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stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
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Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: print_html_status(pe_working_set_t * data_set, const char *filename, gboolean web_cgi)
{
FILE *stream;
GListPtr gIter = NULL;
node_t *dc = NULL;
static int updates = 0;
char *filename_tmp = NULL;
if (web_cgi) {
stream = stdout;
fprintf(stream, "Content-type: text/html\n\n");
} else {
filename_tmp = crm_concat(filename, "tmp", '.');
stream = fopen(filename_tmp, "w");
if (stream == NULL) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Cannot open %s for writing", filename_tmp);
free(filename_tmp);
return -1;
}
}
updates++;
dc = data_set->dc_node;
fprintf(stream, "<html>");
fprintf(stream, "<head>");
fprintf(stream, "<title>Cluster status</title>");
/* content="%d;url=http://webdesign.about.com" */
fprintf(stream, "<meta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"%d\">", reconnect_msec / 1000);
fprintf(stream, "</head>");
/*** SUMMARY ***/
fprintf(stream, "<h2>Cluster summary</h2>");
{
char *now_str = NULL;
time_t now = time(NULL);
now_str = ctime(&now);
now_str[24] = EOS; /* replace the newline */
fprintf(stream, "Last updated: <b>%s</b><br/>\n", now_str);
}
if (dc == NULL) {
fprintf(stream, "Current DC: <font color=\"red\"><b>NONE</b></font><br/>");
} else {
fprintf(stream, "Current DC: %s (%s)<br/>", dc->details->uname, dc->details->id);
}
fprintf(stream, "%d Nodes configured.<br/>", g_list_length(data_set->nodes));
fprintf(stream, "%d Resources configured.<br/>", count_resources(data_set, NULL));
/*** CONFIG ***/
fprintf(stream, "<h3>Config Options</h3>\n");
fprintf(stream, "<table>\n");
fprintf(stream, "<tr><td>STONITH of failed nodes</td><td>:</td><td>%s</td></tr>\n",
is_set(data_set->flags, pe_flag_stonith_enabled) ? "enabled" : "disabled");
fprintf(stream, "<tr><td>Cluster is</td><td>:</td><td>%ssymmetric</td></tr>\n",
is_set(data_set->flags, pe_flag_symmetric_cluster) ? "" : "a-");
fprintf(stream, "<tr><td>No Quorum Policy</td><td>:</td><td>");
switch (data_set->no_quorum_policy) {
case no_quorum_freeze:
fprintf(stream, "Freeze resources");
break;
case no_quorum_stop:
fprintf(stream, "Stop ALL resources");
break;
case no_quorum_ignore:
fprintf(stream, "Ignore");
break;
case no_quorum_suicide:
fprintf(stream, "Suicide");
break;
}
fprintf(stream, "\n</td></tr>\n</table>\n");
/*** NODE LIST ***/
fprintf(stream, "<h2>Node List</h2>\n");
fprintf(stream, "<ul>\n");
for (gIter = data_set->nodes; gIter != NULL; gIter = gIter->next) {
node_t *node = (node_t *) gIter->data;
fprintf(stream, "<li>");
if (node->details->standby_onfail && node->details->online) {
fprintf(stream, "Node: %s (%s): %s", node->details->uname, node->details->id,
"<font color=\"orange\">standby (on-fail)</font>\n");
} else if (node->details->standby && node->details->online) {
fprintf(stream, "Node: %s (%s): %s", node->details->uname, node->details->id,
"<font color=\"orange\">standby</font>\n");
} else if (node->details->standby) {
fprintf(stream, "Node: %s (%s): %s", node->details->uname, node->details->id,
"<font color=\"red\">OFFLINE (standby)</font>\n");
} else if (node->details->online) {
fprintf(stream, "Node: %s (%s): %s", node->details->uname, node->details->id,
"<font color=\"green\">online</font>\n");
} else {
fprintf(stream, "Node: %s (%s): %s", node->details->uname, node->details->id,
"<font color=\"red\">OFFLINE</font>\n");
}
if (group_by_node) {
GListPtr lpc2 = NULL;
fprintf(stream, "<ul>\n");
for (lpc2 = node->details->running_rsc; lpc2 != NULL; lpc2 = lpc2->next) {
resource_t *rsc = (resource_t *) lpc2->data;
fprintf(stream, "<li>");
rsc->fns->print(rsc, NULL, pe_print_html | pe_print_rsconly, stream);
fprintf(stream, "</li>\n");
}
fprintf(stream, "</ul>\n");
}
fprintf(stream, "</li>\n");
}
fprintf(stream, "</ul>\n");
if (group_by_node && inactive_resources) {
fprintf(stream, "<h2>Inactive Resources</h2>\n");
} else if (group_by_node == FALSE) {
fprintf(stream, "<h2>Resource List</h2>\n");
}
if (group_by_node == FALSE || inactive_resources) {
for (gIter = data_set->resources; gIter != NULL; gIter = gIter->next) {
resource_t *rsc = (resource_t *) gIter->data;
gboolean is_active = rsc->fns->active(rsc, TRUE);
gboolean partially_active = rsc->fns->active(rsc, FALSE);
if (is_set(rsc->flags, pe_rsc_orphan) && is_active == FALSE) {
continue;
} else if (group_by_node == FALSE) {
if (partially_active || inactive_resources) {
rsc->fns->print(rsc, NULL, pe_print_html, stream);
}
} else if (is_active == FALSE && inactive_resources) {
rsc->fns->print(rsc, NULL, pe_print_html, stream);
}
}
}
fprintf(stream, "</html>");
fflush(stream);
fclose(stream);
if (!web_cgi) {
if (rename(filename_tmp, filename) != 0) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Unable to rename %s->%s", filename_tmp, filename);
}
free(filename_tmp);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_cmpxchg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
/* Save real source value, then compare EAX against destination. */
ctxt->dst.orig_val = ctxt->dst.val;
ctxt->dst.val = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
ctxt->src.orig_val = ctxt->src.val;
ctxt->src.val = ctxt->dst.orig_val;
fastop(ctxt, em_cmp);
if (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF) {
/* Success: write back to memory; no update of EAX */
ctxt->src.type = OP_NONE;
ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->src.orig_val;
} else {
/* Failure: write the value we saw to EAX. */
ctxt->src.type = OP_REG;
ctxt->src.addr.reg = reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
ctxt->src.val = ctxt->dst.orig_val;
/* Create write-cycle to dest by writing the same value */
ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->dst.orig_val;
}
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 47,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: c_pdf14trans_write(const gs_composite_t * pct, byte * data, uint * psize,
gx_device_clist_writer *cdev)
{
const gs_pdf14trans_params_t * pparams = &((const gs_pdf14trans_t *)pct)->params;
int need, avail = *psize;
byte buf[MAX_CLIST_TRANSPARENCY_BUFFER_SIZE]; /* Must be large enough
to fit the data written below. We don't implement a dynamic check for
the buffer owerflow, assuming that the consistency is verified in the
coding phase. See the definition of MAX_CLIST_TRANSPARENCY_BUFFER_SIZE. */
byte * pbuf = buf;
int opcode = pparams->pdf14_op;
int mask_size = 0;
uint mask_id = 0;
int code;
bool found_icc;
int64_t hashcode = 0;
cmm_profile_t *icc_profile;
gsicc_rendering_param_t render_cond;
cmm_dev_profile_t *dev_profile;
/* We maintain and update working copies until we actually write the clist */
int pdf14_needed = cdev->pdf14_needed;
int trans_group_level = cdev->pdf14_trans_group_level;
int smask_level = cdev->pdf14_smask_level;
code = dev_proc((gx_device *) cdev, get_profile)((gx_device *) cdev,
&dev_profile);
if (code < 0)
return code;
gsicc_extract_profile(GS_UNKNOWN_TAG, dev_profile, &icc_profile,
&render_cond);
*pbuf++ = opcode; /* 1 byte */
switch (opcode) {
default: /* Should not occur. */
break;
case PDF14_PUSH_DEVICE:
trans_group_level = 0;
cdev->pdf14_smask_level = 0;
cdev->page_pdf14_needed = false;
put_value(pbuf, pparams->num_spot_colors);
put_value(pbuf, pparams->is_pattern);
/* If we happen to be going to a color space like CIELAB then
we are going to do our blending in default RGB and convert
to CIELAB at the end. To do this, we need to store the
default RGB profile in the clist so that we can grab it
later on during the clist read back and put image command */
if (icc_profile->data_cs == gsCIELAB || icc_profile->islab) {
/* Get the default RGB profile. Set the device hash code
so that we can extract it during the put_image operation. */
cdev->trans_dev_icc_hash = pparams->iccprofile->hashcode;
found_icc =
clist_icc_searchtable(cdev, pparams->iccprofile->hashcode);
if (!found_icc) {
/* Add it to the table */
clist_icc_addentry(cdev, pparams->iccprofile->hashcode,
pparams->iccprofile);
}
}
break;
case PDF14_POP_DEVICE:
pdf14_needed = false; /* reset pdf14_needed */
trans_group_level = 0;
smask_level = 0;
put_value(pbuf, pparams->is_pattern);
break;
case PDF14_END_TRANS_GROUP:
trans_group_level--; /* if now at page level, pdf14_needed will be updated */
if (smask_level == 0 && trans_group_level == 0)
pdf14_needed = cdev->page_pdf14_needed;
break; /* No data */
case PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_GROUP:
pdf14_needed = true; /* the compositor will be needed while reading */
trans_group_level++;
code = c_pdf14trans_write_ctm(&pbuf, pparams);
if (code < 0)
return code;
*pbuf++ = (pparams->Isolated & 1) + ((pparams->Knockout & 1) << 1);
*pbuf++ = pparams->blend_mode;
*pbuf++ = pparams->group_color;
put_value(pbuf, pparams->group_color_numcomps);
put_value(pbuf, pparams->opacity.alpha);
put_value(pbuf, pparams->shape.alpha);
put_value(pbuf, pparams->bbox);
mask_id = pparams->mask_id;
put_value(pbuf, mask_id);
/* Color space information maybe ICC based
in this case we need to store the ICC
profile or the ID if it is cached already */
if (pparams->group_color == ICC) {
/* Check if it is already in the ICC clist table */
hashcode = pparams->iccprofile->hashcode;
found_icc = clist_icc_searchtable(cdev, hashcode);
if (!found_icc) {
/* Add it to the table */
clist_icc_addentry(cdev, hashcode, pparams->iccprofile);
