instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
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int64 0
1
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int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bdfSkipBitmap(FontFilePtr file, int height)
{
unsigned char *line;
int i = 0;
unsigned char lineBuf[BDFLINELEN];
do {
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
i++;
} while (line && !bdfIsPrefix(line, "ENDCHAR") && i <= height);
if (i > 1 && line && !bdfIsPrefix(line, "ENDCHAR")) {
bdfError("Error in bitmap, missing 'ENDCHAR'\n");
return (FALSE);
}
return (TRUE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rfcomm_tty_tiocmget(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct rfcomm_dev *dev = (struct rfcomm_dev *) tty->driver_data;
BT_DBG("tty %p dev %p", tty, dev);
return dev->modem_status;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.
Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 94,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __poll_t megasas_mgmt_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
__poll_t mask;
unsigned long flags;
poll_wait(file, &megasas_poll_wait, wait);
spin_lock_irqsave(&poll_aen_lock, flags);
if (megasas_poll_wait_aen)
mask = (EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM);
else
mask = 0;
megasas_poll_wait_aen = 0;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&poll_aen_lock, flags);
return mask;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType DrawStrokePolygon(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info)
{
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
MagickBooleanType
closed_path;
MagickStatusType
status;
PrimitiveInfo
*stroke_polygon;
register const PrimitiveInfo
*p,
*q;
/*
Draw stroked polygon.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" begin draw-stroke-polygon");
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
clone_info->fill=draw_info->stroke;
if (clone_info->fill_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
clone_info->fill_pattern=DestroyImage(clone_info->fill_pattern);
if (clone_info->stroke_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
clone_info->fill_pattern=CloneImage(clone_info->stroke_pattern,0,0,
MagickTrue,&clone_info->stroke_pattern->exception);
clone_info->stroke.opacity=(Quantum) TransparentOpacity;
clone_info->stroke_width=0.0;
clone_info->fill_rule=NonZeroRule;
status=MagickTrue;
for (p=primitive_info; p->primitive != UndefinedPrimitive; p+=p->coordinates)
{
stroke_polygon=TraceStrokePolygon(draw_info,p);
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,clone_info,stroke_polygon);
if (status == 0)
break;
stroke_polygon=(PrimitiveInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stroke_polygon);
q=p+p->coordinates-1;
closed_path=(fabs(q->point.x-p->point.x) < DrawEpsilon) &&
(fabs(q->point.y-p->point.y) < DrawEpsilon) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((draw_info->linecap == RoundCap) && (closed_path == MagickFalse))
{
DrawRoundLinecap(image,draw_info,p);
DrawRoundLinecap(image,draw_info,q);
}
}
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" end draw-stroke-polygon");
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 72,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: is_wordchar(int c)
{
return IS_ALNUM(c);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 84,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static UINT dvcman_create_listener(IWTSVirtualChannelManager* pChannelMgr,
const char* pszChannelName, ULONG ulFlags,
IWTSListenerCallback* pListenerCallback, IWTSListener** ppListener)
{
DVCMAN* dvcman = (DVCMAN*) pChannelMgr;
DVCMAN_LISTENER* listener;
if (dvcman->num_listeners < MAX_PLUGINS)
{
WLog_DBG(TAG, "create_listener: %d.%s.", dvcman->num_listeners, pszChannelName);
listener = (DVCMAN_LISTENER*) calloc(1, sizeof(DVCMAN_LISTENER));
if (!listener)
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "calloc failed!");
return CHANNEL_RC_NO_MEMORY;
}
listener->iface.GetConfiguration = dvcman_get_configuration;
listener->iface.pInterface = NULL;
listener->dvcman = dvcman;
listener->channel_name = _strdup(pszChannelName);
if (!listener->channel_name)
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "_strdup failed!");
free(listener);
return CHANNEL_RC_NO_MEMORY;
}
listener->flags = ulFlags;
listener->listener_callback = pListenerCallback;
if (ppListener)
*ppListener = (IWTSListener*) listener;
dvcman->listeners[dvcman->num_listeners++] = (IWTSListener*) listener;
return CHANNEL_RC_OK;
}
else
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "create_listener: Maximum DVC listener number reached.");
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID: | 0 | 74,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
}
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 51,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t unflatten_binder(const sp<ProcessState>& proc,
const Parcel& in, wp<IBinder>* out)
{
const flat_binder_object* flat = in.readObject(false);
if (flat) {
switch (flat->type) {
case BINDER_TYPE_BINDER:
*out = reinterpret_cast<IBinder*>(flat->cookie);
return finish_unflatten_binder(NULL, *flat, in);
case BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_BINDER:
if (flat->binder != 0) {
out->set_object_and_refs(
reinterpret_cast<IBinder*>(flat->cookie),
reinterpret_cast<RefBase::weakref_type*>(flat->binder));
} else {
*out = NULL;
}
return finish_unflatten_binder(NULL, *flat, in);
case BINDER_TYPE_HANDLE:
case BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_HANDLE:
*out = proc->getWeakProxyForHandle(flat->handle);
return finish_unflatten_binder(
static_cast<BpBinder*>(out->unsafe_get()), *flat, in);
}
}
return BAD_TYPE;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _set_batch_job_limits(slurm_msg_t *msg)
{
int i;
uint32_t alloc_lps = 0, last_bit = 0;
bool cpu_log = slurm_get_debug_flags() & DEBUG_FLAG_CPU_BIND;
slurm_cred_arg_t arg;
batch_job_launch_msg_t *req = (batch_job_launch_msg_t *)msg->data;
if (slurm_cred_get_args(req->cred, &arg) != SLURM_SUCCESS)
return;
req->job_core_spec = arg.job_core_spec; /* Prevent user reset */
if (cpu_log) {
char *per_job = "";
uint32_t job_mem = arg.job_mem_limit;
if (job_mem & MEM_PER_CPU) {
job_mem &= (~MEM_PER_CPU);
per_job = "_per_CPU";
}
info("====================");
info("batch_job:%u job_mem:%uMB%s", req->job_id,
job_mem, per_job);
}
if (cpu_log || (arg.job_mem_limit & MEM_PER_CPU)) {
if (arg.job_nhosts > 0) {
last_bit = arg.sockets_per_node[0] *
arg.cores_per_socket[0];
for (i=0; i<last_bit; i++) {
if (!bit_test(arg.job_core_bitmap, i))
continue;
if (cpu_log)
info("JobNode[0] CPU[%u] Job alloc",i);
alloc_lps++;
}
}
if (cpu_log)
info("====================");
if (alloc_lps == 0) {
error("_set_batch_job_limit: alloc_lps is zero");
alloc_lps = 1;
}
/* NOTE: alloc_lps is the count of allocated resources
* (typically cores). Convert to CPU count as needed */
if (last_bit < 1)
error("Batch job credential allocates no CPUs");
else {
i = conf->cpus / last_bit;
if (i > 1)
alloc_lps *= i;
}
}
if (arg.job_mem_limit & MEM_PER_CPU) {
req->job_mem = arg.job_mem_limit & (~MEM_PER_CPU);
req->job_mem *= alloc_lps;
} else
req->job_mem = arg.job_mem_limit;
slurm_cred_free_args(&arg);
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int zend_set_hash_symbol(zval *symbol, const char *name, int name_length, zend_bool is_ref, int num_symbol_tables, ...) /* {{{ */
{
HashTable *symbol_table;
va_list symbol_table_list;
if (num_symbol_tables <= 0) return FAILURE;
Z_SET_ISREF_TO_P(symbol, is_ref);
va_start(symbol_table_list, num_symbol_tables);
while (num_symbol_tables-- > 0) {
symbol_table = va_arg(symbol_table_list, HashTable *);
zend_hash_update(symbol_table, name, name_length + 1, &symbol, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
zval_add_ref(&symbol);
}
va_end(symbol_table_list);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cdrom_ioctl_multisession(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
void __user *argp)
{
struct cdrom_multisession ms_info;
u8 requested_format;
int ret;
cd_dbg(CD_DO_IOCTL, "entering CDROMMULTISESSION\n");
if (!(cdi->ops->capability & CDC_MULTI_SESSION))
return -ENOSYS;
if (copy_from_user(&ms_info, argp, sizeof(ms_info)))
return -EFAULT;
requested_format = ms_info.addr_format;
if (requested_format != CDROM_MSF && requested_format != CDROM_LBA)
return -EINVAL;
ms_info.addr_format = CDROM_LBA;
ret = cdi->ops->get_last_session(cdi, &ms_info);
if (ret)
return ret;
sanitize_format(&ms_info.addr, &ms_info.addr_format, requested_format);
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ms_info, sizeof(ms_info)))
return -EFAULT;
cd_dbg(CD_DO_IOCTL, "CDROMMULTISESSION successful\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 76,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void blk_start_plug(struct blk_plug *plug)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
/*
* If this is a nested plug, don't actually assign it.
*/
if (tsk->plug)
return;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&plug->list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&plug->mq_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&plug->cb_list);
/*
* Store ordering should not be needed here, since a potential
* preempt will imply a full memory barrier
*/
tsk->plug = plug;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 92,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GDataFileSystem::GDataFileSystem(
Profile* profile,
GDataCache* cache,
DocumentsServiceInterface* documents_service,
GDataUploaderInterface* uploader,
DriveWebAppsRegistryInterface* webapps_registry,
base::SequencedTaskRunner* blocking_task_runner)
: profile_(profile),
cache_(cache),
uploader_(uploader),
documents_service_(documents_service),
webapps_registry_(webapps_registry),
update_timer_(true /* retain_user_task */, true /* is_repeating */),
hide_hosted_docs_(false),
blocking_task_runner_(blocking_task_runner),
ui_weak_ptr_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
ui_weak_ptr_(ui_weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 116,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const struct sys_reg_desc *get_target_table(unsigned target,
bool mode_is_64,
size_t *num)
{
struct kvm_sys_reg_target_table *table;
table = target_tables[target];
if (mode_is_64) {
*num = table->table64.num;
return table->table64.table;
} else {
*num = table->table32.num;
return table->table32.table;
}
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: [email protected] # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 62,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::Optional<base::string16> PossibleResidentKeyWarning(
AuthenticatorRequestDialogModel* dialog_model) {
if (dialog_model->might_create_resident_credential()) {
return l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_RESIDENT_KEY_PRIVACY,
GetRelyingPartyIdString(dialog_model));
}
return base::nullopt;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: float FrameQuadScaleDeltaFromIdeal(LayerTreeHostImpl::FrameData* frame_data) {
if (frame_data->has_no_damage)
return 0.f;
float frame_scale = 0.f;
RenderPass* root_pass = frame_data->render_passes.back().get();
for (auto* draw_quad : root_pass->quad_list) {
if (draw_quad->material != DrawQuad::TILED_CONTENT)
return 0.f;
const TileDrawQuad* quad = TileDrawQuad::MaterialCast(draw_quad);
float quad_scale =
quad->tex_coord_rect.width() / static_cast<float>(quad->rect.width());
float transform_scale = SkMScalarToFloat(
quad->shared_quad_state->quad_to_target_transform.matrix().get(0, 0));
float scale = quad_scale / transform_scale;
if (frame_scale != 0.f && frame_scale != scale)
return 0.f;
frame_scale = scale;
}
return frame_scale;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NuPlayer::GenericSource::notifyPreparedAndCleanup(status_t err) {
if (err != OK) {
{
sp<DataSource> dataSource = mDataSource;
sp<NuCachedSource2> cachedSource = mCachedSource;
sp<DataSource> httpSource = mHttpSource;
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDisconnectLock);
mDataSource.clear();
mDecryptHandle = NULL;
mDrmManagerClient = NULL;
mCachedSource.clear();
mHttpSource.clear();
}
}
mBitrate = -1;
cancelPollBuffering();
}
notifyPrepared(err);
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BookmarkManagerView::OnTreeViewKeyDown(unsigned short virtual_keycode) {
switch (virtual_keycode) {
case VK_DELETE: {
BookmarkNode* node = GetSelectedFolder();
if (!node || node->GetParent() == GetBookmarkModel()->root_node())
return;
BookmarkNode* parent = node->GetParent();
GetBookmarkModel()->Remove(parent, parent->IndexOfChild(node));
break;
}
default:
OnCutCopyPaste(KeyCodeToCutCopyPaste(virtual_keycode), false);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Relands cl 16982 as it wasn't the cause of the build breakage. Here's
the description for that cl:
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/115505 for bug
http://crbug.com/4030 for tyoshino.
