show_stack+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:152
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x120/0x188 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x68/0x278 mm/kasan/report.c:253
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x21c/0x348 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x30/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:429
inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
__sock_create+0x4f8/0x770 net/socket.c:1276
sock_create_kern+0x50/0x68 net/socket.c:1322
rds_tcp_conn_path_connect+0x2b4/0x690 net/rds/tcp_connect.c:114
rds_connect_worker+0x108/0x1d0 net/rds/threads.c:175
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
Allocated by task 687:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0x180 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kasan_slab_alloc+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:444 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2705 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2713 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x14c/0x388 mm/slub.c:2718
kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:697 [inline]
net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:384 [inline]
copy_net_ns+0xc4/0x2d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:424
create_new_namespaces+0x300/0x658 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xa0/0x198 kernel/nsproxy.c:206
ksys_unshare+0x340/0x628 kernel/fork.c:2577
__do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2645 [inline]
__se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2643 [inline]
__arm64_sys_unshare+0x38/0x58 kernel/fork.c:2643
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:47 [inline]
el0_svc_common+0x168/0x390 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:83
el0_svc_handler+0x60/0xd0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129
el0_svc+0x8/0xc arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:960
Freed by task 264:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x220 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1370 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1397 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2952 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0xb8/0x3a8 mm/slub.c:2968
net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:400 [inline]
net_drop_ns.part.6+0x78/0x90 net/core/net_namespace.c:407
net_drop_ns net/core/net_namespace.c:406 [inline]
cleanup_net+0x53c/0x6d8 net/core/net_namespace.c:569
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8003496a3f80
which belongs to the cache net_namespace of size 7872
The buggy address is located 1796 bytes inside of
7872-byte region [ffff8003496a3f80, ffff8003496a5e40)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffff7e000d25a800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff80036ce4b000
index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0xffffe0000008100(slab|head)
raw: 0ffffe0000008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff80036ce4b000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8003496a4580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8003496a4680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8003496a4700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 467fa15356ac("RDS-TCP: Support multiple RDS-TCP listen endpoints, one per netns.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GPMF_ERR GPMF_FindNext(GPMF_stream *ms, uint32_t fourcc, GPMF_LEVELS recurse)
{
GPMF_stream prevstate;
if (ms)
{
memcpy(&prevstate, ms, sizeof(GPMF_stream));
if (ms->pos < ms->buffer_size_longs)
{
while (0 == GPMF_Next(ms, recurse))
{
if (ms->buffer[ms->pos] == fourcc)
{
return GPMF_OK; //found match
}
}
memcpy(ms, &prevstate, sizeof(GPMF_stream));
return GPMF_ERROR_FIND;
}
}
return GPMF_ERROR_FIND;
}
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 88,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __be32 nfsd4_map_bcts_dir(u32 *dir)
{
switch (*dir) {
case NFS4_CDFC4_FORE:
case NFS4_CDFC4_BACK:
return nfs_ok;
case NFS4_CDFC4_FORE_OR_BOTH:
case NFS4_CDFC4_BACK_OR_BOTH:
*dir = NFS4_CDFC4_BOTH;
return nfs_ok;
};
return nfserr_inval;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void release_object(const sp<ProcessState>& proc,
const flat_binder_object& obj, const void* who)
{
release_object(proc, obj, who, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Correctly handle dup() failure in Parcel::readNativeHandle
bail out if dup() fails, instead of creating an invalid native_handle_t
Bug: 28395952
Change-Id: Ia1a6198c0f45165b9c6a55a803e5f64d8afa0572
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SampleIterator::findSampleTimeAndDuration(
uint32_t sampleIndex, uint32_t *time, uint32_t *duration) {
if (sampleIndex >= mTable->mNumSampleSizes) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
while (sampleIndex >= mTTSSampleIndex + mTTSCount) {
if (mTimeToSampleIndex == mTable->mTimeToSampleCount) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mTTSSampleIndex += mTTSCount;
mTTSSampleTime += mTTSCount * mTTSDuration;
mTTSCount = mTable->mTimeToSample[2 * mTimeToSampleIndex];
mTTSDuration = mTable->mTimeToSample[2 * mTimeToSampleIndex + 1];
++mTimeToSampleIndex;
}
*time = mTTSSampleTime + mTTSDuration * (sampleIndex - mTTSSampleIndex);
int32_t offset = mTable->getCompositionTimeOffset(sampleIndex);
if ((offset < 0 && *time < (offset == INT32_MIN ?
