instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
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int64 0
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _rpc_ping(slurm_msg_t *msg)
{
int rc = SLURM_SUCCESS;
uid_t req_uid = g_slurm_auth_get_uid(msg->auth_cred,
conf->auth_info);
static bool first_msg = true;
if (!_slurm_authorized_user(req_uid)) {
error("Security violation, ping RPC from uid %d",
req_uid);
if (first_msg) {
error("Do you have SlurmUser configured as uid %d?",
req_uid);
}
rc = ESLURM_USER_ID_MISSING; /* or bad in this case */
}
first_msg = false;
if (rc != SLURM_SUCCESS) {
/* Return result. If the reply can't be sent this indicates
* 1. The network is broken OR
* 2. slurmctld has died OR
* 3. slurmd was paged out due to full memory
* If the reply request fails, we send an registration message
* to slurmctld in hopes of avoiding having the node set DOWN
* due to slurmd paging and not being able to respond in a
* timely fashion. */
if (slurm_send_rc_msg(msg, rc) < 0) {
error("Error responding to ping: %m");
send_registration_msg(SLURM_SUCCESS, false);
}
} else {
slurm_msg_t resp_msg;
ping_slurmd_resp_msg_t ping_resp;
get_cpu_load(&ping_resp.cpu_load);
get_free_mem(&ping_resp.free_mem);
slurm_msg_t_copy(&resp_msg, msg);
resp_msg.msg_type = RESPONSE_PING_SLURMD;
resp_msg.data = &ping_resp;
slurm_send_node_msg(msg->conn_fd, &resp_msg);
}
/* Take this opportunity to enforce any job memory limits */
_enforce_job_mem_limit();
/* Clear up any stalled file transfers as well */
_file_bcast_cleanup();
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int strToMatch(const char* str ,char *retstr)
{
char* anchor = NULL;
const char* anchor1 = NULL;
int result = 0;
if( (!str) || str[0] == '\0'){
return result;
} else {
anchor = retstr;
anchor1 = str;
while( (*str)!='\0' ){
if( *str == '-' ){
*retstr = '_';
} else {
*retstr = tolower(*str);
}
str++;
retstr++;
}
*retstr = '\0';
retstr= anchor;
str= anchor1;
result = 1;
}
return(result);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 52,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned char *read_chunk(struct mschm_decompressor_p *self,
struct mschmd_header *chm,
struct mspack_file *fh,
unsigned int chunk_num)
{
struct mspack_system *sys = self->system;
unsigned char *buf;
/* check arguments - most are already checked by chmd_fast_find */
if (chunk_num > chm->num_chunks) return NULL;
/* ensure chunk cache is available */
if (!chm->chunk_cache) {
size_t size = sizeof(unsigned char *) * chm->num_chunks;
if (!(chm->chunk_cache = (unsigned char **) sys->alloc(sys, size))) {
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
return NULL;
}
memset(chm->chunk_cache, 0, size);
}
/* try to answer out of chunk cache */
if (chm->chunk_cache[chunk_num]) return chm->chunk_cache[chunk_num];
/* need to read chunk - allocate memory for it */
if (!(buf = (unsigned char *) sys->alloc(sys, chm->chunk_size))) {
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
return NULL;
}
/* seek to block and read it */
if (sys->seek(fh, (off_t) (chm->dir_offset + (chunk_num * chm->chunk_size)),
MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START))
{
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
sys->free(buf);
return NULL;
}
if (sys->read(fh, buf, (int)chm->chunk_size) != (int)chm->chunk_size) {
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_READ;
sys->free(buf);
return NULL;
}
/* check the signature. Is is PMGL or PMGI? */
if (!((buf[0] == 0x50) && (buf[1] == 0x4D) && (buf[2] == 0x47) &&
((buf[3] == 0x4C) || (buf[3] == 0x49))))
{
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
sys->free(buf);
return NULL;
}
/* all OK. Store chunk in cache and return it */
return chm->chunk_cache[chunk_num] = buf;
}
Commit Message: Fix off-by-one error in chmd TOLOWER() fallback
CWE ID: CWE-682 | 0 | 79,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ToggleFullscreenToolbar(Browser* browser) {
DCHECK(browser);
PrefService* prefs = browser->profile()->GetPrefs();
bool show_toolbar = prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kShowFullscreenToolbar);
prefs->SetBoolean(prefs::kShowFullscreenToolbar, !show_toolbar);
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 153,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void alsoPropagate(struct redisCommand *cmd, int dbid, robj **argv, int argc,
int target)
{
robj **argvcopy;
int j;
if (server.loading) return; /* No propagation during loading. */
argvcopy = zmalloc(sizeof(robj*)*argc);
for (j = 0; j < argc; j++) {
argvcopy[j] = argv[j];
incrRefCount(argv[j]);
}
redisOpArrayAppend(&server.also_propagate,cmd,dbid,argvcopy,argc,target);
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 69,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int flexarray_append(struct flexarray *flex, void *data)
{
return flexarray_set(flex, flexarray_size(flex), data);
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ion_handle_validate(struct ion_client *client,
struct ion_handle *handle)
{
WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&client->lock));
return idr_find(&client->idr, handle->id) == handle;
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 48,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockDelegate* mock_delegate() {
return &delegate_;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Referrer RenderViewImpl::GetReferrerFromRequest(
WebFrame* frame,
const WebURLRequest& request) {
return Referrer(blink::WebStringToGURL(
request.HttpHeaderField(WebString::FromUTF8("Referer"))),
request.GetReferrerPolicy());
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CL_CompleteRcon( char *args, int argNum )
{
if( argNum == 2 )
{
char *p = Com_SkipTokens( args, 1, " " );
if( p > args )
Field_CompleteCommand( p, qtrue, qtrue );
}
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: g_NPN_GetIntIdentifier(int32_t intid)
{
if (!thread_check()) {
npw_printf("WARNING: NPN_GetIntIdentifier not called from the main thread\n");
return NULL;
}
D(bugiI("NPN_GetIntIdentifier intid=%d\n", intid));
NPIdentifier ret = cached_NPN_GetIntIdentifier(intid);
D(bugiD("NPN_GetIntIdentifier return: %p\n", ret));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint16_t full_header_get_msg_type(SpiceDataHeaderOpaque *header)
{
return ((SpiceDataHeader *)header->data)->type;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_inode_validate_extsize(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
uint32_t extsize,
uint16_t mode,
uint16_t flags)
{
bool rt_flag;
bool hint_flag;
bool inherit_flag;
uint32_t extsize_bytes;
uint32_t blocksize_bytes;
rt_flag = (flags & XFS_DIFLAG_REALTIME);
hint_flag = (flags & XFS_DIFLAG_EXTSIZE);
inherit_flag = (flags & XFS_DIFLAG_EXTSZINHERIT);
extsize_bytes = XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, extsize);
if (rt_flag)
blocksize_bytes = mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize << mp->m_sb.sb_blocklog;
else
blocksize_bytes = mp->m_sb.sb_blocksize;
if ((hint_flag || inherit_flag) && !(S_ISDIR(mode) || S_ISREG(mode)))
return __this_address;
if (hint_flag && !S_ISREG(mode))
return __this_address;
if (inherit_flag && !S_ISDIR(mode))
return __this_address;
if ((hint_flag || inherit_flag) && extsize == 0)
return __this_address;
if (!(hint_flag || inherit_flag) && extsize != 0)
return __this_address;
if (extsize_bytes % blocksize_bytes)
return __this_address;
if (extsize > MAXEXTLEN)
return __this_address;
if (!rt_flag && extsize > mp->m_sb.sb_agblocks / 2)
return __this_address;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: xfs: More robust inode extent count validation
When the inode is in extent format, it can't have more extents that
fit in the inode fork. We don't currenty check this, and so this
corruption goes unnoticed by the inode verifiers. This can lead to
crashes operating on invalid in-memory structures.
Attempts to access such a inode will now error out in the verifier
rather than allowing modification operations to proceed.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
[darrick: fix a typedef, add some braces and breaks to shut up compiler warnings]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 79,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint8_t GLES2Util::StencilBitsPerPixel(int format) {
switch (format) {
case GL_STENCIL_INDEX8:
case GL_DEPTH24_STENCIL8_OES:
return 8;
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Validate glClearBuffer*v function |buffer| param on the client side
Otherwise we could read out-of-bounds even if an invalid |buffer| is passed
in and in theory we should not read the buffer at all.
