instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShellSurface::WindowClosing() {
if (resizer_)
EndDrag(true /* revert */);
SetEnabled(false);
widget_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_seek(AVFormatContext *s, int stream_index, int64_t sample_time, int flags)
{
AVStream *st;
int64_t seek_timestamp, timestamp;
int sample;
int i;
if (stream_index >= s->nb_streams)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (sample_time < 0)
sample_time = 0;
st = s->streams[stream_index];
sample = mov_seek_stream(s, st, sample_time, flags);
if (sample < 0)
return sample;
/* adjust seek timestamp to found sample timestamp */
seek_timestamp = st->index_entries[sample].timestamp;
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
st = s->streams[i];
if (stream_index == i)
continue;
timestamp = av_rescale_q(seek_timestamp, s->streams[stream_index]->time_base, st->time_base);
mov_seek_stream(s, st, timestamp, flags);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pp::VarDictionary PDFiumEngine::TraverseBookmarks(FPDF_BOOKMARK bookmark,
unsigned int depth) {
pp::VarDictionary dict;
base::string16 title;
unsigned long buffer_size = FPDFBookmark_GetTitle(bookmark, nullptr, 0);
if (buffer_size > 0) {
PDFiumAPIStringBufferSizeInBytesAdapter<base::string16> api_string_adapter(
&title, buffer_size, true);
api_string_adapter.Close(FPDFBookmark_GetTitle(
bookmark, api_string_adapter.GetData(), buffer_size));
}
dict.Set(pp::Var("title"), pp::Var(base::UTF16ToUTF8(title)));
FPDF_DEST dest = FPDFBookmark_GetDest(doc_, bookmark);
if (dest) {
unsigned long page_index = FPDFDest_GetPageIndex(doc_, dest);
if (page_index < pages_.size() &&
base::IsValueInRangeForNumericType<int32_t>(page_index)) {
dict.Set(pp::Var("page"), pp::Var(static_cast<int32_t>(page_index)));
PDFiumPage::LinkTarget target;
pages_[page_index]->GetPageYTarget(dest, &target);
if (target.y_in_pixels)
dict.Set(pp::Var("y"), pp::Var(target.y_in_pixels.value()));
}
} else {
FPDF_ACTION action = FPDFBookmark_GetAction(bookmark);
buffer_size = FPDFAction_GetURIPath(doc_, action, nullptr, 0);
if (buffer_size > 0) {
std::string uri;
PDFiumAPIStringBufferAdapter<std::string> api_string_adapter(
&uri, buffer_size, true);
api_string_adapter.Close(FPDFAction_GetURIPath(
doc_, action, api_string_adapter.GetData(), buffer_size));
dict.Set(pp::Var("uri"), pp::Var(uri));
}
}
pp::VarArray children;
const unsigned int kMaxDepth = 128;
if (depth < kMaxDepth) {
int child_index = 0;
std::set<FPDF_BOOKMARK> seen_bookmarks;
for (FPDF_BOOKMARK child_bookmark =
FPDFBookmark_GetFirstChild(doc_, bookmark);
child_bookmark;
child_bookmark = FPDFBookmark_GetNextSibling(doc_, child_bookmark)) {
if (base::ContainsKey(seen_bookmarks, child_bookmark))
break;
seen_bookmarks.insert(child_bookmark);
children.Set(child_index, TraverseBookmarks(child_bookmark, depth + 1));
child_index++;
}
}
dict.Set(pp::Var("children"), children);
return dict;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CLASS smal_v6_load_raw()
{
unsigned seg[2][2];
fseek (ifp, 16, SEEK_SET);
seg[0][0] = 0;
seg[0][1] = get2();
seg[1][0] = raw_width * raw_height;
seg[1][1] = INT_MAX;
smal_decode_segment (seg, 0);
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MYSQLND_METHOD(mysqlnd_protocol, get_sha256_pk_request_packet)(MYSQLND_PROTOCOL * const protocol, zend_bool persistent TSRMLS_DC)
{
struct st_mysqlnd_packet_sha256_pk_request * packet = mnd_pecalloc(1, packet_methods[PROT_SHA256_PK_REQUEST_PACKET].struct_size, persistent);
DBG_ENTER("mysqlnd_protocol::get_sha256_pk_request_packet");
if (packet) {
packet->header.m = &packet_methods[PROT_SHA256_PK_REQUEST_PACKET];
packet->header.persistent = persistent;
}
DBG_RETURN(packet);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72293 - Heap overflow in mysqlnd related to BIT fields
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void comedi_set_subdevice_runflags(struct comedi_subdevice *s,
unsigned mask, unsigned bits)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&s->spin_lock, flags);
s->runflags &= ~mask;
s->runflags |= (bits & mask);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->spin_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: staging: comedi: fix infoleak to userspace
driver_name and board_name are pointers to strings, not buffers of size
COMEDI_NAMELEN. Copying COMEDI_NAMELEN bytes of a string containing
less than COMEDI_NAMELEN-1 bytes would leak some unrelated bytes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResetStorage() {
service_->storage_.reset(new MockAppCacheStorage(service_.get()));
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline char * _php_pgsql_trim_result(PGconn * pgsql, char **buf)
{
return *buf = _php_pgsql_trim_message(PQerrorMessage(pgsql), NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BookmarksRemoveFunction::RunImpl() {
if (!EditBookmarksEnabled())
return false;
scoped_ptr<bookmarks::Remove::Params> params(
bookmarks::Remove::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
int64 id;
if (!base::StringToInt64(params->id, &id)) {
error_ = keys::kInvalidIdError;
return false;
}
bool recursive = false;
if (name() == BookmarksRemoveTreeFunction::function_name())
recursive = true;
BookmarkModel* model = BookmarkModelFactory::GetForProfile(profile());
if (!bookmark_api_helpers::RemoveNode(model, id, recursive, &error_))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free in BookmarksIOFunction::ShowSelectFileDialog.
BUG=177410
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12326086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 115,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double yr_object_get_float(
YR_OBJECT* object,
const char* field,
...)
{
YR_OBJECT* double_obj;
va_list args;
va_start(args, field);
if (field != NULL)
double_obj = _yr_object_lookup(object, 0, field, args);
else
double_obj = object;
va_end(args);
if (double_obj == NULL)
return NAN;
assertf(double_obj->type == OBJECT_TYPE_FLOAT,
"type of \"%s\" is not double\n", field);
return ((YR_OBJECT_DOUBLE*) double_obj)->value;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #658
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 66,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void index_entry_free(git_index_entry *entry)
{
if (!entry)
return;
memset(&entry->id, 0, sizeof(entry->id));
git__free(entry);
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltFreeAttrElemList(xsltAttrElemPtr list) {
xsltAttrElemPtr next;
while (list != NULL) {
next = list->next;
xsltFreeAttrElem(list);
list = next;
}
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: acpi_ns_get_node(struct acpi_namespace_node *prefix_node,
const char *pathname,
u32 flags, struct acpi_namespace_node **return_node)
{
acpi_status status;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE_PTR(ns_get_node, ACPI_CAST_PTR(char, pathname));
status = acpi_ut_acquire_mutex(ACPI_MTX_NAMESPACE);
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
return_ACPI_STATUS(status);
}
status = acpi_ns_get_node_unlocked(prefix_node, pathname,
flags, return_node);
(void)acpi_ut_release_mutex(ACPI_MTX_NAMESPACE);
return_ACPI_STATUS(status);
}
Commit Message: ACPICA: Namespace: fix operand cache leak
ACPICA commit a23325b2e583556eae88ed3f764e457786bf4df6
I found some ACPI operand cache leaks in ACPI early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.174332] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.175504] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.176010] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.177032] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.178284] ACPI: SCI (IRQ16705) allocation failed
>[ 0.179352] ACPI Exception: AE_NOT_ACQUIRED, Unable to install
System Control Interrupt handler (20160930/evevent-131)
>[ 0.180008] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.181125] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler
(20160930/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.184068] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has
objects
>[ 0.185358] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3 #2
>[ 0.186820] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS
virtual_box 12/01/2006
>[ 0.188000] Call Trace:
>[ 0.188000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x7d
>[ 0.188000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x224/0x230
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x22/0x22
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0xd
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_terminate+0x5/0xf
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_init+0x288/0x32e
>[ 0.188000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? video_setup+0x7a/0x7a
>[ 0.188000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1b0
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x194/0x21a
>[ 0.188000] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.188000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling acpi_terminate() function. The function calls
acpi_ns_terminate() function to delete namespace data and ACPI operand cache
(acpi_gbl_module_code_list).
But the deletion code in acpi_ns_terminate() function is wrapped in
ACPI_EXEC_APP definition, therefore the code is only executed when the
definition exists. If the define doesn't exist, ACPI operand cache
(acpi_gbl_module_code_list) is leaked, and stack dump is shown in kernel log.
This causes a security threat because the old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory
locations of kernel functions in stack dump, therefore kernel ASLR can be
neutralized.
To fix ACPI operand leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which
removes the ACPI_EXEC_APP define in acpi_ns_terminate() function for
executing the deletion code unconditionally.