INT32_MAX : uint32_t(-offset))) ||
(offset > 0 && *time > UINT32_MAX - offset)) {
ALOGE("%u + %d would overflow", *time, offset);
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
if (offset > 0) {
*time += offset;
} else {
*time -= (offset == INT32_MIN ? INT32_MAX : (-offset));
}
*duration = mTTSDuration;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: SampleIterator: clear members on seekTo error
Bug: 31091777
Change-Id: Iddf99d0011961d0fd3d755e57db4365b6a6a1193
(cherry picked from commit 03237ce0f9584c98ccda76c2474a4ae84c763f5b)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 157,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void load_xref_from_plaintext(FILE *fp, xref_t *xref)
{
int i, buf_idx, obj_id, added_entries;
char c, buf[32] = {0};
long start, pos;
start = ftell(fp);
/* Get number of entries */
pos = xref->end;
fseek(fp, pos, SEEK_SET);
while (ftell(fp) != 0)
if (SAFE_F(fp, (fgetc(fp) == '/' && fgetc(fp) == 'S')))
break;
else
SAFE_E(fseek(fp, --pos, SEEK_SET), 0, "Failed seek to xref /Size.\n");
SAFE_E(fread(buf, 1, 21, fp), 21, "Failed to load entry Size string.\n");
xref->n_entries = atoi(buf + strlen("ize "));
xref->entries = calloc(1, xref->n_entries * sizeof(struct _xref_entry));
/* Load entry data */
obj_id = 0;
fseek(fp, xref->start + strlen("xref"), SEEK_SET);
added_entries = 0;
for (i=0; i<xref->n_entries; i++)
{
/* Advance past newlines. */
c = fgetc(fp);
while (c == '\n' || c == '\r')
c = fgetc(fp);
/* Collect data up until the following newline. */
buf_idx = 0;
while (c != '\n' && c != '\r' && !feof(fp) &&
!ferror(fp) && buf_idx < sizeof(buf))
{
buf[buf_idx++] = c;
c = fgetc(fp);
}
if (buf_idx >= sizeof(buf))
{
ERR("Failed to locate newline character. "
"This might be a corrupt PDF.\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
buf[buf_idx] = '\0';
/* Went to far and hit start of trailer */
if (strchr(buf, 't'))
break;
/* Entry or object id */
if (strlen(buf) > 17)
{
xref->entries[i].obj_id = obj_id++;
xref->entries[i].offset = atol(strtok(buf, " "));
xref->entries[i].gen_num = atoi(strtok(NULL, " "));
xref->entries[i].f_or_n = buf[17];
++added_entries;
}
else
{
obj_id = atoi(buf);
--i;
}
}
xref->n_entries = added_entries;
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 169,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void testCrash_MakeOwner_Bug20080207() {
UriParserStateA state;
UriUriA sourceUri;
state.uri = &sourceUri;
const char * const sourceUriString = "http://user:[email protected]:80/";
if (uriParseUriA(&state, sourceUriString) != 0) {
TEST_ASSERT(false);
}
if (uriNormalizeSyntaxA(&sourceUri) != 0) {
TEST_ASSERT(false);
}
uriFreeUriMembersA(&sourceUri);
TEST_ASSERT(true);
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 75,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void peer_abort_upcall(struct iwch_ep *ep)
{
struct iw_cm_event event;
PDBG("%s ep %p\n", __func__, ep);
memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event));
event.event = IW_CM_EVENT_CLOSE;
event.status = -ECONNRESET;
if (ep->com.cm_id) {
PDBG("abort delivered ep %p cm_id %p tid %d\n", ep,
ep->com.cm_id, ep->hwtid);
ep->com.cm_id->event_handler(ep->com.cm_id, &event);
ep->com.cm_id->rem_ref(ep->com.cm_id);
ep->com.cm_id = NULL;
ep->com.qp = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcXF86DRIDestroyDrawable(register ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXF86DRIDestroyDrawableReq);
DrawablePtr pDrawable;
int rc;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXF86DRIDestroyDrawableReq);
if (stuff->screen >= screenInfo.numScreens) {
client->errorValue = stuff->screen;
return BadValue;
}
rc = dixLookupDrawable(&pDrawable, stuff->drawable, client, 0,
DixReadAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
if (!DRIDestroyDrawable(screenInfo.screens[stuff->screen], client,
pDrawable)) {
return BadValue;
}
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void aio_free_ring(struct kioctx *ctx)
{
struct aio_ring_info *info = &ctx->ring_info;
long i;
for (i=0; i<info->nr_pages; i++)
put_page(info->ring_pages[i]);
if (info->mmap_size) {
BUG_ON(ctx->mm != current->mm);
vm_munmap(info->mmap_base, info->mmap_size);
}
if (info->ring_pages && info->ring_pages != info->internal_pages)
kfree(info->ring_pages);
info->ring_pages = NULL;
info->nr = 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: make AIO use the proper rw_verify_area() area helpers
We had for some reason overlooked the AIO interface, and it didn't use
the proper rw_verify_area() helper function that checks (for example)
mandatory locking on the file, and that the size of the access doesn't
cause us to overflow the provided offset limits etc.
