instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
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int64 0
175k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnGetFileCompleteForUpdateFile(
const FileOperationCallback& callback,
GDataFileError error,
const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
const FilePath& cache_file_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(error);
return;
}
GDataFileError* get_size_error = new GDataFileError(GDATA_FILE_ERROR_FAILED);
int64* file_size = new int64(-1);
util::PostBlockingPoolSequencedTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE,
blocking_task_runner_,
base::Bind(&GetLocalFileSizeOnBlockingPool,
cache_file_path,
get_size_error,
file_size),
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnGetFileSizeCompleteForUpdateFile,
ui_weak_ptr_,
callback,
resource_id,
md5,
cache_file_path,
base::Owned(get_size_error),
base::Owned(file_size)));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 116,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::enableEncryptedMedia(bool enable)
{
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::setEncryptedMediaEnabled(enable);
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::setEncryptedMediaAnyVersionEnabled(
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::encryptedMediaEnabled()
|| RuntimeEnabledFeatures::prefixedEncryptedMediaEnabled());
}
Commit Message: Remove SpeechSynthesis runtime flag (status=stable)
BUG=402536
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/482273005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180763 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 0 | 116,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rose_del_route_by_neigh(struct rose_neigh *rose_neigh)
{
struct rose_route *rose_route, *s;
rose_neigh->restarted = 0;
rose_stop_t0timer(rose_neigh);
rose_start_ftimer(rose_neigh);
skb_queue_purge(&rose_neigh->queue);
spin_lock_bh(&rose_route_list_lock);
rose_route = rose_route_list;
while (rose_route != NULL) {
if ((rose_route->neigh1 == rose_neigh && rose_route->neigh2 == rose_neigh) ||
(rose_route->neigh1 == rose_neigh && rose_route->neigh2 == NULL) ||
(rose_route->neigh2 == rose_neigh && rose_route->neigh1 == NULL)) {
s = rose_route->next;
rose_remove_route(rose_route);
rose_route = s;
continue;
}
if (rose_route->neigh1 == rose_neigh) {
rose_route->neigh1->use--;
rose_route->neigh1 = NULL;
rose_transmit_clear_request(rose_route->neigh2, rose_route->lci2, ROSE_OUT_OF_ORDER, 0);
}
if (rose_route->neigh2 == rose_neigh) {
rose_route->neigh2->use--;
rose_route->neigh2 = NULL;
rose_transmit_clear_request(rose_route->neigh1, rose_route->lci1, ROSE_OUT_OF_ORDER, 0);
}
rose_route = rose_route->next;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&rose_route_list_lock);
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: handle_deauth(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *src, const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
struct mgmt_body_t pbody;
const char *reason = NULL;
memset(&pbody, 0, sizeof(pbody));
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, IEEE802_11_REASON_LEN))
return 0;
if (length < IEEE802_11_REASON_LEN)
return 0;
pbody.reason_code = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
reason = (pbody.reason_code < NUM_REASONS)
? reason_text[pbody.reason_code]
: "Reserved";
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s", reason));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%s): %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, src), reason));
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13008/IEEE 802.11: Fix TIM bitmap copy to copy from p + offset.
offset has already been advanced to point to the bitmap; we shouldn't
add the amount to advance again.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, remove some redundant tests - we've already checked,
before the case statement, whether we have captured the entire
information element and whether the entire information element is
present in the on-the-wire packet; in the cases for particular IEs, we
only need to make sure we don't go past the end of the IE.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Framebuffer* GetBoundDrawFramebuffer() const {
return framebuffer_state_.bound_draw_framebuffer.get();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ati_remote2_urb_init(struct ati_remote2 *ar2)
{
struct usb_device *udev = ar2->udev;
int i, pipe, maxp;
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
ar2->buf[i] = usb_alloc_coherent(udev, 4, GFP_KERNEL, &ar2->buf_dma[i]);
if (!ar2->buf[i])
return -ENOMEM;
ar2->urb[i] = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ar2->urb[i])
return -ENOMEM;
pipe = usb_rcvintpipe(udev, ar2->ep[i]->bEndpointAddress);
maxp = usb_maxpacket(udev, pipe, usb_pipeout(pipe));
maxp = maxp > 4 ? 4 : maxp;
usb_fill_int_urb(ar2->urb[i], udev, pipe, ar2->buf[i], maxp,
i ? ati_remote2_complete_key : ati_remote2_complete_mouse,
ar2, ar2->ep[i]->bInterval);
ar2->urb[i]->transfer_dma = ar2->buf_dma[i];
ar2->urb[i]->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: ati_remote2 - fix crashes on detecting device with invalid descriptor
The ati_remote2 driver expects at least two interfaces with one
endpoint each. If given malicious descriptor that specify one
interface or no endpoints, it will crash in the probe function.
Ensure there is at least two interfaces and one endpoint for each
interface before using it.
The full disclosure: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/90
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 55,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int query_formats(AVFilterContext *ctx)
{
static const enum AVPixelFormat pix_fmts[] = {
AV_PIX_FMT_YUV410P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P,
AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY8, AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P,
AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUV411P,
AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P,
AV_PIX_FMT_NONE
};
ff_set_common_formats(ctx, ff_make_format_list(pix_fmts));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight))
list_del_init(&u->link);
unix_tot_inflight--;
}
fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight--;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <[email protected]>
Cc: David Herrmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 167,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zfilenameforall(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
file_enum *pfen;
gx_io_device *iodev = NULL;
gs_parsed_file_name_t pname;
int code = 0;
check_write_type(*op, t_string);
check_proc(op[-1]);
check_read_type(op[-2], t_string);
/* Push a mark, the iodev, devicenamelen, the scratch string, the enumerator, */
/* and the procedure, and invoke the continuation. */
check_estack(7);
/* Get the iodevice */
code = parse_file_name(op-2, &pname, i_ctx_p->LockFilePermissions, imemory);
if (code < 0)
return code;
iodev = (pname.iodev == NULL) ? iodev_default(imemory) : pname.iodev;
/* Check for several conditions that just cause us to return success */
if (pname.len == 0 || iodev->procs.enumerate_files == iodev_no_enumerate_files) {
pop(3);
return 0; /* no pattern, or device not found -- just return */
}
pfen = iodev->procs.enumerate_files(iodev, (const char *)pname.fname,
pname.len, imemory);
if (pfen == 0)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
push_mark_estack(es_for, file_cleanup);
++esp;
make_istruct(esp, 0, iodev);
++esp;
make_int(esp, r_size(op-2) - pname.len);
*++esp = *op;
++esp;
make_istruct(esp, 0, pfen);
*++esp = op[-1];
pop(3);
code = file_continue(i_ctx_p);
return (code == o_pop_estack ? o_push_estack : code);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderViewHost* WebContentsImpl::GetRenderViewHost() const {
return render_manager_.current_host();
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: g_NPN_ReleaseObject_Now(NPObject *npobj)
{
D(bugiI("NPN_ReleaseObject npobj=%p\n", npobj));
uint32_t refcount = invoke_NPN_ReleaseObject(npobj);
D(bugiD("NPN_ReleaseObject done (refcount: %d)\n", refcount));
if ((npobj->referenceCount = refcount) == 0)
npobject_destroy(npobj);
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xid_map_enter(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct sunrpc_msg *rp, const u_char *bp)
{
const struct ip *ip = NULL;
const struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL;
struct xid_map_entry *xmep;
if (!ND_TTEST(rp->rm_call.cb_vers))
return (0);
switch (IP_V((const struct ip *)bp)) {
case 4:
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
break;
case 6:
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp;
break;
default:
return (1);
}
xmep = &xid_map[xid_map_next];
if (++xid_map_next >= XIDMAPSIZE)
xid_map_next = 0;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->xid, &rp->rm_xid, sizeof(xmep->xid));
if (ip) {
xmep->ipver = 4;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(ip->ip_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(ip->ip_dst));
}
else if (ip6) {
xmep->ipver = 6;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip6->ip6_src, sizeof(ip6->ip6_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip6->ip6_dst, sizeof(ip6->ip6_dst));
}
xmep->proc = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_proc);
xmep->vers = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_vers);
return (1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13001/NFS: Don't copy more data than is in the file handle.
Also, put the buffer on the stack; no reason to make it static. (65
bytes isn't a lot.)
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_default_send_param(struct sock *sk,
char __user *optval,
unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sctp_sndrcvinfo info;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&info, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, info.sinfo_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && info.sinfo_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
if (asoc) {
asoc->default_stream = info.sinfo_stream;
asoc->default_flags = info.sinfo_flags;
asoc->default_ppid = info.sinfo_ppid;
asoc->default_context = info.sinfo_context;
asoc->default_timetolive = info.sinfo_timetolive;
} else {
sp->default_stream = info.sinfo_stream;
sp->default_flags = info.sinfo_flags;
sp->default_ppid = info.sinfo_ppid;
sp->default_context = info.sinfo_context;
sp->default_timetolive = info.sinfo_timetolive;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderThreadImpl::RenderThreadImpl(
const InProcessChildThreadParams& params,
std::unique_ptr<blink::scheduler::RendererScheduler> scheduler,
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& resource_task_queue)
: ChildThreadImpl(Options::Builder()
.InBrowserProcess(params)
.AutoStartServiceManagerConnection(false)
.ConnectToBrowser(true)
.Build()),
renderer_scheduler_(std::move(scheduler)),
categorized_worker_pool_(new CategorizedWorkerPool()),
renderer_binding_(this),
client_id_(1),
compositing_mode_watcher_binding_(this) {
Init(resource_task_queue);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct device *rdev_get_dev(struct regulator_dev *rdev)
{
return &rdev->dev;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nfs4_check_drain_bc_complete(struct nfs4_session *ses)
{
if (!test_bit(NFS4_SESSION_DRAINING, &ses->session_state) ||
ses->bc_slot_table.highest_used_slotid != NFS4_NO_SLOT)
return;
dprintk("%s COMPLETE: Session Back Channel Drained\n", __func__);
complete(&ses->bc_slot_table.complete);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __netlink_deliver_tap(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int ret;
struct netlink_tap *tmp;
if (!netlink_filter_tap(skb))
return;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(tmp, &netlink_tap_all, list) {
ret = __netlink_deliver_tap_skb(skb, tmp->dev);
if (unlikely(ret))
break;
}
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DidGetAvailableSpace(QuotaStatusCode status, int64 space) {
DCHECK_GE(space, 0);
if (quota_status_ == kQuotaStatusUnknown || quota_status_ == kQuotaStatusOk)
quota_status_ = status;
available_space_ = space;
CheckCompleted();
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeDownloadDelegate::OnDownloadStarted(const std::string& filename,
const std::string& mime_type) {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jfilename = ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(
env, filename);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jmime_type =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, mime_type);
Java_ChromeDownloadDelegate_onDownloadStarted(env, java_ref_, jfilename,
jmime_type);
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 1 | 171,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pdf_run_ri(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, const char *intent)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_gstate *gstate = pdf_flush_text(ctx, pr);
gstate->fill.color_params.ri = fz_lookup_rendering_intent(intent);
gstate->stroke.color_params.ri = gstate->fill.color_params.ri;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantRequestScheme(
int child_id,
const std::string& scheme) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
auto state = security_state_.find(child_id);
if (state == security_state_.end())
return;
state->second->GrantRequestScheme(scheme);
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID: | 0 | 143,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetIdleSocketCountInTransportSocketPool(net::HttpNetworkSession* session) {
return session->GetTransportSocketPool(
net::HttpNetworkSession::NORMAL_SOCKET_POOL)->IdleSocketCount();
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs_invalidate_mapping_nolock(struct inode *inode, struct address_space *mapping)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(inode);
if (mapping->nrpages != 0) {
int ret = invalidate_inode_pages2(mapping);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
nfsi->cache_validity &= ~NFS_INO_INVALID_DATA;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
memset(nfsi->cookieverf, 0, sizeof(nfsi->cookieverf));
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
nfs_inc_stats(inode, NFSIOS_DATAINVALIDATE);
dfprintk(PAGECACHE, "NFS: (%s/%Ld) data cache invalidated\n",
inode->i_sb->s_id, (long long)NFS_FILEID(inode));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int free_slots(struct b43_dmaring *ring)
{
return (ring->nr_slots - ring->used_slots);
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadItemImpl::MarkAsComplete() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(all_data_saved_);
end_time_ = base::Time::Now();
TransitionTo(COMPLETE);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatR8,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoPremultiply,
uint8_t,
uint8_t>(const uint8_t* source,
uint8_t* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
float scale_factor = source[3] / 255.0f;
uint8_t source_r =
static_cast<uint8_t>(static_cast<float>(source[0]) * scale_factor);
destination[0] = source_r;
source += 4;
destination += 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pit_latch_count(struct kvm *kvm, int channel)
{
struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *c =
&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels[channel];
WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock));
if (!c->count_latched) {
c->latched_count = pit_get_count(kvm, channel);
c->count_latched = c->rw_mode;
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Improve thread safety in pit
There's a race condition in the PIT emulation code in KVM. In
__kvm_migrate_pit_timer the pit_timer object is accessed without
synchronization. If the race condition occurs at the wrong time this
can crash the host kernel.