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/a23325b2
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-755 | 0 | 63,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: g_NPN_MemFree(void *ptr)
{
D(bugiI("NPN_MemFree ptr=%p\n", ptr));
NPW_MemFree(ptr);
D(bugiD("NPN_MemFree done\n"));
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const Document& SerializerMarkupAccumulator::document()
{
return *m_document;
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 125,340 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int usb_parse_endpoint(struct device *ddev, int cfgno, int inum,
int asnum, struct usb_host_interface *ifp, int num_ep,
unsigned char *buffer, int size)
{
unsigned char *buffer0 = buffer;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *d;
struct usb_host_endpoint *endpoint;
int n, i, j, retval;
unsigned int maxp;
const unsigned short *maxpacket_maxes;
d = (struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *) buffer;
buffer += d->bLength;
size -= d->bLength;
if (d->bLength >= USB_DT_ENDPOINT_AUDIO_SIZE)
n = USB_DT_ENDPOINT_AUDIO_SIZE;
else if (d->bLength >= USB_DT_ENDPOINT_SIZE)
n = USB_DT_ENDPOINT_SIZE;
else {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d interface %d altsetting %d has an "
"invalid endpoint descriptor of length %d, skipping\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum, d->bLength);
goto skip_to_next_endpoint_or_interface_descriptor;
}
i = d->bEndpointAddress & ~USB_ENDPOINT_DIR_MASK;
if (i >= 16 || i == 0) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d interface %d altsetting %d has an "
"invalid endpoint with address 0x%X, skipping\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum, d->bEndpointAddress);
goto skip_to_next_endpoint_or_interface_descriptor;
}
/* Only store as many endpoints as we have room for */
if (ifp->desc.bNumEndpoints >= num_ep)
goto skip_to_next_endpoint_or_interface_descriptor;
/* Check for duplicate endpoint addresses */
for (i = 0; i < ifp->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
if (ifp->endpoint[i].desc.bEndpointAddress ==
d->bEndpointAddress) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d interface %d altsetting %d has a duplicate endpoint with address 0x%X, skipping\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum, d->bEndpointAddress);
goto skip_to_next_endpoint_or_interface_descriptor;
}
}
endpoint = &ifp->endpoint[ifp->desc.bNumEndpoints];
++ifp->desc.bNumEndpoints;
memcpy(&endpoint->desc, d, n);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&endpoint->urb_list);
/*
* Fix up bInterval values outside the legal range.
* Use 10 or 8 ms if no proper value can be guessed.
*/
i = 0; /* i = min, j = max, n = default */
j = 255;
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_int(d)) {
i = 1;
switch (to_usb_device(ddev)->speed) {
case USB_SPEED_SUPER_PLUS:
case USB_SPEED_SUPER:
case USB_SPEED_HIGH:
/*
* Many device manufacturers are using full-speed
* bInterval values in high-speed interrupt endpoint
* descriptors. Try to fix those and fall back to an
* 8-ms default value otherwise.
*/
n = fls(d->bInterval*8);
if (n == 0)
n = 7; /* 8 ms = 2^(7-1) uframes */
j = 16;
/*
* Adjust bInterval for quirked devices.
*/
/*
* This quirk fixes bIntervals reported in ms.
*/
if (to_usb_device(ddev)->quirks &
USB_QUIRK_LINEAR_FRAME_INTR_BINTERVAL) {
n = clamp(fls(d->bInterval) + 3, i, j);
i = j = n;
}
/*
* This quirk fixes bIntervals reported in
* linear microframes.
*/
if (to_usb_device(ddev)->quirks &
USB_QUIRK_LINEAR_UFRAME_INTR_BINTERVAL) {
n = clamp(fls(d->bInterval), i, j);
i = j = n;
}
break;
default: /* USB_SPEED_FULL or _LOW */
/*
* For low-speed, 10 ms is the official minimum.
* But some "overclocked" devices might want faster
* polling so we'll allow it.
*/
n = 10;
break;
}
} else if (usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc(d)) {
i = 1;
j = 16;
switch (to_usb_device(ddev)->speed) {
case USB_SPEED_HIGH:
n = 7; /* 8 ms = 2^(7-1) uframes */
break;
default: /* USB_SPEED_FULL */
n = 4; /* 8 ms = 2^(4-1) frames */
break;
}
}
if (d->bInterval < i || d->bInterval > j) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d interface %d altsetting %d "
"endpoint 0x%X has an invalid bInterval %d, "
"changing to %d\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum,
d->bEndpointAddress, d->bInterval, n);
endpoint->desc.bInterval = n;
}
/* Some buggy low-speed devices have Bulk endpoints, which is
* explicitly forbidden by the USB spec. In an attempt to make
* them usable, we will try treating them as Interrupt endpoints.
*/
if (to_usb_device(ddev)->speed == USB_SPEED_LOW &&
usb_endpoint_xfer_bulk(d)) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d interface %d altsetting %d "
"endpoint 0x%X is Bulk; changing to Interrupt\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum, d->bEndpointAddress);
endpoint->desc.bmAttributes = USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT;
endpoint->desc.bInterval = 1;
if (usb_endpoint_maxp(&endpoint->desc) > 8)
endpoint->desc.wMaxPacketSize = cpu_to_le16(8);
}
/* Validate the wMaxPacketSize field */
maxp = usb_endpoint_maxp(&endpoint->desc);
/* Find the highest legal maxpacket size for this endpoint */
i = 0; /* additional transactions per microframe */
switch (to_usb_device(ddev)->speed) {
case USB_SPEED_LOW:
maxpacket_maxes = low_speed_maxpacket_maxes;
break;
case USB_SPEED_FULL:
maxpacket_maxes = full_speed_maxpacket_maxes;
break;
case USB_SPEED_HIGH:
/* Bits 12..11 are allowed only for HS periodic endpoints */
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_int(d) || usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc(d)) {
i = maxp & (BIT(12) | BIT(11));
maxp &= ~i;
}
/* fallthrough */
default:
maxpacket_maxes = high_speed_maxpacket_maxes;
break;
case USB_SPEED_SUPER:
case USB_SPEED_SUPER_PLUS:
maxpacket_maxes = super_speed_maxpacket_maxes;
break;
}
j = maxpacket_maxes[usb_endpoint_type(&endpoint->desc)];
if (maxp > j) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d interface %d altsetting %d endpoint 0x%X has invalid maxpacket %d, setting to %d\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum, d->bEndpointAddress, maxp, j);
maxp = j;
endpoint->desc.wMaxPacketSize = cpu_to_le16(i | maxp);
}
/*
* Some buggy high speed devices have bulk endpoints using
* maxpacket sizes other than 512. High speed HCDs may not
* be able to handle that particular bug, so let's warn...
*/
if (to_usb_device(ddev)->speed == USB_SPEED_HIGH
&& usb_endpoint_xfer_bulk(d)) {
if (maxp != 512)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d interface %d altsetting %d "
"bulk endpoint 0x%X has invalid maxpacket %d\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum, d->bEndpointAddress,
maxp);
}
/* Parse a possible SuperSpeed endpoint companion descriptor */
if (to_usb_device(ddev)->speed >= USB_SPEED_SUPER)
usb_parse_ss_endpoint_companion(ddev, cfgno,
inum, asnum, endpoint, buffer, size);
/* Skip over any Class Specific or Vendor Specific descriptors;
* find the next endpoint or interface descriptor */
endpoint->extra = buffer;
i = find_next_descriptor(buffer, size, USB_DT_ENDPOINT,
USB_DT_INTERFACE, &n);
endpoint->extralen = i;
retval = buffer - buffer0 + i;
if (n > 0)
dev_dbg(ddev, "skipped %d descriptor%s after %s\n",
n, plural(n), "endpoint");
return retval;
skip_to_next_endpoint_or_interface_descriptor:
i = find_next_descriptor(buffer, size, USB_DT_ENDPOINT,
USB_DT_INTERFACE, NULL);
return buffer - buffer0 + i;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: fix out-of-bounds access bug in usb_get_bos_descriptor()
Andrey used the syzkaller fuzzer to find an out-of-bounds memory
access in usb_get_bos_descriptor(). The code wasn't checking that the
next usb_dev_cap_header structure could fit into the remaining buffer
space.
This patch fixes the error and also reduces the bNumDeviceCaps field
in the header to match the actual number of capabilities found, in
cases where there are fewer than expected.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~MockAudioRendererHost() {
EXPECT_TRUE(delegates_.empty());
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int resolve_named_entity_html(const char *start, size_t length, const entity_ht *ht, unsigned *uni_cp1, unsigned *uni_cp2)
{
const entity_cp_map *s;
ulong hash = zend_inline_hash_func(start, length);
s = ht->buckets[hash % ht->num_elems];
while (s->entity) {
if (s->entity_len == length) {
if (memcmp(start, s->entity, length) == 0) {
*uni_cp1 = s->codepoint1;
*uni_cp2 = s->codepoint2;
return SUCCESS;
}
}
s++;
}
return FAILURE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 52,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long kvm_device_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int ioctl,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm_device *dev = filp->private_data;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR:
return kvm_device_ioctl_attr(dev, dev->ops->set_attr, arg);
case KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR:
return kvm_device_ioctl_attr(dev, dev->ops->get_attr, arg);
case KVM_HAS_DEVICE_ATTR:
return kvm_device_ioctl_attr(dev, dev->ops->has_attr, arg);
default:
if (dev->ops->ioctl)
return dev->ops->ioctl(dev, ioctl, arg);
return -ENOTTY;
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContainerNode::parserAppendChild(PassRefPtr<Node> newChild)
{
ASSERT(newChild);
ASSERT(!newChild->parentNode()); // Use appendChild if you need to handle reparenting (and want DOM mutation events).
ASSERT(!newChild->isDocumentFragment());
ASSERT(!hasTagName(HTMLNames::templateTag));
if (&document() != &newChild->document())
document().adoptNode(newChild.get(), ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
Node* last = m_lastChild;
{
NoEventDispatchAssertion assertNoEventDispatch;
appendChildToContainer(newChild.get(), this);
treeScope().adoptIfNeeded(newChild.get());
}
newChild->updateAncestorConnectedSubframeCountForInsertion();
ChildListMutationScope(this).childAdded(newChild.get());
childrenChanged(true, last, 0, 1);
ChildNodeInsertionNotifier(this).notify(newChild.get());
}
Commit Message: Notify nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event
This patch changes notifying nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event. In willRemoveChildren(), like willRemoveChild(); r115686 did same change, although it didn't change willRemoveChildren().
