instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_core_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
__u32 __user *uaddr = (__u32 __user *)(unsigned long)reg->addr;
struct kvm_regs *regs = vcpu_gp_regs(vcpu);
int nr_regs = sizeof(*regs) / sizeof(__u32);
__uint128_t tmp;
void *valp = &tmp;
u64 off;
int err = 0;
/* Our ID is an index into the kvm_regs struct. */
off = core_reg_offset_from_id(reg->id);
if (off >= nr_regs ||
(off + (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) / sizeof(__u32))) >= nr_regs)
return -ENOENT;
if (validate_core_offset(reg))
return -EINVAL;
if (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) > sizeof(tmp))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(valp, uaddr, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id))) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (off == KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(regs.pstate)) {
u32 mode = (*(u32 *)valp) & PSR_AA32_MODE_MASK;
switch (mode) {
case PSR_AA32_MODE_USR:
case PSR_AA32_MODE_FIQ:
case PSR_AA32_MODE_IRQ:
case PSR_AA32_MODE_SVC:
case PSR_AA32_MODE_ABT:
case PSR_AA32_MODE_UND:
case PSR_MODE_EL0t:
case PSR_MODE_EL1t:
case PSR_MODE_EL1h:
break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
memcpy((u32 *)regs + off, valp, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id));
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: Sanitize PSTATE.M when being set from userspace
Not all execution modes are valid for a guest, and some of them
depend on what the HW actually supports. Let's verify that what
userspace provides is compatible with both the VM settings and
the HW capabilities.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Fixes: 0d854a60b1d7 ("arm64: KVM: enable initialization of a 32bit vcpu")
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gpr32_set(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
unsigned long *regs = &target->thread.regs->gpr[0];
const compat_ulong_t *k = kbuf;
const compat_ulong_t __user *u = ubuf;
compat_ulong_t reg;
if (target->thread.regs == NULL)
return -EIO;
CHECK_FULL_REGS(target->thread.regs);
pos /= sizeof(reg);
count /= sizeof(reg);
if (kbuf)
for (; count > 0 && pos < PT_MSR; --count)
regs[pos++] = *k++;
else
for (; count > 0 && pos < PT_MSR; --count) {
if (__get_user(reg, u++))
return -EFAULT;
regs[pos++] = reg;
}
if (count > 0 && pos == PT_MSR) {
if (kbuf)
reg = *k++;
else if (__get_user(reg, u++))
return -EFAULT;
set_user_msr(target, reg);
++pos;
--count;
}
if (kbuf) {
for (; count > 0 && pos <= PT_MAX_PUT_REG; --count)
regs[pos++] = *k++;
for (; count > 0 && pos < PT_TRAP; --count, ++pos)
++k;
} else {
for (; count > 0 && pos <= PT_MAX_PUT_REG; --count) {
if (__get_user(reg, u++))
return -EFAULT;
regs[pos++] = reg;
}
for (; count > 0 && pos < PT_TRAP; --count, ++pos)
if (__get_user(reg, u++))
return -EFAULT;
}
if (count > 0 && pos == PT_TRAP) {
if (kbuf)
reg = *k++;
else if (__get_user(reg, u++))
return -EFAULT;
set_user_trap(target, reg);
++pos;
--count;
}
kbuf = k;
ubuf = u;
pos *= sizeof(reg);
count *= sizeof(reg);
return user_regset_copyin_ignore(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
(PT_TRAP + 1) * sizeof(reg), -1);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Browser* Browser::GetOrCreateTabbedBrowser(Profile* profile) {
Browser* browser = GetTabbedBrowser(profile, false);
if (!browser)
browser = Browser::Create(profile);
return browser;
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_SROUND( INS_ARG )
{
DO_SROUND
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::DoCommand(
unsigned int command,
unsigned int arg_count,
const void* cmd_data) {
error::Error result = error::kNoError;
if (log_commands()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "[" << this << "]" << "cmd: " << GetCommandName(command);
}
unsigned int command_index = command - kStartPoint - 1;
if (command_index < arraysize(g_command_info)) {
const CommandInfo& info = g_command_info[command_index];
unsigned int info_arg_count = static_cast<unsigned int>(info.arg_count);
if ((info.arg_flags == cmd::kFixed && arg_count == info_arg_count) ||
(info.arg_flags == cmd::kAtLeastN && arg_count >= info_arg_count)) {
uint32 immediate_data_size =
(arg_count - info_arg_count) * sizeof(CommandBufferEntry); // NOLINT
switch (command) {
#define GLES2_CMD_OP(name) \
case name::kCmdId: \
result = Handle ## name( \
immediate_data_size, \
*static_cast<const name*>(cmd_data)); \
break; \
GLES2_COMMAND_LIST(GLES2_CMD_OP)
#undef GLES2_CMD_OP
}
if (debug()) {
GLenum error;
while ((error = glGetError()) != GL_NO_ERROR) {
LOG(ERROR) << "[" << this << "] "
<< "GL ERROR: " << GLES2Util::GetStringEnum(error) << " : "
<< GetCommandName(command);
SetGLError(error, "GL error from driver");
}
}
} else {
result = error::kInvalidArguments;
}
} else {
result = DoCommonCommand(command, arg_count, cmd_data);
}
if (result == error::kNoError && current_decoder_error_ != error::kNoError) {
result = current_decoder_error_;
current_decoder_error_ = error::kNoError;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int key_notify_policy_flush(const struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *skb_out;
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
skb_out = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb_out)
return -ENOBUFS;
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb_out, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
hdr->sadb_msg_type = SADB_X_SPDFLUSH;
hdr->sadb_msg_seq = c->seq;
hdr->sadb_msg_pid = c->portid;
hdr->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
hdr->sadb_msg_errno = (uint8_t) 0;
hdr->sadb_msg_satype = SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC;
hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) / sizeof(uint64_t));
hdr->sadb_msg_reserved = 0;
pfkey_broadcast(skb_out, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, c->net);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static EAS_RESULT Parse_wave (SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA *pDLSData, EAS_I32 pos, EAS_U16 waveIndex)
{
EAS_RESULT result;
EAS_U32 temp;
EAS_I32 size;
EAS_I32 endChunk;
EAS_I32 chunkPos;
EAS_I32 wsmpPos = 0;
EAS_I32 fmtPos = 0;
EAS_I32 dataPos = 0;
EAS_I32 dataSize = 0;
S_WSMP_DATA *p;
void *pSample;
S_WSMP_DATA wsmp;
/* seek to start of chunk */
chunkPos = pos + 12;
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, pos)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get the chunk type */
if ((result = NextChunk(pDLSData, &pos, &temp, &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* make sure it is a wave chunk */
if (temp != CHUNK_WAVE)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "Offset in ptbl does not point to wave chunk\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* read to end of chunk */
pos = chunkPos;
endChunk = pos + size;
while (pos < endChunk)
{
chunkPos = pos;
/* get the chunk type */
if ((result = NextChunk(pDLSData, &pos, &temp, &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* parse useful chunks */
switch (temp)
{
case CHUNK_WSMP:
wsmpPos = chunkPos + 8;
break;
case CHUNK_FMT:
fmtPos = chunkPos + 8;
break;
case CHUNK_DATA:
dataPos = chunkPos + 8;
dataSize = size;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (dataSize > MAX_DLS_WAVE_SIZE)
{
return EAS_ERROR_SOUND_LIBRARY;
}
/* for first pass, use temporary variable */
if (pDLSData->pDLS == NULL)
p = &wsmp;
else
p = &pDLSData->wsmpData[waveIndex];
/* set the defaults */
p->fineTune = 0;
p->unityNote = 60;
p->gain = 0;
p->loopStart = 0;
p->loopLength = 0;
/* must have a fmt chunk */
if (!fmtPos)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS wave chunk has no fmt chunk\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* must have a data chunk */
if (!dataPos)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS wave chunk has no data chunk\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* parse the wsmp chunk */
if (wsmpPos)
{
if ((result = Parse_wsmp(pDLSData, wsmpPos, p)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
}
/* parse the fmt chunk */
if ((result = Parse_fmt(pDLSData, fmtPos, p)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* calculate the size of the wavetable needed. We need only half
* the memory for 16-bit samples when in 8-bit mode, and we need
* double the memory for 8-bit samples in 16-bit mode. For
* unlooped samples, we may use ADPCM. If so, we need only 1/4
* the memory.
*
* We also need to add one for looped samples to allow for
* the first sample to be copied to the end of the loop.
*/
/* use ADPCM encode for unlooped 16-bit samples if ADPCM is enabled */
/*lint -e{506} -e{774} groundwork for future version to support 8 & 16 bit */
if (bitDepth == 8)
{
if (p->bitsPerSample == 8)
size = dataSize;
else
/*lint -e{704} use shift for performance */
size = dataSize >> 1;
if (p->loopLength)
size++;
}
else
{
if (p->bitsPerSample == 16)
size = dataSize;
else
/*lint -e{703} use shift for performance */
size = dataSize << 1;
if (p->loopLength)
size += 2;
}
/* for first pass, add size to wave pool size and return */
if (pDLSData->pDLS == NULL)
{
pDLSData->wavePoolSize += (EAS_U32) size;
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
/* allocate memory and read in the sample data */
pSample = pDLSData->pDLS->pDLSSamples + pDLSData->wavePoolOffset;
pDLSData->pDLS->pDLSSampleOffsets[waveIndex] = pDLSData->wavePoolOffset;
pDLSData->pDLS->pDLSSampleLen[waveIndex] = (EAS_U32) size;
pDLSData->wavePoolOffset += (EAS_U32) size;
if (pDLSData->wavePoolOffset > pDLSData->wavePoolSize)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "Wave pool exceeded allocation\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_SOUND_LIBRARY;
}
if ((result = Parse_data(pDLSData, dataPos, dataSize, p, pSample)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DLS parser: fix wave pool size check.
Bug: 21132860.
Change-Id: I8ae872ea2cc2e8fec5fa0b7815f0b6b31ce744ff
(cherry picked from commit 2d7f8e1be2241e48458f5d3cab5e90be2b07c699)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 173,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StyleResolver::applyAnimatedProperties(StyleResolverState& state, Element* animatingElement)
{
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::webAnimationsCSSEnabled() || !animatingElement)
return;
state.setAnimationUpdate(CSSAnimations::calculateUpdate(animatingElement, *state.style(), this));
if (!state.animationUpdate())
return;
const AnimationEffect::CompositableValueMap& compositableValuesForAnimations = state.animationUpdate()->compositableValuesForAnimations();
const AnimationEffect::CompositableValueMap& compositableValuesForTransitions = state.animationUpdate()->compositableValuesForTransitions();
applyAnimatedProperties<HighPriorityProperties>(state, compositableValuesForAnimations);
applyAnimatedProperties<HighPriorityProperties>(state, compositableValuesForTransitions);
applyAnimatedProperties<LowPriorityProperties>(state, compositableValuesForAnimations);
applyAnimatedProperties<LowPriorityProperties>(state, compositableValuesForTransitions);
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tight_detect_smooth_image24(VncState *vs, int w, int h)
{
int off;
int x, y, d, dx;
unsigned int c;
unsigned int stats[256];
int pixels = 0;
int pix, left[3];
unsigned int errors;
unsigned char *buf = vs->tight.tight.buffer;
/*
* If client is big-endian, color samples begin from the second
* byte (offset 1) of a 32-bit pixel value.
*/
off = !!(vs->clientds.flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG);
memset(stats, 0, sizeof (stats));
for (y = 0, x = 0; y < h && x < w;) {
for (d = 0; d < h - y && d < w - x - VNC_TIGHT_DETECT_SUBROW_WIDTH;
d++) {
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
left[c] = buf[((y+d)*w+x+d)*4+off+c] & 0xFF;
}
for (dx = 1; dx <= VNC_TIGHT_DETECT_SUBROW_WIDTH; dx++) {
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
pix = buf[((y+d)*w+x+d+dx)*4+off+c] & 0xFF;
stats[abs(pix - left[c])]++;
left[c] = pix;
}
pixels++;
}
}
if (w > h) {
x += h;
y = 0;
} else {
x = 0;
y += w;
}
}
/* 95% smooth or more ... */
if (stats[0] * 33 / pixels >= 95) {
return 0;
}
errors = 0;
for (c = 1; c < 8; c++) {
errors += stats[c] * (c * c);
if (stats[c] == 0 || stats[c] > stats[c-1] * 2) {
return 0;
}
}
for (; c < 256; c++) {
errors += stats[c] * (c * c);
}
errors /= (pixels * 3 - stats[0]);
return errors;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 165,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double VideoTrack::GetFrameRate() const
{
return m_rate;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLES2DecoderImpl::~GLES2DecoderImpl() {
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PSOutputDev::PSOutputDev(PSOutputFunc outputFuncA, void *outputStreamA,
char *psTitle,
XRef *xrefA, Catalog *catalog,
int firstPage, int lastPage, PSOutMode modeA,
int paperWidthA, int paperHeightA, GBool duplexA,
int imgLLXA, int imgLLYA, int imgURXA, int imgURYA,
GBool forceRasterizeA,
GBool manualCtrlA) {
underlayCbk = NULL;
underlayCbkData = NULL;
overlayCbk = NULL;
overlayCbkData = NULL;
fontIDs = NULL;
fontFileIDs = NULL;
fontFileNames = NULL;
font8Info = NULL;
font16Enc = NULL;
imgIDs = NULL;
formIDs = NULL;
xobjStack = NULL;
embFontList = NULL;
customColors = NULL;
haveTextClip = gFalse;
t3String = NULL;
forceRasterize = forceRasterizeA;
init(outputFuncA, outputStreamA, psGeneric, psTitle,
xrefA, catalog, firstPage, lastPage, modeA,
imgLLXA, imgLLYA, imgURXA, imgURYA, manualCtrlA,
paperWidthA, paperHeightA, duplexA);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripModel::ActivateTabAt(int index, bool user_gesture) {
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(index));
bool had_multi = selection_model_.selected_indices().size() > 1;
TabContentsWrapper* old_contents =
(active_index() == TabStripSelectionModel::kUnselectedIndex) ?
