instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ecb_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm));
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int err;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
kernel_fpu_begin();
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
aesni_ecb_enc(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK);
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
kernel_fpu_end();
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::attachToFrame()
{
ASSERT(m_frame);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
{
int ok, ret = 0;
long n;
/* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (n > 0) {
/* should contain no data */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
ret = 1;
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 44,202 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::OnceCallback<void(bool)> BlockingBoolExpectingReply(
base::RunLoop* run_loop,
bool expected_value) {
return base::BindOnce(
[](base::RunLoop* run_loop, bool expected_value, bool value) {
EXPECT_EQ(expected_value, value);
run_loop->Quit();
},
run_loop, expected_value);
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ADDIN_ARGV* dvcman_get_plugin_data(IDRDYNVC_ENTRY_POINTS* pEntryPoints)
{
return ((DVCMAN_ENTRY_POINTS*) pEntryPoints)->args;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID: | 0 | 74,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t sched_power_savings_store(const char *buf, size_t count, int smt)
{
unsigned int level = 0;
if (sscanf(buf, "%u", &level) != 1)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* level is always be positive so don't check for
* level < POWERSAVINGS_BALANCE_NONE which is 0
* What happens on 0 or 1 byte write,
* need to check for count as well?
*/
if (level >= MAX_POWERSAVINGS_BALANCE_LEVELS)
return -EINVAL;
if (smt)
sched_smt_power_savings = level;
else
sched_mc_power_savings = level;
reinit_sched_domains();
return count;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: crm_xml_escape(const char *text)
{
int index;
int changes = 0;
int length = 1 + strlen(text);
char *copy = strdup(text);
/*
* When xmlCtxtReadDoc() parses < and friends in a
* value, it converts them to their human readable
* form.
*
* If one uses xmlNodeDump() to convert it back to a
* string, all is well, because special characters are
* converted back to their escape sequences.
*
* However xmlNodeDump() is randomly dog slow, even with the same
* input. So we need to replicate the escapeing in our custom
* version so that the result can be re-parsed by xmlCtxtReadDoc()
* when necessary.
*/
for (index = 0; index < length; index++) {
switch (copy[index]) {
case 0:
break;
case '<':
copy = crm_xml_escape_shuffle(copy, index, &length, "<");
changes++;
break;
case '>':
copy = crm_xml_escape_shuffle(copy, index, &length, ">");
changes++;
break;
case '"':
copy = crm_xml_escape_shuffle(copy, index, &length, """);
changes++;
break;
case '\'':
copy = crm_xml_escape_shuffle(copy, index, &length, "'");
changes++;
break;
case '&':
copy = crm_xml_escape_shuffle(copy, index, &length, "&");
changes++;
break;
case '\t':
/* Might as well just expand to a few spaces... */
copy = crm_xml_escape_shuffle(copy, index, &length, " ");
changes++;
break;
case '\n':
/* crm_trace("Convert: \\%.3o", copy[index]); */
copy = crm_xml_escape_shuffle(copy, index, &length, "\\n");
changes++;
break;
case '\r':
copy = crm_xml_escape_shuffle(copy, index, &length, "\\r");
changes++;
break;
/* For debugging...
case '\\':
crm_trace("Passthrough: \\%c", copy[index+1]);
break;
*/
default:
/* Check for and replace non-printing characters with their octal equivalent */
if(copy[index] < ' ' || copy[index] > '~') {
char *replace = crm_strdup_printf("\\%.3o", copy[index]);
/* crm_trace("Convert to octal: \\%.3o", copy[index]); */
copy = crm_xml_escape_shuffle(copy, index, &length, replace);
free(replace);
changes++;
}
}
}
if (changes) {
crm_trace("Dumped '%s'", copy);
}
return copy;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xen_netbk_get_extras(struct xenvif *vif,
struct xen_netif_extra_info *extras,
int work_to_do)
{
struct xen_netif_extra_info extra;
RING_IDX cons = vif->tx.req_cons;
do {
if (unlikely(work_to_do-- <= 0)) {
netdev_dbg(vif->dev, "Missing extra info\n");
return -EBADR;
}
memcpy(&extra, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons),
sizeof(extra));
if (unlikely(!extra.type ||
extra.type >= XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_TYPE_MAX)) {
vif->tx.req_cons = ++cons;
netdev_dbg(vif->dev,
"Invalid extra type: %d\n", extra.type);
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(&extras[extra.type - 1], &extra, sizeof(extra));
vif->tx.req_cons = ++cons;
} while (extra.flags & XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_FLAG_MORE);
return work_to_do;
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: shutdown the ring if it contains garbage.
A buggy or malicious frontend should not be able to confuse netback.
If we spot anything which is not as it should be then shutdown the
device and don't try to continue with the ring in a potentially
hostile state. Well behaved and non-hostile frontends will not be
penalised.
As well as making the existing checks for such errors fatal also add a
new check that ensures that there isn't an insane number of requests
on the ring (i.e. more than would fit in the ring). If the ring
contains garbage then previously is was possible to loop over this
insane number, getting an error each time and therefore not generating
any more pending requests and therefore not exiting the loop in
xen_netbk_tx_build_gops for an externded period.
Also turn various netdev_dbg calls which no precipitate a fatal error
into netdev_err, they are rate limited because the device is shutdown
afterwards.
This fixes at least one known DoS/softlockup of the backend domain.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 166,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ndisc_cleanup(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
neigh_sysctl_unregister(&nd_tbl.parms);
#endif
neigh_table_clear(NEIGH_ND_TABLE, &nd_tbl);
unregister_pernet_subsys(&ndisc_net_ops);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 43,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftHEVC::onReset() {
ALOGV("onReset called");
SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::onReset();
mSignalledError = false;
resetDecoder();
resetPlugin();
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 163,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iperf_get_control_socket(struct iperf_test *ipt)
{
return ipt->ctrl_sck;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long read_pmc(int idx)
{
unsigned long val;
switch (idx) {
case 0:
val = mfpmr(PMRN_PMC0);
break;
case 1:
val = mfpmr(PMRN_PMC1);
break;
case 2:
val = mfpmr(PMRN_PMC2);
break;
case 3:
val = mfpmr(PMRN_PMC3);
break;
default:
printk(KERN_ERR "oops trying to read PMC%d\n", idx);
val = 0;
}
return val;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int TextTrack::TrackIndexRelativeToRenderedTracks() {
DCHECK(track_list_);
if (rendered_track_index_ == kInvalidTrackIndex)
rendered_track_index_ =
track_list_->GetTrackIndexRelativeToRenderedTracks(this);
return rendered_track_index_;
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cma_release_port(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv)
{
struct rdma_bind_list *bind_list = id_priv->bind_list;
if (!bind_list)
return;
mutex_lock(&lock);
hlist_del(&id_priv->node);
if (hlist_empty(&bind_list->owners)) {
idr_remove(bind_list->ps, bind_list->port);
kfree(bind_list);
}
mutex_unlock(&lock);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,509 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::uniform2fvCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.uniform2fv()");
return vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf(args, kUniform2v);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_name_to_path(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path,
const char *name, V9fsPath *target)
{
char *buffer;
struct file_handle *fh;
int dirfd, ret, mnt_id;
struct handle_data *data = (struct handle_data *)ctx->private;
/* "." and ".." are not allowed */
if (!strcmp(name, ".") || !strcmp(name, "..")) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
if (dir_path) {
dirfd = open_by_handle(data->mountfd, dir_path->data, O_PATH);
} else {
/* relative to export root */
buffer = rpath(ctx, ".");
dirfd = open(buffer, O_DIRECTORY);
g_free(buffer);
}
if (dirfd < 0) {
return dirfd;
}
fh = g_malloc(sizeof(struct file_handle) + data->handle_bytes);
fh->handle_bytes = data->handle_bytes;
/* add a "./" at the beginning of the path */
buffer = g_strdup_printf("./%s", name);
/* flag = 0 imply don't follow symlink */
ret = name_to_handle(dirfd, buffer, fh, &mnt_id, 0);
if (!ret) {
target->data = (char *)fh;
target->size = sizeof(struct file_handle) + data->handle_bytes;
} else {
g_free(fh);
}
close(dirfd);
g_free(buffer);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport void *AcquireAlignedMemory(const size_t count,const size_t quantum)