BUG=908749
TEST=gl_tests in ASAN build
[email protected]
Change-Id: I94b69b56ce3358ff9bfc0e21f0618aec4371d1ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1354571
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#612023}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 153,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelZip(Image *image,const size_t channels,
const ssize_t type,const PSDCompressionType compression,
const size_t compact_size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
count,
length,
packet_size,
row_size;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels,
*pixels;
z_stream
stream;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is ZIP compressed");
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(compact_size,
sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
packet_size=GetPSDPacketSize(image);
row_size=image->columns*packet_size;
count=image->rows*row_size;
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(count,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
if (ReadBlob(image,compact_size,compact_pixels) != (ssize_t) compact_size)
{
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
}
ResetMagickMemory(&stream,0,sizeof(stream));
stream.data_type=Z_BINARY;
stream.next_in=(Bytef *)compact_pixels;
stream.avail_in=(uInt) compact_size;
stream.next_out=(Bytef *)pixels;
stream.avail_out=(uInt) count;
if (inflateInit(&stream) == Z_OK)
{
int
ret;
while (stream.avail_out > 0)
{
ret=inflate(&stream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
if ((ret != Z_OK) && (ret != Z_STREAM_END))
{
(void) inflateEnd(&stream);
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compact_pixels);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(MagickFalse);
}
}
(void) inflateEnd(&stream);
}
if (compression == ZipWithPrediction)
{
p=pixels;
while (count > 0)
{
length=image->columns;
while (--length)
{
if (packet_size == 2)
{
p[2]+=p[0]+((p[1]+p[3]) >> 8);
p[3]+=p[1];
}
else
*(p+1)+=*p;
p+=packet_size;
}
p+=packet_size;
count-=row_size;
}
}
status=MagickTrue;
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
status=ReadPSDChannelPixels(image,channels,y,type,p,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
p+=row_size;
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void PartiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod1Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8StringResource<> string_arg;
string_arg = info[0];
if (!string_arg.Prepare())
return;
impl->partiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod(string_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, getStub)
{
size_t len;
zend_string *buf;
php_stream *fp;
php_stream_filter *filter = NULL;
phar_entry_info *stub;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (phar_obj->archive->is_tar || phar_obj->archive->is_zip) {
if (NULL != (stub = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&(phar_obj->archive->manifest), ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1))) {
if (phar_obj->archive->fp && !phar_obj->archive->is_brandnew && !(stub->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK)) {
fp = phar_obj->archive->fp;
} else {
if (!(fp = php_stream_open_wrapper(phar_obj->archive->fname, "rb", 0, NULL))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0, "phar error: unable to open phar \"%s\"", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (stub->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK) {
char *filter_name;
if ((filter_name = phar_decompress_filter(stub, 0)) != NULL) {
filter = php_stream_filter_create(filter_name, NULL, php_stream_is_persistent(fp));
} else {
filter = NULL;
}
if (!filter) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0, "phar error: unable to read stub of phar \"%s\" (cannot create %s filter)", phar_obj->archive->fname, phar_decompress_filter(stub, 1));
return;
}
php_stream_filter_append(&fp->readfilters, filter);
}
}
if (!fp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0,
"Unable to read stub");
return;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, stub->offset_abs, SEEK_SET);
len = stub->uncompressed_filesize;
goto carry_on;
} else {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
}
len = phar_obj->archive->halt_offset;
if (phar_obj->archive->fp && !phar_obj->archive->is_brandnew) {
fp = phar_obj->archive->fp;
} else {
fp = php_stream_open_wrapper(phar_obj->archive->fname, "rb", 0, NULL);
}
if (!fp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0,
"Unable to read stub");
return;
}
php_stream_rewind(fp);
carry_on:
buf = zend_string_alloc(len, 0);
if (len != php_stream_read(fp, ZSTR_VAL(buf), len)) {
if (fp != phar_obj->archive->fp) {
php_stream_close(fp);
}
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0,
"Unable to read stub");
zend_string_release(buf);
return;
}
if (filter) {
php_stream_filter_flush(filter, 1);
php_stream_filter_remove(filter, 1);
}
if (fp != phar_obj->archive->fp) {
php_stream_close(fp);
}
ZSTR_VAL(buf)[len] = '\0';
ZSTR_LEN(buf) = len;
RETVAL_STR(buf);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StreamTcpSetSessionBypassFlag (TcpSession *ssn)
{
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_BYPASS;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 79,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_start_secure_connection_phase1(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS) {
p_cb->sec_level = SMP_SEC_UNAUTHENTICATE;
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("p_cb->sec_level =%d (SMP_SEC_UNAUTHENTICATE) ",
p_cb->sec_level);
} else {
p_cb->sec_level = SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED;
SMP_TRACE_EVENT("p_cb->sec_level =%d (SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED) ",
p_cb->sec_level);
}
switch (p_cb->selected_association_model) {
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS:
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP:
memset(p_cb->local_random, 0, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
smp_start_nonce_generation(p_cb);
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT:
/* user has to provide passkey */
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_PASSKEY_REQ_EVT;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_TK_REQ_EVT, NULL);
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP:
/* passkey has to be provided to user */
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("Need to generate SC Passkey");
smp_generate_passkey(p_cb, NULL);
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB:
/* use the available OOB information */
smp_process_secure_connection_oob_data(p_cb, NULL);
break;
default:
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("Association Model = %d is not used in LE SC",
p_cb->selected_association_model);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetPermissionInfo(const PermissionInfoList& permission_info_list,
ChosenObjectInfoList chosen_object_info_list) {
last_chosen_object_info_.clear();
for (auto& chosen_object_info : chosen_object_info_list)
last_chosen_object_info_.push_back(std::move(chosen_object_info));
last_permission_info_list_ = permission_info_list;
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 138,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ErrorResilienceTestLarge()
: EncoderTest(GET_PARAM(0)),
psnr_(0.0),
nframes_(0),
mismatch_psnr_(0.0),
mismatch_nframes_(0),
encoding_mode_(GET_PARAM(1)) {
Reset();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *parse_object(cJSON *item,const char *value,const char **ep)
{
cJSON *child;
if (*value!='{') {*ep=value;return 0;} /* not an object! */
item->type=cJSON_Object;
value=skip(value+1);
if (*value=='}') return value+1; /* empty array. */
item->child=child=cJSON_New_Item();
if (!item->child) return 0;
value=skip(parse_string(child,skip(value),ep));
if (!value) return 0;
child->string=child->valuestring;child->valuestring=0;
if (*value!=':') {*ep=value;return 0;} /* fail! */
value=skip(parse_value(child,skip(value+1),ep)); /* skip any spacing, get the value. */
if (!value) return 0;
while (*value==',')
{
cJSON *new_item;
if (!(new_item=cJSON_New_Item())) return 0; /* memory fail */
child->next=new_item;new_item->prev=child;child=new_item;
value=skip(parse_string(child,skip(value+1),ep));
if (!value) return 0;
child->string=child->valuestring;child->valuestring=0;
if (*value!=':') {*ep=value;return 0;} /* fail! */
value=skip(parse_value(child,skip(value+1),ep)); /* skip any spacing, get the value. */
if (!value) return 0;
}
if (*value=='}') return value+1; /* end of array */
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 93,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sk_buff *skb_clone(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
struct sk_buff_fclones *fclones = container_of(skb,
struct sk_buff_fclones,
skb1);
struct sk_buff *n;
if (skb_orphan_frags(skb, gfp_mask))
return NULL;
if (skb->fclone == SKB_FCLONE_ORIG &&
atomic_read(&fclones->fclone_ref) == 1) {
n = &fclones->skb2;
atomic_set(&fclones->fclone_ref, 2);
} else {
if (skb_pfmemalloc(skb))
gfp_mask |= __GFP_MEMALLOC;
n = kmem_cache_alloc(skbuff_head_cache, gfp_mask);
if (!n)
return NULL;
kmemcheck_annotate_bitfield(n, flags1);
n->fclone = SKB_FCLONE_UNAVAILABLE;
}
return __skb_clone(n, skb);
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 67,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PaymentHandlerWebFlowViewController::ShouldShowSecondaryButton() {
return false;
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameLoader::LoadInSameDocument(
const KURL& url,
scoped_refptr<SerializedScriptValue> state_object,
FrameLoadType frame_load_type,
HistoryItem* history_item,
ClientRedirectPolicy client_redirect,
Document* initiating_document) {
DCHECK(!state_object || frame_load_type == kFrameLoadTypeBackForward);
DetachDocumentLoader(provisional_document_loader_);
if (!frame_->GetPage())
return;
SaveScrollState();
KURL old_url = frame_->GetDocument()->Url();
bool hash_change = EqualIgnoringFragmentIdentifier(url, old_url) &&
url.FragmentIdentifier() != old_url.FragmentIdentifier();
if (hash_change) {
frame_->GetEventHandler().StopAutoscroll();
frame_->DomWindow()->EnqueueHashchangeEvent(old_url, url);
}
document_loader_->SetIsClientRedirect(client_redirect ==
ClientRedirectPolicy::kClientRedirect);
if (history_item)
document_loader_->SetItemForHistoryNavigation(history_item);
UpdateForSameDocumentNavigation(url, kSameDocumentNavigationDefault, nullptr,
kScrollRestorationAuto, frame_load_type,
initiating_document);
document_loader_->GetInitialScrollState().was_scrolled_by_user = false;
frame_->GetDocument()->CheckCompleted();
std::unique_ptr<HistoryItem::ViewState> view_state;
if (history_item && history_item->GetViewState()) {
view_state =
std::make_unique<HistoryItem::ViewState>(*history_item->GetViewState());
}
frame_->DomWindow()->StatePopped(state_object
? std::move(state_object)
: SerializedScriptValue::NullValue());
if (history_item) {
RestoreScrollPositionAndViewState(frame_load_type, kHistorySameDocumentLoad,
view_state.get(),
history_item->ScrollRestorationType());
}
ProcessFragment(url, frame_load_type, kNavigationWithinSameDocument);
TakeObjectSnapshot();
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 125,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TEE_Result tee_svc_obj_generate_key_dsa(
struct tee_obj *o, const struct tee_cryp_obj_type_props *type_props,
uint32_t key_size)
{
TEE_Result res;
res = crypto_acipher_gen_dsa_key(o->attr, key_size);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
/* Set bits for all known attributes for this object type */
o->have_attrs = (1 << type_props->num_type_attrs) - 1;
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void svm_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
struct vmcb_seg *s = svm_seg(vcpu, seg);
s->base = var->base;
s->limit = var->limit;
s->selector = var->selector;
if (var->unusable)
s->attrib = 0;
else {
s->attrib = (var->type & SVM_SELECTOR_TYPE_MASK);
s->attrib |= (var->s & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_S_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->dpl & 3) << SVM_SELECTOR_DPL_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->present & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_P_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->avl & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_AVL_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->l & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_L_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->db & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_DB_SHIFT;
s->attrib |= (var->g & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_G_SHIFT;
}
/*
* This is always accurate, except if SYSRET returned to a segment
* with SS.DPL != 3. Intel does not have this quirk, and always
* forces SS.DPL to 3 on sysret, so we ignore that case; fixing it
* would entail passing the CPL to userspace and back.