NULL : GetSelectedTabContents();
selection_model_.SetSelectedIndex(index);
TabContentsWrapper* new_contents = GetContentsAt(index);
if (old_contents != new_contents && old_contents) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabDeselected(old_contents));
}
if (old_contents != new_contents || had_multi) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabSelectedAt(old_contents, new_contents,
active_index(), user_gesture));
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::ResetWaitingState() {
DCHECK(is_active());
if (is_waiting_for_beforeunload_ack_) {
is_waiting_for_beforeunload_ack_ = false;
if (beforeunload_timeout_)
beforeunload_timeout_->Stop();
}
send_before_unload_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks();
render_view_host_->is_waiting_for_close_ack_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reada_for_search(struct btrfs_root *root,
struct btrfs_path *path,
int level, int slot, u64 objectid)
{
struct extent_buffer *node;
struct btrfs_disk_key disk_key;
u32 nritems;
u64 search;
u64 target;
u64 nread = 0;
u64 gen;
int direction = path->reada;
struct extent_buffer *eb;
u32 nr;
u32 blocksize;
u32 nscan = 0;
if (level != 1)
return;
if (!path->nodes[level])
return;
node = path->nodes[level];
search = btrfs_node_blockptr(node, slot);
blocksize = root->nodesize;
eb = btrfs_find_tree_block(root, search);
if (eb) {
free_extent_buffer(eb);
return;
}
target = search;
nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(node);
nr = slot;
while (1) {
if (direction < 0) {
if (nr == 0)
break;
nr--;
} else if (direction > 0) {
nr++;
if (nr >= nritems)
break;
}
if (path->reada < 0 && objectid) {
btrfs_node_key(node, &disk_key, nr);
if (btrfs_disk_key_objectid(&disk_key) != objectid)
break;
}
search = btrfs_node_blockptr(node, nr);
if ((search <= target && target - search <= 65536) ||
(search > target && search - target <= 65536)) {
gen = btrfs_node_ptr_generation(node, nr);
readahead_tree_block(root, search, blocksize);
nread += blocksize;
}
nscan++;
if ((nread > 65536 || nscan > 32))
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 45,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: selaFindSelByName(SELA *sela,
const char *name,
l_int32 *pindex,
SEL **psel)
{
l_int32 i, n;
char *sname;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selaFindSelByName");
if (pindex) *pindex = -1;
if (psel) *psel = NULL;
if (!sela)
return ERROR_INT("sela not defined", procName, 1);
n = selaGetCount(sela);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
{
if ((sel = selaGetSel(sela, i)) == NULL) {
L_WARNING("missing sel\n", procName);
continue;
}
sname = selGetName(sel);
if (sname && (!strcmp(name, sname))) {
if (pindex)
*pindex = i;
if (psel)
*psel = sel;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline dma_addr_t __alloc_iova(struct dma_iommu_mapping *mapping,
size_t size)
{
unsigned int order = get_order(size);
unsigned int align = 0;
unsigned int count, start;
unsigned long flags;
if (order > CONFIG_ARM_DMA_IOMMU_ALIGNMENT)
order = CONFIG_ARM_DMA_IOMMU_ALIGNMENT;
count = ((PAGE_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT) +
(1 << mapping->order) - 1) >> mapping->order;
if (order > mapping->order)
align = (1 << (order - mapping->order)) - 1;
spin_lock_irqsave(&mapping->lock, flags);
start = bitmap_find_next_zero_area(mapping->bitmap, mapping->bits, 0,
count, align);
if (start > mapping->bits) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mapping->lock, flags);
return DMA_ERROR_CODE;
}
bitmap_set(mapping->bitmap, start, count);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mapping->lock, flags);
return mapping->base + (start << (mapping->order + PAGE_SHIFT));
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 58,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_zbuf(AVBPrint *bp, const uint8_t *data,
const uint8_t *data_end)
{
z_stream zstream;
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned buf_size;
int ret;
zstream.zalloc = ff_png_zalloc;
zstream.zfree = ff_png_zfree;
zstream.opaque = NULL;
if (inflateInit(&zstream) != Z_OK)
return AVERROR_EXTERNAL;
zstream.next_in = (unsigned char *)data;
zstream.avail_in = data_end - data;
av_bprint_init(bp, 0, -1);
while (zstream.avail_in > 0) {
av_bprint_get_buffer(bp, 1, &buf, &buf_size);
if (!buf_size) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto fail;
}
zstream.next_out = buf;
zstream.avail_out = buf_size;
ret = inflate(&zstream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
if (ret != Z_OK && ret != Z_STREAM_END) {
ret = AVERROR_EXTERNAL;
goto fail;
}
bp->len += zstream.next_out - buf;
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
break;
}
inflateEnd(&zstream);
bp->str[bp->len] = 0;
return 0;
fail:
inflateEnd(&zstream);
av_bprint_finalize(bp, NULL);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/pngdec: Fix off by 1 size in decode_zbuf()
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 444/fuzz-2-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_PNG_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 168,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsFullAccessibilityModeForTesting() const {
return accessibility_mode_ == ui::kAXModeComplete;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 144,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void swevent_hlist_put(struct perf_event *event)
{
int cpu;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
swevent_hlist_put_cpu(event, cpu);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 50,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: s32 hid_snto32(__u32 value, unsigned n)
{
return snto32(value, n);
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 49,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pdu_complete(V9fsPDU *pdu, ssize_t len)
{
int8_t id = pdu->id + 1; /* Response */
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
if (len < 0) {
int err = -len;
len = 7;
if (s->proto_version != V9FS_PROTO_2000L) {
V9fsString str;
str.data = strerror(err);
str.size = strlen(str.data);
len += pdu_marshal(pdu, len, "s", &str);
id = P9_RERROR;
}
len += pdu_marshal(pdu, len, "d", err);
if (s->proto_version == V9FS_PROTO_2000L) {
id = P9_RLERROR;
}
trace_v9fs_rerror(pdu->tag, pdu->id, err); /* Trace ERROR */
}
/* fill out the header */
pdu_marshal(pdu, 0, "dbw", (int32_t)len, id, pdu->tag);
/* keep these in sync */
pdu->size = len;
pdu->id = id;
pdu_push_and_notify(pdu);
/* Now wakeup anybody waiting in flush for this request */
qemu_co_queue_next(&pdu->complete);
pdu_free(pdu);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void SetImpl(FixedArrayBase* backing_store, uint32_t entry,
Object* value, WriteBarrierMode mode) {
BackingStore::cast(backing_store)->SetValue(entry, value);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VOID ParaNdis_PadPacketToMinimalLength(PNET_PACKET_INFO packetInfo)
{
if(packetInfo->dataLength < ETH_MIN_PACKET_SIZE)
{
RtlZeroMemory(
RtlOffsetToPointer(packetInfo->headersBuffer, packetInfo->dataLength),
ETH_MIN_PACKET_SIZE - packetInfo->dataLength);
packetInfo->dataLength = ETH_MIN_PACKET_SIZE;
}
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Plugin::BitcodeDidTranslateContinuation(int32_t pp_error) {
ErrorInfo error_info;
bool was_successful = LoadNaClModuleContinuationIntern(&error_info);
NaClLog(4, "Entered BitcodeDidTranslateContinuation\n");
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(pp_error);
if (was_successful) {
ReportLoadSuccess(LENGTH_IS_NOT_COMPUTABLE,
kUnknownBytes,
kUnknownBytes);
} else {
ReportLoadError(error_info);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceLoader::Release(ResourceLoadScheduler::ReleaseOption option) {
DCHECK_NE(ResourceLoadScheduler::kInvalidClientId, scheduler_client_id_);
bool released = scheduler_->Release(scheduler_client_id_, option);
DCHECK(released);
scheduler_client_id_ = ResourceLoadScheduler::kInvalidClientId;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gsicc_init_gs_colors(gs_gstate *pgs)
{
int code = 0;
gs_color_space *cs_old;
gs_color_space *cs_new;
int k;
if (pgs->in_cachedevice)
return_error(gs_error_undefined);
for (k = 0; k < 2; k++) {
/* First do color space 0 */
cs_old = pgs->color[k].color_space;
cs_new = gs_cspace_new_DeviceGray(pgs->memory);
rc_increment_cs(cs_new);
pgs->color[k].color_space = cs_new;
if ( (code = cs_new->type->install_cspace(cs_new, pgs)) < 0 ) {
pgs->color[k].color_space = cs_old;
rc_decrement_only_cs(cs_new, "gsicc_init_gs_colors");
return code;
} else {
rc_decrement_only_cs(cs_old, "gsicc_init_gs_colors");
}
}
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wc_ecc_import_raw(ecc_key* key, const char* qx, const char* qy,
const char* d, const char* curveName)
{
int err, x;
/* if d is NULL, only import as public key using Qx,Qy */
if (key == NULL || qx == NULL || qy == NULL || curveName == NULL) {
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}
/* set curve type and index */
for (x = 0; ecc_sets[x].size != 0; x++) {
if (XSTRNCMP(ecc_sets[x].name, curveName,
XSTRLEN(curveName)) == 0) {
break;
}
}
if (ecc_sets[x].size == 0) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("ecc_set curve name not found");
err = ASN_PARSE_E;
} else {
return wc_ecc_import_raw_private(key, qx, qy, d, ecc_sets[x].id,
ECC_TYPE_HEX_STR);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 81,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SetWidget(mojom::WidgetPtr widget) {
if (widget && base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kMojoInputMessages)) {
if (widget_input_handler_.get())
SetupInputRouter();
mojom::WidgetInputHandlerHostPtr host;
mojom::WidgetInputHandlerHostRequest host_request =
mojo::MakeRequest(&host);
widget->SetupWidgetInputHandler(mojo::MakeRequest(&widget_input_handler_),
std::move(host));
input_router_->BindHost(std::move(host_request), false);
}
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WallpaperManagerBase::OnPolicySet(const std::string& policy,
const AccountId& account_id) {
WallpaperInfo info;
GetUserWallpaperInfo(account_id, &info);
info.type = POLICY;
SetUserWallpaperInfo(account_id, info, true /* is_persistent */);
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 128,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dbmatch_authorize(krb5_context context, krb5_certauth_moddata moddata,
const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_len,
krb5_const_principal princ, const void *opts,
const struct _krb5_db_entry_new *db_entry,
char ***authinds_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
const struct certauth_req_opts *req_opts = opts;
char *pattern;
krb5_boolean matched;
*authinds_out = NULL;
/* Fetch the matching pattern. Pass if it isn't specified. */
ret = req_opts->cb->get_string(context, req_opts->rock,
"pkinit_cert_match", &pattern);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (pattern == NULL)
return KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE;
/* Check the certificate against the match expression. */
ret = pkinit_client_cert_match(context, req_opts->plgctx->cryptoctx,
req_opts->reqctx->cryptoctx, pattern,
&matched);
req_opts->cb->free_string(context, req_opts->rock, pattern);
if (ret)
return ret;
return matched ? 0 : KRB5KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH;
}
Commit Message: Fix certauth built-in module returns
The PKINIT certauth eku module should never authoritatively authorize
a certificate, because an extended key usage does not establish a
relationship between the certificate and any specific user; it only
establishes that the certificate was created for PKINIT client
authentication. Therefore, pkinit_eku_authorize() should return
KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE on success, not 0.
The certauth san module should pass if it does not find any SANs of
the types it can match against; the presence of other types of SANs
should not cause it to explicitly deny a certificate. Check for an
empty result from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() in verify_client_san(),
instead of returning ENOENT from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() when
there are no SANs at all.
ticket: 8561
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 96,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void manage_server_side_cookies(struct session *s, struct channel *res)
{
struct http_txn *txn = &s->txn;
struct server *srv;
int is_cookie2;
int cur_idx, old_idx, delta;
char *hdr_beg, *hdr_end, *hdr_next;
char *prev, *att_beg, *att_end, *equal, *val_beg, *val_end, *next;
/* Iterate through the headers.
* we start with the start line.
*/
old_idx = 0;
hdr_next = res->buf->p + hdr_idx_first_pos(&txn->hdr_idx);
while ((cur_idx = txn->hdr_idx.v[old_idx].next)) {
struct hdr_idx_elem *cur_hdr;
int val;
cur_hdr = &txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx];
hdr_beg = hdr_next;
hdr_end = hdr_beg + cur_hdr->len;
hdr_next = hdr_end + cur_hdr->cr + 1;
/* We have one full header between hdr_beg and hdr_end, and the
* next header starts at hdr_next. We're only interested in
* "Set-Cookie" and "Set-Cookie2" headers.
*/
is_cookie2 = 0;
prev = hdr_beg + 10;
val = http_header_match2(hdr_beg, hdr_end, "Set-Cookie", 10);
if (!val) {
val = http_header_match2(hdr_beg, hdr_end, "Set-Cookie2", 11);
if (!val) {
old_idx = cur_idx;
continue;
}
is_cookie2 = 1;
prev = hdr_beg + 11;
}
/* OK, right now we know we have a Set-Cookie* at hdr_beg, and
* <prev> points to the colon.
*/
txn->flags |= TX_SCK_PRESENT;
/* Maybe we only wanted to see if there was a Set-Cookie (eg:
* check-cache is enabled) and we are not interested in checking
* them. Warning, the cookie capture is declared in the frontend.
*/
if (s->be->cookie_name == NULL &&
s->be->appsession_name == NULL &&
s->fe->capture_name == NULL)
return;
/* OK so now we know we have to process this response cookie.
* The format of the Set-Cookie header is slightly different
* from the format of the Cookie header in that it does not
* support the comma as a cookie delimiter (thus the header
* cannot be folded) because the Expires attribute described in
* the original Netscape's spec may contain an unquoted date
* with a comma inside. We have to live with this because
* many browsers don't support Max-Age and some browsers don't
* support quoted strings. However the Set-Cookie2 header is
* clean.
*
* We have to keep multiple pointers in order to support cookie
* removal at the beginning, middle or end of header without
* corrupting the header (in case of set-cookie2). A special
* pointer, <scav> points to the beginning of the set-cookie-av
* fields after the first semi-colon. The <next> pointer points
* either to the end of line (set-cookie) or next unquoted comma
* (set-cookie2). All of these headers are valid :
*
* Set-Cookie: NAME1 = VALUE 1 ; Secure; Path="/"\r\n
* Set-Cookie:NAME=VALUE; Secure; Expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:01 GMT\r\n
* Set-Cookie: NAME = VALUE ; Secure; Expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:01 GMT\r\n
* Set-Cookie2: NAME1 = VALUE 1 ; Max-Age=0, NAME2=VALUE2; Discard\r\n
* | | | | | | | | | |
* | | | | | | | | +-> next hdr_end <--+
* | | | | | | | +------------> scav
* | | | | | | +--------------> val_end
* | | | | | +--------------------> val_beg
* | | | | +----------------------> equal
* | | | +------------------------> att_end
* | | +----------------------------> att_beg
* | +------------------------------> prev
* +-----------------------------------------> hdr_beg
*/
for (; prev < hdr_end; prev = next) {
/* Iterate through all cookies on this line */
/* find att_beg */
att_beg = prev + 1;
while (att_beg < hdr_end && http_is_spht[(unsigned char)*att_beg])
att_beg++;
/* find att_end : this is the first character after the last non
* space before the equal. It may be equal to hdr_end.
*/
equal = att_end = att_beg;
while (equal < hdr_end) {
if (*equal == '=' || *equal == ';' || (is_cookie2 && *equal == ','))
break;
if (http_is_spht[(unsigned char)*equal++])
continue;
att_end = equal;
}
/* here, <equal> points to '=', a delimitor or the end. <att_end>
* is between <att_beg> and <equal>, both may be identical.
*/
/* look for end of cookie if there is an equal sign */
if (equal < hdr_end && *equal == '=') {
/* look for the beginning of the value */
val_beg = equal + 1;
while (val_beg < hdr_end && http_is_spht[(unsigned char)*val_beg])
val_beg++;
/* find the end of the value, respecting quotes */
next = find_cookie_value_end(val_beg, hdr_end);
/* make val_end point to the first white space or delimitor after the value */
val_end = next;
while (val_end > val_beg && http_is_spht[(unsigned char)*(val_end - 1)])
val_end--;
} else {
/* <equal> points to next comma, semi-colon or EOL */
val_beg = val_end = next = equal;
}
if (next < hdr_end) {
/* Set-Cookie2 supports multiple cookies, and <next> points to
* a colon or semi-colon before the end. So skip all attr-value
* pairs and look for the next comma. For Set-Cookie, since
* commas are permitted in values, skip to the end.
*/
if (is_cookie2)
next = find_hdr_value_end(next, hdr_end);
else
next = hdr_end;
}
/* Now everything is as on the diagram above */
/* Ignore cookies with no equal sign */
if (equal == val_end)
continue;
/* If there are spaces around the equal sign, we need to
* strip them otherwise we'll get trouble for cookie captures,
* or even for rewrites. Since this happens extremely rarely,
* it does not hurt performance.
*/
if (unlikely(att_end != equal || val_beg > equal + 1)) {
int stripped_before = 0;
int stripped_after = 0;
if (att_end != equal) {
stripped_before = buffer_replace2(res->buf, att_end, equal, NULL, 0);
equal += stripped_before;
val_beg += stripped_before;
}
if (val_beg > equal + 1) {
stripped_after = buffer_replace2(res->buf, equal + 1, val_beg, NULL, 0);
val_beg += stripped_after;
stripped_before += stripped_after;
}
val_end += stripped_before;
next += stripped_before;
hdr_end += stripped_before;
hdr_next += stripped_before;
cur_hdr->len += stripped_before;
http_msg_move_end(&txn->rsp, stripped_before);
}
/* First, let's see if we want to capture this cookie. We check
* that we don't already have a server side cookie, because we
* can only capture one. Also as an optimisation, we ignore
* cookies shorter than the declared name.
*/
if (s->fe->capture_name != NULL &&
txn->srv_cookie == NULL &&
(val_end - att_beg >= s->fe->capture_namelen) &&
memcmp(att_beg, s->fe->capture_name, s->fe->capture_namelen) == 0) {
int log_len = val_end - att_beg;
if ((txn->srv_cookie = pool_alloc2(pool2_capture)) == NULL) {
Alert("HTTP logging : out of memory.\n");
}
else {
if (log_len > s->fe->capture_len)
log_len = s->fe->capture_len;
memcpy(txn->srv_cookie, att_beg, log_len);
txn->srv_cookie[log_len] = 0;
}
}
srv = objt_server(s->target);
/* now check if we need to process it for persistence */
if (!(s->flags & SN_IGNORE_PRST) &&
(att_end - att_beg == s->be->cookie_len) && (s->be->cookie_name != NULL) &&
(memcmp(att_beg, s->be->cookie_name, att_end - att_beg) == 0)) {
/* assume passive cookie by default */
txn->flags &= ~TX_SCK_MASK;
txn->flags |= TX_SCK_FOUND;
/* If the cookie is in insert mode on a known server, we'll delete
* this occurrence because we'll insert another one later.