BUG=http://crbug.com/4030
TEST=make sure control-w dismisses bookmark manager.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/113902
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@16987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
reg->umin_value = 0;
reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 59,094 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void stroke_status(private_stroke_socket_t *this,
stroke_msg_t *msg, FILE *out, bool all, bool wait)
{
pop_string(msg, &(msg->status.name));
this->list->status(this->list, msg, out, all, wait);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 12,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_get_iv_size)
{
char *cipher;
char *module;
int cipher_len, module_len;
char *cipher_dir_string;
char *module_dir_string;
MCRYPT td;
MCRYPT_GET_INI
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss",
&cipher, &cipher_len, &module, &module_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
td = mcrypt_module_open(cipher, cipher_dir_string, module, module_dir_string);
if (td != MCRYPT_FAILED) {
RETVAL_LONG(mcrypt_enc_get_iv_size(td));
mcrypt_module_close(td);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, MCRYPT_OPEN_MODULE_FAILED);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanSendMidiSysExMessage(int child_id) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id);
if (state == security_state_.end())
return false;
return state->second->can_send_midi_sysex();
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 125,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::StopFind() {
SelectionChangeInvalidator selection_invalidator(this);
selection_.clear();
selecting_ = false;
find_results_.clear();
next_page_to_search_ = -1;
last_page_to_search_ = -1;
last_character_index_to_search_ = -1;
current_find_index_.Invalidate();
current_find_text_.clear();
UpdateTickMarks();
find_factory_.CancelAll();
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline LayoutInline* startOfContinuations(LayoutObject* r) {
if (r->isInlineElementContinuation()) {
return toLayoutInline(r->node()->layoutObject());
}
if (r->isLayoutBlockFlow() &&
toLayoutBlockFlow(r)->inlineElementContinuation())
return toLayoutInline(toLayoutBlockFlow(r)
->inlineElementContinuation()
->node()
->layoutObject());
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetUniformfv(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::GetUniformfv& c) {
GLuint program = c.program;
GLint fake_location = c.location;
GLuint service_id;
GLint real_location = -1;
Error error;
typedef cmds::GetUniformfv::Result Result;
Result* result;
GLenum result_type;
if (GetUniformSetup(
program, fake_location, c.params_shm_id, c.params_shm_offset,
&error, &real_location, &service_id,
reinterpret_cast<void**>(&result), &result_type)) {
if (result_type == GL_BOOL || result_type == GL_BOOL_VEC2 ||
result_type == GL_BOOL_VEC3 || result_type == GL_BOOL_VEC4) {
GLsizei num_values = result->GetNumResults();
scoped_ptr<GLint[]> temp(new GLint[num_values]);
glGetUniformiv(service_id, real_location, temp.get());
GLfloat* dst = result->GetData();
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < num_values; ++ii) {
dst[ii] = (temp[ii] != 0);
}
} else {
glGetUniformfv(service_id, real_location, result->GetData());
}
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void arch_cpu_idle_dead(void)
{
cpu_die();
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 58,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void string_addr_inc(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int reg,
struct operand *op)
{
int df = (ctxt->eflags & EFLG_DF) ? -op->count : op->count;
register_address_increment(ctxt, reg_rmw(ctxt, reg), df * op->bytes);
op->addr.mem.ea = register_address(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, reg));
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static GURL GetOriginalRequestURL(WebDataSource* ds) {
if (ds->hasUnreachableURL())
return ds->unreachableURL();
std::vector<GURL> redirects;
GetRedirectChain(ds, &redirects);
if (!redirects.empty())
return redirects.at(0);
return ds->originalRequest().url();
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mem_cgroup_count_vm_event(struct mm_struct *mm, enum vm_event_item idx)
{
struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
if (!mm)
return;
rcu_read_lock();
memcg = mem_cgroup_from_task(rcu_dereference(mm->owner));
if (unlikely(!memcg))
goto out;
switch (idx) {
case PGFAULT:
this_cpu_inc(memcg->stat->events[MEM_CGROUP_EVENTS_PGFAULT]);
break;
case PGMAJFAULT:
this_cpu_inc(memcg->stat->events[MEM_CGROUP_EVENTS_PGMAJFAULT]);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int restart_array(struct mddev *mddev)
{
struct gendisk *disk = mddev->gendisk;
/* Complain if it has no devices */
if (list_empty(&mddev->disks))
return -ENXIO;
if (!mddev->pers)
return -EINVAL;
if (!mddev->ro)
return -EBUSY;
mddev->safemode = 0;
mddev->ro = 0;
set_disk_ro(disk, 0);
printk(KERN_INFO "md: %s switched to read-write mode.\n",
mdname(mddev));
/* Kick recovery or resync if necessary */
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread(mddev->thread);
md_wakeup_thread(mddev->sync_thread);
sysfs_notify_dirent_safe(mddev->sysfs_state);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::HasSVGRootNode() const {
return isSVGSVGElement(documentElement());
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_always_inline void mc_part_weighted(H264Context *h, int n, int square,
int height, int delta,
uint8_t *dest_y, uint8_t *dest_cb,
uint8_t *dest_cr,
int x_offset, int y_offset,
qpel_mc_func *qpix_put,
h264_chroma_mc_func chroma_put,
h264_weight_func luma_weight_op,
h264_weight_func chroma_weight_op,
h264_biweight_func luma_weight_avg,
h264_biweight_func chroma_weight_avg,
int list0, int list1,
int pixel_shift, int chroma_idc)
{
int chroma_height;
dest_y += (2 * x_offset << pixel_shift) + 2 * y_offset * h->mb_linesize;
if (chroma_idc == 3 /* yuv444 */) {
chroma_height = height;
chroma_weight_avg = luma_weight_avg;
chroma_weight_op = luma_weight_op;
dest_cb += (2 * x_offset << pixel_shift) + 2 * y_offset * h->mb_linesize;
dest_cr += (2 * x_offset << pixel_shift) + 2 * y_offset * h->mb_linesize;
} else if (chroma_idc == 2 /* yuv422 */) {
chroma_height = height;
dest_cb += (x_offset << pixel_shift) + 2 * y_offset * h->mb_uvlinesize;
dest_cr += (x_offset << pixel_shift) + 2 * y_offset * h->mb_uvlinesize;
} else { /* yuv420 */
chroma_height = height >> 1;
dest_cb += (x_offset << pixel_shift) + y_offset * h->mb_uvlinesize;
dest_cr += (x_offset << pixel_shift) + y_offset * h->mb_uvlinesize;
}
x_offset += 8 * h->mb_x;
y_offset += 8 * (h->mb_y >> MB_FIELD(h));
if (list0 && list1) {
/* don't optimize for luma-only case, since B-frames usually
* use implicit weights => chroma too. */
uint8_t *tmp_cb = h->bipred_scratchpad;
uint8_t *tmp_cr = h->bipred_scratchpad + (16 << pixel_shift);
uint8_t *tmp_y = h->bipred_scratchpad + 16 * h->mb_uvlinesize;
int refn0 = h->ref_cache[0][scan8[n]];
int refn1 = h->ref_cache[1][scan8[n]];
mc_dir_part(h, &h->ref_list[0][refn0], n, square, height, delta, 0,
dest_y, dest_cb, dest_cr,
x_offset, y_offset, qpix_put, chroma_put,
pixel_shift, chroma_idc);
mc_dir_part(h, &h->ref_list[1][refn1], n, square, height, delta, 1,
tmp_y, tmp_cb, tmp_cr,
x_offset, y_offset, qpix_put, chroma_put,
pixel_shift, chroma_idc);
if (h->use_weight == 2) {
int weight0 = h->implicit_weight[refn0][refn1][h->mb_y & 1];
int weight1 = 64 - weight0;
luma_weight_avg(dest_y, tmp_y, h->mb_linesize,
height, 5, weight0, weight1, 0);
chroma_weight_avg(dest_cb, tmp_cb, h->mb_uvlinesize,
chroma_height, 5, weight0, weight1, 0);
chroma_weight_avg(dest_cr, tmp_cr, h->mb_uvlinesize,
chroma_height, 5, weight0, weight1, 0);
} else {
luma_weight_avg(dest_y, tmp_y, h->mb_linesize, height,
h->luma_log2_weight_denom,
h->luma_weight[refn0][0][0],
h->luma_weight[refn1][1][0],
h->luma_weight[refn0][0][1] +
h->luma_weight[refn1][1][1]);
chroma_weight_avg(dest_cb, tmp_cb, h->mb_uvlinesize, chroma_height,
h->chroma_log2_weight_denom,
h->chroma_weight[refn0][0][0][0],
h->chroma_weight[refn1][1][0][0],
h->chroma_weight[refn0][0][0][1] +
h->chroma_weight[refn1][1][0][1]);
chroma_weight_avg(dest_cr, tmp_cr, h->mb_uvlinesize, chroma_height,
h->chroma_log2_weight_denom,
h->chroma_weight[refn0][0][1][0],
h->chroma_weight[refn1][1][1][0],
h->chroma_weight[refn0][0][1][1] +
h->chroma_weight[refn1][1][1][1]);
}
} else {
int list = list1 ? 1 : 0;
int refn = h->ref_cache[list][scan8[n]];
Picture *ref = &h->ref_list[list][refn];
mc_dir_part(h, ref, n, square, height, delta, list,
dest_y, dest_cb, dest_cr, x_offset, y_offset,
qpix_put, chroma_put, pixel_shift, chroma_idc);
luma_weight_op(dest_y, h->mb_linesize, height,
h->luma_log2_weight_denom,
h->luma_weight[refn][list][0],
h->luma_weight[refn][list][1]);
if (h->use_weight_chroma) {
chroma_weight_op(dest_cb, h->mb_uvlinesize, chroma_height,
h->chroma_log2_weight_denom,
h->chroma_weight[refn][list][0][0],
h->chroma_weight[refn][list][0][1]);
chroma_weight_op(dest_cr, h->mb_uvlinesize, chroma_height,
h->chroma_log2_weight_denom,
h->chroma_weight[refn][list][1][0],
h->chroma_weight[refn][list][1][1]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool Type_ViewingConditions_Write(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, void* Ptr, cmsUInt32Number nItems)
{
cmsICCViewingConditions* sc = (cmsICCViewingConditions* ) Ptr;
if (!_cmsWriteXYZNumber(io, &sc ->IlluminantXYZ)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteXYZNumber(io, &sc ->SurroundXYZ)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt32Number(io, sc ->IlluminantType)) return FALSE;
return TRUE;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(nItems);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 71,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
return 1;
#else
int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
X509 *x;
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
int proxy_path_length = 0;
int purpose;
int allow_proxy_certs;
cb = ctx->verify_cb;
/*-
* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
* -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
* use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
* 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
* used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
* 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
* all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
*/
must_be_ca = -1;