*/
if (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
svm->vmcb->save.cpl = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_DPL_SHIFT) & 3;
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_SEG);
}
Commit Message: KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 41,917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BluetoothSocketListenUsingL2capFunction::CreateParams() {
params_ = bluetooth_socket::ListenUsingL2cap::Params::Create(*args_);
return params_ != nullptr;
}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 154,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dpcm_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame_ptr, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
const uint8_t *buf = avpkt->data;
int buf_size = avpkt->size;
const uint8_t *buf_end = buf + buf_size;
DPCMContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int out = 0, ret;
int predictor[2];
int ch = 0;
int stereo = s->channels - 1;
int16_t *output_samples;
/* calculate output size */
switch(avctx->codec->id) {
case CODEC_ID_ROQ_DPCM:
case CODEC_ID_XAN_DPCM:
out = buf_size - 2 * s->channels;
break;
case CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM:
if (avctx->codec_tag != 3)
out = buf_size * 2;
else
out = buf_size;
break;
}
if (out <= 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "packet is too small\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* get output buffer */
s->frame.nb_samples = out / s->channels;
if ((ret = avctx->get_buffer(avctx, &s->frame)) < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "get_buffer() failed\n");
return ret;
}
output_samples = (int16_t *)s->frame.data[0];
switch(avctx->codec->id) {
case CODEC_ID_ROQ_DPCM:
buf += 6;
if (stereo) {
predictor[1] = (int16_t)(bytestream_get_byte(&buf) << 8);
predictor[0] = (int16_t)(bytestream_get_byte(&buf) << 8);
} else {
predictor[0] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
}
/* decode the samples */
while (buf < buf_end) {
predictor[ch] += s->roq_square_array[*buf++];
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
case CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_DPCM:
buf += 6; /* skip over the stream mask and stream length */
for (ch = 0; ch < s->channels; ch++) {
predictor[ch] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
}
ch = 0;
while (buf < buf_end) {
predictor[ch] += interplay_delta_table[*buf++];
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
case CODEC_ID_XAN_DPCM:
{
int shift[2] = { 4, 4 };
for (ch = 0; ch < s->channels; ch++)
predictor[ch] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
ch = 0;
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
int16_t diff = (n & 0xFC) << 8;
if ((n & 0x03) == 3)
shift[ch]++;
else
shift[ch] -= (2 * (n & 3));
/* saturate the shifter to a lower limit of 0 */
if (shift[ch] < 0)
shift[ch] = 0;
diff >>= shift[ch];
predictor[ch] += diff;
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
}
case CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM:
if (avctx->codec_tag != 3) {
uint8_t *output_samples_u8 = s->frame.data[0];
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
s->sample[0] += s->sol_table[n >> 4];
s->sample[0] = av_clip_uint8(s->sample[0]);
*output_samples_u8++ = s->sample[0];
s->sample[stereo] += s->sol_table[n & 0x0F];
s->sample[stereo] = av_clip_uint8(s->sample[stereo]);
*output_samples_u8++ = s->sample[stereo];
}
} else {
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
if (n & 0x80) s->sample[ch] -= sol_table_16[n & 0x7F];
else s->sample[ch] += sol_table_16[n & 0x7F];
s->sample[ch] = av_clip_int16(s->sample[ch]);
*output_samples++ = s->sample[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
}
break;
}
*got_frame_ptr = 1;
*(AVFrame *)data = s->frame;
return buf_size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 165,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, mount)
{
char *fname, *arch = NULL, *entry = NULL, *path, *actual;
int fname_len, arch_len, entry_len, path_len, actual_len;
phar_archive_data **pphar;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss", &path, &path_len, &actual, &actual_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
fname = (char*)zend_get_executed_filename(TSRMLS_C);
fname_len = strlen(fname);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(fname, fname_len);
#endif
if (fname_len > 7 && !memcmp(fname, "phar://", 7) && SUCCESS == phar_split_fname(fname, fname_len, &arch, &arch_len, &entry, &entry_len, 2, 0 TSRMLS_CC)) {
efree(entry);
entry = NULL;
if (path_len > 7 && !memcmp(path, "phar://", 7)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Can only mount internal paths within a phar archive, use a relative path instead of \"%s\"", path);
efree(arch);
return;
}
carry_on2:
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), arch, arch_len, (void **)&pphar)) {
if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&cached_phars, arch, arch_len, (void **)&pphar)) {
if (SUCCESS == phar_copy_on_write(pphar TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto carry_on;
}
}
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s is not a phar archive, cannot mount", arch);
if (arch) {
efree(arch);
}
return;
}
carry_on:
if (SUCCESS != phar_mount_entry(*pphar, actual, actual_len, path, path_len TSRMLS_CC)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Mounting of %s to %s within phar %s failed", path, actual, arch);
if (path && path == entry) {
efree(entry);
}
if (arch) {
efree(arch);
}
return;
}
if (entry && path && path == entry) {
efree(entry);
}
if (arch) {
efree(arch);
}
return;
} else if (PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map.arBuckets && SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), fname, fname_len, (void **)&pphar)) {
goto carry_on;
} else if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&cached_phars, fname, fname_len, (void **)&pphar)) {
if (SUCCESS == phar_copy_on_write(pphar TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto carry_on;
}
goto carry_on;
} else if (SUCCESS == phar_split_fname(path, path_len, &arch, &arch_len, &entry, &entry_len, 2, 0 TSRMLS_CC)) {
path = entry;
path_len = entry_len;
goto carry_on2;
}
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Mounting of %s to %s failed", path, actual);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AMediaCodecActionCode_isTransient(int32_t actionCode) {
return (actionCode == ACTION_CODE_TRANSIENT);
}
Commit Message: Check for overflow of crypto size
Bug: 111603051
Test: CTS
Change-Id: Ib5b1802b9b35769a25c16e2b977308cf7a810606
(cherry picked from commit d1fd02761236b35a336434367131f71bef7405c9)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 162,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void disable_sched_clock_irqtime(void)
{
sched_clock_irqtime = 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int cqspi_calc_rdreg(struct spi_nor *nor, const u8 opcode)
{
struct cqspi_flash_pdata *f_pdata = nor->priv;
u32 rdreg = 0;
rdreg |= f_pdata->inst_width << CQSPI_REG_RD_INSTR_TYPE_INSTR_LSB;
rdreg |= f_pdata->addr_width << CQSPI_REG_RD_INSTR_TYPE_ADDR_LSB;
rdreg |= f_pdata->data_width << CQSPI_REG_RD_INSTR_TYPE_DATA_LSB;
return rdreg;
}
Commit Message: mtd: spi-nor: Off by one in cqspi_setup_flash()
There are CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT elements in the ->f_pdata array so the >
should be >=.
Fixes: 140623410536 ('mtd: spi-nor: Add driver for Cadence Quad SPI Flash Controller')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cyrille Pitchen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfrm_exp_state_notify(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c)
{
struct net *net = xs_net(x);
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = nlmsg_new(xfrm_expire_msgsize(), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (build_expire(skb, x, c) < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
return xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_EXPIRE);
}
Commit Message: ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_recover_open_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
rpc_task_set_priority(task, RPC_PRIORITY_PRIVILEGED);
nfs4_open_prepare(task, calldata);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int find_highest_bits(int *dat)
{
u32 bits, bitnum;
int i;
/* loop for all 256 bits */
for (i = 7; i >= 0 ; i--) {
bits = dat[i];
if (bits) {
bitnum = fls(bits);
return i * 32 + bitnum - 1;
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GetModifiedSinceOnDBThread(StorageType type,
base::Time modified_since,
QuotaDatabase* database) {
DCHECK(database);
return database->GetOriginsModifiedSince(type, &origins_, modified_since);
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void register_sysctl_root(struct ctl_table_root *root)
{
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CWebServer::SetWebCompressionMode(const _eWebCompressionMode gzmode)
{
if (m_pWebEm == NULL)
return;
m_pWebEm->SetWebCompressionMode(gzmode);
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 91,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_write_rows(png_structp png_ptr, png_bytepp row,
png_uint_32 num_rows)
{
png_uint_32 i; /* row counter */
png_bytepp rp; /* row pointer */
png_debug(1, "in png_write_rows");
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
/* Loop through the rows */
for (i = 0, rp = row; i < num_rows; i++, rp++)
{
png_write_row(png_ptr, *rp);
}
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int process_cpu_clock_get(const clockid_t which_clock,
struct timespec *tp)
{
return posix_cpu_clock_get(PROCESS_CLOCK, tp);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __glXDisp_QueryContextInfoEXT(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
xGLXQueryContextInfoEXTReq *req = (xGLXQueryContextInfoEXTReq *) pc;
return DoQueryContext(cl, req->context);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::InsertText(const base::string16& text) {
DCHECK_NE(GetTextInputType(), ui::TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_NONE);
if (text_input_manager_ && text_input_manager_->GetActiveWidget()) {
if (text.length())
text_input_manager_->GetActiveWidget()->ImeCommitText(
text, std::vector<blink::WebCompositionUnderline>(),
gfx::Range::InvalidRange(), 0);
else if (has_composition_text_)
text_input_manager_->GetActiveWidget()->ImeFinishComposingText(false);
}
has_composition_text_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::derefObject(void* object)
{
fromInternalPointer(object)->deref();
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_rcv_rtt_update(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 sample, int win_dep)
{
u32 new_sample = tp->rcv_rtt_est.rtt;
long m = sample;
if (m == 0)
m = 1;
if (new_sample != 0) {
/* If we sample in larger samples in the non-timestamp
* case, we could grossly overestimate the RTT especially
* with chatty applications or bulk transfer apps which
* are stalled on filesystem I/O.