* We'll delete it too if the "indirect" option is set and we're in
* a direct access.
*/
if (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_PSV) {
/* The "preserve" flag was set, we don't want to touch the
* server's cookie.
*/
}
else if ((srv && (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_INS)) ||
((s->flags & SN_DIRECT) && (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_IND))) {
/* this cookie must be deleted */
if (*prev == ':' && next == hdr_end) {
/* whole header */
delta = buffer_replace2(res->buf, hdr_beg, hdr_next, NULL, 0);
txn->hdr_idx.v[old_idx].next = cur_hdr->next;
txn->hdr_idx.used--;
cur_hdr->len = 0;
cur_idx = old_idx;
hdr_next += delta;
http_msg_move_end(&txn->rsp, delta);
/* note: while both invalid now, <next> and <hdr_end>
* are still equal, so the for() will stop as expected.
*/
} else {
/* just remove the value */
int delta = del_hdr_value(res->buf, &prev, next);
next = prev;
hdr_end += delta;
hdr_next += delta;
cur_hdr->len += delta;
http_msg_move_end(&txn->rsp, delta);
}
txn->flags &= ~TX_SCK_MASK;
txn->flags |= TX_SCK_DELETED;
/* and go on with next cookie */
}
else if (srv && srv->cookie && (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_RW)) {
/* replace bytes val_beg->val_end with the cookie name associated
* with this server since we know it.
*/
delta = buffer_replace2(res->buf, val_beg, val_end, srv->cookie, srv->cklen);
next += delta;
hdr_end += delta;
hdr_next += delta;
cur_hdr->len += delta;
http_msg_move_end(&txn->rsp, delta);
txn->flags &= ~TX_SCK_MASK;
txn->flags |= TX_SCK_REPLACED;
}
else if (srv && srv->cookie && (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_PFX)) {
/* insert the cookie name associated with this server
* before existing cookie, and insert a delimiter between them..
*/
delta = buffer_replace2(res->buf, val_beg, val_beg, srv->cookie, srv->cklen + 1);
next += delta;
hdr_end += delta;
hdr_next += delta;
cur_hdr->len += delta;
http_msg_move_end(&txn->rsp, delta);
val_beg[srv->cklen] = COOKIE_DELIM;
txn->flags &= ~TX_SCK_MASK;
txn->flags |= TX_SCK_REPLACED;
}
}
/* next, let's see if the cookie is our appcookie, unless persistence must be ignored */
else if (!(s->flags & SN_IGNORE_PRST) && (s->be->appsession_name != NULL)) {
int cmp_len, value_len;
char *value_begin;
if (s->be->options2 & PR_O2_AS_PFX) {
cmp_len = MIN(val_end - att_beg, s->be->appsession_name_len);
value_begin = att_beg + s->be->appsession_name_len;
value_len = MIN(s->be->appsession_len, val_end - att_beg - s->be->appsession_name_len);
} else {
cmp_len = att_end - att_beg;
value_begin = val_beg;
value_len = MIN(s->be->appsession_len, val_end - val_beg);
}
if ((cmp_len == s->be->appsession_name_len) &&
(memcmp(att_beg, s->be->appsession_name, s->be->appsession_name_len) == 0)) {
/* free a possibly previously allocated memory */
pool_free2(apools.sessid, txn->sessid);
/* Store the sessid in the session for future use */
if ((txn->sessid = pool_alloc2(apools.sessid)) == NULL) {
Alert("Not enough Memory process_srv():asession->sessid:malloc().\n");
send_log(s->be, LOG_ALERT, "Not enough Memory process_srv():asession->sessid:malloc().\n");
return;
}
memcpy(txn->sessid, value_begin, value_len);
txn->sessid[value_len] = 0;
}
}
/* that's done for this cookie, check the next one on the same
* line when next != hdr_end (only if is_cookie2).
*/
}
/* check next header */
old_idx = cur_idx;
}
if (txn->sessid != NULL) {
appsess *asession = NULL;
/* only do insert, if lookup fails */
asession = appsession_hash_lookup(&(s->be->htbl_proxy), txn->sessid);
if (asession == NULL) {
size_t server_id_len;
if ((asession = pool_alloc2(pool2_appsess)) == NULL) {
Alert("Not enough Memory process_srv():asession:calloc().\n");
send_log(s->be, LOG_ALERT, "Not enough Memory process_srv():asession:calloc().\n");
return;
}
asession->serverid = NULL; /* to avoid a double free in case of allocation error */
if ((asession->sessid = pool_alloc2(apools.sessid)) == NULL) {
Alert("Not enough Memory process_srv():asession->sessid:malloc().\n");
send_log(s->be, LOG_ALERT, "Not enough Memory process_srv():asession->sessid:malloc().\n");
s->be->htbl_proxy.destroy(asession);
return;
}
memcpy(asession->sessid, txn->sessid, s->be->appsession_len);
asession->sessid[s->be->appsession_len] = 0;
server_id_len = strlen(objt_server(s->target)->id) + 1;
if ((asession->serverid = pool_alloc2(apools.serverid)) == NULL) {
Alert("Not enough Memory process_srv():asession->serverid:malloc().\n");
send_log(s->be, LOG_ALERT, "Not enough Memory process_srv():asession->sessid:malloc().\n");
s->be->htbl_proxy.destroy(asession);
return;
}
asession->serverid[0] = '\0';
memcpy(asession->serverid, objt_server(s->target)->id, server_id_len);
asession->request_count = 0;
appsession_hash_insert(&(s->be->htbl_proxy), asession);
}
asession->expire = tick_add_ifset(now_ms, s->be->timeout.appsession);
asession->request_count++;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: opj_tcd_t* opj_tcd_create(OPJ_BOOL p_is_decoder)
{
opj_tcd_t *l_tcd = 00;
/* create the tcd structure */
l_tcd = (opj_tcd_t*) opj_calloc(1,sizeof(opj_tcd_t));
if (!l_tcd) {
return 00;
}
l_tcd->m_is_decoder = p_is_decoder ? 1 : 0;
l_tcd->tcd_image = (opj_tcd_image_t*)opj_calloc(1,sizeof(opj_tcd_image_t));
if (!l_tcd->tcd_image) {
opj_free(l_tcd);
return 00;
}
return l_tcd;
}
Commit Message: Add sanity check for tile coordinates (#823)
Coordinates are casted from OPJ_UINT32 to OPJ_INT32
Add sanity check for negative values and upper bound becoming lower
than lower bound.
See also
https://pdfium.googlesource.com/pdfium/+/b6befb2ed2485a3805cddea86dc7574510178ea9
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int usb_reset_and_verify_device(struct usb_device *udev)
{
struct usb_device *parent_hdev = udev->parent;
struct usb_hub *parent_hub;
struct usb_hcd *hcd = bus_to_hcd(udev->bus);
struct usb_device_descriptor descriptor = udev->descriptor;
struct usb_host_bos *bos;
int i, j, ret = 0;
int port1 = udev->portnum;
if (udev->state == USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED ||
udev->state == USB_STATE_SUSPENDED) {
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "device reset not allowed in state %d\n",
udev->state);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!parent_hdev)
return -EISDIR;
parent_hub = usb_hub_to_struct_hub(parent_hdev);
/* Disable USB2 hardware LPM.
* It will be re-enabled by the enumeration process.
*/
if (udev->usb2_hw_lpm_enabled == 1)
usb_set_usb2_hardware_lpm(udev, 0);
/* Disable LPM and LTM while we reset the device and reinstall the alt
* settings. Device-initiated LPM settings, and system exit latency
* settings are cleared when the device is reset, so we have to set
* them up again.
*/
ret = usb_unlocked_disable_lpm(udev);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&udev->dev, "%s Failed to disable LPM\n.", __func__);
goto re_enumerate_no_bos;
}
ret = usb_disable_ltm(udev);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&udev->dev, "%s Failed to disable LTM\n.",
__func__);
goto re_enumerate_no_bos;
}
bos = udev->bos;
udev->bos = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < SET_CONFIG_TRIES; ++i) {
/* ep0 maxpacket size may change; let the HCD know about it.
* Other endpoints will be handled by re-enumeration. */
usb_ep0_reinit(udev);
ret = hub_port_init(parent_hub, udev, port1, i);
if (ret >= 0 || ret == -ENOTCONN || ret == -ENODEV)
break;
}
if (ret < 0)
goto re_enumerate;
/* Device might have changed firmware (DFU or similar) */
if (descriptors_changed(udev, &descriptor, bos)) {
dev_info(&udev->dev, "device firmware changed\n");
udev->descriptor = descriptor; /* for disconnect() calls */
goto re_enumerate;
}
/* Restore the device's previous configuration */
if (!udev->actconfig)
goto done;
mutex_lock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
ret = usb_hcd_alloc_bandwidth(udev, udev->actconfig, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_warn(&udev->dev,
"Busted HC? Not enough HCD resources for "
"old configuration.\n");
mutex_unlock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
goto re_enumerate;
}
ret = usb_control_msg(udev, usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
USB_REQ_SET_CONFIGURATION, 0,
udev->actconfig->desc.bConfigurationValue, 0,
NULL, 0, USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_err(&udev->dev,
"can't restore configuration #%d (error=%d)\n",
udev->actconfig->desc.bConfigurationValue, ret);
mutex_unlock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
goto re_enumerate;
}
mutex_unlock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
usb_set_device_state(udev, USB_STATE_CONFIGURED);
/* Put interfaces back into the same altsettings as before.
* Don't bother to send the Set-Interface request for interfaces
* that were already in altsetting 0; besides being unnecessary,
* many devices can't handle it. Instead just reset the host-side
* endpoint state.
*/
for (i = 0; i < udev->actconfig->desc.bNumInterfaces; i++) {
struct usb_host_config *config = udev->actconfig;
struct usb_interface *intf = config->interface[i];
struct usb_interface_descriptor *desc;
desc = &intf->cur_altsetting->desc;
if (desc->bAlternateSetting == 0) {
usb_disable_interface(udev, intf, true);
usb_enable_interface(udev, intf, true);
ret = 0;
} else {
/* Let the bandwidth allocation function know that this
* device has been reset, and it will have to use
* alternate setting 0 as the current alternate setting.
*/
intf->resetting_device = 1;
ret = usb_set_interface(udev, desc->bInterfaceNumber,
desc->bAlternateSetting);
intf->resetting_device = 0;
}
if (ret < 0) {
dev_err(&udev->dev, "failed to restore interface %d "
"altsetting %d (error=%d)\n",
desc->bInterfaceNumber,
desc->bAlternateSetting,
ret);
goto re_enumerate;
}
/* Resetting also frees any allocated streams */
for (j = 0; j < intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints; j++)
intf->cur_altsetting->endpoint[j].streams = 0;
}
done:
/* Now that the alt settings are re-installed, enable LTM and LPM. */
usb_set_usb2_hardware_lpm(udev, 1);
usb_unlocked_enable_lpm(udev);
usb_enable_ltm(udev);
usb_release_bos_descriptor(udev);
udev->bos = bos;
return 0;
re_enumerate:
usb_release_bos_descriptor(udev);
udev->bos = bos;
re_enumerate_no_bos:
/* LPM state doesn't matter when we're about to destroy the device. */
hub_port_logical_disconnect(parent_hub, port1);
return -ENODEV;
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
if ((old->uid == 0 || old->euid == 0 || old->suid == 0) &&
(new->uid != 0 && new->euid != 0 && new->suid != 0) &&
!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
cap_clear(new->cap_permitted);
cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
}
if (old->euid == 0 && new->euid != 0)
cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
if (old->euid != 0 && new->euid == 0)
new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
}
Commit Message: fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used
If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t vmci_transport_stream_enqueue(
struct vsock_sock *vsk,
struct iovec *iov,
size_t len)
{
return vmci_qpair_enquev(vmci_trans(vsk)->qpair, iov, len, 0);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Cc: George Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::Cancel() {
internal_state_ = CANCELLED;
LogHistogramStats(CANCELLED_ERROR, GURL());
if (manifest_fetcher_) {
delete manifest_fetcher_;
manifest_fetcher_ = NULL;
}
for (PendingUrlFetches::iterator it = pending_url_fetches_.begin();
it != pending_url_fetches_.end(); ++it) {
delete it->second;
}
pending_url_fetches_.clear();
for (PendingUrlFetches::iterator it = master_entry_fetches_.begin();
it != master_entry_fetches_.end(); ++it) {
delete it->second;
}
master_entry_fetches_.clear();
ClearPendingMasterEntries();
DiscardInprogressCache();
if (manifest_response_writer_)
manifest_response_writer_.reset();
storage_->CancelDelegateCallbacks(this);
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_subscribe_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *subs = arg;
int result = -EINVAL;
struct snd_seq_client *receiver = NULL, *sender = NULL;
struct snd_seq_client_port *sport = NULL, *dport = NULL;
if ((receiver = snd_seq_client_use_ptr(subs->dest.client)) == NULL)
goto __end;
if ((sender = snd_seq_client_use_ptr(subs->sender.client)) == NULL)
goto __end;
if ((sport = snd_seq_port_use_ptr(sender, subs->sender.port)) == NULL)
goto __end;
if ((dport = snd_seq_port_use_ptr(receiver, subs->dest.port)) == NULL)
goto __end;
result = check_subscription_permission(client, sport, dport, subs);
if (result < 0)
goto __end;
/* connect them */
result = snd_seq_port_connect(client, sender, sport, receiver, dport, subs);
if (! result) /* broadcast announce */
snd_seq_client_notify_subscription(SNDRV_SEQ_ADDRESS_SUBSCRIBERS, 0,
subs, SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_PORT_SUBSCRIBED);
__end:
if (sport)
snd_seq_port_unlock(sport);
if (dport)
snd_seq_port_unlock(dport);
if (sender)
snd_seq_client_unlock(sender);
if (receiver)
snd_seq_client_unlock(receiver);
return result;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 60,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void neuterArrayBufferInAllWorlds(ArrayBuffer* object)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
if (isMainThread()) {
Vector<RefPtr<DOMWrapperWorld> > worlds;
DOMWrapperWorld::allWorldsInMainThread(worlds);
for (size_t i = 0; i < worlds.size(); i++) {
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper = worlds[i]->domDataStore().get<V8ArrayBuffer>(object, isolate);
if (!wrapper.IsEmpty()) {
ASSERT(wrapper->IsArrayBuffer());
v8::Handle<v8::ArrayBuffer>::Cast(wrapper)->Neuter();
}
}
} else {
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper = DOMWrapperWorld::current(isolate).domDataStore().get<V8ArrayBuffer>(object, isolate);
if (!wrapper.IsEmpty()) {
ASSERT(wrapper->IsArrayBuffer());
v8::Handle<v8::ArrayBuffer>::Cast(wrapper)->Neuter();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 69,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ihevcd_get_vui_params(iv_obj_t *ps_codec_obj,
void *pv_api_ip,
void *pv_api_op)
{
ihevcd_cxa_ctl_get_vui_params_ip_t *ps_ip;
ihevcd_cxa_ctl_get_vui_params_op_t *ps_op;
codec_t *ps_codec = (codec_t *)ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle;
sps_t *ps_sps;
vui_t *ps_vui;
WORD32 i;