This fixes CVE-2014-3611.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 37,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::UnforgeableLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_unforgeableLongAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::UnforgeableLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnDidGetPreviewPageCount(
const PrintHostMsg_DidGetPreviewPageCount_Params& params) {
DCHECK_GT(params.page_count, 0);
base::FundamentalValue count(params.page_count);
base::FundamentalValue request_id(params.preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("onDidGetPreviewPageCount",
count,
request_id);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 105,840 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_send_pair_fail(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
p_cb->status = p_data->status;
p_cb->failure = p_data->status;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: status=%d failure=%d ", __func__, p_cb->status,
p_cb->failure);
if (p_cb->status <= SMP_MAX_FAIL_RSN_PER_SPEC &&
p_cb->status != SMP_SUCCESS) {
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_FAILED, p_cb);
p_cb->wait_for_authorization_complete = true;
}
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::IsShuttingDown() {
return browser_shutdown::GetShutdownType() != browser_shutdown::NOT_VALID;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterDDSImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry = SetMagickInfo("DDS");
entry->decoder = (DecodeImageHandler *) ReadDDSImage;
entry->encoder = (EncodeImageHandler *) WriteDDSImage;
entry->magick = (IsImageFormatHandler *) IsDDS;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description = ConstantString("Microsoft DirectDraw Surface");
entry->module = ConstantString("DDS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry = SetMagickInfo("DXT1");
entry->decoder = (DecodeImageHandler *) ReadDDSImage;
entry->encoder = (EncodeImageHandler *) WriteDDSImage;
entry->magick = (IsImageFormatHandler *) IsDDS;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description = ConstantString("Microsoft DirectDraw Surface");
entry->module = ConstantString("DDS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry = SetMagickInfo("DXT5");
entry->decoder = (DecodeImageHandler *) ReadDDSImage;
entry->encoder = (EncodeImageHandler *) WriteDDSImage;
entry->magick = (IsImageFormatHandler *) IsDDS;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description = ConstantString("Microsoft DirectDraw Surface");
entry->module = ConstantString("DDS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: Added check to prevent image being 0x0 (reported in #489).
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 65,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const char **format,
char **master_desc, char **decrypted_datalen,
char **hex_encoded_iv)
{
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int ret = -EINVAL;
int key_cmd;
int key_format;
char *p, *keyword;
keyword = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
if (!keyword) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: insufficient parameters specified\n");
return ret;
}
key_cmd = match_token(keyword, key_tokens, args);
/* Get optional format: default | ecryptfs */
p = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
if (!p) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: insufficient parameters specified\n");
return ret;
}
key_format = match_token(p, key_format_tokens, args);
switch (key_format) {
case Opt_ecryptfs:
case Opt_default:
*format = p;
*master_desc = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
break;
case Opt_error:
*master_desc = p;
break;
}
if (!*master_desc) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: master key parameter is missing\n");
goto out;
}
if (valid_master_desc(*master_desc, NULL) < 0) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: master key parameter \'%s\' "
"is invalid\n", *master_desc);
goto out;
}
if (decrypted_datalen) {
*decrypted_datalen = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
if (!*decrypted_datalen) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: keylen parameter is missing\n");
goto out;
}
}
switch (key_cmd) {
case Opt_new:
if (!decrypted_datalen) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: keyword \'%s\' not allowed "
"when called from .update method\n", keyword);
break;
}
ret = 0;
break;
case Opt_load:
if (!decrypted_datalen) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: keyword \'%s\' not allowed "
"when called from .update method\n", keyword);
break;
}
*hex_encoded_iv = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
if (!*hex_encoded_iv) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: hex blob is missing\n");
break;
}
ret = 0;
break;
case Opt_update:
if (decrypted_datalen) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: keyword \'%s\' not allowed "
"when called from .instantiate method\n",
keyword);
break;
}
ret = 0;
break;
case Opt_err:
pr_info("encrypted_key: keyword \'%s\' not recognized\n",
keyword);
break;
}
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 57,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info,
size_t callout_len, void *aux,
struct key *dest_keyring)
{
struct key_construction *cons;
request_key_actor_t actor;
struct key *authkey;
int ret;
kenter("%d,%p,%zu,%p", key->serial, callout_info, callout_len, aux);
cons = kmalloc(sizeof(*cons), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cons)
return -ENOMEM;
/* allocate an authorisation key */
authkey = request_key_auth_new(key, callout_info, callout_len,
dest_keyring);
if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
kfree(cons);
ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
authkey = NULL;
} else {
cons->authkey = key_get(authkey);
cons->key = key_get(key);
/* make the call */
actor = call_sbin_request_key;
if (key->type->request_key)
actor = key->type->request_key;
ret = actor(cons, "create", aux);
/* check that the actor called complete_request_key() prior to
* returning an error */
WARN_ON(ret < 0 &&
!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags));
key_put(authkey);
}
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull key handling fixes from David Howells:
"Here are two patches, the first of which at least should go upstream
immediately:
(1) Prevent a user-triggerable crash in the keyrings destructor when a
negatively instantiated keyring is garbage collected. I have also
seen this triggered for user type keys.
(2) Prevent the user from using requesting that a keyring be created
and instantiated through an upcall. Doing so is probably safe
since the keyring type ignores the arguments to its instantiation
function - but we probably shouldn't let keyrings be created in
this manner"
* 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring
KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyring
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsFormTextArea(PDFiumPage::Area area, int form_type) {
if (form_type == FPDF_FORMFIELD_UNKNOWN)
return false;
DCHECK_EQ(area, PDFiumPage::FormTypeToArea(form_type));
return area == PDFiumPage::FORM_TEXT_AREA;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void webkitWebViewBaseInitializeFullScreenClient(WebKitWebViewBase* webkitWebViewBase, const WKFullScreenClientGtk* wkClient)
{
webkitWebViewBase->priv->fullScreenClient.initialize(wkClient);
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLenum WebGL2RenderingContextBase::clientWaitSync(WebGLSync* sync,
GLbitfield flags,
GLuint64 timeout) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateWebGLObject("clientWaitSync", sync))
return GL_WAIT_FAILED;
if (timeout > kMaxClientWaitTimeout) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "clientWaitSync",
"timeout > MAX_CLIENT_WAIT_TIMEOUT_WEBGL");
return GL_WAIT_FAILED;
}
if (!(flags == 0 || flags == GL_SYNC_FLUSH_COMMANDS_BIT)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "clientWaitSync", "invalid flags");
return GL_WAIT_FAILED;
}
if (sync->IsSignaled()) {
return GL_ALREADY_SIGNALED;
}
sync->UpdateCache(ContextGL());
if (sync->IsSignaled()) {
return GL_CONDITION_SATISFIED;
}
return GL_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED;
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 153,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void predictor_decode_mono_3930(APEContext *ctx, int count)
{
APEPredictor *p = &ctx->predictor;
int32_t *decoded0 = ctx->decoded[0];
ape_apply_filters(ctx, ctx->decoded[0], NULL, count);
while (count--) {
*decoded0 = predictor_update_3930(p, *decoded0, 0, YDELAYA);
decoded0++;
p->buf++;
/* Have we filled the history buffer? */
if (p->buf == p->historybuffer + HISTORY_SIZE) {
memmove(p->historybuffer, p->buf,
PREDICTOR_SIZE * sizeof(*p->historybuffer));
p->buf = p->historybuffer;