*
* Also, since we are only going for a minimum in the
* non-timestamp case, we do not smooth things out
* else with timestamps disabled convergence takes too
* long.
*/
if (!win_dep) {
m -= (new_sample >> 3);
new_sample += m;
} else if (m < new_sample)
new_sample = m << 3;
} else {
/* No previous measure. */
new_sample = m << 3;
}
if (tp->rcv_rtt_est.rtt != new_sample)
tp->rcv_rtt_est.rtt = new_sample;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 41,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rfc_send_credit(tRFC_MCB* p_mcb, uint8_t dlci, uint8_t credit) {
uint8_t* p_data;
uint8_t cr = RFCOMM_CR(p_mcb->is_initiator, true);
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(RFCOMM_CMD_BUF_SIZE);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_data = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
*p_data++ = RFCOMM_EA | cr | (dlci << RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI);
*p_data++ = RFCOMM_UIH | RFCOMM_PF;
*p_data++ = RFCOMM_EA | 0;
*p_data++ = credit;
*p_data = RFCOMM_UIH_FCS((uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset, dlci);
p_buf->len = 5;
rfc_check_send_cmd(p_mcb, p_buf);
}
Commit Message: Check remaining frame length in rfc_process_mx_message
Bug: 111936792
Bug: 80432928
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ie2c09f3d598fb230ce060c9043f5a88c241cdd79
(cherry picked from commit 0471355c8b035aaa2ce07a33eecad60ad49c5ad0)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xpathDocTest(const char *filename,
const char *resul ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const char *err ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
int options) {
char pattern[500];
char result[500];
glob_t globbuf;
size_t i;
int ret = 0, res;
xpathDocument = xmlReadFile(filename, NULL,
options | XML_PARSE_DTDATTR | XML_PARSE_NOENT);
if (xpathDocument == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to load %s\n", filename);
return(-1);
}
snprintf(pattern, 499, "./test/XPath/tests/%s*", baseFilename(filename));
pattern[499] = 0;
globbuf.gl_offs = 0;
glob(pattern, GLOB_DOOFFS, NULL, &globbuf);
for (i = 0;i < globbuf.gl_pathc;i++) {
snprintf(result, 499, "result/XPath/tests/%s",
baseFilename(globbuf.gl_pathv[i]));
res = xpathCommonTest(globbuf.gl_pathv[i], &result[0], 0, 0);
if (res != 0)
ret = res;
}
globfree(&globbuf);
xmlFreeDoc(xpathDocument);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _PUBLIC_ char *talloc_strdup_upper(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, const char *src)
{
return strupper_talloc(ctx, src);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int createSocketChannelNative(JNIEnv *env, jobject object, jint type,
jstring name_str, jbyteArray uuidObj,
jint channel, jint flag) {
const char *service_name = NULL;
jbyte *uuid = NULL;
int socket_fd;
bt_status_t status;
if (!sBluetoothSocketInterface) return -1;
ALOGV("%s: SOCK FLAG = %x", __FUNCTION__, flag);
if(name_str != NULL) {
service_name = env->GetStringUTFChars(name_str, NULL);
}
if(uuidObj != NULL) {
uuid = env->GetByteArrayElements(uuidObj, NULL);
if (!uuid) {
ALOGE("failed to get uuid");
goto Fail;
}
}
if ( (status = sBluetoothSocketInterface->listen((btsock_type_t) type, service_name,
(const uint8_t*) uuid, channel, &socket_fd, flag)) != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Socket listen failed: %d", status);
goto Fail;
}
if (socket_fd < 0) {
ALOGE("Fail to creat file descriptor on socket fd");
goto Fail;
}
if (service_name) env->ReleaseStringUTFChars(name_str, service_name);
if (uuid) env->ReleaseByteArrayElements(uuidObj, uuid, 0);
return socket_fd;
Fail:
if (service_name) env->ReleaseStringUTFChars(name_str, service_name);
if (uuid) env->ReleaseByteArrayElements(uuidObj, uuid, 0);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 163,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::DisableVirtualTimeForTesting() {
if (!main_thread_only().use_virtual_time)
return;
main_thread_only().use_virtual_time = false;
if (main_thread_only().virtual_time_stopped) {
main_thread_only().virtual_time_stopped = false;
VirtualTimeResumed();
}
ForceUpdatePolicy();
virtual_time_control_task_queue_->ShutdownTaskQueue();
virtual_time_control_task_queue_ = nullptr;
UnregisterTimeDomain(virtual_time_domain_.get());
virtual_time_domain_.reset();
virtual_time_control_task_queue_ = nullptr;
ApplyVirtualTimePolicy();
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
[email protected]
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ConnectionChangeHandler(void* object, bool connected) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->ime_connected_ = connected;
if (connected) {
input_method_library->pending_config_requests_.clear();
input_method_library->pending_config_requests_.insert(
input_method_library->current_config_values_.begin(),
input_method_library->current_config_values_.end());
input_method_library->FlushImeConfig();
input_method_library->ChangeInputMethod(
input_method_library->previous_input_method().id);
input_method_library->ChangeInputMethod(
input_method_library->current_input_method().id);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool peer_pmtu_cleaned(struct inet_peer *peer)
{
unsigned long orig = ACCESS_ONCE(peer->pmtu_expires);
return orig &&
cmpxchg(&peer->pmtu_expires, orig, 0) == orig;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return compat20 &&
(ssh->state->rekeying || (ssh->kex != NULL && ssh->kex->done == 0));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 17,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 blkg_prfill_rwstat_field(struct seq_file *sf,
struct blkg_policy_data *pd, int off)
{
struct blkg_rwstat rwstat = blkg_rwstat_read((void *)pd->blkg + off);
return __blkg_prfill_rwstat(sf, pd, &rwstat);
}
Commit Message: blkcg: fix double free of new_blkg in blkcg_init_queue
If blkg_create fails, new_blkg passed as an argument will
be freed by blkg_create, so there is no need to free it again.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 84,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int validatedevicenspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref **space)
{
int i, code = 0;
ref *devicenspace = *space, proc;
ref nameref, sref, altspace, namesarray, sname;
/* Check enough arguments in the space */
if (r_size(devicenspace) < 4)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
/* Check the names parameter is an array */
code = array_get(imemory, devicenspace, 1, &namesarray);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (!r_is_array(&namesarray))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
/* Ensure we have at least one ink */
if (r_size(&namesarray) < 1)
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
/* Make sure no more inks than we can cope with */
if (r_size(&namesarray) > MAX_COMPONENTS_IN_DEVN) /* MUST match psi/icremap.h int_remap_color_info_s */
return_error(gs_error_limitcheck);
/* Check the tint transform is a procedure */
code = array_get(imemory, devicenspace, 3, &proc);
if (code < 0)
return code;
check_proc(proc);
/* Check the array of ink names only contains names or strings */
for (i = 0; i < r_size(&namesarray); ++i) {
array_get(imemory, &namesarray, (long)i, &sname);
switch (r_type(&sname)) {
case t_string:
case t_name:
break;
default:
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
}
}
/* Get the name of the alternate space */
code = array_get(imemory, devicenspace, 2, &altspace);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (r_has_type(&altspace, t_name))
ref_assign(&nameref, &altspace);
else {
/* Make sure the alternate space is an array */
if (!r_is_array(&altspace))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
/* And has a name for its type */
code = array_get(imemory, &altspace, 0, &nameref);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (!r_has_type(&nameref, t_name))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
}
/* Convert alternate space name to string */
name_string_ref(imemory, &nameref, &sref);
/* Check its not /Indexed, /Pattern, /DeviceN */
if (r_size(&sref) == 7) {
if (strncmp((const char *)sref.value.const_bytes, "Indexed", 7) == 0)
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (strncmp((const char *)sref.value.const_bytes, "Pattern", 7) == 0)
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (strncmp((const char *)sref.value.const_bytes, "DeviceN", 7) == 0)
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
}
/* and also not /Separation */
if (r_size(&sref) == 9 && strncmp((const char *)sref.value.const_bytes, "Separation", 9) == 0)
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
ref_assign(*space, &altspace);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RList *r_bin_wasm_get_exports (RBinWasmObj *bin) {
RBinWasmSection *export = NULL;
RList *exports = NULL;
if (!bin || !bin->g_sections) {
return NULL;
}
if (bin->g_exports) {
return bin->g_exports;
}
if (!(exports= r_bin_wasm_get_sections_by_id (bin->g_sections,
R_BIN_WASM_SECTION_EXPORT))) {
return r_list_new();
}
if (!(export = (RBinWasmSection*) r_list_first (exports))) {
return r_list_new();
}
bin->g_exports = r_bin_wasm_get_export_entries (bin, export);
return bin->g_exports;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in fuzzed wasm r2_hoobr_consume_init_expr
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 67,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int br_nf_forward_arp(unsigned int hook, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct net_device *in,
const struct net_device *out,
int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
{
struct net_bridge_port *p;
struct net_bridge *br;
struct net_device **d = (struct net_device **)(skb->cb);
p = br_port_get_rcu(out);
if (p == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
br = p->br;
if (!brnf_call_arptables && !br->nf_call_arptables)
return NF_ACCEPT;
if (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_ARP)) {
if (!IS_VLAN_ARP(skb))
return NF_ACCEPT;
nf_bridge_pull_encap_header(skb);
}
if (arp_hdr(skb)->ar_pln != 4) {
if (IS_VLAN_ARP(skb))
nf_bridge_push_encap_header(skb);
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
*d = (struct net_device *)in;
NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_ARP, NF_ARP_FORWARD, skb, (struct net_device *)in,
(struct net_device *)out, br_nf_forward_finish);
return NF_STOLEN;
}
Commit Message: bridge: reset IPCB in br_parse_ip_options
Commit 462fb2af9788a82 (bridge : Sanitize skb before it enters the IP
stack), missed one IPCB init before calling ip_options_compile()
Thanks to Scot Doyle for his tests and bug reports.