put_value(pbuf, hashcode);
} else {
/* It will be in the clist. Just write out the hashcode */
put_value(pbuf, hashcode);
}
} else {
put_value(pbuf, hashcode);
}
break;
case PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_MASK:
if (pparams->subtype != TRANSPARENCY_MASK_None) {
pdf14_needed = true; /* the compositor will be needed while reading */
smask_level++;
}
code = c_pdf14trans_write_ctm(&pbuf, pparams);
if (code < 0)
return code;
put_value(pbuf, pparams->subtype);
*pbuf++ = pparams->group_color;
put_value(pbuf, pparams->group_color_numcomps);
*pbuf++ = pparams->replacing;
*pbuf++ = pparams->function_is_identity;
*pbuf++ = pparams->Background_components;
*pbuf++ = pparams->Matte_components;
put_value(pbuf, pparams->bbox);
mask_id = pparams->mask_id;
put_value(pbuf, mask_id);
if (pparams->Background_components) {
const int l = sizeof(pparams->Background[0]) * pparams->Background_components;
memcpy(pbuf, pparams->Background, l);
pbuf += l;
memcpy(pbuf, &pparams->GrayBackground, sizeof(pparams->GrayBackground));
pbuf += sizeof(pparams->GrayBackground);
}
if (pparams->Matte_components) {
const int m = sizeof(pparams->Matte[0]) * pparams->Matte_components;
memcpy(pbuf, pparams->Matte, m);
pbuf += m;
}
if (!pparams->function_is_identity)
mask_size = sizeof(pparams->transfer_fn);
/* Color space information may be ICC based
in this case we need to store the ICC
profile or the ID if it is cached already */
if (pparams->group_color == ICC) {
/* Check if it is already in the ICC clist table */
hashcode = pparams->iccprofile->hashcode;
found_icc = clist_icc_searchtable(cdev, hashcode);
if (!found_icc) {
/* Add it to the table */
clist_icc_addentry(cdev, hashcode, pparams->iccprofile);
put_value(pbuf, hashcode);
} else {
/* It will be in the clist. Just write out the hashcode */
put_value(pbuf, hashcode);
}
} else {
put_value(pbuf, hashcode);
}
break;
case PDF14_END_TRANS_MASK:
smask_level--;
if (smask_level == 0 && trans_group_level == 0)
pdf14_needed = cdev->page_pdf14_needed;
break;
case PDF14_SET_BLEND_PARAMS:
if (pparams->blend_mode != BLEND_MODE_Normal || pparams->opacity.alpha != 1.0 ||
pparams->shape.alpha != 1.0)
pdf14_needed = true; /* the compositor will be needed while reading */
else if (smask_level == 0 && trans_group_level == 0)
pdf14_needed = false; /* At page level, set back to false */
if (smask_level == 0 && trans_group_level == 0)
cdev->page_pdf14_needed = pdf14_needed; /* save for after popping to page level */
*pbuf++ = pparams->changed;
if (pparams->changed & PDF14_SET_BLEND_MODE)
*pbuf++ = pparams->blend_mode;
if (pparams->changed & PDF14_SET_TEXT_KNOCKOUT)
*pbuf++ = pparams->text_knockout;
if (pparams->changed & PDF14_SET_OPACITY_ALPHA)
put_value(pbuf, pparams->opacity.alpha);
if (pparams->changed & PDF14_SET_SHAPE_ALPHA)
put_value(pbuf, pparams->shape.alpha);
if (pparams->changed & PDF14_SET_OVERPRINT)
put_value(pbuf, pparams->overprint);
if (pparams->changed & PDF14_SET_OVERPRINT_MODE)
put_value(pbuf, pparams->overprint_mode);
break;
case PDF14_PUSH_TRANS_STATE:
break;
case PDF14_POP_TRANS_STATE:
break;
case PDF14_PUSH_SMASK_COLOR:
return 0; /* We really should never be here */
break;
case PDF14_POP_SMASK_COLOR:
return 0; /* We really should never be here */
break;
}
/* check for fit */
need = (pbuf - buf) + mask_size;
*psize = need;
if (need > avail) {
if (avail)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
else
return gs_error_rangecheck;
}
/* If we are writing more than the maximum ever expected,
* return a rangecheck error. Second check is for Coverity
*/
if ((need + 3 > MAX_CLIST_COMPOSITOR_SIZE) ||
(need + 3 - mask_size > MAX_CLIST_TRANSPARENCY_BUFFER_SIZE) )
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
/* Copy our serialized data into the output buffer */
memcpy(data, buf, need - mask_size);
if (mask_size) /* Include the transfer mask data if present */
memcpy(data + need - mask_size, pparams->transfer_fn, mask_size);
if_debug3m('v', cdev->memory,
"[v] c_pdf14trans_write: opcode = %s mask_id=%d need = %d\n",
pdf14_opcode_names[opcode], mask_id, need);
cdev->pdf14_needed = pdf14_needed; /* all OK to update */
cdev->pdf14_trans_group_level = trans_group_level;
cdev->pdf14_smask_level = smask_level;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SyncTest::SetupSync() {
if (profiles_.empty()) {
if (!SetupClients())
LOG(FATAL) << "SetupClients() failed.";
}
for (int i = 0; i < num_clients_; ++i) {
if (!GetClient(i)->SetupSync())
LOG(FATAL) << "SetupSync() failed.";
}
AwaitQuiescence();
number_of_default_sync_items_ = GetClient(0)->GetNumEntries() -
GetClient(0)->GetNumDatatypes() - 7;
DVLOG(1) << "Setting " << number_of_default_sync_items_ << " as default "
<< " number of entries.";
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcXFixesChangeSaveSet(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesChangeSaveSetReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->window);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 165,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int perf_trace_init(struct perf_event *p_event)
{
struct ftrace_event_call *tp_event;
int event_id = p_event->attr.config;
int ret = -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&event_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(tp_event, &ftrace_events, list) {
if (tp_event->event.type == event_id &&
tp_event->class && tp_event->class->reg &&
try_module_get(tp_event->mod)) {
ret = perf_trace_event_init(tp_event, p_event);
if (ret)
module_put(tp_event->mod);
break;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&event_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf/ftrace: Fix paranoid level for enabling function tracer
The current default perf paranoid level is "1" which has
"perf_paranoid_kernel()" return false, and giving any operations that
use it, access to normal users. Unfortunately, this includes function
tracing and normal users should not be allowed to enable function
tracing by default.
The proper level is defined at "-1" (full perf access), which
"perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw()" will only give access to. Use that
check instead for enabling function tracing.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 3.4+
CVE: CVE-2013-2930
Fixes: ced39002f5ea ("ftrace, perf: Add support to use function tracepoint in perf")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 30,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::OnMouseDown(Node& mouse_down_node) {
if (auto* fill_client =
AutofillClientFromFrame(mouse_down_node.GetDocument().GetFrame())) {
fill_client->DidReceiveLeftMouseDownOrGestureTapInNode(
WebNode(&mouse_down_node));
}
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithOptionalArg(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
size_t argsCount = exec->argumentCount();
if (argsCount <= 0) {
impl->methodWithOptionalArg();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
int opt(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->methodWithOptionalArg(opt);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit pmcraid_exit(void)
{
pmcraid_netlink_release();
unregister_chrdev_region(MKDEV(pmcraid_major, 0),
PMCRAID_MAX_ADAPTERS);
pci_unregister_driver(&pmcraid_driver);
class_destroy(pmcraid_class);
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int skb_store_bits(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, const void *from, int len)
{
int start = skb_headlen(skb);
struct sk_buff *frag_iter;
int i, copy;
if (offset > (int)skb->len - len)
goto fault;
if ((copy = start - offset) > 0) {
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
skb_copy_to_linear_data_offset(skb, offset, from, copy);
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return 0;
offset += copy;
from += copy;
}
for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
skb_frag_t *frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
int end;
WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
end = start + skb_frag_size(frag);
if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) {
u8 *vaddr;
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
vaddr = kmap_atomic(skb_frag_page(frag));
memcpy(vaddr + frag->page_offset + offset - start,
from, copy);
kunmap_atomic(vaddr);
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return 0;
offset += copy;
from += copy;
}
start = end;
}
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) {
int end;
WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
end = start + frag_iter->len;
if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) {
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
if (skb_store_bits(frag_iter, offset - start,
from, copy))
goto fault;
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return 0;
offset += copy;
from += copy;
}
start = end;
}
if (!len)
return 0;
fault:
return -EFAULT;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 39,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SessionRestore::IsRestoring(const Profile* profile) {
return (profiles_getting_restored &&
profiles_getting_restored->find(profile) !=
profiles_getting_restored->end());
}
Commit Message: Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/9316065/ for Marja. I reviewed
this, so I'm using TBR to land it.
Don't crash if multiple SessionRestoreImpl:s refer to the same
Profile.
It shouldn't ever happen but it seems to happen anyway.