Instead, AIO did just the security_file_permission() thing (that
rw_verify_area() also does) directly.
This fixes it to do all the proper helper functions, which not only
means that now mandatory file locking works with AIO too, we can
actually remove lines of code.
Reported-by: Manish Honap <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void GetMinimumPixelList(PixelList *pixel_list,MagickPixelPacket *pixel)
{
register SkipList
*list;
register ssize_t
channel;
size_t
color,
minimum;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned short
channels[ListChannels];
/*
Find the minimum value for each of the color.
*/
for (channel=0; channel < 5; channel++)
{
list=pixel_list->lists+channel;
count=0;
color=65536UL;
minimum=list->nodes[color].next[0];
do
{
color=list->nodes[color].next[0];
if (color < minimum)
minimum=color;
count+=list->nodes[color].count;
} while (count < (ssize_t) pixel_list->length);
channels[channel]=(unsigned short) minimum;
}
pixel->red=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[0]);
pixel->green=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[1]);
pixel->blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[2]);
pixel->opacity=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[3]);
pixel->index=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[4]);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool vmci_transport_is_trusted(struct vsock_sock *vsock, u32 peer_cid)
{
return vsock->trusted ||
vmci_is_context_owner(peer_cid, vsock->owner->uid);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Cc: George Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SpdyProxyClientSocket::Connect(const CompletionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(read_callback_.is_null());
if (next_state_ == STATE_OPEN)
return OK;
DCHECK_EQ(STATE_DISCONNECTED, next_state_);
next_state_ = STATE_GENERATE_AUTH_TOKEN;
int rv = DoLoop(OK);
if (rv == ERR_IO_PENDING)
read_callback_ = callback;
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebKitTestController::ResetAfterLayoutTest() {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
printer_->PrintTextFooter();
printer_->PrintImageFooter();
printer_->CloseStderr();
send_configuration_to_next_host_ = false;
test_phase_ = BETWEEN_TESTS;
is_compositing_test_ = false;
enable_pixel_dumping_ = false;
expected_pixel_hash_.clear();
test_url_ = GURL();
prefs_ = WebPreferences();
should_override_prefs_ = false;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
DiscardMainWindow();
#endif
return true;
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static AttributeTextStyle compositionTextStyle()
{
AttributeTextStyle style;
addCompositionTextStyleToAttributeTextStyle(style);
return style;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tsc_khz_changed(void *data)
{
struct cpufreq_freqs *freq = data;
unsigned long khz = 0;
if (data)
khz = freq->new;
else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC))
khz = cpufreq_quick_get(raw_smp_processor_id());
if (!khz)
khz = tsc_khz;
__this_cpu_write(cpu_tsc_khz, khz);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err gf_isom_linf_write_entry(void *entry, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_LHVCLayerInformation* ptr = (GF_LHVCLayerInformation *)entry;
u32 i, count;
if (!ptr) return GF_OK;
gf_bs_write_int(bs, 0, 2);
count=gf_list_count(ptr->num_layers_in_track);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, count, 6);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHVCLayerInfoItem *li = (LHVCLayerInfoItem *)gf_list_get(ptr->num_layers_in_track, i);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, 0, 4);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, li->layer_id, 6);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, li->min_TemporalId, 3);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, li->max_TemporalId, 3);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, 0, 1);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, li->sub_layer_presence_flags, 7);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LocalFrame* ResourceFetcher::frame() const
{
if (m_documentLoader)
return m_documentLoader->frame();
if (m_document && m_document->importsController())
return m_document->importsController()->master()->frame();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 121,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::FocusNextPane() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("FocusNextPane"), profile_);