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 63,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmci_transport_set_max_buffer_size(struct vsock_sock *vsk,
u64 val)
{
if (val < vmci_trans(vsk)->queue_pair_size)
vmci_trans(vsk)->queue_pair_size = val;
vmci_trans(vsk)->queue_pair_max_size = val;
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Cc: George Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_flush_fragment(AVFormatContext *s, int force)
{
MOVMuxContext *mov = s->priv_data;
int i, first_track = -1;
int64_t mdat_size = 0;
int ret;
int has_video = 0, starts_with_key = 0, first_video_track = 1;
if (!(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_FRAGMENT))
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
MOVTrack *track = &mov->tracks[i];
if (!track->end_reliable) {
AVPacket pkt;
if (!ff_interleaved_peek(s, i, &pkt, 1)) {
if (track->dts_shift != AV_NOPTS_VALUE)
pkt.dts += track->dts_shift;
track->track_duration = pkt.dts - track->start_dts;
if (pkt.pts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE)
track->end_pts = pkt.pts;
else
track->end_pts = pkt.dts;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++) {
MOVTrack *track = &mov->tracks[i];
if (track->entry <= 1)
continue;
if (get_cluster_duration(track, track->entry - 1) != 0)
continue;
track->track_duration += get_cluster_duration(track, track->entry - 2);
track->end_pts += get_cluster_duration(track, track->entry - 2);
if (!mov->missing_duration_warned) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Estimating the duration of the last packet in a "
"fragment, consider setting the duration field in "
"AVPacket instead.\n");
mov->missing_duration_warned = 1;
}
}
if (!mov->moov_written) {
int64_t pos = avio_tell(s->pb);
uint8_t *buf;
int buf_size, moov_size;
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++)
if (!mov->tracks[i].entry && !is_cover_image(mov->tracks[i].st))
break;
/* Don't write the initial moov unless all tracks have data */
if (i < mov->nb_streams && !force)
return 0;
moov_size = get_moov_size(s);
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++)
mov->tracks[i].data_offset = pos + moov_size + 8;
avio_write_marker(s->pb, AV_NOPTS_VALUE, AVIO_DATA_MARKER_HEADER);
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_DELAY_MOOV)
mov_write_identification(s->pb, s);
if ((ret = mov_write_moov_tag(s->pb, mov, s)) < 0)
return ret;
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_DELAY_MOOV) {
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_GLOBAL_SIDX)
mov->reserved_header_pos = avio_tell(s->pb);
avio_flush(s->pb);
mov->moov_written = 1;
return 0;
}
buf_size = avio_close_dyn_buf(mov->mdat_buf, &buf);
mov->mdat_buf = NULL;
avio_wb32(s->pb, buf_size + 8);
ffio_wfourcc(s->pb, "mdat");
avio_write(s->pb, buf, buf_size);
av_free(buf);
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_GLOBAL_SIDX)
mov->reserved_header_pos = avio_tell(s->pb);
mov->moov_written = 1;
mov->mdat_size = 0;
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++) {
if (mov->tracks[i].entry)
mov->tracks[i].frag_start += mov->tracks[i].start_dts +
mov->tracks[i].track_duration -
mov->tracks[i].cluster[0].dts;
mov->tracks[i].entry = 0;
mov->tracks[i].end_reliable = 0;
}
avio_flush(s->pb);
return 0;
}
if (mov->frag_interleave) {
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++) {
MOVTrack *track = &mov->tracks[i];
int ret;
if ((ret = mov_flush_fragment_interleaving(s, track)) < 0)
return ret;
}
if (!mov->mdat_buf)
return 0;
mdat_size = avio_tell(mov->mdat_buf);
}
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++) {
MOVTrack *track = &mov->tracks[i];
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_SEPARATE_MOOF || mov->frag_interleave)
track->data_offset = 0;
else
track->data_offset = mdat_size;
if (track->par->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO) {
has_video = 1;
if (first_video_track) {
if (track->entry)
starts_with_key = track->cluster[0].flags & MOV_SYNC_SAMPLE;
first_video_track = 0;
}
}
if (!track->entry)
continue;
if (track->mdat_buf)
mdat_size += avio_tell(track->mdat_buf);
if (first_track < 0)
first_track = i;
}
if (!mdat_size)
return 0;
avio_write_marker(s->pb,
av_rescale(mov->tracks[first_track].cluster[0].dts, AV_TIME_BASE, mov->tracks[first_track].timescale),
(has_video ? starts_with_key : mov->tracks[first_track].cluster[0].flags & MOV_SYNC_SAMPLE) ? AVIO_DATA_MARKER_SYNC_POINT : AVIO_DATA_MARKER_BOUNDARY_POINT);
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++) {
MOVTrack *track = &mov->tracks[i];
int buf_size, write_moof = 1, moof_tracks = -1;
uint8_t *buf;
int64_t duration = 0;
if (track->entry)
duration = track->start_dts + track->track_duration -
track->cluster[0].dts;
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_SEPARATE_MOOF) {
if (!track->mdat_buf)
continue;
mdat_size = avio_tell(track->mdat_buf);
moof_tracks = i;
} else {
write_moof = i == first_track;
}
if (write_moof) {
avio_flush(s->pb);
mov_write_moof_tag(s->pb, mov, moof_tracks, mdat_size);
mov->fragments++;
avio_wb32(s->pb, mdat_size + 8);
ffio_wfourcc(s->pb, "mdat");
}
if (track->entry)
track->frag_start += duration;
track->entry = 0;
track->entries_flushed = 0;
track->end_reliable = 0;
if (!mov->frag_interleave) {
if (!track->mdat_buf)
continue;
buf_size = avio_close_dyn_buf(track->mdat_buf, &buf);
track->mdat_buf = NULL;
} else {
if (!mov->mdat_buf)
continue;
buf_size = avio_close_dyn_buf(mov->mdat_buf, &buf);
mov->mdat_buf = NULL;
}
avio_write(s->pb, buf, buf_size);
av_free(buf);
}
mov->mdat_size = 0;
avio_flush(s->pb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::setDesignMode(const String& value) {
bool new_value = design_mode_;
if (DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(value, "on")) {
new_value = true;
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kDocumentDesignModeEnabeld);
} else if (DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(value, "off")) {
new_value = false;
}
if (new_value == design_mode_)
return;
design_mode_ = new_value;
StyleChangeType type = RuntimeEnabledFeatures::LayoutNGEnabled()
? kNeedsReattachStyleChange
: kSubtreeStyleChange;
SetNeedsStyleRecalc(type, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::Create(
StyleChangeReason::kDesignMode));
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void unlink_anon_vmas(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct anon_vma_chain *avc, *next;
struct anon_vma *root = NULL;
/*
* Unlink each anon_vma chained to the VMA. This list is ordered
* from newest to oldest, ensuring the root anon_vma gets freed last.
*/
list_for_each_entry_safe(avc, next, &vma->anon_vma_chain, same_vma) {
struct anon_vma *anon_vma = avc->anon_vma;
root = lock_anon_vma_root(root, anon_vma);
anon_vma_interval_tree_remove(avc, &anon_vma->rb_root);
/*
* Leave empty anon_vmas on the list - we'll need
* to free them outside the lock.
*/
if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&anon_vma->rb_root))
continue;
list_del(&avc->same_vma);
anon_vma_chain_free(avc);
}
unlock_anon_vma_root(root);
/*
* Iterate the list once more, it now only contains empty and unlinked
* anon_vmas, destroy them. Could not do before due to __put_anon_vma()
* needing to write-acquire the anon_vma->root->rwsem.
*/
list_for_each_entry_safe(avc, next, &vma->anon_vma_chain, same_vma) {
struct anon_vma *anon_vma = avc->anon_vma;
put_anon_vma(anon_vma);
list_del(&avc->same_vma);
anon_vma_chain_free(avc);
}
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 38,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *vnc_socket_local_addr(const char *format, int fd) {
struct sockaddr_storage sa;
socklen_t salen;
salen = sizeof(sa);
if (getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&sa, &salen) < 0)
return NULL;
return addr_to_string(format, &sa, salen);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct fib6_table *fib6_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id)
{
return fib6_get_table(net, id);
}
Commit Message: net: fib: fib6_add: fix potential NULL pointer dereference
When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES, and we return
with an error in fn = fib6_add_1(), then error codes are encoded into
the return pointer e.g. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). In such an error case, we
write the error code into err and jump to out, hence enter the if(err)
condition. Now, if CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is enabled, we check for:
if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt)
...
if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO))
...
Since pn is NULL and fn is f.e. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), then pn != fn
evaluates to true and causes a NULL-pointer dereference on further
checks on pn. Fix it, by setting both NULL in error case, so that
pn != fn already evaluates to false and no further dereference
takes place.