BUG=111238
TEST=NONE
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9343005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120648 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_dmmp_device_node (Device *device)
{
static gchar buf[1024];
g_assert (device->priv->device_is_linux_dmmp);
g_snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "/dev/mapper/%s", device->priv->linux_dmmp_name);
return buf;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FoFiType1C::readFDSelect() {
int fdSelectFmt, pos, nRanges, gid0, gid1, fd, i, j;
fdSelect = (Guchar *)gmalloc(nGlyphs);
if (topDict.fdSelectOffset == 0) {
for (i = 0; i < nGlyphs; ++i) {
fdSelect[i] = 0;
}
} else {
pos = topDict.fdSelectOffset;
fdSelectFmt = getU8(pos++, &parsedOk);
if (!parsedOk) {
return;
}
if (fdSelectFmt == 0) {
if (!checkRegion(pos, nGlyphs)) {
parsedOk = gFalse;
return;
}
memcpy(fdSelect, file + pos, nGlyphs);
} else if (fdSelectFmt == 3) {
nRanges = getU16BE(pos, &parsedOk);
pos += 2;
gid0 = getU16BE(pos, &parsedOk);
pos += 2;
for (i = 1; i <= nRanges; ++i) {
fd = getU8(pos++, &parsedOk);
gid1 = getU16BE(pos, &parsedOk);
if (!parsedOk) {
return;
}
pos += 2;
if (gid0 > gid1 || gid1 > nGlyphs) {
parsedOk = gFalse;
return;
}
for (j = gid0; j < gid1; ++j) {
fdSelect[j] = fd;
}
gid0 = gid1;
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < nGlyphs; ++i) {
fdSelect[i] = 0;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 2,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void RuntimeEnabledVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->runtimeEnabledVoidMethod();
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void notifier_del_vio(struct hvc_struct *hp, int data)
{
hp->irq_requested = 0;
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ar6000_ap_mode_profile_commit(struct ar6_softc *ar)
{
WMI_CONNECT_CMD p;
unsigned long flags;
/* No change in AP's profile configuration */
if(ar->ap_profile_flag==0) {
A_PRINTF("COMMIT: No change in profile!!!\n");
return -ENODATA;
}
if(!ar->arSsidLen) {
A_PRINTF("SSID not set!!!\n");
return -ECHRNG;
}
switch(ar->arAuthMode) {
case NONE_AUTH:
if((ar->arPairwiseCrypto != NONE_CRYPT) &&
#ifdef WAPI_ENABLE
(ar->arPairwiseCrypto != WAPI_CRYPT) &&
#endif
(ar->arPairwiseCrypto != WEP_CRYPT)) {
A_PRINTF("Cipher not supported in AP mode Open auth\n");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
break;
case WPA_PSK_AUTH:
case WPA2_PSK_AUTH:
case (WPA_PSK_AUTH|WPA2_PSK_AUTH):
break;
default:
A_PRINTF("This key mgmt type not supported in AP mode\n");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
/* Update the arNetworkType */
ar->arNetworkType = ar->arNextMode;
A_MEMZERO(&p,sizeof(p));
p.ssidLength = ar->arSsidLen;
memcpy(p.ssid,ar->arSsid,p.ssidLength);
p.channel = ar->arChannelHint;
p.networkType = ar->arNetworkType;
p.dot11AuthMode = ar->arDot11AuthMode;
p.authMode = ar->arAuthMode;
p.pairwiseCryptoType = ar->arPairwiseCrypto;
p.pairwiseCryptoLen = ar->arPairwiseCryptoLen;
p.groupCryptoType = ar->arGroupCrypto;
p.groupCryptoLen = ar->arGroupCryptoLen;
p.ctrl_flags = ar->arConnectCtrlFlags;
wmi_ap_profile_commit(ar->arWmi, &p);
spin_lock_irqsave(&ar->arLock, flags);
ar->arConnected = true;
netif_carrier_on(ar->arNetDev);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ar->arLock, flags);
ar->ap_profile_flag = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pl022_init(SysBusDevice *sbd)
{
DeviceState *dev = DEVICE(sbd);
PL022State *s = PL022(dev);
memory_region_init_io(&s->iomem, OBJECT(s), &pl022_ops, s, "pl022", 0x1000);
sysbus_init_mmio(sbd, &s->iomem);
sysbus_init_irq(sbd, &s->irq);
s->ssi = ssi_create_bus(dev, "ssi");
pl022_reset(s);
vmstate_register(dev, -1, &vmstate_pl022, s);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool OMXCodec::drainAnyInputBuffer() {
return drainInputBuffer((BufferInfo *)NULL);
}
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Camera3Device::setNotifyCallback(NotificationListener *listener) {
ATRACE_CALL();
Mutex::Autolock l(mOutputLock);
if (listener != NULL && mListener != NULL) {
ALOGW("%s: Replacing old callback listener", __FUNCTION__);
}
mListener = listener;
mRequestThread->setNotificationListener(listener);
mPreparerThread->setNotificationListener(listener);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameBuffer::AttachRenderTexture(Texture* texture) {
DCHECK_NE(id_, 0u);
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(decoder_);
ScopedFrameBufferBinder binder(decoder_, id_);
GLuint attach_id = texture ? texture->id() : 0;
glFramebufferTexture2DEXT(GL_FRAMEBUFFER,
GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0,
GL_TEXTURE_2D,
attach_id,
0);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OverflowEventDispatcher(const RenderBlock* block)
: m_block(block)
, m_hadHorizontalLayoutOverflow(false)
, m_hadVerticalLayoutOverflow(false)
{
m_shouldDispatchEvent = !m_block->isAnonymous() && m_block->hasOverflowClip() && m_block->document().hasListenerType(Document::OVERFLOWCHANGED_LISTENER);
if (m_shouldDispatchEvent) {
m_hadHorizontalLayoutOverflow = m_block->hasHorizontalLayoutOverflow();
m_hadVerticalLayoutOverflow = m_block->hasVerticalLayoutOverflow();
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API ut16 r_bin_java_calculate_method_access_value(const char *access_flags_str) {
return calculate_access_value (access_flags_str, METHOD_ACCESS_FLAGS);
}
Commit Message: Fix #10498 - Crash in fuzzed java file
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 79,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_get_sset_count(struct net_device *dev, int sset)
{
switch (sset) {
case ETH_SS_TEST:
return TG3_NUM_TEST;
case ETH_SS_STATS:
return TG3_NUM_STATS;
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Matt Carlson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlobURLRequestJob::DidStart() {
if (request()->method() != "GET") {
NotifyFailure(net::ERR_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return;
}
if (!blob_data_) {
NotifyFailure(net::ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND);
return;
}
CountSize();
}
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 115,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void igmp_heard_query(struct in_device *in_dev, struct sk_buff *skb,
int len)
{
struct igmphdr *ih = igmp_hdr(skb);
struct igmpv3_query *ih3 = igmpv3_query_hdr(skb);
struct ip_mc_list *im;
__be32 group = ih->group;
int max_delay;
int mark = 0;
if (len == 8) {
if (ih->code == 0) {
/* Alas, old v1 router presents here. */
max_delay = IGMP_Query_Response_Interval;
in_dev->mr_v1_seen = jiffies +
IGMP_V1_Router_Present_Timeout;
group = 0;
} else {
/* v2 router present */
max_delay = ih->code*(HZ/IGMP_TIMER_SCALE);
in_dev->mr_v2_seen = jiffies +
IGMP_V2_Router_Present_Timeout;
}
/* cancel the interface change timer */
in_dev->mr_ifc_count = 0;
if (del_timer(&in_dev->mr_ifc_timer))
__in_dev_put(in_dev);
/* clear deleted report items */
igmpv3_clear_delrec(in_dev);
} else if (len < 12) {
return; /* ignore bogus packet; freed by caller */
} else if (IGMP_V1_SEEN(in_dev)) {
/* This is a v3 query with v1 queriers present */
max_delay = IGMP_Query_Response_Interval;
group = 0;
} else if (IGMP_V2_SEEN(in_dev)) {
/* this is a v3 query with v2 queriers present;
* Interpretation of the max_delay code is problematic here.
* A real v2 host would use ih_code directly, while v3 has a
* different encoding. We use the v3 encoding as more likely
* to be intended in a v3 query.
*/
max_delay = IGMPV3_MRC(ih3->code)*(HZ/IGMP_TIMER_SCALE);
} else { /* v3 */
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct igmpv3_query)))
return;
ih3 = igmpv3_query_hdr(skb);
if (ih3->nsrcs) {
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct igmpv3_query)
+ ntohs(ih3->nsrcs)*sizeof(__be32)))
return;
ih3 = igmpv3_query_hdr(skb);
}
max_delay = IGMPV3_MRC(ih3->code)*(HZ/IGMP_TIMER_SCALE);
if (!max_delay)
max_delay = 1; /* can't mod w/ 0 */
in_dev->mr_maxdelay = max_delay;
if (ih3->qrv)
in_dev->mr_qrv = ih3->qrv;
if (!group) { /* general query */
if (ih3->nsrcs)
return; /* no sources allowed */
igmp_gq_start_timer(in_dev);
return;
}
/* mark sources to include, if group & source-specific */
mark = ih3->nsrcs != 0;
}
/*
* - Start the timers in all of our membership records
* that the query applies to for the interface on
* which the query arrived excl. those that belong
* to a "local" group (224.0.0.X)
* - For timers already running check if they need to
* be reset.