window_->RotatePaneFocus(true);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputMethodController::SetComposition(
const String& text,
const Vector<CompositionUnderline>& underlines,
int selection_start,
int selection_end) {
Editor::RevealSelectionScope reveal_selection_scope(&GetEditor());
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutTree();
SelectComposition();
if (GetFrame()
.Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.IsNone())
return;
Element* target = GetDocument().FocusedElement();
if (!target)
return;
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
PlainTextRange selected_range = CreateSelectionRangeForSetComposition(
selection_start, selection_end, text.length());
if (text.IsEmpty()) {
if (HasComposition()) {
Editor::RevealSelectionScope reveal_selection_scope(&GetEditor());
ReplaceComposition(g_empty_string);
} else {
TypingCommand::DeleteSelection(GetDocument(),
TypingCommand::kPreventSpellChecking);
}
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
SetEditableSelectionOffsets(selected_range);
return;
}
if (!HasComposition()) {
target->DispatchEvent(CompositionEvent::Create(
EventTypeNames::compositionstart, GetFrame().DomWindow(),
GetFrame().SelectedText()));
if (!IsAvailable())
return;
}
DCHECK(!text.IsEmpty());
Clear();
InsertTextDuringCompositionWithEvents(
GetFrame(), text,
TypingCommand::kSelectInsertedText | TypingCommand::kPreventSpellChecking,
TypingCommand::kTextCompositionUpdate);
if (!IsAvailable())
return;
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
Position base = MostForwardCaretPosition(
GetFrame().Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().Base());
Node* base_node = base.AnchorNode();
if (!base_node || !base_node->IsTextNode())
return;
Position extent =
GetFrame().Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().Extent();
Node* extent_node = extent.AnchorNode();
unsigned extent_offset = extent.ComputeOffsetInContainerNode();
unsigned base_offset = base.ComputeOffsetInContainerNode();
has_composition_ = true;
if (!composition_range_)
composition_range_ = Range::Create(GetDocument());
composition_range_->setStart(base_node, base_offset);
composition_range_->setEnd(extent_node, extent_offset);
if (base_node->GetLayoutObject())
base_node->GetLayoutObject()->SetShouldDoFullPaintInvalidation();
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
SetEditableSelectionOffsets(selected_range, TypingContinuation::kContinue);
if (underlines.IsEmpty()) {
GetDocument().Markers().AddCompositionMarker(
EphemeralRange(composition_range_), Color::kBlack,
StyleableMarker::Thickness::kThin,
LayoutTheme::GetTheme().PlatformDefaultCompositionBackgroundColor());
return;
}
const PlainTextRange composition_plain_text_range =
PlainTextRange::Create(*base_node->parentNode(), *composition_range_);
AddCompositionUnderlines(underlines, base_node->parentNode(),
composition_plain_text_range.Start());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Console::CommandLineAPIScope::accessorGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::Name> name, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
CommandLineAPIScope* scope = static_cast<CommandLineAPIScope*>(info.Data().As<v8::External>()->Value());
DCHECK(scope);
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = info.GetIsolate()->GetCurrentContext();
if (scope->m_cleanup) {
bool removed = info.Holder()->Delete(context, name).FromMaybe(false);
DCHECK(removed);
return;
}
v8::Local<v8::Object> commandLineAPI = scope->m_commandLineAPI;
v8::Local<v8::Value> value;
if (!commandLineAPI->Get(context, name).ToLocal(&value))
return;
if (isCommandLineAPIGetter(toProtocolStringWithTypeCheck(name))) {
DCHECK(value->IsFunction());
v8::MicrotasksScope microtasks(info.GetIsolate(), v8::MicrotasksScope::kDoNotRunMicrotasks);
if (value.As<v8::Function>()->Call(context, commandLineAPI, 0, nullptr).ToLocal(&value))
info.GetReturnValue().Set(value);
} else {
info.GetReturnValue().Set(value);
}
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void createDecodingBaseline(SharedBuffer* data, Vector<unsigned>* baselineHashes)
{
OwnPtr<GIFImageDecoder> decoder = createDecoder();
decoder->setData(data, true);
size_t frameCount = decoder->frameCount();
for (size_t i = 0; i < frameCount; ++i) {
ImageFrame* frame = decoder->frameBufferAtIndex(i);
baselineHashes->append(hashSkBitmap(frame->getSkBitmap()));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of broken GIFs with weird frame sizes
Code didn't handle well if a GIF frame has dimension greater than the
"screen" dimension. This will break deferred image decoding.
