instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_LIBXML_API zval *php_libxml_switch_context(zval *context TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval *oldcontext;
oldcontext = LIBXML(stream_context);
LIBXML(stream_context) = context;
return oldcontext;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::AllowInlineEventHandler(
Element* element,
const String& source,
const String& context_url,
const WTF::OrdinalNumber& context_line,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reporting_policy) const {
Vector<CSPHashValue> csp_hash_values;
FillInCSPHashValues(source, script_hash_algorithms_used_, &csp_hash_values);
bool is_allowed = true;
for (const auto& policy : policies_) {
is_allowed &=
CheckScriptHashAgainstPolicy(csp_hash_values, policy,
InlineType::kAttribute) ||
policy->AllowInlineEventHandlers(element, source, context_url,
context_line, reporting_policy);
}
return is_allowed;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _6502_anal_esil_ccall(RAnalOp *op, ut8 data0)
{
char *flag;
switch(data0) {
case 0x10: // bpl $ffff
flag = "N,!";
break;
case 0x30: // bmi $ffff
flag = "N";
break;
case 0x50: // bvc $ffff
flag = "V,!";
break;
case 0x70: // bvs $ffff
flag = "V";
break;
case 0x90: // bcc $ffff
flag = "C,!";
break;
case 0xb0: // bcs $ffff
flag = "C";
break;
case 0xd0: // bne $ffff
flag = "Z,!";
break;
case 0xf0: // beq $ffff
flag = "Z";
break;
default:
flag = "unk";
break;
}
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,?{,0x%04x,pc,=,}", flag, (op->jump & 0xffff));
}
Commit Message: Fix #10294 - crash in r2_hoobr__6502_op
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 81,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_recover_proc_open(struct nfs4_opendata *data)
{
struct inode *dir = data->dir->d_inode;
struct nfs_openres *o_res = &data->o_res;
int status;
status = nfs4_run_open_task(data, 1);
if (status != 0 || !data->rpc_done)
return status;
nfs_fattr_map_and_free_names(NFS_SERVER(dir), &data->f_attr);
nfs_refresh_inode(dir, o_res->dir_attr);
if (o_res->rflags & NFS4_OPEN_RESULT_CONFIRM) {
status = _nfs4_proc_open_confirm(data);
if (status != 0)
return status;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TreeCache::~TreeCache() {}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ptaaDestroy(PTAA **pptaa)
{
l_int32 i;
PTAA *ptaa;
PROCNAME("ptaaDestroy");
if (pptaa == NULL) {
L_WARNING("ptr address is NULL!\n", procName);
return;
}
if ((ptaa = *pptaa) == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < ptaa->n; i++)
ptaDestroy(&ptaa->pta[i]);
LEPT_FREE(ptaa->pta);
LEPT_FREE(ptaa);
*pptaa = NULL;
return;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ocfs2_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb,
struct iov_iter *to)
{
int ret = 0, rw_level = -1, lock_level = 0;
struct file *filp = iocb->ki_filp;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
trace_ocfs2_file_aio_read(inode, filp, filp->f_path.dentry,
(unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno,
filp->f_path.dentry->d_name.len,
filp->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
to->nr_segs); /* GRRRRR */
if (!inode) {
ret = -EINVAL;
mlog_errno(ret);
goto bail;
}
/*
* buffered reads protect themselves in ->readpage(). O_DIRECT reads
* need locks to protect pending reads from racing with truncate.
*/
if (iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_DIRECT) {
ret = ocfs2_rw_lock(inode, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto bail;
}
rw_level = 0;
/* communicate with ocfs2_dio_end_io */
ocfs2_iocb_set_rw_locked(iocb, rw_level);
}
/*
* We're fine letting folks race truncates and extending
* writes with read across the cluster, just like they can
* locally. Hence no rw_lock during read.
*
* Take and drop the meta data lock to update inode fields
* like i_size. This allows the checks down below
* generic_file_aio_read() a chance of actually working.
*/
ret = ocfs2_inode_lock_atime(inode, filp->f_path.mnt, &lock_level);
if (ret < 0) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto bail;
}
ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, lock_level);
ret = generic_file_read_iter(iocb, to);
trace_generic_file_aio_read_ret(ret);
/* buffered aio wouldn't have proper lock coverage today */
BUG_ON(ret == -EIOCBQUEUED && !(iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_DIRECT));
/* see ocfs2_file_write_iter */
if (ret == -EIOCBQUEUED || !ocfs2_iocb_is_rw_locked(iocb)) {
rw_level = -1;
}
bail:
if (rw_level != -1)
ocfs2_rw_unlock(inode, rw_level);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 85,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void messagePortArrayAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::messagePortArrayAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_sbversion_add_attr2(xfs_mount_t *mp, xfs_trans_t *tp)
{
if ((mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_ATTR2) &&
!(xfs_sb_version_hasattr2(&mp->m_sb))) {
spin_lock(&mp->m_sb_lock);
if (!xfs_sb_version_hasattr2(&mp->m_sb)) {
xfs_sb_version_addattr2(&mp->m_sb);
spin_unlock(&mp->m_sb_lock);
xfs_log_sb(tp);
} else
spin_unlock(&mp->m_sb_lock);
}
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't call xfs_da_shrink_inode with NULL bp
xfs_attr3_leaf_create may have errored out before instantiating a buffer,
for example if the blkno is out of range. In that case there is no work
to do to remove it, and in fact xfs_da_shrink_inode will lead to an oops
if we try.
This also seems to fix a flaw where the original error from
xfs_attr3_leaf_create gets overwritten in the cleanup case, and it
removes a pointless assignment to bp which isn't used after this.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199969
Reported-by: Xu, Wen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Xu, Wen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 79,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ApplyFontsFromMap(const ScriptFontFamilyMap& map,
SetFontFamilyWrapper setter,
WebSettings* settings) {
for (ScriptFontFamilyMap::const_iterator it = map.begin(); it != map.end();
++it) {
int32_t script = u_getPropertyValueEnum(UCHAR_SCRIPT, (it->first).c_str());
if (script >= 0 && script < USCRIPT_CODE_LIMIT) {
UScriptCode code = static_cast<UScriptCode>(script);
(*setter)(settings, it->second, GetScriptForWebSettings(code));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RBinSection *getsection(RBin *a, const char *sn) {
RListIter *iter;
RBinSection *section = NULL;
RBinFile *binfile = a ? a->cur: NULL;
RBinObject *o = binfile ? binfile->o : NULL;
if ( o && o->sections) {
r_list_foreach (o->sections, iter, section) {
if (strstr (section->name, sn)) {
return section;
}
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionPrefs* ExtensionService::extension_prefs() {
return extension_prefs_;
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Riemersma(Image *image,CacheView *image_view,CubeInfo *cube_info,
const size_t level,const unsigned int direction)
{
if (level == 1)
switch (direction)
{
case WestGravity:
{
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,EastGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,SouthGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,WestGravity);
break;
}
case EastGravity:
{
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,WestGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,NorthGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,EastGravity);
break;
}
case NorthGravity:
{
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,SouthGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,EastGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,NorthGravity);
break;
}
case SouthGravity:
{
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,NorthGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,WestGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,SouthGravity);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
else
switch (direction)
{
case WestGravity:
{
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,NorthGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,EastGravity);
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,WestGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,SouthGravity);
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,WestGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,WestGravity);
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,SouthGravity);
break;
}
case EastGravity:
{
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,SouthGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,WestGravity);
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,EastGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,NorthGravity);
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,EastGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,EastGravity);
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,NorthGravity);
break;
}
case NorthGravity:
{
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,WestGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,SouthGravity);
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,NorthGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,EastGravity);
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,NorthGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,NorthGravity);
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,EastGravity);
break;
}
case SouthGravity:
{
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,EastGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,NorthGravity);
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,SouthGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,WestGravity);
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,SouthGravity);
(void) RiemersmaDither(image,image_view,cube_info,SouthGravity);
Riemersma(image,image_view,cube_info,level-1,WestGravity);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/574
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ocfs2_init_acl(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct inode *dir,
struct buffer_head *di_bh,
struct buffer_head *dir_bh,
struct ocfs2_alloc_context *meta_ac,
struct ocfs2_alloc_context *data_ac)
{
struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct posix_acl *acl = NULL;
int ret = 0, ret2;
umode_t mode;
if (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
if (osb->s_mount_opt & OCFS2_MOUNT_POSIX_ACL) {
acl = ocfs2_get_acl_nolock(dir, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT,
dir_bh);
if (IS_ERR(acl))
return PTR_ERR(acl);
}
if (!acl) {
mode = inode->i_mode & ~current_umask();
ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh, handle, mode);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
if ((osb->s_mount_opt & OCFS2_MOUNT_POSIX_ACL) && acl) {
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
ret = ocfs2_set_acl(handle, inode, di_bh,
ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, acl,
meta_ac, data_ac);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
mode = inode->i_mode;
ret = __posix_acl_create(&acl, GFP_NOFS, &mode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
ret2 = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh, handle, mode);
if (ret2) {
mlog_errno(ret2);
ret = ret2;
goto cleanup;
}
if (ret > 0) {
ret = ocfs2_set_acl(handle, inode,
di_bh, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS,
acl, meta_ac, data_ac);
}
}
cleanup:
posix_acl_release(acl);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 50,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit fini(void)
{
reclaim_dma_bufs();
unregister_virtio_driver(&virtio_console);
unregister_virtio_driver(&virtio_rproc_serial);
class_destroy(pdrvdata.class);
debugfs_remove_recursive(pdrvdata.debugfs_dir);
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void perf_cgroup_sched_in(struct task_struct *prev,
struct task_struct *task)
{
struct perf_cgroup *cgrp1;
struct perf_cgroup *cgrp2 = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
/*
* we come here when we know perf_cgroup_events > 0
* we do not need to pass the ctx here because we know
* we are holding the rcu lock
*/
cgrp1 = perf_cgroup_from_task(task, NULL);
/* prev can never be NULL */
cgrp2 = perf_cgroup_from_task(prev, NULL);
/*
* only need to schedule in cgroup events if we are changing
* cgroup during ctxsw. Cgroup events were not scheduled
* out of ctxsw out if that was not the case.