The issue 295010, use-after-free, is caused by setting removed node to Selection in mutation event handler.
BUG=295010
TEST=LayoutTests/fast/dom/Range/range-created-during-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-mutation-event-by-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-blur-event-by-remove-children.html
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25389004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __be32 *encode_entryplus_baggage(struct nfsd3_readdirres *cd, __be32 *p, const char *name, int namlen, u64 ino)
{
struct svc_fh *fh = &cd->scratch;
__be32 err;
fh_init(fh, NFS3_FHSIZE);
err = compose_entry_fh(cd, fh, name, namlen, ino);
if (err) {
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = 0;
goto out;
}
p = encode_post_op_attr(cd->rqstp, p, fh);
*p++ = xdr_one; /* yes, a file handle follows */
p = encode_fh(p, fh);
out:
fh_put(fh);
return p;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets(Document::RunPostLayoutTasks runPostLayoutTasks)
{
DocumentLifecycle::PreventThrottlingScope preventThrottling(lifecycle());
updateLayoutTreeIgnorePendingStylesheets();
updateLayout();
if (runPostLayoutTasks == RunPostLayoutTasksSynchronously && view())
view()->flushAnyPendingPostLayoutTasks();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetTouchpadLibrary(
TouchpadLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->touchpad_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 170,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataCache::RequestInitializeOnUIThread() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
pool_->GetSequencedTaskRunner(sequence_token_)->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GDataCache::Initialize, base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
[email protected]
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 105,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cma_disable_callback(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv,
enum rdma_cm_state state)
{
mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
if (id_priv->state != state) {
mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mpol_rebind_default(struct mempolicy *pol, const nodemask_t *nodes,
enum mpol_rebind_step step)
{
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int runtime_refresh_within(struct cfs_bandwidth *cfs_b, u64 min_expire)
{
struct hrtimer *refresh_timer = &cfs_b->period_timer;
u64 remaining;
/* if the call-back is running a quota refresh is already occurring */
if (hrtimer_callback_running(refresh_timer))
return 1;
/* is a quota refresh about to occur? */
remaining = ktime_to_ns(hrtimer_expires_remaining(refresh_timer));
if (remaining < min_expire)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static base::TimeDelta GetSwapDelay() {
CommandLine* cmd_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
int delay = 0;
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kGpuSwapDelay)) {
base::StringToInt(cmd_line->GetSwitchValueNative(
switches::kGpuSwapDelay).c_str(), &delay);
}
return base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(delay);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void methodWithCallbackInterfaceAndOptionalArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::methodWithCallbackInterfaceAndOptionalArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ide_sector_read(IDEState *s)
{
int64_t sector_num;
int n;
s->status = READY_STAT | SEEK_STAT;
s->error = 0; /* not needed by IDE spec, but needed by Windows */
sector_num = ide_get_sector(s);
n = s->nsector;
if (n == 0) {
ide_transfer_stop(s);
return;
}
s->status |= BUSY_STAT;
if (n > s->req_nb_sectors) {
n = s->req_nb_sectors;
}
#if defined(DEBUG_IDE)
printf("sector=%" PRId64 "\n", sector_num);
#endif
if (!ide_sect_range_ok(s, sector_num, n)) {
ide_rw_error(s);
return;
}
s->iov.iov_base = s->io_buffer;
s->iov.iov_len = n * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE;
qemu_iovec_init_external(&s->qiov, &s->iov, 1);
block_acct_start(blk_get_stats(s->blk), &s->acct,
n * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE, BLOCK_ACCT_READ);
s->pio_aiocb = blk_aio_readv(s->blk, sector_num, &s->qiov, n,
ide_sector_read_cb, s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int l2tp_ip_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags)
{
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
return 0;
return __udp_disconnect(sk, flags);
}
Commit Message: l2tp: fix racy SOCK_ZAPPED flag check in l2tp_ip{,6}_bind()
Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff829f835b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8174d3cc>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
[< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
[<ffffffff8174d666>] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
[< inline >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
[<ffffffff8174db7e>] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
[< inline >] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
[< inline >] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
[< inline >] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
[<ffffffff8579047e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
[<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c9ad>] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cee2>] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817476a8>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4f6a9>] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c58ac8>] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851ddf67>] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4af7b>] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4b46f>] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d685>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cf61>] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81748b28>] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c541eb>] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5aca4>] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5ad33>] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5af23>] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5cb6c>] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8579044e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.
Fixes: c51ce49735c1 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 70,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smp_fetch_capture_req_uri(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct chunk *temp;
struct http_txn *txn = l7;
char *ptr;
if (!txn->uri)
return 0;
ptr = txn->uri;
while (*ptr != ' ' && *ptr != '\0') /* find first space */
ptr++;
if (!*ptr)
return 0;
ptr++; /* skip the space */
temp = get_trash_chunk();
ptr = temp->str = http_get_path_from_string(ptr);
if (!ptr)
return 0;
while (*ptr != ' ' && *ptr != '\0') /* find space after URI */
ptr++;
smp->data.str = *temp;
smp->data.str.len = ptr - temp->str;
smp->type = SMP_T_STR;
smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
{
return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 5,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OfflinePageModelImpl::OfflinePageModelImpl(
std::unique_ptr<OfflinePageMetadataStore> store,
std::unique_ptr<ArchiveManager> archive_manager,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& task_runner)
: store_(std::move(store)),
is_loaded_(false),
policy_controller_(new ClientPolicyController()),
archive_manager_(std::move(archive_manager)),
testing_clock_(nullptr),
skip_clearing_original_url_for_testing_(false),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
archive_manager_->EnsureArchivesDirCreated(
base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::OnEnsureArchivesDirCreatedDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), base::TimeTicks::Now()));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebMediaPlayerImpl::Seeking() const {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (ready_state_ == WebMediaPlayer::kReadyStateHaveNothing)
return false;
return seeking_;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgidp, gid_t __user *, egidp, gid_t __user *, sgidp)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int retval;
gid_t rgid, egid, sgid;
rgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid);
egid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid);
sgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->sgid);
if (!(retval = put_user(rgid, rgidp)) &&
!(retval = put_user(egid, egidp)))
retval = put_user(sgid, sgidp);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Cc: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-16 | 0 | 21,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WavpackContext *WavpackOpenFileInputEx64 (WavpackStreamReader64 *reader, void *wv_id, void *wvc_id, char *error, int flags, int norm_offset)
{
WavpackContext *wpc = malloc (sizeof (WavpackContext));
WavpackStream *wps;
int num_blocks = 0;
unsigned char first_byte;
uint32_t bcount;
if (!wpc) {
if (error) strcpy (error, "can't allocate memory");
return NULL;
}
CLEAR (*wpc);
wpc->wv_in = wv_id;
wpc->wvc_in = wvc_id;
wpc->reader = reader;
wpc->total_samples = -1;
wpc->norm_offset = norm_offset;
wpc->max_streams = OLD_MAX_STREAMS; // use this until overwritten with actual number
wpc->open_flags = flags;
wpc->filelen = wpc->reader->get_length (wpc->wv_in);
#ifndef NO_TAGS
if ((flags & (OPEN_TAGS | OPEN_EDIT_TAGS)) && wpc->reader->can_seek (wpc->wv_in)) {
load_tag (wpc);
wpc->reader->set_pos_abs (wpc->wv_in, 0);
if ((flags & OPEN_EDIT_TAGS) && !editable_tag (&wpc->m_tag)) {
if (error) strcpy (error, "can't edit tags located at the beginning of files!");
return WavpackCloseFile (wpc);
}
}
#endif
if (wpc->reader->read_bytes (wpc->wv_in, &first_byte, 1) != 1) {
if (error) strcpy (error, "can't read all of WavPack file!");
return WavpackCloseFile (wpc);
}
wpc->reader->push_back_byte (wpc->wv_in, first_byte);
if (first_byte == 'R') {
#ifdef ENABLE_LEGACY
return open_file3 (wpc, error);
#else
if (error) strcpy (error, "this legacy WavPack file is deprecated, use version 4.80.0 to transcode");
return WavpackCloseFile (wpc);
#endif
}
wpc->streams = malloc ((wpc->num_streams = 1) * sizeof (wpc->streams [0]));
if (!wpc->streams) {
if (error) strcpy (error, "can't allocate memory");
return WavpackCloseFile (wpc);
}
wpc->streams [0] = wps = malloc (sizeof (WavpackStream));
if (!wps) {
if (error) strcpy (error, "can't allocate memory");
return WavpackCloseFile (wpc);
}
CLEAR (*wps);
while (!wps->wphdr.block_samples) {