This change reports the size as final only when the first frame is
encountered.
Added a test to verify this behavior. Frame size reported by the decoder
should be constant.
BUG=437651
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/813943003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@188423 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintViewManager::PrintPreviewDone() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (print_preview_state_ == NOT_PREVIEWING)
return;
if (print_preview_state_ == SCRIPTED_PREVIEW) {
auto& map = g_scripted_print_preview_closure_map.Get();
auto it = map.find(scripted_print_preview_rph_);
CHECK(it != map.end());
it->second.Run();
map.erase(it);
scripted_print_preview_rph_ = nullptr;
}
print_preview_state_ = NOT_PREVIEWING;
print_preview_rfh_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void fm10k_rx_checksum(struct fm10k_ring *ring,
union fm10k_rx_desc *rx_desc,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
skb_checksum_none_assert(skb);
/* Rx checksum disabled via ethtool */
if (!(ring->netdev->features & NETIF_F_RXCSUM))
return;
/* TCP/UDP checksum error bit is set */
if (fm10k_test_staterr(rx_desc,
FM10K_RXD_STATUS_L4E |
FM10K_RXD_STATUS_L4E2 |
FM10K_RXD_STATUS_IPE |
FM10K_RXD_STATUS_IPE2)) {
ring->rx_stats.csum_err++;
return;
}
/* It must be a TCP or UDP packet with a valid checksum */
if (fm10k_test_staterr(rx_desc, FM10K_RXD_STATUS_L4CS2))
skb->encapsulation = true;
else if (!fm10k_test_staterr(rx_desc, FM10K_RXD_STATUS_L4CS))
return;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
ring->rx_stats.csum_good++;
}
Commit Message: fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 87,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HRESULT CGaiaCredentialBase::GetComboBoxValueCount(DWORD field_id,
DWORD* pcItems,
DWORD* pdwSelectedItem) {
return E_NOTIMPL;
}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 130,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SkSampler* SkIcoCodec::getSampler(bool createIfNecessary) {
if (fCurrScanlineCodec) {
SkASSERT(!fCurrIncrementalCodec);
return fCurrScanlineCodec->getSampler(createIfNecessary);
}
if (fCurrIncrementalCodec) {
return fCurrIncrementalCodec->getSampler(createIfNecessary);
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: RESTRICT AUTOMERGE: Cherry-pick "begin cleanup of malloc porting layer"
Bug: 78354855
Test: Not feasible
Original description:
========================================================================
1. Merge some of the allocators into sk_malloc_flags by redefining a flag to mean zero-init
2. Add more private helpers to simplify our call-sites (and handle some overflow mul checks)
3. The 2-param helpers rely on the saturating SkSafeMath::Mul to pass max_size_t as the request,
which should always fail.
chromium: 508641
Reviewed-on: https://skia-review.googlesource.com/90940
Commit-Queue: Mike Reed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Phillips <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Altmueller <[email protected]>
========================================================================
Conflicts:
- include/private/SkMalloc.h
Simply removed the old definitions of SK_MALLOC_TEMP and SK_MALLOC_THROW.
- public.bzl
Copied SK_SUPPORT_LEGACY_MALLOC_PORTING_LAYER into the old defines.
- src/codec/SkIcoCodec.cpp
Drop a change where we were not using malloc yet.
- src/codec/SkBmpBaseCodec.cpp
- src/core/SkBitmapCache.cpp
These files weren't yet using malloc (and SkBmpBaseCodec hadn't been
factored out).
- src/core/SkMallocPixelRef.cpp
These were still using New rather than Make (return raw pointer). Leave
them unchanged, as sk_malloc_flags is still valid.
- src/lazy/SkDiscardableMemoryPool.cpp
Leave this unchanged; sk_malloc_flags is still valid
In addition, pull in SkSafeMath.h, which was originally introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/c/skia/+/33721. This is required
for the new sk_malloc calls.