*/
if (cgrp1 != cgrp2)
perf_cgroup_switch(task, PERF_CGROUP_SWIN);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPagePrivate::setVisible(bool visible)
{
if (visible != m_visible) {
if (visible) {
if (m_mainFrame)
m_mainFrame->animation()->resumeAnimations();
if (m_page->scriptedAnimationsSuspended())
m_page->resumeScriptedAnimations();
} else {
if (m_mainFrame)
m_mainFrame->animation()->suspendAnimations();
if (!m_page->scriptedAnimationsSuspended())
m_page->suspendScriptedAnimations();
}
m_visible = visible;
}
#if ENABLE(PAGE_VISIBILITY_API)
setPageVisibilityState();
#endif
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CLASS kodak_radc_load_raw()
{
static const char src[] = {
1,1, 2,3, 3,4, 4,2, 5,7, 6,5, 7,6, 7,8,
1,0, 2,1, 3,3, 4,4, 5,2, 6,7, 7,6, 8,5, 8,8,
2,1, 2,3, 3,0, 3,2, 3,4, 4,6, 5,5, 6,7, 6,8,
2,0, 2,1, 2,3, 3,2, 4,4, 5,6, 6,7, 7,5, 7,8,
2,1, 2,4, 3,0, 3,2, 3,3, 4,7, 5,5, 6,6, 6,8,
2,3, 3,1, 3,2, 3,4, 3,5, 3,6, 4,7, 5,0, 5,8,
2,3, 2,6, 3,0, 3,1, 4,4, 4,5, 4,7, 5,2, 5,8,
2,4, 2,7, 3,3, 3,6, 4,1, 4,2, 4,5, 5,0, 5,8,
2,6, 3,1, 3,3, 3,5, 3,7, 3,8, 4,0, 5,2, 5,4,
2,0, 2,1, 3,2, 3,3, 4,4, 4,5, 5,6, 5,7, 4,8,
1,0, 2,2, 2,-2,
1,-3, 1,3,
2,-17, 2,-5, 2,5, 2,17,
2,-7, 2,2, 2,9, 2,18,
2,-18, 2,-9, 2,-2, 2,7,
2,-28, 2,28, 3,-49, 3,-9, 3,9, 4,49, 5,-79, 5,79,
2,-1, 2,13, 2,26, 3,39, 4,-16, 5,55, 6,-37, 6,76,
2,-26, 2,-13, 2,1, 3,-39, 4,16, 5,-55, 6,-76, 6,37
};
ushort huff[19][256];
int row, col, tree, nreps, rep, step, i, j, k, c, s, r, x, y, val;
short last[3] = { 16,16,16 }, mul[3], buf[3][3][386];
static const ushort pt[] =
{ 0,0, 1280,1344, 2320,3616, 3328,8000, 4095,16383, 65535,16383 };
for (i=2; i < 12; i+=2)
for (c=pt[i-2]; c <= pt[i]; c++)
curve[c] = (float)
(c-pt[i-2]) / (pt[i]-pt[i-2]) * (pt[i+1]-pt[i-1]) + pt[i-1] + 0.5;
for (s=i=0; i < (int) sizeof src; i+=2)
FORC(256 >> src[i])
huff[0][s++] = src[i] << 8 | (uchar) src[i+1];
s = kodak_cbpp == 243 ? 2 : 3;
FORC(256) huff[18][c] = (8-s) << 8 | c >> s << s | 1 << (s-1);
getbits(-1);
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
for (j=0; j < 3; j++)
for (k=0; k < 386; k++)
buf[i][j][k] = 2048;
for (row=0; row < height; row+=4) {
FORC3 mul[c] = getbits(6);
FORC3 {
val = ((0x1000000/last[c] + 0x7ff) >> 12) * mul[c];
s = val > 65564 ? 10:12;
x = ~(-1 << (s-1));
val <<= 12-s;
for (i=0; i < (int) sizeof(buf[0])/(int) sizeof(short); i++)
buf[c][0][i] = (buf[c][0][i] * val + x) >> s;
last[c] = mul[c];
for (r=0; r <= !c; r++) {
buf[c][1][width/2] = buf[c][2][width/2] = mul[c] << 7;
for (tree=1, col=width/2; col > 0; ) {
if ((tree = radc_token(tree))) {
col -= 2;
if (tree == 8)
FORYX buf[c][y][x] = (uchar) radc_token(18) * mul[c];
else
FORYX buf[c][y][x] = radc_token(tree+10) * 16 + PREDICTOR;
} else
do {
nreps = (col > 2) ? radc_token(9) + 1 : 1;
for (rep=0; rep < 8 && rep < nreps && col > 0; rep++) {
col -= 2;
FORYX buf[c][y][x] = PREDICTOR;
if (rep & 1) {
step = radc_token(10) << 4;
FORYX buf[c][y][x] += step;
}
}
} while (nreps == 9);
}
for (y=0; y < 2; y++)
for (x=0; x < width/2; x++) {
val = (buf[c][y+1][x] << 4) / mul[c];
if (val < 0) val = 0;
if (c) BAYER(row+y*2+c-1,x*2+2-c) = val;
else BAYER(row+r*2+y,x*2+y) = val;
}
memcpy (buf[c][0]+!c, buf[c][2], sizeof buf[c][0]-2*!c);
}
}
for (y=row; y < row+4; y++)
for (x=0; x < width; x++)
if ((x+y) & 1) {
r = x ? x-1 : x+1;
s = x+1 < width ? x+1 : x-1;
val = (BAYER(y,x)-2048)*2 + (BAYER(y,r)+BAYER(y,s))/2;
if (val < 0) val = 0;
BAYER(y,x) = val;
}
}
for (i=0; i < iheight*iwidth*4; i++)
image[0][i] = curve[image[0][i]];
maximum = 0x3fff;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xml2_xmlattr_setup(struct archive_read *a,
struct xmlattr_list *list, xmlTextReaderPtr reader)
{
struct xmlattr *attr;
int r;
list->first = NULL;
list->last = &(list->first);
r = xmlTextReaderMoveToFirstAttribute(reader);
while (r == 1) {
attr = malloc(sizeof*(attr));
if (attr == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, "Out of memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
attr->name = strdup(
(const char *)xmlTextReaderConstLocalName(reader));
if (attr->name == NULL) {
free(attr);
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, "Out of memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
attr->value = strdup(
(const char *)xmlTextReaderConstValue(reader));
if (attr->value == NULL) {
free(attr->name);
free(attr);
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, "Out of memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
attr->next = NULL;
*list->last = attr;
list->last = &(attr->next);
r = xmlTextReaderMoveToNextAttribute(reader);
}
return (r);
}
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 61,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishGpuChannelOnIO(
EstablishRequest* request,
CauseForGpuLaunch cause_for_gpu_launch) {
GpuProcessHost* host = GpuProcessHost::FromID(gpu_host_id_);
if (!host) {
host = GpuProcessHost::Get(GpuProcessHost::GPU_PROCESS_KIND_SANDBOXED,
cause_for_gpu_launch);
if (!host) {
request->event.Signal();
return;
}
gpu_host_id_ = host->host_id();
}
host->EstablishGpuChannel(
gpu_client_id_,
true,
base::Bind(&BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::GpuChannelEstablishedOnIO,
request));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::OnManifestDataReadComplete(int result) {
if (result > 0) {
loaded_manifest_data_.append(read_manifest_buffer_->data(), result);
manifest_response_reader_->ReadData(
read_manifest_buffer_.get(),
kBufferSize,
base::Bind(&AppCacheUpdateJob::OnManifestDataReadComplete,
base::Unretained(this))); // read more
} else {
read_manifest_buffer_ = NULL;
manifest_response_reader_.reset();
ContinueHandleManifestFetchCompleted(
result < 0 || manifest_data_ != loaded_manifest_data_);
}
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct mobj *get_cmd_buffer(paddr_t parg, uint32_t *num_params)
{
struct optee_msg_arg *arg;
size_t args_size;
arg = phys_to_virt(parg, MEM_AREA_NSEC_SHM);
if (!arg)
return NULL;
*num_params = READ_ONCE(arg->num_params);
args_size = OPTEE_MSG_GET_ARG_SIZE(*num_params);
return mobj_shm_alloc(parg, args_size, 0);
}
Commit Message: core: ensure that supplied range matches MOBJ
In set_rmem_param() if the MOBJ is found by the cookie it's verified to
represent non-secure shared memory. Prior to this patch the supplied
sub-range to be used of the MOBJ was not checked here and relied on
later checks further down the chain. Those checks seems to be enough
for user TAs, but not for pseudo TAs where the size isn't checked.