ps_ip = (ihevcd_cxa_ctl_get_vui_params_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_op = (ihevcd_cxa_ctl_get_vui_params_op_t *)pv_api_op;
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_sps_done)
{
ps_op->u4_error_code = IHEVCD_VUI_PARAMS_NOT_FOUND;
return IV_FAIL;
}
ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
if(0 == ps_sps->i1_sps_valid || 0 == ps_sps->i1_vui_parameters_present_flag)
{
WORD32 sps_idx = 0;
ps_sps = ps_codec->ps_sps_base;
while((0 == ps_sps->i1_sps_valid) || (0 == ps_sps->i1_vui_parameters_present_flag))
{
sps_idx++;
ps_sps++;
if(sps_idx == MAX_SPS_CNT - 1)
{
ps_op->u4_error_code = IHEVCD_VUI_PARAMS_NOT_FOUND;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
ps_vui = &ps_sps->s_vui_parameters;
UNUSED(ps_ip);
ps_op->u1_aspect_ratio_info_present_flag = ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_info_present_flag;
ps_op->u1_aspect_ratio_idc = ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_idc;
ps_op->u2_sar_width = ps_vui->u2_sar_width;
ps_op->u2_sar_height = ps_vui->u2_sar_height;
ps_op->u1_overscan_info_present_flag = ps_vui->u1_overscan_info_present_flag;
ps_op->u1_overscan_appropriate_flag = ps_vui->u1_overscan_appropriate_flag;
ps_op->u1_video_signal_type_present_flag = ps_vui->u1_video_signal_type_present_flag;
ps_op->u1_video_format = ps_vui->u1_video_format;
ps_op->u1_video_full_range_flag = ps_vui->u1_video_full_range_flag;
ps_op->u1_colour_description_present_flag = ps_vui->u1_colour_description_present_flag;
ps_op->u1_colour_primaries = ps_vui->u1_colour_primaries;
ps_op->u1_transfer_characteristics = ps_vui->u1_transfer_characteristics;
ps_op->u1_matrix_coefficients = ps_vui->u1_matrix_coefficients;
ps_op->u1_chroma_loc_info_present_flag = ps_vui->u1_chroma_loc_info_present_flag;
ps_op->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_top_field = ps_vui->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_top_field;
ps_op->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_bottom_field = ps_vui->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_bottom_field;
ps_op->u1_neutral_chroma_indication_flag = ps_vui->u1_neutral_chroma_indication_flag;
ps_op->u1_field_seq_flag = ps_vui->u1_field_seq_flag;
ps_op->u1_frame_field_info_present_flag = ps_vui->u1_frame_field_info_present_flag;
ps_op->u1_default_display_window_flag = ps_vui->u1_default_display_window_flag;
ps_op->u4_def_disp_win_left_offset = ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_left_offset;
ps_op->u4_def_disp_win_right_offset = ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_right_offset;
ps_op->u4_def_disp_win_top_offset = ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_top_offset;
ps_op->u4_def_disp_win_bottom_offset = ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_bottom_offset;
ps_op->u1_vui_hrd_parameters_present_flag = ps_vui->u1_vui_hrd_parameters_present_flag;
ps_op->u1_vui_timing_info_present_flag = ps_vui->u1_vui_timing_info_present_flag;
ps_op->u4_vui_num_units_in_tick = ps_vui->u4_vui_num_units_in_tick;
ps_op->u4_vui_time_scale = ps_vui->u4_vui_time_scale;
ps_op->u1_poc_proportional_to_timing_flag = ps_vui->u1_poc_proportional_to_timing_flag;
ps_op->u1_num_ticks_poc_diff_one_minus1 = ps_vui->u1_num_ticks_poc_diff_one_minus1;
ps_op->u1_bitstream_restriction_flag = ps_vui->u1_bitstream_restriction_flag;
ps_op->u1_tiles_fixed_structure_flag = ps_vui->u1_tiles_fixed_structure_flag;
ps_op->u1_motion_vectors_over_pic_boundaries_flag = ps_vui->u1_motion_vectors_over_pic_boundaries_flag;
ps_op->u1_restricted_ref_pic_lists_flag = ps_vui->u1_restricted_ref_pic_lists_flag;
ps_op->u4_min_spatial_segmentation_idc = ps_vui->u4_min_spatial_segmentation_idc;
ps_op->u1_max_bytes_per_pic_denom = ps_vui->u1_max_bytes_per_pic_denom;
ps_op->u1_max_bits_per_mincu_denom = ps_vui->u1_max_bits_per_mincu_denom;
ps_op->u1_log2_max_mv_length_horizontal = ps_vui->u1_log2_max_mv_length_horizontal;
ps_op->u1_log2_max_mv_length_vertical = ps_vui->u1_log2_max_mv_length_vertical;
/* HRD parameters */
ps_op->u1_timing_info_present_flag = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u1_timing_info_present_flag;
ps_op->u4_num_units_in_tick = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u4_num_units_in_tick;
ps_op->u4_time_scale = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u4_time_scale;
ps_op->u1_nal_hrd_parameters_present_flag = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u1_nal_hrd_parameters_present_flag;
ps_op->u1_vcl_hrd_parameters_present_flag = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u1_vcl_hrd_parameters_present_flag;
ps_op->u1_cpbdpb_delays_present_flag = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u1_cpbdpb_delays_present_flag;
ps_op->u1_sub_pic_cpb_params_present_flag = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u1_sub_pic_cpb_params_present_flag;
ps_op->u1_tick_divisor_minus2 = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u1_tick_divisor_minus2;
ps_op->u1_du_cpb_removal_delay_increment_length_minus1 = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u1_du_cpb_removal_delay_increment_length_minus1;
ps_op->u1_sub_pic_cpb_params_in_pic_timing_sei_flag = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u1_sub_pic_cpb_params_in_pic_timing_sei_flag;
ps_op->u1_dpb_output_delay_du_length_minus1 = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u1_dpb_output_delay_du_length_minus1;
ps_op->u4_bit_rate_scale = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u4_bit_rate_scale;
ps_op->u4_cpb_size_scale = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u4_cpb_size_scale;
ps_op->u4_cpb_size_du_scale = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u4_cpb_size_du_scale;
ps_op->u1_initial_cpb_removal_delay_length_minus1 = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u1_initial_cpb_removal_delay_length_minus1;
ps_op->u1_au_cpb_removal_delay_length_minus1 = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u1_au_cpb_removal_delay_length_minus1;
ps_op->u1_dpb_output_delay_length_minus1 = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.u1_dpb_output_delay_length_minus1;
for(i = 0; i < 6; i++)
{
ps_op->au1_fixed_pic_rate_general_flag[i] = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.au1_fixed_pic_rate_general_flag[i];
ps_op->au1_fixed_pic_rate_within_cvs_flag[i] = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.au1_fixed_pic_rate_within_cvs_flag[i];
ps_op->au1_elemental_duration_in_tc_minus1[i] = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.au1_elemental_duration_in_tc_minus1[i];
ps_op->au1_low_delay_hrd_flag[i] = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.au1_low_delay_hrd_flag[i];
ps_op->au1_cpb_cnt_minus1[i] = ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters.au1_cpb_cnt_minus1[i];
}
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Handle ps_codec_obj memory allocation failure gracefully
If memory allocation for ps_codec_obj fails, return gracefully
with an error code. All other allocation failures are
handled correctly.
Bug: 68299873
Test: before/after with always-failing malloc
Change-Id: I5e6c07b147b13df81e65476851662d4b55d33b83
(cherry picked from commit a966e2a65dd901151ce7f4481d0084840c9a0f7e)
CWE ID: CWE-770 | 0 | 163,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lex_expect(JsonParseContext ctx, JsonLexContext *lex, JsonTokenType token)
{
if (!lex_accept(lex, token, NULL))
report_parse_error(ctx, lex);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PSIR_FileWriter::GetImgRsrc ( XMP_Uns16 id, ImgRsrcInfo* info ) const
{
InternalRsrcMap::const_iterator rsrcPos = this->imgRsrcs.find ( id );
if ( rsrcPos == this->imgRsrcs.end() ) return false;
const InternalRsrcInfo & rsrcInfo = rsrcPos->second;
if ( info != 0 ) {
info->id = rsrcInfo.id;
info->dataLen = rsrcInfo.dataLen;
info->dataPtr = rsrcInfo.dataPtr;
info->origOffset = rsrcInfo.origOffset;
}
return true;
} // PSIR_FileWriter::GetImgRsrc
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 9,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UINT CSoundFile::ReadSample(MODINSTRUMENT *pIns, UINT nFlags, LPCSTR lpMemFile, DWORD dwMemLength)
{
UINT len = 0, mem = pIns->nLength+6;
if ((!pIns) || (pIns->nLength < 4) || (!lpMemFile)) return 0;
if (pIns->nLength > MAX_SAMPLE_LENGTH) pIns->nLength = MAX_SAMPLE_LENGTH;
pIns->uFlags &= ~(CHN_16BIT|CHN_STEREO);
if (nFlags & RSF_16BIT)
{
mem *= 2;
pIns->uFlags |= CHN_16BIT;
}
if (nFlags & RSF_STEREO)
{
mem *= 2;
pIns->uFlags |= CHN_STEREO;
}
if ((pIns->pSample = AllocateSample(mem)) == NULL)
{
pIns->nLength = 0;
return 0;
}
switch(nFlags)
{
case RS_PCM8U:
{
len = pIns->nLength;
if (len > dwMemLength) len = pIns->nLength = dwMemLength;
signed char *pSample = pIns->pSample;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j++) pSample[j] = (signed char)(lpMemFile[j] - 0x80);
}
break;
case RS_PCM8D:
{
len = pIns->nLength;
if (len > dwMemLength) break;
signed char *pSample = pIns->pSample;
const signed char *p = (const signed char *)lpMemFile;
int delta = 0;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j++)
{
delta += p[j];
*pSample++ = (signed char)delta;
}
}
break;
case RS_ADPCM4:
{
len = (pIns->nLength + 1) / 2;
if (len > dwMemLength - 16) break;
memcpy(CompressionTable, lpMemFile, 16);
lpMemFile += 16;
signed char *pSample = pIns->pSample;
signed char delta = 0;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j++)
{
BYTE b0 = (BYTE)lpMemFile[j];
BYTE b1 = (BYTE)(lpMemFile[j] >> 4);
delta = (signed char)GetDeltaValue((int)delta, b0);
pSample[0] = delta;
delta = (signed char)GetDeltaValue((int)delta, b1);
pSample[1] = delta;
pSample += 2;
}
len += 16;
}
break;
case RS_PCM16D:
{
len = pIns->nLength * 2;
if (len > dwMemLength) break;
short int *pSample = (short int *)pIns->pSample;
short int *p = (short int *)lpMemFile;
int delta16 = 0;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j+=2)
{
delta16 += bswapLE16(*p++);
*pSample++ = (short int)delta16;
}
}
break;
case RS_PCM16S:
{
len = pIns->nLength * 2;
if (len <= dwMemLength) memcpy(pIns->pSample, lpMemFile, len);
short int *pSample = (short int *)pIns->pSample;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j+=2)
{
short int s = bswapLE16(*pSample);
*pSample++ = s;
}
}
break;
case RS_PCM16M:
len = pIns->nLength * 2;
if (len > dwMemLength) len = dwMemLength & ~1;
if (len > 1)
{
signed char *pSample = (signed char *)pIns->pSample;
signed char *pSrc = (signed char *)lpMemFile;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j+=2)
{
*((unsigned short *)(pSample+j)) = bswapBE16(*((unsigned short *)(pSrc+j)));
}
}
break;
case RS_PCM16U:
{
len = pIns->nLength * 2;
if (len > dwMemLength) break;
short int *pSample = (short int *)pIns->pSample;
short int *pSrc = (short int *)lpMemFile;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j+=2) *pSample++ = bswapLE16(*(pSrc++)) - 0x8000;
}
break;
case RS_STPCM16M:
len = pIns->nLength * 2;
if (len*2 <= dwMemLength)
{
signed char *pSample = (signed char *)pIns->pSample;
signed char *pSrc = (signed char *)lpMemFile;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j+=2)
{
*((unsigned short *)(pSample+j*2)) = bswapBE16(*((unsigned short *)(pSrc+j)));
*((unsigned short *)(pSample+j*2+2)) = bswapBE16(*((unsigned short *)(pSrc+j+len)));
}
len *= 2;
}
break;
case RS_STPCM8S:
case RS_STPCM8U:
case RS_STPCM8D:
{
int iadd_l = 0, iadd_r = 0;
if (nFlags == RS_STPCM8U) { iadd_l = iadd_r = -128; }
len = pIns->nLength;
signed char *psrc = (signed char *)lpMemFile;
signed char *pSample = (signed char *)pIns->pSample;
if (len*2 > dwMemLength) break;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j++)
{
pSample[j*2] = (signed char)(psrc[0] + iadd_l);
pSample[j*2+1] = (signed char)(psrc[len] + iadd_r);
psrc++;
if (nFlags == RS_STPCM8D)
{
iadd_l = pSample[j*2];
iadd_r = pSample[j*2+1];
}
}
len *= 2;
}
break;
case RS_STPCM16S:
case RS_STPCM16U:
case RS_STPCM16D:
{
int iadd_l = 0, iadd_r = 0;
if (nFlags == RS_STPCM16U) { iadd_l = iadd_r = -0x8000; }
len = pIns->nLength;
short int *psrc = (short int *)lpMemFile;
short int *pSample = (short int *)pIns->pSample;
if (len*4 > dwMemLength) break;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j++)
{
pSample[j*2] = (short int) (bswapLE16(psrc[0]) + iadd_l);
pSample[j*2+1] = (short int) (bswapLE16(psrc[len]) + iadd_r);
psrc++;
if (nFlags == RS_STPCM16D)
{
iadd_l = pSample[j*2];
iadd_r = pSample[j*2+1];
}
}
len *= 4;
}
break;
case RS_IT2148:
case RS_IT21416:
case RS_IT2158:
case RS_IT21516:
len = dwMemLength;
if (len < 4) break;
if ((nFlags == RS_IT2148) || (nFlags == RS_IT2158))
ITUnpack8Bit(pIns->pSample, pIns->nLength, (LPBYTE)lpMemFile, dwMemLength, (nFlags == RS_IT2158));
else
ITUnpack16Bit(pIns->pSample, pIns->nLength, (LPBYTE)lpMemFile, dwMemLength, (nFlags == RS_IT21516));
break;
#ifndef MODPLUG_BASIC_SUPPORT
#ifndef FASTSOUNDLIB
case RS_STIPCM8S:
case RS_STIPCM8U:
{
int iadd = 0;
if (nFlags == RS_STIPCM8U) { iadd = -0x80; }
len = pIns->nLength;
if (len*2 > dwMemLength) len = dwMemLength >> 1;
LPBYTE psrc = (LPBYTE)lpMemFile;
LPBYTE pSample = (LPBYTE)pIns->pSample;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j++)
{
pSample[j*2] = (signed char)(psrc[0] + iadd);
pSample[j*2+1] = (signed char)(psrc[1] + iadd);
psrc+=2;
}
len *= 2;
}
break;
case RS_STIPCM16S:
case RS_STIPCM16U:
{
int iadd = 0;
if (nFlags == RS_STIPCM16U) iadd = -32768;
len = pIns->nLength;
if (len*4 > dwMemLength) len = dwMemLength >> 2;
short int *psrc = (short int *)lpMemFile;
short int *pSample = (short int *)pIns->pSample;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j++)
{
pSample[j*2] = (short int)(bswapLE16(psrc[0]) + iadd);
pSample[j*2+1] = (short int)(bswapLE16(psrc[1]) + iadd);
psrc += 2;
}
len *= 4;
}
break;
case RS_AMS8:
case RS_AMS16:
len = 9;
if (dwMemLength > 9)
{
const char *psrc = lpMemFile;
char packcharacter = lpMemFile[8], *pdest = (char *)pIns->pSample;
len += bswapLE32(*((LPDWORD)(lpMemFile+4)));
if (len > dwMemLength) len = dwMemLength;
UINT dmax = pIns->nLength;
if (pIns->uFlags & CHN_16BIT) dmax <<= 1;
AMSUnpack(psrc+9, len-9, pdest, dmax, packcharacter);
}
break;
case RS_PTM8DTO16:
{
len = pIns->nLength * 2;
if (len > dwMemLength) break;
signed char *pSample = (signed char *)pIns->pSample;
signed char delta8 = 0;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j++)
{
delta8 += lpMemFile[j];
*pSample++ = delta8;
}
WORD *pSampleW = (WORD *)pIns->pSample;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j+=2) // swaparoni!