This was first correctly implemented in 4a287eba2 ("IPv6 routing,
NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about
missing CREATE flag"), but the bug got later on introduced by
188c517a0 ("ipv6: return errno pointers consistently for fib6_add_1()").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Lin Ming <[email protected]>
Cc: Matti Vaittinen <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Matti Vaittinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int recursive_scan(struct gfs2_inode *ip, struct buffer_head *dibh,
struct metapath *mp, unsigned int height,
u64 block, int first, struct strip_mine *sm)
{
struct gfs2_sbd *sdp = GFS2_SB(&ip->i_inode);
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
__be64 *top, *bottom, *t2;
u64 bn;
int error;
int mh_size = sizeof(struct gfs2_meta_header);
if (!height) {
error = gfs2_meta_inode_buffer(ip, &bh);
if (error)
return error;
dibh = bh;
top = (__be64 *)(bh->b_data + sizeof(struct gfs2_dinode)) + mp->mp_list[0];
bottom = (__be64 *)(bh->b_data + sizeof(struct gfs2_dinode)) + sdp->sd_diptrs;
} else {
error = gfs2_meta_indirect_buffer(ip, height, block, 0, &bh);
if (error)
return error;
top = (__be64 *)(bh->b_data + mh_size) +
(first ? mp->mp_list[height] : 0);
bottom = (__be64 *)(bh->b_data + mh_size) + sdp->sd_inptrs;
}
error = do_strip(ip, dibh, bh, top, bottom, height, sm);
if (error)
goto out;
if (height < ip->i_height - 1) {
struct buffer_head *rabh;
for (t2 = top; t2 < bottom; t2++, first = 0) {
if (!*t2)
continue;
bn = be64_to_cpu(*t2);
rabh = gfs2_getbuf(ip->i_gl, bn, CREATE);
if (trylock_buffer(rabh)) {
if (buffer_uptodate(rabh)) {
unlock_buffer(rabh);
brelse(rabh);
continue;
}
rabh->b_end_io = end_buffer_read_sync;
submit_bh(READA | REQ_META, rabh);
continue;
}
brelse(rabh);
}
for (; top < bottom; top++, first = 0) {
if (!*top)
continue;
bn = be64_to_cpu(*top);
error = recursive_scan(ip, dibh, mp, height + 1, bn,
first, sm);
if (error)
break;
}
}
out:
brelse(bh);
return error;
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 34,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* dump_av_sm_event_name(btif_av_sm_event_t event) {
switch ((int)event) {
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_ENABLE_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_REGISTER_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_OPEN_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_CLOSE_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_START_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_STOP_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_PROTECT_REQ_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_PROTECT_RSP_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_RC_OPEN_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_RC_CLOSE_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_RC_BROWSE_OPEN_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_RC_BROWSE_CLOSE_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_REMOTE_CMD_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_REMOTE_RSP_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_VENDOR_CMD_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_VENDOR_RSP_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_RECONFIG_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_SUSPEND_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_PENDING_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_META_MSG_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_REJECT_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_RC_FEAT_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTA_AV_OFFLOAD_START_RSP_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTIF_SM_ENTER_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTIF_SM_EXIT_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTIF_AV_CONNECT_REQ_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTIF_AV_DISCONNECT_REQ_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTIF_AV_START_STREAM_REQ_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTIF_AV_STOP_STREAM_REQ_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTIF_AV_SUSPEND_STREAM_REQ_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTIF_AV_SOURCE_CONFIG_REQ_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTIF_AV_SOURCE_CONFIG_UPDATED_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTIF_AV_SINK_CONFIG_REQ_EVT)
CASE_RETURN_STR(BTIF_AV_OFFLOAD_START_REQ_EVT)
default:
return "UNKNOWN_EVENT";
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE AVRC: Copy browse.p_browse_data in btif_av_event_deep_copy
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data is not copied, but used after the
original pointer is freed
Bug: 109699112
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1d014eb9a8911da6913173a9b11218bf1c89e16e
(cherry picked from commit 1d9a58768e6573899c7e80c2b3f52e22f2d8f58b)
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 163,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BIGNUM *srp_Calc_k(BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
{
/* k = SHA1(N | PAD(g)) -- tls-srp draft 8 */
unsigned char digest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char *tmp;
EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
int longg ;
int longN = BN_num_bytes(N);
if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(longN)) == NULL)
return NULL;
BN_bn2bin(N,tmp) ;
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, tmp, longN);
memset(tmp, 0, longN);
longg = BN_bn2bin(g,tmp) ;
/* use the zeros behind to pad on left */
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, tmp + longg, longN-longg);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, tmp, longg);
OPENSSL_free(tmp);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctxt, digest, NULL);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctxt);
return BN_bin2bn(digest, sizeof(digest), NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 165,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sb_is_blkdev_sb(struct super_block *sb)
{
return sb == blockdev_superblock;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleWaitSyncTokenCHROMIUM(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::WaitSyncTokenCHROMIUM& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::WaitSyncTokenCHROMIUM*>(
cmd_data);
const gpu::CommandBufferNamespace kMinNamespaceId =
gpu::CommandBufferNamespace::INVALID;
const gpu::CommandBufferNamespace kMaxNamespaceId =
gpu::CommandBufferNamespace::NUM_COMMAND_BUFFER_NAMESPACES;
gpu::CommandBufferNamespace namespace_id =
static_cast<gpu::CommandBufferNamespace>(c.namespace_id);
if ((namespace_id < static_cast<int32_t>(kMinNamespaceId)) ||
(namespace_id >= static_cast<int32_t>(kMaxNamespaceId))) {
namespace_id = gpu::CommandBufferNamespace::INVALID;
}
const CommandBufferId command_buffer_id =
CommandBufferId::FromUnsafeValue(c.command_buffer_id());
const uint64_t release = c.release_count();
gpu::SyncToken sync_token;
sync_token.Set(namespace_id, command_buffer_id, release);
return client_->OnWaitSyncToken(sync_token) ? error::kDeferCommandUntilLater
: error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 145,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: media::AudioParameters GetDeviceParametersOnDeviceThread(
media::AudioManager* audio_manager,
const std::string& unique_id) {
DCHECK(audio_manager->GetTaskRunner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
return media::AudioDeviceDescription::IsDefaultDevice(unique_id)
? audio_manager->GetDefaultOutputStreamParameters()
: audio_manager->GetOutputStreamParameters(unique_id);
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PowerOverlayEnabled() {
return base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
::switches::kEnablePowerOverlay);
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParamTraits<std::vector<bool> >::Log(const param_type& p, std::string* l) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < p.size(); ++i) {
if (i != 0)
l->push_back(' ');
LogParam((p[i]), l);
}
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: psf_fgets (char *buffer, sf_count_t bufsize, SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ sf_count_t k = 0 ;
sf_count_t count ;
while (k < bufsize - 1)
{ count = read (psf->file.filedes, &(buffer [k]), 1) ;
if (count == -1)
{ if (errno == EINTR)
continue ;
psf_log_syserr (psf, errno) ;
break ;
} ;
if (count == 0 || buffer [k++] == '\n')
break ;
} ;
buffer [k] = 0 ;
return k ;
} /* psf_fgets */
Commit Message: src/file_io.c : Prevent potential divide-by-zero.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/92
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 45,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t jas_get_mem_usage()
{
return jas_mem;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 70,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int may_ptrace_stop(void)
{
if (!likely(task_ptrace(current)))
return 0;
/*
* Are we in the middle of do_coredump?
* If so and our tracer is also part of the coredump stopping
* is a deadlock situation, and pointless because our tracer
* is dead so don't allow us to stop.
* If SIGKILL was already sent before the caller unlocked
* ->siglock we must see ->core_state != NULL. Otherwise it
* is safe to enter schedule().
*/
if (unlikely(current->mm->core_state) &&
unlikely(current->mm == current->parent->mm))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 35,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool CheckMpeg2ProgramStream(const uint8_t* buffer, int buffer_size) {
RCHECK(buffer_size > 14);
int offset = 0;
while (offset + 14 < buffer_size) {
BitReader reader(buffer + offset, 14);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 24) == 1);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 8) == PACK_START_CODE);
int mpeg_version = ReadBits(&reader, 2);
if (mpeg_version == 0) {
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 2) == 2);
} else {
RCHECK(mpeg_version == 1);
}
reader.SkipBits(3);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 1) == 1);
reader.SkipBits(15);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 1) == 1);
reader.SkipBits(15);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 1) == 1);
if (mpeg_version == 0) {
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 1) == 1);
reader.SkipBits(22);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 1) == 1);
offset += 12;
} else {
reader.SkipBits(22);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 2) == 3);
reader.SkipBits(5);
int pack_stuffing_length = ReadBits(&reader, 3);
offset += 14 + pack_stuffing_length;
}
while (offset + 6 < buffer_size && Read24(buffer + offset) == 1) {
int stream_id = buffer[offset + 3];
if (mpeg_version == 0)
RCHECK(stream_id != 0xbc && stream_id < 0xf0);
else
RCHECK(stream_id != 0xfc && stream_id != 0xfd && stream_id != 0xfe);
if (stream_id == PACK_START_CODE) // back to outer loop.
break;
if (stream_id == PROGRAM_END_CODE) // end of stream.
return true;
int pes_length = Read16(buffer + offset + 4);
RCHECK(pes_length > 0);
offset = offset + 6 + pes_length;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by [email protected].
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport PixelPacket *GetAuthenticPixelCacheNexus(Image *image,
const ssize_t x,const ssize_t y,const size_t columns,const size_t rows,
NexusInfo *nexus_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info;
PixelPacket
*restrict pixels;
/*
Transfer pixels from the cache.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
pixels=QueueAuthenticPixelCacheNexus(image,x,y,columns,rows,MagickTrue,
nexus_info,exception);
if (pixels == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return((PixelPacket *) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (nexus_info->authentic_pixel_cache != MagickFalse)
return(pixels);
if (ReadPixelCachePixels(cache_info,nexus_info,exception) == MagickFalse)
return((PixelPacket *) NULL);
if (cache_info->active_index_channel != MagickFalse)
if (ReadPixelCacheIndexes(cache_info,nexus_info,exception) == MagickFalse)
return((PixelPacket *) NULL);
return(pixels);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 73,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool tap_cancel() const { return tap_cancel_; }
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned runsFromLeadingWhitespace() const { return m_runsFromLeadingWhitespace; }
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggingGetterForAllWorldsLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->activityLoggingGetterForAllWorldsLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct extent_map *btrfs_get_extent_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
size_t pg_offset, u64 start, u64 len,
int create)
{
struct extent_map *em;
struct extent_map *hole_em = NULL;
u64 range_start = start;
u64 end;
u64 found;
u64 found_end;
int err = 0;
em = btrfs_get_extent(inode, page, pg_offset, start, len, create);
if (IS_ERR(em))
return em;
if (em) {
/*
* if our em maps to a hole, there might
* actually be delalloc bytes behind it
*/
if (em->block_start != EXTENT_MAP_HOLE)
return em;
else
hole_em = em;
}
/* check to see if we've wrapped (len == -1 or similar) */
end = start + len;
if (end < start)
end = (u64)-1;
else
end -= 1;
em = NULL;
/* ok, we didn't find anything, lets look for delalloc */
found = count_range_bits(&BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree, &range_start,
end, len, EXTENT_DELALLOC, 1);
found_end = range_start + found;
if (found_end < range_start)
found_end = (u64)-1;
/*
* we didn't find anything useful, return
* the original results from get_extent()
*/
if (range_start > end || found_end <= start) {
em = hole_em;
hole_em = NULL;
goto out;
}
/* adjust the range_start to make sure it doesn't
* go backwards from the start they passed in
*/
range_start = max(start,range_start);
found = found_end - range_start;
if (found > 0) {
u64 hole_start = start;
u64 hole_len = len;
em = alloc_extent_map();
if (!em) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/*
* when btrfs_get_extent can't find anything it
* returns one huge hole
*
* make sure what it found really fits our range, and
* adjust to make sure it is based on the start from
* the caller
*/
if (hole_em) {
u64 calc_end = extent_map_end(hole_em);
if (calc_end <= start || (hole_em->start > end)) {
free_extent_map(hole_em);
hole_em = NULL;
} else {
hole_start = max(hole_em->start, start);
hole_len = calc_end - hole_start;
}
}
em->bdev = NULL;
if (hole_em && range_start > hole_start) {
/* our hole starts before our delalloc, so we
* have to return just the parts of the hole
* that go until the delalloc starts
*/
em->len = min(hole_len,
range_start - hole_start);
em->start = hole_start;
em->orig_start = hole_start;
/*
* don't adjust block start at all,
* it is fixed at EXTENT_MAP_HOLE
*/
em->block_start = hole_em->block_start;
em->block_len = hole_len;
} else {
em->start = range_start;
em->len = found;
em->orig_start = range_start;
em->block_start = EXTENT_MAP_DELALLOC;
em->block_len = found;
}
} else if (hole_em) {
return hole_em;
}
out:
free_extent_map(hole_em);
if (err) {
free_extent_map(em);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
return em;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmxnet3_cleanup_msi(VMXNET3State *s)
{
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
msi_uninit(d);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 8,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL update_send_desktop_resize(rdpContext* context)
{
return rdp_server_reactivate(context->rdp);
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned int blk_rq_err_bytes(const struct request *rq)
{
unsigned int ff = rq->cmd_flags & REQ_FAILFAST_MASK;
unsigned int bytes = 0;
struct bio *bio;
if (!(rq->rq_flags & RQF_MIXED_MERGE))
return blk_rq_bytes(rq);
/*
* Currently the only 'mixing' which can happen is between
* different fastfail types. We can safely fail portions
* which have all the failfast bits that the first one has -
* the ones which are at least as eager to fail as the first
* one.