This patch adds a check for offset and size to see that they remain
inside the memory covered by the MOBJ.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0004: "Unchecked parameters are passed through from
REE".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void TraceCircle(PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,const PointInfo start,
const PointInfo end)
{
double
alpha,
beta,
radius;
PointInfo
offset,
degrees;
alpha=end.x-start.x;
beta=end.y-start.y;
radius=hypot((double) alpha,(double) beta);
offset.x=(double) radius;
offset.y=(double) radius;
degrees.x=0.0;
degrees.y=360.0;
TraceEllipse(primitive_info,start,offset,degrees);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CloseDevToolsWindow() {
Browser* browser = window_->browser();
content::WindowedNotificationObserver close_observer(
content::NOTIFICATION_WEB_CONTENTS_DESTROYED,
content::Source<content::WebContents>(window_->web_contents()));
browser->tab_strip_model()->CloseAllTabs();
close_observer.Wait();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vhost_scsi_queue_status(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
{
struct vhost_scsi_cmd *cmd = container_of(se_cmd,
struct vhost_scsi_cmd, tvc_se_cmd);
vhost_scsi_complete_cmd(cmd);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_schedstats(bool enabled)
{
if (enabled)
static_branch_enable(&sched_schedstats);
else
static_branch_disable(&sched_schedstats);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Cues::Cues(
Segment* pSegment,
long long start_,
long long size_,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_start(start_),
m_size(size_),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
m_cue_points(NULL),
m_count(0),
m_preload_count(0),
m_pos(start_)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vapic_register(void)
{
type_register_static(&vapic_type);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t calculate_camera_metadata_entry_data_size(uint8_t type,
size_t data_count) {
if (type >= NUM_TYPES) return 0;
size_t data_bytes = data_count *
camera_metadata_type_size[type];
return data_bytes <= 4 ? 0 : ALIGN_TO(data_bytes, DATA_ALIGNMENT);
}
Commit Message: Camera metadata: Check for inconsistent data count
Resolve merge conflict for nyc-release
Also check for overflow of data/entry count on append.
Bug: 30591838
Change-Id: Ibf4c3c6e236cdb28234f3125055d95ef0a2416a2
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int time_independent_strcmp(char *a, char *b) {
char bufa[CONFIG_AUTHPASS_MAX_LEN], bufb[CONFIG_AUTHPASS_MAX_LEN];
/* The above two strlen perform len(a) + len(b) operations where either
* a or b are fixed (our password) length, and the difference is only
* relative to the length of the user provided string, so no information
* leak is possible in the following two lines of code. */
unsigned int alen = strlen(a);
unsigned int blen = strlen(b);
unsigned int j;
int diff = 0;
/* We can't compare strings longer than our static buffers.
* Note that this will never pass the first test in practical circumstances
* so there is no info leak. */
if (alen > sizeof(bufa) || blen > sizeof(bufb)) return 1;
memset(bufa,0,sizeof(bufa)); /* Constant time. */
memset(bufb,0,sizeof(bufb)); /* Constant time. */
/* Again the time of the following two copies is proportional to
* len(a) + len(b) so no info is leaked. */
memcpy(bufa,a,alen);
memcpy(bufb,b,blen);
/* Always compare all the chars in the two buffers without
* conditional expressions. */
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(bufa); j++) {
diff |= (bufa[j] ^ bufb[j]);
}
/* Length must be equal as well. */
diff |= alen ^ blen;
return diff; /* If zero strings are the same. */
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 70,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::FailedNavigation(
int64_t navigation_id,
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
const RequestNavigationParams& request_params,
bool has_stale_copy_in_cache,
int error_code,
const base::Optional<std::string>& error_page_content) {
TRACE_EVENT2("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl::FailedNavigation",
"frame_tree_node", frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id(),
"error", error_code);
UpdatePermissionsForNavigation(common_params, request_params);
ResetWaitingState();
url::Origin origin = url::Origin();
std::unique_ptr<URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo> subresource_loader_factories;
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService)) {
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtrInfo default_factory_info;
bool bypass_redirect_checks = CreateNetworkServiceDefaultFactoryAndObserve(
origin, mojo::MakeRequest(&default_factory_info));
subresource_loader_factories = std::make_unique<URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo>(
std::move(default_factory_info),
URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo::SchemeMap(),
URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo::OriginMap(), bypass_redirect_checks);
}
auto find_request = navigation_requests_.find(navigation_id);
NavigationRequest* request = find_request != navigation_requests_.end()
? find_request->second.get()
: nullptr;
if (IsPerNavigationMojoInterfaceEnabled() && request &&
request->GetCommitNavigationClient()) {
request->GetCommitNavigationClient()->CommitFailedNavigation(
common_params, request_params, has_stale_copy_in_cache, error_code,
error_page_content, std::move(subresource_loader_factories),
base::BindOnce(&RenderFrameHostImpl::OnCrossDocumentCommitProcessed,
base::Unretained(this), navigation_id));
} else {
GetNavigationControl()->CommitFailedNavigation(
common_params, request_params, has_stale_copy_in_cache, error_code,
error_page_content, std::move(subresource_loader_factories),
base::BindOnce(&RenderFrameHostImpl::OnCrossDocumentCommitProcessed,
base::Unretained(this), navigation_id));
}
is_loading_ = true;
DCHECK(request && request->navigation_handle() &&
request->navigation_handle()->GetNetErrorCode() != net::OK);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jv_parser_free(struct jv_parser* p) {
parser_free(p);
jv_mem_free(p);
}
Commit Message: Heap buffer overflow in tokenadd() (fix #105)
This was an off-by one: the NUL terminator byte was not allocated on
resize. This was triggered by JSON-encoded numbers longer than 256
bytes.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 56,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fuse_vma_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
filemap_write_and_wait(vma->vm_file->f_mapping);
}
Commit Message: fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
CC: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]> [2.6.31+]
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutocompleteInput::ParseForEmphasizeComponents(
const string16& text,
const string16& desired_tld,
url_parse::Component* scheme,
url_parse::Component* host) {
url_parse::Parsed parts;
string16 scheme_str;
Parse(text, desired_tld, &parts, &scheme_str, NULL);
*scheme = parts.scheme;
*host = parts.host;
int after_scheme_and_colon = parts.scheme.end() + 1;
if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(scheme_str, chrome::kViewSourceScheme) &&
(static_cast<int>(text.length()) > after_scheme_and_colon)) {
string16 real_url(text.substr(after_scheme_and_colon));
url_parse::Parsed real_parts;
AutocompleteInput::Parse(real_url, desired_tld, &real_parts, NULL,
NULL);
if (real_parts.scheme.is_nonempty() || real_parts.host.is_nonempty()) {
if (real_parts.scheme.is_nonempty()) {
*scheme = url_parse::Component(
after_scheme_and_colon + real_parts.scheme.begin,
real_parts.scheme.len);
} else {
scheme->reset();
}
if (real_parts.host.is_nonempty()) {
*host = url_parse::Component(
after_scheme_and_colon + real_parts.host.begin,
real_parts.host.len);
} else {
host->reset();
}
}
} else if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(scheme_str, chrome::kFileSystemScheme) &&
parts.inner_parsed() && parts.inner_parsed()->scheme.is_valid()) {
*host = parts.inner_parsed()->host;
}
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_spoolss_printer_enum_values(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
guint32 start_offset = offset;
guint32 name_offset, name_len, val_offset, val_len, val_type;
char *name;
proto_item *item;
proto_tree *subtree;
/* Get offset of value name */
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, NULL, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdataex_name_offset, &name_offset);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, NULL, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdataex_name_len, &name_len);
dissect_spoolss_uint16uni(
tvb, start_offset + name_offset, pinfo, NULL, drep,
&name, hf_enumprinterdataex_name);
subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(tree, tvb, offset, 0, ett_printer_enumdataex_value, &item, "Name: %s", name);
proto_tree_add_uint(subtree, hf_enumprinterdataex_name_offset, tvb, offset - 8, 4, name_offset);
proto_tree_add_uint(subtree, hf_enumprinterdataex_name_len, tvb, offset - 4, 4, name_len);
proto_tree_add_string( subtree, hf_enumprinterdataex_name, tvb, start_offset + name_offset, ((int)strlen(name) + 1) * 2, name);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep, hf_printerdata_type,
&val_type);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdataex_val_offset, &val_offset);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdataex_val_len, &val_len);
if (val_len == 0) {
proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(subtree, hf_enumprinterdataex_value_null, tvb, start_offset + val_offset, 4, 0, "(null)");
goto done;
}
switch(val_type) {
case DCERPC_REG_DWORD: {
guint32 value;
guint16 low, high;
int offset2 = start_offset + val_offset;
/* Needs to be broken into two 16-byte ints because it may
not be aligned. */
offset2 = dissect_ndr_uint16(
tvb, offset2, pinfo, subtree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdataex_val_dword_low, &low);
/*offset2 = */dissect_ndr_uint16(
tvb, offset2, pinfo, subtree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdataex_val_dword_high, &high);
value = (high << 16) | low;
proto_tree_add_uint(subtree, hf_enumprinterdataex_value_uint, tvb, start_offset + val_offset, 4, value);
proto_item_append_text(item, ", Value: %d", value);
break;
}
case DCERPC_REG_SZ: {
char *value;
dissect_spoolss_uint16uni(
tvb, start_offset + val_offset, pinfo, subtree, drep,
&value, hf_value_string);
proto_item_append_text(item, ", Value: %s", value);
g_free(value);
break;
}
case DCERPC_REG_BINARY:
/* FIXME: nicer way to display this */
proto_tree_add_bytes_format_value( subtree, hf_enumprinterdataex_value_binary, tvb, start_offset + val_offset, val_len, NULL, "<binary data>");
break;
case DCERPC_REG_MULTI_SZ:
/* FIXME: implement REG_MULTI_SZ support */
proto_tree_add_bytes_format_value(subtree, hf_enumprinterdataex_value_multi_sz, tvb, start_offset + val_offset, val_len, NULL, "<REG_MULTI_SZ not implemented>");
break;
default:
proto_tree_add_expert_format( subtree, pinfo, &ei_enumprinterdataex_value, tvb, start_offset + val_offset, val_len, "%s: unknown type %d", name, val_type);
}
done:
g_free(name);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 52,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DrawingBufferClientRestoreRenderbufferBinding() {
if (destruction_in_progress_)
return;
if (!ContextGL())
return;
ContextGL()->BindRenderbuffer(GL_RENDERBUFFER,
ObjectOrZero(renderbuffer_binding_.Get()));
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int StreamTcpTest09 (void)
{
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
FAIL_IF(unlikely(p == NULL));
Flow f;
ThreadVars tv;
StreamTcpThread stt;
TCPHdr tcph;
uint8_t payload[1] = {0x42};
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
PacketQueue pq;
memset(&pq,0,sizeof(PacketQueue));
memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof (ThreadVars));
memset(&stt, 0, sizeof(StreamTcpThread));
memset(&tcph, 0, sizeof(TCPHdr));
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
p->flow = &f;
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
stream_config.midstream = TRUE;
tcph.th_win = htons(5480);
tcph.th_seq = htonl(10);
tcph.th_ack = htonl(20);
tcph.th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->tcph = &tcph;
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 1;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(12);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(23);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
FAIL_IF(p->flow->protoctx == NULL);
StreamTcpSetSessionNoReassemblyFlag(((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx)), 0);
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(23);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
FAIL_IF(((TcpSession *) (p->flow->protoctx))->client.seg_list->next != NULL);
StreamTcpSessionClear(p->flow->protoctx);
SCFree(p);
FLOW_DESTROY(&f);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
PASS;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 79,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int i8042_kbd_write(struct serio *port, unsigned char c)
{
unsigned long flags;
int retval = 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&i8042_lock, flags);
if (!(retval = i8042_wait_write())) {
dbg("%02x -> i8042 (kbd-data)\n", c);
i8042_write_data(c);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&i8042_lock, flags);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <[email protected]>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 86,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::MarkLayerComposited() {
if (!isContextLost())
GetDrawingBuffer()->SetBufferClearNeeded(true);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AudioFramesPerBuffer AsAudioFramesPerBuffer(int frames_per_buffer) {
switch (frames_per_buffer) {
case 160: return k160;
case 320: return k320;
case 440: return k440;
case 480: return k480;
case 640: return k640;
case 880: return k880;
case 960: return k960;
case 1440: return k1440;
case 1920: return k1920;
}
return kUnexpectedAudioBufferSize;
}
Commit Message: Avoids crash in WebRTC audio clients for 96kHz render rate on Mac OSX.