{
#define AlignedExtent(size,alignment) \
(((size)+((alignment)-1)) & ~((alignment)-1))
size_t
alignment,
extent,
size;
void
*memory;
if (CheckMemoryOverflow(count,quantum) != MagickFalse)
return((void *) NULL);
memory=NULL;
alignment=CACHE_LINE_SIZE;
size=count*quantum;
extent=AlignedExtent(size,alignment);
if ((size == 0) || (alignment < sizeof(void *)) || (extent < size))
return((void *) NULL);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_POSIX_MEMALIGN)
if (posix_memalign(&memory,alignment,extent) != 0)
memory=NULL;
#elif defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE__ALIGNED_MALLOC)
memory=_aligned_malloc(extent,alignment);
#else
{
void
*p;
extent=(size+alignment-1)+sizeof(void *);
if (extent > size)
{
p=malloc(extent);
if (p != NULL)
{
memory=(void *) AlignedExtent((size_t) p+sizeof(void *),alignment);
*((void **) memory-1)=p;
}
}
}
#endif
return(memory);
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType GetTypeMetrics(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,TypeMetric *metrics,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DrawInfo
*annotate_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PointInfo
offset;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(draw_info != (DrawInfo *) NULL);
assert(draw_info->text != (char *) NULL);
assert(draw_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
annotate_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
annotate_info->render=MagickFalse;
annotate_info->direction=UndefinedDirection;
(void) memset(metrics,0,sizeof(*metrics));
offset.x=0.0;
offset.y=0.0;
status=RenderType(image,annotate_info,&offset,metrics,exception);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(AnnotateEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Metrics: text: %s; "
"width: %g; height: %g; ascent: %g; descent: %g; max advance: %g; "
"bounds: %g,%g %g,%g; origin: %g,%g; pixels per em: %g,%g; "
"underline position: %g; underline thickness: %g",annotate_info->text,
metrics->width,metrics->height,metrics->ascent,metrics->descent,
metrics->max_advance,metrics->bounds.x1,metrics->bounds.y1,
metrics->bounds.x2,metrics->bounds.y2,metrics->origin.x,metrics->origin.y,
metrics->pixels_per_em.x,metrics->pixels_per_em.y,
metrics->underline_position,metrics->underline_thickness);
annotate_info=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate_info);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1589
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 88,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int megasas_alloc_mfi_ctrl_mem(struct megasas_instance *instance)
{
instance->producer = dma_alloc_coherent(&instance->pdev->dev,
sizeof(u32), &instance->producer_h, GFP_KERNEL);
instance->consumer = dma_alloc_coherent(&instance->pdev->dev,
sizeof(u32), &instance->consumer_h, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!instance->producer || !instance->consumer) {
dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev,
"Failed to allocate memory for producer, consumer\n");
return -1;
}
*instance->producer = 0;
*instance->consumer = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted (GFile *file,
GtkWindow *parent_window,
gboolean interactive,
NautilusOpCallback done_callback,
gpointer done_callback_data)
{
GTask *task;
MarkTrustedJob *job;
job = op_job_new (MarkTrustedJob, parent_window);
job->file = g_object_ref (file);
job->interactive = interactive;
job->done_callback = done_callback;
job->done_callback_data = done_callback_data;
task = g_task_new (NULL, NULL, mark_trusted_task_done, job);
g_task_set_task_data (task, job, NULL);
g_task_run_in_thread (task, mark_trusted_task_thread_func);
g_object_unref (task);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 167,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btrfs_insert_dir_item(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, struct btrfs_root
*root, const char *name, int name_len,
struct inode *dir, struct btrfs_key *location,
u8 type, u64 index)
{
int ret = 0;
int ret2 = 0;
struct btrfs_path *path;
struct btrfs_dir_item *dir_item;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
unsigned long name_ptr;
struct btrfs_key key;
struct btrfs_disk_key disk_key;
u32 data_size;
key.objectid = btrfs_ino(dir);
btrfs_set_key_type(&key, BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY);
key.offset = btrfs_name_hash(name, name_len);
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
path->leave_spinning = 1;
btrfs_cpu_key_to_disk(&disk_key, location);
data_size = sizeof(*dir_item) + name_len;
dir_item = insert_with_overflow(trans, root, path, &key, data_size,
name, name_len);
if (IS_ERR(dir_item)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dir_item);
if (ret == -EEXIST)
goto second_insert;
goto out_free;
}
leaf = path->nodes[0];
btrfs_set_dir_item_key(leaf, dir_item, &disk_key);
btrfs_set_dir_type(leaf, dir_item, type);
btrfs_set_dir_data_len(leaf, dir_item, 0);
btrfs_set_dir_name_len(leaf, dir_item, name_len);
btrfs_set_dir_transid(leaf, dir_item, trans->transid);
name_ptr = (unsigned long)(dir_item + 1);
write_extent_buffer(leaf, name, name_ptr, name_len);
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(leaf);
second_insert:
/* FIXME, use some real flag for selecting the extra index */
if (root == root->fs_info->tree_root) {
ret = 0;
goto out_free;
}
btrfs_release_path(path);
ret2 = btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index(trans, root, name, name_len, dir,
&disk_key, type, index);
out_free:
btrfs_free_path(path);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (ret2)
return ret2;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long snd_compr_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct snd_compr_file *data = f->private_data;
struct snd_compr_stream *stream;
int retval = -ENOTTY;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!data))
return -EFAULT;
stream = &data->stream;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!stream))
return -EFAULT;
mutex_lock(&stream->device->lock);
switch (_IOC_NR(cmd)) {
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_IOCTL_VERSION):
retval = put_user(SNDRV_COMPRESS_VERSION,
(int __user *)arg) ? -EFAULT : 0;
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_CAPS):
retval = snd_compr_get_caps(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_CODEC_CAPS):
retval = snd_compr_get_codec_caps(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_PARAMS):
retval = snd_compr_set_params(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_PARAMS):
retval = snd_compr_get_params(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_METADATA):
retval = snd_compr_set_metadata(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_METADATA):
retval = snd_compr_get_metadata(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_TSTAMP):
retval = snd_compr_tstamp(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_AVAIL):
retval = snd_compr_ioctl_avail(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_PAUSE):
retval = snd_compr_pause(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_RESUME):
retval = snd_compr_resume(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_START):
retval = snd_compr_start(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_STOP):
retval = snd_compr_stop(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_DRAIN):
retval = snd_compr_drain(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_PARTIAL_DRAIN):
retval = snd_compr_partial_drain(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_NEXT_TRACK):
retval = snd_compr_next_track(stream);
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&stream->device->lock);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission(
Event* event,
HTMLFormControlElement* submitButton) {
LocalFrame* frame = document().frame();
if (!frame || m_isSubmitting || m_inUserJSSubmitEvent)
return;
if (document().isSandboxed(SandboxForms)) {
document().addConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::create(
SecurityMessageSource, ErrorMessageLevel,
"Blocked form submission to '" + m_attributes.action() +
"' because the form's frame is sandboxed and the 'allow-forms' "
"permission is not set."));
return;
}
bool skipValidation = !document().page() || noValidate();
DCHECK(event);
if (submitButton && submitButton->formNoValidate())
skipValidation = true;
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::FormSubmissionStarted);
if (!skipValidation && !validateInteractively())
return;
bool shouldSubmit;
{
AutoReset<bool> submitEventHandlerScope(&m_inUserJSSubmitEvent, true);
frame->loader().client()->dispatchWillSendSubmitEvent(this);
shouldSubmit =
dispatchEvent(Event::createCancelableBubble(EventTypeNames::submit)) ==
DispatchEventResult::NotCanceled;
}
if (shouldSubmit) {
m_plannedNavigation = nullptr;
submit(event, submitButton);
}
if (!m_plannedNavigation)
return;
AutoReset<bool> submitScope(&m_isSubmitting, true);
scheduleFormSubmission(m_plannedNavigation);
m_plannedNavigation = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Enforce form-action CSP even when form.target is present.