{
WORD s = bswapLE16(*pSampleW);
*pSampleW++ = s;
}
}
break;
case RS_MDL8:
case RS_MDL16:
len = dwMemLength;
if (len >= 4)
{
LPBYTE pSample = (LPBYTE)pIns->pSample;
LPBYTE ibuf = (LPBYTE)lpMemFile;
DWORD bitbuf = bswapLE32(*((DWORD *)ibuf));
UINT bitnum = 32;
BYTE dlt = 0, lowbyte = 0;
ibuf += 4;
for (UINT j=0; j<pIns->nLength; j++)
{
BYTE hibyte;
BYTE sign;
if (nFlags == RS_MDL16) lowbyte = (BYTE)MDLReadBits(bitbuf, bitnum, ibuf, 8);
sign = (BYTE)MDLReadBits(bitbuf, bitnum, ibuf, 1);
if (MDLReadBits(bitbuf, bitnum, ibuf, 1))
{
hibyte = (BYTE)MDLReadBits(bitbuf, bitnum, ibuf, 3);
} else
{
hibyte = 8;
while (!MDLReadBits(bitbuf, bitnum, ibuf, 1)) hibyte += 0x10;
hibyte += MDLReadBits(bitbuf, bitnum, ibuf, 4);
}
if (sign) hibyte = ~hibyte;
dlt += hibyte;
if (nFlags != RS_MDL16)
pSample[j] = dlt;
else
{
pSample[j<<1] = lowbyte;
pSample[(j<<1)+1] = dlt;
}
}
}
break;
case RS_DMF8:
case RS_DMF16:
len = dwMemLength;
if (len >= 4)
{
UINT maxlen = pIns->nLength;
if (pIns->uFlags & CHN_16BIT) maxlen <<= 1;
LPBYTE ibuf = (LPBYTE)lpMemFile, ibufmax = (LPBYTE)(lpMemFile+dwMemLength);
len = DMFUnpack((LPBYTE)pIns->pSample, ibuf, ibufmax, maxlen);
}
break;
#ifdef MODPLUG_TRACKER
case RS_PCM24S:
case RS_PCM32S:
len = pIns->nLength * 3;
if (nFlags == RS_PCM32S) len += pIns->nLength;
if (len > dwMemLength) break;
if (len > 4*8)
{
UINT slsize = (nFlags == RS_PCM32S) ? 4 : 3;
LPBYTE pSrc = (LPBYTE)lpMemFile;
LONG max = 255;
if (nFlags == RS_PCM32S) pSrc++;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j+=slsize)
{
LONG l = ((((pSrc[j+2] << 8) + pSrc[j+1]) << 8) + pSrc[j]) << 8;
l /= 256;
if (l > max) max = l;
if (-l > max) max = -l;
}
max = (max / 128) + 1;
signed short *pDest = (signed short *)pIns->pSample;
for (UINT k=0; k<len; k+=slsize)
{
LONG l = ((((pSrc[k+2] << 8) + pSrc[k+1]) << 8) + pSrc[k]) << 8;
*pDest++ = (signed short)(l / max);
}
}
break;
case RS_STIPCM24S:
case RS_STIPCM32S:
len = pIns->nLength * 6;
if (nFlags == RS_STIPCM32S) len += pIns->nLength * 2;
if (len > dwMemLength) break;
if (len > 8*8)
{
UINT slsize = (nFlags == RS_STIPCM32S) ? 4 : 3;
LPBYTE pSrc = (LPBYTE)lpMemFile;
LONG max = 255;
if (nFlags == RS_STIPCM32S) pSrc++;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j+=slsize)
{
LONG l = ((((pSrc[j+2] << 8) + pSrc[j+1]) << 8) + pSrc[j]) << 8;
l /= 256;
if (l > max) max = l;
if (-l > max) max = -l;
}
max = (max / 128) + 1;
signed short *pDest = (signed short *)pIns->pSample;
for (UINT k=0; k<len; k+=slsize)
{
LONG lr = ((((pSrc[k+2] << 8) + pSrc[k+1]) << 8) + pSrc[k]) << 8;
k += slsize;
LONG ll = ((((pSrc[k+2] << 8) + pSrc[k+1]) << 8) + pSrc[k]) << 8;
pDest[0] = (signed short)ll;
pDest[1] = (signed short)lr;
pDest += 2;
}
}
break;
case RS_STIPCM16M:
{
len = pIns->nLength;
if (len*4 > dwMemLength) len = dwMemLength >> 2;
LPCBYTE psrc = (LPCBYTE)lpMemFile;
short int *pSample = (short int *)pIns->pSample;
for (UINT j=0; j<len; j++)
{
pSample[j*2] = (signed short)(((UINT)psrc[0] << 8) | (psrc[1]));
pSample[j*2+1] = (signed short)(((UINT)psrc[2] << 8) | (psrc[3]));
psrc += 4;
}
len *= 4;
}
break;
#endif // MODPLUG_TRACKER
#endif // !FASTSOUNDLIB
#endif // !MODPLUG_BASIC_SUPPORT
default:
len = pIns->nLength;
if (len > dwMemLength) len = pIns->nLength = dwMemLength;
memcpy(pIns->pSample, lpMemFile, len);
}
if (len > dwMemLength)
{
if (pIns->pSample)
{
pIns->nLength = 0;
FreeSample(pIns->pSample);
pIns->pSample = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
AdjustSampleLoop(pIns);
return len;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 1 | 164,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_symlinks(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
#if !defined(HAVE_LSTAT)
/* Platform doesn't have lstat, so we can't look for symlinks. */
(void)a; /* UNUSED */
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
#else
char *pn;
char c;
int r;
struct stat st;
/*
* Guard against symlink tricks. Reject any archive entry whose
* destination would be altered by a symlink.
*/
/* Whatever we checked last time doesn't need to be re-checked. */
pn = a->name;
if (archive_strlen(&(a->path_safe)) > 0) {
char *p = a->path_safe.s;
while ((*pn != '\0') && (*p == *pn))
++p, ++pn;
}
/* Skip the root directory if the path is absolute. */
if(pn == a->name && pn[0] == '/')
++pn;
c = pn[0];
/* Keep going until we've checked the entire name. */
while (pn[0] != '\0' && (pn[0] != '/' || pn[1] != '\0')) {
/* Skip the next path element. */
while (*pn != '\0' && *pn != '/')
++pn;
c = pn[0];
pn[0] = '\0';
/* Check that we haven't hit a symlink. */
r = lstat(a->name, &st);
if (r != 0) {
/* We've hit a dir that doesn't exist; stop now. */
if (errno == ENOENT) {
break;
} else {
/* Note: This effectively disables deep directory
* support when security checks are enabled.
* Otherwise, very long pathnames that trigger
* an error here could evade the sandbox.
* TODO: We could do better, but it would probably
* require merging the symlink checks with the
* deep-directory editing. */
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
} else if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
if (c == '\0') {
/*
* Last element is symlink; remove it
* so we can overwrite it with the
* item being extracted.
*/
if (unlink(a->name)) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Could not remove symlink %s",
a->name);
pn[0] = c;
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
a->pst = NULL;
/*
* Even if we did remove it, a warning
* is in order. The warning is silly,
* though, if we're just replacing one
* symlink with another symlink.
*/
if (!S_ISLNK(a->mode)) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
"Removing symlink %s",
a->name);
}
/* Symlink gone. No more problem! */
pn[0] = c;
return (0);
} else if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_UNLINK) {
/* User asked us to remove problems. */
if (unlink(a->name) != 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
"Cannot remove intervening symlink %s",
a->name);
pn[0] = c;
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
a->pst = NULL;
} else {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
"Cannot extract through symlink %s",
a->name);
pn[0] = c;
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
}
pn[0] = c;
if (pn[0] != '\0')
pn++; /* Advance to the next segment. */
}
pn[0] = c;
/* We've checked and/or cleaned the whole path, so remember it. */
archive_strcpy(&a->path_safe, a->name);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fixes for Issue #745 and Issue #746 from Doran Moppert.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 167,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vrend_destroy_vertex_elements_object(void *obj_ptr)
{
struct vrend_vertex_element_array *v = obj_ptr;
if (vrend_state.have_vertex_attrib_binding) {
glDeleteVertexArrays(1, &v->id);
}
FREE(v);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: top_proc(mrb_state *mrb, struct RProc *proc)
{
while (proc->upper) {
if (MRB_PROC_SCOPE_P(proc) || MRB_PROC_STRICT_P(proc))
return proc;
proc = proc->upper;
}
return proc;
}
Commit Message: Check length of env stack before accessing upvar; fix #3995
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 83,198 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Gfx::opSetTextLeading(Object args[], int numArgs) {
state->setLeading(args[0].getNum());
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CLOSE_BRACKET_WITHOUT_ESC_WARN(ScanEnv* env, UChar* c)
{
if (onig_warn == onig_null_warn) return ;
if (IS_SYNTAX_BV((env)->syntax, ONIG_SYN_WARN_CC_OP_NOT_ESCAPED)) {
UChar buf[WARN_BUFSIZE];
onig_snprintf_with_pattern(buf, WARN_BUFSIZE, (env)->enc,
(env)->pattern, (env)->pattern_end,
(UChar* )"regular expression has '%s' without escape", c);
(*onig_warn)((char* )buf);
}
}
Commit Message: fix #60 : invalid state(CCS_VALUE) in parse_char_class()
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mkfifo_atomic(const char *path, mode_t mode) {
_cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
int r;
assert(path);
r = tempfn_random(path, NULL, &t);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (mkfifo(t, mode) < 0)
return -errno;
if (rename(t, path) < 0) {
unlink_noerrno(t);
return -errno;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: basic: fix touch() creating files with 07777 mode
mode_t is unsigned, so MODE_INVALID < 0 can never be true.
This fixes a possible DoS where any user could fill /run by writing to
a world-writable /run/systemd/show-status.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 71,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoCopyTexSubImage2D(
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint x,
GLint y,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height) {
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info = GetTextureInfoForTarget(target);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glCopyTexSubImage2D: unknown texture for target");
return;
}
GLenum type = 0;
GLenum format = 0;
if (!info->GetLevelType(target, level, &type, &format) ||
!info->ValidForTexture(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, height, format, type)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glCopyTexSubImage2D: bad dimensions.");
return;
}
GLenum read_format = GetBoundReadFrameBufferInternalFormat();
uint32 channels_exist = GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(read_format);
uint32 channels_needed = GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(format);
if ((channels_needed & channels_exist) != channels_needed) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glCopyTexSubImage2D: incompatible format");
return;
}
ScopedResolvedFrameBufferBinder binder(this, false, true);
gfx::Size size = GetBoundReadFrameBufferSize();
GLint copyX = 0;
GLint copyY = 0;
GLint copyWidth = 0;
GLint copyHeight = 0;
Clip(x, width, size.width(), ©X, ©Width);
Clip(y, height, size.height(), ©Y, ©Height);
if (copyX != x ||
copyY != y ||
copyWidth != width ||
copyHeight != height) {
uint32 pixels_size = 0;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSize(
width, height, format, type, unpack_alignment_, &pixels_size)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glCopyTexSubImage2D: dimensions too large");
return;
}
scoped_array<char> zero(new char[pixels_size]);
memset(zero.get(), 0, pixels_size);
glTexSubImage2D(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, height,
format, type, zero.get());
}
if (copyHeight > 0 && copyWidth > 0) {
GLint dx = copyX - x;
GLint dy = copyY - y;
GLint destX = xoffset + dx;
GLint destY = yoffset + dy;
glCopyTexSubImage2D(target, level,
destX, destY, copyX, copyY,
copyWidth, copyHeight);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void aesni_xts_dec(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
{
glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv, GLUE_FUNC_CAST(aesni_dec));
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cff_builder_add_contour( CFF_Builder* builder )
{
FT_Outline* outline = builder->current;
FT_Error error;
if ( !builder->load_points )
{
outline->n_contours++;
return CFF_Err_Ok;
}
error = FT_GLYPHLOADER_CHECK_POINTS( builder->loader, 0, 1 );
if ( !error )
{
if ( outline->n_contours > 0 )
outline->contours[outline->n_contours - 1] =
(short)( outline->n_points - 1 );
outline->n_contours++;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 10,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fz_drop_cmm_context(fz_context *ctx)
{
fz_cmm_drop_instance(ctx);
ctx->cmm_instance = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::detachNodeIterator(NodeIterator* ni)
{
m_nodeIterators.remove(ni);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void js_pushrune(js_State *J, Rune rune)
{
char buf[UTFmax + 1];
if (rune > 0) {
buf[runetochar(buf, &rune)] = 0;
js_pushstring(J, buf);
} else {
js_pushundefined(J);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void e1000e_update_flowctl_status(E1000ECore *core)
{
if (e1000e_have_autoneg(core) &&
core->phy[0][PHY_STATUS] & MII_SR_AUTONEG_COMPLETE) {
trace_e1000e_link_autoneg_flowctl(true);
core->mac[CTRL] |= E1000_CTRL_TFCE | E1000_CTRL_RFCE;
} else {
trace_e1000e_link_autoneg_flowctl(false);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 6,092 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc,
const char **argv) {
(void)pamh;
(void)flags;
(void)argc;
(void)argv;
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Do not leak file descriptor when doing exec
When opening a custom debug file, the descriptor would stay
open when calling exec and leak to the child process.
Make sure all files are opened with close-on-exec.
This fixes CVE-2019-12210.
Thanks to Matthias Gerstner of the SUSE Security Team for reporting
the issue.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 89,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vop_host_init(struct vop_info *vi)
{
int rc;
struct miscdevice *mdev;
struct vop_device *vpdev = vi->vpdev;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vi->vdev_list);
vi->dma_ch = vpdev->dma_ch;
mdev = &vi->miscdev;
mdev->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR;
snprintf(vi->name, sizeof(vi->name), "vop_virtio%d", vpdev->index);
mdev->name = vi->name;
mdev->fops = &vop_fops;
mdev->parent = &vpdev->dev;
rc = misc_register(mdev);
if (rc)
dev_err(&vpdev->dev, "%s failed rc %d\n", __func__, rc);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: misc: mic: Fix for double fetch security bug in VOP driver
The MIC VOP driver does two successive reads from user space to read a
variable length data structure. Kernel memory corruption can result if
the data structure changes between the two reads. This patch disallows
the chance of this happening.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116651
Reported by: Pengfei Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Dutt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Dixit <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetBooleanv(GLenum pname, GLboolean* params) {
DCHECK(params);
GLsizei num_written = 0;
if (GetNumValuesReturnedForGLGet(pname, &num_written)) {
scoped_ptr<GLint[]> values(new GLint[num_written]);
if (!state_.GetStateAsGLint(pname, values.get(), &num_written)) {
GetHelper(pname, values.get(), &num_written);
}
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < num_written; ++ii) {
params[ii] = static_cast<GLboolean>(values[ii]);
}
} else {
pname = AdjustGetPname(pname);
glGetBooleanv(pname, params);
}
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean cosine_check_file_type(wtap *wth, int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
char buf[COSINE_LINE_LENGTH];
gsize reclen;
guint line;
buf[COSINE_LINE_LENGTH-1] = '\0';
for (line = 0; line < COSINE_HEADER_LINES_TO_CHECK; line++) {
if (file_gets(buf, COSINE_LINE_LENGTH, wth->fh) == NULL) {
/* EOF or error. */
*err = file_error(wth->fh, err_info);
return FALSE;
}
reclen = strlen(buf);
if (reclen < strlen(COSINE_HDR_MAGIC_STR1) ||
reclen < strlen(COSINE_HDR_MAGIC_STR2)) {
continue;
}
if (strstr(buf, COSINE_HDR_MAGIC_STR1) ||
strstr(buf, COSINE_HDR_MAGIC_STR2)) {
return TRUE;
}
}
*err = 0;
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Don't treat the packet length as unsigned.
The scanf family of functions are as annoyingly bad at handling unsigned
numbers as strtoul() is - both of them are perfectly willing to accept a
value beginning with a negative sign as an unsigned value. When using
strtoul(), you can compensate for this by explicitly checking for a '-'
as the first character of the string, but you can't do that with
sscanf().
So revert to having pkt_len be signed, and scanning it with %d, but
check for a negative value and fail if we see a negative value.