Also pull in SkSafeMath::Add and SkSafeMath::Mul, introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/88581
Also add SK_MaxSizeT, which the above depends on, introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/57084
Also, modify NewFromStream to use sk_malloc_canfail, matching pi and
avoiding a build break
Change-Id: Ib320484673a865460fc1efb900f611209e088edb
(cherry picked from commit a12cc3e14ea6734c7efe76aa6a19239909830b28)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 162,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 GetDisplayName(int64_t display_id) {
return base::UTF8ToUTF16(
GetDisplayManager()->GetDisplayNameForId(display_id));
}
Commit Message: Avoid Showing rotation change notification when source is accelerometer
BUG=717252
TEST=Manually rotate device with accelerometer and observe there's no notification
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2853113005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469058}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 129,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err infe_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_ItemInfoEntryBox *p = (GF_ItemInfoEntryBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "ItemInfoEntryBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "item_ID=\"%d\" item_protection_index=\"%d\" item_name=\"%s\" content_type=\"%s\" content_encoding=\"%s\" item_type=\"%s\">\n", p->item_ID, p->item_protection_index, p->item_name, p->content_type, p->content_encoding, gf_4cc_to_str(p->item_type));
gf_isom_box_dump_done("ItemInfoEntryBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void write_node_summaries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t start_blk)
{
write_normal_summaries(sbi, start_blk, CURSEG_HOT_NODE);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rngapi_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed,
unsigned int slen)
{
u8 *buf = NULL;
u8 *src = (u8 *)seed;
int err;
if (slen) {
buf = kmalloc(slen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(buf, seed, slen);
src = buf;
}
err = crypto_old_rng_alg(tfm)->rng_reset(tfm, src, slen);
kzfree(buf);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: rng - Remove old low-level rng interface
Now that all rng implementations have switched over to the new
interface, we can remove the old low-level interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 167,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<EntityReference> Document::createEntityReference(const String& name, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (!isValidName(name)) {
ec = INVALID_CHARACTER_ERR;
return 0;
}
if (isHTMLDocument()) {
ec = NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return 0;
}
return EntityReference::create(this, name);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionInfoMap* ExtensionSystemImpl::info_map() {
return shared_->info_map();
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
[email protected]
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t getPropertyByteArray(String8 const &name, Vector<uint8_t> &value) const {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IDrm::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeString8(name);
status_t status = remote()->transact(GET_PROPERTY_BYTE_ARRAY, data, &reply);
if (status != OK) {
return status;
}
readVector(reply, value);
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: Fix info leak vulnerability of IDrm
bug: 26323455
Change-Id: I25bb30d3666ab38d5150496375ed2f55ecb23ba8
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipa_draw_polygon(wmfAPI * API, wmfPolyLine_t * polyline)
{
if (polyline->count <= 2)
return;
if (TO_FILL(polyline) || TO_DRAW(polyline))
{
int
point;
/* Save graphic wand */
(void) PushDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
util_set_pen(API, polyline->dc);
util_set_brush(API, polyline->dc, BrushApplyFill);
DrawPathStart(WmfDrawingWand);
DrawPathMoveToAbsolute(WmfDrawingWand,
XC(polyline->pt[0].x),
YC(polyline->pt[0].y));
for (point = 1; point < polyline->count; point++)
{
DrawPathLineToAbsolute(WmfDrawingWand,
XC(polyline->pt[point].x),
YC(polyline->pt[point].y));
}
DrawPathClose(WmfDrawingWand);
DrawPathFinish(WmfDrawingWand);
/* Restore graphic wand */
(void) PopDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: format_DEC_MPLS_TTL(const struct ofpact_null *a OVS_UNUSED, struct ds *s)
{
ds_put_format(s, "%sdec_mpls_ttl%s", colors.value, colors.end);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltCleanupTemplates(xsltStylesheetPtr style ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) {
}
Commit Message: Handle a bad XSLT expression better.