/* CRL path validation */
if (ctx->parent) {
allow_proxy_certs = 0;
purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
} else {
allow_proxy_certs =
! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
/*
* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
* happy
*/
if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
allow_proxy_certs = 1;
purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
}
/* Check all untrusted certificates */
for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
int ret;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
ret = X509_check_ca(x);
switch (must_be_ca) {
case -1:
if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
&& (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
} else
ret = 1;
break;
case 0:
if (ret != 0) {
ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
} else
ret = 1;
break;
default:
if ((ret == 0)
|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
&& (ret != 1))) {
ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
} else
ret = 1;
break;
}
if (ret == 0) {
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
if ((ret == 0)
|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
&& (ret != 1))) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
}
/* Check pathlen if not self issued */
if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
&& (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
&& (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
/* Increment path length if not self issued */
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
plen++;
/*
* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
* must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
* the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
*/
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
proxy_path_length++;
must_be_ca = 0;
} else
must_be_ca = 1;
}
ok = 1;
end:
return ok;
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 5,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: telnet_parse(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *sp, u_int length, int print)
{
int i, x;
u_int c;
const u_char *osp, *p;
#define FETCH(c, sp, length) \
do { \
if (length < 1) \
goto pktend; \
ND_TCHECK(*sp); \
c = *sp++; \
length--; \
} while (0)
osp = sp;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (c != IAC)
goto pktend;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (c == IAC) { /* <IAC><IAC>! */
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IAC IAC"));
goto done;
}
i = c - TELCMD_FIRST;
if (i < 0 || i > IAC - TELCMD_FIRST)
goto pktend;
switch (c) {
case DONT:
case DO:
case WONT:
case WILL:
case SB:
/* DONT/DO/WONT/WILL x */
FETCH(x, sp, length);
if (x >= 0 && x < NTELOPTS) {
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s %s", telcmds[i], telopts[x]));
} else {
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s %#x", telcmds[i], x));
}
if (c != SB)
break;
/* IAC SB .... IAC SE */
p = sp;
while (length > (u_int)(p + 1 - sp)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
if (p[0] == IAC && p[1] == SE)
break;
p++;
}
if (*p != IAC)
goto pktend;
switch (x) {
case TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION:
if (p <= sp)
break;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", STR_OR_ID(c, authcmd)));
if (p <= sp)
break;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", STR_OR_ID(c, authtype)));
break;
case TELOPT_ENCRYPT:
if (p <= sp)
break;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", STR_OR_ID(c, enccmd)));
if (p <= sp)
break;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", STR_OR_ID(c, enctype)));
break;
default:
if (p <= sp)
break;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", STR_OR_ID(c, cmds)));
break;
}
while (p > sp) {
FETCH(x, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %#x", x));
}
/* terminating IAC SE */
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " SE"));
sp += 2;
break;
default:
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", telcmds[i]));
goto done;
}
done:
return sp - osp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
pktend:
return -1;
#undef FETCH
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12988/TELNET: Add a missing bounds check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CheckDownloadStatesForBrowser(Browser* browser,
size_t num,
DownloadItem::DownloadState state) {
std::vector<DownloadItem*> download_items;
GetDownloads(browser, &download_items);
EXPECT_EQ(num, download_items.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < download_items.size(); ++i) {
EXPECT_EQ(state, download_items[i]->GetState()) << " Item " << i;
}
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 151,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip6_setup_cork(struct sock *sk, struct inet_cork_full *cork,
struct inet6_cork *v6_cork, struct ipcm6_cookie *ipc6,
struct rt6_info *rt, struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
unsigned int mtu;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = ipc6->opt;
/*
* setup for corking
*/
if (opt) {
if (WARN_ON(v6_cork->opt))
return -EINVAL;
v6_cork->opt = kzalloc(opt->tot_len, sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(!v6_cork->opt))
return -ENOBUFS;
v6_cork->opt->tot_len = opt->tot_len;
v6_cork->opt->opt_flen = opt->opt_flen;
v6_cork->opt->opt_nflen = opt->opt_nflen;
v6_cork->opt->dst0opt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->dst0opt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->dst0opt && !v6_cork->opt->dst0opt)
return -ENOBUFS;
v6_cork->opt->dst1opt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->dst1opt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->dst1opt && !v6_cork->opt->dst1opt)
return -ENOBUFS;
v6_cork->opt->hopopt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->hopopt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->hopopt && !v6_cork->opt->hopopt)
return -ENOBUFS;
v6_cork->opt->srcrt = ip6_rthdr_dup(opt->srcrt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->srcrt && !v6_cork->opt->srcrt)
return -ENOBUFS;
/* need source address above miyazawa*/
}
dst_hold(&rt->dst);
cork->base.dst = &rt->dst;
cork->fl.u.ip6 = *fl6;
v6_cork->hop_limit = ipc6->hlimit;
v6_cork->tclass = ipc6->tclass;
if (rt->dst.flags & DST_XFRM_TUNNEL)
mtu = np->pmtudisc >= IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
else
mtu = np->pmtudisc >= IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
if (np->frag_size < mtu) {
if (np->frag_size)
mtu = np->frag_size;
}
cork->base.fragsize = mtu;
if (dst_allfrag(rt->dst.path))
cork->base.flags |= IPCORK_ALLFRAG;
cork->base.length = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: fix out of bound writes in __ip6_append_data()
Andrey Konovalov and [email protected] reported crashes caused by
one skb shared_info being overwritten from __ip6_append_data()
Andrey program lead to following state :
copy -4200 datalen 2000 fraglen 2040
maxfraglen 2040 alloclen 2048 transhdrlen 0 offset 0 fraggap 6200
The skb_copy_and_csum_bits(skb_prev, maxfraglen, data + transhdrlen,
fraggap, 0); is overwriting skb->head and skb_shared_info
Since we apparently detect this rare condition too late, move the
code earlier to even avoid allocating skb and risking crashes.
Once again, many thanks to Andrey and syzkaller team.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 64,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void throttle_cfs_rq(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq)
{
struct rq *rq = rq_of(cfs_rq);
struct cfs_bandwidth *cfs_b = tg_cfs_bandwidth(cfs_rq->tg);
struct sched_entity *se;
long task_delta, dequeue = 1;
bool empty;
se = cfs_rq->tg->se[cpu_of(rq_of(cfs_rq))];
/* freeze hierarchy runnable averages while throttled */
rcu_read_lock();
walk_tg_tree_from(cfs_rq->tg, tg_throttle_down, tg_nop, (void *)rq);
rcu_read_unlock();
task_delta = cfs_rq->h_nr_running;
for_each_sched_entity(se) {
struct cfs_rq *qcfs_rq = cfs_rq_of(se);
/* throttled entity or throttle-on-deactivate */
if (!se->on_rq)
break;
if (dequeue)
dequeue_entity(qcfs_rq, se, DEQUEUE_SLEEP);
qcfs_rq->h_nr_running -= task_delta;
if (qcfs_rq->load.weight)
dequeue = 0;
}
if (!se)
sub_nr_running(rq, task_delta);
cfs_rq->throttled = 1;
cfs_rq->throttled_clock = rq_clock(rq);
raw_spin_lock(&cfs_b->lock);
empty = list_empty(&cfs_b->throttled_cfs_rq);
/*
* Add to the _head_ of the list, so that an already-started
* distribute_cfs_runtime will not see us. If disribute_cfs_runtime is
* not running add to the tail so that later runqueues don't get starved.
*/
if (cfs_b->distribute_running)
list_add_rcu(&cfs_rq->throttled_list, &cfs_b->throttled_cfs_rq);
else
list_add_tail_rcu(&cfs_rq->throttled_list, &cfs_b->throttled_cfs_rq);
/*
* If we're the first throttled task, make sure the bandwidth
* timer is running.
*/
if (empty)
start_cfs_bandwidth(cfs_b);
raw_spin_unlock(&cfs_b->lock);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SystemClipboard::WriteHTML(const String& markup,
const KURL& document_url,
const String& plain_text,
SmartReplaceOption smart_replace_option) {
String text = plain_text;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
ReplaceNewlinesWithWindowsStyleNewlines(text);
#endif
ReplaceNBSPWithSpace(text);
clipboard_->WriteHtml(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard,
NonNullString(markup), document_url);
clipboard_->WriteText(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard, NonNullString(text));
if (smart_replace_option == kCanSmartReplace)
clipboard_->WriteSmartPasteMarker(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard);
clipboard_->CommitWrite(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard);
}
Commit Message: System Clipboard: Remove extraneous check for bitmap.getPixels()
Bug 369621 originally led to this check being introduced via
https://codereview.chromium.org/289573002/patch/40001/50002, but after
https://crrev.com/c/1345809, I'm not sure that it's still necessary.
This change succeeds when tested against the "minimized test case" provided in
crbug.com/369621 's description, but I'm unsure how to make the minimized test
case fail, so this doesn't prove that the change would succeed against the
fuzzer's test case (which originally filed the bug).
As I'm unable to view the relevant fuzzer test case, (see crbug.com/918705),
I don't know exactly what may have caused the fuzzer to fail. Therefore,
I've added a CHECK for the time being, so that we will be notified in canary
if my assumption was incorrect.