*/
for (bio = rq->bio; bio; bio = bio->bi_next) {
if ((bio->bi_opf & ff) != ff)
break;
bytes += bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
}
/* this could lead to infinite loop */
BUG_ON(blk_rq_bytes(rq) && !bytes);
return bytes;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 92,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int PageInfoUI::GetConnectionIconID(PageInfo::SiteConnectionStatus status) {
int resource_id = IDR_PAGEINFO_INFO;
switch (status) {
case PageInfo::SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_UNKNOWN:
case PageInfo::SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_INTERNAL_PAGE:
break;
case PageInfo::SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_ENCRYPTED:
resource_id = IDR_PAGEINFO_GOOD;
break;
case PageInfo::SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_INSECURE_PASSIVE_SUBRESOURCE:
case PageInfo::SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_INSECURE_FORM_ACTION:
resource_id = IDR_PAGEINFO_WARNING_MINOR;
break;
case PageInfo::SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_UNENCRYPTED:
resource_id = IDR_PAGEINFO_WARNING_MAJOR;
break;
case PageInfo::SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_INSECURE_ACTIVE_SUBRESOURCE:
case PageInfo::SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_ENCRYPTED_ERROR:
resource_id = IDR_PAGEINFO_BAD;
break;
}
return resource_id;
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 138,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned int unix_hash_fold(__wsum n)
{
unsigned int hash = (__force unsigned int)csum_fold(n);
hash ^= hash>>8;
return hash&(UNIX_HASH_SIZE-1);
}
Commit Message: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 46,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int r = -ENOTTY;
/*
* This union makes it completely explicit to gcc-3.x
* that these two variables' stack usage should be
* combined, not added together.
*/
union {
struct kvm_pit_state ps;
struct kvm_pit_state2 ps2;
struct kvm_pit_config pit_config;
} u;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_tss_addr(kvm, arg);
break;
case KVM_SET_IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR: {
u64 ident_addr;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ident_addr, argp, sizeof ident_addr))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_identity_map_addr(kvm, ident_addr);
break;
}
case KVM_SET_NR_MMU_PAGES:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_nr_mmu_pages(kvm, arg);
break;
case KVM_GET_NR_MMU_PAGES:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_nr_mmu_pages(kvm);
break;
case KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP: {
struct kvm_pic *vpic;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
r = -EEXIST;
if (kvm->arch.vpic)
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
r = -EINVAL;
if (atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus))
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
r = -ENOMEM;
vpic = kvm_create_pic(kvm);
if (vpic) {
r = kvm_ioapic_init(kvm);
if (r) {
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&vpic->dev_master);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&vpic->dev_slave);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&vpic->dev_eclr);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
kfree(vpic);
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
}
} else
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
smp_wmb();
kvm->arch.vpic = vpic;
smp_wmb();
r = kvm_setup_default_irq_routing(kvm);
if (r) {
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->irq_lock);
kvm_ioapic_destroy(kvm);
kvm_destroy_pic(kvm);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->irq_lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
}
create_irqchip_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
break;
}
case KVM_CREATE_PIT:
u.pit_config.flags = KVM_PIT_SPEAKER_DUMMY;
goto create_pit;
case KVM_CREATE_PIT2:
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.pit_config, argp,
sizeof(struct kvm_pit_config)))
goto out;
create_pit:
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
r = -EEXIST;
if (kvm->arch.vpit)
goto create_pit_unlock;
r = -ENOMEM;
kvm->arch.vpit = kvm_create_pit(kvm, u.pit_config.flags);
if (kvm->arch.vpit)
r = 0;
create_pit_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
break;
case KVM_GET_IRQCHIP: {
/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
struct kvm_irqchip *chip;
chip = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*chip));
if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
r = PTR_ERR(chip);
goto out;
}
r = -ENXIO;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
goto get_irqchip_out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_irqchip(kvm, chip);
if (r)
goto get_irqchip_out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, chip, sizeof *chip))
goto get_irqchip_out;
r = 0;
get_irqchip_out:
kfree(chip);
break;
}
case KVM_SET_IRQCHIP: {
/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
struct kvm_irqchip *chip;
chip = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*chip));
if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
r = PTR_ERR(chip);
goto out;
}
r = -ENXIO;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
goto set_irqchip_out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip(kvm, chip);
if (r)
goto set_irqchip_out;
r = 0;
set_irqchip_out:
kfree(chip);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_PIT: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.ps, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state)))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit(kvm, &u.ps);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &u.ps, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_PIT: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.ps, argp, sizeof u.ps))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit(kvm, &u.ps);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_PIT2: {
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(kvm, &u.ps2);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &u.ps2, sizeof(u.ps2)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_PIT2: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.ps2, argp, sizeof(u.ps2)))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(kvm, &u.ps2);
break;
}
case KVM_REINJECT_CONTROL: {
struct kvm_reinject_control control;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&control, argp, sizeof(control)))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_reinject(kvm, &control);
break;
}
case KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config, argp,
sizeof(struct kvm_xen_hvm_config)))
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
if (kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.flags)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_CLOCK: {
struct kvm_clock_data user_ns;
u64 now_ns;
s64 delta;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&user_ns, argp, sizeof(user_ns)))
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
if (user_ns.flags)
goto out;
r = 0;
local_irq_disable();
now_ns = get_kernel_ns();
delta = user_ns.clock - now_ns;
local_irq_enable();
kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset = delta;
break;
}
case KVM_GET_CLOCK: {
struct kvm_clock_data user_ns;
u64 now_ns;
local_irq_disable();
now_ns = get_kernel_ns();
user_ns.clock = kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset + now_ns;
local_irq_enable();
user_ns.flags = 0;
memset(&user_ns.pad, 0, sizeof(user_ns.pad));
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &user_ns, sizeof(user_ns)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
default:
;
}
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool tee_mmu_is_vbuf_intersect_ta_private(const struct user_ta_ctx *utc,
const void *va, size_t size)
{
struct vm_region *r;
TAILQ_FOREACH(r, &utc->vm_info->regions, link) {
if (r->attr & (TEE_MATTR_EPHEMERAL | TEE_MATTR_PERMANENT))
continue;
if (core_is_buffer_intersect(va, size, r->va, r->size))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: core: tee_mmu_check_access_rights() check all pages
Prior to this patch tee_mmu_check_access_rights() checks an address in
each page of a supplied range. If both the start and length of that
range is unaligned the last page in the range is sometimes not checked.
With this patch the first address of each page in the range is checked
to simplify the logic of checking each page and the range and also to
cover the last page under all circumstances.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0005: "tee_mmu_check_access_rights does not check
final page of TA buffer"
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 86,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t PepperFlashRendererHost::OnInvokePrinting(
ppapi::host::HostMessageContext* host_context) {
PPB_PDF_Impl::InvokePrintingForInstance(pp_instance());
return PP_OK;
}
Commit Message: PPB_Flash.Navigate(): Disallow certain HTTP request headers.
With this CL, PPB_Flash.Navigate() fails the operation with
PP_ERROR_NOACCESS if the request headers contain non-simple headers.
BUG=332023
TEST=None
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/136393004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@249114 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CtcpHandler::CtcpHandler(CoreNetwork *parent)
: CoreBasicHandler(parent),
XDELIM("\001"),
_ignoreListManager(parent->ignoreListManager())
{
QByteArray MQUOTE = QByteArray("\020");
ctcpMDequoteHash[MQUOTE + '0'] = QByteArray(1, '\000');
ctcpMDequoteHash[MQUOTE + 'n'] = QByteArray(1, '\n');
ctcpMDequoteHash[MQUOTE + 'r'] = QByteArray(1, '\r');
ctcpMDequoteHash[MQUOTE + MQUOTE] = MQUOTE;
QByteArray XQUOTE = QByteArray("\134");
ctcpXDelimDequoteHash[XQUOTE + XQUOTE] = XQUOTE;
ctcpXDelimDequoteHash[XQUOTE + QByteArray("a")] = XDELIM;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::CallDeferredErrorCallbacks() {
if (deferred_error_callbacks_.empty())
return;
if (error_message_callback_.is_null()) {
deferred_error_callbacks_.clear();
return;
}
std::deque<DeferredErrorCallback> local_callbacks;
std::swap(deferred_error_callbacks_, local_callbacks);
for (auto c : local_callbacks) {
error_message_callback_.Run(c.message.c_str(), c.id);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CSPSourceList::parseScheme(const UChar* begin, const UChar* end, String& scheme)
{
ASSERT(begin <= end);
ASSERT(scheme.isEmpty());
if (begin == end)
return false;
const UChar* position = begin;
if (!skipExactly<UChar, isASCIIAlpha>(position, end))
return false;
skipWhile<UChar, isSchemeContinuationCharacter>(position, end);
if (position != end)
return false;
scheme = String(begin, end - begin);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Disallow CSP source * matching of data:, blob:, and filesystem: URLs
The CSP spec specifically excludes matching of data:, blob:, and
filesystem: URLs with the source '*' wildcard. This adds checks to make
sure that doesn't happen, along with tests.
BUG=534570
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1361763005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#350950}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 125,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void DeprecateAsSameValueMeasureAsOverloadedMethod1Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->deprecateAsSameValueMeasureAsOverloadedMethod();
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tm_ppr_set(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
int ret;
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM))
return -ENODEV;
if (!MSR_TM_ACTIVE(target->thread.regs->msr))
return -ENODATA;
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.tm_ppr, 0, sizeof(u64));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: [email protected] # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RList* relocs(RBinFile *bf) {
RList *ret = NULL;
RBinReloc *ptr = NULL;
RBinElfReloc *relocs = NULL;
struct Elf_(r_bin_elf_obj_t) *bin = NULL;
ut64 got_addr;
int i;
if (!bf || !bf->o || !bf->o->bin_obj) {
return NULL;
}
bin = bf->o->bin_obj;
if (!(ret = r_list_newf (free))) {
return NULL;
}
/* FIXME: This is a _temporary_ fix/workaround to prevent a use-after-
* free detected by ASan that would corrupt the relocation names */
r_list_free (imports (bf));
if ((got_addr = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_section_addr) (bin, ".got")) == -1) {
got_addr = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_section_addr) (bin, ".got.plt");
if (got_addr == -1) {
got_addr = 0;
}
}
if (got_addr < 1 && bin->ehdr.e_type == ET_REL) {
got_addr = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_section_addr) (bin, ".got.r2");
if (got_addr == -1) {
got_addr = 0;
}
}
if (bf->o) {
if (!(relocs = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_relocs) (bin))) {
return ret;
}
for (i = 0; !relocs[i].last; i++) {
if (!(ptr = reloc_convert (bin, &relocs[i], got_addr))) {
continue;
}
r_list_append (ret, ptr);
}
free (relocs);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MAYBE_WebRtcBrowserTest() {}
Commit Message: Rewrite getUseMedia calls to use promises.