TBR=xians
BUG=166523
TEST=Misc set of WebRTC audio clients on Mac.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11773017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@175323 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 117,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutomationProvider::OnChannelError() {
VLOG(1) << "AutomationProxy went away, shutting down app.";
AutomationProviderList::GetInstance()->RemoveProvider(this);
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* Track::GetNameAsUTF8() const
{
return m_info.nameAsUTF8;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool IsFlagExpired(const flags_ui::FeatureEntry& entry) {
return flags::IsFlagExpired(entry.internal_name);
}
Commit Message: Add Virtual Keyboard bordered key experiment to chrome flag
BUG: b/143232594
Change-Id: I76b160ad565649db32a21b984fbed1594b0ae6ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1875347
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: My Nguyen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#710190}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ip_vs_edit_service(struct ip_vs_service *svc, struct ip_vs_service_user_kern *u)
{
struct ip_vs_scheduler *sched, *old_sched;
struct ip_vs_pe *pe = NULL, *old_pe = NULL;
int ret = 0;
/*
* Lookup the scheduler, by 'u->sched_name'
*/
sched = ip_vs_scheduler_get(u->sched_name);
if (sched == NULL) {
pr_info("Scheduler module ip_vs_%s not found\n", u->sched_name);
return -ENOENT;
}
old_sched = sched;
if (u->pe_name && *u->pe_name) {
pe = ip_vs_pe_getbyname(u->pe_name);
if (pe == NULL) {
pr_info("persistence engine module ip_vs_pe_%s "
"not found\n", u->pe_name);
ret = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
old_pe = pe;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6
if (u->af == AF_INET6 && (u->netmask < 1 || u->netmask > 128)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
#endif
write_lock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
/*
* Wait until all other svc users go away.
*/
IP_VS_WAIT_WHILE(atomic_read(&svc->usecnt) > 0);
/*
* Set the flags and timeout value
*/
svc->flags = u->flags | IP_VS_SVC_F_HASHED;
svc->timeout = u->timeout * HZ;
svc->netmask = u->netmask;
old_sched = svc->scheduler;
if (sched != old_sched) {
/*
* Unbind the old scheduler
*/
if ((ret = ip_vs_unbind_scheduler(svc))) {
old_sched = sched;
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* Bind the new scheduler
*/
if ((ret = ip_vs_bind_scheduler(svc, sched))) {
/*
* If ip_vs_bind_scheduler fails, restore the old
* scheduler.
* The main reason of failure is out of memory.
*
* The question is if the old scheduler can be
* restored all the time. TODO: if it cannot be
* restored some time, we must delete the service,
* otherwise the system may crash.
*/
ip_vs_bind_scheduler(svc, old_sched);
old_sched = sched;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
old_pe = svc->pe;
if (pe != old_pe) {
ip_vs_unbind_pe(svc);
ip_vs_bind_pe(svc, pe);
}
out_unlock:
write_unlock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
out:
ip_vs_scheduler_put(old_sched);
ip_vs_pe_put(old_pe);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <[email protected]>
Cc: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err hvcc_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u64 pos;
GF_HEVCConfigurationBox *ptr = (GF_HEVCConfigurationBox *)s;
if (ptr->config) gf_odf_hevc_cfg_del(ptr->config);
pos = gf_bs_get_position(bs);
ptr->config = gf_odf_hevc_cfg_read_bs(bs, (s->type == GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HVCC) ? GF_FALSE : GF_TRUE);
pos = gf_bs_get_position(bs) - pos ;
if (pos < ptr->size)
ptr->size -= (u32) pos;
return ptr->config ? GF_OK : GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PrintRenderFrameHelper::PrintRenderFrameHelper(
content::RenderFrame* render_frame,
std::unique_ptr<Delegate> delegate)
: content::RenderFrameObserver(render_frame),
content::RenderFrameObserverTracker<PrintRenderFrameHelper>(render_frame),
reset_prep_frame_view_(false),
is_print_ready_metafile_sent_(false),
ignore_css_margins_(false),
is_printing_enabled_(true),
notify_browser_of_print_failure_(true),
print_for_preview_(false),
delegate_(std::move(delegate)),
print_node_in_progress_(false),
is_loading_(false),
is_scripted_preview_delayed_(false),
ipc_nesting_level_(0),
render_frame_gone_(false),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
if (!delegate_->IsPrintPreviewEnabled())
DisablePreview();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 149,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs_cpu(int cpu)
{
int node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
struct page *pages;
struct vmcs *vmcs;
pages = __alloc_pages_node(node, GFP_KERNEL, vmcs_config.order);
if (!pages)
return NULL;
vmcs = page_address(pages);
memset(vmcs, 0, vmcs_config.size);
vmcs->revision_id = vmcs_config.revision_id; /* vmcs revision id */
return vmcs;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnUpdateScreenInfo(const ScreenInfo& screen_info) {
if (!main_render_frame_)
GetWidget()->set_screen_info(screen_info);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void setLayoutTestMode(bool value)
{
LayoutTestSupport::setIsRunningLayoutTest(value);
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CronTab::nextRunTime( long timestamp ) {
long runtime = CRONTAB_INVALID;
struct tm *tm;
if ( ! this->valid ) {
this->lastRunTime = CRONTAB_INVALID;
return ( this->lastRunTime );
}
timestamp += ( 60 - ( timestamp % 60 ) );
const time_t _timestamp = (time_t)timestamp;
tm = localtime( &_timestamp );
int fields[CRONTAB_FIELDS];
fields[CRONTAB_MINUTES_IDX] = tm->tm_min;
fields[CRONTAB_HOURS_IDX] = tm->tm_hour;
fields[CRONTAB_DOM_IDX] = tm->tm_mday;
fields[CRONTAB_MONTHS_IDX] = tm->tm_mon + 1;
fields[CRONTAB_DOW_IDX] = tm->tm_wday;
int match[CRONTAB_FIELDS + 1];
match[CRONTAB_YEARS_IDX] = tm->tm_year + 1900;
match[CRONTAB_DOW_IDX] = -1;
if ( this->matchFields( fields, match, CRONTAB_FIELDS - 2 ) ) {
struct tm matchTime;
matchTime.tm_sec = 0;
matchTime.tm_min = match[CRONTAB_MINUTES_IDX];
matchTime.tm_hour = match[CRONTAB_HOURS_IDX];
matchTime.tm_mday = match[CRONTAB_DOM_IDX];
matchTime.tm_mon = match[CRONTAB_MONTHS_IDX] - 1;
matchTime.tm_year = match[CRONTAB_YEARS_IDX] - 1900;
matchTime.tm_isdst = -1; // auto-calculate whether daylight savings time applies
runtime = (long)mktime( &matchTime );
if ( runtime < timestamp ) {
EXCEPT( "CronTab: Generated a runtime that is in the past (%d < %d)"
, (int)runtime, (int)timestamp );
}
} else {
EXCEPT( "CronTab: Failed to find a match for timestamp %d",
(int)timestamp );
}
this->lastRunTime = runtime;
return ( runtime );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::writeDupFileDescriptor(int fd)
{
int dupFd = dup(fd);
if (dupFd < 0) {
return -errno;
}
status_t err = writeFileDescriptor(dupFd, true /*takeOwnership*/);
if (err) {
close(dupFd);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didFinishResourceLoad(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
unsigned identifier) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
InternalDocumentStateData* internal_data =
InternalDocumentStateData::FromDataSource(frame->dataSource());
if (!internal_data->use_error_page())
return;
if (render_view_->devtools_agent_->IsAttached())
return;
std::string error_domain = "http";
int http_status_code = internal_data->http_status_code();
if (GetContentClient()->renderer()->HasErrorPage(
http_status_code, &error_domain)) {
WebURLError error;
error.unreachableURL = frame->document().url();
error.domain = WebString::fromUTF8(error_domain);
error.reason = http_status_code;
LoadNavigationErrorPage(frame->dataSource()->request(), error, true);
}
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void setLogicalWidthForTextRun(RootInlineBox* lineBox, BidiRun* run, RenderText* renderer, float xPos, const LineInfo& lineInfo,
GlyphOverflowAndFallbackFontsMap& textBoxDataMap, VerticalPositionCache& verticalPositionCache, WordMeasurements& wordMeasurements)
{
HashSet<const SimpleFontData*> fallbackFonts;
GlyphOverflow glyphOverflow;
const Font& font = renderer->style(lineInfo.isFirstLine())->font();
if (lineBox->fitsToGlyphs()) {
bool includeRootLine = lineBox->includesRootLineBoxFontOrLeading();
int baselineShift = lineBox->verticalPositionForBox(run->m_box, verticalPositionCache);
int rootDescent = includeRootLine ? font.fontMetrics().descent() : 0;
int rootAscent = includeRootLine ? font.fontMetrics().ascent() : 0;
int boxAscent = font.fontMetrics().ascent() - baselineShift;
int boxDescent = font.fontMetrics().descent() + baselineShift;
if (boxAscent > rootDescent || boxDescent > rootAscent)
glyphOverflow.computeBounds = true;
}
LayoutUnit hyphenWidth = 0;
if (toInlineTextBox(run->m_box)->hasHyphen()) {
const Font& font = renderer->style(lineInfo.isFirstLine())->font();
hyphenWidth = measureHyphenWidth(renderer, font);
}
float measuredWidth = 0;
bool kerningIsEnabled = font.typesettingFeatures() & Kerning;
#if OS(DARWIN)
bool canUseSimpleFontCodePath = renderer->canUseSimpleFontCodePath() && !font.fontDescription().featureSettings();
#else
bool canUseSimpleFontCodePath = renderer->canUseSimpleFontCodePath();
#endif
if (!lineBox->fitsToGlyphs() && canUseSimpleFontCodePath) {
int lastEndOffset = run->m_start;
for (size_t i = 0, size = wordMeasurements.size(); i < size && lastEndOffset < run->m_stop; ++i) {
const WordMeasurement& wordMeasurement = wordMeasurements[i];
if (wordMeasurement.width <=0 || wordMeasurement.startOffset == wordMeasurement.endOffset)
continue;
if (wordMeasurement.renderer != renderer || wordMeasurement.startOffset != lastEndOffset || wordMeasurement.endOffset > run->m_stop)
continue;
lastEndOffset = wordMeasurement.endOffset;
if (kerningIsEnabled && lastEndOffset == run->m_stop) {
int wordLength = lastEndOffset - wordMeasurement.startOffset;
measuredWidth += renderer->width(wordMeasurement.startOffset, wordLength, xPos, lineInfo.isFirstLine());
if (i > 0 && wordLength == 1 && renderer->characterAt(wordMeasurement.startOffset) == ' ')
measuredWidth += renderer->style()->wordSpacing();
} else
measuredWidth += wordMeasurement.width;
if (!wordMeasurement.fallbackFonts.isEmpty()) {