Reported-by: Scot Doyle <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Hiroaki SHIMODA <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Bandan Das <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Lübbe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QuitMessageLoop() {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
MessageLoop::QuitClosure());
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,819 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __net_exit tcp4_proc_exit_net(struct net *net)
{
tcp_proc_unregister(net, &tcp4_seq_afinfo);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ib_uverbs_comp_dev(struct ib_uverbs_device *dev)
{
complete(&dev->comp);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::EmitGLWarning(const char* function_name,
const char* description) {
if (synthesized_errors_to_console_) {
String message =
String("WebGL: ") + String(function_name) + ": " + String(description);
PrintGLErrorToConsole(message);
}
probe::DidFireWebGLWarning(canvas());
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: logger_create_directory ()
{
int rc;
char *file_path;
rc = 1;
file_path = logger_get_file_path ();
if (file_path)
{
if (!weechat_mkdir_parents (file_path, 0700))
rc = 0;
free (file_path);
}
else
rc = 0;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: logger: call strftime before replacing buffer local variables
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 60,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlockFlow::handleAfterSideOfBlock(RenderBox* lastChild, LayoutUnit beforeSide, LayoutUnit afterSide, MarginInfo& marginInfo)
{
marginInfo.setAtAfterSideOfBlock(true);
if (lastChild && lastChild->isRenderBlockFlow() && lastChild->isSelfCollapsingBlock())
setLogicalHeight(logicalHeight() - toRenderBlockFlow(lastChild)->marginOffsetForSelfCollapsingBlock());
if (marginInfo.canCollapseMarginAfterWithChildren() && !marginInfo.canCollapseMarginAfterWithLastChild())
marginInfo.setCanCollapseMarginAfterWithChildren(false);
if (!marginInfo.discardMargin() && (!marginInfo.canCollapseWithMarginAfter() && !marginInfo.canCollapseWithMarginBefore()
&& (!document().inQuirksMode() || !marginInfo.quirkContainer() || !marginInfo.hasMarginAfterQuirk())))
setLogicalHeight(logicalHeight() + marginInfo.margin());
setLogicalHeight(logicalHeight() + afterSide);
setLogicalHeight(max(logicalHeight(), beforeSide + afterSide));
setCollapsedBottomMargin(marginInfo);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _c2s_hosts_expand(c2s_t c2s)
{
char *realm;
config_elem_t elem;
char id[1024];
int i;
elem = config_get(c2s->config, "local.id");
if(!elem) {
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "no local.id configured - skipping local domains configuration");
return;
}
for(i = 0; i < elem->nvalues; i++) {
host_t host = (host_t) pmalloco(xhash_pool(c2s->hosts), sizeof(struct host_st));
if(!host) {
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory for new host, aborting");
exit(1);
}
realm = j_attr((const char **) elem->attrs[i], "realm");
/* stringprep ids (domain names) so that they are in canonical form */
strncpy(id, elem->values[i], 1024);
id[1023] = '\0';
if (stringprep_nameprep(id, 1024) != 0) {
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_ERR, "cannot stringprep id %s, aborting", id);
exit(1);
}
host->realm = (realm != NULL) ? realm : pstrdup(xhash_pool(c2s->hosts), id);
host->host_pemfile = j_attr((const char **) elem->attrs[i], "pemfile");
host->host_cachain = j_attr((const char **) elem->attrs[i], "cachain");
host->host_verify_mode = j_atoi(j_attr((const char **) elem->attrs[i], "verify-mode"), 0);
host->host_private_key_password = j_attr((const char **) elem->attrs[i], "private-key-password");
host->host_ciphers = j_attr((const char **) elem->attrs[i], "ciphers");
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
if(host->host_pemfile != NULL) {
if(c2s->sx_ssl == NULL) {
c2s->sx_ssl = sx_env_plugin(c2s->sx_env, sx_ssl_init, host->realm, host->host_pemfile, host->host_cachain, host->host_verify_mode, host->host_private_key_password, host->host_ciphers);
if(c2s->sx_ssl == NULL) {
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_ERR, "failed to load %s SSL pemfile", host->realm);
host->host_pemfile = NULL;
}
} else {
if(sx_ssl_server_addcert(c2s->sx_ssl, host->realm, host->host_pemfile, host->host_cachain, host->host_verify_mode, host->host_private_key_password, host->host_ciphers) != 0) {
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_ERR, "failed to load %s SSL pemfile", host->realm);
host->host_pemfile = NULL;
}
}
}
#endif
host->host_require_starttls = (j_attr((const char **) elem->attrs[i], "require-starttls") != NULL);
host->ar_module_name = j_attr((const char **) elem->attrs[i], "authreg-module");
if(host->ar_module_name) {
if((host->ar = authreg_init(c2s, host->ar_module_name)) == NULL) {
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "failed to load %s authreg module - using default", host->realm);
host->ar = c2s->ar;
}
} else
host->ar = c2s->ar;
host->ar_register_enable = (j_attr((const char **) elem->attrs[i], "register-enable") != NULL);
host->ar_register_oob = j_attr((const char **) elem->attrs[i], "register-oob");
if(host->ar_register_enable || host->ar_register_oob) {
host->ar_register_instructions = j_attr((const char **) elem->attrs[i], "instructions");
if(host->ar_register_instructions == NULL) {
if(host->ar_register_oob)
host->ar_register_instructions = "Only web based registration is possible with this server.";
else
host->ar_register_instructions = "Enter a username and password to register with this server.";
}
} else
host->ar_register_password = (j_attr((const char **) elem->attrs[i], "password-change") != NULL);
/* check for empty <id/> CDATA - XXX this "1" is VERY config.c dependant !!! */
if(! strcmp(id, "1")) {
/* remove the realm even if set */
host->realm = NULL;
/* skip if vHost already configured */
if(! c2s->vhost)
c2s->vhost = host;
/* add meaningful log "id" */
strcpy(id, "default vHost");
} else {
/* insert into vHosts xhash */
xhash_put(c2s->hosts, pstrdup(xhash_pool(c2s->hosts), id), host);
}
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "[%s] configured; realm=%s, authreg=%s, registration %s, using PEM:%s",
id, (host->realm != NULL ? host->realm : "no realm set"),
(host->ar_module_name ? host->ar_module_name : c2s->ar_module_name),
(host->ar_register_enable ? "enabled" : "disabled"),
(host->host_pemfile ? host->host_pemfile : "Default"));
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed offered SASL mechanism check
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 63,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_xdr_enc_renew(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p, struct nfs_client *clp)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.nops = 1,
};
xdr_init_encode(&xdr, &req->rq_snd_buf, p);
encode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
return encode_renew(&xdr, clp);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SetUpEncryption(NigoriStatus nigori_status,
EncryptionStatus encryption_status) {
UserShare* share = sync_manager_.GetUserShare();
share->directory->set_initial_sync_ended_for_type(syncable::NIGORI, true);
int64 nigori_id = GetIdForDataType(syncable::NIGORI);
if (nigori_id == kInvalidId)
return false;
WriteTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, share);
Cryptographer* cryptographer = trans.GetCryptographer();
if (!cryptographer)
return false;
if (encryption_status != UNINITIALIZED) {
KeyParams params = {"localhost", "dummy", "foobar"};
cryptographer->AddKey(params);
} else {
DCHECK_NE(nigori_status, WRITE_TO_NIGORI);
}
if (encryption_status == FULL_ENCRYPTION)
cryptographer->set_encrypt_everything();
if (nigori_status == WRITE_TO_NIGORI) {
sync_pb::NigoriSpecifics nigori;
cryptographer->GetKeys(nigori.mutable_encrypted());
cryptographer->UpdateNigoriFromEncryptedTypes(&nigori);
WriteNode node(&trans);
EXPECT_EQ(BaseNode::INIT_OK, node.InitByIdLookup(nigori_id));
node.SetNigoriSpecifics(nigori);
}
return cryptographer->is_ready();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(snmpset)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_SET, SNMP_VERSION_1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,518 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SiteFeatureUsage LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataImpl::UsesAudioInBackground()
const {
return GetFeatureUsage(
site_characteristics_.uses_audio_in_background(),
GetSiteCharacteristicsDatabaseParams().audio_usage_observation_window);
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ohci_set_frame_interval(OHCIState *ohci, uint16_t val)
{
val &= OHCI_FMI_FI;
if (val != ohci->fi) {
trace_usb_ohci_set_frame_interval(ohci->name, ohci->fi, ohci->fi);
}
ohci->fi = val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rds_tcp_accept_worker(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct rds_tcp_net *rtn = container_of(work,
struct rds_tcp_net,
rds_tcp_accept_w);
while (rds_tcp_accept_one(rtn->rds_tcp_listen_sock) == 0)
cond_resched();
}
Commit Message: net: rds: force to destroy connection if t_sock is NULL in rds_tcp_kill_sock().