This removes many uses of waitForVideo() etc. and makes the
control flow of the test clearer. Instead of having the
all-events-occurred handler magically calling reportTestSuccess,
it's laid out explicitly in each test.
Bug: chromium:777857
Change-Id: I034d8950f764df607069b3e4b5ce6baeb46eab9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758848
Commit-Queue: Patrik Höglund <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515917}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 148,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int virtio_load(VirtIODevice *vdev, QEMUFile *f)
{
int i, ret;
uint32_t num;
uint32_t features;
uint32_t supported_features;
BusState *qbus = qdev_get_parent_bus(DEVICE(vdev));
VirtioBusClass *k = VIRTIO_BUS_GET_CLASS(qbus);
if (k->load_config) {
ret = k->load_config(qbus->parent, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->status);
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->isr);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->queue_sel);
qemu_get_be32s(f, &features);
if (virtio_set_features(vdev, features) < 0) {
return -1;
}
vdev->config_len = qemu_get_be32(f);
qemu_get_buffer(f, vdev->config, vdev->config_len);
num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (num > VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX) {
error_report("Invalid number of PCI queues: 0x%x", num);
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (k->has_variable_vring_alignment) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.align = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
vdev->vq[i].pa = qemu_get_be64(f);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
vdev->vq[i].signalled_used_valid = false;
vdev->vq[i].notification = true;
if (vdev->vq[i].pa) {
uint16_t nheads;
virtqueue_init(&vdev->vq[i]);
nheads = vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]) - vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx;
/* Check it isn't doing very strange things with descriptor numbers. */
if (nheads > vdev->vq[i].vring.num) {
error_report("VQ %d size 0x%x Guest index 0x%x "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x: delta 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].vring.num,
vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]),
vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx, nheads);
return -1;
}
} else if (vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx) {
error_report("VQ %d address 0x0 "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
return -1;
}
if (k->load_queue) {
ret = k->load_queue(qbus->parent, i, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
virtio_notify_vector(vdev, VIRTIO_NO_VECTOR);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 1 | 165,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_utf8_to_ascii(const char *src, char *dst, int dstlen)
{
struct iw_utf8cvt_struct s;
int sp;
unsigned char c;
unsigned int pending_char;
int bytes_expected;
s.dst = dst;
s.dstlen = dstlen;
s.dp = 0;
pending_char=0;
bytes_expected=0;
for(sp=0;src[sp];sp++) {
c = (unsigned char)src[sp];
if(c<128) { // Only byte of a 1-byte sequence
utf8cvt_emitoctet(&s,c);
bytes_expected=0;
}
else if(c<0xc0) { // Continuation byte
if(bytes_expected>0) {
pending_char = (pending_char<<6)|(c&0x3f);
bytes_expected--;
if(bytes_expected<1) {
utf8cvt_emitunichar(&s,pending_char);
}
}
}
else if(c<0xe0) { // 1st byte of a 2-byte sequence
pending_char = c&0x1f;
bytes_expected=1;
}
else if(c<0xf0) { // 1st byte of a 3-byte sequence
pending_char = c&0x0f;
bytes_expected=2;
}
else if(c<0xf8) { // 1st byte of a 4-byte sequence
pending_char = c&0x07;
bytes_expected=3;
}
}
dst[s.dp] = '\0';
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682 | 0 | 66,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_get_algo_block_size)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir)
RETURN_LONG(mcrypt_module_get_algo_block_size(module, dir));
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int udf_char_to_ustr(struct ustr *dest, const uint8_t *src, int strlen)
{
if ((!dest) || (!src) || (!strlen) || (strlen > UDF_NAME_LEN - 2))
return 0;
memset(dest, 0, sizeof(struct ustr));
memcpy(dest->u_name, src, strlen);
dest->u_cmpID = 0x08;
dest->u_len = strlen;
return strlen;
}
Commit Message: udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: [email protected]
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 45,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AutofillDialogViews::SaveDetailsLocally() {
DCHECK(save_in_chrome_checkbox_->visible());
return save_in_chrome_checkbox_->checked();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 110,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void op_addSseCC(MCInst *MI, int v)
{
if (MI->csh->detail) {
MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.sse_cc = v;
}
}
Commit Message: x86: fast path checking for X86_insn_reg_intel()
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 94,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_spoolss_uint16uni(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo _U_,
proto_tree *tree, guint8 *drep _U_, char **data,
int hf_name)
{
gint len, remaining;
char *text;
if (offset % 2)
offset += 2 - (offset % 2);
/* Get remaining data in buffer as a string */
remaining = tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
if (remaining <= 0) {
if (data)
*data = g_strdup("");
return offset;
}
text = tvb_get_string_enc(NULL, tvb, offset, remaining, ENC_UTF_16|ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
len = (int)strlen(text);
proto_tree_add_string(tree, hf_name, tvb, offset, len * 2, text);
if (data)
*data = text;
else
g_free(text);
return offset + (len + 1) * 2;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 167,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline SearchBuffer::~SearchBuffer()
{
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
usearch_setPattern(WebCore::searcher(), &newlineCharacter, 1, &status);
ASSERT(status == U_ZERO_ERROR);
unlockSearcher();
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsAndroid::DidStartNavigationTransitionForFrame(int64 frame_id) {
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
Java_WebContentsImpl_didStartNavigationTransitionForFrame(
env, obj_.obj(), frame_id);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _fep_transceive_control_message (Fep *fep,
int fd,
FepControlMessage *request,
FepControlMessage *response)
{
FepList *messages = NULL;
int retval = 0;
retval = _fep_write_control_message (fd, request);
if (retval < 0)
return retval;
while (true)
{
FepControlMessage message;
retval = _fep_read_control_message (fd, &message);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
if (message.command == FEP_CONTROL_RESPONSE)
{
memcpy (response, &message, sizeof (FepControlMessage));
break;
}
fep_log (FEP_LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"not a control response %d",
message.command);
messages = _fep_append_control_message (messages, &message);
}
if (response->n_args == 0)
{
_fep_control_message_free_args (response);
fep_log (FEP_LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
"too few arguments for RESPONSE");
retval = -1;
goto out;
}
if (response->args[0].len != 1)
{
_fep_control_message_free_args (response);
fep_log (FEP_LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
"can't extract command from RESPONSE");
retval = -1;
goto out;
}
if (*response->args[0].str != request->command)
{
_fep_control_message_free_args (response);
fep_log (FEP_LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
"commands do not match (%d != %d)",
*response->args[0].str,
request->command);
retval = -1;
goto out;
}
out:
/* flush queued messages received during waiting for response */
while (messages)
{
FepList *_head = messages;
FepControlMessage *_message = _head->data;
messages = _head->next;
_fep_dispatch_control_message (fep, _message);
_fep_control_message_free (_message);
free (_head);
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Don't use abstract Unix domain sockets
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hw_break_release_slot(int breakno)
{
struct perf_event **pevent;
int cpu;
if (dbg_is_early)
return 0;
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
pevent = per_cpu_ptr(breakinfo[breakno].pev, cpu);
if (dbg_release_bp_slot(*pevent))
/*
* The debugger is responsible for handing the retry on
* remove failure.
*/
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hns_roce_register_device(struct hns_roce_dev *hr_dev)
{
int ret;
struct hns_roce_ib_iboe *iboe = NULL;
struct ib_device *ib_dev = NULL;
struct device *dev = hr_dev->dev;
iboe = &hr_dev->iboe;
spin_lock_init(&iboe->lock);
ib_dev = &hr_dev->ib_dev;
strlcpy(ib_dev->name, "hns_%d", IB_DEVICE_NAME_MAX);
ib_dev->owner = THIS_MODULE;
ib_dev->node_type = RDMA_NODE_IB_CA;
ib_dev->dev.parent = dev;
ib_dev->phys_port_cnt = hr_dev->caps.num_ports;
ib_dev->local_dma_lkey = hr_dev->caps.reserved_lkey;
ib_dev->num_comp_vectors = hr_dev->caps.num_comp_vectors;
ib_dev->uverbs_abi_ver = 1;
ib_dev->uverbs_cmd_mask =
(1ULL << IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_GET_CONTEXT) |
(1ULL << IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_QUERY_DEVICE) |
(1ULL << IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_QUERY_PORT) |
(1ULL << IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_ALLOC_PD) |
(1ULL << IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_DEALLOC_PD) |
(1ULL << IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_REG_MR) |
(1ULL << IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_DEREG_MR) |
(1ULL << IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_CREATE_COMP_CHANNEL) |