* - Use the igmp->igmp_code field as the maximum
* delay possible
*/
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_pmc_rcu(in_dev, im) {
int changed;
if (group && group != im->multiaddr)
continue;
if (im->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS)
continue;
spin_lock_bh(&im->lock);
if (im->tm_running)
im->gsquery = im->gsquery && mark;
else
im->gsquery = mark;
changed = !im->gsquery ||
igmp_marksources(im, ntohs(ih3->nsrcs), ih3->srcs);
spin_unlock_bh(&im->lock);
if (changed)
igmp_mod_timer(im, max_delay);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <[email protected]>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 165,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DataReductionProxyConfig::AddDefaultProxyBypassRules() {
DCHECK(configurator_);
configurator_->SetBypassRules(
"<local>,"
"127.0.0.0/8,"
"0.0.0.0/8,"
"10.0.0.0/8,"
"172.16.0.0/12,"
"192.168.0.0/16,"
"::/128,"
"fc00::/7,"
"*-ds.metric.gstatic.com,"
"*-v4.metric.gstatic.com");
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderProcessHost::ShouldTryToUseExistingProcessHost(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url) {
if (run_renderer_in_process())
return true;
if (SiteIsolationPolicy::UseDedicatedProcessesForAllSites())
return false;
if (g_all_hosts.Get().size() >= GetMaxRendererProcessCount())
return true;
return GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldTryToUseExistingProcessHost(
browser_context, url);
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void synchronize_net(void)
{
might_sleep();
if (rtnl_is_locked())
synchronize_rcu_expedited();
else
synchronize_rcu();
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void omx_vdec::append_qp_extradata(OMX_OTHER_EXTRADATATYPE *extra,
struct msm_vidc_frame_qp_payload *qp_payload)
{
OMX_QCOM_EXTRADATA_QP * qp = NULL;
if (!qp_payload) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("QP payload is NULL");
return;
}
extra->nSize = OMX_QP_EXTRADATA_SIZE;
extra->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
extra->nPortIndex = OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX;
extra->eType = (OMX_EXTRADATATYPE)OMX_ExtraDataQP;
extra->nDataSize = sizeof(OMX_QCOM_EXTRADATA_QP);
qp = (OMX_QCOM_EXTRADATA_QP *)(void *)extra->data;
qp->nQP = qp_payload->frame_qp;
print_debug_extradata(extra);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void unlock_trace(struct task_struct *task)
{
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int equalizer_get_preset(equalizer_context_t *context)
{
ALOGV("%s: preset: %d", __func__, context->preset);
return context->preset;
}
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability: Equalizer command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32247948
Bug: 32438598
Bug: 32436341
Test: use POC on bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I56a92582687599b5b313dea1abcb8bcb19c7fc0e
(cherry picked from commit 3f37d4ef89f4f0eef9e201c5a91b7b2c77ed1071)
(cherry picked from commit ceb7b2d7a4c4cb8d03f166c61f5c7551c6c760aa)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 164,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InputHandler::setText(spannable_string_t* spannableString)
{
if (!isActiveTextEdit() || !spannableString)
return false;
ASSERT(m_currentFocusElement->document() && m_currentFocusElement->document()->frame());
Frame* frame = m_currentFocusElement->document()->frame();
Editor* editor = frame->editor();
ASSERT(editor);
m_webPage->m_selectionHandler->setSelectionActive(false);
WTF::String textToInsert = convertSpannableStringToString(spannableString);
int textLength = textToInsert.length();
InputLog(LogLevelInfo, "InputHandler::setText spannableString is '%s', of length %d", textToInsert.latin1().data(), textLength);
span_t* changedSpan = firstSpanInString(spannableString, CHANGED_ATTRIB);
int composingTextStart = m_composingTextStart;
int composingTextEnd = m_composingTextEnd;
int composingTextLength = compositionLength();
removeAttributedTextMarker();
if (isTrailingSingleCharacter(changedSpan, textLength, composingTextLength)) {
if (firstSpanInString(spannableString, UNCONVERTED_TEXT_ATTRIB)) {
InputLog(LogLevelInfo, "InputHandler::setText Single trailing character detected. Text is unconverted.");
return editor->command("InsertText").execute(textToInsert.right(1));
}
InputLog(LogLevelInfo, "InputHandler::setText Single trailing character detected.");
return handleKeyboardInput(Platform::KeyboardEvent(textToInsert[textLength - 1], Platform::KeyboardEvent::KeyDown, 0), false /* changeIsPartOfComposition */);
}
if (!changedSpan) {
if (composingTextLength == textLength) {
InputLog(LogLevelInfo, "InputHandler::setText No spans have changed. New text is the same length as the old. Nothing to do.");
return true;
}
if (composingTextLength - textLength == 1) {
InputLog(LogLevelInfo, "InputHandler::setText No spans have changed. New text is one character shorter than the old. Treating as 'delete'.");
return handleKeyboardInput(Platform::KeyboardEvent(KEYCODE_BACKSPACE, Platform::KeyboardEvent::KeyDown, 0), true /* changeIsPartOfComposition */);
}
}
if (composingTextLength && !setSelection(composingTextStart, composingTextEnd, true /* changeIsPartOfComposition */))
return false;
if (!textLength) {
if (selectionActive())
return handleKeyboardInput(Platform::KeyboardEvent(KEYCODE_BACKSPACE, Platform::KeyboardEvent::KeyDown, 0), true /* changeIsPartOfComposition */);
return true;
}
bool requiresSpaceKeyPress = false;
if (textLength > 0 && textToInsert[textLength - 1] == KEYCODE_SPACE) {
requiresSpaceKeyPress = true;
textLength--;
textToInsert.remove(textLength, 1);
}
InputLog(LogLevelInfo, "InputHandler::setText Request being processed. Text before processing: '%s'", elementText().latin1().data());
if (textLength == 1 && !spannableString->spans_count) {
InputLog(LogLevelInfo, "InputHandler::setText Single character entry treated as key-press in the absense of spans.");
return handleKeyboardInput(Platform::KeyboardEvent(textToInsert[0], Platform::KeyboardEvent::KeyDown, 0), true /* changeIsPartOfComposition */);
}
if (!textToInsert.isEmpty() && !editor->command("InsertText").execute(textToInsert)) {
InputLog(LogLevelWarn, "InputHandler::setText Failed to insert text '%s'", textToInsert.latin1().data());
return false;
}
if (requiresSpaceKeyPress)
handleKeyboardInput(Platform::KeyboardEvent(KEYCODE_SPACE, Platform::KeyboardEvent::KeyDown, 0), true /* changeIsPartOfComposition */);
InputLog(LogLevelInfo, "InputHandler::setText Request being processed. Text after processing '%s'", elementText().latin1().data());
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ecb_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm));
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int err;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
kernel_fpu_begin();
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
aesni_ecb_dec(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK);
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
kernel_fpu_end();
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sctp_put_port(struct sock *sk)
{
sctp_local_bh_disable();
__sctp_put_port(sk);
sctp_local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: main(int argc, char **argv)
{
Jbig2Ctx *ctx = jbig2_ctx_new(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < countof(tests); i++) {
Jbig2HuffmanTable *table;
Jbig2HuffmanState *hs;
test_stream_t st;
int32_t code;
bool oob;
int j;
st.ws.get_next_word = test_get_word;
st.h = &tests[i];
printf("testing Standard Huffman table %s: ", st.h->name);
table = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, st.h->params);
if (table == NULL) {
printf("jbig2_build_huffman_table() returned NULL!\n");
} else {
/* jbig2_dump_huffman_table(table); */
hs = jbig2_huffman_new(ctx, &st.ws);
if (hs == NULL) {
printf("jbig2_huffman_new() returned NULL!\n");
} else {
for (j = 0; j < st.h->output_len; j++) {
printf("%d...", st.h->output[j]);
code = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, table, &oob);
if (code == st.h->output[j] && !oob) {
printf("ok, ");
} else {
int need_comma = 0;
printf("NG(");
if (code != st.h->output[j]) {
printf("%d", code);
need_comma = 1;
}
if (oob) {
if (need_comma)
printf(",");
printf("OOB");
}
printf("), ");
}
}
if (st.h->params->HTOOB) {
printf("OOB...");
code = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, table, &oob);
if (oob) {
printf("ok");
} else {
printf("NG(%d)", code);
}
}
printf("\n");
jbig2_huffman_free(ctx, hs);
}
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, table);
}
}
jbig2_ctx_free(ctx);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::GetPDFiumRect(int page_index,
const pp::Rect& rect,
int* start_x,
int* start_y,
int* size_x,
int* size_y) const {
pp::Rect page_rect = GetScreenRect(pages_[page_index]->rect());
page_rect.Offset(-rect.x(), -rect.y());
*start_x = page_rect.x();
*start_y = page_rect.y();
*size_x = page_rect.width();
*size_y = page_rect.height();
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const extensions::Extension* FindCastExtension() {
Profile* profile = ProfileManager::GetActiveUserProfile();
const extensions::ExtensionRegistry* extension_registry =
extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile);
const extensions::ExtensionSet& enabled_extensions =
extension_registry->enabled_extensions();
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(extensions::kChromecastExtensionIds); ++i) {
const std::string extension_id(extensions::kChromecastExtensionIds[i]);
if (enabled_extensions.Contains(extension_id)) {
return extension_registry->GetExtensionById(
extension_id, extensions::ExtensionRegistry::ENABLED);
}
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 119,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int FlateStream::getChars(int nChars, Guchar *buffer) {
if (pred) {
return pred->getChars(nChars, buffer);
} else {
for (int i = 0; i < nChars; ++i) {
const int c = doGetRawChar();
if (likely(c != EOF)) buffer[i] = c;
else return i;
}
return nChars;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: write_int (unsigned char * data, int offset, int value)
{ data [offset] = value >> 24 ;
data [offset + 1] = value >> 16 ;
data [offset + 2] = value >> 8 ;
data [offset + 3] = value ;
} /* write_int */
Commit Message: src/sd2.c : Fix two potential buffer read overflows.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/93
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 45,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dbpageUpdate(
sqlite3_vtab *pVtab,
int argc,
sqlite3_value **argv,
sqlite_int64 *pRowid
){
DbpageTable *pTab = (DbpageTable *)pVtab;
Pgno pgno;
DbPage *pDbPage = 0;
int rc = SQLITE_OK;
char *zErr = 0;
const char *zSchema;
int iDb;
Btree *pBt;
Pager *pPager;
int szPage;
if( pTab->db->flags & SQLITE_Defensive ){
zErr = "read-only";
goto update_fail;
}
if( argc==1 ){
zErr = "cannot delete";
goto update_fail;
}
pgno = sqlite3_value_int(argv[0]);
if( (Pgno)sqlite3_value_int(argv[1])!=pgno ){
zErr = "cannot insert";
goto update_fail;
}
zSchema = (const char*)sqlite3_value_text(argv[4]);
iDb = zSchema ? sqlite3FindDbName(pTab->db, zSchema) : -1;
if( iDb<0 ){
zErr = "no such schema";
goto update_fail;
}
pBt = pTab->db->aDb[iDb].pBt;
if( pgno<1 || pBt==0 || pgno>(int)sqlite3BtreeLastPage(pBt) ){
zErr = "bad page number";
goto update_fail;
}
szPage = sqlite3BtreeGetPageSize(pBt);
if( sqlite3_value_type(argv[3])!=SQLITE_BLOB
|| sqlite3_value_bytes(argv[3])!=szPage
){
zErr = "bad page value";
goto update_fail;
}
pPager = sqlite3BtreePager(pBt);
rc = sqlite3PagerGet(pPager, pgno, (DbPage**)&pDbPage, 0);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK ){
rc = sqlite3PagerWrite(pDbPage);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK ){
memcpy(sqlite3PagerGetData(pDbPage),
sqlite3_value_blob(argv[3]),
szPage);
}
}
sqlite3PagerUnref(pDbPage);
return rc;
update_fail:
sqlite3_free(pVtab->zErrMsg);
pVtab->zErrMsg = sqlite3_mprintf("%s", zErr);
return SQLITE_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 151,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RecordParallelizableDownloadAverageStats(
int64_t bytes_downloaded,
const base::TimeDelta& time_span) {
if (time_span.is_zero() || bytes_downloaded <= 0)
return;
int64_t average_bandwidth =
CalculateBandwidthBytesPerSecond(bytes_downloaded, time_span);
int64_t file_size_kb = bytes_downloaded / 1024;
RecordBandwidthMetric("Download.ParallelizableDownloadBandwidth",
average_bandwidth);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_LONG_TIMES("Download.Parallelizable.DownloadTime", time_span);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS("Download.Parallelizable.FileSize", file_size_kb,
1, kMaxFileSizeKb, 50);
if (average_bandwidth > kHighBandwidthBytesPerSecond) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_LONG_TIMES(
"Download.Parallelizable.DownloadTime.HighDownloadBandwidth",
time_span);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS(
"Download.Parallelizable.FileSize.HighDownloadBandwidth", file_size_kb,
1, kMaxFileSizeKb, 50);
}
}
Commit Message: Add .desktop file to download_file_types.asciipb
.desktop files act as shortcuts on Linux, allowing arbitrary code
execution. We should send pings for these files.