wpc->filepos = wpc->reader->get_pos (wpc->wv_in);
bcount = read_next_header (wpc->reader, wpc->wv_in, &wps->wphdr);
if (bcount == (uint32_t) -1 ||
(!wps->wphdr.block_samples && num_blocks++ > 16)) {
if (error) strcpy (error, "not compatible with this version of WavPack file!");
return WavpackCloseFile (wpc);
}
wpc->filepos += bcount;
wps->blockbuff = malloc (wps->wphdr.ckSize + 8);
if (!wps->blockbuff) {
if (error) strcpy (error, "can't allocate memory");
return WavpackCloseFile (wpc);
}
memcpy (wps->blockbuff, &wps->wphdr, 32);
if (wpc->reader->read_bytes (wpc->wv_in, wps->blockbuff + 32, wps->wphdr.ckSize - 24) != wps->wphdr.ckSize - 24) {
if (error) strcpy (error, "can't read all of WavPack file!");
return WavpackCloseFile (wpc);
}
if (!WavpackVerifySingleBlock (wps->blockbuff, !(flags & OPEN_NO_CHECKSUM))) {
wps->wphdr.block_samples = 0;
free (wps->blockbuff);
wps->blockbuff = NULL;
wpc->crc_errors++;
continue;
}
wps->init_done = FALSE;
if (wps->wphdr.block_samples) {
if (flags & OPEN_STREAMING)
SET_BLOCK_INDEX (wps->wphdr, 0);
else if (wpc->total_samples == -1) {
if (GET_BLOCK_INDEX (wps->wphdr) || GET_TOTAL_SAMPLES (wps->wphdr) == -1) {
wpc->initial_index = GET_BLOCK_INDEX (wps->wphdr);
SET_BLOCK_INDEX (wps->wphdr, 0);
if (wpc->reader->can_seek (wpc->wv_in)) {
int64_t final_index = -1;
seek_eof_information (wpc, &final_index, FALSE);
if (final_index != -1)
wpc->total_samples = final_index - wpc->initial_index;
}
}
else
wpc->total_samples = GET_TOTAL_SAMPLES (wps->wphdr);
}
}
else if (wpc->total_samples == -1 && !GET_BLOCK_INDEX (wps->wphdr) && GET_TOTAL_SAMPLES (wps->wphdr))
wpc->total_samples = GET_TOTAL_SAMPLES (wps->wphdr);
if (wpc->wvc_in && wps->wphdr.block_samples && (wps->wphdr.flags & HYBRID_FLAG)) {
unsigned char ch;
if (wpc->reader->read_bytes (wpc->wvc_in, &ch, 1) == 1) {
wpc->reader->push_back_byte (wpc->wvc_in, ch);
wpc->file2len = wpc->reader->get_length (wpc->wvc_in);
wpc->wvc_flag = TRUE;
}
}
if (wpc->wvc_flag && !read_wvc_block (wpc)) {
if (error) strcpy (error, "not compatible with this version of correction file!");
return WavpackCloseFile (wpc);
}
if (!wps->init_done && !unpack_init (wpc)) {
if (error) strcpy (error, wpc->error_message [0] ? wpc->error_message :
"not compatible with this version of WavPack file!");
return WavpackCloseFile (wpc);
}
wps->init_done = TRUE;
}
wpc->config.flags &= ~0xff;
wpc->config.flags |= wps->wphdr.flags & 0xff;
if (!wpc->config.num_channels) {
wpc->config.num_channels = (wps->wphdr.flags & MONO_FLAG) ? 1 : 2;
wpc->config.channel_mask = 0x5 - wpc->config.num_channels;
}
if ((flags & OPEN_2CH_MAX) && !(wps->wphdr.flags & FINAL_BLOCK))
wpc->reduced_channels = (wps->wphdr.flags & MONO_FLAG) ? 1 : 2;
if (wps->wphdr.flags & DSD_FLAG) {
#ifdef ENABLE_DSD
if (flags & OPEN_DSD_NATIVE) {
wpc->config.bytes_per_sample = 1;
wpc->config.bits_per_sample = 8;
}
else if (flags & OPEN_DSD_AS_PCM) {
wpc->decimation_context = decimate_dsd_init (wpc->reduced_channels ?
wpc->reduced_channels : wpc->config.num_channels);
wpc->config.bytes_per_sample = 3;
wpc->config.bits_per_sample = 24;
}
else {
if (error) strcpy (error, "not configured to handle DSD WavPack files!");
return WavpackCloseFile (wpc);
}
#else
if (error) strcpy (error, "not configured to handle DSD WavPack files!");
return WavpackCloseFile (wpc);
#endif
}
else {
wpc->config.bytes_per_sample = (wps->wphdr.flags & BYTES_STORED) + 1;
wpc->config.float_norm_exp = wps->float_norm_exp;
wpc->config.bits_per_sample = (wpc->config.bytes_per_sample * 8) -
((wps->wphdr.flags & SHIFT_MASK) >> SHIFT_LSB);
}
if (!wpc->config.sample_rate) {
if (!wps->wphdr.block_samples || (wps->wphdr.flags & SRATE_MASK) == SRATE_MASK)
wpc->config.sample_rate = 44100;
else
wpc->config.sample_rate = sample_rates [(wps->wphdr.flags & SRATE_MASK) >> SRATE_LSB];
}
return wpc;
}
Commit Message: fixes for 4 fuzz failures posted to SourceForge mailing list
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void set_sched_topology(struct sched_domain_topology_level *tl)
{
sched_domain_topology = tl;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum hrtimer_restart pit_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *data)
{
struct kvm_kpit_state *ps = container_of(data, struct kvm_kpit_state, timer);
struct kvm_pit *pt = ps->kvm->arch.vpit;
if (ps->reinject || !atomic_read(&ps->pending)) {
atomic_inc(&ps->pending);
queue_kthread_work(&pt->worker, &pt->expired);
}
if (ps->is_periodic) {
hrtimer_add_expires_ns(&ps->timer, ps->period);
return HRTIMER_RESTART;
} else
return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Improve thread safety in pit
There's a race condition in the PIT emulation code in KVM. In
__kvm_migrate_pit_timer the pit_timer object is accessed without
synchronization. If the race condition occurs at the wrong time this
can crash the host kernel.
This fixes CVE-2014-3611.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 37,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::IsPaired() const {
BluetoothDeviceClient::Properties* properties =
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->
GetProperties(object_path_);
DCHECK(properties);
return properties->paired.value() || properties->trusted.value();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHost* TabLoader::GetRenderWidgetHost(NavigationController* tab) {
WebContents* web_contents = tab->GetWebContents();
if (web_contents) {
RenderWidgetHostView* render_widget_host_view =
web_contents->GetRenderWidgetHostView();
if (render_widget_host_view)
return render_widget_host_view->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/9316065/ for Marja. I reviewed
this, so I'm using TBR to land it.
Don't crash if multiple SessionRestoreImpl:s refer to the same
Profile.
It shouldn't ever happen but it seems to happen anyway.
BUG=111238
TEST=NONE
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9343005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120648 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 108,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_reply_serial (DBusMessage *message)
{
if (message == NULL)
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
if (!dbus_message_set_reply_serial (message, 100))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SyncError ExtensionService::MergeDataAndStartSyncing(
syncable::ModelType type,
const SyncDataList& initial_sync_data,
SyncChangeProcessor* sync_processor) {
CHECK(sync_processor);
SyncBundle* bundle = NULL;
switch (type) {
case syncable::EXTENSIONS:
bundle = &extension_sync_bundle_;
bundle->filter = IsSyncableExtension;
break;
case syncable::APPS:
bundle = &app_sync_bundle_;
bundle->filter = IsSyncableApp;
break;
default:
LOG(FATAL) << "Got " << type << " ModelType";
}
bundle->sync_processor = sync_processor;
for (SyncDataList::const_iterator i = initial_sync_data.begin();
i != initial_sync_data.end();
++i) {
ExtensionSyncData extension_sync_data = ExtensionSyncData(*i);
bundle->synced_extensions.insert(extension_sync_data.id());
ProcessExtensionSyncData(extension_sync_data, *bundle);
}
SyncDataList sync_data_list = GetAllSyncData(type);
SyncChangeList sync_change_list;
for (SyncDataList::const_iterator i = sync_data_list.begin();
i != sync_data_list.end();
++i) {
if (bundle->HasExtensionId(i->GetTag()))
sync_change_list.push_back(SyncChange(SyncChange::ACTION_UPDATE, *i));
else
sync_change_list.push_back(SyncChange(SyncChange::ACTION_ADD, *i));
}
bundle->sync_processor->ProcessSyncChanges(FROM_HERE, sync_change_list);
return SyncError();
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_h_kerning(hb_font_t *font, void *font_data, hb_codepoint_t first,
hb_codepoint_t second, void *user_data)
{
FT_Face face = font_data;
FT_Vector kern;
if (FT_Get_Kerning(face, first, second, FT_KERNING_DEFAULT, &kern))
return 0;
return kern.x;
}
Commit Message: shaper: fix reallocation
Update the variable that tracks the allocated size. This potentially
improves performance and avoid some side effects, which lead to
undefined behavior in some cases.
Fixes fuzzer test case id:000051,sig:11,sync:fuzzer3,src:004221.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 73,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ext_t_1_wml_10(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 value, guint32 str_tbl)
{
char *str = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "Variable substitution - unescaped: '%s'",
tvb_get_const_stringz(tvb, str_tbl + value, NULL));
return str;
}
Commit Message: WBXML: add a basic sanity check for offset overflow
This is a naive approach allowing to detact that something went wrong,
without the need to replace all proto_tree_add_text() calls as what was
done in master-2.0 branch.
Bug: 12408
Change-Id: Ia14905005e17ae322c2fc639ad5e491fa08b0108
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15310
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pascal Quantin <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void WT_UpdateEG2 (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, const S_ENVELOPE *pEnv)
{
EAS_I32 temp;
switch (pWTVoice->eg2State)
{
case eEnvelopeStateAttack:
temp = pWTVoice->eg2Value + pWTVoice->eg2Increment;
/* check if we have reached peak amplitude */
if (temp >= SYNTH_FULL_SCALE_EG1_GAIN)
{
/* limit the volume */
temp = SYNTH_FULL_SCALE_EG1_GAIN;
/* prepare to move to decay state */
pWTVoice->eg2State = eEnvelopeStateDecay;
pWTVoice->eg2Increment = pEnv->decayTime;
}
break;
/* implement linear pitch decay in cents */
case eEnvelopeStateDecay:
temp = pWTVoice->eg2Value -pWTVoice->eg2Increment;
/* check if we have reached sustain level */
if (temp <= pEnv->sustainLevel)
{
/* enforce the sustain level */
temp = pEnv->sustainLevel;
/* prepare to move to sustain state */
pWTVoice->eg2State = eEnvelopeStateSustain;
}
break;
case eEnvelopeStateSustain:
return;
case eEnvelopeStateRelease:
temp = pWTVoice->eg2Value - pWTVoice->eg2Increment;
if (temp <= 0)
{
temp = 0;
pWTVoice->eg2State = eEnvelopeStateMuted;
}
break;
/* voice is muted, set target to zero */
case eEnvelopeStateMuted:
temp = 0;
break;
case eEnvelopeStateInvalid:
default:
temp = 0;
#ifdef _DEBUG_SYNTH
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_INFO, "WT_UpdateEG2: error, %d is an unrecognized state\n",
pWTVoice->eg2State); */ }
#endif
break;
}
pWTVoice->eg2Value = (EAS_I16) temp;
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: views::View* TrayPower::CreateDetailedView(user::LoginStatus status) {
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ash: Fix right-alignment of power-status text.