HashSet<const SimpleFontData*>::const_iterator end = wordMeasurement.fallbackFonts.end();
for (HashSet<const SimpleFontData*>::const_iterator it = wordMeasurement.fallbackFonts.begin(); it != end; ++it)
fallbackFonts.add(*it);
}
}
if (measuredWidth && lastEndOffset != run->m_stop) {
measuredWidth = 0;
fallbackFonts.clear();
}
}
if (!measuredWidth)
measuredWidth = renderer->width(run->m_start, run->m_stop - run->m_start, xPos, lineInfo.isFirstLine(), &fallbackFonts, &glyphOverflow);
run->m_box->setLogicalWidth(measuredWidth + hyphenWidth);
if (!fallbackFonts.isEmpty()) {
ASSERT(run->m_box->isText());
GlyphOverflowAndFallbackFontsMap::iterator it = textBoxDataMap.add(toInlineTextBox(run->m_box), make_pair(Vector<const SimpleFontData*>(), GlyphOverflow())).iterator;
ASSERT(it->value.first.isEmpty());
copyToVector(fallbackFonts, it->value.first);
run->m_box->parent()->clearDescendantsHaveSameLineHeightAndBaseline();
}
if ((glyphOverflow.top || glyphOverflow.bottom || glyphOverflow.left || glyphOverflow.right)) {
ASSERT(run->m_box->isText());
GlyphOverflowAndFallbackFontsMap::iterator it = textBoxDataMap.add(toInlineTextBox(run->m_box), make_pair(Vector<const SimpleFontData*>(), GlyphOverflow())).iterator;
it->value.second = glyphOverflow;
run->m_box->clearKnownToHaveNoOverflow();
}
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,410 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: find_rp_for_intro(const rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
char **err_msg_out)
{
extend_info_t *rp = NULL;
char *err_msg = NULL;
const char *rp_nickname = NULL;
const node_t *node = NULL;
if (!intro) {
if (err_msg_out)
err_msg = tor_strdup("Bad parameters to find_rp_for_intro()");
goto err;
}
if (intro->version == 0 || intro->version == 1) {
rp_nickname = (const char *)(intro->u.v0_v1.rp);
node = node_get_by_nickname(rp_nickname, 0);
if (!node) {
if (err_msg_out) {
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
"Couldn't find router %s named in INTRODUCE2 cell",
escaped_safe_str_client(rp_nickname));
}
goto err;
}
/* Are we in single onion mode? */
const int allow_direct = rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(
get_options());
rp = extend_info_from_node(node, allow_direct);
if (!rp) {
if (err_msg_out) {
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
"Couldn't build extend_info_t for router %s named "
"in INTRODUCE2 cell",
escaped_safe_str_client(rp_nickname));
}
goto err;
}
} else if (intro->version == 2) {
rp = extend_info_dup(intro->u.v2.extend_info);
} else if (intro->version == 3) {
rp = extend_info_dup(intro->u.v3.extend_info);
} else {
if (err_msg_out) {
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
"Unknown version %d in INTRODUCE2 cell",
(int)(intro->version));
}
goto err;
}
/* rp is always set here: extend_info_dup guarantees a non-NULL result, and
* the other cases goto err. */
tor_assert(rp);
/* Make sure the RP we are being asked to connect to is _not_ a private
* address unless it's allowed. Let's avoid to build a circuit to our
* second middle node and fail right after when extending to the RP. */
if (!extend_info_addr_is_allowed(&rp->addr)) {
if (err_msg_out) {
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
"Relay IP in INTRODUCE2 cell is private address.");
}
extend_info_free(rp);
rp = NULL;
goto err;
}
goto done;
err:
if (err_msg_out)
*err_msg_out = err_msg;
else
tor_free(err_msg);
done:
return rp;
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532 | 0 | 69,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int g_input_add_poll(int fd, int priority, int condition,
GInputFunction function, void *data)
{
GIOChannel *source = g_io_channel_unix_new(fd);
int ret = g_input_add_full(source, priority, condition, function, data);
g_io_channel_unref(source);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 63,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::WidgetDestroyed() {
DCHECK_GT(widget_count_, 0);
DCHECK_GT(widget_count_, hidden_widget_count_);
widget_count_--;
if (RendererIsHidden())
OnRendererHidden();
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int pdf_add_line(struct pdf_doc *pdf, struct pdf_object *page,
int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2, int width, uint32_t colour)
{
int ret;
struct dstr str = {0, 0, 0};
dstr_append(&str, "BT\r\n");
dstr_printf(&str, "%d w\r\n", width);
dstr_printf(&str, "%d %d m\r\n", x1, y1);
dstr_printf(&str, "/DeviceRGB CS\r\n");
dstr_printf(&str, "%f %f %f RG\r\n",
PDF_RGB_R(colour), PDF_RGB_G(colour), PDF_RGB_B(colour));
dstr_printf(&str, "%d %d l S\r\n", x2, y2);
dstr_append(&str, "ET");
ret = pdf_add_stream(pdf, page, str.data);
dstr_free(&str);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::Closed(MediaStreamType stream_type,
int capture_session_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xcrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_xcrs *guest_xcrs)
{
int i, r = 0;
if (!cpu_has_xsave)
return -EINVAL;
if (guest_xcrs->nr_xcrs > KVM_MAX_XCRS || guest_xcrs->flags)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < guest_xcrs->nr_xcrs; i++)
/* Only support XCR0 currently */
if (guest_xcrs->xcrs[0].xcr == XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK) {
r = __kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK,
guest_xcrs->xcrs[0].value);
break;
}
if (r)
r = -EINVAL;
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct Packet *ssh_new_packet(void)
{
struct Packet *pkt = snew(struct Packet);
pkt->body = pkt->data = NULL;
pkt->maxlen = 0;
return pkt;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPage::setViewportSize(const Platform::IntSize& viewportSize, bool ensureFocusElementVisible)
{
d->setViewportSize(viewportSize, ensureFocusElementVisible);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CNBL::ParseCSO(TClassPred IsClass, TOffloadPred IsOffload,
TSupportedPred IsSupported, LPSTR OffloadName)
{
ASSERT(IsClass());
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(IsClass);
if (IsOffload())
{
if(!IsSupported())
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] %s request when it is not supported\n", __FUNCTION__, OffloadName));
#if FAIL_UNEXPECTED
return false;
#endif
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType TraceRectangle(PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,
const PointInfo start,const PointInfo end)
{
PointInfo
point;
register PrimitiveInfo
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
p=primitive_info;
if (TracePoint(p,start) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p+=p->coordinates;
point.x=start.x;
point.y=end.y;
if (TracePoint(p,point) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p+=p->coordinates;
if (TracePoint(p,end) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p+=p->coordinates;
point.x=end.x;
point.y=start.y;
if (TracePoint(p,point) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p+=p->coordinates;
if (TracePoint(p,start) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p+=p->coordinates;
primitive_info->coordinates=(size_t) (p-primitive_info);
primitive_info->closed_subpath=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) primitive_info->coordinates; i++)
{
p->primitive=primitive_info->primitive;
p--;
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: | 0 | 87,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cryptd_blkcipher_crypt(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
struct crypto_blkcipher *child,
int err,
int (*crypt)(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int len))
{
struct cryptd_blkcipher_request_ctx *rctx;
struct blkcipher_desc desc;
rctx = ablkcipher_request_ctx(req);
if (unlikely(err == -EINPROGRESS))
goto out;
desc.tfm = child;
desc.info = req->info;
desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
err = crypt(&desc, req->dst, req->src, req->nbytes);
req->base.complete = rctx->complete;
out:
local_bh_disable();
rctx->complete(&req->base, err);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::send_command_proxy(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_COMMANDTYPE cmd,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 param1,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR cmdData
)
{
(void)hComp;
(void)cmdData;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
OMX_STATETYPE eState = (OMX_STATETYPE) param1;
int bFlag = 1;
if (cmd == OMX_CommandStateSet) {
/***************************/
/* Current State is Loaded */
/***************************/
if (m_state == OMX_StateLoaded) {
if (eState == OMX_StateIdle) {
if (allocate_done() ||
( m_sInPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE && m_sOutPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMXCORE-SM: Loaded-->Idle");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMXCORE-SM: Loaded-->Idle-Pending");
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING);
bFlag = 0;
}
}
/* Requesting transition from Loaded to Loaded */
else if (eState == OMX_StateLoaded) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Loaded-->Loaded");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorSameState,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorSameState;
}
/* Requesting transition from Loaded to WaitForResources */
else if (eState == OMX_StateWaitForResources) {
/* Since error is None , we will post an event
at the end of this function definition */
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMXCORE-SM: Loaded-->WaitForResources");
}
/* Requesting transition from Loaded to Executing */
else if (eState == OMX_StateExecuting) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Loaded-->Executing");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition;
}
/* Requesting transition from Loaded to Pause */
else if (eState == OMX_StatePause) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Loaded-->Pause");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition;
}
/* Requesting transition from Loaded to Invalid */
else if (eState == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Loaded-->Invalid");
post_event(OMX_EventError,eState,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Loaded-->%d Not Handled",\
eState);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
/***************************/
/* Current State is IDLE */