BUG=630332
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2464123004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#429922}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 142,546 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void hinf_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_HintInfoBox *hinf = (GF_HintInfoBox *)s;
gf_free(hinf);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int m_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct proc_mounts *p = proc_mounts(m);
struct mount *r = list_entry(v, struct mount, mnt_list);
return p->show(m, &r->mnt);
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NaClProcessHost::~NaClProcessHost() {
int exit_code;
process_->GetTerminationStatus(&exit_code);
std::string message =
base::StringPrintf("NaCl process exited with status %i (0x%x)",
exit_code, exit_code);
if (exit_code == 0) {
LOG(INFO) << message;
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << message;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < internal_->sockets_for_renderer.size(); i++) {
if (nacl::Close(internal_->sockets_for_renderer[i]) != 0) {
NOTREACHED() << "nacl::Close() failed";
}
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.size(); i++) {
if (nacl::Close(internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr[i]) != 0) {
NOTREACHED() << "nacl::Close() failed";
}
}
if (reply_msg_) {
reply_msg_->set_reply_error();
chrome_render_message_filter_->Send(reply_msg_);
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (process_launched_by_broker_) {
NaClBrokerService::GetInstance()->OnLoaderDied();
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: atm_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int length = h->len;
uint32_t llchdr;
u_int hdrlen = 0;
if (caplen < 1 || length < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
/* Cisco Style NLPID ? */
if (*p == LLC_UI) {
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CNLPID "));
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1, caplen - 1);
return hdrlen;
}
/*
* Must have at least a DSAP, an SSAP, and the first byte of the
* control field.
*/
if (caplen < 3 || length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
/*
* Extract the presumed LLC header into a variable, for quick
* testing.
* Then check for a header that's neither a header for a SNAP
* packet nor an RFC 2684 routed NLPID-formatted PDU nor
* an 802.2-but-no-SNAP IP packet.
*/
llchdr = EXTRACT_24BITS(p);
if (llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_SNAP) &&
llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_ISONS) &&
llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_IP)) {
/*
* XXX - assume 802.6 MAC header from Fore driver.
*
* Unfortunately, the above list doesn't check for
* all known SAPs, doesn't check for headers where
* the source and destination SAP aren't the same,
* and doesn't check for non-UI frames. It also
* runs the risk of an 802.6 MAC header that happens
* to begin with one of those values being
* incorrectly treated as an 802.2 header.
*
* So is that Fore driver still around? And, if so,
* is it still putting 802.6 MAC headers on ATM
* packets? If so, could it be changed to use a
* new DLT_IEEE802_6 value if we added it?
*/
if (caplen < 20 || length < 20) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%08x%08x %08x%08x ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(p),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+12)));
p += 20;
length -= 20;
caplen -= 20;
hdrlen += 20;
}
hdrlen += atm_llc_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (hdrlen);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response InspectorPageAgent::addScriptToEvaluateOnLoad(const String& source,
String* identifier) {
protocol::DictionaryValue* scripts =
state_->getObject(PageAgentState::kPageAgentScriptsToEvaluateOnLoad);
if (!scripts) {
std::unique_ptr<protocol::DictionaryValue> new_scripts =
protocol::DictionaryValue::create();
scripts = new_scripts.get();
state_->setObject(PageAgentState::kPageAgentScriptsToEvaluateOnLoad,
std::move(new_scripts));
}
do {
*identifier = String::Number(++last_script_identifier_);
} while (scripts->get(*identifier));
scripts->setString(*identifier, source);
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MarkingVisitor::RegisterBackingStoreReference(void* slot) {
if (marking_mode_ != kGlobalMarkingWithCompaction)
return;
Heap().RegisterMovingObjectReference(
reinterpret_cast<MovableReference*>(slot));
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XmpFilePtr xmp_files_new()
{
RESET_ERROR;
try {
auto txf = std::unique_ptr<SXMPFiles>(new SXMPFiles());
return reinterpret_cast<XmpFilePtr>(txf.release());
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 16,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bgp_attr_flush_encap(struct attr *attr)
{
if (!attr)
return;
if (attr->encap_subtlvs) {
encap_free(attr->encap_subtlvs);
attr->encap_subtlvs = NULL;
}
#if ENABLE_BGP_VNC
if (attr->vnc_subtlvs) {
encap_free(attr->vnc_subtlvs);
attr->vnc_subtlvs = NULL;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 91,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void saved_tgids_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,340 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(SoapClient, __getFunctions)
{
sdlPtr sdl;
HashPosition pos;
FETCH_THIS_SDL(sdl);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (sdl) {
smart_str buf = {0};
sdlFunctionPtr *function;
array_init(return_value);
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(&sdl->functions, &pos);
while (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(&sdl->functions, (void **)&function, &pos) != FAILURE) {
function_to_string((*function), &buf);
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, buf.c, buf.len, 1);
smart_str_free(&buf);
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(&sdl->functions, &pos);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
pred_fn_ = GetParam();
SetupMacroblock(mb_, mi_, data_array_, kBlockSize, kStride, 1);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vips_foreign_load_gif_scan_image( VipsForeignLoadGif *gif )
{
VipsObjectClass *class = VIPS_OBJECT_GET_CLASS( gif );
GifFileType *file = gif->file;
ColorMapObject *map = file->Image.ColorMap ?
file->Image.ColorMap : file->SColorMap;
GifByteType *extension;
if( DGifGetImageDesc( gif->file ) == GIF_ERROR ) {
vips_foreign_load_gif_error( gif );
return( -1 );
}
/* Check that the frame looks sane. Perhaps giflib checks
* this for us.
*/
if( file->Image.Left < 0 ||
file->Image.Width < 1 ||
file->Image.Width > 10000 ||
file->Image.Left + file->Image.Width > file->SWidth ||
file->Image.Top < 0 ||
file->Image.Height < 1 ||
file->Image.Height > 10000 ||
file->Image.Top + file->Image.Height > file->SHeight ) {
vips_error( class->nickname, "%s", _( "bad frame size" ) );
return( -1 );
}
/* Test for a non-greyscale colourmap for this frame.
*/
if( !gif->has_colour &&
map ) {
int i;
for( i = 0; i < map->ColorCount; i++ )
if( map->Colors[i].Red != map->Colors[i].Green ||
map->Colors[i].Green != map->Colors[i].Blue ) {
gif->has_colour = TRUE;
break;
}
}
/* Step over compressed image data.
*/
do {
if( vips_foreign_load_gif_code_next( gif, &extension ) )
return( -1 );
} while( extension != NULL );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: fetch map after DGifGetImageDesc()
Earlier refactoring broke GIF map fetch.