BUG=138672
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10830177
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@150123 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 106,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::BindFullscreen(
mojom::FullscreenVideoElementHandlerAssociatedRequest request) {
fullscreen_binding_.Bind(std::move(request),
GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kInternalIPC));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,520 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::SetColorSpaceMetadataCHROMIUM(
GLuint texture_id,
GLColorSpace color_space) {
#if defined(__native_client__)
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "GLES2::SetColorSpaceMetadataCHROMIUM",
"not supported");
#else
gfx::ColorSpace* gfx_color_space =
reinterpret_cast<gfx::ColorSpace*>(color_space);
base::Pickle color_space_data;
IPC::ParamTraits<gfx::ColorSpace>::Write(&color_space_data, *gfx_color_space);
ScopedTransferBufferPtr buffer(color_space_data.size(), helper_,
transfer_buffer_);
if (!buffer.valid() || buffer.size() < color_space_data.size()) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "GLES2::SetColorSpaceMetadataCHROMIUM",
"out of memory");
return;
}
memcpy(buffer.address(), color_space_data.data(), color_space_data.size());
helper_->SetColorSpaceMetadataCHROMIUM(
texture_id, buffer.shm_id(), buffer.offset(), color_space_data.size());
#endif
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsLoadingToDifferentDocument() const {
return IsLoading() && is_load_to_different_document_;
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cpu_clock_event_stop(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
perf_swevent_cancel_hrtimer(event);
cpu_clock_event_update(event);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _php_image_bw_convert(gdImagePtr im_org, gdIOCtx *out, int threshold)
{
gdImagePtr im_dest;
int white, black;
int color, color_org, median;
int dest_height = gdImageSY(im_org);
int dest_width = gdImageSX(im_org);
int x, y;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
im_dest = gdImageCreate(dest_width, dest_height);
if (im_dest == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to allocate temporary buffer");
return;
}
white = gdImageColorAllocate(im_dest, 255, 255, 255);
if (white == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to allocate the colors for the destination buffer");
return;
}
black = gdImageColorAllocate(im_dest, 0, 0, 0);
if (black == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to allocate the colors for the destination buffer");
return;
}
if (im_org->trueColor) {
gdImageTrueColorToPalette(im_org, 1, 256);
}
for (y = 0; y < dest_height; y++) {
for (x = 0; x < dest_width; x++) {
color_org = gdImageGetPixel(im_org, x, y);
median = (im_org->red[color_org] + im_org->green[color_org] + im_org->blue[color_org]) / 3;
if (median < threshold) {
color = black;
} else {
color = white;
}
gdImageSetPixel (im_dest, x, y, color);
}
}
#ifdef USE_GD_IOCTX
gdImageWBMPCtx (im_dest, black, out);
#else
gdImageWBMP (im_dest, black, out);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvp_key_delete(int pool, __u8 *key, int key_size)
{
int i;
int j, k;
int num_records;
struct kvp_record *record;
/*
* First update the in-memory state.
*/
kvp_update_mem_state(pool);
num_records = kvp_file_info[pool].num_records;
record = kvp_file_info[pool].records;
for (i = 0; i < num_records; i++) {
if (memcmp(key, record[i].key, key_size))
continue;
/*
* Found a match; just move the remaining
* entries up.
*/
if (i == num_records) {
kvp_file_info[pool].num_records--;
kvp_update_file(pool);
return 0;
}
j = i;
k = j + 1;
for (; k < num_records; k++) {
strcpy(record[j].key, record[k].key);
strcpy(record[j].value, record[k].value);
j++;
}
kvp_file_info[pool].num_records--;
kvp_update_file(pool);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: tools: hv: Netlink source address validation allows DoS
The source code without this patch caused hypervkvpd to exit when it processed
a spoofed Netlink packet which has been sent from an untrusted local user.
Now Netlink messages with a non-zero nl_pid source address are ignored
and a warning is printed into the syslog.