Bug: 904182
Change-Id: Ibc26141fb180e843e1ffaf3f78717a9109d2fa9a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1344552
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#611272}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 153,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cff_lookup_glyph_by_stdcharcode( CFF_Font cff,
FT_Int charcode )
{
FT_UInt n;
FT_UShort glyph_sid;
/* CID-keyed fonts don't have glyph names */
if ( !cff->charset.sids )
return -1;
/* check range of standard char code */
if ( charcode < 0 || charcode > 255 )
return -1;
/* Get code to SID mapping from `cff_standard_encoding'. */
glyph_sid = cff_get_standard_encoding( (FT_UInt)charcode );
for ( n = 0; n < cff->num_glyphs; n++ )
{
if ( cff->charset.sids[n] == glyph_sid )
return n;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 10,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::setLooping(int loop)
{
ALOGV("[%d] setLooping(%d)", mConnId, loop);
mLoop = loop;
sp<MediaPlayerBase> p = getPlayer();
if (p != 0) return p->setLooping(loop);
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QuotaManager::SetPersistentHostQuota(const std::string& host,
int64 new_quota,
const HostQuotaCallback& callback) {
LazyInitialize();
if (host.empty()) {
callback.Run(kQuotaErrorNotSupported, host, kStorageTypePersistent, 0);
return;
}
if (new_quota < 0) {
callback.Run(kQuotaErrorInvalidModification,
host, kStorageTypePersistent, -1);
return;
}
if (db_disabled_) {
callback.Run(kQuotaErrorInvalidAccess,
host, kStorageTypePersistent, -1);
return;
}
int64* new_quota_ptr = new int64(new_quota);
PostTaskAndReplyWithResultForDBThread(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SetPersistentHostQuotaOnDBThread,
host,
base::Unretained(new_quota_ptr)),
base::Bind(&QuotaManager::DidSetPersistentHostQuota,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
host,
callback,
base::Owned(new_quota_ptr)));
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::InitializeRenderFrameIfNecessary(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host) {
if (render_frame_host->IsRenderFrameLive())
return;
if (!ReinitializeRenderFrame(render_frame_host))
return;
if (render_frame_host != render_frame_host_.get())
return;
EnsureRenderFrameHostVisibilityConsistent();
delegate_->NotifyMainFrameSwappedFromRenderManager(nullptr,
render_frame_host_.get());
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct svc_rdma_fastreg_mr *svc_rdma_get_frmr(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma)
{
struct svc_rdma_fastreg_mr *frmr = NULL;
spin_lock(&rdma->sc_frmr_q_lock);
if (!list_empty(&rdma->sc_frmr_q)) {
frmr = list_entry(rdma->sc_frmr_q.next,
struct svc_rdma_fastreg_mr, frmr_list);
list_del_init(&frmr->frmr_list);
frmr->sg_nents = 0;
}
spin_unlock(&rdma->sc_frmr_q_lock);
if (frmr)
return frmr;
return rdma_alloc_frmr(rdma);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcp_ack_update_window(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 ack,
u32 ack_seq)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int flag = 0;
u32 nwin = ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->window);
if (likely(!tcp_hdr(skb)->syn))
nwin <<= tp->rx_opt.snd_wscale;
if (tcp_may_update_window(tp, ack, ack_seq, nwin)) {
flag |= FLAG_WIN_UPDATE;
tcp_update_wl(tp, ack_seq);
if (tp->snd_wnd != nwin) {
tp->snd_wnd = nwin;
/* Note, it is the only place, where
* fast path is recovered for sending TCP.
*/
tp->pred_flags = 0;
tcp_fast_path_check(sk);
if (tcp_send_head(sk))
tcp_slow_start_after_idle_check(sk);
if (nwin > tp->max_window) {
tp->max_window = nwin;
tcp_sync_mss(sk, inet_csk(sk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
}
}
}
tcp_snd_una_update(tp, ack);
return flag;
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 51,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: blink::WebScreenInfo RenderViewImpl::GetScreenInfo() {
return RenderWidget::GetScreenInfo();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold int lutrgb_init(AVFilterContext *ctx)
{
LutContext *s = ctx->priv;
s->is_rgb = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SandboxIPCHandler::HandleGetStyleForStrike(
int fd,
base::PickleIterator iter,
const std::vector<base::ScopedFD>& fds) {
std::string family;
bool bold;
bool italic;
uint16_t pixel_size;
if (!iter.ReadString(&family) || !iter.ReadBool(&bold) ||
!iter.ReadBool(&italic) || !iter.ReadUInt16(&pixel_size)) {
return;
}
gfx::FontRenderParamsQuery query;
query.families.push_back(family);
query.pixel_size = pixel_size;
query.style = italic ? gfx::Font::ITALIC : 0;
query.weight = bold ? gfx::Font::Weight::BOLD : gfx::Font::Weight::NORMAL;
const gfx::FontRenderParams params = gfx::GetFontRenderParams(query, nullptr);
base::Pickle reply;
reply.WriteInt(params.use_bitmaps);
reply.WriteInt(params.autohinter);
reply.WriteInt(params.hinting != gfx::FontRenderParams::HINTING_NONE);
reply.WriteInt(ConvertHinting(params.hinting));
reply.WriteInt(params.antialiasing);
reply.WriteInt(ConvertSubpixelRendering(params.subpixel_rendering));
reply.WriteInt(params.subpixel_positioning);
SendRendererReply(fds, reply, -1);
}
Commit Message: Serialize struct tm in a safe way.
BUG=765512
Change-Id: If235b8677eb527be2ac0fe621fc210e4116a7566
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/679441
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julien Tinnes <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 150,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_rlcp(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
OPJ_UINT32 index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.precno1 = res->pw * res->ph;
}
for (pi->precno = pi->poc.precno0; pi->precno < pi->poc.precno1; pi->precno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (index >= pi->include_size) {
opj_pi_emit_error(pi, "Invalid access to pi->include");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [OPENJP2] change the way to compute *p_tx0, *p_tx1, *p_ty0, *p_ty1 in function
opj_get_encoding_parameters
Signed-off-by: Young_X <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 92,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
{
if (c == NULL)
return 1;
if (c->cipher != NULL) {
if (c->cipher->cleanup && !c->cipher->cleanup(c))
return 0;
/* Cleanse cipher context data */
if (c->cipher_data && c->cipher->ctx_size)
OPENSSL_cleanse(c->cipher_data, c->cipher->ctx_size);
}
OPENSSL_free(c->cipher_data);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ENGINE_finish(c->engine);
#endif
memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 12,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gpc_sRGB(Pixel *out, const Pixel *in, const Background *back)
{
(void)back;
out->r = isRGB(in->r);
if (in->g == in->r)
{
out->g = out->r;
if (in->b == in->r)
out->b = out->r;
else
out->b = isRGB(in->b);
}
else
{
out->g = isRGB(in->g);
if (in->b == in->r)
out->b = out->r;
else if (in->b == in->g)
out->b = out->g;
else
out->b = isRGB(in->b);
}
out->a = 255;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ath_tx_complete_buf(struct ath_softc *sc, struct ath_buf *bf,
struct ath_txq *txq, struct list_head *bf_q,
struct ath_tx_status *ts, int txok)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = bf->bf_mpdu;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *tx_info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
unsigned long flags;
int tx_flags = 0;
if (!txok)
tx_flags |= ATH_TX_ERROR;
if (ts->ts_status & ATH9K_TXERR_FILT)
tx_info->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_STAT_TX_FILTERED;
dma_unmap_single(sc->dev, bf->bf_buf_addr, skb->len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
bf->bf_buf_addr = 0;
if (sc->tx99_state)
goto skip_tx_complete;
if (bf->bf_state.bfs_paprd) {
if (time_after(jiffies,
bf->bf_state.bfs_paprd_timestamp +
msecs_to_jiffies(ATH_PAPRD_TIMEOUT)))
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
else
complete(&sc->paprd_complete);
} else {
ath_debug_stat_tx(sc, bf, ts, txq, tx_flags);
ath_tx_complete(sc, skb, tx_flags, txq);
}
skip_tx_complete:
/* At this point, skb (bf->bf_mpdu) is consumed...make sure we don't
* accidentally reference it later.