Bug: 369621
Change-Id: Ie9b47a4b38ba1ed47624de776015728e541d27f7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1393436
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#619591}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_SANGW( INS_ARG )
{ (void)exc; (void)args;
/* instruction not supported anymore */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PPVarArrayFromNPVariantArray::~PPVarArrayFromNPVariantArray() {
for (size_t i = 0; i < size_; i++)
Var::PluginReleasePPVar(array_[i]);
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in ppapi code
BUG=77493
TEST=attached test
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6883059
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@82172 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 kvm_async_pf_gfn_slot(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
{
int i;
u32 key = kvm_async_pf_hash_fn(gfn);
for (i = 0; i < roundup_pow_of_two(ASYNC_PF_PER_VCPU) &&
(vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[key] != gfn &&
vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[key] != ~0); i++)
key = kvm_async_pf_next_probe(key);
return key;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _php_curl_close_ex(php_curl *ch)
{
#if PHP_CURL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "DTOR CALLED, ch = %x\n", ch);
#endif
_php_curl_verify_handlers(ch, 0);
/*
* Libcurl is doing connection caching. When easy handle is cleaned up,
* if the handle was previously used by the curl_multi_api, the connection
* remains open un the curl multi handle is cleaned up. Some protocols are
* sending content like the FTP one, and libcurl try to use the
* WRITEFUNCTION or the HEADERFUNCTION. Since structures used in those
* callback are freed, we need to use an other callback to which avoid
* segfaults.
*
* Libcurl commit d021f2e8a00 fix this issue and should be part of 7.28.2
*/
curl_easy_setopt(ch->cp, CURLOPT_HEADERFUNCTION, curl_write_nothing);
curl_easy_setopt(ch->cp, CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, curl_write_nothing);
curl_easy_cleanup(ch->cp);
/* cURL destructors should be invoked only by last curl handle */
if (--ch->clone == 0) {
zend_llist_clean(&ch->to_free->str);
zend_llist_clean(&ch->to_free->post);
zend_hash_destroy(ch->to_free->slist);
efree(ch->to_free->slist);
efree(ch->to_free);
}
smart_str_free(&ch->handlers->write->buf);
zval_ptr_dtor(&ch->handlers->write->func_name);
zval_ptr_dtor(&ch->handlers->read->func_name);
zval_ptr_dtor(&ch->handlers->write_header->func_name);
#if CURLOPT_PASSWDFUNCTION != 0
zval_ptr_dtor(&ch->handlers->passwd);
#endif
zval_ptr_dtor(&ch->handlers->std_err);
if (ch->header.str) {
zend_string_release(ch->header.str);
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&ch->handlers->write_header->stream);
zval_ptr_dtor(&ch->handlers->write->stream);
zval_ptr_dtor(&ch->handlers->read->stream);
efree(ch->handlers->write);
efree(ch->handlers->write_header);
efree(ch->handlers->read);
if (ch->handlers->progress) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ch->handlers->progress->func_name);
efree(ch->handlers->progress);
}
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071500 /* Available since 7.21.0 */
if (ch->handlers->fnmatch) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ch->handlers->fnmatch->func_name);
efree(ch->handlers->fnmatch);
}
#endif
efree(ch->handlers);
efree(ch);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnZipAnalysisFinished(const zip_analyzer::Results& results) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK_EQ(ClientDownloadRequest::ZIPPED_EXECUTABLE, type_);
if (!service_)
return;
if (results.success) {
zipped_executable_ = results.has_executable;
archived_binary_.CopyFrom(results.archived_binary);
DVLOG(1) << "Zip analysis finished for " << item_->GetFullPath().value()
<< ", has_executable=" << results.has_executable
<< " has_archive=" << results.has_archive;
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "Zip analysis failed for " << item_->GetFullPath().value();
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("SBClientDownload.ZipFileHasExecutable",
zipped_executable_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("SBClientDownload.ZipFileHasArchiveButNoExecutable",
results.has_archive && !zipped_executable_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("SBClientDownload.ExtractZipFeaturesTime",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - zip_analysis_start_time_);
for (const auto& file_extension : results.archived_archive_filetypes)
RecordArchivedArchiveFileExtensionType(file_extension);
if (!zipped_executable_ && !results.has_archive) {
PostFinishTask(UNKNOWN, REASON_ARCHIVE_WITHOUT_BINARIES);
return;
}
if (!zipped_executable_ && results.has_archive)
type_ = ClientDownloadRequest::ZIPPED_ARCHIVE;
OnFileFeatureExtractionDone();
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::CachedAttributeAnyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_cachedAttributeAnyAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::CachedAttributeAnyAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::HandleAccessRequestResponse(
const std::string& label,
const media::AudioParameters& output_parameters,
const MediaStreamDevices& devices,
MediaStreamRequestResult result) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DVLOG(1) << "HandleAccessRequestResponse("
<< ", {label = " << label << "})";
DeviceRequest* request = FindRequest(label);
if (!request) {
return;
}
if (request->request_type == MEDIA_DEVICE_ACCESS) {
FinalizeMediaAccessRequest(label, request, devices);
return;
}
if (result != MEDIA_DEVICE_OK) {
FinalizeRequestFailed(label, request, result);
return;
}
DCHECK(!devices.empty());
bool found_audio = false;
bool found_video = false;
for (const MediaStreamDevice& media_stream_device : devices) {
MediaStreamDevice device = media_stream_device;
if (device.type == MEDIA_TAB_VIDEO_CAPTURE ||
device.type == MEDIA_TAB_AUDIO_CAPTURE) {
device.id = request->tab_capture_device_id;
}
if (device.type == MEDIA_TAB_AUDIO_CAPTURE ||
device.type == MEDIA_DESKTOP_AUDIO_CAPTURE) {
int sample_rate = output_parameters.sample_rate();
if (sample_rate <= 0 || sample_rate > 96000)
sample_rate = 44100;
media::AudioParameters params(
device.input.format(), media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_STEREO, sample_rate,
device.input.bits_per_sample(), device.input.frames_per_buffer());
params.set_effects(device.input.effects());
params.set_mic_positions(device.input.mic_positions());
DCHECK(params.IsValid());
device.input = params;
}
if (device.type == request->audio_type())
found_audio = true;
else if (device.type == request->video_type())
found_video = true;
if (request->request_type == MEDIA_GENERATE_STREAM) {
MediaRequestState state;
if (FindExistingRequestedDevice(*request, device, &device, &state)) {
request->devices.push_back(device);
request->SetState(device.type, state);
DVLOG(1) << "HandleAccessRequestResponse - device already opened "
<< ", {label = " << label << "}"
<< ", device_id = " << device.id << "}";
continue;
}
}
device.session_id = GetDeviceManager(device.type)->Open(device);
TranslateDeviceIdToSourceId(request, &device);
request->devices.push_back(device);
request->SetState(device.type, MEDIA_REQUEST_STATE_OPENING);
DVLOG(1) << "HandleAccessRequestResponse - opening device "
<< ", {label = " << label << "}"
<< ", {device_id = " << device.id << "}"
<< ", {session_id = " << device.session_id << "}";
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mojo::Handle TestServiceProvider::ConnectToService(
const std::string& service_name) {
EXPECT_EQ(1u, service_factories_.count(service_name))
<< "Unregistered service " << service_name << " requested.";
mojo::MessagePipe pipe;
std::map<std::string,
base::Callback<void(mojo::ScopedMessagePipeHandle)> >::iterator it =
service_factories_.find(service_name);
if (it != service_factories_.end())
it->second.Run(pipe.handle0.Pass());
return pipe.handle1.release();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 133,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ShowOptionsTab(const std::string& sub_page) {
GURL url(chrome::kChromeUISettingsURL + sub_page);
browser::NavigateParams params(GetSingletonTabNavigateParams(url));
params.path_behavior = browser::NavigateParams::IGNORE_AND_NAVIGATE;
browser::Navigate(¶ms);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: blink::WebLocalFrame* RenderFrameImpl::GetWebFrame() {
DCHECK(frame_);
return frame_;
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StorageHandler::NotifyCacheStorageListChanged(const std::string& origin) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
frontend_->CacheStorageListUpdated(origin);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int test_rshift(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *a,*b,*c,*d,*e;
int i;
a=BN_new();
b=BN_new();
c=BN_new();
d=BN_new();
e=BN_new();
BN_one(c);
BN_bntest_rand(a,200,0,0); /**/
a->neg=rand_neg();
for (i=0; i<num0; i++)
{
BN_rshift(b,a,i+1);
BN_add(c,c,c);
if (bp != NULL)
{
if (!results)
{
BN_print(bp,a);
BIO_puts(bp," / ");
BN_print(bp,c);
BIO_puts(bp," - ");
}
BN_print(bp,b);
BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
}
BN_div(d,e,a,c,ctx);
BN_sub(d,d,b);
if(!BN_is_zero(d))
{
fprintf(stderr,"Right shift test failed!\n");
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
BN_free(d);
BN_free(e);
return(1);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2014-3570 (with minor bn_asm.c revamp).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 46,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *uat_umts_fp_record_copy_cb(void *n, const void *o, size_t siz _U_) {
uat_umts_fp_ep_and_ch_record_t *new_rec = (uat_umts_fp_ep_and_ch_record_t *)n;
const uat_umts_fp_ep_and_ch_record_t *old_rec = (const uat_umts_fp_ep_and_ch_record_t *)o;
new_rec->srcIP = (old_rec->srcIP) ? g_strdup(old_rec->srcIP) : NULL;
new_rec->dstIP = (old_rec->dstIP) ? g_strdup(old_rec->dstIP) : NULL;
return new_rec;
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 51,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::WasHidden() {
if (!IsBeingCaptured() && !HasPictureInPictureVideo()) {
if (auto* view = GetRenderWidgetHostView())
view->Hide();
if (!ShowingInterstitialPage())
SetVisibilityForChildViews(false);
SendPageMessage(new PageMsg_WasHidden(MSG_ROUTING_NONE));
}
SetVisibility(Visibility::HIDDEN);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableHeapCompaction(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetHeapCompactionEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetImageProperty(Image *image,
const char *property,const char *value,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickStatusType
flags;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->properties == (void *) NULL)
image->properties=NewSplayTree(CompareSplayTreeString,
RelinquishMagickMemory,RelinquishMagickMemory); /* create splay-tree */
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
return(DeleteImageProperty(image,property)); /* delete if NULL */
status=MagickTrue;
if (strlen(property) <= 1)
{
/*
Do not 'set' single letter properties - read only shorthand.