Bug: 12395
Change-Id: I43b458a73b0934e9a5c2c89d34eac5a8f21a7455
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15223
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillPopupViewViews::CreateChildViews() {
RemoveAllChildViews(true /* delete_children */);
int set_size = controller_->GetLineCount();
for (int i = 0; i < set_size; ++i) {
AddChildView(new AutofillPopupChildView(controller_->GetSuggestionAt(i),
set_size, i + 1));
}
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: eval_condition(uschar *s, BOOL *resetok, BOOL *yield)
{
BOOL testfor = TRUE;
BOOL tempcond, combined_cond;
BOOL *subcondptr;
BOOL sub2_honour_dollar = TRUE;
int i, rc, cond_type, roffset;
int_eximarith_t num[2];
struct stat statbuf;
uschar name[256];
uschar *sub[10];
const pcre *re;
const uschar *rerror;
for (;;)
{
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s == '!') { testfor = !testfor; s++; } else break;
}
/* Numeric comparisons are symbolic */
if (*s == '=' || *s == '>' || *s == '<')
{
int p = 0;
name[p++] = *s++;
if (*s == '=')
{
name[p++] = '=';
s++;
}
name[p] = 0;
}
/* All other conditions are named */
else s = read_name(name, 256, s, US"_");
/* If we haven't read a name, it means some non-alpha character is first. */
if (name[0] == 0)
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("condition name expected, "
"but found \"%.16s\"", s);
return NULL;
}
/* Find which condition we are dealing with, and switch on it */
cond_type = chop_match(name, cond_table, sizeof(cond_table)/sizeof(uschar *));
switch(cond_type)
{
/* def: tests for a non-empty variable, or for the existence of a header. If
yield == NULL we are in a skipping state, and don't care about the answer. */
case ECOND_DEF:
if (*s != ':')
{
expand_string_message = US"\":\" expected after \"def\"";
return NULL;
}
s = read_name(name, 256, s+1, US"_");
/* Test for a header's existence. If the name contains a closing brace
character, this may be a user error where the terminating colon has been
omitted. Set a flag to adjust a subsequent error message in this case. */
if (Ustrncmp(name, "h_", 2) == 0 ||
Ustrncmp(name, "rh_", 3) == 0 ||
Ustrncmp(name, "bh_", 3) == 0 ||
Ustrncmp(name, "header_", 7) == 0 ||
Ustrncmp(name, "rheader_", 8) == 0 ||
Ustrncmp(name, "bheader_", 8) == 0)
{
s = read_header_name(name, 256, s);
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (Ustrchr(name, '}') != NULL) malformed_header = TRUE;
if (yield != NULL) *yield =
(find_header(name, TRUE, NULL, FALSE, NULL) != NULL) == testfor;
}
/* Test for a variable's having a non-empty value. A non-existent variable
causes an expansion failure. */
else
{
uschar *value = find_variable(name, TRUE, yield == NULL, NULL);
if (value == NULL)
{
expand_string_message = (name[0] == 0)?
string_sprintf("variable name omitted after \"def:\"") :
string_sprintf("unknown variable \"%s\" after \"def:\"", name);
check_variable_error_message(name);
return NULL;
}
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (value[0] != 0) == testfor;
}
return s;
/* first_delivery tests for first delivery attempt */
case ECOND_FIRST_DELIVERY:
if (yield != NULL) *yield = deliver_firsttime == testfor;
return s;
/* queue_running tests for any process started by a queue runner */
case ECOND_QUEUE_RUNNING:
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (queue_run_pid != (pid_t)0) == testfor;
return s;
/* exists: tests for file existence
isip: tests for any IP address
isip4: tests for an IPv4 address
isip6: tests for an IPv6 address
pam: does PAM authentication
radius: does RADIUS authentication
ldapauth: does LDAP authentication
pwcheck: does Cyrus SASL pwcheck authentication
*/
case ECOND_EXISTS:
case ECOND_ISIP:
case ECOND_ISIP4:
case ECOND_ISIP6:
case ECOND_PAM:
case ECOND_RADIUS:
case ECOND_LDAPAUTH:
case ECOND_PWCHECK:
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
sub[0] = expand_string_internal(s+1, TRUE, &s, yield == NULL, TRUE, resetok);
if (sub[0] == NULL) return NULL;
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (*s++ != '}') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_END;
if (yield == NULL) return s; /* No need to run the test if skipping */
switch(cond_type)
{
case ECOND_EXISTS:
if ((expand_forbid & RDO_EXISTS) != 0)
{
expand_string_message = US"File existence tests are not permitted";
return NULL;
}
*yield = (Ustat(sub[0], &statbuf) == 0) == testfor;
break;
case ECOND_ISIP:
case ECOND_ISIP4:
case ECOND_ISIP6:
rc = string_is_ip_address(sub[0], NULL);
*yield = ((cond_type == ECOND_ISIP)? (rc != 0) :
(cond_type == ECOND_ISIP4)? (rc == 4) : (rc == 6)) == testfor;
break;
/* Various authentication tests - all optionally compiled */
case ECOND_PAM:
#ifdef SUPPORT_PAM
rc = auth_call_pam(sub[0], &expand_string_message);
goto END_AUTH;
#else
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#endif /* SUPPORT_PAM */
case ECOND_RADIUS:
#ifdef RADIUS_CONFIG_FILE
rc = auth_call_radius(sub[0], &expand_string_message);
goto END_AUTH;
#else
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#endif /* RADIUS_CONFIG_FILE */
case ECOND_LDAPAUTH:
#ifdef LOOKUP_LDAP
{
/* Just to keep the interface the same */
BOOL do_cache;
int old_pool = store_pool;
store_pool = POOL_SEARCH;
rc = eldapauth_find((void *)(-1), NULL, sub[0], Ustrlen(sub[0]), NULL,
&expand_string_message, &do_cache);
store_pool = old_pool;
}
goto END_AUTH;
#else
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#endif /* LOOKUP_LDAP */
case ECOND_PWCHECK:
#ifdef CYRUS_PWCHECK_SOCKET
rc = auth_call_pwcheck(sub[0], &expand_string_message);
goto END_AUTH;
#else
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#endif /* CYRUS_PWCHECK_SOCKET */
#if defined(SUPPORT_PAM) || defined(RADIUS_CONFIG_FILE) || \
defined(LOOKUP_LDAP) || defined(CYRUS_PWCHECK_SOCKET)
END_AUTH:
if (rc == ERROR || rc == DEFER) return NULL;
*yield = (rc == OK) == testfor;
#endif
}
return s;
/* call ACL (in a conditional context). Accept true, deny false.
Defer is a forced-fail. Anything set by message= goes to $value.
Up to ten parameters are used; we use the braces round the name+args
like the saslauthd condition does, to permit a variable number of args.
See also the expansion-item version EITEM_ACL and the traditional
acl modifier ACLC_ACL.
Since the ACL may allocate new global variables, tell our caller to not
reclaim memory.
*/
case ECOND_ACL:
/* ${if acl {{name}{arg1}{arg2}...} {yes}{no}} */
{
uschar *user_msg;
BOOL cond = FALSE;
int size = 0;
int ptr = 0;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s++ != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /*}*/
switch(read_subs(sub, sizeof(sub)/sizeof(*sub), 1,
&s, yield == NULL, TRUE, US"acl", resetok))
{
case 1: expand_string_message = US"too few arguments or bracketing "
"error for acl";
case 2:
case 3: return NULL;
}
*resetok = FALSE;
if (yield != NULL) switch(eval_acl(sub, sizeof(sub)/sizeof(*sub), &user_msg))
{
case OK:
cond = TRUE;
case FAIL:
lookup_value = NULL;
if (user_msg)
{
lookup_value = string_cat(NULL, &size, &ptr, user_msg, Ustrlen(user_msg));
lookup_value[ptr] = '\0';
}
*yield = cond == testfor;
break;
case DEFER:
expand_string_forcedfail = TRUE;
default:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("error from acl \"%s\"", sub[0]);
return NULL;
}
return s;
}
/* saslauthd: does Cyrus saslauthd authentication. Four parameters are used:
${if saslauthd {{username}{password}{service}{realm}} {yes}{no}}
However, the last two are optional. That is why the whole set is enclosed
in their own set of braces. */
case ECOND_SASLAUTHD:
#ifndef CYRUS_SASLAUTHD_SOCKET
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#else
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s++ != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
switch(read_subs(sub, 4, 2, &s, yield == NULL, TRUE, US"saslauthd", resetok))
{
case 1: expand_string_message = US"too few arguments or bracketing "
"error for saslauthd";
case 2:
case 3: return NULL;
}
if (sub[2] == NULL) sub[3] = NULL; /* realm if no service */
if (yield != NULL)
{
int rc;
rc = auth_call_saslauthd(sub[0], sub[1], sub[2], sub[3],
&expand_string_message);
if (rc == ERROR || rc == DEFER) return NULL;
*yield = (rc == OK) == testfor;
}
return s;
#endif /* CYRUS_SASLAUTHD_SOCKET */
/* symbolic operators for numeric and string comparison, and a number of
other operators, all requiring two arguments.
crypteq: encrypts plaintext and compares against an encrypted text,
using crypt(), crypt16(), MD5 or SHA-1
inlist/inlisti: checks if first argument is in the list of the second
match: does a regular expression match and sets up the numerical
variables if it succeeds
match_address: matches in an address list
match_domain: matches in a domain list
match_ip: matches a host list that is restricted to IP addresses
match_local_part: matches in a local part list
*/
case ECOND_MATCH_ADDRESS:
case ECOND_MATCH_DOMAIN:
case ECOND_MATCH_IP:
case ECOND_MATCH_LOCAL_PART:
#ifndef EXPAND_LISTMATCH_RHS
sub2_honour_dollar = FALSE;
#endif
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case ECOND_CRYPTEQ:
case ECOND_INLIST:
case ECOND_INLISTI:
case ECOND_MATCH:
case ECOND_NUM_L: /* Numerical comparisons */
case ECOND_NUM_LE:
case ECOND_NUM_E:
case ECOND_NUM_EE:
case ECOND_NUM_G:
case ECOND_NUM_GE:
case ECOND_STR_LT: /* String comparisons */
case ECOND_STR_LTI:
case ECOND_STR_LE:
case ECOND_STR_LEI:
case ECOND_STR_EQ:
case ECOND_STR_EQI:
case ECOND_STR_GT:
case ECOND_STR_GTI:
case ECOND_STR_GE:
case ECOND_STR_GEI:
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
{
/* Sometimes, we don't expand substrings; too many insecure configurations
created using match_address{}{} and friends, where the second param
includes information from untrustworthy sources. */
BOOL honour_dollar = TRUE;
if ((i > 0) && !sub2_honour_dollar)
honour_dollar = FALSE;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s != '{')
{
if (i == 0) goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START;
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("missing 2nd string in {} "
"after \"%s\"", name);
return NULL;
}
sub[i] = expand_string_internal(s+1, TRUE, &s, yield == NULL,
honour_dollar, resetok);
if (sub[i] == NULL) return NULL;
if (*s++ != '}') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_END;
/* Convert to numerical if required; we know that the names of all the
conditions that compare numbers do not start with a letter. This just saves
checking for them individually. */
if (!isalpha(name[0]) && yield != NULL)
{
if (sub[i][0] == 0)
{
num[i] = 0;
DEBUG(D_expand)
debug_printf("empty string cast to zero for numerical comparison\n");
}
else
{
num[i] = expand_string_integer(sub[i], FALSE);
if (expand_string_message != NULL) return NULL;
}
}
}
/* Result not required */
if (yield == NULL) return s;
/* Do an appropriate comparison */
switch(cond_type)
{
case ECOND_NUM_E:
case ECOND_NUM_EE:
tempcond = (num[0] == num[1]);
break;
case ECOND_NUM_G:
tempcond = (num[0] > num[1]);
break;
case ECOND_NUM_GE:
tempcond = (num[0] >= num[1]);
break;
case ECOND_NUM_L:
tempcond = (num[0] < num[1]);
break;
case ECOND_NUM_LE:
tempcond = (num[0] <= num[1]);
break;
case ECOND_STR_LT:
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(sub[0], sub[1]) < 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_LTI:
tempcond = (strcmpic(sub[0], sub[1]) < 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_LE:
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(sub[0], sub[1]) <= 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_LEI:
tempcond = (strcmpic(sub[0], sub[1]) <= 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_EQ:
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(sub[0], sub[1]) == 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_EQI:
tempcond = (strcmpic(sub[0], sub[1]) == 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_GT:
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(sub[0], sub[1]) > 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_GTI:
tempcond = (strcmpic(sub[0], sub[1]) > 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_GE:
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(sub[0], sub[1]) >= 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_GEI:
tempcond = (strcmpic(sub[0], sub[1]) >= 0);
break;
case ECOND_MATCH: /* Regular expression match */
re = pcre_compile(CS sub[1], PCRE_COPT, (const char **)&rerror, &roffset,
NULL);
if (re == NULL)
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("regular expression error in "
"\"%s\": %s at offset %d", sub[1], rerror, roffset);
return NULL;
}
tempcond = regex_match_and_setup(re, sub[0], 0, -1);
break;
case ECOND_MATCH_ADDRESS: /* Match in an address list */
rc = match_address_list(sub[0], TRUE, FALSE, &(sub[1]), NULL, -1, 0, NULL);
goto MATCHED_SOMETHING;
case ECOND_MATCH_DOMAIN: /* Match in a domain list */
rc = match_isinlist(sub[0], &(sub[1]), 0, &domainlist_anchor, NULL,
MCL_DOMAIN + MCL_NOEXPAND, TRUE, NULL);
goto MATCHED_SOMETHING;
case ECOND_MATCH_IP: /* Match IP address in a host list */
if (sub[0][0] != 0 && string_is_ip_address(sub[0], NULL) == 0)
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not an IP address",
sub[0]);
return NULL;
}
else
{
unsigned int *nullcache = NULL;
check_host_block cb;
cb.host_name = US"";
cb.host_address = sub[0];
/* If the host address starts off ::ffff: it is an IPv6 address in
IPv4-compatible mode. Find the IPv4 part for checking against IPv4
addresses. */
cb.host_ipv4 = (Ustrncmp(cb.host_address, "::ffff:", 7) == 0)?