It turns out setting ALING_RIGHT on a Label isn't enough to get proper
right-aligned text. Label has to be explicitly told that it is multi-lined.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9918026
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@129898 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 106,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TreeView::CreateRootItems() {
DCHECK(model_);
DCHECK(tree_view_);
TreeModelNode* root = model_->GetRoot();
if (root_shown_) {
CreateItem(NULL, TVI_LAST, root);
} else {
for (int i = 0; i < model_->GetChildCount(root); ++i)
CreateItem(NULL, TVI_LAST, model_->GetChild(root, i));
}
}
Commit Message: Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static zval *spl_array_read_dimension_ex(int check_inherited, zval *object, zval *offset, int type TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval **ret;
if (check_inherited) {
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->fptr_offset_get) {
zval *rv;
if (!offset) {
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(offset);
} else {
SEPARATE_ARG_IF_REF(offset);
}
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&object, Z_OBJCE_P(object), &intern->fptr_offset_get, "offsetGet", &rv, offset);
zval_ptr_dtor(&offset);
if (rv) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&intern->retval);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(intern->retval);
ZVAL_ZVAL(intern->retval, rv, 1, 1);
return intern->retval;
}
return EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr);
}
}
ret = spl_array_get_dimension_ptr_ptr(check_inherited, object, offset, type TSRMLS_CC);
/* When in a write context,
* ZE has to be fooled into thinking this is in a reference set
* by separating (if necessary) and returning as an is_ref=1 zval (even if refcount == 1) */
if ((type == BP_VAR_W || type == BP_VAR_RW || type == BP_VAR_UNSET) && !Z_ISREF_PP(ret) && ret != &EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr)) {
if (Z_REFCOUNT_PP(ret) > 1) {
zval *newval;
/* Separate */
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(newval);
*newval = **ret;
zval_copy_ctor(newval);
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(newval, 1);
/* Replace */
Z_DELREF_PP(ret);
*ret = newval;
}
Z_SET_ISREF_PP(ret);
}
return *ret;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73029 - Missing type check when unserializing SplArray
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 49,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs_init(void)
{
rootnfsopts = xstrdup("v3,tcp");
globalvar_add_simple_string("linux.rootnfsopts", &rootnfsopts);
return register_fs_driver(&nfs_driver);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MarginInfo::MarginInfo(RenderBlockFlow* blockFlow, LayoutUnit beforeBorderPadding, LayoutUnit afterBorderPadding)
: m_canCollapseMarginAfterWithLastChild(true)
, m_atBeforeSideOfBlock(true)
, m_atAfterSideOfBlock(false)
, m_hasMarginBeforeQuirk(false)
, m_hasMarginAfterQuirk(false)
, m_determinedMarginBeforeQuirk(false)
, m_discardMargin(false)
{
RenderStyle* blockStyle = blockFlow->style();
ASSERT(blockFlow->isRenderView() || blockFlow->parent());
m_canCollapseWithChildren = !blockFlow->createsBlockFormattingContext() && !blockFlow->isRenderFlowThread() && !blockFlow->isRenderView();
m_canCollapseMarginBeforeWithChildren = m_canCollapseWithChildren && !beforeBorderPadding && blockStyle->marginBeforeCollapse() != MSEPARATE;
m_canCollapseMarginAfterWithChildren = m_canCollapseWithChildren && !afterBorderPadding
&& (blockStyle->logicalHeight().isAuto() && !blockStyle->logicalHeight().value()) && blockStyle->marginAfterCollapse() != MSEPARATE;
m_quirkContainer = blockFlow->isTableCell() || blockFlow->isBody();
m_discardMargin = m_canCollapseMarginBeforeWithChildren && blockFlow->mustDiscardMarginBefore();
m_positiveMargin = (m_canCollapseMarginBeforeWithChildren && !blockFlow->mustDiscardMarginBefore()) ? blockFlow->maxPositiveMarginBefore() : LayoutUnit();
m_negativeMargin = (m_canCollapseMarginBeforeWithChildren && !blockFlow->mustDiscardMarginBefore()) ? blockFlow->maxNegativeMarginBefore() : LayoutUnit();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ForwardGestureEventWithLatencyInfo(
const blink::WebGestureEvent& gesture_event,
const ui::LatencyInfo& latency) {
TRACE_EVENT1("input", "RenderWidgetHostImpl::ForwardGestureEvent", "type",
WebInputEvent::GetName(gesture_event.GetType()));
if (ShouldDropInputEvents())
return;
bool scroll_update_needs_wrapping = false;
if (gesture_event.GetType() == blink::WebInputEvent::kGestureScrollBegin) {
DCHECK(!is_in_gesture_scroll_[gesture_event.SourceDevice()] ||
FlingCancellationIsDeferred());
is_in_gesture_scroll_[gesture_event.SourceDevice()] = true;
} else if (gesture_event.GetType() ==
blink::WebInputEvent::kGestureScrollEnd) {
DCHECK(is_in_gesture_scroll_[gesture_event.SourceDevice()]);
is_in_gesture_scroll_[gesture_event.SourceDevice()] = false;
is_in_touchpad_gesture_fling_ = false;
if (view_)
view_->set_is_currently_scrolling_viewport(false);
} else if (gesture_event.GetType() ==
blink::WebInputEvent::kGestureFlingStart) {
if (gesture_event.SourceDevice() ==
blink::WebGestureDevice::kWebGestureDeviceTouchpad) {
if (GetView()->IsInVR()) {
DCHECK(is_in_gesture_scroll_[gesture_event.SourceDevice()]);
is_in_gesture_scroll_[gesture_event.SourceDevice()] = false;
} else {
}
is_in_touchpad_gesture_fling_ = true;
} else {
DCHECK(is_in_gesture_scroll_[gesture_event.SourceDevice()]);
}
}
scroll_update_needs_wrapping =
gesture_event.GetType() == blink::WebInputEvent::kGestureScrollUpdate &&
gesture_event.resending_plugin_id != -1 &&
!is_in_gesture_scroll_[gesture_event.SourceDevice()];
if (scroll_update_needs_wrapping) {
ForwardGestureEventWithLatencyInfo(
CreateScrollBeginForWrapping(gesture_event),
ui::WebInputEventTraits::CreateLatencyInfoForWebGestureEvent(
gesture_event));
}
if (delegate_->PreHandleGestureEvent(gesture_event))
return;
GestureEventWithLatencyInfo gesture_with_latency(gesture_event, latency);
DispatchInputEventWithLatencyInfo(gesture_event,
&gesture_with_latency.latency);
input_router_->SendGestureEvent(gesture_with_latency);
if (scroll_update_needs_wrapping) {
ForwardGestureEventWithLatencyInfo(
CreateScrollEndForWrapping(gesture_event),
ui::WebInputEventTraits::CreateLatencyInfoForWebGestureEvent(
gesture_event));
}
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: server_unresponsive(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
/*
* We need to wait 2 echo intervals to make sure we handle such
* situations right:
* 1s client sends a normal SMB request
* 2s client gets a response
* 30s echo workqueue job pops, and decides we got a response recently
* and don't need to send another
* ...
* 65s kernel_recvmsg times out, and we see that we haven't gotten
* a response in >60s.
*/
if (server->tcpStatus == CifsGood &&
time_after(jiffies, server->lstrp + 2 * SMB_ECHO_INTERVAL)) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Server %s has not responded in %d seconds. Reconnecting...\n",
server->hostname, (2 * SMB_ECHO_INTERVAL) / HZ);
cifs_reconnect(server);
wake_up(&server->response_q);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect GetSplitViewRightWindowBounds(aura::Window* window) {
return split_view_controller()->GetSnappedWindowBoundsInScreen(
window, SplitViewController::RIGHT);
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tt_cmap4_char_map_linear( TT_CMap cmap,
FT_UInt32* pcharcode,
FT_Bool next )
{
FT_UInt num_segs2, start, end, offset;
FT_Int delta;
FT_UInt i, num_segs;
FT_UInt32 charcode = *pcharcode;
FT_UInt gindex = 0;
FT_Byte* p;
p = cmap->data + 6;
num_segs2 = FT_PAD_FLOOR( TT_PEEK_USHORT( p ), 2 );
num_segs = num_segs2 >> 1;
if ( !num_segs )
return 0;
if ( next )
charcode++;
/* linear search */
for ( ; charcode <= 0xFFFFU; charcode++ )
{
FT_Byte* q;
p = cmap->data + 14; /* ends table */
q = cmap->data + 16 + num_segs2; /* starts table */
for ( i = 0; i < num_segs; i++ )
{
end = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
start = TT_NEXT_USHORT( q );
if ( charcode >= start && charcode <= end )
{
p = q - 2 + num_segs2;
delta = TT_PEEK_SHORT( p );
p += num_segs2;
offset = TT_PEEK_USHORT( p );
/* some fonts have an incorrect last segment; */
/* we have to catch it */
if ( i >= num_segs - 1 &&
start == 0xFFFFU && end == 0xFFFFU )
{
TT_Face face = (TT_Face)cmap->cmap.charmap.face;
FT_Byte* limit = face->cmap_table + face->cmap_size;
if ( offset && p + offset + 2 > limit )
{
delta = 1;
offset = 0;
}
}
if ( offset == 0xFFFFU )
continue;
if ( offset )
{
p += offset + ( charcode - start ) * 2;
gindex = TT_PEEK_USHORT( p );
if ( gindex != 0 )
gindex = (FT_UInt)( gindex + delta ) & 0xFFFFU;
}
else
gindex = (FT_UInt)( charcode + delta ) & 0xFFFFU;
break;
}
}
if ( !next || gindex )
break;
}
if ( next && gindex )
*pcharcode = charcode;
return gindex;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 4,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int intel_pmu_drain_bts_buffer(void)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
struct debug_store *ds = cpuc->ds;
struct bts_record {
u64 from;
u64 to;
u64 flags;
};
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[X86_PMC_IDX_FIXED_BTS];
struct bts_record *at, *top;
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_event_header header;
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct pt_regs regs;
if (!event)
return 0;
if (!x86_pmu.bts_active)
return 0;
at = (struct bts_record *)(unsigned long)ds->bts_buffer_base;
top = (struct bts_record *)(unsigned long)ds->bts_index;
if (top <= at)
return 0;
ds->bts_index = ds->bts_buffer_base;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
regs.ip = 0;
/*
* Prepare a generic sample, i.e. fill in the invariant fields.