CWE ID: | 1 | 169,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOLEAN btm_sec_start_encryption (tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec)
{
if (!btsnd_hcic_set_conn_encrypt (p_dev_rec->hci_handle, TRUE))
return(FALSE);
p_dev_rec->sec_state = BTM_SEC_STATE_ENCRYPTING;
return(TRUE);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cma_query_handler(int status, struct ib_sa_path_rec *path_rec,
void *context)
{
struct cma_work *work = context;
struct rdma_route *route;
route = &work->id->id.route;
if (!status) {
route->num_paths = 1;
*route->path_rec = *path_rec;
} else {
work->old_state = RDMA_CM_ROUTE_QUERY;
work->new_state = RDMA_CM_ADDR_RESOLVED;
work->event.event = RDMA_CM_EVENT_ROUTE_ERROR;
work->event.status = status;
}
queue_work(cma_wq, &work->work);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IndexedDBDatabase::Clear(IndexedDBTransaction* transaction,
int64_t object_store_id,
scoped_refptr<IndexedDBCallbacks> callbacks) {
DCHECK(transaction);
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBDatabase::Clear", "txn.id", transaction->id());
DCHECK_NE(transaction->mode(), blink::kWebIDBTransactionModeReadOnly);
if (!ValidateObjectStoreId(object_store_id))
return;
transaction->ScheduleTask(base::BindOnce(&IndexedDBDatabase::ClearOperation,
this, object_store_id, callbacks));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PPB_URLLoader_Impl::LastPluginRefWasDeleted(bool instance_destroyed) {
Resource::LastPluginRefWasDeleted(instance_destroyed);
if (instance_destroyed) {
loader_.reset();
}
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_primary_addr(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_prim prim;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (len != sizeof(struct sctp_prim))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&prim, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_prim)))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, prim.ssp_assoc_id);
if (!asoc)
return -EINVAL;
if (!asoc->peer.primary_path)
return -ENOTCONN;
memcpy(&prim.ssp_addr, &asoc->peer.primary_path->ipaddr,
asoc->peer.primary_path->af_specific->sockaddr_len);
sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_v4map(sp,
(union sctp_addr *)&prim.ssp_addr);
if (copy_to_user(optval, &prim, sizeof(struct sctp_prim)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 35,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UnlockProfileAndHideLoginUI(const base::FilePath profile_path,
InlineLoginHandlerImpl* handler) {
if (!profile_path.empty()) {
ProfileManager* profile_manager = g_browser_process->profile_manager();
if (profile_manager) {
ProfileAttributesEntry* entry;
if (profile_manager->GetProfileAttributesStorage()
.GetProfileAttributesWithPath(profile_path, &entry)) {
entry->SetIsSigninRequired(false);
}
}
}
if (handler)
handler->CloseDialogFromJavascript();
UserManager::Hide();
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void register_sched_domain_sysctl(void)
{
int i, cpu_num = num_possible_cpus();
struct ctl_table *entry = sd_alloc_ctl_entry(cpu_num + 1);
char buf[32];
WARN_ON(sd_ctl_dir[0].child);
sd_ctl_dir[0].child = entry;
if (entry == NULL)
return;
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
snprintf(buf, 32, "cpu%d", i);
entry->procname = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
entry->mode = 0555;
entry->child = sd_alloc_ctl_cpu_table(i);
entry++;
}
WARN_ON(sd_sysctl_header);
sd_sysctl_header = register_sysctl_table(sd_ctl_root);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PanelSettingsMenuModel::ExecuteCommand(int command_id) {
const Extension* extension = panel_->GetExtension();
DCHECK(extension);
Browser* browser = panel_->browser();
switch (command_id) {
case COMMAND_NAME: {
OpenURLParams params(
extension->GetHomepageURL(), Referrer(), NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB,
content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, false);
browser->OpenURL(params);
break;
}
case COMMAND_CONFIGURE:
DCHECK(!extension->options_url().is_empty());
browser->GetProfile()->GetExtensionProcessManager()->OpenOptionsPage(
extension, browser);
break;
case COMMAND_DISABLE:
browser->GetProfile()->GetExtensionService()->DisableExtension(
extension->id());
break;
case COMMAND_UNINSTALL:
extension_uninstall_dialog_.reset(
ExtensionUninstallDialog::Create(browser->GetProfile(), this));
extension_uninstall_dialog_->ConfirmUninstall(extension);
break;
case COMMAND_MANAGE:
browser->ShowOptionsTab(chrome::kExtensionsSubPage);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SWFShape_setRightFillStyle(SWFShape shape, SWFFillStyle fill)
{
ShapeRecord record;
int idx;
if ( shape->isEnded || shape->isMorph )
return;
if(fill == NOFILL)
{
record = addStyleRecord(shape);
record.record.stateChange->rightFill = 0;
record.record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_FILLSTYLE1FLAG;
return;
}
idx = getFillIdx(shape, fill);
if(idx == 0) // fill not present in array
{
SWFFillStyle_addDependency(fill, (SWFCharacter)shape);
if(addFillStyle(shape, fill) < 0)
return;
idx = getFillIdx(shape, fill);
}
else if (idx >= 255 && shape->useVersion == SWF_SHAPE1)
{
SWF_error("Too many fills for SWFShape V1.\n"
"Use a higher SWFShape version\n");
}
record = addStyleRecord(shape);
record.record.stateChange->rightFill = idx;
record.record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_FILLSTYLE1FLAG;
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 89,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: file_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
es_ptr pscratch = esp - 2;
file_enum *pfen = r_ptr(esp - 1, file_enum);
int devlen = esp[-3].value.intval;
gx_io_device *iodev = r_ptr(esp - 4, gx_io_device);
uint len = r_size(pscratch);
uint code;
if (len < devlen)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck); /* not even room for device len */
do {
memcpy((char *)pscratch->value.bytes, iodev->dname, devlen);
code = iodev->procs.enumerate_next(pfen, (char *)pscratch->value.bytes + devlen,
len - devlen);
if (code == ~(uint) 0) { /* all done */
esp -= 5; /* pop proc, pfen, devlen, iodev , mark */
return o_pop_estack;
} else if (code > len) /* overran string */
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
else if (iodev != iodev_default(imemory)
|| (check_file_permissions_reduced(i_ctx_p, (char *)pscratch->value.bytes, code + devlen, "PermitFileReading")) == 0) {
push(1);
ref_assign(op, pscratch);
r_set_size(op, code + devlen);
push_op_estack(file_continue); /* come again */
*++esp = pscratch[2]; /* proc */
return o_push_estack;
}
} while(1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::writeByteArray(size_t len, const uint8_t *val) {
if (!val) {
return writeAligned(-1);
}
status_t ret = writeAligned(len);
if (ret == NO_ERROR) {
ret = write(val, len * sizeof(*val));
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_wddx_push_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name, const XML_Char **atts)
{
st_entry ent;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
if (!strcmp(name, EL_PACKET)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i=0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_VERSION)) {
/* nothing for now */
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING)) {
ent.type = ST_STRING;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent.data) = STR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
Z_STRLEN_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
ent.type = ST_BINARY;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent.data) = STR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
Z_STRLEN_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_CHAR)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_CHAR_CODE) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
char tmp_buf[2];
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "%c", (char)strtol(atts[i+1], NULL, 16));
php_wddx_process_data(user_data, tmp_buf, strlen(tmp_buf));
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER)) {
ent.type = ST_NUMBER;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_LONG;
Z_LVAL_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_VALUE) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
ent.type = ST_BOOLEAN;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_BOOL;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
php_wddx_process_data(user_data, atts[i+1], strlen(atts[i+1]));
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_NULL)) {
ent.type = ST_NULL;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
ZVAL_NULL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY)) {
ent.type = ST_ARRAY;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT)) {
ent.type = ST_STRUCT;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_NAME) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
if (stack->varname) efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = estrdup(atts[i+1]);
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET)) {
int i;
ent.type = ST_RECORDSET;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], "fieldNames") && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
zval *tmp;
char *key;
char *p1, *p2, *endp;
i++;
endp = (char *)atts[i] + strlen(atts[i]);
p1 = (char *)atts[i];
while ((p2 = php_memnstr(p1, ",", sizeof(",")-1, endp)) != NULL) {
key = estrndup(p1, p2 - p1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
array_init(tmp);
add_assoc_zval_ex(ent.data, key, p2 - p1 + 1, tmp);
p1 = p2 + sizeof(",")-1;
efree(key);
}
if (p1 <= endp) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
array_init(tmp);
add_assoc_zval_ex(ent.data, p1, endp - p1 + 1, tmp);
}
break;
}
}
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
int i;
st_entry ent;
ent.type = ST_FIELD;
ent.varname = NULL;
ent.data = NULL;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_NAME) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
st_entry *recordset;
zval **field;
if (wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&recordset) == SUCCESS &&