*/
bf->bf_mpdu = NULL;
/*
* Return the list of ath_buf of this mpdu to free queue
*/
spin_lock_irqsave(&sc->tx.txbuflock, flags);
list_splice_tail_init(bf_q, &sc->tx.txbuf);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sc->tx.txbuflock, flags);
}
Commit Message: ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 38,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __do_replace(struct net *net, const char *name,
unsigned int valid_hooks,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int num_counters,
void __user *counters_ptr)
{
int ret;
struct xt_table *t;
struct xt_table_info *oldinfo;
struct xt_counters *counters;
void *loc_cpu_old_entry;
struct arpt_entry *iter;
ret = 0;
counters = vzalloc(num_counters * sizeof(struct xt_counters));
if (!counters) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
t = try_then_request_module(xt_find_table_lock(net, NFPROTO_ARP, name),
"arptable_%s", name);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) {
ret = t ? PTR_ERR(t) : -ENOENT;
goto free_newinfo_counters_untrans;
}
/* You lied! */
if (valid_hooks != t->valid_hooks) {
duprintf("Valid hook crap: %08X vs %08X\n",
valid_hooks, t->valid_hooks);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto put_module;
}
oldinfo = xt_replace_table(t, num_counters, newinfo, &ret);
if (!oldinfo)
goto put_module;
/* Update module usage count based on number of rules */
duprintf("do_replace: oldnum=%u, initnum=%u, newnum=%u\n",
oldinfo->number, oldinfo->initial_entries, newinfo->number);
if ((oldinfo->number > oldinfo->initial_entries) ||
(newinfo->number <= oldinfo->initial_entries))
module_put(t->me);
if ((oldinfo->number > oldinfo->initial_entries) &&
(newinfo->number <= oldinfo->initial_entries))
module_put(t->me);
/* Get the old counters, and synchronize with replace */
get_counters(oldinfo, counters);
/* Decrease module usage counts and free resource */
loc_cpu_old_entry = oldinfo->entries;
xt_entry_foreach(iter, loc_cpu_old_entry, oldinfo->size)
cleanup_entry(iter);
xt_free_table_info(oldinfo);
if (copy_to_user(counters_ptr, counters,
sizeof(struct xt_counters) * num_counters) != 0) {
/* Silent error, can't fail, new table is already in place */
net_warn_ratelimited("arptables: counters copy to user failed while replacing table\n");
}
vfree(counters);
xt_table_unlock(t);
return ret;
put_module:
module_put(t->me);
xt_table_unlock(t);
free_newinfo_counters_untrans:
vfree(counters);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __init int rb_hammer_test(void *arg)
{
while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
/* Send an IPI to all cpus to write data! */
smp_call_function(rb_ipi, NULL, 1);
/* No sleep, but for non preempt, let others run */
schedule();
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: [email protected] # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: horizontalDifference16(unsigned short *ip, int n, int stride,
unsigned short *wp, uint16 *From14)
{
register int r1, g1, b1, a1, r2, g2, b2, a2, mask;
/* assumption is unsigned pixel values */
#undef CLAMP
#define CLAMP(v) From14[(v) >> 2]
mask = CODE_MASK;
if (n >= stride) {
if (stride == 3) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]);
n -= 3;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 3;
wp += 3;
ip += 3;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]); a2 = wp[3] = CLAMP(ip[3]);
n -= 4;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 4;
wp += 4;
ip += 4;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
a1 = CLAMP(ip[3]); wp[3] = (uint16)((a1-a2) & mask); a2 = a1;
}
} else {
ip += n - 1; /* point to last one */
wp += n - 1; /* point to last one */
n -= stride;
while (n > 0) {
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]);
wp[stride] -= wp[0];
wp[stride] &= mask;
wp--; ip--)
n -= stride;
}
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp--; ip--)
}
}
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 166,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_sessions(void)
{
simple_ssl_session *sess, *tsess;
for (sess = first; sess;) {
OPENSSL_free(sess->id);
OPENSSL_free(sess->der);
tsess = sess;
sess = sess->next;
OPENSSL_free(tsess);
}
first = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void do_dut_mode_configure(char *p)
{
bdt_dut_mode_configure(p);
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewTest::SendNativeKeyEvent(
const NativeWebKeyboardEvent& key_event) {
SendWebKeyboardEvent(key_event);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ip_exceeds_mtu(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int mtu)
{
if (skb->len <= mtu)
return false;
if (skb_is_gso(skb) && skb_gso_network_seglen(skb) <= mtu)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ip4_frags_ctl_register(void)
{
register_net_sysctl_rotable(net_ipv4_ctl_path, ip4_frags_ctl_table);
}
Commit Message: net: ip_expire() must revalidate route
Commit 4a94445c9a5c (net: Use ip_route_input_noref() in input path)
added a bug in IP defragmentation handling, in case timeout is fired.
When a frame is defragmented, we use last skb dst field when building
final skb. Its dst is valid, since we are in rcu read section.
But if a timeout occurs, we take first queued fragment to build one ICMP
TIME EXCEEDED message. Problem is all queued skb have weak dst pointers,
since we escaped RCU critical section after their queueing. icmp_send()
might dereference a now freed (and possibly reused) part of memory.
Calling skb_dst_drop() and ip_route_input_noref() to revalidate route is
the only possible choice.
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct bio *btrfs_dio_bio_alloc(struct block_device *bdev,
u64 first_sector, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
int nr_vecs = bio_get_nr_vecs(bdev);
return btrfs_bio_alloc(bdev, first_sector, nr_vecs, gfp_flags);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_report_acomp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_acomp racomp;
strlcpy(racomp.type, "acomp", sizeof(racomp.type));
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_ACOMP,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_acomp), &racomp))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix leaking uninitialized memory to userspace
All bytes of the NETLINK_CRYPTO report structures must be initialized,
since they are copied to userspace. The change from strncpy() to
strlcpy() broke this. As a minimal fix, change it back.
Fixes: 4473710df1f8 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME expansion")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 1 | 168,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void init_tracking(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
{
if (!(s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER))
return;
set_track(s, object, TRACK_FREE, NULL);
set_track(s, object, TRACK_ALLOC, NULL);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,822 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cssAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->cssAttribute());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::CreateQuotaPermissionContext() {
return new ChromeQuotaPermissionContext();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EventRouter* ExtensionSystemImpl::Shared::event_router() {
return event_router_.get();
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
[email protected]
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sk_buff *__skb_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features, bool tx_path)
{
struct sk_buff *segs;
if (unlikely(skb_needs_check(skb, tx_path))) {
int err;
/* We're going to init ->check field in TCP or UDP header */
err = skb_cow_head(skb, 0);
if (err < 0)
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
/* Only report GSO partial support if it will enable us to
* support segmentation on this frame without needing additional
* work.
*/
if (features & NETIF_F_GSO_PARTIAL) {
netdev_features_t partial_features = NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST;
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
partial_features |= dev->features & dev->gso_partial_features;
if (!skb_gso_ok(skb, features | partial_features))
features &= ~NETIF_F_GSO_PARTIAL;
}
BUILD_BUG_ON(SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET +
sizeof(*SKB_GSO_CB(skb)) > sizeof(skb->cb));
SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->mac_offset = skb_headroom(skb);
SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->encap_level = 0;
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb_reset_mac_len(skb);
segs = skb_mac_gso_segment(skb, features);
if (unlikely(skb_needs_check(skb, tx_path)))
skb_warn_bad_offload(skb);
return segs;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
{
int fd, error;
struct file *file;
error = get_unused_fd_flags(flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS);
if (error < 0)
return error;
fd = error;
file = userfaultfd_file_create(flags);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
error = PTR_ERR(file);
goto err_put_unused_fd;
}
fd_install(fd, file);
return fd;
err_put_unused_fd:
put_unused_fd(fd);
return error;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: non-cooperative: fix fork use after free
When reading the event from the uffd, we put it on a temporary
fork_event list to detect if we can still access it after releasing and
retaking the event_wqh.lock.
If fork aborts and removes the event from the fork_event all is fine as
long as we're still in the userfault read context and fork_event head is
still alive.
We've to put the event allocated in the fork kernel stack, back from
fork_event list-head to the event_wqh head, before returning from
userfaultfd_ctx_read, because the fork_event head lifetime is limited to
the userfaultfd_ctx_read stack lifetime.
Forgetting to move the event back to its event_wqh place then results in
__remove_wait_queue(&ctx->event_wqh, &ewq->wq); in
userfaultfd_event_wait_completion to remove it from a head that has been
already freed from the reader stack.
This could only happen if resolve_userfault_fork failed (for example if
there are no file descriptors available to allocate the fork uffd). If
it succeeded it was put back correctly.
Furthermore, after find_userfault_evt receives a fork event, the forked
userfault context in fork_nctx and uwq->msg.arg.reserved.reserved1 can
be released by the fork thread as soon as the event_wqh.lock is
released. Taking a reference on the fork_nctx before dropping the lock
prevents an use after free in resolve_userfault_fork().
If the fork side aborted and it already released everything, we still
try to succeed resolve_userfault_fork(), if possible.