/***************************/
else if (m_state == OMX_StateIdle) {
if (eState == OMX_StateLoaded) {
if (release_done()) {
/*
Since error is None , we will post an event at the end
of this function definition
*/
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMXCORE-SM: Idle-->Loaded");
if (dev_stop() != 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_stop() failed at Idle --> Loaded");
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMXCORE-SM: Idle-->Loaded-Pending");
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_LOADING_PENDING);
bFlag = 0;
}
}
/* Requesting transition from Idle to Executing */
else if (eState == OMX_StateExecuting) {
if ( dev_start() ) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_start() failed in SCP on Idle --> Exe");
omx_report_error ();
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
} else {
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_EXECUTE_PENDING);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMXCORE-SM: Idle-->Executing");
bFlag = 0;
}
dev_start_done();
}
/* Requesting transition from Idle to Idle */
else if (eState == OMX_StateIdle) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Idle-->Idle");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorSameState,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorSameState;
}
/* Requesting transition from Idle to WaitForResources */
else if (eState == OMX_StateWaitForResources) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Idle-->WaitForResources");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition;
}
/* Requesting transition from Idle to Pause */
else if (eState == OMX_StatePause) {
/*To pause the Video core we need to start the driver*/
if ( dev_start() ) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_start() failed in SCP on Idle --> Pause");
omx_report_error ();
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
} else {
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_PAUSE_PENDING);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMXCORE-SM: Idle-->Pause");
bFlag = 0;
}
}
/* Requesting transition from Idle to Invalid */
else if (eState == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Idle-->Invalid");
post_event(OMX_EventError,eState,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Idle --> %d Not Handled",eState);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
/******************************/
/* Current State is Executing */
/******************************/
else if (m_state == OMX_StateExecuting) {
/* Requesting transition from Executing to Idle */
if (eState == OMX_StateIdle) {
/* Since error is None , we will post an event
at the end of this function definition
*/
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMXCORE-SM: Executing --> Idle");
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING);
execute_omx_flush(OMX_ALL);
bFlag = 0;
}
/* Requesting transition from Executing to Paused */
else if (eState == OMX_StatePause) {
if (dev_pause()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_pause() failed in SCP on Exe --> Pause");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorHardware,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
} else {
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_PAUSE_PENDING);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMXCORE-SM: Executing-->Pause");
bFlag = 0;
}
}
/* Requesting transition from Executing to Loaded */
else if (eState == OMX_StateLoaded) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Executing --> Loaded");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition;
}
/* Requesting transition from Executing to WaitForResources */
else if (eState == OMX_StateWaitForResources) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Executing --> WaitForResources");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition;
}
/* Requesting transition from Executing to Executing */
else if (eState == OMX_StateExecuting) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Executing --> Executing");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorSameState,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorSameState;
}
/* Requesting transition from Executing to Invalid */
else if (eState == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Executing --> Invalid");
post_event(OMX_EventError,eState,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Executing --> %d Not Handled",eState);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
/***************************/
/* Current State is Pause */
/***************************/
else if (m_state == OMX_StatePause) {
/* Requesting transition from Pause to Executing */
if (eState == OMX_StateExecuting) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Pause --> Executing");
if ( dev_resume() ) {
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorHardware,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
} else {
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_EXECUTE_PENDING);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMXCORE-SM: Pause-->Executing");
post_event (0, 0, OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_RESUME_DONE);
bFlag = 0;
}
}
/* Requesting transition from Pause to Idle */
else if (eState == OMX_StateIdle) {
/* Since error is None , we will post an event
at the end of this function definition */
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Pause --> Idle");
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING);
execute_omx_flush(OMX_ALL);
bFlag = 0;
}
/* Requesting transition from Pause to loaded */
else if (eState == OMX_StateLoaded) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Pause --> loaded");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition;
}
/* Requesting transition from Pause to WaitForResources */
else if (eState == OMX_StateWaitForResources) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Pause --> WaitForResources");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition;
}
/* Requesting transition from Pause to Pause */
else if (eState == OMX_StatePause) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Pause --> Pause");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorSameState,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorSameState;
}
/* Requesting transition from Pause to Invalid */
else if (eState == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Pause --> Invalid");
post_event(OMX_EventError,eState,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Paused --> %d Not Handled",eState);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
/***************************/
/* Current State is WaitForResources */
/***************************/
else if (m_state == OMX_StateWaitForResources) {
/* Requesting transition from WaitForResources to Loaded */
if (eState == OMX_StateLoaded) {
/* Since error is None , we will post an event
at the end of this function definition */
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMXCORE-SM: WaitForResources-->Loaded");
}
/* Requesting transition from WaitForResources to WaitForResources */
else if (eState == OMX_StateWaitForResources) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: WaitForResources-->WaitForResources");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorSameState,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorSameState;
}
/* Requesting transition from WaitForResources to Executing */
else if (eState == OMX_StateExecuting) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: WaitForResources-->Executing");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition;
}
/* Requesting transition from WaitForResources to Pause */
else if (eState == OMX_StatePause) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: WaitForResources-->Pause");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateTransition;
}
/* Requesting transition from WaitForResources to Invalid */
else if (eState == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: WaitForResources-->Invalid");
post_event(OMX_EventError,eState,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
/* Requesting transition from WaitForResources to Loaded -
is NOT tested by Khronos TS */
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: %d --> %d(Not Handled)",m_state,eState);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
/********************************/
/* Current State is Invalid */
/*******************************/
else if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
/* State Transition from Inavlid to any state */
if (eState == (OMX_StateLoaded || OMX_StateWaitForResources
|| OMX_StateIdle || OMX_StateExecuting
|| OMX_StatePause || OMX_StateInvalid)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMXCORE-SM: Invalid -->Loaded");
post_event(OMX_EventError,OMX_ErrorInvalidState,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
} else if (cmd == OMX_CommandFlush) {
if (0 == param1 || OMX_ALL == param1) {
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_FLUSH_PENDING);
}
if (1 == param1 || OMX_ALL == param1) {
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_FLUSH_PENDING);
}
execute_omx_flush(param1);
bFlag = 0;
} else if ( cmd == OMX_CommandPortEnable) {
if (param1 == PORT_INDEX_IN || param1 == OMX_ALL) {
m_sInPortDef.bEnabled = OMX_TRUE;
if ( (m_state == OMX_StateLoaded &&
!BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING))
|| allocate_input_done()) {
post_event(OMX_CommandPortEnable,PORT_INDEX_IN,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMXCORE-SM: Disabled-->Enabled Pending");
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_ENABLE_PENDING);
bFlag = 0;
}
}
if (param1 == PORT_INDEX_OUT || param1 == OMX_ALL) {
m_sOutPortDef.bEnabled = OMX_TRUE;
if ( (m_state == OMX_StateLoaded &&
!BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING))
|| (allocate_output_done())) {
post_event(OMX_CommandPortEnable,PORT_INDEX_OUT,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMXCORE-SM: Disabled-->Enabled Pending");
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_ENABLE_PENDING);
bFlag = 0;
}
}
} else if (cmd == OMX_CommandPortDisable) {
if (param1 == PORT_INDEX_IN || param1 == OMX_ALL) {
m_sInPortDef.bEnabled = OMX_FALSE;
if ((m_state == OMX_StateLoaded || m_state == OMX_StateIdle)