* We will overwrite the from and to address before we output
* the sample.
*/
perf_prepare_sample(&header, &data, event, ®s);
if (perf_output_begin(&handle, event, header.size * (top - at), 1, 1))
return 1;
for (; at < top; at++) {
data.ip = at->from;
data.addr = at->to;
perf_output_sample(&handle, &header, &data, event);
}
perf_output_end(&handle);
/* There's new data available. */
event->hw.interrupts++;
event->pending_kill = POLL_IN;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 165,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_conjunctions(const struct ofputil_flow_mod *fm,
struct cls_conjunction **conjsp, size_t *n_conjsp)
{
struct cls_conjunction *conjs = NULL;
int n_conjs = 0;
const struct ofpact *ofpact;
OFPACT_FOR_EACH (ofpact, fm->ofpacts, fm->ofpacts_len) {
if (ofpact->type == OFPACT_CONJUNCTION) {
n_conjs++;
} else if (ofpact->type != OFPACT_NOTE) {
/* "conjunction" may appear with "note" actions but not with any
* other type of actions. */
ovs_assert(!n_conjs);
break;
}
}
if (n_conjs) {
int i = 0;
conjs = xzalloc(n_conjs * sizeof *conjs);
OFPACT_FOR_EACH (ofpact, fm->ofpacts, fm->ofpacts_len) {
if (ofpact->type == OFPACT_CONJUNCTION) {
struct ofpact_conjunction *oc = ofpact_get_CONJUNCTION(ofpact);
conjs[i].clause = oc->clause;
conjs[i].n_clauses = oc->n_clauses;
conjs[i].id = oc->id;
i++;
}
}
}
*conjsp = conjs;
*n_conjsp = n_conjs;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseDocument(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar start[4];
xmlCharEncoding enc;
xmlInitParser();
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->input == NULL))
return(-1);
GROW;
/*
* SAX: detecting the level.
*/
xmlDetectSAX2(ctxt);
/*
* SAX: beginning of the document processing.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator))
ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator(ctxt->userData, &xmlDefaultSAXLocator);
if ((ctxt->encoding == (const xmlChar *)XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) &&
((ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur) >= 4)) {
/*
* Get the 4 first bytes and decode the charset
* if enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE
* plug some encoding conversion routines.
*/
start[0] = RAW;
start[1] = NXT(1);
start[2] = NXT(2);
start[3] = NXT(3);
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding(&start[0], 4);
if (enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) {
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
}
}
if (CUR == 0) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY, NULL);
}
/*
* Check for the XMLDecl in the Prolog.
* do not GROW here to avoid the detected encoder to decode more
* than just the first line, unless the amount of data is really
* too small to hold "<?xml version="1.0" encoding="foo"
*/
if ((ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur) < 35) {
GROW;
}
if ((CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) && (IS_BLANK_CH(NXT(5)))) {
/*
* Note that we will switch encoding on the fly.
*/
xmlParseXMLDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right here
*/
return(-1);
}
ctxt->standalone = ctxt->input->standalone;
SKIP_BLANKS;
} else {
ctxt->version = xmlCharStrdup(XML_DEFAULT_VERSION);
}
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->startDocument) && (!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->startDocument(ctxt->userData);
/*
* The Misc part of the Prolog
*/
GROW;
xmlParseMisc(ctxt);
/*
* Then possibly doc type declaration(s) and more Misc
* (doctypedecl Misc*)?
*/
GROW;
if (CMP9(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', 'D', 'O', 'C', 'T', 'Y', 'P', 'E')) {
ctxt->inSubset = 1;
xmlParseDocTypeDecl(ctxt);
if (RAW == '[') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
xmlParseInternalSubset(ctxt);
}
/*
* Create and update the external subset.
*/
ctxt->inSubset = 2;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->externalSubset != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->externalSubset(ctxt->userData, ctxt->intSubName,
ctxt->extSubSystem, ctxt->extSubURI);
ctxt->inSubset = 0;
xmlCleanSpecialAttr(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PROLOG;
xmlParseMisc(ctxt);
}
/*
* Time to start parsing the tree itself
*/
GROW;
if (RAW != '<') {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY,
"Start tag expected, '<' not found\n");
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
xmlParseElement(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
/*
* The Misc part at the end
*/
xmlParseMisc(ctxt);
if (RAW != 0) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_END, NULL);
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
}
/*
* SAX: end of the document processing.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
/*
* Remove locally kept entity definitions if the tree was not built
*/
if ((ctxt->myDoc != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(ctxt->myDoc->version, SAX_COMPAT_MODE))) {
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
if ((ctxt->wellFormed) && (ctxt->myDoc != NULL)) {
ctxt->myDoc->properties |= XML_DOC_WELLFORMED;
if (ctxt->valid)
ctxt->myDoc->properties |= XML_DOC_DTDVALID;
if (ctxt->nsWellFormed)
ctxt->myDoc->properties |= XML_DOC_NSVALID;
if (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10)
ctxt->myDoc->properties |= XML_DOC_OLD10;
}
if (! ctxt->wellFormed) {
ctxt->valid = 0;
return(-1);
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GrantPermissionsForFileSystem(const std::string& filesystem_id,
int permissions) {
if (!base::ContainsKey(filesystem_permissions_, filesystem_id))
storage::IsolatedContext::GetInstance()->AddReference(filesystem_id);
filesystem_permissions_[filesystem_id] |= permissions;
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID: | 0 | 143,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AsyncReadPixelsCompletedQuery::Destroy(bool /* have_context */) {
if (!IsDeleted()) {
MarkAsDeleted();
}
}
Commit Message: Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset)
{
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
/*
* We're here if L1 chose not to trap WRMSR to TSC. According
* to the spec, this should set L1's TSC; The offset that L1
* set for L2 remains unchanged, and still needs to be added
* to the newly set TSC to get L2's TSC.
*/
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;
to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmcs01_tsc_offset = offset;
/* recalculate vmcs02.TSC_OFFSET: */
vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, offset +
(nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETING) ?
vmcs12->tsc_offset : 0));
} else {
trace_kvm_write_tsc_offset(vcpu->vcpu_id,
vmcs_read64(TSC_OFFSET), offset);
vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, offset);
}
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResourceFetcher* XSLStyleSheet::fetcher()
{
Document* document = ownerDocument();
if (!document)
return 0;
return document->fetcher();
}
Commit Message: Avoid reparsing an XSLT stylesheet after the first failure.
Certain libxslt versions appear to leave the doc in an invalid state when parsing fails. We should cache this result and avoid re-parsing.
(The test cannot be converted to text-only due to its invalid stylesheet).
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
BUG=271939
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23103007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@156248 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Type_Signature_Free(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, void* Ptr)
{
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, Ptr);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 71,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dump(int fd)
{
btif_debug_dump(fd);
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UrlData::set_valid_until(base::Time valid_until) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
valid_until_ = valid_until;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: line_construct_pts(LINE *line, Point *pt1, Point *pt2)
{
if (FPeq(pt1->x, pt2->x))
{ /* vertical */
/* use "x = C" */
line->A = -1;
line->B = 0;
line->C = pt1->x;
#ifdef GEODEBUG
printf("line_construct_pts- line is vertical\n");
#endif
}
else if (FPeq(pt1->y, pt2->y))
{ /* horizontal */
/* use "y = C" */
line->A = 0;
line->B = -1;
line->C = pt1->y;
#ifdef GEODEBUG
printf("line_construct_pts- line is horizontal\n");
#endif
}
else
{
/* use "mx - y + yinter = 0" */
line->A = (pt2->y - pt1->y) / (pt2->x - pt1->x);
line->B = -1.0;
line->C = pt1->y - line->A * pt1->x;
/* on some platforms, the preceding expression tends to produce -0 */
if (line->C == 0.0)
line->C = 0.0;
#ifdef GEODEBUG
printf("line_construct_pts- line is neither vertical nor horizontal (diffs x=%.*g, y=%.*g\n",
DBL_DIG, (pt2->x - pt1->x), DBL_DIG, (pt2->y - pt1->y));
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ext4_ext_truncate(struct inode *inode)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_lblk_t last_block;
handle_t *handle;
int err = 0;
/*
* finish any pending end_io work so we won't run the risk of
* converting any truncated blocks to initialized later
*/
ext4_flush_completed_IO(inode);
/*
* probably first extent we're gonna free will be last in block
*/
err = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, err);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return;
if (inode->i_size & (sb->s_blocksize - 1))
ext4_block_truncate_page(handle, mapping, inode->i_size);
if (ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode))
goto out_stop;
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_ext_invalidate_cache(inode);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
/*
* TODO: optimization is possible here.