Fixes: 893e26e61d04eac9 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 86,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *old_name)
{
return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
S_IFLNK);
}
Commit Message: apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LogLuvVSetField(TIFF* tif, uint32 tag, va_list ap)
{
static const char module[] = "LogLuvVSetField";
LogLuvState* sp = DecoderState(tif);
int bps, fmt;
switch (tag) {
case TIFFTAG_SGILOGDATAFMT:
sp->user_datafmt = (int) va_arg(ap, int);
/*
* Tweak the TIFF header so that the rest of libtiff knows what
* size of data will be passed between app and library, and
* assume that the app knows what it is doing and is not
* confused by these header manipulations...
*/
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case SGILOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
bps = 32;
fmt = SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
bps = 16;
fmt = SAMPLEFORMAT_INT;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_RAW:
bps = 32;
fmt = SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT;
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, 1);
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_8BIT:
bps = 8;
fmt = SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT;
break;
default:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, tif->tif_name,
"Unknown data format %d for LogLuv compression",
sp->user_datafmt);
return (0);
}
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, bps);
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT, fmt);
/*
* Must recalculate sizes should bits/sample change.
*/
tif->tif_tilesize = isTiled(tif) ? TIFFTileSize(tif) : (tmsize_t) -1;
tif->tif_scanlinesize = TIFFScanlineSize(tif);
return (1);
case TIFFTAG_SGILOGENCODE:
sp->encode_meth = (int) va_arg(ap, int);
if (sp->encode_meth != SGILOGENCODE_NODITHER &&
sp->encode_meth != SGILOGENCODE_RANDITHER) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Unknown encoding %d for LogLuv compression",
sp->encode_meth);
return (0);
}
return (1);
default:
return (*sp->vsetparent)(tif, tag, ap);
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UrlData::OnRedirect(const RedirectCB& cb) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
redirect_callbacks_.push_back(cb);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int veth_validate(struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[])
{
if (tb[IFLA_ADDRESS]) {
if (nla_len(tb[IFLA_ADDRESS]) != ETH_ALEN)
return -EINVAL;
if (!is_valid_ether_addr(nla_data(tb[IFLA_ADDRESS])))
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
if (tb[IFLA_MTU]) {
if (!is_valid_veth_mtu(nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_MTU])))
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int avi_read_close(AVFormatContext *s)
{
int i;
AVIContext *avi = s->priv_data;
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
AVStream *st = s->streams[i];
AVIStream *ast = st->priv_data;
if (ast) {
if (ast->sub_ctx) {
av_freep(&ast->sub_ctx->pb);
avformat_close_input(&ast->sub_ctx);
}
av_freep(&ast->sub_buffer);
av_packet_unref(&ast->sub_pkt);
}
}
av_freep(&avi->dv_demux);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/avidec: Limit formats in gab2 to srt and ass/ssa
This prevents part of one exploit leading to an information leak
Found-by: Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by: Thierry Foucu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 64,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: is_token(apr_array_header_t *tokens, apr_size_t index, TokenType type, const char *value)
{
if (index >= tokens->nelts) {
return false;
}
Token token = APR_ARRAY_IDX(tokens, index, Token);
if (token.type != type) {
return false;
}
if (value) {
if (!g_str_equal(token.str, value)) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 91,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 69,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataEntry::ConvertPlatformFileInfoToProto(
const base::PlatformFileInfo& file_info,
PlatformFileInfoProto* proto) {
proto->set_size(file_info.size);
proto->set_is_directory(file_info.is_directory);
proto->set_is_symbolic_link(file_info.is_symbolic_link);
proto->set_last_modified(file_info.last_modified.ToInternalValue());
proto->set_last_accessed(file_info.last_accessed.ToInternalValue());
proto->set_creation_time(file_info.creation_time.ToInternalValue());
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppLayerProtoDetectUnittestCtxBackup(void)
{
SCEnter();
alpd_ctx_ut = alpd_ctx;
memset(&alpd_ctx, 0, sizeof(alpd_ctx));
SCReturn;
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_fpu_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *parent, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct crypto_fpu_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(parent);
struct crypto_blkcipher *child = ctx->child;
int err;
crypto_blkcipher_clear_flags(child, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(child, crypto_tfm_get_flags(parent) &
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(child, key, keylen);
crypto_tfm_set_flags(parent, crypto_blkcipher_get_flags(child) &
CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void OverloadedMethodE1Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "overloadedMethodE");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
int32_t long_arg;
long_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->overloadedMethodE(long_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FT_Stream_ReadShortLE( FT_Stream stream,
FT_Error* error )
{
FT_Byte reads[2];
FT_Byte* p = 0;
FT_Short result = 0;
FT_ASSERT( stream );
*error = FT_Err_Ok;
if ( stream->pos + 1 < stream->size )
{
if ( stream->read )
{
if ( stream->read( stream, stream->pos, reads, 2L ) != 2L )
goto Fail;
p = reads;
}
else
{
p = stream->base + stream->pos;
}
if ( p )
result = FT_NEXT_SHORT_LE( p );
}
else
goto Fail;
stream->pos += 2;
return result;
Fail:
*error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_ReadShortLE:"
" invalid i/o; pos = 0x%lx, size = 0x%lx\n",
stream->pos, stream->size ));
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int atalk_pick_and_bind_port(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_at *sat)
{
int retval;
write_lock_bh(&atalk_sockets_lock);
for (sat->sat_port = ATPORT_RESERVED;
sat->sat_port < ATPORT_LAST;
sat->sat_port++) {
struct sock *s;
sk_for_each(s, &atalk_sockets) {
struct atalk_sock *at = at_sk(s);
if (at->src_net == sat->sat_addr.s_net &&
at->src_node == sat->sat_addr.s_node &&
at->src_port == sat->sat_port)
goto try_next_port;
}
/* Wheee, it's free, assign and insert. */
__atalk_insert_socket(sk);
at_sk(sk)->src_port = sat->sat_port;
retval = 0;
goto out;
try_next_port:;
}
retval = -EBUSY;
out:
write_unlock_bh(&atalk_sockets_lock);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void set_store_user_dirty(struct kmem_cache *cachep) {}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __imlib_RenderGetPixel(Display * d, Drawable w, Visual * v, Colormap cm,
int depth, DATA8 r, DATA8 g, DATA8 b)
{
Context *ct;
ct = __imlib_GetContext(d, v, cm, depth);
if (ct->palette)
{
switch (ct->palette_type)
{
case 0: /* 332 */
return ct->palette[((r >> 0) & 0xe0) |
((g >> 3) & 0x1b) | ((b >> 6) & 0x02)];
break;
case 1: /* 232 */
return ct->palette[((r >> 0) & 0xe0) |
((g >> 3) & 0x1b) | ((b >> 6) & 0x02)];
break;
case 2: /* 222 */
return ct->palette[((r >> 0) & 0xe0) |
((g >> 3) & 0x1b) | ((b >> 6) & 0x02)];
break;
case 3: /* 221 */
return ct->palette[((r >> 0) & 0xe0) |
((g >> 3) & 0x1b) | ((b >> 6) & 0x02)];
break;
case 4: /* 121 */
return ct->palette[((r >> 0) & 0xe0) |
((g >> 3) & 0x1b) | ((b >> 6) & 0x02)];
break;
case 5: /* 111 */
return ct->palette[((r >> 0) & 0xe0) |
((g >> 3) & 0x1b) | ((b >> 6) & 0x02)];
break;
case 6: /* 1 */
return ct->palette[((r >> 0) & 0xe0) |
((g >> 3) & 0x1b) | ((b >> 6) & 0x02)];
break;
case 7: /* 666 */
return ct->palette[((int)(((double)r / 255) * 5.0) * 36) +
((int)(((double)g / 255) * 5.0) * 6) +
((int)(((double)b / 255) * 5.0))];
break;
default:
return 0;
}
}
else
{
unsigned int rm, gm, bm;
int i, rshift = 0, gshift = 0, bshift = 0;
DATA32 val;
rm = v->red_mask;
gm = v->green_mask;
bm = v->blue_mask;
if ((rm == 0xf800) && (gm == 0x7e0) && (bm == 0x1f)) /* 565 */
{
return (((r << 8) & 0xf800) |
((g << 3) & 0x07e0) | ((b >> 3) & 0x001f));
}
if ((rm == 0xff0000) && (gm == 0xff00) && (bm == 0xff)) /* 888 */
{
return (((r << 16) & 0xff0000) |
((g << 8) & 0x00ff00) | ((r) & 0x0000ff));
}
if ((rm == 0x7c00) && (gm == 0x3e0) && (bm == 0x1f)) /* 555 */
{
return (((r << 7) & 0x7c00) |
((g << 2) & 0x03e0) | ((b >> 3) & 0x001f));
}
for (i = 31; i >= 0; i--)
{
if (rm >= (1U << i))
{
rshift = i - 7;
break;
}
}
for (i = 31; i >= 0; i--)
{
if (gm >= (1U << i))
{
gshift = i - 7;
break;
}
}
for (i = 31; i >= 0; i--)
{
if (bm >= (1U << i))
{
bshift = i - 7;
break;
}
}
if (rshift >= 0)
val = ((r << rshift) & rm);
else
val = ((r >> (-rshift)) & rm);
if (gshift >= 0)
val |= ((g << gshift) & gm);
else
val |= ((g >> (-gshift)) & gm);
if (bshift >= 0)
val |= ((b << bshift) & bm);
else
val |= ((b >> (-bshift)) & bm);
return val;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: enable_console_log(void)
{
log_console = true;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rawsock_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
pr_debug("sock=%p sk=%p\n", sock, sk);
if (!sk)
return 0;
sock_orphan(sk);
sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: METHODDEF(JDIMENSION)
get_8bit_row(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
/* This version is for reading 8-bit colormap indexes */
{
bmp_source_ptr source = (bmp_source_ptr)sinfo;
register JSAMPARRAY colormap = source->colormap;
JSAMPARRAY image_ptr;
register int t;
register JSAMPROW inptr, outptr;
register JDIMENSION col;
if (source->use_inversion_array) {
/* Fetch next row from virtual array */
source->source_row--;
image_ptr = (*cinfo->mem->access_virt_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, source->whole_image,
source->source_row, (JDIMENSION)1, FALSE);
inptr = image_ptr[0];
} else {
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, source->iobuffer, source->row_width))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
inptr = source->iobuffer;
}
/* Expand the colormap indexes to real data */
outptr = source->pub.buffer[0];
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_GRAYSCALE) {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
t = GETJSAMPLE(*inptr++);
*outptr++ = colormap[0][t];
}
} else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK) {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
t = GETJSAMPLE(*inptr++);
rgb_to_cmyk(colormap[0][t], colormap[1][t], colormap[2][t], outptr,
outptr + 1, outptr + 2, outptr + 3);
outptr += 4;
}
} else {
register int rindex = rgb_red[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int gindex = rgb_green[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int bindex = rgb_blue[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int aindex = alpha_index[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int ps = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
if (aindex >= 0) {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
t = GETJSAMPLE(*inptr++);
outptr[rindex] = colormap[0][t];
outptr[gindex] = colormap[1][t];
outptr[bindex] = colormap[2][t];
outptr[aindex] = 0xFF;
outptr += ps;
}
} else {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
t = GETJSAMPLE(*inptr++);
outptr[rindex] = colormap[0][t];
outptr[gindex] = colormap[1][t];
outptr[bindex] = colormap[2][t];
outptr += ps;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: cjpeg: Fix OOB read caused by malformed 8-bit BMP
... in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the
number of palette entries.