recordset->type == ST_RECORDSET &&
zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(recordset->data), (char*)atts[i+1], strlen(atts[i+1])+1, (void**)&field) == SUCCESS) {
ent.data = *field;
}
break;
}
}
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
ent.type = ST_DATETIME;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_LONG;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73631 - Invalid read when wddx decodes empty boolean element
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 168,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AudioTrack::AudioTrack(Segment* pSegment, long long element_start,
long long element_size)
: Track(pSegment, element_start, element_size) {}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_time(int ttime)
{
struct tm tm;
tm.tm_sec = 2 * (ttime & 0x1f);
tm.tm_min = (ttime >> 5) & 0x3f;
tm.tm_hour = (ttime >> 11) & 0x1f;
tm.tm_mday = (ttime >> 16) & 0x1f;
tm.tm_mon = ((ttime >> 21) & 0x0f) - 1;
tm.tm_year = ((ttime >> 25) & 0x7f) + 80;
tm.tm_isdst = -1;
return mktime(&tm);
}
Commit Message: Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __dev_addr_add(struct dev_addr_list **list, int *count,
void *addr, int alen, int glbl)
{
struct dev_addr_list *da;
for (da = *list; da != NULL; da = da->next) {
if (memcmp(da->da_addr, addr, da->da_addrlen) == 0 &&
da->da_addrlen == alen) {
if (glbl) {
int old_glbl = da->da_gusers;
da->da_gusers = 1;
if (old_glbl)
return 0;
}
da->da_users++;
return 0;
}
}
da = kzalloc(sizeof(*da), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (da == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(da->da_addr, addr, alen);
da->da_addrlen = alen;
da->da_users = 1;
da->da_gusers = glbl ? 1 : 0;
da->next = *list;
*list = da;
(*count)++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsIT8SetPropertyStr(cmsHANDLE hIT8, const char* Key, const char *Val)
{
cmsIT8* it8 = (cmsIT8*) hIT8;
if (!Val) return FALSE;
if (!*Val) return FALSE;
return AddToList(it8, &GetTable(it8)->HeaderList, Key, NULL, Val, WRITE_STRINGIFY) != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 78,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String PresentationConnection::binaryType() const {
switch (m_binaryType) {
case BinaryTypeBlob:
return "blob";
case BinaryTypeArrayBuffer:
return "arraybuffer";
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return String();
}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, int whole)
{
struct task_io_accounting acct = task->ioac;
unsigned long flags;
if (whole && lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) {
struct task_struct *t = task;
task_io_accounting_add(&acct, &task->signal->ioac);
while_each_thread(task, t)
task_io_accounting_add(&acct, &t->ioac);
unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
}
return sprintf(buffer,
"rchar: %llu\n"
"wchar: %llu\n"
"syscr: %llu\n"
"syscw: %llu\n"
"read_bytes: %llu\n"
"write_bytes: %llu\n"
"cancelled_write_bytes: %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)acct.rchar,
(unsigned long long)acct.wchar,
(unsigned long long)acct.syscr,
(unsigned long long)acct.syscw,
(unsigned long long)acct.read_bytes,
(unsigned long long)acct.write_bytes,
(unsigned long long)acct.cancelled_write_bytes);
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SSLErrorHandler::CompleteTakeNoAction() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(!request_has_been_notified_);
if (request_has_been_notified_)
return;
request_has_been_notified_ = true;
Release();
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<FakeMediaStreamUIProxy> CreateMockUI(bool expect_started) {
std::unique_ptr<MockMediaStreamUIProxy> fake_ui =
std::make_unique<MockMediaStreamUIProxy>();
if (expect_started)
EXPECT_CALL(*fake_ui, MockOnStarted(_));
return fake_ui;
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 173,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileReaderLoader::didReceiveResponse(unsigned long, const ResourceResponse& response)
{
if (response.httpStatusCode() != 200) {
failed(httpStatusCodeToErrorCode(response.httpStatusCode()));
return;
}
unsigned long long length = response.expectedContentLength();
if (length > INT_MAX) {
m_variableLength = true;
if (m_hasRange)
length = 1 + m_rangeEnd - m_rangeStart;
else
length = defaultBufferLength;
}
if (length > numeric_limits<unsigned>::max()) {
failed(FileError::NOT_READABLE_ERR);
return;
}
ASSERT(!m_rawData);
m_rawData = ArrayBuffer::create(static_cast<unsigned>(length), 1);
if (!m_rawData) {
failed(FileError::NOT_READABLE_ERR);
return;
}
m_totalBytes = static_cast<unsigned>(length);
if (m_client)
m_client->didStartLoading();
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void databasesCron(void) {
/* Expire keys by random sampling. Not required for slaves
* as master will synthesize DELs for us. */
if (server.active_expire_enabled && server.masterhost == NULL)
activeExpireCycle(ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_SLOW);
/* Perform hash tables rehashing if needed, but only if there are no
* other processes saving the DB on disk. Otherwise rehashing is bad
* as will cause a lot of copy-on-write of memory pages. */
if (server.rdb_child_pid == -1 && server.aof_child_pid == -1) {
/* We use global counters so if we stop the computation at a given
* DB we'll be able to start from the successive in the next
* cron loop iteration. */
static unsigned int resize_db = 0;
static unsigned int rehash_db = 0;
int dbs_per_call = CRON_DBS_PER_CALL;
int j;
/* Don't test more DBs than we have. */
if (dbs_per_call > server.dbnum) dbs_per_call = server.dbnum;
/* Resize */
for (j = 0; j < dbs_per_call; j++) {
tryResizeHashTables(resize_db % server.dbnum);
resize_db++;
}
/* Rehash */
if (server.activerehashing) {
for (j = 0; j < dbs_per_call; j++) {
int work_done = incrementallyRehash(rehash_db % server.dbnum);
rehash_db++;
if (work_done) {
/* If the function did some work, stop here, we'll do
* more at the next cron loop. */
break;
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 70,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::windowScreenDidChange(PlatformDisplayID displayID)
{
UNUSED_PARAM(displayID);
#if ENABLE(REQUEST_ANIMATION_FRAME)
if (m_scriptedAnimationController)
m_scriptedAnimationController->windowScreenDidChange(displayID);
#endif
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
if (RenderView* view = renderView()) {
if (view->usesCompositing())
view->compositor()->windowScreenDidChange(displayID);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *limit, int *al)
{
int extdatalen = 0;
unsigned char *orig = buf;
unsigned char *ret = buf;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int next_proto_neg_seen;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
#endif
ret += 2;
if (ret >= limit)
return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
int el;
if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
s2n(el, ret);
if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
ret += el;
}
/* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
goto done;
if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
&& s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (using_ecc) {
const unsigned char *plist;
size_t plistlen;
/*
* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
*/
long lenmax;
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
return NULL;
if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
return NULL;
if (plistlen > 255) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
*(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
ret += plistlen;
}
/*
* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
* extension
*/
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
} else {
/*
* if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
* later
*/
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
}
if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
int el;
/* Returns 0 on success!! */
if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
s2n(el, ret);
if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
ret += el;
}
#endif
if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
};
if (limit - ret < 36)
return NULL;
memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
ret += 36;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
s2n(1, ret);
/*-
* Set mode:
* 1: peer may send requests
* 2: peer not allowed to send requests
*/
if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
*(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
else
*(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
const unsigned char *npa;
unsigned int npalen;
int r;
r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
s->
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
s2n(npalen, ret);
memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
ret += npalen;
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
}
#endif
if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
return NULL;
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
/*
* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
* for other cases too.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
else {
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
s2n(3 + len, ret);
s2n(1 + len, ret);
*ret++ = len;
memcpy(ret, selected, len);
ret += len;
}
done:
if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
return orig;
s2n(extdatalen, orig);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_amf_double(AVIOContext *pb, double d)
{
avio_w8(pb, AMF_DATA_TYPE_NUMBER);
avio_wb64(pb, av_double2int(d));
}
Commit Message: avformat/flvenc: Check audio packet size
Fixes: Assertion failure
Fixes: assert_flvenc.c:941_1.swf
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 79,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void webkit_web_view_drag_leave(GtkWidget* widget, GdkDragContext* context, guint time)
{
WebKitWebView* webView = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(widget);
WebKitWebViewPrivate* priv = webView->priv;