When it is to cleanup net namespace, rds_tcp_exit_net() will call
rds_tcp_kill_sock(), if t_sock is NULL, it will not call
rds_conn_destroy(), rds_conn_path_destroy() and rds_tcp_conn_free() to free
connection, and the worker cp_conn_w is not stopped, afterwards the net is freed in
net_drop_ns(); While cp_conn_w rds_connect_worker() will call rds_tcp_conn_path_connect()
and reference 'net' which has already been freed.
In rds_tcp_conn_path_connect(), rds_tcp_set_callbacks() will set t_sock = sock before
sock->ops->connect, but if connect() is failed, it will call
rds_tcp_restore_callbacks() and set t_sock = NULL, if connect is always
failed, rds_connect_worker() will try to reconnect all the time, so
rds_tcp_kill_sock() will never to cancel worker cp_conn_w and free the
connections.
Therefore, the condition !tc->t_sock is not needed if it is going to do
cleanup_net->rds_tcp_exit_net->rds_tcp_kill_sock, because tc->t_sock is always
NULL, and there is on other path to cancel cp_conn_w and free
connection. So this patch is to fix this.
rds_tcp_kill_sock():
...
if (net != c_net || !tc->t_sock)
...
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28
net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8003496a4684 by task kworker/u8:4/3721
CPU: 3 PID: 3721 Comm: kworker/u8:4 Not tainted 5.1.0 #11
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: krdsd rds_connect_worker
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3c0 arch/arm64/kernel/time.c:53
show_stack+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:152
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x120/0x188 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x68/0x278 mm/kasan/report.c:253
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x21c/0x348 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x30/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:429
inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
__sock_create+0x4f8/0x770 net/socket.c:1276
sock_create_kern+0x50/0x68 net/socket.c:1322
rds_tcp_conn_path_connect+0x2b4/0x690 net/rds/tcp_connect.c:114
rds_connect_worker+0x108/0x1d0 net/rds/threads.c:175
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
Allocated by task 687:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0x180 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kasan_slab_alloc+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:444 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2705 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2713 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x14c/0x388 mm/slub.c:2718
kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:697 [inline]
net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:384 [inline]
copy_net_ns+0xc4/0x2d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:424
create_new_namespaces+0x300/0x658 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xa0/0x198 kernel/nsproxy.c:206
ksys_unshare+0x340/0x628 kernel/fork.c:2577
__do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2645 [inline]
__se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2643 [inline]
__arm64_sys_unshare+0x38/0x58 kernel/fork.c:2643
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:47 [inline]
el0_svc_common+0x168/0x390 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:83
el0_svc_handler+0x60/0xd0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129
el0_svc+0x8/0xc arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:960
Freed by task 264:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x220 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1370 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1397 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2952 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0xb8/0x3a8 mm/slub.c:2968
net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:400 [inline]
net_drop_ns.part.6+0x78/0x90 net/core/net_namespace.c:407
net_drop_ns net/core/net_namespace.c:406 [inline]
cleanup_net+0x53c/0x6d8 net/core/net_namespace.c:569
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8003496a3f80
which belongs to the cache net_namespace of size 7872
The buggy address is located 1796 bytes inside of
7872-byte region [ffff8003496a3f80, ffff8003496a5e40)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffff7e000d25a800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff80036ce4b000
index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0xffffe0000008100(slab|head)
raw: 0ffffe0000008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff80036ce4b000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8003496a4580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8003496a4680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8003496a4700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 467fa15356ac("RDS-TCP: Support multiple RDS-TCP listen endpoints, one per netns.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::setSize(unsigned size, ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (size == 0) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kIndexSizeError, "The value provided is 0, which is an invalid size.");
} else {
SetUnsignedIntegralAttribute(sizeAttr, size ? size : kDefaultSize,
kDefaultSize);
}
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void print_usage(void)
{
printf("mosquitto version %s\n\n", VERSION);
printf("mosquitto is an MQTT v3.1.1 broker.\n\n");
printf("Usage: mosquitto [-c config_file] [-d] [-h] [-p port]\n\n");
printf(" -c : specify the broker config file.\n");
printf(" -d : put the broker into the background after starting.\n");
printf(" -h : display this help.\n");
printf(" -p : start the broker listening on the specified port.\n");
printf(" Not recommended in conjunction with the -c option.\n");
printf(" -v : verbose mode - enable all logging types. This overrides\n");
printf(" any logging options given in the config file.\n");
printf("\nSee http://mosquitto.org/ for more information.\n\n");
}
Commit Message: Fix acl_file being ignore for default listener if with per_listener_settings
Close #1073. Thanks to Jef Driesen.
Bug: https://github.com/eclipse/mosquitto/issues/1073
CWE ID: | 0 | 75,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::AddPolicyFromHeaderValue(
const String& header,
ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderType type,
ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderSource source) {
if (source == kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderSourceMeta &&
type == kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderTypeReport) {
ReportReportOnlyInMeta(header);
return;
}
if (source == kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderSourceHTTP)
header_delivered_ = true;
Vector<UChar> characters;
header.AppendTo(characters);
const UChar* begin = characters.data();
const UChar* end = begin + characters.size();
const UChar* position = begin;
while (position < end) {
SkipUntil<UChar>(position, end, ',');
Member<CSPDirectiveList> policy =
CSPDirectiveList::Create(this, begin, position, type, source);
if (!policy->AllowEval(nullptr,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy::kSuppressReporting,
kWillNotThrowException, g_empty_string) &&
disable_eval_error_message_.IsNull()) {
disable_eval_error_message_ = policy->EvalDisabledErrorMessage();
}
policies_.push_back(policy.Release());
DCHECK(position == end || *position == ',');
SkipExactly<UChar>(position, end, ',');
begin = position;
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __init ecryptfs_init_crypto(void)
{
mutex_init(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&key_tfm_list);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 45,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ihevcd_delete(iv_obj_t *ps_codec_obj, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
codec_t *ps_dec;
ihevcd_cxa_delete_ip_t *ps_ip = (ihevcd_cxa_delete_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ihevcd_cxa_delete_op_t *ps_op = (ihevcd_cxa_delete_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_dec = (codec_t *)(ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle);
UNUSED(ps_ip);
ps_op->s_ivd_delete_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
ihevcd_free_dynamic_bufs(ps_dec);
ihevcd_free_static_bufs(ps_codec_obj);
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Handle ps_codec_obj memory allocation failure gracefully
If memory allocation for ps_codec_obj fails, return gracefully
with an error code. All other allocation failures are
handled correctly.