*/
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
/* FUTURE: binary chars or quotes in key should produce a error */
/* Set attributes with known names or special prefixes
return result is found, or break to set a free form properity
*/
switch (*property)
{
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
case '8':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("8bim:",property,5) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
#endif
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
if (LocaleCompare("background",property) == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorCompliance(value,AllCompliance,
&image->background_color,exception);
/* check for FUTURE: value exception?? */
/* also add user input to splay tree */
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channels",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (LocaleCompare("colorspace",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
colorspace;
colorspace=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (colorspace < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
return(SetImageColorspace(image,(ColorspaceType) colorspace,exception));
}
if (LocaleCompare("compose",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
compose;
compose=ParseCommandOption(MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (compose < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->compose=(CompositeOperator) compose;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("compress",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
compression;
compression=ParseCommandOption(MagickCompressOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (compression < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->compression=(CompressionType) compression;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("delay",property) == 0)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & GreaterValue) != 0)
{
if (image->delay > (size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5))
image->delay=(size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5);
}
else
if ((flags & LessValue) != 0)
{
if (image->delay < (size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5))
image->delay=(ssize_t)
floor(geometry_info.sigma+0.5);
}
else
image->delay=(size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
image->ticks_per_second=(ssize_t) floor(geometry_info.sigma+0.5);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("delay_units",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (LocaleCompare("density",property) == 0)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
image->resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->resolution.y=image->resolution.x;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("depth",property) == 0)
{
image->depth=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("dispose",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
dispose;
dispose=ParseCommandOption(MagickDisposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (dispose < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
case 'E':
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("exif:",property,5) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("fx:",property,3) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#endif
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare("gamma",property) == 0)
{
image->gamma=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("gravity",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
gravity;
gravity=ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (gravity < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->gravity=(GravityType) gravity;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("height",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("intensity",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
intensity;
intensity=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (intensity < 0)
return(MagickFalse);
image->intensity=(PixelIntensityMethod) intensity;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("intent",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("interpolate",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
interpolate;
interpolate=ParseCommandOption(MagickInterpolateOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (interpolate < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->interpolate=(PixelInterpolateMethod) interpolate;
return(MagickTrue);
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
if (LocaleNCompare("iptc:",property,5) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
#endif
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'K':
case 'k':
if (LocaleCompare("kurtosis",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'L':
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("loop",property) == 0)
{
image->iterations=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'M':
case 'm':
if ((LocaleCompare("magick",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("max",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("mean",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("min",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("min",property) == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'O':
case 'o':
if (LocaleCompare("opaque",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'P':
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("page",property) == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(value);
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->page);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
return(MagickTrue);
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
if (LocaleNCompare("pixel:",property,6) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
#endif
if (LocaleCompare("profile",property) == 0)
{
ImageInfo
*image_info;
StringInfo
*profile;
image_info=AcquireImageInfo();
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->filename,value,MagickPathExtent);
(void) SetImageInfo(image_info,1,exception);
profile=FileToStringInfo(image_info->filename,~0UL,exception);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
status=SetImageProfile(image,image_info->magick,profile,exception);
image_info=DestroyImageInfo(image_info);
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("rendering-intent",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'S':
case 's':
if ((LocaleCompare("size",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("skewness",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("scenes",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("standard-deviation",property) == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'T':
case 't':
{
if (LocaleCompare("tile-offset",property) == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(value);
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->tile_offset);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'U':
case 'u':
{
if (LocaleCompare("units",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
units;
units=ParseCommandOption(MagickResolutionOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (units < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->units=(ResolutionType) units;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'V':
case 'v':
{
if (LocaleCompare("version",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare("width",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("xmp:",property,4) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#endif
}
/* Default: not an attribute, add as a property */
status=AddValueToSplayTree((SplayTreeInfo *) image->properties,
ConstantString(property),ConstantString(value));
/* FUTURE: error if status is bad? */
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/298
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 168,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t ACodec::setupEAC3Codec(
bool encoder, int32_t numChannels, int32_t sampleRate) {
status_t err = setupRawAudioFormat(
encoder ? kPortIndexInput : kPortIndexOutput, sampleRate, numChannels);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (encoder) {
ALOGW("EAC3 encoding is not supported.");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_EAC3TYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = kPortIndexInput;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidEac3,
&def,
sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
def.nChannels = numChannels;
def.nSampleRate = sampleRate;
return mOMX->setParameter(
mNode,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidEac3,
&def,
sizeof(def));
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int orderly_poweroff(bool force)
{
int ret = __orderly_poweroff();
if (ret && force) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "Failed to start orderly shutdown: "
"forcing the issue\n");
/*
* I guess this should try to kick off some daemon to sync and
* poweroff asap. Or not even bother syncing if we're doing an
* emergency shutdown?
*/
emergency_sync();
kernel_power_off();
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Cc: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-16 | 0 | 21,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AppListControllerDelegate::ForceNativeDesktop() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: t42_loader_init( T42_Loader loader,
T42_Face face )
{
FT_UNUSED( face );
FT_MEM_ZERO( loader, sizeof ( *loader ) );
loader->num_glyphs = 0;
loader->num_chars = 0;
/* initialize the tables -- simply set their `init' field to 0 */
loader->encoding_table.init = 0;
loader->charstrings.init = 0;
loader->glyph_names.init = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GraphicsContext3D::getImageData(Image* image,
GC3Denum format,
GC3Denum type,
bool premultiplyAlpha,
bool ignoreGammaAndColorProfile,
Vector<uint8_t>& outputVector)
{
if (!image)
return false;
CGImageRef cgImage;
RetainPtr<CGImageRef> decodedImage;
bool hasAlpha = image->isBitmapImage() ? static_cast<BitmapImage*>(image)->frameHasAlphaAtIndex(0) : true;
if ((ignoreGammaAndColorProfile || (hasAlpha && !premultiplyAlpha)) && image->data()) {
ImageSource decoder(ImageSource::AlphaNotPremultiplied,
ignoreGammaAndColorProfile ? ImageSource::GammaAndColorProfileIgnored : ImageSource::GammaAndColorProfileApplied);
decoder.setData(image->data(), true);
if (!decoder.frameCount())
return false;
decodedImage.adoptCF(decoder.createFrameAtIndex(0));
cgImage = decodedImage.get();
} else
cgImage = image->nativeImageForCurrentFrame();
if (!cgImage)
return false;
size_t width = CGImageGetWidth(cgImage);
size_t height = CGImageGetHeight(cgImage);
if (!width || !height)
return false;
CGColorSpaceRef colorSpace = CGImageGetColorSpace(cgImage);
CGColorSpaceModel model = CGColorSpaceGetModel(colorSpace);
if (model == kCGColorSpaceModelIndexed) {
RetainPtr<CGContextRef> bitmapContext;
bitmapContext.adoptCF(CGBitmapContextCreate(0, width, height, 8, width * 4,
deviceRGBColorSpaceRef(),
kCGImageAlphaPremultipliedFirst | kCGBitmapByteOrder32Host));
if (!bitmapContext)
return false;
CGContextSetBlendMode(bitmapContext.get(), kCGBlendModeCopy);
CGContextSetInterpolationQuality(bitmapContext.get(), kCGInterpolationNone);
CGContextDrawImage(bitmapContext.get(), CGRectMake(0, 0, width, height), cgImage);
decodedImage.adoptCF(CGBitmapContextCreateImage(bitmapContext.get()));
cgImage = decodedImage.get();
}
size_t bitsPerComponent = CGImageGetBitsPerComponent(cgImage);
size_t bitsPerPixel = CGImageGetBitsPerPixel(cgImage);
if (bitsPerComponent != 8 && bitsPerComponent != 16)
return false;
if (bitsPerPixel % bitsPerComponent)
return false;
size_t componentsPerPixel = bitsPerPixel / bitsPerComponent;
CGBitmapInfo bitInfo = CGImageGetBitmapInfo(cgImage);
bool bigEndianSource = false;
if (bitsPerComponent == 16) {
switch (bitInfo & kCGBitmapByteOrderMask) {
case kCGBitmapByteOrder16Big:
bigEndianSource = true;
break;
case kCGBitmapByteOrder16Little:
bigEndianSource = false;
break;
case kCGBitmapByteOrderDefault:
bigEndianSource = true;
break;
default:
return false;
}
} else {
switch (bitInfo & kCGBitmapByteOrderMask) {
case kCGBitmapByteOrder32Big:
bigEndianSource = true;
break;
case kCGBitmapByteOrder32Little:
bigEndianSource = false;
break;
case kCGBitmapByteOrderDefault:
bigEndianSource = true;
break;
default:
return false;
}
}
AlphaOp neededAlphaOp = AlphaDoNothing;
AlphaFormat alphaFormat = AlphaFormatNone;
switch (CGImageGetAlphaInfo(cgImage)) {
case kCGImageAlphaPremultipliedFirst:
if (!premultiplyAlpha)
neededAlphaOp = AlphaDoUnmultiply;
alphaFormat = AlphaFormatFirst;
break;
case kCGImageAlphaFirst:
if (premultiplyAlpha)
neededAlphaOp = AlphaDoPremultiply;
alphaFormat = AlphaFormatFirst;
break;
case kCGImageAlphaNoneSkipFirst:
alphaFormat = AlphaFormatFirst;
break;
case kCGImageAlphaPremultipliedLast:
if (!premultiplyAlpha)
neededAlphaOp = AlphaDoUnmultiply;
alphaFormat = AlphaFormatLast;
break;
case kCGImageAlphaLast:
if (premultiplyAlpha)
neededAlphaOp = AlphaDoPremultiply;
alphaFormat = AlphaFormatLast;
break;
case kCGImageAlphaNoneSkipLast:
alphaFormat = AlphaFormatLast;
break;
case kCGImageAlphaNone:
alphaFormat = AlphaFormatNone;
break;
default:
return false;
}
SourceDataFormat srcDataFormat = getSourceDataFormat(componentsPerPixel, alphaFormat, bitsPerComponent == 16, bigEndianSource);
if (srcDataFormat == SourceFormatNumFormats)
return false;
RetainPtr<CFDataRef> pixelData;
pixelData.adoptCF(CGDataProviderCopyData(CGImageGetDataProvider(cgImage)));
if (!pixelData)
return false;
const UInt8* rgba = CFDataGetBytePtr(pixelData.get());
unsigned int packedSize;
if (computeImageSizeInBytes(format, type, width, height, 1, &packedSize, 0) != GraphicsContext3D::NO_ERROR)
return false;
outputVector.resize(packedSize);
unsigned int srcUnpackAlignment = 0;
size_t bytesPerRow = CGImageGetBytesPerRow(cgImage);
unsigned int padding = bytesPerRow - bitsPerPixel / 8 * width;
if (padding) {
srcUnpackAlignment = padding + 1;
while (bytesPerRow % srcUnpackAlignment)
++srcUnpackAlignment;
}
bool rt = packPixels(rgba, srcDataFormat, width, height, srcUnpackAlignment,
format, type, neededAlphaOp, outputVector.data());
return rt;
}
Commit Message: Set the access qualifier of two methods to query frame specific info of BitmapImage to protected.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90505
Patch by Huang Dongsung <[email protected]> on 2012-08-12
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Following 4 methods are protected.
size_t frameCount();
NativeImagePtr frameAtIndex(size_t);
bool frameIsCompleteAtIndex(size_t);
float frameDurationAtIndex(size_t);
So, 2 methds also should be protected because the frame info is only specific of
BitmapImage.
bool frameHasAlphaAtIndex(size_t);
ImageOrientation frameOrientationAtIndex(size_t);
On the other hand, this patch amended GraphicsContext3DCG.
- static_cast<BitmapImage*>(image)->frameHasAlphaAtIndex(0)
+ image->currentFrameHasAlpha()
This patch does not affect PNG, JPEG, BMP, and WEBP because those images
have only 0 indexed frame.
Thus, GIF, and ICO are affected. However, an above query to get Alpha
is for the image that is created by image->nativeImageForCurrentFrame(), so it
is proper to use image->currentFrameHasAlpha() instead of
image->frameHasAlphaAtIndex(0).
No new tests, because it is hard to test. We need an animated GIF that
one frame has alpha and another frame does not have alpha. However, I
cannot find the animated GIF file that suffices the requirement.