* Probably we need not scan at all,
* because page truncation is enough.
*/
/* we have to know where to truncate from in crash case */
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = inode->i_size;
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
last_block = (inode->i_size + sb->s_blocksize - 1)
>> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
err = ext4_ext_remove_space(inode, last_block);
/* In a multi-transaction truncate, we only make the final
* transaction synchronous.
*/
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
out_stop:
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
/*
* If this was a simple ftruncate() and the file will remain alive,
* then we need to clear up the orphan record which we created above.
* However, if this was a real unlink then we were called by
* ext4_delete_inode(), and we allow that function to clean up the
* orphan info for us.
*/
if (inode->i_nlink)
ext4_orphan_del(handle, inode);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 34,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_excluded_envvar(void)
{
struct strbuf *item_list = strbuf_new();
const char *fmt = "%s";
GtkTreeIter iter;
if (gtk_tree_model_get_iter_first(GTK_TREE_MODEL(g_ls_details), &iter))
{
do {
gchar *item_name = NULL;
gboolean checked = 0;
gtk_tree_model_get(GTK_TREE_MODEL(g_ls_details), &iter,
DETAIL_COLUMN_NAME, &item_name,
DETAIL_COLUMN_CHECKBOX, &checked,
-1);
if (!item_name) /* paranoia, should never happen */
continue;
if (!checked)
{
strbuf_append_strf(item_list, fmt, item_name);
fmt = ",%s";
}
g_free(item_name);
} while (gtk_tree_model_iter_next(GTK_TREE_MODEL(g_ls_details), &iter));
}
char *var = strbuf_free_nobuf(item_list);
if (var)
{
xsetenv("EXCLUDE_FROM_REPORT", var);
free(var);
}
else
unsetenv("EXCLUDE_FROM_REPORT");
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sixel_put_flash(sixel_output_t *const context)
{
int n;
int nwrite;
#if defined(USE_VT240) /* VT240 Max 255 ? */
while (context->save_count > 255) {
nwrite = spritf((char *)context->buffer + context->pos, "!255%c", context->save_pixel);
if (nwrite <= 0) {
return (-1);
}
sixel_advance(context, nwrite);
context->save_count -= 255;
}
#endif /* defined(USE_VT240) */
if (context->save_count > 3) {
/* DECGRI Graphics Repeat Introducer ! Pn Ch */
nwrite = sprintf((char *)context->buffer + context->pos, "!%d%c", context->save_count, context->save_pixel);
if (nwrite <= 0) {
return (-1);
}
sixel_advance(context, nwrite);
} else {
for (n = 0; n < context->save_count; n++) {
context->buffer[context->pos] = (char)context->save_pixel;
sixel_advance(context, 1);
}
}
context->save_pixel = 0;
context->save_count = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pxa2xx_ssp_fifo_update(PXA2xxSSPState *s)
{
s->sssr &= ~(0xf << 12); /* Clear RFL */
s->sssr &= ~(0xf << 8); /* Clear TFL */
s->sssr &= ~SSSR_TFS;
s->sssr &= ~SSSR_TNF;
if (s->enable) {
s->sssr |= ((s->rx_level - 1) & 0xf) << 12;
if (s->rx_level >= SSCR1_RFT(s->sscr[1]))
s->sssr |= SSSR_RFS;
else
s->sssr &= ~SSSR_RFS;
if (s->rx_level)
s->sssr |= SSSR_RNE;
else
s->sssr &= ~SSSR_RNE;
/* TX FIFO is never filled, so it is always in underrun
condition if SSP is enabled */
s->sssr |= SSSR_TFS;
s->sssr |= SSSR_TNF;
}
pxa2xx_ssp_int_update(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Extension::HasAPIPermissionForTab(int tab_id,
APIPermission::ID permission) const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_data_lock_);
if (runtime_data_.GetActivePermissions()->HasAPIPermission(permission))
return true;
scoped_refptr<const PermissionSet> tab_specific_permissions =
runtime_data_.GetTabSpecificPermissions(tab_id);
return tab_specific_permissions.get() &&
tab_specific_permissions->HasAPIPermission(permission);
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 114,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd_init_raparms(struct file *file)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
dev_t dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
ino_t ino = inode->i_ino;
struct raparms *ra, **rap, **frap = NULL;
int depth = 0;
unsigned int hash;
struct raparm_hbucket *rab;
hash = jhash_2words(dev, ino, 0xfeedbeef) & RAPARM_HASH_MASK;
rab = &raparm_hash[hash];
spin_lock(&rab->pb_lock);
for (rap = &rab->pb_head; (ra = *rap); rap = &ra->p_next) {
if (ra->p_ino == ino && ra->p_dev == dev)
goto found;
depth++;
if (ra->p_count == 0)
frap = rap;
}
depth = nfsdstats.ra_size;
if (!frap) {
spin_unlock(&rab->pb_lock);
return NULL;
}
rap = frap;
ra = *frap;
ra->p_dev = dev;
ra->p_ino = ino;
ra->p_set = 0;
ra->p_hindex = hash;
found:
if (rap != &rab->pb_head) {
*rap = ra->p_next;
ra->p_next = rab->pb_head;
rab->pb_head = ra;
}
ra->p_count++;
nfsdstats.ra_depth[depth*10/nfsdstats.ra_size]++;
spin_unlock(&rab->pb_lock);
if (ra->p_set)
file->f_ra = ra->p_ra;
return ra;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::RequestToLockMouse(bool user_gesture,
bool last_unlocked_by_target) {
delegate_->RequestToLockMouse(user_gesture, last_unlocked_by_target);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void inverse_mdct(float *buffer, int n, vorb *f, int blocktype)
{
mdct_lookup *M;
if (M1.n == n) M = &M1;
else if (M2.n == n) M = &M2;
else if (M1.n == 0) { mdct_init(&M1, n); M = &M1; }
else {
if (M2.n) __asm int 3;
mdct_init(&M2, n);
M = &M2;
}
mdct_backward(M, buffer, buffer);
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 75,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmsvga_invalidate_display(void *opaque)
{
struct vmsvga_state_s *s = opaque;
if (!s->enable) {
s->vga.hw_ops->invalidate(&s->vga);
return;
}
s->invalidated = 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptPromise VRDisplay::exitPresent(ScriptState* script_state) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::Create(script_state);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->Promise();
if (!is_presenting_) {
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError, "VRDisplay is not presenting.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
return promise;
}
if (!display_) {
DOMException* exception =
DOMException::Create(kInvalidStateError, "VRService is not available.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
return promise;
}
display_->ExitPresent();
resolver->Resolve();
StopPresenting();
return promise;
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int prb_curr_blk_in_use(struct tpacket_kbdq_core *pkc,
struct tpacket_block_desc *pbd)
{
return TP_STATUS_USER & BLOCK_STATUS(pbd);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
{
__audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
}
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 51,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int WavpackStoreMD5Sum (WavpackContext *wpc, unsigned char data [16])
{
return add_to_metadata (wpc, data, 16, (wpc->config.qmode & 0xff) ? ID_ALT_MD5_CHECKSUM : ID_MD5_CHECKSUM);
}
Commit Message: issue #53: error out on zero sample rate
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 75,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(statIndex)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *self = getThis();
zend_long index, flags = 0;
struct zip_stat sb;
if (!self) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, self);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "l|l",
&index, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (zip_stat_index(intern, index, flags, &sb) != 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_SB(&sb);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 54,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int shift_data(AVFormatContext *s)
{
int ret = 0, moov_size;
MOVMuxContext *mov = s->priv_data;
int64_t pos, pos_end = avio_tell(s->pb);
uint8_t *buf, *read_buf[2];
int read_buf_id = 0;
int read_size[2];
AVIOContext *read_pb;
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_FRAGMENT)
moov_size = compute_sidx_size(s);
else
moov_size = compute_moov_size(s);
if (moov_size < 0)
return moov_size;
buf = av_malloc(moov_size * 2);
if (!buf)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
read_buf[0] = buf;
read_buf[1] = buf + moov_size;
/* Shift the data: the AVIO context of the output can only be used for
* writing, so we re-open the same output, but for reading. It also avoids
* a read/seek/write/seek back and forth. */
avio_flush(s->pb);
ret = s->io_open(s, &read_pb, s->url, AVIO_FLAG_READ, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to re-open %s output file for "
"the second pass (faststart)\n", s->url);
goto end;
}
/* mark the end of the shift to up to the last data we wrote, and get ready
* for writing */
pos_end = avio_tell(s->pb);
avio_seek(s->pb, mov->reserved_header_pos + moov_size, SEEK_SET);
/* start reading at where the new moov will be placed */
avio_seek(read_pb, mov->reserved_header_pos, SEEK_SET);
pos = avio_tell(read_pb);
#define READ_BLOCK do { \
read_size[read_buf_id] = avio_read(read_pb, read_buf[read_buf_id], moov_size); \
read_buf_id ^= 1; \
} while (0)
/* shift data by chunk of at most moov_size */
READ_BLOCK;
do {
int n;
READ_BLOCK;
n = read_size[read_buf_id];
if (n <= 0)
break;
avio_write(s->pb, read_buf[read_buf_id], n);
pos += n;
} while (pos < pos_end);
ff_format_io_close(s, &read_pb);
end:
av_free(buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ComputedAccessibleNode* Document::GetOrCreateComputedAccessibleNode(
AXID ax_id,
WebComputedAXTree* tree) {
if (computed_node_mapping_.find(ax_id) == computed_node_mapping_.end()) {
ComputedAccessibleNode* node =
ComputedAccessibleNode::Create(ax_id, tree, this);
computed_node_mapping_.insert(ax_id, node);
}
return computed_node_mapping_.at(ax_id);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageInputType::createShadowSubtree()
{
if (!m_useFallbackContent) {
BaseButtonInputType::createShadowSubtree();
return;
}
HTMLImageFallbackHelper::createAltTextShadowTree(element());
}
Commit Message: ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent should recreate UA shadow tree.