Bug: 68299873
Test: before/after with always-failing malloc
Change-Id: I5e6c07b147b13df81e65476851662d4b55d33b83
(cherry picked from commit a966e2a65dd901151ce7f4481d0084840c9a0f7e)
CWE ID: CWE-770 | 0 | 163,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ipv6_create_tempaddr(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, struct inet6_ifaddr *ift)
{
struct inet6_dev *idev = ifp->idev;
struct in6_addr addr, *tmpaddr;
unsigned long tmp_prefered_lft, tmp_valid_lft, tmp_tstamp, age;
unsigned long regen_advance;
int tmp_plen;
int ret = 0;
u32 addr_flags;
unsigned long now = jiffies;
write_lock_bh(&idev->lock);
if (ift) {
spin_lock_bh(&ift->lock);
memcpy(&addr.s6_addr[8], &ift->addr.s6_addr[8], 8);
spin_unlock_bh(&ift->lock);
tmpaddr = &addr;
} else {
tmpaddr = NULL;
}
retry:
in6_dev_hold(idev);
if (idev->cnf.use_tempaddr <= 0) {
write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
pr_info("%s: use_tempaddr is disabled\n", __func__);
in6_dev_put(idev);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
if (ifp->regen_count++ >= idev->cnf.regen_max_retry) {
idev->cnf.use_tempaddr = -1; /*XXX*/
spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
pr_warn("%s: regeneration time exceeded - disabled temporary address support\n",
__func__);
in6_dev_put(idev);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
in6_ifa_hold(ifp);
memcpy(addr.s6_addr, ifp->addr.s6_addr, 8);
__ipv6_try_regen_rndid(idev, tmpaddr);
memcpy(&addr.s6_addr[8], idev->rndid, 8);
age = (now - ifp->tstamp) / HZ;
tmp_valid_lft = min_t(__u32,
ifp->valid_lft,
idev->cnf.temp_valid_lft + age);
tmp_prefered_lft = min_t(__u32,
ifp->prefered_lft,
idev->cnf.temp_prefered_lft + age -
idev->cnf.max_desync_factor);
tmp_plen = ifp->prefix_len;
tmp_tstamp = ifp->tstamp;
spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
regen_advance = idev->cnf.regen_max_retry *
idev->cnf.dad_transmits *
NEIGH_VAR(idev->nd_parms, RETRANS_TIME) / HZ;
write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
/* A temporary address is created only if this calculated Preferred
* Lifetime is greater than REGEN_ADVANCE time units. In particular,
* an implementation must not create a temporary address with a zero
* Preferred Lifetime.
* Use age calculation as in addrconf_verify to avoid unnecessary
* temporary addresses being generated.
*/
age = (now - tmp_tstamp + ADDRCONF_TIMER_FUZZ_MINUS) / HZ;
if (tmp_prefered_lft <= regen_advance + age) {
in6_ifa_put(ifp);
in6_dev_put(idev);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
addr_flags = IFA_F_TEMPORARY;
/* set in addrconf_prefix_rcv() */
if (ifp->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC)
addr_flags |= IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC;
ift = ipv6_add_addr(idev, &addr, NULL, tmp_plen,
ipv6_addr_scope(&addr), addr_flags,
tmp_valid_lft, tmp_prefered_lft);
if (IS_ERR(ift)) {
in6_ifa_put(ifp);
in6_dev_put(idev);
pr_info("%s: retry temporary address regeneration\n", __func__);
tmpaddr = &addr;
write_lock_bh(&idev->lock);
goto retry;
}
spin_lock_bh(&ift->lock);
ift->ifpub = ifp;
ift->cstamp = now;
ift->tstamp = tmp_tstamp;
spin_unlock_bh(&ift->lock);
addrconf_dad_start(ift);
in6_ifa_put(ift);
in6_dev_put(idev);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagegammacorrect)
{
zval *IM;
gdImagePtr im;
int i;
double input, output;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rdd", &IM, &input, &output) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
int x, y, c;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
c = gdImageGetPixel(im, x, y);
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y,
gdTrueColor(
(int) ((pow((pow((gdTrueColorGetRed(c) / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5),
(int) ((pow((pow((gdTrueColorGetGreen(c) / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5),
(int) ((pow((pow((gdTrueColorGetBlue(c) / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5)
)
);
}
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
for (i = 0; i < gdImageColorsTotal(im); i++) {
im->red[i] = (int)((pow((pow((im->red[i] / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5);
im->green[i] = (int)((pow((pow((im->green[i] / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5);
im->blue[i] = (int)((pow((pow((im->blue[i] / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double AffineTransform::xScale() const
{
return sqrt(m_transform[0] * m_transform[0] + m_transform[1] * m_transform[1]);
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *string_of_NPPVariable(int variable)
{
const char *str;
switch (variable) {
#define _(VAL) case VAL: str = #VAL; break;
_(NPPVpluginNameString);
_(NPPVpluginDescriptionString);
_(NPPVpluginWindowBool);
_(NPPVpluginTransparentBool);
_(NPPVjavaClass);
_(NPPVpluginWindowSize);
_(NPPVpluginTimerInterval);
_(NPPVpluginScriptableInstance);
_(NPPVpluginScriptableIID);
_(NPPVjavascriptPushCallerBool);
_(NPPVpluginKeepLibraryInMemory);
_(NPPVpluginNeedsXEmbed);
_(NPPVpluginScriptableNPObject);
_(NPPVformValue);
#undef _
default:
switch (variable & 0xff) {
#define _(VAL, VAR) case VAL: str = #VAR; break
_(10, NPPVpluginScriptableInstance);
#undef _
default:
str = "<unknown variable>";
break;
}
break;
}
return str;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 165,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void killchild(gpointer key, gpointer value, gpointer user_data) {
pid_t *pid=value;
kill(*pid, SIGTERM);
}
Commit Message: nbd-server: handle modern-style negotiation in a child process
Previously, the modern style negotiation was carried out in the root
server (listener) process before forking the actual client handler. This
made it possible for a malfunctioning or evil client to terminate the
root process simply by querying a non-existent export or aborting in the
middle of the negotation process (caused SIGPIPE in the server).
This commit moves the negotiation process to the child to keep the root
process up and running no matter what happens during the negotiation.
See http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/message.php?msg_id=30410146
Signed-off-by: Tuomas Räsänen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 46,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: js_Function *jsC_compile(js_State *J, js_Ast *prog)
{
return newfun(J, NULL, NULL, prog, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vldb_reply_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, int length, int32_t opcode)
{
const struct rx_header *rxh;
unsigned long i;
if (length < (int)sizeof(struct rx_header))
return;
rxh = (const struct rx_header *) bp;
/*
* Print out the afs call we're invoking. The table used here was
* gleaned from vlserver/vldbint.xg. Check to see if it's a
* Ubik call, however.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " vldb"));
if (is_ubik(opcode)) {
ubik_reply_print(ndo, bp, length, opcode);
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " reply %s", tok2str(vldb_req, "op#%d", opcode)));
bp += sizeof(struct rx_header);
/*
* If it was a data packet, interpret the response
*/
if (rxh->type == RX_PACKET_TYPE_DATA)
switch (opcode) {
case 510: /* List entry */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " count"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nextindex"));
INTOUT();
case 503: /* Get entry by id */
case 504: /* Get entry by name */
{ unsigned long nservers, j;
VECOUT(VLNAMEMAX);
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " numservers"));
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
nservers = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %lu", nservers));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " servers"));
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
if (i < nservers)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s",
intoa(((const struct in_addr *) bp)->s_addr)));
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " partitions"));
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
j = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
if (i < nservers && j <= 26)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %c", 'a' + (int)j));
else if (i < nservers)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %lu", j));
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 8 * sizeof(int32_t));
bp += 8 * sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rwvol"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rovol"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " backup"));
UINTOUT();
}
break;
case 505: /* Get new volume ID */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " newvol"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 521: /* List entry */
case 529: /* List entry U */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " count"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nextindex"));
INTOUT();
case 518: /* Get entry by ID N */
case 519: /* Get entry by name N */
{ unsigned long nservers, j;
VECOUT(VLNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " numservers"));
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
nservers = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %lu", nservers));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " servers"));
for (i = 0; i < 13; i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
if (i < nservers)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s",
intoa(((const struct in_addr *) bp)->s_addr)));
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " partitions"));
for (i = 0; i < 13; i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
j = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
if (i < nservers && j <= 26)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %c", 'a' + (int)j));
else if (i < nservers)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %lu", j));
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 13 * sizeof(int32_t));
bp += 13 * sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rwvol"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rovol"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " backup"));
UINTOUT();
}
break;
case 526: /* Get entry by ID U */
case 527: /* Get entry by name U */
{ unsigned long nservers, j;
VECOUT(VLNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " numservers"));
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
nservers = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %lu", nservers));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " servers"));
for (i = 0; i < 13; i++) {
if (i < nservers) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " afsuuid"));
AFSUUIDOUT();
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 44);
bp += 44;
}
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4 * 13);
bp += 4 * 13;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " partitions"));
for (i = 0; i < 13; i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
j = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
if (i < nservers && j <= 26)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %c", 'a' + (int)j));
else if (i < nservers)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %lu", j));
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 13 * sizeof(int32_t));
bp += 13 * sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rwvol"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rovol"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " backup"));
UINTOUT();
}
default:
;
}
else {
/*
* Otherwise, just print out the return code
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " errcode"));
INTOUT();
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|vldb]"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13049/Rx: add a missing bounds check for Ubik
One of the case blocks in ubik_print() didn't check bounds before
fetching 32 bits of packet data and could overread past the captured
packet data by that amount.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int StreamTcpCheckMemcap(uint64_t size)
{
uint64_t memcapcopy = SC_ATOMIC_GET(stream_config.memcap);
if (memcapcopy == 0 || size + SC_ATOMIC_GET(st_memuse) <= memcapcopy)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 79,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fz_colorspace_name_colorant(fz_context *ctx, fz_colorspace *cs, int i, const char *name)
{
if (!cs)
return;
if (i < 0 || i >= cs->n)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "Attempt to name out of range colorant");
fz_free(ctx, cs->colorant[i]);
cs->colorant[i] = NULL;
if (name)
{
cs->colorant[i] = fz_strdup(ctx, name);
if (cs->type == FZ_COLORSPACE_SEPARATION)
{
if (i == 0)
{
if (strcmp(name, "Cyan") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "Magenta") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "Yellow") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "Black") == 0)
{
cs->flags |= FZ_CS_HAS_CMYK;
}
}
else
{
if ((cs->flags & FZ_CS_HAS_CMYK_AND_SPOTS) != FZ_CS_HAS_CMYK_AND_SPOTS)
{
if (strcmp(name, "Cyan") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "Magenta") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "Yellow") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "Black") == 0)
cs->flags |= FZ_CS_HAS_CMYK;
else
cs->flags |= FZ_CS_HAS_SPOTS;
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheGroup::RemoveUpdateObserver(UpdateObserver* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
queued_observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Refcount AppCacheGroup correctly.