* platform/graphics/BitmapImage.h:
(BitmapImage):
* platform/graphics/cg/GraphicsContext3DCG.cpp:
(WebCore::GraphicsContext3D::getImageData):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125374 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sock_no_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator::SimulatedToken HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator::Simulate(
const CompactHTMLToken& token,
HTMLTokenizer* tokenizer) {
SimulatedToken simulated_token = kOtherToken;
if (token.GetType() == HTMLToken::kStartTag) {
const String& tag_name = token.Data();
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, SVGNames::svgTag))
namespace_stack_.push_back(SVG);
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::mathTag))
namespace_stack_.push_back(kMathML);
if (InForeignContent() && TokenExitsForeignContent(token))
namespace_stack_.pop_back();
if ((namespace_stack_.back() == SVG && TokenExitsSVG(token)) ||
(namespace_stack_.back() == kMathML && TokenExitsMath(token)))
namespace_stack_.push_back(HTML);
if (!InForeignContent()) {
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, textareaTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, titleTag)) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kRCDATAState);
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, scriptTag)) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kScriptDataState);
simulated_token = kScriptStart;
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, linkTag)) {
simulated_token = kLink;
} else if (!in_select_insertion_mode_) {
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, plaintextTag) &&
!in_select_insertion_mode_) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kPLAINTEXTState);
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, styleTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, iframeTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, xmpTag) ||
(ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, noembedTag) &&
options_.plugins_enabled) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, noframesTag) ||
(ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, noscriptTag) &&
options_.script_enabled)) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kRAWTEXTState);
}
}
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, selectTag)) {
in_select_insertion_mode_ = true;
} else if (in_select_insertion_mode_ && TokenExitsInSelect(token)) {
in_select_insertion_mode_ = false;
}
}
}
if (token.GetType() == HTMLToken::kEndTag ||
(token.GetType() == HTMLToken::kStartTag && token.SelfClosing() &&
InForeignContent())) {
const String& tag_name = token.Data();
if ((namespace_stack_.back() == SVG &&
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, SVGNames::svgTag)) ||
(namespace_stack_.back() == kMathML &&
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::mathTag)) ||
(namespace_stack_.Contains(SVG) && namespace_stack_.back() == HTML &&
TokenExitsSVG(token)) ||
(namespace_stack_.Contains(kMathML) &&
namespace_stack_.back() == HTML && TokenExitsMath(token))) {
namespace_stack_.pop_back();
}
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, scriptTag)) {
if (!InForeignContent())
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kDataState);
return kScriptEnd;
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, selectTag)) {
in_select_insertion_mode_ = false;
}
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, styleTag))
simulated_token = kStyleEnd;
}
tokenizer->SetForceNullCharacterReplacement(InForeignContent());
tokenizer->SetShouldAllowCDATA(InForeignContent());
return simulated_token;
}
Commit Message: HTML parser: Fix "HTML integration point" implementation in HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator.
HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator assumed only <foreignObject> as an HTML
integration point. This CL adds <annotation-xml>, <desc>, and SVG
<title>.
Bug: 805924
Change-Id: I6793d9163d4c6bc8bf0790415baedddaac7a1fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964038
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543634}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 1 | 173,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cmykvalidate(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, ref *space, float *values, int num_comps)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
int i;
if (num_comps < 4)
return_error(gs_error_stackunderflow);
op -= 3;
for (i=0;i < 4;i++) {
if (!r_has_type(op, t_integer) && !r_has_type(op, t_real))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
op++;
}
for (i=0;i < 4; i++) {
if (values[i] > 1.0)
values[i] = 1.0;
if (values[i] < 0.0)
values[i] = 0.0;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void copy_buffer(int ssize, int max_sector, int max_sector_2)
{
int remaining; /* number of transferred 512-byte sectors */
struct bio_vec bv;
char *buffer;
char *dma_buffer;
int size;
struct req_iterator iter;
max_sector = transfer_size(ssize,
min(max_sector, max_sector_2),
blk_rq_sectors(current_req));
if (current_count_sectors <= 0 && CT(COMMAND) == FD_WRITE &&
buffer_max > fsector_t + blk_rq_sectors(current_req))
current_count_sectors = min_t(int, buffer_max - fsector_t,
blk_rq_sectors(current_req));
remaining = current_count_sectors << 9;
if (remaining > blk_rq_bytes(current_req) && CT(COMMAND) == FD_WRITE) {
DPRINT("in copy buffer\n");
pr_info("current_count_sectors=%ld\n", current_count_sectors);
pr_info("remaining=%d\n", remaining >> 9);
pr_info("current_req->nr_sectors=%u\n",
blk_rq_sectors(current_req));
pr_info("current_req->current_nr_sectors=%u\n",
blk_rq_cur_sectors(current_req));
pr_info("max_sector=%d\n", max_sector);
pr_info("ssize=%d\n", ssize);
}
buffer_max = max(max_sector, buffer_max);
dma_buffer = floppy_track_buffer + ((fsector_t - buffer_min) << 9);
size = blk_rq_cur_bytes(current_req);
rq_for_each_segment(bv, current_req, iter) {
if (!remaining)
break;
size = bv.bv_len;
SUPBOUND(size, remaining);
buffer = page_address(bv.bv_page) + bv.bv_offset;
if (dma_buffer + size >
floppy_track_buffer + (max_buffer_sectors << 10) ||
dma_buffer < floppy_track_buffer) {
DPRINT("buffer overrun in copy buffer %d\n",
(int)((floppy_track_buffer - dma_buffer) >> 9));
pr_info("fsector_t=%d buffer_min=%d\n",
fsector_t, buffer_min);
pr_info("current_count_sectors=%ld\n",
current_count_sectors);
if (CT(COMMAND) == FD_READ)
pr_info("read\n");
if (CT(COMMAND) == FD_WRITE)
pr_info("write\n");
break;
}
if (((unsigned long)buffer) % 512)
DPRINT("%p buffer not aligned\n", buffer);
if (CT(COMMAND) == FD_READ)
memcpy(buffer, dma_buffer, size);
else
memcpy(dma_buffer, buffer, size);
remaining -= size;
dma_buffer += size;
}
if (remaining) {
if (remaining > 0)
max_sector -= remaining >> 9;
DPRINT("weirdness: remaining %d\n", remaining >> 9);
}
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void virtio_queue_host_notifier_aio_read(EventNotifier *n)
{
VirtQueue *vq = container_of(n, VirtQueue, host_notifier);
if (event_notifier_test_and_clear(n)) {
virtio_queue_notify_aio_vq(vq);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
int sec_len,
const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
unsigned char *out, int olen)
{
int chunk;
size_t j;
EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t A1_len;
int ret = 0;
chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
if (!mac_key)
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
goto err;
if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
goto err;
if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
goto err;
if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
goto err;
if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
goto err;
if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
goto err;
for (;;)
{
/* Reinit mac contexts */
if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
goto err;
if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
goto err;
if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
goto err;
if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
goto err;
if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
goto err;
if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
goto err;
if (olen > chunk)
{
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
goto err;
out+=j;
olen-=j;
/* calc the next A1 value */
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
goto err;
}
else /* last one */
{
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
goto err;
memcpy(out,A1,olen);
break;
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 15,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t IPCThreadState::getLastTransactionBinderFlags() const
{
return mLastTransactionBinderFlags;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #27252896: Security Vulnerability -- weak binder
Sending transaction to freed BBinder through weak handle
can cause use of a (mostly) freed object. We need to try to
safely promote to a strong reference first.
Change-Id: Ic9c6940fa824980472e94ed2dfeca52a6b0fd342
(cherry picked from commit c11146106f94e07016e8e26e4f8628f9a0c73199)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void prepare_lock_switch(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *next)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* We can optimise this out completely for !SMP, because the
* SMP rebalancing from interrupt is the only thing that cares
* here.