Once the fallback shadow tree was created, it was never recreated even if
ensurePrimaryContent was called. Such situation happens by updating |src|
attribute.
BUG=589838
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1732753004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#377804}
CWE ID: CWE-361 | 0 | 133,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AddChromeOSUserStrings(content::WebUIDataSource* html_source,
Profile* profile) {
user_manager::UserManager* user_manager = user_manager::UserManager::Get();
const user_manager::User* user =
chromeos::ProfileHelper::Get()->GetUserByProfile(profile);
const user_manager::User* primary_user = user_manager->GetPrimaryUser();
std::string primary_user_email = primary_user->GetAccountId().GetUserEmail();
html_source->AddString("primaryUserEmail", primary_user_email);
html_source->AddBoolean(
"isSecondaryUser",
user && user->GetAccountId() != primary_user->GetAccountId());
html_source->AddString(
"secondaryUserBannerText",
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_SETTINGS_SECONDARY_USER_BANNER,
base::ASCIIToUTF16(primary_user_email)));
policy::BrowserPolicyConnectorChromeOS* connector =
g_browser_process->platform_part()->browser_policy_connector_chromeos();
if (!connector->IsEnterpriseManaged() &&
!user_manager->IsCurrentUserOwner()) {
html_source->AddString("ownerEmail",
user_manager->GetOwnerAccountId().GetUserEmail());
}
}
Commit Message: [md-settings] Clarify Password Saving and Autofill Toggles
This change clarifies the wording around the password saving and
autofill toggles.
Bug: 822465
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I91b31fe61cd0754239f7908e8c04c7e69b72f670
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/970541
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544661}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 148,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void lsi_resume_script(LSIState *s)
{
if (s->waiting != 2) {
s->waiting = LSI_NOWAIT;
lsi_execute_script(s);
} else {
s->waiting = LSI_NOWAIT;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 3,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHost::InitializeThreaded(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> main_task_runner,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> impl_task_runner) {
task_runner_provider_ =
TaskRunnerProvider::Create(main_task_runner, impl_task_runner);
std::unique_ptr<ProxyMain> proxy_main =
base::MakeUnique<ProxyMain>(this, task_runner_provider_.get());
InitializeProxy(std::move(proxy_main));
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void toplevelWindowResizeGripVisibilityChanged(GObject* object, GParamSpec*, WebKitWebViewBase* webViewBase)
{
webkitWebViewBaseNotifyResizerSizeForWindow(webViewBase, GTK_WINDOW(object));
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPICE_GNUC_VISIBLE int spice_server_set_agent_mouse(SpiceServer *s, int enable)
{
spice_assert(reds == s);
agent_mouse = enable;
reds_update_mouse_mode();
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vrrp_vroutes_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
alloc_value_block(alloc_vrrp_vroute, vector_slot(strvec, 0));
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Framebuffer::UnbindTexture(
GLenum target, TextureRef* texture_ref) {
bool done;
do {
done = true;
for (AttachmentMap::const_iterator it = attachments_.begin();
it != attachments_.end(); ++it) {
Attachment* attachment = it->second.get();
if (attachment->IsTexture(texture_ref)) {
AttachTexture(it->first, NULL, GL_TEXTURE_2D, 0, 0);
done = false;
break;
}
}
} while (!done);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int channel_exec (lua_State *L, int status, lua_KContext ctx) {
int rc;
LIBSSH2_CHANNEL **channel = (LIBSSH2_CHANNEL **) lua_touserdata(L, 2);
const char *cmd = luaL_checkstring(L, 3);
while ((rc = libssh2_channel_exec(*channel, cmd)) == LIBSSH2_ERROR_EAGAIN) {
luaL_getmetafield(L, 1, "filter");
lua_pushvalue(L, 1);
lua_callk(L, 1, 0, 0, channel_exec);
}
if (rc != 0)
return luaL_error(L, "Error executing command");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Avoid a crash (double-free) when SSH connection fails
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 93,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int adev_set_master_mute(struct audio_hw_device *dev, bool muted)
{
(void)dev;
(void)muted;
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,253 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SetCriticalEvent(int event)
{
if (event >= MAXEVENTS)
FatalError("SetCriticalEvent: bogus event number");
criticalEvents[event >> 3] |= 1 << (event & 7);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InputHandler::ScrollStatus LayerTreeHostImpl::ScrollAnimated(
const gfx::Point& viewport_point,
const gfx::Vector2dF& scroll_delta,
base::TimeDelta delayed_by) {
InputHandler::ScrollStatus scroll_status;
scroll_status.main_thread_scrolling_reasons =
MainThreadScrollingReason::kNotScrollingOnMain;
ScrollTree& scroll_tree = active_tree_->property_trees()->scroll_tree;
ScrollNode* scroll_node = scroll_tree.CurrentlyScrollingNode();
if (scroll_node) {
gfx::Vector2dF delta = scroll_delta;
if (!scroll_node->user_scrollable_horizontal)
delta.set_x(0);
if (!scroll_node->user_scrollable_vertical)
delta.set_y(0);
if (ScrollAnimationUpdateTarget(scroll_node, delta, delayed_by)) {
scroll_status.thread = SCROLL_ON_IMPL_THREAD;
} else {
scroll_status.thread = SCROLL_IGNORED;
scroll_status.main_thread_scrolling_reasons =
MainThreadScrollingReason::kNotScrollable;
}
return scroll_status;
}
ScrollStateData scroll_state_data;
scroll_state_data.position_x = viewport_point.x();
scroll_state_data.position_y = viewport_point.y();
ScrollState scroll_state(scroll_state_data);
scroll_status = ScrollBegin(&scroll_state, WHEEL);
scroll_node = scroll_tree.CurrentlyScrollingNode();
if (scroll_status.thread == SCROLL_ON_IMPL_THREAD && scroll_node) {
gfx::Vector2dF pending_delta = scroll_delta;
for (; scroll_tree.parent(scroll_node);
scroll_node = scroll_tree.parent(scroll_node)) {
if (!scroll_node->scrollable)
continue;
bool scrolls_main_viewport_scroll_layer =
viewport()->MainScrollLayer() &&
viewport()->MainScrollLayer()->scroll_tree_index() == scroll_node->id;
if (scrolls_main_viewport_scroll_layer) {
gfx::Vector2dF scrolled =
viewport()->ScrollAnimated(pending_delta, delayed_by);
if (scrolled == pending_delta)
return scroll_status;
break;
}
gfx::Vector2dF scroll_delta =
ComputeScrollDelta(scroll_node, pending_delta);
if (ScrollAnimationCreate(scroll_node, scroll_delta, delayed_by))
return scroll_status;
pending_delta -= scroll_delta;
}
}
scroll_state.set_is_ending(true);
ScrollEnd(&scroll_state);
return scroll_status;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int call_netdevice_notifiers(unsigned long val, struct net_device *dev)
{
return raw_notifier_call_chain(&netdev_chain, val, dev);
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetTabId(base::DictionaryValue* tab) {
int id = kUndefinedId;
if (tab)
tab->GetInteger(keys::kIdKey, &id);
return id;
}
Commit Message: Change TemporaryAddressSpoof test to not depend on PDF OpenActions.
OpenActions that navigate to URIs are going to be blocked when
https://pdfium-review.googlesource.com/c/pdfium/+/42731 relands.
It was reverted because this test was breaking and blocking the
pdfium roll into chromium.
The test will now click on a link in the PDF that navigates to the
URI.
Bug: 851821
Change-Id: I49853e99de7b989858b1962ad4a92a4168d4c2db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1244367
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#596011}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintRenderFrameHelper::OnFramePreparedForPrintPages() {
PrintPages();
FinishFramePrinting();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t createPlugin(const uint8_t uuid[16]) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IDrm::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.write(uuid, 16);
status_t status = remote()->transact(CREATE_PLUGIN, data, &reply);
if (status != OK) {
return status;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: Fix info leak vulnerability of IDrm
bug: 26323455
Change-Id: I25bb30d3666ab38d5150496375ed2f55ecb23ba8
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Effect_Init(preproc_effect_t *effect, uint32_t procId)
{
if (HasReverseStream(procId)) {
effect->itfe = &sEffectInterfaceReverse;
} else {
effect->itfe = &sEffectInterface;
}
effect->ops = sPreProcOps[procId];
effect->procId = procId;
effect->state = PREPROC_EFFECT_STATE_INIT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::AllowWebBluetooth(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
const url::Origin& requesting_origin,
const url::Origin& embedding_origin) {
if (variations::GetVariationParamValue(
PermissionContextBase::kPermissionsKillSwitchFieldStudy,
"Bluetooth") ==
PermissionContextBase::kPermissionsKillSwitchBlockedValue) {
return AllowWebBluetoothResult::BLOCK_GLOBALLY_DISABLED;
}
const HostContentSettingsMap* const content_settings =
HostContentSettingsMapFactory::GetForProfile(
Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context));
if (content_settings->GetContentSetting(
requesting_origin.GetURL(), embedding_origin.GetURL(),
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_BLUETOOTH_GUARD,
std::string()) == CONTENT_SETTING_BLOCK) {
return AllowWebBluetoothResult::BLOCK_POLICY;
}
return AllowWebBluetoothResult::ALLOW;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,590 |
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