&& release_input_done()) {
post_event(OMX_CommandPortDisable,PORT_INDEX_IN,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
} else {
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_DISABLE_PENDING);
if (m_state == OMX_StatePause ||m_state == OMX_StateExecuting) {
execute_omx_flush(PORT_INDEX_IN);
}
bFlag = 0;
}
}
if (param1 == PORT_INDEX_OUT || param1 == OMX_ALL) {
m_sOutPortDef.bEnabled = OMX_FALSE;
if ((m_state == OMX_StateLoaded || m_state == OMX_StateIdle)
&& release_output_done()) {
post_event(OMX_CommandPortDisable,PORT_INDEX_OUT,\
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
} else {
BITMASK_SET(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_DISABLE_PENDING);
if (m_state == OMX_StatePause ||m_state == OMX_StateExecuting) {
execute_omx_flush(PORT_INDEX_OUT);
}
bFlag = 0;
}
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Command received other than StateSet (%d)",cmd);
eRet = OMX_ErrorNotImplemented;
}
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone && bFlag) {
post_event(cmd,eState,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
sem_post(&m_cmd_lock);
return eRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 cpu_based_vm_exec_control;
/* clear pending NMI */
cpu_based_vm_exec_control = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
cpu_based_vm_exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING;
vmcs_write32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, cpu_based_vm_exec_control);
++vcpu->stat.nmi_window_exits;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __vma_address(struct page *page, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
pgoff_t pgoff = page->index << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT);
if (unlikely(is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)))
pgoff = page->index << huge_page_order(page_hstate(page));
return vma->vm_start + ((pgoff - vma->vm_pgoff) << PAGE_SHIFT);
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 38,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sycc420_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
int *d0, *d1, *d2, *r, *g, *b, *nr, *ng, *nb;
const int *y, *cb, *cr, *ny;
size_t maxw, maxh, max, offx, loopmaxw, offy, loopmaxh;
int offset, upb;
size_t i;
upb = (int)img->comps[0].prec;
offset = 1<<(upb - 1); upb = (1<<upb)-1;
maxw = (size_t)img->comps[0].w; maxh = (size_t)img->comps[0].h;
max = maxw * maxh;
y = img->comps[0].data;
cb = img->comps[1].data;
cr = img->comps[2].data;
d0 = r = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d1 = g = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d2 = b = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
if (r == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) goto fails;
/* if img->x0 is odd, then first column shall use Cb/Cr = 0 */
offx = img->x0 & 1U;
loopmaxw = maxw - offx;
/* if img->y0 is odd, then first line shall use Cb/Cr = 0 */
offy = img->y0 & 1U;
loopmaxh = maxh - offy;
if (offy > 0U) {
size_t j;
for(j=0; j < maxw; ++j)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, 0, 0, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
}
}
for(i=0U; i < (loopmaxh & ~(size_t)1U); i += 2U)
{
size_t j;
ny = y + maxw;
nr = r + maxw; ng = g + maxw; nb = b + maxw;
if (offx > 0U) {
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, 0, 0, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb;
}
for(j=0; j < (loopmaxw & ~(size_t)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if(j < loopmaxw)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb; ++cb; ++cr;
}
y += maxw; r += maxw; g += maxw; b += maxw;
}
if(i < loopmaxh)
{
size_t j;
for(j=0U; j < (maxw & ~(size_t)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if(j < maxw)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
}
}
free(img->comps[0].data); img->comps[0].data = d0;
free(img->comps[1].data); img->comps[1].data = d1;
free(img->comps[2].data); img->comps[2].data = d2;
img->comps[1].w = img->comps[2].w = img->comps[0].w;
img->comps[1].h = img->comps[2].h = img->comps[0].h;
img->comps[1].dx = img->comps[2].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[1].dy = img->comps[2].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
img->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
return;
fails:
free(r);
free(g);
free(b);
}/* sycc420_to_rgb() */
Commit Message: Fix Heap Buffer Overflow in function color_cmyk_to_rgb
Fix uclouvain/openjpeg#774
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rtnl_bridge_setlink(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct ifinfomsg *ifm;
struct net_device *dev;
struct nlattr *br_spec, *attr = NULL;
int rem, err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
u16 flags = 0;
bool have_flags = false;
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*ifm))
return -EINVAL;
ifm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
if (ifm->ifi_family != AF_BRIDGE)
return -EPFNOSUPPORT;
dev = __dev_get_by_index(net, ifm->ifi_index);
if (!dev) {
pr_info("PF_BRIDGE: RTM_SETLINK with unknown ifindex\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
br_spec = nlmsg_find_attr(nlh, sizeof(struct ifinfomsg), IFLA_AF_SPEC);
if (br_spec) {
nla_for_each_nested(attr, br_spec, rem) {
if (nla_type(attr) == IFLA_BRIDGE_FLAGS) {
if (nla_len(attr) < sizeof(flags))
return -EINVAL;
have_flags = true;
flags = nla_get_u16(attr);
break;
}
}
}
if (!flags || (flags & BRIDGE_FLAGS_MASTER)) {
struct net_device *br_dev = netdev_master_upper_dev_get(dev);
if (!br_dev || !br_dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_setlink) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
err = br_dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_setlink(dev, nlh, flags);
if (err)
goto out;
flags &= ~BRIDGE_FLAGS_MASTER;
}
if ((flags & BRIDGE_FLAGS_SELF)) {
if (!dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_setlink)
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
else
err = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_setlink(dev, nlh,
flags);
if (!err) {
flags &= ~BRIDGE_FLAGS_SELF;
/* Generate event to notify upper layer of bridge
* change
*/
err = rtnl_bridge_notify(dev);
}
}
if (have_flags)
memcpy(nla_data(attr), &flags, sizeof(flags));
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t ChooseBufferSize(size_t callback_buffer_size) {
size_t buffer_size =
1 << static_cast<unsigned>(log2(4 * callback_buffer_size) + 0.5);
if (buffer_size < 256)
return 256;
if (buffer_size > 16384)
return 16384;
return buffer_size;
}
Commit Message: Keep ScriptProcessorHandler alive across threads
When posting a task from the ScriptProcessorHandler::Process to fire a
process event, we need to keep the handler alive in case the
ScriptProcessorNode goes away (because it has no onaudioprocess
handler) and removes the its handler.
Bug: 765495
Test:
Change-Id: Ib4fa39d7b112c7051897700a1eff9f59a4a7a054
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/677137
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503629}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 150,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int match_hist_bytes(sc_card_t *card, const char *str, size_t len)
{
const char *src = (const char *) card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes;
size_t srclen = card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len;
size_t offset = 0;
if (len == 0)
len = strlen(str);
if (srclen < len)
return 0;
while (srclen - offset > len) {
if (memcmp(src + offset, str, len) == 0) {
return 1;
}
offset++;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cm_init_av_by_path(struct ib_sa_path_rec *path, struct cm_av *av)
{
struct cm_device *cm_dev;
struct cm_port *port = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
u8 p;
read_lock_irqsave(&cm.device_lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(cm_dev, &cm.device_list, list) {
if (!ib_find_cached_gid(cm_dev->ib_device, &path->sgid,
&p, NULL)) {
port = cm_dev->port[p-1];
break;
}
}
read_unlock_irqrestore(&cm.device_lock, flags);
if (!port)
return -EINVAL;
ret = ib_find_cached_pkey(cm_dev->ib_device, port->port_num,
be16_to_cpu(path->pkey), &av->pkey_index);
if (ret)
return ret;
av->port = port;
ib_init_ah_from_path(cm_dev->ib_device, port->port_num, path,
&av->ah_attr);
av->timeout = path->packet_life_time + 1;
memcpy(av->smac, path->smac, sizeof(av->smac));
av->valid = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoResult Core::BeginWriteData(MojoHandle data_pipe_producer_handle,
void** buffer,
uint32_t* buffer_num_bytes,
MojoWriteDataFlags flags) {
RequestContext request_context;
scoped_refptr<Dispatcher> dispatcher(
GetDispatcher(data_pipe_producer_handle));
if (!dispatcher)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return dispatcher->BeginWriteData(buffer, buffer_num_bytes, flags);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ImageBitmapFactories& ImageBitmapFactories::From(EventTarget& event_target) {
if (LocalDOMWindow* window = event_target.ToLocalDOMWindow())
return FromInternal(*window);
return ImageBitmapFactories::FromInternal(
*To<WorkerGlobalScope>(event_target.GetExecutionContext()));
}
Commit Message: Fix UAP in ImageBitmapLoader/FileReaderLoader
FileReaderLoader stores its client as a raw pointer, so in cases like
ImageBitmapLoader where the FileReaderLoaderClient really is garbage
collected we have to make sure to destroy the FileReaderLoader when
the ExecutionContext that owns it is destroyed.
Bug: 913970
Change-Id: I40b02115367cf7bf5bbbbb8e9b57874d2510f861
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1374511
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616342}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NetworkActionPredictor::~NetworkActionPredictor() {
}
Commit Message: Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 107,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType LevelImage(Image *image,const double black_point,
const double white_point,const double gamma,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define LevelImageTag "Level/Image"
CacheView
*image_view;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Allocate and initialize levels map.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
/*
Level colormap.