Signed-off-by: Tomas Hozza <[email protected]>
Acked-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType BlackThresholdImage(Image *image,
const char *thresholds,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThresholdImageTag "Threshold/Image"
CacheView
*image_view;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
PixelInfo
threshold;
MagickStatusType
flags;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (thresholds == (const char *) NULL)
return(MagickTrue);
if (SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
if (IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
GetPixelInfo(image,&threshold);
flags=ParseGeometry(thresholds,&geometry_info);
threshold.red=geometry_info.rho;
threshold.green=geometry_info.rho;
threshold.blue=geometry_info.rho;
threshold.black=geometry_info.rho;
threshold.alpha=100.0;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
threshold.green=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & XiValue) != 0)
threshold.blue=geometry_info.xi;
if ((flags & PsiValue) != 0)
threshold.alpha=geometry_info.psi;
if (threshold.colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
if ((flags & PsiValue) != 0)
threshold.black=geometry_info.psi;
if ((flags & ChiValue) != 0)
threshold.alpha=geometry_info.chi;
}
if ((flags & PercentValue) != 0)
{
threshold.red*=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange/100.0);
threshold.green*=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange/100.0);
threshold.blue*=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange/100.0);
threshold.black*=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange/100.0);
threshold.alpha*=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange/100.0);
}
/*
White threshold image.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(progress,status) \
magick_number_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
double
pixel;
register ssize_t
i;
pixel=GetPixelIntensity(image,q);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
PixelChannel channel = GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
PixelTrait traits = GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
if ((traits & UpdatePixelTrait) == 0)
continue;
if (image->channel_mask != DefaultChannels)
pixel=(double) q[i];
if (pixel < GetPixelInfoChannel(&threshold,channel))
q[i]=(Quantum) 0;
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,ThresholdImageTag,progress,
image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1608
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 89,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rose_set_loopback_timer(void)
{
del_timer(&loopback_timer);
loopback_timer.data = 0;
loopback_timer.function = &rose_loopback_timer;
loopback_timer.expires = jiffies + 10;
add_timer(&loopback_timer);
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int gdImageColorClosest (gdImagePtr im, int r, int g, int b)
{
return gdImageColorClosestAlpha (im, r, g, b, gdAlphaOpaque);
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int output_frame(H264Context *h, AVFrame *dst, Picture *srcp)
{
AVFrame *src = &srcp->f;
int i;
int ret = av_frame_ref(dst, src);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
av_dict_set(&dst->metadata, "stereo_mode", ff_h264_sei_stereo_mode(h), 0);
if (!srcp->crop)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
int hshift = (i > 0) ? h->chroma_x_shift : 0;
int vshift = (i > 0) ? h->chroma_y_shift : 0;
int off = ((srcp->crop_left >> hshift) << h->pixel_shift) +
(srcp->crop_top >> vshift) * dst->linesize[i];
dst->data[i] += off;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OnCanTriggerClipboardRead(
const GURL& origin, bool* allowed) {
*allowed = extension_info_map_->SecurityOriginHasAPIPermission(
origin, render_process_id_, ExtensionAPIPermission::kClipboardRead);
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void AddObserver(ImageTransportFactoryObserver* observer) {
observer_list_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MultibufferDataSource::GetSize(int64_t* size_out) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
if (total_bytes_ != kPositionNotSpecified) {
*size_out = total_bytes_;
return true;
}
*size_out = 0;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit floppy_module_exit(void)
{
int drive;
blk_unregister_region(MKDEV(FLOPPY_MAJOR, 0), 256);
unregister_blkdev(FLOPPY_MAJOR, "fd");
platform_driver_unregister(&floppy_driver);
destroy_workqueue(floppy_wq);
for (drive = 0; drive < N_DRIVE; drive++) {
del_timer_sync(&motor_off_timer[drive]);
if (floppy_available(drive)) {
del_gendisk(disks[drive]);
device_remove_file(&floppy_device[drive].dev, &dev_attr_cmos);
platform_device_unregister(&floppy_device[drive]);
}
blk_cleanup_queue(disks[drive]->queue);
/*
* These disks have not called add_disk(). Don't put down
* queue reference in put_disk().
*/
if (!(allowed_drive_mask & (1 << drive)) ||
fdc_state[FDC(drive)].version == FDC_NONE)
disks[drive]->queue = NULL;
put_disk(disks[drive]);
}
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&fd_timeout);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&fd_timer);
if (atomic_read(&usage_count))
floppy_release_irq_and_dma();
/* eject disk, if any */
fd_eject(0);
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String HTMLFormControlElement::nameForAutofill() const
{
String fullName = name();
String trimmedName = fullName.stripWhiteSpace();
if (!trimmedName.isEmpty())
return trimmedName;
fullName = getIdAttribute();
trimmedName = fullName.stripWhiteSpace();
return trimmedName;
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sspi_SecureHandleSetUpperPointer(SecHandle* handle, void* pointer)
{
if (!handle)
return;
handle->dwUpper = (ULONG_PTR) (~((size_t) pointer));
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 58,621 |
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