if (!priv->droppingContexts.contains(context))
return;
g_timeout_add(0, reinterpret_cast<GSourceFunc>(doDragLeaveLater), priv->droppingContexts.get(context));
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
{
int errno;
char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
return -EINVAL;
down_write(&uts_sem);
errno = -EFAULT;
if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
struct new_utsname *u = utsname();
memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len);
memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len);
errno = 0;
}
uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_HOSTNAME);
up_write(&uts_sem);
return errno;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 162,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoFramebufferTexture2DMultisample(
GLenum target, GLenum attachment, GLenum textarget,
GLuint client_texture_id, GLint level, GLsizei samples) {
DoFramebufferTexture2DCommon(
"glFramebufferTexture2DMultisample", target, attachment,
textarget, client_texture_id, level, samples);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nf_tables_getgen(struct sock *nlsk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
const struct nlattr * const nla[])
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct sk_buff *skb2;
int err;
skb2 = alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb2 == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
err = nf_tables_fill_gen_info(skb2, net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
nlh->nlmsg_seq);
if (err < 0)
goto err;
return nlmsg_unicast(nlsk, skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
err:
kfree_skb(skb2);
return err;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 57,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sco_conn_ready(struct sco_conn *conn)
{
struct sock *parent;
struct sock *sk = conn->sk;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
if (sk) {
sco_sock_clear_timer(sk);
bh_lock_sock(sk);
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
} else {
sco_conn_lock(conn);
if (!conn->hcon) {
sco_conn_unlock(conn);
return;
}
parent = sco_get_sock_listen(&conn->hcon->src);
if (!parent) {
sco_conn_unlock(conn);
return;
}
bh_lock_sock(parent);
sk = sco_sock_alloc(sock_net(parent), NULL,
BTPROTO_SCO, GFP_ATOMIC, 0);
if (!sk) {
bh_unlock_sock(parent);
sco_conn_unlock(conn);
return;
}
sco_sock_init(sk, parent);
bacpy(&sco_pi(sk)->src, &conn->hcon->src);
bacpy(&sco_pi(sk)->dst, &conn->hcon->dst);
hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
__sco_chan_add(conn, sk, parent);
if (test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(parent)->flags))
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT2;
else
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
/* Wake up parent */
parent->sk_data_ready(parent);
bh_unlock_sock(parent);
sco_conn_unlock(conn);
}
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Validate socket address length in sco_sock_bind().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 57,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: next_nonnull_line(Line *line)
{
Line *l;
for (l = line; l != NULL && l->len == 0; l = l->next) ;
if (l == NULL || l->len == 0)
return -1;
Currentbuf->currentLine = l;
if (l != line)
Currentbuf->pos = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 84,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform1uiv(GLint fake_location,
GLsizei count,
const volatile GLuint* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniform1uiv",
Program::kUniform1ui,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
api()->glUniform1uivFn(real_location, count,
const_cast<const GLuint*>(value));
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool param(std::string &buf,char const *param_name,char const *default_value)
{
bool found = false;
char *param_value = param(param_name);
if( param_value ) {
buf = param_value;
found = true;
}
else if( default_value ) {
buf = default_value;
}
free( param_value );
return found;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int send_break(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned int duration)
{
int retval;
if (tty->ops->break_ctl == NULL)
return 0;
if (tty->driver->flags & TTY_DRIVER_HARDWARE_BREAK)
retval = tty->ops->break_ctl(tty, duration);
else {
/* Do the work ourselves */
if (tty_write_lock(tty, 0) < 0)
return -EINTR;
retval = tty->ops->break_ctl(tty, -1);
if (retval)
goto out;
if (!signal_pending(current))
msleep_interruptible(duration);
retval = tty->ops->break_ctl(tty, 0);
out:
tty_write_unlock(tty);
if (signal_pending(current))
retval = -EINTR;
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void svc_rdma_wc_inv(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)
{
svc_rdma_send_wc_common_put(cq, wc, "localInv");
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 66,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OxideQQuickWebView::wheelEvent(QWheelEvent* event) {
Q_D(OxideQQuickWebView);
QQuickItem::wheelEvent(event);
d->contents_view_->handleWheelEvent(event);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InFlightBackendIO::WriteData(EntryImpl* entry, int index, int offset,
net::IOBuffer* buf, int buf_len,
bool truncate,
const net::CompletionCallback& callback) {
scoped_refptr<BackendIO> operation(new BackendIO(this, backend_, callback));
operation->WriteData(entry, index, offset, buf, buf_len, truncate);
PostOperation(FROM_HERE, operation.get());
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Directory* directory() {
return dir_maker_.directory();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bt_accept_unlink(struct sock *sk)
{
BT_DBG("sk %p state %d", sk, sk->sk_state);
list_del_init(&bt_sk(sk)->accept_q);
bt_sk(sk)->parent->sk_ack_backlog--;
bt_sk(sk)->parent = NULL;
sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: fix possible info leak in bt_sock_recvmsg()
In case the socket is already shutting down, bt_sock_recvmsg() returns
with 0 without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the
local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes
of kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the msg_namelen assignment in front of the shutdown
test.
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: android::SoftOMXComponent *createSoftOMXComponent(
const char *name, const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData, OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component) {
return new android::SoftAMR(name, callbacks, appData, component);
}
Commit Message: SoftAMR: check output buffer size to avoid overflow.
Bug: 27662364
Change-Id: I7b26892c41d6f2e690e77478ab855c2fed1ff6b0
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 160,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<HistogramSamples> Histogram::SnapshotSamples() const {
return SnapshotSampleVector();
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 140,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool kvm_request_needs_ipi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned req)
{
int mode = kvm_vcpu_exiting_guest_mode(vcpu);
/*
* We need to wait for the VCPU to reenable interrupts and get out of
* READING_SHADOW_PAGE_TABLES mode.
*/
if (req & KVM_REQUEST_WAIT)
return mode != OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
/*
* Need to kick a running VCPU, but otherwise there is nothing to do.
*/
return mode == IN_GUEST_MODE;
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 91,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response InspectorNetworkAgent::setCacheDisabled(bool cache_disabled) {
state_->setBoolean(NetworkAgentState::kCacheDisabled, cache_disabled);
if (cache_disabled && IsMainThread())
GetMemoryCache()->EvictResources();
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parse3GPPMetaData(off64_t offset, size_t size, int depth) {
if (size < 4 || size == SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + 1];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
offset, buffer, size) != (ssize_t)size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t metadataKey = 0;
switch (mPath[depth]) {
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyTitle;
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyArtist;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyWriter;
break;
}
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyGenre;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
{
if (buffer[size - 1] != '\0') {
char tmp[4];
sprintf(tmp, "%u", buffer[size - 1]);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyCDTrackNumber, tmp);
}
metadataKey = kKeyAlbum;
break;
}
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
char tmp[5];
uint16_t year = U16_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (year < 10000) {
sprintf(tmp, "%u", year);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyYear, tmp);
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (metadataKey > 0) {
bool isUTF8 = true; // Common case
char16_t *framedata = NULL;
int len16 = 0; // Number of UTF-16 characters
if (size - 6 >= 4) {
len16 = ((size - 6) / 2) - 1; // don't include 0x0000 terminator
framedata = (char16_t *)(buffer + 6);
if (0xfffe == *framedata) {
for (int i = 0; i < len16; i++) {
framedata[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
}
if (0xfeff == *framedata) {
framedata++;
len16--;
isUTF8 = false;
}
}
if (isUTF8) {
buffer[size] = 0;
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, (const char *)buffer + 6);
} else {
String8 tmpUTF8str(framedata, len16);
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, tmpUTF8str.string());
}
}
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Prevent integer overflow when processing covr MPEG4 atoms
If the 'chunk_data_size' value is SIZE_MAX, an integer overflow will occur
and cause an undersized buffer to be allocated. The following processing
then overfills the resulting memory and creates a potentially exploitable
condition. Ensure that integer overflow does not occur.