*/
if ((GetPixelRedTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].red=(double) ClampToQuantum(LevelPixel(black_point,
white_point,gamma,image->colormap[i].red));
if ((GetPixelGreenTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].green=(double) ClampToQuantum(LevelPixel(black_point,
white_point,gamma,image->colormap[i].green));
if ((GetPixelBlueTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].blue=(double) ClampToQuantum(LevelPixel(black_point,
white_point,gamma,image->colormap[i].blue));
if ((GetPixelAlphaTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].alpha=(double) ClampToQuantum(LevelPixel(black_point,
white_point,gamma,image->colormap[i].alpha));
}
/*
Level image.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(progress,status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
if (GetPixelWriteMask(image,q) == 0)
{
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
continue;
}
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); j++)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,j);
PixelTrait traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
if ((traits & UpdatePixelTrait) == 0)
continue;
q[j]=ClampToQuantum(LevelPixel(black_point,white_point,gamma,
(double) q[j]));
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp critical (MagickCore_LevelImage)
#endif
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,LevelImageTag,progress++,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
(void) ClampImage(image,exception);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/663
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/655
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 62,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void scoop_register_types(void)
{
type_register_static(&scoop_sysbus_info);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fuse_request_send_background_locked(struct fuse_conn *fc,
struct fuse_req *req)
{
req->isreply = 1;
fuse_request_send_nowait_locked(fc, req);
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xt_client_set_info(Widget w, unsigned long flags)
{
Atom atom_XEMBED_INFO = XInternAtom(x_display, "_XEMBED_INFO", False);
unsigned long buffer[2];
buffer[1] = 0; /* Protocol version */
buffer[1] = flags;
XChangeProperty(XtDisplay(w), XtWindow(w),
atom_XEMBED_INFO,
atom_XEMBED_INFO,
32, PropModeReplace, (unsigned char *)buffer, 2);
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XRRFreeMonitors(XRRMonitorInfo *monitors)
{
Xfree(monitors);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UserSelectionScreen::FillMultiProfileUserPrefs(
user_manager::User* user,
base::DictionaryValue* user_dict,
bool is_signin_to_add) {
if (!is_signin_to_add) {
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyMultiProfilesAllowed, true);
return;
}
bool is_user_allowed;
ash::mojom::MultiProfileUserBehavior policy;
GetMultiProfilePolicy(user, &is_user_allowed, &policy);
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyMultiProfilesAllowed, is_user_allowed);
user_dict->SetInteger(kKeyMultiProfilesPolicy, static_cast<int>(policy));
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used
If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void convert_channels_short_interleaved(int buf_c, short *buffer, int data_c, float **data, int d_offset, int len)
{
int i;
check_endianness();
if (buf_c != data_c && buf_c <= 2 && data_c <= 6) {
assert(buf_c == 2);
for (i=0; i < buf_c; ++i)
compute_stereo_samples(buffer, data_c, data, d_offset, len);
} else {
int limit = buf_c < data_c ? buf_c : data_c;
int j;
for (j=0; j < len; ++j) {
for (i=0; i < limit; ++i) {
FASTDEF(temp);
float f = data[i][d_offset+j];
int v = FAST_SCALED_FLOAT_TO_INT(temp, f,15);//data[i][d_offset+j],15);
if ((unsigned int) (v + 32768) > 65535)
v = v < 0 ? -32768 : 32767;
*buffer++ = v;
}
for ( ; i < buf_c; ++i)
*buffer++ = 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 75,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit DeferredTaskSetDateTimeInput(WebPagePrivate* webPagePrivate, BlackBerry::Platform::String value)
: DeferredTaskType(webPagePrivate)
{
webPagePrivate->m_cachedDateTimeInput = value;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const aura::Window::Windows GetWindows(WindowCycleController* controller) {
return controller->window_cycle_list()->windows();
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __exit sco_exit(void)
{
bt_procfs_cleanup(&init_net, "sco");
debugfs_remove(sco_debugfs);
if (bt_sock_unregister(BTPROTO_SCO) < 0)
BT_ERR("SCO socket unregistration failed");
proto_unregister(&sco_proto);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: SCO - Fix missing msg_namelen update in sco_sock_recvmsg()
If the socket is in state BT_CONNECT2 and BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP is set in
the flags, sco_sock_recvmsg() returns early with 0 without updating the
possibly set msg_namelen member. This, in turn, leads to a 128 byte
kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadManagerDelegate::GetNextId(const DownloadIdCallback& callback) {
callback.Run(content::DownloadItem::kInvalidId);
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void drain_alien_cache(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
struct alien_cache **alien)
{
int i = 0;
struct alien_cache *alc;
struct array_cache *ac;
unsigned long flags;
for_each_online_node(i) {
alc = alien[i];
if (alc) {
LIST_HEAD(list);
ac = &alc->ac;
spin_lock_irqsave(&alc->lock, flags);
__drain_alien_cache(cachep, ac, i, &list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&alc->lock, flags);
slabs_destroy(cachep, &list);
}
}
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_control_compat(struct usb_dev_state *ps,
struct usbdevfs_ctrltransfer32 __user *p32)
{
struct usbdevfs_ctrltransfer __user *p;
__u32 udata;
p = compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(*p));
if (copy_in_user(p, p32, (sizeof(*p32) - sizeof(compat_caddr_t))) ||
get_user(udata, &p32->data) ||
put_user(compat_ptr(udata), &p->data))
return -EFAULT;
return proc_control(ps, p);
}
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void initialize_transaction(int lbl)
{
pthread_mutex_lock(&device.lbllock);
if(lbl < MAX_TRANSACTIONS_PER_SESSION)
{
device.transaction[lbl].lbl = lbl;
device.transaction[lbl].in_use=FALSE;
device.transaction[lbl].handle=0;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&device.lbllock);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: calculate_path_table_size(struct vdd *vdd)
{
int depth, size;
struct path_table *pt;
pt = vdd->pathtbl;
size = 0;
for (depth = 0; depth < vdd->max_depth; depth++) {
struct isoent **ptbl;
int i, cnt;
if ((cnt = pt[depth].cnt) == 0)
break;
ptbl = pt[depth].sorted;
for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
int len;
if (ptbl[i]->identifier == NULL)
len = 1; /* root directory */
else
len = ptbl[i]->id_len;
if (len & 0x01)
len++; /* Padding Field */
size += 8 + len;
}
}
vdd->path_table_size = size;
vdd->path_table_block =
((size + PATH_TABLE_BLOCK_SIZE -1) /
PATH_TABLE_BLOCK_SIZE) *
(PATH_TABLE_BLOCK_SIZE / LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 50,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void skb_over_panic(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int sz, void *addr)
{
skb_panic(skb, sz, addr, __func__);
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 39,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s)
{
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
{
freelist_insert(s->ctx, 1, s->s3->rbuf.len, s->s3->rbuf.buf);
s->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Huff_addRef(huff_t* huff, byte ch) {
node_t *tnode, *tnode2;
if (huff->loc[ch] == NULL) { /* if this is the first transmission of this node */
tnode = &(huff->nodeList[huff->blocNode++]);
tnode2 = &(huff->nodeList[huff->blocNode++]);
tnode2->symbol = INTERNAL_NODE;
tnode2->weight = 1;
tnode2->next = huff->lhead->next;
if (huff->lhead->next) {
huff->lhead->next->prev = tnode2;
if (huff->lhead->next->weight == 1) {
tnode2->head = huff->lhead->next->head;
} else {
tnode2->head = get_ppnode(huff);
*tnode2->head = tnode2;
}
} else {
tnode2->head = get_ppnode(huff);
*tnode2->head = tnode2;
}
huff->lhead->next = tnode2;
tnode2->prev = huff->lhead;
tnode->symbol = ch;
tnode->weight = 1;
tnode->next = huff->lhead->next;
if (huff->lhead->next) {
huff->lhead->next->prev = tnode;
if (huff->lhead->next->weight == 1) {
tnode->head = huff->lhead->next->head;
} else {
/* this should never happen */
tnode->head = get_ppnode(huff);
*tnode->head = tnode2;
}
} else {
/* this should never happen */
tnode->head = get_ppnode(huff);
*tnode->head = tnode;
}
huff->lhead->next = tnode;
tnode->prev = huff->lhead;
tnode->left = tnode->right = NULL;
if (huff->lhead->parent) {
if (huff->lhead->parent->left == huff->lhead) { /* lhead is guaranteed to by the NYT */
huff->lhead->parent->left = tnode2;
} else {
huff->lhead->parent->right = tnode2;
}
} else {
huff->tree = tnode2;
}
tnode2->right = tnode;
tnode2->left = huff->lhead;
tnode2->parent = huff->lhead->parent;
huff->lhead->parent = tnode->parent = tnode2;
huff->loc[ch] = tnode;
increment(huff, tnode2->parent);
} else {
increment(huff, huff->loc[ch]);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsShowingContextMenu() const {
return showing_context_menu_;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
{
if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
if (!iint) {
iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
if (!iint)
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len, iint);
}
Commit Message: EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 55,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Range> Document::caretRangeFromPoint(int x, int y)
{
if (!layoutView())
return nullptr;
HitTestResult result = hitTestInDocument(this, x, y);
PositionWithAffinity positionWithAffinity = result.position();
if (positionWithAffinity.position().isNull())
return nullptr;
Position rangeCompliantPosition = positionWithAffinity.position().parentAnchoredEquivalent();
return Range::createAdjustedToTreeScope(*this, rangeCompliantPosition);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool sk_ns_capable(const struct sock *sk,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, int cap)
{
return file_ns_capable(sk->sk_socket->file, user_ns, cap) &&
ns_capable(user_ns, cap);
}
Commit Message: net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 47,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool skb_page_frag_refill(unsigned int sz, struct page_frag *pfrag, gfp_t gfp)
{
if (pfrag->page) {
if (page_ref_count(pfrag->page) == 1) {
pfrag->offset = 0;
return true;
}
if (pfrag->offset + sz <= pfrag->size)
return true;
put_page(pfrag->page);
}
pfrag->offset = 0;
if (SKB_FRAG_PAGE_ORDER) {
/* Avoid direct reclaim but allow kswapd to wake */
pfrag->page = alloc_pages((gfp & ~__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM) |
__GFP_COMP | __GFP_NOWARN |
__GFP_NORETRY,
SKB_FRAG_PAGE_ORDER);
if (likely(pfrag->page)) {
pfrag->size = PAGE_SIZE << SKB_FRAG_PAGE_ORDER;
return true;
}
}
pfrag->page = alloc_page(gfp);
if (likely(pfrag->page)) {
pfrag->size = PAGE_SIZE;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 47,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btsock_thread_wakeup(int h)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("thread handle:%d, cmd socket is not created", h);
return FALSE;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_WAKEUP, 0, 0, 0, 0};
return send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0) == sizeof(cmd);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 173,464 |
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