cb.host_address + 7 : cb.host_address;
rc = match_check_list(
&sub[1], /* the list */
0, /* separator character */
&hostlist_anchor, /* anchor pointer */
&nullcache, /* cache pointer */
check_host, /* function for testing */
&cb, /* argument for function */
MCL_HOST, /* type of check */
sub[0], /* text for debugging */
NULL); /* where to pass back data */
}
goto MATCHED_SOMETHING;
case ECOND_MATCH_LOCAL_PART:
rc = match_isinlist(sub[0], &(sub[1]), 0, &localpartlist_anchor, NULL,
MCL_LOCALPART + MCL_NOEXPAND, TRUE, NULL);
/* Fall through */
/* VVVVVVVVVVVV */
MATCHED_SOMETHING:
switch(rc)
{
case OK:
tempcond = TRUE;
break;
case FAIL:
tempcond = FALSE;
break;
case DEFER:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("unable to complete match "
"against \"%s\": %s", sub[1], search_error_message);
return NULL;
}
break;
/* Various "encrypted" comparisons. If the second string starts with
"{" then an encryption type is given. Default to crypt() or crypt16()
(build-time choice). */
/* }-for-text-editors */
case ECOND_CRYPTEQ:
#ifndef SUPPORT_CRYPTEQ
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#else
if (strncmpic(sub[1], US"{md5}", 5) == 0)
{
int sublen = Ustrlen(sub[1]+5);
md5 base;
uschar digest[16];
md5_start(&base);
md5_end(&base, (uschar *)sub[0], Ustrlen(sub[0]), digest);
/* If the length that we are comparing against is 24, the MD5 digest
is expressed as a base64 string. This is the way LDAP does it. However,
some other software uses a straightforward hex representation. We assume
this if the length is 32. Other lengths fail. */
if (sublen == 24)
{
uschar *coded = auth_b64encode((uschar *)digest, 16);
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: using MD5+B64 hashing\n"
" subject=%s\n crypted=%s\n", coded, sub[1]+5);
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(coded, sub[1]+5) == 0);
}
else if (sublen == 32)
{
int i;
uschar coded[36];
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) sprintf(CS (coded+2*i), "%02X", digest[i]);
coded[32] = 0;
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: using MD5+hex hashing\n"
" subject=%s\n crypted=%s\n", coded, sub[1]+5);
tempcond = (strcmpic(coded, sub[1]+5) == 0);
}
else
{
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: length for MD5 not 24 or 32: "
"fail\n crypted=%s\n", sub[1]+5);
tempcond = FALSE;
}
}
else if (strncmpic(sub[1], US"{sha1}", 6) == 0)
{
int sublen = Ustrlen(sub[1]+6);
sha1 base;
uschar digest[20];
sha1_start(&base);
sha1_end(&base, (uschar *)sub[0], Ustrlen(sub[0]), digest);
/* If the length that we are comparing against is 28, assume the SHA1
digest is expressed as a base64 string. If the length is 40, assume a
straightforward hex representation. Other lengths fail. */
if (sublen == 28)
{
uschar *coded = auth_b64encode((uschar *)digest, 20);
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: using SHA1+B64 hashing\n"
" subject=%s\n crypted=%s\n", coded, sub[1]+6);
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(coded, sub[1]+6) == 0);
}
else if (sublen == 40)
{
int i;
uschar coded[44];
for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) sprintf(CS (coded+2*i), "%02X", digest[i]);
coded[40] = 0;
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: using SHA1+hex hashing\n"
" subject=%s\n crypted=%s\n", coded, sub[1]+6);
tempcond = (strcmpic(coded, sub[1]+6) == 0);
}
else
{
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: length for SHA-1 not 28 or 40: "
"fail\n crypted=%s\n", sub[1]+6);
tempcond = FALSE;
}
}
else /* {crypt} or {crypt16} and non-{ at start */
/* }-for-text-editors */
{
int which = 0;
uschar *coded;
if (strncmpic(sub[1], US"{crypt}", 7) == 0)
{
sub[1] += 7;
which = 1;
}
else if (strncmpic(sub[1], US"{crypt16}", 9) == 0)
{
sub[1] += 9;
which = 2;
}
else if (sub[1][0] == '{') /* }-for-text-editors */
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("unknown encryption mechanism "
"in \"%s\"", sub[1]);
return NULL;
}
switch(which)
{
case 0: coded = US DEFAULT_CRYPT(CS sub[0], CS sub[1]); break;
case 1: coded = US crypt(CS sub[0], CS sub[1]); break;
default: coded = US crypt16(CS sub[0], CS sub[1]); break;
}
#define STR(s) # s
#define XSTR(s) STR(s)
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: using %s()\n"
" subject=%s\n crypted=%s\n",
(which == 0)? XSTR(DEFAULT_CRYPT) : (which == 1)? "crypt" : "crypt16",
coded, sub[1]);
#undef STR
#undef XSTR
/* If the encrypted string contains fewer than two characters (for the
salt), force failure. Otherwise we get false positives: with an empty
string the yield of crypt() is an empty string! */
tempcond = (Ustrlen(sub[1]) < 2)? FALSE :
(Ustrcmp(coded, sub[1]) == 0);
}
break;
#endif /* SUPPORT_CRYPTEQ */
case ECOND_INLIST:
case ECOND_INLISTI:
{
int sep = 0;
uschar *save_iterate_item = iterate_item;
int (*compare)(const uschar *, const uschar *);
tempcond = FALSE;
if (cond_type == ECOND_INLISTI)
compare = strcmpic;
else
compare = (int (*)(const uschar *, const uschar *)) strcmp;
while ((iterate_item = string_nextinlist(&sub[1], &sep, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
if (compare(sub[0], iterate_item) == 0)
{
tempcond = TRUE;
break;
}
iterate_item = save_iterate_item;
}
} /* Switch for comparison conditions */
*yield = tempcond == testfor;
return s; /* End of comparison conditions */
/* and/or: computes logical and/or of several conditions */
case ECOND_AND:
case ECOND_OR:
subcondptr = (yield == NULL)? NULL : &tempcond;
combined_cond = (cond_type == ECOND_AND);
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s++ != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
for (;;)
{
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (*s == '}') break;
if (*s != '{') /* }-for-text-editors */
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("each subcondition "
"inside an \"%s{...}\" condition must be in its own {}", name);
return NULL;
}
if (!(s = eval_condition(s+1, resetok, subcondptr)))
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("%s inside \"%s{...}\" condition",
expand_string_message, name);
return NULL;
}
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (*s++ != '}')
{
/* {-for-text-editors */
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("missing } at end of condition "
"inside \"%s\" group", name);
return NULL;
}
if (yield != NULL)
{
if (cond_type == ECOND_AND)
{
combined_cond &= tempcond;
if (!combined_cond) subcondptr = NULL; /* once false, don't */
} /* evaluate any more */
else
{
combined_cond |= tempcond;
if (combined_cond) subcondptr = NULL; /* once true, don't */
} /* evaluate any more */
}
}
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (combined_cond == testfor);
return ++s;
/* forall/forany: iterates a condition with different values */
case ECOND_FORALL:
case ECOND_FORANY:
{
int sep = 0;
uschar *save_iterate_item = iterate_item;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s++ != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
sub[0] = expand_string_internal(s, TRUE, &s, (yield == NULL), TRUE, resetok);
if (sub[0] == NULL) return NULL;
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (*s++ != '}') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_END;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s++ != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
sub[1] = s;
/* Call eval_condition once, with result discarded (as if scanning a
"false" part). This allows us to find the end of the condition, because if
the list it empty, we won't actually evaluate the condition for real. */
if (!(s = eval_condition(sub[1], resetok, NULL)))
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("%s inside \"%s\" condition",
expand_string_message, name);
return NULL;
}
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (*s++ != '}')
{
/* {-for-text-editors */
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("missing } at end of condition "
"inside \"%s\"", name);
return NULL;
}
if (yield != NULL) *yield = !testfor;
while ((iterate_item = string_nextinlist(&sub[0], &sep, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
{
DEBUG(D_expand) debug_printf("%s: $item = \"%s\"\n", name, iterate_item);
if (!eval_condition(sub[1], resetok, &tempcond))
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("%s inside \"%s\" condition",
expand_string_message, name);
iterate_item = save_iterate_item;
return NULL;
}
DEBUG(D_expand) debug_printf("%s: condition evaluated to %s\n", name,
tempcond? "true":"false");
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (tempcond == testfor);
if (tempcond == (cond_type == ECOND_FORANY)) break;
}
iterate_item = save_iterate_item;
return s;
}
/* The bool{} expansion condition maps a string to boolean.
The values supported should match those supported by the ACL condition
(acl.c, ACLC_CONDITION) so that we keep to a minimum the different ideas
of true/false. Note that Router "condition" rules have a different
interpretation, where general data can be used and only a few values
map to FALSE.
Note that readconf.c boolean matching, for boolean configuration options,
only matches true/yes/false/no.
The bool_lax{} condition matches the Router logic, which is much more
liberal. */
case ECOND_BOOL:
case ECOND_BOOL_LAX:
{
uschar *sub_arg[1];
uschar *t, *t2;
uschar *ourname;
size_t len;
BOOL boolvalue = FALSE;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
ourname = cond_type == ECOND_BOOL_LAX ? US"bool_lax" : US"bool";
switch(read_subs(sub_arg, 1, 1, &s, yield == NULL, FALSE, ourname, resetok))
{
case 1: expand_string_message = string_sprintf(
"too few arguments or bracketing error for %s",
ourname);
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case 2:
case 3: return NULL;
}
t = sub_arg[0];
while (isspace(*t)) t++;
len = Ustrlen(t);
if (len)
{
/* trailing whitespace: seems like a good idea to ignore it too */
t2 = t + len - 1;
while (isspace(*t2)) t2--;
if (t2 != (t + len))
{
*++t2 = '\0';
len = t2 - t;
}
}
DEBUG(D_expand)
debug_printf("considering %s: %s\n", ourname, len ? t : US"<empty>");
/* logic for the lax case from expand_check_condition(), which also does
expands, and the logic is both short and stable enough that there should
be no maintenance burden from replicating it. */
if (len == 0)
boolvalue = FALSE;
else if (*t == '-'
? Ustrspn(t+1, "0123456789") == len-1
: Ustrspn(t, "0123456789") == len)
{
boolvalue = (Uatoi(t) == 0) ? FALSE : TRUE;
/* expand_check_condition only does a literal string "0" check */
if ((cond_type == ECOND_BOOL_LAX) && (len > 1))
boolvalue = TRUE;
}
else if (strcmpic(t, US"true") == 0 || strcmpic(t, US"yes") == 0)
boolvalue = TRUE;
else if (strcmpic(t, US"false") == 0 || strcmpic(t, US"no") == 0)
boolvalue = FALSE;
else if (cond_type == ECOND_BOOL_LAX)
boolvalue = TRUE;
else
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("unrecognised boolean "
"value \"%s\"", t);
return NULL;
}
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (boolvalue == testfor);
return s;
}
/* Unknown condition */
default:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("unknown condition \"%s\"", name);
return NULL;
} /* End switch on condition type */
/* Missing braces at start and end of data */
COND_FAILED_CURLY_START:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("missing { after \"%s\"", name);
return NULL;
COND_FAILED_CURLY_END:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("missing } at end of \"%s\" condition",
name);
return NULL;
/* A condition requires code that is not compiled */
#if !defined(SUPPORT_PAM) || !defined(RADIUS_CONFIG_FILE) || \
!defined(LOOKUP_LDAP) || !defined(CYRUS_PWCHECK_SOCKET) || \
!defined(SUPPORT_CRYPTEQ) || !defined(CYRUS_SASLAUTHD_SOCKET)
COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("support for \"%s\" not compiled",
name);
return NULL;
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 165,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void customLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
V8TestObjectPython::customLongAttributeAttributeGetterCustom(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fixup_vary(request_rec *r)
{
apr_array_header_t *varies;
varies = apr_array_make(r->pool, 5, sizeof(char *));
/* Extract all Vary fields from the headers_out, separate each into
* its comma-separated fieldname values, and then add them to varies
* if not already present in the array.
*/
apr_table_do((int (*)(void *, const char *, const char *))uniq_field_values,
(void *) varies, r->headers_out, "Vary", NULL);
/* If we found any, replace old Vary fields with unique-ified value */
if (varies->nelts > 0) {
apr_table_setn(r->headers_out, "Vary",
apr_array_pstrcat(r->pool, varies, ','));
}
}
Commit Message: Limit accepted chunk-size to 2^63-1 and be strict about chunk-ext
authorized characters.
Submitted by: Yann Ylavic
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684513 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 43,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sc_valid_oid(const struct sc_object_id *oid)
{
int ii;
if (!oid)
return 0;
if (oid->value[0] == -1 || oid->value[1] == -1)
return 0;
if (oid->value[0] > 2 || oid->value[1] > 39)
return 0;
for (ii=0;ii<SC_MAX_OBJECT_ID_OCTETS;ii++)
if (oid->value[ii])
break;
if (ii==SC_MAX_OBJECT_ID_OCTETS)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kdc_process_for_user(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_pa_for_user *for_user;
krb5_data req_data;
req_data.length = pa_data->length;
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_for_user(&req_data, &for_user);
if (code) {
*status = "DECODE_PA_FOR_USER";
return code;
}
code = verify_for_user_checksum(kdc_context, tgs_session, for_user);
if (code) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return code;
}
*s4u_x509_user = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user));
if (*s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return ENOMEM;
}
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user = for_user->user;
for_user->user = NULL;
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Ignore password attributes for S4U2Self requests
For consistency with Windows KDCs, allow protocol transition to work
even if the password has expired or needs changing.
Also, when looking up an enterprise principal with an AS request,
treat ERR_KEY_EXP as confirmation that the client is present in the
realm.
[[email protected]: added comment in kdc_process_s4u2self_req(); edited
commit message]
ticket: 8763 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.17
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 75,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int connectSocketNative(JNIEnv *env, jobject object, jbyteArray address, jint type,
jbyteArray uuidObj, jint channel, jint flag) {
jbyte *addr = NULL, *uuid = NULL;
int socket_fd;
bt_status_t status;
if (!sBluetoothSocketInterface) return -1;
addr = env->GetByteArrayElements(address, NULL);
if (!addr) {
ALOGE("failed to get Bluetooth device address");
goto Fail;
}
if(uuidObj != NULL) {
uuid = env->GetByteArrayElements(uuidObj, NULL);
if (!uuid) {
ALOGE("failed to get uuid");
goto Fail;
}
}
if ( (status = sBluetoothSocketInterface->connect((bt_bdaddr_t *) addr, (btsock_type_t) type,
(const uint8_t*) uuid, channel, &socket_fd, flag)) != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Socket connection failed: %d", status);
goto Fail;
}
if (socket_fd < 0) {
ALOGE("Fail to create file descriptor on socket fd");
goto Fail;
}
env->ReleaseByteArrayElements(address, addr, 0);
env->ReleaseByteArrayElements(uuidObj, uuid, 0);
return socket_fd;
Fail:
if (addr) env->ReleaseByteArrayElements(address, addr, 0);
if (uuid) env->ReleaseByteArrayElements(uuidObj, uuid, 0);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 163,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: g_NPN_GetURL(NPP instance, const char *url, const char *target)
{
if (!thread_check()) {
npw_printf("WARNING: NPN_GetURL not called from the main thread\n");
return NPERR_INVALID_INSTANCE_ERROR;
}
if (instance == NULL)
return NPERR_INVALID_INSTANCE_ERROR;
PluginInstance *plugin = PLUGIN_INSTANCE(instance);
if (plugin == NULL)
return NPERR_INVALID_INSTANCE_ERROR;
D(bugiI("NPN_GetURL instance=%p\n", instance));
npw_plugin_instance_ref(plugin);
NPError ret = invoke_NPN_GetURL(plugin, url, target);
npw_plugin_instance_unref(plugin);
D(bugiD("NPN_GetURL return: %d [%s]\n", ret, string_of_NPError(ret)));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromotingInstance::NotifyClientDimensions(int width, int height) {
if (!IsConnected()) {
return;
}
protocol::ClientDimensions client_dimensions;
client_dimensions.set_width(width);
client_dimensions.set_height(height);
host_connection_->host_stub()->NotifyClientDimensions(client_dimensions);
}
Commit Message: Restrict the Chromoting client plugin to use by extensions & apps.
BUG=160456
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11365276
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void spl_array_it_dtor(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_it *iterator = (spl_array_it *)iter;
zend_user_it_invalidate_current(iter TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor((zval**)&iterator->intern.it.data);
efree(iterator);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int wc_ecc_cmp_param(const char* curveParam,
const byte* param, word32 paramSz)
{
int err = MP_OKAY;
mp_int a, b;
if (param == NULL || curveParam == NULL)
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
if ((err = mp_init_multi(&a, &b, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != MP_OKAY)
return err;
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(&a, param, paramSz);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_read_radix(&b, curveParam, MP_RADIX_HEX);
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if (mp_cmp(&a, &b) != MP_EQ) {
err = -1;
} else {
err = MP_EQ;
}
}
mp_clear(&a);
mp_clear(&b);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 81,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string_num_dots(const char *s) {
int count = 0;
while ((s = strchr(s, '.'))) {
s++;
count++;
}
return count;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned char *DecodeImage(Image *blob,Image *image,
size_t bytes_per_line,const unsigned int bits_per_pixel,size_t *extent,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p,
*q;
size_t
bytes_per_pixel,
length,
row_bytes,
scanline_length,
width;
ssize_t
count,
j,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels,
*scanline;
/*
Determine pixel buffer size.
*/
if (bits_per_pixel <= 8)
bytes_per_line&=0x7fff;
width=image->columns;
bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (bits_per_pixel == 16)
{
bytes_per_pixel=2;
width*=2;
}
else
if (bits_per_pixel == 32)
width*=image->alpha_trait ? 4 : 3;
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=width;
row_bytes=(size_t) (image->columns | 0x8000);
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
row_bytes=(size_t) ((4*image->columns) | 0x8000);
/*
Allocate pixel and scanline buffer.