Bug: 20923261
Change-Id: I75cce323aec04a612e5a230ecd7c2077ce06035f
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void unlock_two_nondirectories(struct inode *inode1, struct inode *inode2)
{
if (inode1 && !S_ISDIR(inode1->i_mode))
inode_unlock(inode1);
if (inode2 && !S_ISDIR(inode2->i_mode) && inode2 != inode1)
inode_unlock(inode2);
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 79,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BufStream::~BufStream() {
gfree(buf);
delete str;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_ports_changed(struct usb_hub *hub)
{
int port1;
for (port1 = 1; port1 <= hub->hdev->maxchild; ++port1) {
u16 portstatus, portchange;
int status;
status = hub_port_status(hub, port1, &portstatus, &portchange);
if (!status && portchange)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::SetCanReceiveDroppedFiles(
bool can_receive_dropped_files) {
if (!!can_receive_dropped_files_ == can_receive_dropped_files)
return;
can_receive_dropped_files_ = can_receive_dropped_files;
if (GetLayoutObject())
GetLayoutObject()->UpdateFromElement();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_empty_message_digest(
struct hash_device_data *device_data,
u8 *zero_hash, u32 *zero_hash_size, bool *zero_digest)
{
int ret = 0;
struct hash_ctx *ctx = device_data->current_ctx;
*zero_digest = false;
/**
* Caller responsible for ctx != NULL.
*/
if (HASH_OPER_MODE_HASH == ctx->config.oper_mode) {
if (HASH_ALGO_SHA1 == ctx->config.algorithm) {
memcpy(zero_hash, &zero_message_hash_sha1[0],
SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
*zero_hash_size = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
*zero_digest = true;
} else if (HASH_ALGO_SHA256 ==
ctx->config.algorithm) {
memcpy(zero_hash, &zero_message_hash_sha256[0],
SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
*zero_hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
*zero_digest = true;
} else {
dev_err(device_data->dev, "%s: Incorrect algorithm!\n",
__func__);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
} else if (HASH_OPER_MODE_HMAC == ctx->config.oper_mode) {
if (!ctx->keylen) {
if (HASH_ALGO_SHA1 == ctx->config.algorithm) {
memcpy(zero_hash, &zero_message_hmac_sha1[0],
SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
*zero_hash_size = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
*zero_digest = true;
} else if (HASH_ALGO_SHA256 == ctx->config.algorithm) {
memcpy(zero_hash, &zero_message_hmac_sha256[0],
SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
*zero_hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
*zero_digest = true;
} else {
dev_err(device_data->dev, "%s: Incorrect algorithm!\n",
__func__);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
} else {
dev_dbg(device_data->dev,
"%s: Continue hash calculation, since hmac key available\n",
__func__);
}
}
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exsltDateWeekInYear (const xmlChar *dateTime)
{
exsltDateValPtr dt;
long diy, diw, year, ret;
if (dateTime == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_TIME
dt = exsltDateCurrent();
if (dt == NULL)
#endif
return xmlXPathNAN;
} else {
dt = exsltDateParse(dateTime);
if (dt == NULL)
return xmlXPathNAN;
if ((dt->type != XS_DATETIME) && (dt->type != XS_DATE)) {
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return xmlXPathNAN;
}
}
diy = DAY_IN_YEAR(dt->value.date.day, dt->value.date.mon,
dt->value.date.year);
/*
* Determine day-in-week (0=Sun, 1=Mon, etc.) then adjust so Monday
* is the first day-in-week
*/
diw = (_exsltDateDayInWeek(diy, dt->value.date.year) + 6) % 7;
/* ISO 8601 adjustment, 3 is Thu */
diy += (3 - diw);
if(diy < 1) {
year = dt->value.date.year - 1;
if(year == 0) year--;
diy = DAY_IN_YEAR(31, 12, year) + diy;
} else if (diy > (long)DAY_IN_YEAR(31, 12, dt->value.date.year)) {
diy -= DAY_IN_YEAR(31, 12, dt->value.date.year);
}
ret = ((diy - 1) / 7) + 1;
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return (double) ret;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void o2nm_cluster_release(struct config_item *item)
{
struct o2nm_cluster *cluster = to_o2nm_cluster(item);
kfree(cluster);
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[[email protected]: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Textfield::UpdateContextMenu() {
if (!context_menu_contents_.get()) {
context_menu_contents_.reset(new ui::SimpleMenuModel(this));
context_menu_contents_->AddItemWithStringId(IDS_APP_UNDO, IDS_APP_UNDO);
context_menu_contents_->AddSeparator(ui::NORMAL_SEPARATOR);
context_menu_contents_->AddItemWithStringId(IDS_APP_CUT, IDS_APP_CUT);
context_menu_contents_->AddItemWithStringId(IDS_APP_COPY, IDS_APP_COPY);
context_menu_contents_->AddItemWithStringId(IDS_APP_PASTE, IDS_APP_PASTE);
context_menu_contents_->AddItemWithStringId(IDS_APP_DELETE, IDS_APP_DELETE);
context_menu_contents_->AddSeparator(ui::NORMAL_SEPARATOR);
context_menu_contents_->AddItemWithStringId(IDS_APP_SELECT_ALL,
IDS_APP_SELECT_ALL);
if (controller_)
controller_->UpdateContextMenu(context_menu_contents_.get());
text_services_context_menu_ = ViewsTextServicesContextMenu::Create(
context_menu_contents_.get(), this);
}
context_menu_runner_.reset(
new MenuRunner(context_menu_contents_.get(),
MenuRunner::HAS_MNEMONICS | MenuRunner::CONTEXT_MENU));
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderProcessImpl::InProcessPlugins() {
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
#if defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_OPENBSD)
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessPlugins))
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << ": in process plugins not supported on Linux";
return command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessPlugins);
#else
return command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessPlugins) ||
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kSingleProcess);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: update_max_tr(struct trace_array *tr, struct task_struct *tsk, int cpu,
void *cond_data)
{
if (tr->stop_count)
return;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
if (!tr->allocated_snapshot) {
/* Only the nop tracer should hit this when disabling */
WARN_ON_ONCE(tr->current_trace != &nop_trace);
return;
}
arch_spin_lock(&tr->max_lock);
/* Inherit the recordable setting from trace_buffer */
if (ring_buffer_record_is_set_on(tr->trace_buffer.buffer))
ring_buffer_record_on(tr->max_buffer.buffer);
else
ring_buffer_record_off(tr->max_buffer.buffer);
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_SNAPSHOT
if (tr->cond_snapshot && !tr->cond_snapshot->update(tr, cond_data))
goto out_unlock;
#endif
swap(tr->trace_buffer.buffer, tr->max_buffer.buffer);
__update_max_tr(tr, tsk, cpu);
out_unlock:
arch_spin_unlock(&tr->max_lock);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct mem_cgroup *mem_cgroup_from_task(struct task_struct *p)
{
/*
* mm_update_next_owner() may clear mm->owner to NULL
* if it races with swapoff, page migration, etc.
* So this can be called with p == NULL.