Bug: 888926
Change-Id: Iab0d82d272e2f24a5e91180d64bc8e2aa8a8238d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1246827
Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594475}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(php_if_ftruncate)
{
zval *fp;
long size;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl", &fp, &size) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PHP_STREAM_TO_ZVAL(stream, &fp);
if (!php_stream_truncate_supported(stream)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Can't truncate this stream!");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_BOOL(0 == php_stream_truncate_set_size(stream, size));
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 52,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __weak void arch_setup_gd(struct global_data *gd_ptr)
{
gd = gd_ptr;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 89,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int l2cap_sock_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sock %p, sk %p", sock, sk);
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
return err;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Check outgoing MTU */
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_RAW && len > l2cap_pi(sk)->omtu)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECTED)
err = l2cap_do_send(sk, msg, len);
else
err = -ENOTCONN;
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 58,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetNextCookieRequestId() {
static int id = 0;
if (id == std::numeric_limits<int>::max()) {
int i = id;
id = 0;
return i;
}
return id++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __net_exit void net_ns_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
ns_free_inum(&net->ns);
}
Commit Message: net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()
(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)
Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.
It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been
finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory
corruption:
put_net(peer) rtnl_lock()
atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ...
__put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id)
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id)
| get_net(peer) [count=1]
| ...
| (use after final put)
v ...
cleanup_net() ...
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ...
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
... ...
... put_net(peer)
... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]
... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... queue_work()
... rtnl_unlock()
rtnl_lock() ...
for_each_net(tmp) { ...
id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ...
spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ...
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ...
... ...
net_drop_ns() ...
net_free(peer) ...
} ...
|
v
cleanup_net()
...
(Second free of peer)
Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list
will be corrupted.
Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while
put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be
enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick
the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely.
The patch fixes the problem in standard way.
(Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires
check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but
in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be
safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should
be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send
a separate message to netdev@ later).
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids"
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 86,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Bool PVDecSetReference(VideoDecControls *decCtrl, uint8 *refYUV, uint32 timestamp)
{
VideoDecData *video = (VideoDecData *) decCtrl->videoDecoderData;
Vop *prevVop = video->prevVop;
int width = video->width;
uint8 *dstPtr, *orgPtr, *dstPtr2, *orgPtr2;
int32 size = (int32)width * video->height;
/* set new parameters */
prevVop->timeStamp = timestamp;
prevVop->predictionType = I_VOP;
dstPtr = prevVop->yChan;
orgPtr = refYUV;
oscl_memcpy(dstPtr, orgPtr, size);
dstPtr = prevVop->uChan;
dstPtr2 = prevVop->vChan;
orgPtr = refYUV + size;
orgPtr2 = orgPtr + (size >> 2);
oscl_memcpy(dstPtr, orgPtr, (size >> 2));
oscl_memcpy(dstPtr2, orgPtr2, (size >> 2));
video->concealFrame = video->prevVop->yChan;
video->vop_coding_type = I_VOP;
decCtrl->outputFrame = video->prevVop->yChan;
return PV_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix NPDs in h263 decoder
Bug: 35269635
Test: decoded PoC with and without patch
Change-Id: I636a14360c7801cc5bca63c9cb44d1d235df8fd8
(cherry picked from commit 2ad2a92318a3b9daf78ebcdc597085adbf32600d)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void invalid_filename(const char *fname) {
assert(fname);
const char *ptr = fname;
if (arg_debug_check_filename)
printf("Checking filename %s\n", fname);
if (strncmp(ptr, "${HOME}", 7) == 0)
ptr = fname + 7;
else if (strncmp(ptr, "${PATH}", 7) == 0)
ptr = fname + 7;
else if (strcmp(fname, "${DOWNLOADS}") == 0)
return;
int len = strlen(ptr);
if (strcspn(ptr, "\\&!?\"'<>%^(){}[];,") != (size_t)len) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: \"%s\" is an invalid filename\n", ptr);
exit(1);
}
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 96,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u32 nfsd4_layoutreturn_rsize(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_op *op)
{
return (op_encode_hdr_size +
1 /* lrs_stateid */ +
op_encode_stateid_maxsz) * sizeof(__be32);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int BrowserContextIOData::GetMaxCacheSizeHint() const {
int max_cache_size_hint = GetSharedData().max_cache_size_hint;
static int upper_limit = std::numeric_limits<int>::max() / (1024 * 1024);
DCHECK_LE(max_cache_size_hint, upper_limit);
return max_cache_size_hint;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_timerfd_gettime(int ufd, struct itimerspec *t)
{
struct fd f;
struct timerfd_ctx *ctx;
int ret = timerfd_fget(ufd, &f);
if (ret)
return ret;
ctx = f.file->private_data;
spin_lock_irq(&ctx->wqh.lock);
if (ctx->expired && ctx->tintv) {
ctx->expired = 0;
if (isalarm(ctx)) {
ctx->ticks +=
alarm_forward_now(
&ctx->t.alarm, ctx->tintv) - 1;
alarm_restart(&ctx->t.alarm);
} else {
ctx->ticks +=
hrtimer_forward_now(&ctx->t.tmr, ctx->tintv)
- 1;
hrtimer_restart(&ctx->t.tmr);
}
}
t->it_value = ktime_to_timespec(timerfd_get_remaining(ctx));
t->it_interval = ktime_to_timespec(ctx->tintv);
spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->wqh.lock);
fdput(f);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper
The handling of the might_cancel queueing is not properly protected, so
parallel operations on the file descriptor can race with each other and
lead to list corruptions or use after free.
Protect the context for these operations with a seperate lock.
The wait queue lock cannot be reused for this because that would create a
lock inversion scenario vs. the cancel lock. Replacing might_cancel with an
atomic (atomic_t or atomic bit) does not help either because it still can
race vs. the actual list operation.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected]"
Cc: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1701311521430.3457@nanos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 63,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Buffer* GetBuffer(GLuint client_id) {
Buffer* buffer = buffer_manager()->GetBuffer(client_id);
return buffer;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_core(struct pt_regs *iregs)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
struct debug_store *ds = cpuc->ds;
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[0]; /* PMC0 only */
struct pebs_record_core *at, *top;
int n;
if (!x86_pmu.pebs_active)
return;
at = (struct pebs_record_core *)(unsigned long)ds->pebs_buffer_base;
top = (struct pebs_record_core *)(unsigned long)ds->pebs_index;
/*
* Whatever else happens, drain the thing
*/
ds->pebs_index = ds->pebs_buffer_base;
if (!test_bit(0, cpuc->active_mask))
return;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!event);
if (!event->attr.precise_ip)
return;
n = top - at;
if (n <= 0)
return;
/*
* Should not happen, we program the threshold at 1 and do not
* set a reset value.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(n > 1);
at += n - 1;
__intel_pmu_pebs_event(event, iregs, at);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FeatureInfo::InitializeForTesting(ContextType context_type) {
initialized_ = false;
Initialize(context_type, false /* is_passthrough_cmd_decoder */,
DisallowedFeatures());
}
Commit Message: gpu: Disallow use of IOSurfaces for half-float format with swiftshader.
[email protected]
Bug: 998038
Change-Id: Ic31d28938ef205b36657fc7bd297fe8a63d08543
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1798052
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#695826}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 137,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *x1,
BIGNUM *z1, BIGNUM *x2, BIGNUM *z2, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *t3, *t4, *t5;
int ret = 0;
if (BN_is_zero(z1))
{
BN_zero(x2);
BN_zero(z2);
return 1;
}
if (BN_is_zero(z2))
{
if (!BN_copy(x2, x)) return 0;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, x, y)) return 0;
return 2;
}
/* Since Mxy is static we can guarantee that ctx != NULL. */
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t4 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t5 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t5 == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_one(t5)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, z1, z2, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z1, z1, x, ctx)) goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(z1, z1, x1)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z2, z2, x, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x1, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, z2, x2)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z2, z2, z1, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, t4, x, ctx)) goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(t4, t4, y)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t4, t3, ctx)) goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(t4, t4, z2)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, t3, x, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_div(group, t3, t5, t3, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t3, t4, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x2, x1, t3, ctx)) goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, x2, x)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z2, z2, t4, ctx)) goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, z2, y)) goto err;
ret = 2;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 14,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::IsSafeRedirectTarget(
const GURL& url,
content::ResourceContext* context) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
if (url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme)) {
ProfileIOData* io_data = ProfileIOData::FromResourceContext(context);
const Extension* extension =
io_data->GetExtensionInfoMap()->extensions().GetByID(url.host());
if (!extension)
return false;
return extensions::WebAccessibleResourcesInfo::IsResourceWebAccessible(
extension, url.path());
}
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,713 |
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