*/
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->rows,row_bytes*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return((unsigned char *) NULL);
*extent=row_bytes*image->rows*sizeof(*pixels);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(pixels,0,*extent);
scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_bytes,2*
sizeof(*scanline));
if (scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return((unsigned char *) NULL);
if (bytes_per_line < 8)
{
/*
Pixels are already uncompressed.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=pixels+y*width*GetPixelChannels(image);;
number_pixels=bytes_per_line;
count=ReadBlob(blob,(size_t) number_pixels,scanline);
if (count != (ssize_t) number_pixels)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"UnableToUncompressImage","`%s'",
image->filename);
break;
}
p=ExpandBuffer(scanline,&number_pixels,bits_per_pixel);
if ((q+number_pixels) > (pixels+(*extent)))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"UnableToUncompressImage","`%s'",
image->filename);
break;
}
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,p,(size_t) number_pixels);
}
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
return(pixels);
}
/*
Uncompress RLE pixels into uncompressed pixel buffer.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=pixels+y*width;
if (bytes_per_line > 200)
scanline_length=ReadBlobMSBShort(blob);
else
scanline_length=1UL*ReadBlobByte(blob);
if (scanline_length >= row_bytes)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"UnableToUncompressImage","`%s'",image->filename);
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(blob,scanline_length,scanline);
if (count != (ssize_t) scanline_length)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"UnableToUncompressImage","`%s'",image->filename);
break;
}
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) scanline_length; )
if ((scanline[j] & 0x80) == 0)
{
length=(size_t) ((scanline[j] & 0xff)+1);
number_pixels=length*bytes_per_pixel;
p=ExpandBuffer(scanline+j+1,&number_pixels,bits_per_pixel);
if ((q-pixels+number_pixels) <= *extent)
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,p,(size_t) number_pixels);
q+=number_pixels;
j+=(ssize_t) (length*bytes_per_pixel+1);
}
else
{
length=(size_t) (((scanline[j] ^ 0xff) & 0xff)+2);
number_pixels=bytes_per_pixel;
p=ExpandBuffer(scanline+j+1,&number_pixels,bits_per_pixel);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
{
if ((q-pixels+number_pixels) <= *extent)
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,p,(size_t) number_pixels);
q+=number_pixels;
}
j+=(ssize_t) bytes_per_pixel+1;
}
}
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
return(pixels);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 74,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int compact_input_order(void) {
int i;
dbg_printf("\nCompacting element input order: %u elements\n", cache.input_count);
for ( i=0; i< cache.input_count; i++ ) {
dbg_printf("%i: type: %u, length: %u\n",
i, cache.input_order[i].type, cache.input_order[i].length);
if ( (cache.input_order[i].type == SKIP_ELEMENT) && (cache.input_order[i].length == DYN_FIELD_LENGTH) ) {
dbg_printf("Dynamic length field: %u\n", cache.input_order[i].type);
continue;
}
while ( (i+1) < cache.input_count &&
(cache.input_order[i].type == SKIP_ELEMENT) && (cache.input_order[i].length != DYN_FIELD_LENGTH) &&
(cache.input_order[i+1].type == SKIP_ELEMENT) && (cache.input_order[i+1].length != DYN_FIELD_LENGTH)) {
int j;
dbg_printf("%i: type: %u, length: %u\n",
i+1, cache.input_order[i+1].type, cache.input_order[i+1].length);
dbg_printf("Merge order %u and %u\n", i, i+1);
cache.input_order[i].type = SKIP_ELEMENT;
cache.input_order[i].length += cache.input_order[i+1].length;
for ( j=i+1; (j+1)<cache.input_count; j++) {
cache.input_order[j] = cache.input_order[j+1];
}
cache.input_count--;
}
}
#ifdef DEVEL
printf("\nCompacted input order table: count: %u\n", cache.input_count);
for ( i=0; i< cache.input_count; i++ ) {
dbg_printf("%i: Type: %u, Length: %u\n",
i, cache.input_order[i].type, cache.input_order[i].length);
}
printf("\n");
#endif
for ( i=0; i< cache.input_count; i++ ) {
if ( cache.input_order[i].type != SKIP_ELEMENT )
return 1;
}
return 0;
} // End of compact_input_order
Commit Message: Fix potential unsigned integer underflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 88,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::ResourceDispatcherHostImpl()
: download_file_manager_(new DownloadFileManager(NULL)),
save_file_manager_(new SaveFileManager()),
request_id_(-1),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(weak_factory_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(ssl_delegate_weak_factory_(this)),
is_shutdown_(false),
max_outstanding_requests_cost_per_process_(
kMaxOutstandingRequestsCostPerProcess),
filter_(NULL),
delegate_(NULL),
allow_cross_origin_auth_prompt_(false) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!g_resource_dispatcher_host);
g_resource_dispatcher_host = this;
GetContentClient()->browser()->ResourceDispatcherHostCreated();
ANNOTATE_BENIGN_RACE(
&last_user_gesture_time_,
"We don't care about the precise value, see http://crbug.com/92889");
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&appcache::AppCacheInterceptor::EnsureRegistered));
update_load_states_timer_.reset(
new base::RepeatingTimer<ResourceDispatcherHostImpl>());
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MessageLoop::MessageLoop(std::unique_ptr<MessagePump> pump)
: MessageLoop(TYPE_CUSTOM, BindOnce(&ReturnPump, Passed(&pump))) {
BindToCurrentThread();
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
[email protected]
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: danakj <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, addAll)
{
zval *obj;
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = Z_SPLOBJSTORAGE_P(getThis());
spl_SplObjectStorage *other;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "O", &obj, spl_ce_SplObjectStorage) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
other = Z_SPLOBJSTORAGE_P(obj);
spl_object_storage_addall(intern, getThis(), other);
RETURN_LONG(zend_hash_num_elements(&intern->storage));
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool SplObjectStorage::removeAll(SplObjectStorage $os)
Commit Message: Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::enableNativeBuffers(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL graphic, OMX_BOOL enable) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CLOG_CONFIG(enableNativeBuffers, "%s:%u%s, %d", portString(portIndex), portIndex,
graphic ? ", graphic" : "", enable);
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
graphic ? "OMX.google.android.index.enableAndroidNativeBuffers"
: "OMX.google.android.index.allocateNativeHandle");
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.enable = enable;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable);
if (!graphic) {
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] =
enable ? kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle : kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
} else if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeUnknown) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
}
}
} else {
CLOG_ERROR_IF(enable, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
if (!graphic) {
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
if (property_get("media.mediadrmservice.enable", value, NULL)
&& (!strcmp("1", value) || !strcasecmp("true", value))) {
CLOG_CONFIG(enableNativeBuffers, "system property override: using native-handles");
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle;
} else if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeUnknown) {
mSecureBufferType[portIndex] = kSecureBufferTypeOpaque;
}
err = OMX_ErrorNone;
}
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: OMXNodeInstance: sanity check portIndex.
Bug: 31385713
Change-Id: Ib91d00eb5cc8c51c84d37f5d36d6b7ca594d201f
(cherry picked from commit f80a1f5075a7c6e1982d37c68bfed7c9a611bb20)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 173,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestLifecycleUnit::TestLifecycleUnit(content::Visibility visibility)
: LifecycleUnitBase(visibility) {}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_number(char *p)
{
while (*p) {
if (!isdigit(*p))
return FALSE;
++p;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *MakeNewMapValue(STRING2PTR value, const char *mapstr)
{
char *ptr;
char *newtitle = NULL;
StrAllocCopy(newtitle, "[");
StrAllocCat(newtitle, mapstr); /* ISMAP or USEMAP */
if (verbose_img && non_empty(value[HTML_IMG_SRC])) {
StrAllocCat(newtitle, ":");
ptr = strrchr(value[HTML_IMG_SRC], '/');
if (!ptr) {
StrAllocCat(newtitle, value[HTML_IMG_SRC]);
} else {
StrAllocCat(newtitle, ptr + 1);
}
}
StrAllocCat(newtitle, "]");
return newtitle;
}
Commit Message: snapshot of project "lynx", label v2-8-9dev_15b
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_set_asm_flags (png_structp png_ptr, png_uint_32 asm_flags)
{
/* Obsolete as of libpng-1.2.20 and will be removed from libpng-1.4.0 */
if (png_ptr != NULL)
png_ptr->asm_flags = 0;
PNG_UNUSED(asm_flags) /* Quiet the compiler */
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InputMsgWatcher::~InputMsgWatcher() {
render_widget_host_->RemoveInputEventObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void delete_item(struct pppoe_net *pn, __be16 sid,
char *addr, int ifindex)
{
write_lock_bh(&pn->hash_lock);
__delete_item(pn, sid, addr, ifindex);
write_unlock_bh(&pn->hash_lock);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void cJSON_AddItemToObject( cJSON *object, const char *string, cJSON *item )
{
if ( ! item )
return;
if ( item->string )
cJSON_free( item->string );
item->string = cJSON_strdup( string );
cJSON_AddItemToArray( object, item );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct fsnotify_event *inotify_merge(struct list_head *list,
struct fsnotify_event *event)
{
struct fsnotify_event_holder *last_holder;
struct fsnotify_event *last_event;
/* and the list better be locked by something too */
spin_lock(&event->lock);
last_holder = list_entry(list->prev, struct fsnotify_event_holder, event_list);
last_event = last_holder->event;
if (event_compare(last_event, event))
fsnotify_get_event(last_event);
else
last_event = NULL;
spin_unlock(&event->lock);
return last_event;
}
Commit Message: inotify: fix double free/corruption of stuct user
On an error path in inotify_init1 a normal user can trigger a double
free of struct user. This is a regression introduced by a2ae4cc9a16e
("inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure").
We fix this by making sure that if a group exists the user reference is
dropped when the group is cleaned up. We should not explictly drop the
reference on error and also drop the reference when the group is cleaned
up.
The new lifetime rules are that an inotify group lives from
inotify_new_group to the last fsnotify_put_group. Since the struct user
and inotify_devs are directly tied to this lifetime they are only
changed/updated in those two locations. We get rid of all special
casing of struct user or user->inotify_devs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] (2.6.37 and up)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::CloneDataFromDocument(const Document& other) {
SetCompatibilityMode(other.GetCompatibilityMode());
SetEncodingData(other.encoding_data_);
SetContextFeatures(other.GetContextFeatures());
SetSecurityOrigin(other.GetSecurityOrigin()->IsolatedCopy());
SetMimeType(other.contentType());
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutSize RenderBox::topLeftLocationOffset() const
{
RenderBlock* containerBlock = containingBlock();
if (!containerBlock || containerBlock == this)
return locationOffset();
LayoutRect rect(frameRect());
containerBlock->flipForWritingMode(rect); // FIXME: This is wrong if we are an absolutely positioned object enclosed by a relative-positioned inline.
return LayoutSize(rect.x(), rect.y());
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t ZSTD_compressBound(size_t srcSize) {
return ZSTD_COMPRESSBOUND(srcSize);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t sizeForShareableElementDataWithAttributeCount(unsigned count)
{
return sizeof(ShareableElementData) + sizeof(Attribute) * count;
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLHeadElement* Document::head()
{
Node* de = documentElement();
if (!de)
return 0;
for (Node* e = de->firstChild(); e; e = e->nextSibling())
if (e->hasTagName(headTag))
return static_cast<HTMLHeadElement*>(e);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double AudioTrack::GetSamplingRate() const { return m_rate; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::AdjustUtilityServiceProcessCommandLine(
const service_manager::Identity& identity,
base::CommandLine* command_line) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
bool copy_switches = false;
if (identity.name() == ash::mojom::kServiceName) {
copy_switches = true;
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kMessageLoopTypeUi);
}
if (ash_service_registry::IsAshRelatedServiceName(identity.name())) {
copy_switches = true;
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kMashServiceName,
identity.name());
}
if (identity.name() == viz::mojom::kVizServiceName) {
#if defined(USE_OZONE)
if (ui::OzonePlatform::EnsureInstance()->GetMessageLoopTypeForGpu() ==
base::MessageLoop::TYPE_UI) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kMessageLoopTypeUi);
}
#endif
content::GpuDataManager::GetInstance()->AppendGpuCommandLine(command_line);
}
if (copy_switches) {
for (const auto& sw : base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitches())
command_line->AppendSwitchNative(sw.first, sw.second);
}
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (identity.name() == video_capture::mojom::kServiceName ||
identity.name() == audio::mojom::kServiceName)
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kMessageLoopTypeUi);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ap_device_release(struct device *dev)
{
struct ap_device *ap_dev = to_ap_dev(dev);
kfree(ap_dev);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0)
{
unsigned int hook;
/* No recursion; use packet counter to save back ptrs (reset
to 0 as we leave), and comefrom to save source hook bitmask */
for (hook = 0; hook < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; hook++) {
unsigned int pos = newinfo->hook_entry[hook];
struct ipt_entry *e = (struct ipt_entry *)(entry0 + pos);
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << hook)))
continue;
/* Set initial back pointer. */
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
for (;;) {
const struct xt_standard_target *t
= (void *)ipt_get_target_c(e);
int visited = e->comefrom & (1 << hook);
if (e->comefrom & (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS)) {
pr_err("iptables: loop hook %u pos %u %08X.\n",
hook, pos, e->comefrom);
return 0;
}
e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
/* Unconditional return/END. */
if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->ip)) ||
visited) {
unsigned int oldpos, size;
if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) {
duprintf("mark_source_chains: bad "
"negative verdict (%i)\n",
t->verdict);
return 0;
}
/* Return: backtrack through the last
big jump. */
do {
e->comefrom ^= (1<<NF_INET_NUMHOOKS);
#ifdef DEBUG_IP_FIREWALL_USER
if (e->comefrom
& (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS)) {
duprintf("Back unset "
"on hook %u "
"rule %u\n",
hook, pos);
}
#endif
oldpos = pos;
pos = e->counters.pcnt;
e->counters.pcnt = 0;
/* We're at the start. */
if (pos == oldpos)
goto next;
e = (struct ipt_entry *)
(entry0 + pos);
} while (oldpos == pos + e->next_offset);
/* Move along one */
size = e->next_offset;
e = (struct ipt_entry *)
(entry0 + pos + size);
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos += size;
} else {
int newpos = t->verdict;
if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
newpos >= 0) {
if (newpos > newinfo->size -
sizeof(struct ipt_entry)) {
duprintf("mark_source_chains: "
"bad verdict (%i)\n",
newpos);
return 0;
}
/* This a jump; chase it. */
duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
pos, newpos);
} else {
/* ... this is a fallthru */
newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
}
e = (struct ipt_entry *)
(entry0 + newpos);
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos = newpos;
}
}
next:
duprintf("Finished chain %u\n", hook);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rehighlight_forbidden_words(int page, GtkTextView *tev)
{
GList *forbidden_words = load_words_from_file(FORBIDDEN_WORDS_BLACKLLIST);
GList *allowed_words = load_words_from_file(FORBIDDEN_WORDS_WHITELIST);
highligh_words_in_textview(page, tev, forbidden_words, allowed_words, /*case sensitive*/false);
list_free_with_free(forbidden_words);
list_free_with_free(allowed_words);
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: off_t size_autodetect(int fhandle) {
off_t es;
u64 bytes;
struct stat stat_buf;
int error;
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H
#ifdef BLKGETSIZE64
DEBUG("looking for export size with ioctl BLKGETSIZE64\n");
if (!ioctl(fhandle, BLKGETSIZE64, &bytes) && bytes) {
return (off_t)bytes;
}
#endif /* BLKGETSIZE64 */
#endif /* HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H */
#endif /* HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H */
DEBUG("looking for fhandle size with fstat\n");
stat_buf.st_size = 0;
error = fstat(fhandle, &stat_buf);
if (!error) {
if(stat_buf.st_size > 0)
return (off_t)stat_buf.st_size;
} else {
err("fstat failed: %m");
}
DEBUG("looking for fhandle size with lseek SEEK_END\n");
es = lseek(fhandle, (off_t)0, SEEK_END);
if (es > ((off_t)0)) {
return es;
} else {
DEBUG2("lseek failed: %d", errno==EBADF?1:(errno==ESPIPE?2:(errno==EINVAL?3:4)));
}
err("Could not find size of exported block device: %m");
return OFFT_MAX;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_branch_stack_sched_in(struct task_struct *prev,
struct task_struct *task)
{
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
struct pmu *pmu;
unsigned long flags;
/* no need to flush branch stack if not changing task */
if (prev == task)
return;
local_irq_save(flags);
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(pmu, &pmus, entry) {
cpuctx = this_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context);
/*
* check if the context has at least one
* event using PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK
*/
if (cpuctx->ctx.nr_branch_stack > 0
&& pmu->flush_branch_stack) {
pmu = cpuctx->ctx.pmu;
perf_ctx_lock(cpuctx, cpuctx->task_ctx);
perf_pmu_disable(pmu);
pmu->flush_branch_stack();
perf_pmu_enable(pmu);
perf_ctx_unlock(cpuctx, cpuctx->task_ctx);
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InspectorPageAgent::applyViewportStyleOverride(StyleResolver* resolver)
{
if (!m_deviceMetricsOverridden || !m_emulateViewportEnabled)
return false;
RefPtr<StyleSheetContents> styleSheet = StyleSheetContents::create(CSSParserContext(UASheetMode));
styleSheet->parseString(String(viewportAndroidUserAgentStyleSheet, sizeof(viewportAndroidUserAgentStyleSheet)));
OwnPtr<RuleSet> ruleSet = RuleSet::create();
ruleSet->addRulesFromSheet(styleSheet.get(), MediaQueryEvaluator("screen"));
resolver->viewportStyleResolver()->collectViewportRules(ruleSet.get(), ViewportStyleResolver::UserAgentOrigin);
return true;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,248 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.