(1ULL << IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_CREATE_CQ) |
(1ULL << IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_DESTROY_CQ) |
(1ULL << IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_CREATE_QP) |
(1ULL << IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_MODIFY_QP) |
(1ULL << IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_QUERY_QP) |
(1ULL << IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_DESTROY_QP);
/* HCA||device||port */
ib_dev->modify_device = hns_roce_modify_device;
ib_dev->query_device = hns_roce_query_device;
ib_dev->query_port = hns_roce_query_port;
ib_dev->modify_port = hns_roce_modify_port;
ib_dev->get_link_layer = hns_roce_get_link_layer;
ib_dev->get_netdev = hns_roce_get_netdev;
ib_dev->query_gid = hns_roce_query_gid;
ib_dev->add_gid = hns_roce_add_gid;
ib_dev->del_gid = hns_roce_del_gid;
ib_dev->query_pkey = hns_roce_query_pkey;
ib_dev->alloc_ucontext = hns_roce_alloc_ucontext;
ib_dev->dealloc_ucontext = hns_roce_dealloc_ucontext;
ib_dev->mmap = hns_roce_mmap;
/* PD */
ib_dev->alloc_pd = hns_roce_alloc_pd;
ib_dev->dealloc_pd = hns_roce_dealloc_pd;
/* AH */
ib_dev->create_ah = hns_roce_create_ah;
ib_dev->query_ah = hns_roce_query_ah;
ib_dev->destroy_ah = hns_roce_destroy_ah;
/* QP */
ib_dev->create_qp = hns_roce_create_qp;
ib_dev->modify_qp = hns_roce_modify_qp;
ib_dev->query_qp = hr_dev->hw->query_qp;
ib_dev->destroy_qp = hr_dev->hw->destroy_qp;
ib_dev->post_send = hr_dev->hw->post_send;
ib_dev->post_recv = hr_dev->hw->post_recv;
/* CQ */
ib_dev->create_cq = hns_roce_ib_create_cq;
ib_dev->modify_cq = hr_dev->hw->modify_cq;
ib_dev->destroy_cq = hns_roce_ib_destroy_cq;
ib_dev->req_notify_cq = hr_dev->hw->req_notify_cq;
ib_dev->poll_cq = hr_dev->hw->poll_cq;
/* MR */
ib_dev->get_dma_mr = hns_roce_get_dma_mr;
ib_dev->reg_user_mr = hns_roce_reg_user_mr;
ib_dev->dereg_mr = hns_roce_dereg_mr;
if (hr_dev->caps.flags & HNS_ROCE_CAP_FLAG_REREG_MR) {
ib_dev->rereg_user_mr = hns_roce_rereg_user_mr;
ib_dev->uverbs_cmd_mask |= (1ULL << IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_REREG_MR);
}
/* OTHERS */
ib_dev->get_port_immutable = hns_roce_port_immutable;
ret = ib_register_device(ib_dev, NULL);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "ib_register_device failed!\n");
return ret;
}
ret = hns_roce_setup_mtu_mac(hr_dev);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "setup_mtu_mac failed!\n");
goto error_failed_setup_mtu_mac;
}
iboe->nb.notifier_call = hns_roce_netdev_event;
ret = register_netdevice_notifier(&iboe->nb);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "register_netdevice_notifier failed!\n");
goto error_failed_setup_mtu_mac;
}
return 0;
error_failed_setup_mtu_mac:
ib_unregister_device(ib_dev);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: RDMA/hns: Fix init resp when alloc ucontext
The data in resp will be copied from kernel to userspace, thus it needs to
be initialized to zeros to avoid copying uninited stack memory.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Fixes: e088a685eae9 ("RDMA/hns: Support rq record doorbell for the user space")
Signed-off-by: Yixian Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-665 | 0 | 87,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static AnimatedPropertyType EmptyValue() { return kAnimatedUnknown; }
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 152,753 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DictionaryValue* GetUpdatesResponseToValue(
const sync_pb::GetUpdatesResponse& proto,
bool include_specifics) {
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue();
value->Set("entries",
SyncEntitiesToValue(proto.entries(), include_specifics));
SET_INT64(changes_remaining);
SET_REP(new_progress_marker, DataTypeProgressMarkerToValue);
return value;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Plugin::BitcodeDidTranslate(int32_t pp_error) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::BitcodeDidTranslate (pp_error=%"NACL_PRId32")\n",
pp_error));
if (pp_error != PP_OK) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::BitcodeDidTranslate error in Pnacl\n"));
return;
}
EnqueueProgressEvent(kProgressEventProgress);
nacl::scoped_ptr<nacl::DescWrapper>
wrapper(pnacl_coordinator_.get()->ReleaseTranslatedFD());
ErrorInfo error_info;
bool was_successful = LoadNaClModule(
wrapper.get(), &error_info,
callback_factory_.NewCallback(&Plugin::BitcodeDidTranslateContinuation),
callback_factory_.NewCallback(&Plugin::NexeDidCrash));
if (!was_successful) {
ReportLoadError(error_info);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SplashError Splash::arbitraryTransformImage(SplashImageSource src, void *srcData,
SplashColorMode srcMode, int nComps,
GBool srcAlpha,
int srcWidth, int srcHeight,
SplashCoord *mat, GBool interpolate,
GBool tilingPattern) {
SplashBitmap *scaledImg;
SplashClipResult clipRes, clipRes2;
SplashPipe pipe;
SplashColor pixel;
int scaledWidth, scaledHeight, t0, t1, th;
SplashCoord r00, r01, r10, r11, det, ir00, ir01, ir10, ir11;
SplashCoord vx[4], vy[4];
int xMin, yMin, xMax, yMax;
ImageSection section[3];
int nSections;
int y, xa, xb, x, i, xx, yy, yp;
vx[0] = mat[4]; vy[0] = mat[5];
vx[1] = mat[2] + mat[4]; vy[1] = mat[3] + mat[5];
vx[2] = mat[0] + mat[2] + mat[4]; vy[2] = mat[1] + mat[3] + mat[5];
vx[3] = mat[0] + mat[4]; vy[3] = mat[1] + mat[5];
xMin = imgCoordMungeLower(vx[0]);
xMax = imgCoordMungeUpper(vx[0]);
yMin = imgCoordMungeLower(vy[0]);
yMax = imgCoordMungeUpper(vy[0]);
for (i = 1; i < 4; ++i) {
t0 = imgCoordMungeLower(vx[i]);
if (t0 < xMin) {
xMin = t0;
}
t0 = imgCoordMungeUpper(vx[i]);
if (t0 > xMax) {
xMax = t0;
}
t1 = imgCoordMungeLower(vy[i]);
if (t1 < yMin) {
yMin = t1;
}
t1 = imgCoordMungeUpper(vy[i]);
if (t1 > yMax) {
yMax = t1;
}
}
clipRes = state->clip->testRect(xMin, yMin, xMax - 1, yMax - 1);
opClipRes = clipRes;
if (clipRes == splashClipAllOutside) {
return splashOk;
}
if (splashAbs(mat[0]) >= splashAbs(mat[1])) {
scaledWidth = xMax - xMin;
scaledHeight = yMax - yMin;
} else {
scaledWidth = yMax - yMin;
scaledHeight = xMax - xMin;
}
if (scaledHeight <= 1 || scaledHeight <= 1 || tilingPattern) {
if (mat[0] >= 0) {
t0 = imgCoordMungeUpper(mat[0] + mat[4]) - imgCoordMungeLower(mat[4]);
} else {
t0 = imgCoordMungeUpper(mat[4]) - imgCoordMungeLower(mat[0] + mat[4]);
}
if (mat[1] >= 0) {
t1 = imgCoordMungeUpper(mat[1] + mat[5]) - imgCoordMungeLower(mat[5]);
} else {
t1 = imgCoordMungeUpper(mat[5]) - imgCoordMungeLower(mat[1] + mat[5]);
}
scaledWidth = t0 > t1 ? t0 : t1;
if (mat[2] >= 0) {
t0 = imgCoordMungeUpper(mat[2] + mat[4]) - imgCoordMungeLower(mat[4]);
if (splashAbs(mat[1]) >= 1) {
th = imgCoordMungeUpper(mat[2]) - imgCoordMungeLower(mat[0] * mat[3] / mat[1]);
if (th > t0) t0 = th;
}
} else {
t0 = imgCoordMungeUpper(mat[4]) - imgCoordMungeLower(mat[2] + mat[4]);
if (splashAbs(mat[1]) >= 1) {
th = imgCoordMungeUpper(mat[0] * mat[3] / mat[1]) - imgCoordMungeLower(mat[2]);
if (th > t0) t0 = th;
}
}
if (mat[3] >= 0) {
t1 = imgCoordMungeUpper(mat[3] + mat[5]) - imgCoordMungeLower(mat[5]);
if (splashAbs(mat[0]) >= 1) {
th = imgCoordMungeUpper(mat[3]) - imgCoordMungeLower(mat[1] * mat[2] / mat[0]);
if (th > t1) t1 = th;
}
} else {
t1 = imgCoordMungeUpper(mat[5]) - imgCoordMungeLower(mat[3] + mat[5]);
if (splashAbs(mat[0]) >= 1) {
th = imgCoordMungeUpper(mat[1] * mat[2] / mat[0]) - imgCoordMungeLower(mat[3]);
if (th > t1) t1 = th;
}
}
scaledHeight = t0 > t1 ? t0 : t1;
}
if (scaledWidth == 0) {
scaledWidth = 1;
}
if (scaledHeight == 0) {
scaledHeight = 1;
}
r00 = mat[0] / scaledWidth;
r01 = mat[1] / scaledWidth;
r10 = mat[2] / scaledHeight;
r11 = mat[3] / scaledHeight;
det = r00 * r11 - r01 * r10;
if (splashAbs(det) < 1e-6) {
return splashErrBadArg;
}
ir00 = r11 / det;
ir01 = -r01 / det;
ir10 = -r10 / det;
ir11 = r00 / det;
yp = srcHeight / scaledHeight;
if (yp < 0 || yp > INT_MAX - 1) {
return splashErrBadArg;
}
scaledImg = scaleImage(src, srcData, srcMode, nComps, srcAlpha,
srcWidth, srcHeight, scaledWidth, scaledHeight, interpolate);
if (scaledImg == NULL) {
return splashErrBadArg;
}
i = 0;
if (vy[1] < vy[i]) {
i = 1;
}
if (vy[2] < vy[i]) {
i = 2;
}
if (vy[3] < vy[i]) {
i = 3;
}
if (splashAbs(vy[i] - vy[(i-1) & 3]) <= 0.000001 &&
vy[(i-1) & 3] < vy[(i+1) & 3]) {
i = (i-1) & 3;
}
if (splashAbs(vy[i] - vy[(i+1) & 3]) <= 0.000001) {
section[0].y0 = imgCoordMungeLower(vy[i]);
section[0].y1 = imgCoordMungeUpper(vy[(i+2) & 3]) - 1;
if (vx[i] < vx[(i+1) & 3]) {
section[0].ia0 = i;
section[0].ia1 = (i+3) & 3;
section[0].ib0 = (i+1) & 3;
section[0].ib1 = (i+2) & 3;
} else {
section[0].ia0 = (i+1) & 3;
section[0].ia1 = (i+2) & 3;
section[0].ib0 = i;
section[0].ib1 = (i+3) & 3;
}
nSections = 1;
} else {
section[0].y0 = imgCoordMungeLower(vy[i]);
section[2].y1 = imgCoordMungeUpper(vy[(i+2) & 3]) - 1;
section[0].ia0 = section[0].ib0 = i;
section[2].ia1 = section[2].ib1 = (i+2) & 3;
if (vx[(i+1) & 3] < vx[(i+3) & 3]) {
section[0].ia1 = section[2].ia0 = (i+1) & 3;
section[0].ib1 = section[2].ib0 = (i+3) & 3;
} else {
section[0].ia1 = section[2].ia0 = (i+3) & 3;
section[0].ib1 = section[2].ib0 = (i+1) & 3;
}
if (vy[(i+1) & 3] < vy[(i+3) & 3]) {
section[1].y0 = imgCoordMungeLower(vy[(i+1) & 3]);
section[2].y0 = imgCoordMungeUpper(vy[(i+3) & 3]);
if (vx[(i+1) & 3] < vx[(i+3) & 3]) {
section[1].ia0 = (i+1) & 3;
section[1].ia1 = (i+2) & 3;
section[1].ib0 = i;
section[1].ib1 = (i+3) & 3;
} else {
section[1].ia0 = i;
section[1].ia1 = (i+3) & 3;
section[1].ib0 = (i+1) & 3;
section[1].ib1 = (i+2) & 3;
}
} else {
section[1].y0 = imgCoordMungeLower(vy[(i+3) & 3]);
section[2].y0 = imgCoordMungeUpper(vy[(i+1) & 3]);
if (vx[(i+1) & 3] < vx[(i+3) & 3]) {
section[1].ia0 = i;
section[1].ia1 = (i+1) & 3;
section[1].ib0 = (i+3) & 3;
section[1].ib1 = (i+2) & 3;
} else {