Fix partly borrowed from jpeg-9c. This commit also adopts Guido's
JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE enum value in lieu of our project-specific
JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE enum value.
Fixes #258
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 169,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BlockEntry::Kind SimpleBlock::GetKind() const { return kBlockSimple; }
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 164,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSC::JSValue toJS(JSC::ExecState* exec, JSDOMGlobalObject* globalObject, TestMediaQueryListListener* impl)
{
return wrap<JSTestMediaQueryListListener>(exec, globalObject, impl);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlinkMediaTestSuite::Initialize() {
base::TestSuite::Initialize();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
ui::gl::android::RegisterJni(env);
media::RegisterJni(env);
#endif
media::InitializeMediaLibrary();
#ifdef V8_USE_EXTERNAL_STARTUP_DATA
gin::V8Initializer::LoadV8Snapshot();
gin::V8Initializer::LoadV8Natives();
#endif
scoped_ptr<base::MessageLoop> message_loop;
if (!base::MessageLoop::current())
message_loop.reset(new base::MessageLoop());
blink::initialize(blink_platform_support_.get());
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 132,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HB_Error Load_PosRule( HB_PosRule* pr,
HB_Stream stream )
{
HB_Error error;
HB_UShort n, count;
HB_UShort* i;
HB_PosLookupRecord* plr;
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 4L ) )
return error;
pr->GlyphCount = GET_UShort();
pr->PosCount = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
pr->Input = NULL;
count = pr->GlyphCount - 1; /* only GlyphCount - 1 elements */
if ( ALLOC_ARRAY( pr->Input, count, HB_UShort ) )
return error;
i = pr->Input;
if ( ACCESS_Frame( count * 2L ) )
goto Fail2;
for ( n = 0; n < count; n++ )
i[n] = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
pr->PosLookupRecord = NULL;
count = pr->PosCount;
if ( ALLOC_ARRAY( pr->PosLookupRecord, count, HB_PosLookupRecord ) )
goto Fail2;
plr = pr->PosLookupRecord;
if ( ACCESS_Frame( count * 4L ) )
goto Fail1;
for ( n = 0; n < count; n++ )
{
plr[n].SequenceIndex = GET_UShort();
plr[n].LookupListIndex = GET_UShort();
}
FORGET_Frame();
return HB_Err_Ok;
Fail1:
FREE( plr );
Fail2:
FREE( i );
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int reg_to_user(void __user *uaddr, const u64 *val, u64 id)
{
if (copy_to_user(uaddr, val, KVM_REG_SIZE(id)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: [email protected] # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 62,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static zend_always_inline int zend_mm_bitset_is_set(zend_mm_bitset *bitset, int bit)
{
return (bitset[bit / ZEND_MM_BITSET_LEN] & (Z_L(1) << (bit & (ZEND_MM_BITSET_LEN-1)))) != 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72742 - memory allocator fails to realloc small block to large one
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 50,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsToneCurve* ReadEmbeddedCurve(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io)
{
cmsTagTypeSignature BaseType;
cmsUInt32Number nItems;
BaseType = _cmsReadTypeBase(io);
switch (BaseType) {
case cmsSigCurveType:
return (cmsToneCurve*) Type_Curve_Read(self, io, &nItems, 0);
case cmsSigParametricCurveType:
return (cmsToneCurve*) Type_ParametricCurve_Read(self, io, &nItems, 0);
default:
{
char String[5];
_cmsTagSignature2String(String, (cmsTagSignature) BaseType);
cmsSignalError(self ->ContextID, cmsERROR_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION, "Unknown curve type '%s'", String);
}
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void remove_decompressor(VP8D_COMP *pbi)
{
#if CONFIG_ERROR_CONCEALMENT
vp8_de_alloc_overlap_lists(pbi);
#endif
vp8_remove_common(&pbi->common);
vpx_free(pbi);
}
Commit Message: vp8:fix threading issues
1 - stops de allocating before threads are closed.
2 - limits threads to mb_rows when mb_rows < partitions
BUG=webm:851
Bug: 30436808
Change-Id: Ie017818ed28103ca9d26d57087f31361b642e09b
(cherry picked from commit 70cca742efa20617c70c3209aa614a70f282f90e)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NDIS_HANDLE ParaNdis_OpenNICConfiguration(PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext)
{
NDIS_CONFIGURATION_OBJECT co;
NDIS_HANDLE cfg;
NDIS_STATUS status;
DEBUG_ENTRY(2);
co.Header.Type = NDIS_OBJECT_TYPE_CONFIGURATION_OBJECT;
co.Header.Revision = NDIS_CONFIGURATION_OBJECT_REVISION_1;
co.Header.Size = sizeof(co);
co.Flags = 0;
co.NdisHandle = pContext->MiniportHandle;
status = NdisOpenConfigurationEx(&co, &cfg);
if (status != NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
cfg = NULL;
DEBUG_EXIT_STATUS(status == NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS ? 2 : 0, status);
return cfg;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int HarfBuzzShaper::HarfBuzzRun::characterIndexForXPosition(float targetX)
{
ASSERT(targetX <= m_width);
float currentX = 0;
float currentAdvance = m_advances[0];
unsigned glyphIndex = 0;
while (glyphIndex < m_numGlyphs - 1 && m_glyphToCharacterIndexes[glyphIndex] == m_glyphToCharacterIndexes[glyphIndex + 1])
currentAdvance += m_advances[++glyphIndex];
currentAdvance = currentAdvance / 2.0;
if (targetX <= currentAdvance)
return rtl() ? m_numCharacters : 0;
currentX = currentAdvance;
++glyphIndex;
while (glyphIndex < m_numGlyphs) {
unsigned prevCharacterIndex = m_glyphToCharacterIndexes[glyphIndex - 1];
float prevAdvance = currentAdvance;
currentAdvance = m_advances[glyphIndex];
while (glyphIndex < m_numGlyphs - 1 && m_glyphToCharacterIndexes[glyphIndex] == m_glyphToCharacterIndexes[glyphIndex + 1])
currentAdvance += m_advances[++glyphIndex];
currentAdvance = currentAdvance / 2.0;
float nextX = currentX + prevAdvance + currentAdvance;
if (currentX <= targetX && targetX <= nextX)
return rtl() ? prevCharacterIndex : m_glyphToCharacterIndexes[glyphIndex];
currentX = nextX;
++glyphIndex;
}
return rtl() ? 0 : m_numCharacters;
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
[email protected]
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct mr6_table *ip6mr_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id)
{
struct mr6_table *mrt;
unsigned int i;
mrt = ip6mr_get_table(net, id);
if (mrt)
return mrt;
mrt = kzalloc(sizeof(*mrt), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mrt)
return NULL;
mrt->id = id;
write_pnet(&mrt->net, net);
/* Forwarding cache */
for (i = 0; i < MFC6_LINES; i++)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mrt->mfc6_cache_array[i]);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mrt->mfc6_unres_queue);
setup_timer(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer, ipmr_expire_process,
(unsigned long)mrt);
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_PIMSM_V2
mrt->mroute_reg_vif_num = -1;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES
list_add_tail_rcu(&mrt->list, &net->ipv6.mr6_tables);
#endif
return mrt;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 93,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rfcomm_sock_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rfcomm_dlc *d = rfcomm_pi(sk)->dlc;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int sent;
if (test_bit(RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP, &d->flags))
return -ENOTCONN;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN)
return -EPIPE;
BT_DBG("sock %p, sk %p", sock, sk);
lock_sock(sk);
sent = bt_sock_wait_ready(sk, msg->msg_flags);
if (sent)
goto done;
while (len) {
size_t size = min_t(size_t, len, d->mtu);
int err;
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, size + RFCOMM_SKB_RESERVE,
msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (!skb) {
if (sent == 0)
sent = err;
break;
}
skb_reserve(skb, RFCOMM_SKB_HEAD_RESERVE);
err = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, size), msg->msg_iov, size);
if (err) {
kfree_skb(skb);
if (sent == 0)
sent = err;
break;
}
skb->priority = sk->sk_priority;
err = rfcomm_dlc_send(d, skb);
if (err < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
if (sent == 0)
sent = err;
break;
}
sent += size;
len -= size;
}
done:
release_sock(sk);
return sent;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,382 |
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