*/
next->oncpu = 1;
#endif
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_INTERRUPTS_ON_CTXSW
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&rq->lock);
#else
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int lxc_attach_run_shell(void* payload)
{
uid_t uid;
struct passwd *passwd;
char *user_shell;
/* ignore payload parameter */
(void)payload;
uid = getuid();
passwd = getpwuid(uid);
/* this probably happens because of incompatible nss
* implementations in host and container (remember, this
* code is still using the host's glibc but our mount
* namespace is in the container)
* we may try to get the information by spawning a
* [getent passwd uid] process and parsing the result
*/
if (!passwd)
user_shell = lxc_attach_getpwshell(uid);
else
user_shell = passwd->pw_shell;
if (user_shell)
execlp(user_shell, user_shell, NULL);
/* executed if either no passwd entry or execvp fails,
* we will fall back on /bin/sh as a default shell
*/
execlp("/bin/sh", "/bin/sh", NULL);
SYSERROR("failed to exec shell");
return -1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1334: Don't use the container's /proc during attach
A user could otherwise over-mount /proc and prevent the apparmor profile
or selinux label from being written which combined with a modified
/bin/sh or other commonly used binary would lead to unconfined code
execution.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void test_burl_normalize (void) {
buffer *psrc = buffer_init();
buffer *ptmp = buffer_init();
int flags;
flags = HTTP_PARSEOPT_URL_NORMALIZE_UNRESERVED;
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("no-slash"), CONST_STR_LEN("no-slash"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/"), CONST_STR_LEN("/"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc/"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc/"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc/def"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc/def"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d="), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d="));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f=g"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f=g"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f=g#"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f=g"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f=g#any"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f=g"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/%2F"), CONST_STR_LEN("/%2F"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/%2f"), CONST_STR_LEN("/%2F"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/%20"), CONST_STR_LEN("/%20"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/%2b"), CONST_STR_LEN("/%2B"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/%2B"), CONST_STR_LEN("/%2B"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/%3a"), CONST_STR_LEN("/%3A"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/%3A"), CONST_STR_LEN("/%3A"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/~test%20ä_"), CONST_STR_LEN("/~test%20%C3%A4_"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/\375"), "", (size_t)-2);
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/\376"), "", (size_t)-2);
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/\377"), "", (size_t)-2);
flags = HTTP_PARSEOPT_URL_NORMALIZE_REQUIRED;
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/"), CONST_STR_LEN("/"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc/"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc/"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc/def"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc/def"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d="), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d="));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f=g"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f=g"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f=g#"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f=g"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f=g#any"), CONST_STR_LEN("/abc?d=e&f=g"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/%2F"), CONST_STR_LEN("/%2F"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/%2f"), CONST_STR_LEN("/%2F"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/%20"), CONST_STR_LEN("/%20"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/%2b"), CONST_STR_LEN("/+"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/%2B"), CONST_STR_LEN("/+"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/%3a"), CONST_STR_LEN("/:"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/%3A"), CONST_STR_LEN("/:"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/~test%20ä_"), CONST_STR_LEN("/~test%20%C3%A4_"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/\375"), "", (size_t)-2);
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/\376"), "", (size_t)-2);
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/\377"), "", (size_t)-2);
flags |= HTTP_PARSEOPT_URL_NORMALIZE_CTRLS_REJECT;
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/\a"), "", (size_t)-2);
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/\t"), "", (size_t)-2);
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/\r"), "", (size_t)-2);
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/\177"), "", (size_t)-2);
#if defined(__WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
flags |= HTTP_PARSEOPT_URL_NORMALIZE_PATH_BACKSLASH_TRANS;
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a\\b"), CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b"));
#endif
flags |= HTTP_PARSEOPT_URL_NORMALIZE_PATH_2F_DECODE;
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b?c=/"), CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b?c=/"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b?c=%2f"), CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b?c=/"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a%2fb"), CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a%2Fb"), CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a%2fb?c=/"), CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b?c=/"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a%2fb?c=%2f"), CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b?c=/"));
flags &= ~HTTP_PARSEOPT_URL_NORMALIZE_PATH_2F_DECODE;
flags |= HTTP_PARSEOPT_URL_NORMALIZE_PATH_2F_REJECT;
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a%2fb"), "", (size_t)-2);
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a%2Fb"), "", (size_t)-2);
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b?c=%2f"), CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b?c=/"));
flags &= ~HTTP_PARSEOPT_URL_NORMALIZE_PATH_2F_REJECT;
flags |= HTTP_PARSEOPT_URL_NORMALIZE_PATH_DOTSEG_REMOVE;
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("./a/b"), CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("../a/b"), CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a/./b"), CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a/../b"), CONST_STR_LEN("/b"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b/."), CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b/"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b/.."), CONST_STR_LEN("/a/"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a/../b/.."), CONST_STR_LEN("/"));
flags &= ~HTTP_PARSEOPT_URL_NORMALIZE_PATH_DOTSEG_REMOVE;
flags |= HTTP_PARSEOPT_URL_NORMALIZE_PATH_DOTSEG_REJECT;
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("./a/b"), "", (size_t)-2);
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("../a/b"), "", (size_t)-2);
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a/./b"), "", (size_t)-2);
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a/../b"), "", (size_t)-2);
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b/."), "", (size_t)-2);
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b/.."), "", (size_t)-2);
flags &= ~HTTP_PARSEOPT_URL_NORMALIZE_PATH_DOTSEG_REJECT;
flags |= HTTP_PARSEOPT_URL_NORMALIZE_QUERY_20_PLUS;
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b?c=d+e"), CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b?c=d+e"));
run_burl_normalize(psrc, ptmp, flags, __LINE__, CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b?c=d%20e"), CONST_STR_LEN("/a/b?c=d+e"));
flags &= ~HTTP_PARSEOPT_URL_NORMALIZE_QUERY_20_PLUS;
buffer_free(psrc);
buffer_free(ptmp);
}
Commit Message: [core] fix abort in http-parseopts (fixes #2945)
fix abort in server.http-parseopts with url-path-2f-decode enabled
(thx stze)
x-ref:
"Security - SIGABRT during GET request handling with url-path-2f-decode enabled"
https://redmine.lighttpd.net/issues/2945
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 169,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void arm_iommu_detach_device(struct device *dev)
{
struct dma_iommu_mapping *mapping;
mapping = to_dma_iommu_mapping(dev);
if (!mapping) {
dev_warn(dev, "Not attached\n");
return;
}
iommu_detach_device(mapping->domain, dev);
kref_put(&mapping->kref, release_iommu_mapping);
dev->archdata.mapping = NULL;
set_dma_ops(dev, NULL);
pr_debug("Detached IOMMU controller from %s device.\n", dev_name(dev));
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 58,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CWebServer::Cmd_VacuumDatabase(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
if (session.rights != 2)
{
session.reply_status = reply::forbidden;
return; //Only admin user allowed
}
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "VacuumDatabase";
m_sql.VacuumDatabase();
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 91,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMXCodecObserver() {
}
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void testResizeYieldsCorrectScrollAndScale(const char* url,
const float initialPageScaleFactor,
const WebSize scrollOffset,
const WebSize viewportSize,
const bool shouldScaleRelativeToViewportWidth) {
UseMockScrollbarSettings mockScrollbarSettings;
registerMockedHttpURLLoad(url);
const float aspectRatio = static_cast<float>(viewportSize.width) / viewportSize.height;
FrameTestHelpers::WebViewHelper webViewHelper;
webViewHelper.initializeAndLoad(m_baseURL + url, true, 0, 0, enableViewportSettings);
{
webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->resize(WebSize(viewportSize.width, viewportSize.height));
webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->setPageScaleFactor(initialPageScaleFactor, WebPoint());
ASSERT_EQ(viewportSize, webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->size());
ASSERT_EQ(initialPageScaleFactor, webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->pageScaleFactor());
webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->resize(WebSize(viewportSize.height, viewportSize.width));
float expectedPageScaleFactor = initialPageScaleFactor * (shouldScaleRelativeToViewportWidth ? 1 / aspectRatio : 1);
EXPECT_NEAR(expectedPageScaleFactor, webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->pageScaleFactor(), 0.05f);
EXPECT_EQ(WebSize(), webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->mainFrame()->scrollOffset());
}
{
webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->resize(WebSize(viewportSize.width, viewportSize.height));
webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->setPageScaleFactor(initialPageScaleFactor, WebPoint(scrollOffset.width, scrollOffset.height));
webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->layout();
const WebSize expectedScrollOffset = webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->mainFrame()->scrollOffset();
webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->resize(WebSize(viewportSize.width, viewportSize.height * 0.8f));
EXPECT_EQ(initialPageScaleFactor, webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->pageScaleFactor());
EXPECT_EQ(expectedScrollOffset, webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->mainFrame()->scrollOffset());
webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->resize(WebSize(viewportSize.width, viewportSize.height * 0.8f));
EXPECT_EQ(initialPageScaleFactor, webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->pageScaleFactor());
EXPECT_EQ(expectedScrollOffset, webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->mainFrame()->scrollOffset());
}
{
webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->resize(WebSize(viewportSize.height, viewportSize.width));
float pageScaleFactor = webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->pageScaleFactor();
webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->resize(WebSize(viewportSize.width, viewportSize.height));
float expectedPageScaleFactor = pageScaleFactor * (shouldScaleRelativeToViewportWidth ? aspectRatio : 1);
EXPECT_NEAR(expectedPageScaleFactor, webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->pageScaleFactor(), 0.05f);
webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->mainFrame()->setScrollOffset(scrollOffset);
WebCore::IntPoint anchorPoint = WebCore::IntPoint(scrollOffset) + WebCore::IntPoint(viewportSize.width / 2, 0);
RefPtr<WebCore::Node> anchorNode = webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->mainFrameImpl()->frame()->eventHandler().hitTestResultAtPoint(anchorPoint, HitTestRequest::ReadOnly | HitTestRequest::Active | HitTestRequest::ConfusingAndOftenMisusedDisallowShadowContent).innerNode();
ASSERT(anchorNode);
pageScaleFactor = webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->pageScaleFactor();
const WebCore::FloatSize preResizeRelativeOffset
= computeRelativeOffset(anchorPoint, anchorNode->boundingBox());
webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->resize(WebSize(viewportSize.height, viewportSize.width));
WebCore::IntPoint newAnchorPoint = WebCore::IntPoint(webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->mainFrame()->scrollOffset()) + WebCore::IntPoint(viewportSize.height / 2, 0);
const WebCore::FloatSize postResizeRelativeOffset