section[1].ia0 = (i+3) & 3;
section[1].ia1 = (i+2) & 3;
section[1].ib0 = i;
section[1].ib1 = (i+1) & 3;
}
}
section[0].y1 = section[1].y0 - 1;
section[1].y1 = section[2].y0 - 1;
nSections = 3;
}
for (i = 0; i < nSections; ++i) {
section[i].xa0 = vx[section[i].ia0];
section[i].ya0 = vy[section[i].ia0];
section[i].xa1 = vx[section[i].ia1];
section[i].ya1 = vy[section[i].ia1];
section[i].xb0 = vx[section[i].ib0];
section[i].yb0 = vy[section[i].ib0];
section[i].xb1 = vx[section[i].ib1];
section[i].yb1 = vy[section[i].ib1];
section[i].dxdya = (section[i].xa1 - section[i].xa0) /
(section[i].ya1 - section[i].ya0);
section[i].dxdyb = (section[i].xb1 - section[i].xb0) /
(section[i].yb1 - section[i].yb0);
}
pipeInit(&pipe, 0, 0, NULL, pixel,
(Guchar)splashRound(state->fillAlpha * 255),
srcAlpha || (vectorAntialias && clipRes != splashClipAllInside),
gFalse);
if (vectorAntialias) {
drawAAPixelInit();
}
if (nSections == 1) {
if (section[0].y0 == section[0].y1) {
++section[0].y1;
clipRes = opClipRes = splashClipPartial;
}
} else {
if (section[0].y0 == section[2].y1) {
++section[1].y1;
clipRes = opClipRes = splashClipPartial;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < nSections; ++i) {
for (y = section[i].y0; y <= section[i].y1; ++y) {
xa = imgCoordMungeLower(section[i].xa0 +
((SplashCoord)y + 0.5 - section[i].ya0) *
section[i].dxdya);
xb = imgCoordMungeUpper(section[i].xb0 +
((SplashCoord)y + 0.5 - section[i].yb0) *
section[i].dxdyb);
if (xa == xb) {
++xb;
}
if (clipRes != splashClipAllInside) {
clipRes2 = state->clip->testSpan(xa, xb - 1, y);
} else {
clipRes2 = clipRes;
}
for (x = xa; x < xb; ++x) {
xx = splashFloor(((SplashCoord)x + 0.5 - mat[4]) * ir00 +
((SplashCoord)y + 0.5 - mat[5]) * ir10);
yy = splashFloor(((SplashCoord)x + 0.5 - mat[4]) * ir01 +
((SplashCoord)y + 0.5 - mat[5]) * ir11);
if (xx < 0) {
xx = 0;
} else if (xx >= scaledWidth) {
xx = scaledWidth - 1;
}
if (yy < 0) {
yy = 0;
} else if (yy >= scaledHeight) {
yy = scaledHeight - 1;
}
scaledImg->getPixel(xx, yy, pixel);
if (srcAlpha) {
pipe.shape = scaledImg->alpha[yy * scaledWidth + xx];
} else {
pipe.shape = 255;
}
if (vectorAntialias && clipRes2 != splashClipAllInside) {
drawAAPixel(&pipe, x, y);
} else {
drawPixel(&pipe, x, y, clipRes2 == splashClipAllInside);
}
}
}
}
delete scaledImg;
return splashOk;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
DelogoContext *s = inlink->dst->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = inlink->dst->outputs[0];
const AVPixFmtDescriptor *desc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(inlink->format);
AVFrame *out;
int hsub0 = desc->log2_chroma_w;
int vsub0 = desc->log2_chroma_h;
int direct = 0;
int plane;
AVRational sar;
if (av_frame_is_writable(in)) {
direct = 1;
out = in;
} else {
out = ff_get_video_buffer(outlink, outlink->w, outlink->h);
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
}
sar = in->sample_aspect_ratio;
/* Assume square pixels if SAR is unknown */
if (!sar.num)
sar.num = sar.den = 1;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && in->data[plane]; plane++) {
int hsub = plane == 1 || plane == 2 ? hsub0 : 0;
int vsub = plane == 1 || plane == 2 ? vsub0 : 0;
apply_delogo(out->data[plane], out->linesize[plane],
in ->data[plane], in ->linesize[plane],
FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->w, hsub),
FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->h, vsub),
sar, s->x>>hsub, s->y>>vsub,
/* Up and left borders were rounded down, inject lost bits
* into width and height to avoid error accumulation */
FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(s->w + (s->x & ((1<<hsub)-1)), hsub),
FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(s->h + (s->y & ((1<<vsub)-1)), vsub),
s->band>>FFMIN(hsub, vsub),
s->show, direct);
}
if (!direct)
av_frame_free(&in);
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, out);
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 165,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _krb5_pk_load_id(krb5_context context,
struct krb5_pk_identity **ret_id,
const char *user_id,
const char *anchor_id,
char * const *chain_list,
char * const *revoke_list,
krb5_prompter_fct prompter,
void *prompter_data,
char *password)
{
struct krb5_pk_identity *id = NULL;
struct prompter p;
int ret;
*ret_id = NULL;
if (anchor_id == NULL) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, HEIM_PKINIT_NO_VALID_CA,
N_("PKINIT: No anchor given", ""));
return HEIM_PKINIT_NO_VALID_CA;
}
/* load cert */
id = calloc(1, sizeof(*id));
if (id == NULL)
return krb5_enomem(context);
if (user_id) {
hx509_lock lock;
ret = hx509_lock_init(context->hx509ctx, &lock);
if (ret) {
pk_copy_error(context, context->hx509ctx, ret, "Failed init lock");
goto out;
}
if (password && password[0])
hx509_lock_add_password(lock, password);
if (prompter) {
p.context = context;
p.prompter = prompter;
p.prompter_data = prompter_data;
ret = hx509_lock_set_prompter(lock, hx_pass_prompter, &p);
if (ret) {
hx509_lock_free(lock);
goto out;
}
}
ret = hx509_certs_init(context->hx509ctx, user_id, 0, lock, &id->certs);
hx509_lock_free(lock);
if (ret) {
pk_copy_error(context, context->hx509ctx, ret,
"Failed to init cert certs");
goto out;
}
} else {
id->certs = NULL;
}
ret = hx509_certs_init(context->hx509ctx, anchor_id, 0, NULL, &id->anchors);
if (ret) {
pk_copy_error(context, context->hx509ctx, ret,
"Failed to init anchors");
goto out;
}
ret = hx509_certs_init(context->hx509ctx, "MEMORY:pkinit-cert-chain",
0, NULL, &id->certpool);
if (ret) {
pk_copy_error(context, context->hx509ctx, ret,
"Failed to init chain");
goto out;
}
while (chain_list && *chain_list) {
ret = hx509_certs_append(context->hx509ctx, id->certpool,
NULL, *chain_list);
if (ret) {
pk_copy_error(context, context->hx509ctx, ret,
"Failed to laod chain %s",
*chain_list);
goto out;
}
chain_list++;
}
if (revoke_list) {
ret = hx509_revoke_init(context->hx509ctx, &id->revokectx);
if (ret) {
pk_copy_error(context, context->hx509ctx, ret,
"Failed init revoke list");
goto out;
}
while (*revoke_list) {
ret = hx509_revoke_add_crl(context->hx509ctx,
id->revokectx,
*revoke_list);
if (ret) {
pk_copy_error(context, context->hx509ctx, ret,
"Failed load revoke list");
goto out;
}
revoke_list++;
}
} else
hx509_context_set_missing_revoke(context->hx509ctx, 1);
ret = hx509_verify_init_ctx(context->hx509ctx, &id->verify_ctx);
if (ret) {
pk_copy_error(context, context->hx509ctx, ret,
"Failed init verify context");
goto out;
}
hx509_verify_attach_anchors(id->verify_ctx, id->anchors);
hx509_verify_attach_revoke(id->verify_ctx, id->revokectx);
out:
if (ret) {
hx509_verify_destroy_ctx(id->verify_ctx);
hx509_certs_free(&id->certs);
hx509_certs_free(&id->anchors);
hx509_certs_free(&id->certpool);
hx509_revoke_free(&id->revokectx);
free(id);
} else
*ret_id = id;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320 | 0 | 89,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintBackgroundStroke(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
bool active,
SkColor stroke_color) const {
SkPath outer_path =
GetPath(TabStyle::PathType::kBorder, canvas->image_scale(), active);
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(canvas);
float scale = canvas->UndoDeviceScaleFactor();
cc::PaintFlags flags;
flags.setAntiAlias(true);
flags.setColor(stroke_color);
flags.setStyle(cc::PaintFlags::kStroke_Style);
flags.setStrokeWidth(GetStrokeThickness(active) * scale);
canvas->DrawPath(outer_path, flags);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *set_cgi_var(cmd_parms *cmd, void *d_,
const char *var, const char *rule_)
{
core_dir_config *d = d_;
char *rule = apr_pstrdup(cmd->pool, rule_);
ap_str_tolower(rule);
if (!strcmp(var, "REQUEST_URI")) {
if (strcmp(rule, "current-uri") && strcmp(rule, "original-uri")) {
return "Valid rules for REQUEST_URI are 'current-uri' and 'original-uri'";
}
}
else {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "Unrecognized CGI variable: \"",
var, "\"", NULL);
}
if (!d->cgi_var_rules) {
d->cgi_var_rules = apr_hash_make(cmd->pool);
}
apr_hash_set(d->cgi_var_rules, var, APR_HASH_KEY_STRING, rule);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LayerTreeHostImpl::IsActivelyScrolling() const {
if (!CurrentlyScrollingNode())
return false;
if (settings_.ignore_root_layer_flings && IsCurrentlyScrollingViewport())
return false;
return did_lock_scrolling_layer_;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sepinitialproc(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, ref *space)
{
gs_client_color cc;
cc.pattern = 0x00;
cc.paint.values[0] = 1.0;
return gs_setcolor(igs, &cc);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t tpm_show_owned(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
char *buf)
{
cap_t cap;
ssize_t rc;
rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER, &cap,
"attempting to determine the owner state");
if (rc)
return 0;
rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", cap.owned);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: char/tpm: Fix unitialized usage of data buffer
This patch fixes information leakage to the userspace by initializing
the data buffer to zero.
Reported-by: Peter Huewe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Selhorst <[email protected]>
[ Also removed the silly "* sizeof(u8)". If that isn't 1, we have way
deeper problems than a simple multiplication can fix. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 27,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const btrc_interface_t *btif_rc_get_interface(void)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __FUNCTION__);
return &bt_rc_interface;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,803 |
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