*/
if (unlikely(!p))
return NULL;
return container_of(task_subsys_state(p, mem_cgroup_subsys_id),
struct mem_cgroup, css);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::TexSubImage2DImpl(GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
uint32_t unpadded_row_size,
const void* pixels,
uint32_t pixels_padded_row_size,
GLboolean internal,
ScopedTransferBufferPtr* buffer,
uint32_t buffer_padded_row_size) {
DCHECK(buffer);
DCHECK_GE(level, 0);
DCHECK_GT(height, 0);
DCHECK_GT(width, 0);
DCHECK_GE(xoffset, 0);
DCHECK_GE(yoffset, 0);
const int8_t* source = reinterpret_cast<const int8_t*>(pixels);
while (height) {
unsigned int desired_size =
buffer_padded_row_size * (height - 1) + unpadded_row_size;
if (!buffer->valid() || buffer->size() == 0) {
buffer->Reset(desired_size);
if (!buffer->valid()) {
return;
}
}
GLint num_rows = ComputeNumRowsThatFitInBuffer(
buffer_padded_row_size, unpadded_row_size, buffer->size(), height);
num_rows = std::min(num_rows, height);
CopyRectToBuffer(source, num_rows, unpadded_row_size,
pixels_padded_row_size, buffer->address(),
buffer_padded_row_size);
helper_->TexSubImage2D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, num_rows,
format, type, buffer->shm_id(), buffer->offset(),
internal);
buffer->Release();
yoffset += num_rows;
source += num_rows * pixels_padded_row_size;
height -= num_rows;
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rtnl_link_fill(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *dev)
{
const struct rtnl_link_ops *ops = dev->rtnl_link_ops;
struct nlattr *linkinfo, *data;
int err = -EMSGSIZE;
linkinfo = nla_nest_start(skb, IFLA_LINKINFO);
if (linkinfo == NULL)
goto out;
if (nla_put_string(skb, IFLA_INFO_KIND, ops->kind) < 0)
goto err_cancel_link;
if (ops->fill_xstats) {
err = ops->fill_xstats(skb, dev);
if (err < 0)
goto err_cancel_link;
}
if (ops->fill_info) {
data = nla_nest_start(skb, IFLA_INFO_DATA);
if (data == NULL)
goto err_cancel_link;
err = ops->fill_info(skb, dev);
if (err < 0)
goto err_cancel_data;
nla_nest_end(skb, data);
}
nla_nest_end(skb, linkinfo);
return 0;
err_cancel_data:
nla_nest_cancel(skb, data);
err_cancel_link:
nla_nest_cancel(skb, linkinfo);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long Track::GetNext(
const BlockEntry* pCurrEntry,
const BlockEntry*& pNextEntry) const
{
assert(pCurrEntry);
assert(!pCurrEntry->EOS()); //?
const Block* const pCurrBlock = pCurrEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pCurrBlock && pCurrBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number);
if (!pCurrBlock || pCurrBlock->GetTrackNumber() != m_info.number)
return -1;
const Cluster* pCluster = pCurrEntry->GetCluster();
assert(pCluster);
assert(!pCluster->EOS());
long status = pCluster->GetNext(pCurrEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
for (int i = 0; ; )
{
while (pNextEntry)
{
const Block* const pNextBlock = pNextEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pNextBlock);
if (pNextBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number)
return 0;
pCurrEntry = pNextEntry;
status = pCluster->GetNext(pCurrEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
}
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
if (pCluster == NULL)
{
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
if (pCluster->EOS())
{
#if 0
if (m_pSegment->Unparsed() <= 0) //all clusters have been loaded
{
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#else
if (m_pSegment->DoneParsing())
{
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#endif
pNextEntry = NULL;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
status = pCluster->GetFirst(pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (pNextEntry == NULL) //empty cluster
continue;
++i;
if (i >= 100)
break;
}
pNextEntry = GetEOS(); //so we can return a non-NULL value
return 1;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetOpenerForNewContents(FrameTreeNode* opener,
bool opener_suppressed) {
if (opener) {
FrameTreeNode* new_root = GetFrameTree()->root();
new_root->SetOriginalOpener(opener->frame_tree()->root());
if (!opener_suppressed) {
new_root->SetOpener(opener);
created_with_opener_ = true;
}
}
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lua_ap_scoreboard_process(lua_State *L)
{
int i;
process_score *ps_record;
luaL_checktype(L, 1, LUA_TUSERDATA);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TNUMBER);
i = lua_tointeger(L, 2);
ps_record = ap_get_scoreboard_process(i);
if (ps_record) {
lua_newtable(L);
lua_pushstring(L, "connections");
lua_pushnumber(L, ps_record->connections);
lua_settable(L, -3);
lua_pushstring(L, "keepalive");
lua_pushnumber(L, ps_record->keep_alive);
lua_settable(L, -3);
lua_pushstring(L, "lingering_close");
lua_pushnumber(L, ps_record->lingering_close);
lua_settable(L, -3);
lua_pushstring(L, "pid");
lua_pushnumber(L, ps_record->pid);
lua_settable(L, -3);
lua_pushstring(L, "suspended");
lua_pushnumber(L, ps_record->suspended);
lua_settable(L, -3);
lua_pushstring(L, "write_completion");
lua_pushnumber(L, ps_record->write_completion);
lua_settable(L, -3);
lua_pushstring(L, "not_accepting");
lua_pushnumber(L, ps_record->not_accepting);
lua_settable(L, -3);
lua_pushstring(L, "quiescing");
lua_pushnumber(L, ps_record->quiescing);
lua_settable(L, -3);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 45,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool hugetlbfs_pagecache_present(struct hstate *h,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
{
struct address_space *mapping;
pgoff_t idx;
struct page *page;
mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
idx = vma_hugecache_offset(h, vma, address);
page = find_get_page(mapping, idx);
if (page)
put_page(page);
return page != NULL;
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static l2cap_socket *btsock_l2cap_alloc(const char *name, const bt_bdaddr_t *addr,
char is_server, int flags)
{
l2cap_socket *ret;
pthread_mutex_lock(&state_lock);
ret = btsock_l2cap_alloc_l(name, addr, is_server, flags);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&state_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,840 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct page *get_partial_node(struct kmem_cache_node *n)
{
struct page *page;
/*
* Racy check. If we mistakenly see no partial slabs then we
* just allocate an empty slab. If we mistakenly try to get a
* partial slab and there is none available then get_partials()
* will return NULL.
*/
if (!n || !n->nr_partial)
return NULL;
spin_lock(&n->list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(page, &n->partial, lru)
if (lock_and_freeze_slab(n, page))
goto out;
page = NULL;
out:
spin_unlock(&n->list_lock);
return page;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptPromise FetchManager::Fetch(ScriptState* script_state,
FetchRequestData* request,
AbortSignal* signal) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::Create(script_state);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->Promise();
DCHECK(signal);
if (signal->aborted()) {
resolver->Reject(DOMException::Create(kAbortError));
return promise;
}
request->SetContext(WebURLRequest::kRequestContextFetch);
Loader* loader =
Loader::Create(GetExecutionContext(), this, resolver, request,
script_state->World().IsIsolatedWorld(), signal);
loaders_.insert(loader);
signal->AddAlgorithm(WTF::Bind(&Loader::Abort, WrapWeakPersistent(loader)));
loader->Start();
return promise;
}
Commit Message: [Fetch API] Fix redirect leak on "no-cors" requests
The spec issue is now fixed, and this CL follows the spec change[1].
1: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/commit/14858d3e9402285a7ff3b5e47a22896ff3adc95d
Bug: 791324
Change-Id: Ic3e3955f43578b38fc44a5a6b2a1b43d56a2becb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023613
Reviewed-by: Tsuyoshi Horo <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552964}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint64_t PaintLayerScrollableArea::Id() const {
return DOMNodeIds::IdForNode(GetLayoutBox()->GetNode());
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,062 |
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