= computeRelativeOffset(newAnchorPoint, anchorNode->boundingBox());
EXPECT_NEAR(preResizeRelativeOffset.width(), postResizeRelativeOffset.width(), 0.15f);
expectedPageScaleFactor = pageScaleFactor * (shouldScaleRelativeToViewportWidth ? 1 / aspectRatio : 1);
EXPECT_NEAR(expectedPageScaleFactor, webViewHelper.webViewImpl()->pageScaleFactor(), 0.05f);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> [email protected]
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 118,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnFollowRedirect(
int request_id,
bool has_new_first_party_for_cookies,
const GURL& new_first_party_for_cookies) {
ResourceLoader* loader = GetLoader(filter_->child_id(), request_id);
if (!loader) {
DVLOG(1) << "OnFollowRedirect for invalid request";
return;
}
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = loader->GetRequestInfo();
if (info->async_handler()) {
info->async_handler()->OnFollowRedirect(
has_new_first_party_for_cookies,
new_first_party_for_cookies);
}
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::CancelRequest(const std::string& label) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DVLOG(1) << "CancelRequest({label = " << label << "})";
DeviceRequest* request = FindRequest(label);
if (!request) {
LOG(ERROR) << "The request with label = " << label << " does not exist.";
return;
}
for (const MediaStreamDevice& device : request->devices) {
const MediaRequestState state = request->state(device.type);
if (state != MEDIA_REQUEST_STATE_OPENING &&
state != MEDIA_REQUEST_STATE_DONE) {
continue;
}
CloseDevice(device.type, device.session_id);
}
request->SetState(NUM_MEDIA_TYPES, MEDIA_REQUEST_STATE_CLOSING);
DeleteRequest(label);
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: irc_server_get_prefix_mode_index (struct t_irc_server *server, char mode)
{
const char *prefix_modes;
char *pos;
if (server)
{
prefix_modes = irc_server_get_prefix_modes (server);
pos = strchr (prefix_modes, mode);
if (pos)
return pos - prefix_modes;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean OnCrossingEvent(GtkWidget* widget,
GdkEventCrossing* event,
RenderWidgetHostViewGtk* host_view) {
TRACE_EVENT0("browser",
"RenderWidgetHostViewGtkWidget::OnCrossingEvent");
const int any_button_mask =
GDK_BUTTON1_MASK |
GDK_BUTTON2_MASK |
GDK_BUTTON3_MASK |
GDK_BUTTON4_MASK |
GDK_BUTTON5_MASK;
if (!(event->state & any_button_mask)) {
WebKit::WebMouseEvent mouse_event =
WebInputEventFactory::mouseEvent(event);
host_view->ModifyEventMovementAndCoords(&mouse_event);
mouse_event.movementX = 0;
mouse_event.movementY = 0;
RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(
host_view->GetRenderWidgetHost())->ForwardMouseEvent(mouse_event);
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: device_luks_lock (Device *device,
char **options,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
uid_t unlocked_by_uid;
uid_t uid;
Device *cleartext_device;
const gchar *action_id;
daemon_local_get_uid (device->priv->daemon, &uid, context);
if (device->priv->id_usage == NULL || strcmp (device->priv->id_usage, "crypto") != 0)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Not a LUKS crypto device");
goto out;
}
cleartext_device = find_cleartext_device (device);
if (cleartext_device == NULL)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Cleartext device is not unlocked");
goto out;
}
if (cleartext_device->priv->dm_name == NULL || strlen (cleartext_device->priv->dm_name) == 0)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Cannot determine device-mapper name");
goto out;
}
/* see if we (e.g. udisks) set up this clear text device */
if (!luks_get_uid_from_dm_name (cleartext_device->priv->dm_name, &unlocked_by_uid))
{
/* nope.. so assume uid 0 set it up.. we still allow locking
* the device... given enough privilege
*/
unlocked_by_uid = 0;
}
/* require authorization if unlocked by someone else */
action_id = NULL;
if (unlocked_by_uid != uid)
{
action_id = "org.freedesktop.udisks.luks-lock-others";
}
daemon_local_check_auth (device->priv->daemon,
device,
action_id,
"LuksLock",
TRUE,
device_luks_lock_authorized_cb,
context,
1,
g_strdupv (options),
g_strfreev);
out:
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int i, c, sd;
int log_level = LOG_NOTICE;
int log_opts = LOG_CONS | LOG_PID;
int interval = NOTIFY_INTERVAL;
int refresh = REFRESH_INTERVAL;
time_t now, rtmo = 0, itmo = 0;
while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "dhi:r:v")) != EOF) {
switch (c) {
case 'd':
debug = 1;
break;
case 'h':
return usage(0);
case 'i':
interval = atoi(optarg);
if (interval < 30 || interval > 900)
errx(1, "Invalid announcement interval (30-900).");
break;
case 'r':
refresh = atoi(optarg);
if (refresh < 5 || refresh > 1800)
errx(1, "Invalid refresh interval (5-1800).");
break;
case 'v':
puts(PACKAGE_VERSION);
return 0;
default:
break;
}
}
signal_init();
if (debug) {
log_level = LOG_DEBUG;
log_opts |= LOG_PERROR;
}
openlog(PACKAGE_NAME, log_opts, LOG_DAEMON);
setlogmask(LOG_UPTO(log_level));
uuidgen();
lsb_init();
web_init();
sd = multicast_init();
if (sd < 0)
err(1, "Failed creating multicast socket");
while (running) {
now = time(NULL);
if (rtmo <= now) {
if (ssdp_init(sd, &argv[optind], argc - optind) > 0)
announce(1);
rtmo = now + refresh;
}
if (itmo <= now) {
announce(0);
itmo = now + interval;
}
wait_message(MIN(rtmo, itmo));
}
closelog();
return close_socket();
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct lzxd_stream *lzxd_init(struct mspack_system *system,
struct mspack_file *input,
struct mspack_file *output,
int window_bits,
int reset_interval,
int input_buffer_size,
off_t output_length,
char is_delta)
{
unsigned int window_size = 1 << window_bits;
struct lzxd_stream *lzx;
if (!system) return NULL;
/* LZX DELTA window sizes are between 2^17 (128KiB) and 2^25 (32MiB),
* regular LZX windows are between 2^15 (32KiB) and 2^21 (2MiB)
*/
if (is_delta) {
if (window_bits < 17 || window_bits > 25) return NULL;
}
else {
if (window_bits < 15 || window_bits > 21) return NULL;
}
input_buffer_size = (input_buffer_size + 1) & -2;
if (!input_buffer_size) return NULL;
/* allocate decompression state */
if (!(lzx = (struct lzxd_stream *) system->alloc(system, sizeof(struct lzxd_stream)))) {
return NULL;
}
/* allocate decompression window and input buffer */
lzx->window = (unsigned char *) system->alloc(system, (size_t) window_size);
lzx->inbuf = (unsigned char *) system->alloc(system, (size_t) input_buffer_size);
if (!lzx->window || !lzx->inbuf) {
system->free(lzx->window);
system->free(lzx->inbuf);
system->free(lzx);
return NULL;
}
/* initialise decompression state */
lzx->sys = system;
lzx->input = input;
lzx->output = output;
lzx->offset = 0;
lzx->length = output_length;
lzx->inbuf_size = input_buffer_size;
lzx->window_size = 1 << window_bits;
lzx->ref_data_size = 0;
lzx->window_posn = 0;
lzx->frame_posn = 0;
lzx->frame = 0;
lzx->reset_interval = reset_interval;
lzx->intel_filesize = 0;
lzx->intel_curpos = 0;
lzx->intel_started = 0;
lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_OK;
lzx->num_offsets = position_slots[window_bits - 15] << 3;
lzx->is_delta = is_delta;
lzx->o_ptr = lzx->o_end = &lzx->e8_buf[0];
lzxd_reset_state(lzx);
INIT_BITS;
return lzx;
}
Commit Message: Prevent a 1-byte underread of the input buffer if an odd-sized data block comes just before an uncompressed block header
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void debugt(const char *func, const char *msg) { }
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentWriter::clear()
{
m_decoder = 0;
m_hasReceivedSomeData = false;
if (!m_encodingWasChosenByUser)
m_encoding = String();
}
Commit Message: Remove DocumentWriter::setDecoder as a grep of WebKit shows no callers
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=67803
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Smells like dead code.
* loader/DocumentWriter.cpp:
* loader/DocumentWriter.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@94800 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 98,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _PUBLIC_ size_t strlen_m_term(const char *s)
{
return strlen_m_ext_term(s, CH_UNIX, CH_UTF16LE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameImpl::CreateRendererFactory() {
scoped_ptr<MediaStreamRendererFactory> factory =
GetContentClient()->renderer()->CreateMediaStreamRendererFactory();
if (factory.get())
return factory.Pass();
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
return scoped_ptr<MediaStreamRendererFactory>(
new MediaStreamRendererFactoryImpl());
#else
return scoped_ptr<MediaStreamRendererFactory>(
static_cast<MediaStreamRendererFactory*>(NULL));
#endif
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_apic_match_dest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_lapic *source,
int short_hand, int dest, int dest_mode)
{
int result = 0;
struct kvm_lapic *target = vcpu->arch.apic;
apic_debug("target %p, source %p, dest 0x%x, "
"dest_mode 0x%x, short_hand 0x%x\n",
target, source, dest, dest_mode, short_hand);
ASSERT(target);
switch (short_hand) {
case APIC_DEST_NOSHORT:
if (dest_mode == 0)
/* Physical mode. */
result = kvm_apic_match_physical_addr(target, dest);
else
/* Logical mode. */
result = kvm_apic_match_logical_addr(target, dest);
break;
case APIC_DEST_SELF:
result = (target == source);
break;
case APIC_DEST_ALLINC:
result = 1;
break;
case APIC_DEST_ALLBUT:
result = (target != source);
break;
default:
apic_debug("kvm: apic: Bad dest shorthand value %x\n",
short_hand);
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SoftAVC::resetPlugin() {
mIsInFlush = false;
mReceivedEOS = false;
memset(mTimeStamps, 0, sizeof(mTimeStamps));
memset(mTimeStampsValid, 0, sizeof(mTimeStampsValid));
/* Initialize both start and end times */
gettimeofday(&mTimeStart, NULL);
gettimeofday(&mTimeEnd, NULL);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 163,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *mptsas_load_request(QEMUFile *f, SCSIRequest *sreq)
{
SCSIBus *bus = sreq->bus;
MPTSASState *s = container_of(bus, MPTSASState, bus);
PCIDevice *pci = PCI_DEVICE(s);
MPTSASRequest *req;
int i, n;
req = g_new(MPTSASRequest, 1);
qemu_get_buffer(f, (unsigned char *)&req->scsi_io, sizeof(req->scsi_io));
n = qemu_get_be32(f);
/* TODO: add a way for SCSIBusInfo's load_request to fail,
* and fail migration instead of asserting here.
* When we do, we might be able to re-enable NDEBUG below.
*/
#ifdef NDEBUG
#error building with NDEBUG is not supported
#endif
assert(n >= 0);
pci_dma_sglist_init(&req->qsg, pci, n);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
uint64_t base = qemu_get_be64(f);
uint64_t len = qemu_get_be64(f);
qemu_sglist_add(&req->qsg, base, len);
}
scsi_req_ref(sreq);
req->sreq = sreq;
req->dev = s;
return req;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaStreamManager::~MediaStreamManager() {
DCHECK(!BrowserThread::IsThreadInitialized(BrowserThread::IO));
DVLOG(1) << "~MediaStreamManager";
DCHECK(requests_.empty());
base::PowerMonitor* power_monitor = base::PowerMonitor::Get();
if (power_monitor)
power_monitor->RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GenerateRandomNumber(const int range)
{
if (p == ((unsigned char *) (&entropy + 1)))
{
switch (entropy.which)
{
case 0:
entropy.t += time (NULL);
accSeed ^= entropy.t;
break;
case 1:
entropy.c += clock();
break;
case 2:
entropy.counter++;
break;
}
entropy.which = (entropy.which + 1) % 3;
p = (unsigned char *) &entropy.t;
}
accSeed = ((accSeed * (UCHAR_MAX + 2U)) | 1) + (int) *p;
p++;
srand (accSeed);
return (rand() / (RAND_MAX / range));
}
Commit Message: Do not allow enters/returns in arguments (thanks to Fabio Carretto)
CWE ID: CWE-93 | 0 | 90,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void aiptek_irq(struct urb *urb)
{
struct aiptek *aiptek = urb->context;
unsigned char *data = aiptek->data;
struct input_dev *inputdev = aiptek->inputdev;
struct usb_interface *intf = aiptek->intf;
int jitterable = 0;
int retval, macro, x, y, z, left, right, middle, p, dv, tip, bs, pck;
switch (urb->status) {
case 0:
/* Success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
/* This urb is terminated, clean up */
dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "%s - urb shutting down with status: %d\n",
__func__, urb->status);
return;
default:
dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "%s - nonzero urb status received: %d\n",
__func__, urb->status);
goto exit;
}
/* See if we are in a delay loop -- throw out report if true.
*/
if (aiptek->inDelay == 1 && time_after(aiptek->endDelay, jiffies)) {
goto exit;
}
aiptek->inDelay = 0;
aiptek->eventCount++;
/* Report 1 delivers relative coordinates with either a stylus
* or the mouse. You do not know, however, which input
* tool generated the event.
*/
if (data[0] == 1) {
if (aiptek->curSetting.coordinateMode ==
AIPTEK_COORDINATE_ABSOLUTE_MODE) {
aiptek->diagnostic =
AIPTEK_DIAGNOSTIC_SENDING_RELATIVE_IN_ABSOLUTE;
} else {
x = (signed char) data[2];
y = (signed char) data[3];
/* jitterable keeps track of whether any button has been pressed.
* We're also using it to remap the physical mouse button mask
* to pseudo-settings. (We don't specifically care about it's
* value after moving/transposing mouse button bitmasks, except
* that a non-zero value indicates that one or more
* mouse button was pressed.)
*/
jitterable = data[1] & 0x07;
left = (data[1] & aiptek->curSetting.mouseButtonLeft >> 2) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
right = (data[1] & aiptek->curSetting.mouseButtonRight >> 2) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
middle = (data[1] & aiptek->curSetting.mouseButtonMiddle >> 2) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
input_report_key(inputdev, BTN_LEFT, left);
input_report_key(inputdev, BTN_MIDDLE, middle);
input_report_key(inputdev, BTN_RIGHT, right);
input_report_abs(inputdev, ABS_MISC,
1 | AIPTEK_REPORT_TOOL_UNKNOWN);
input_report_rel(inputdev, REL_X, x);
input_report_rel(inputdev, REL_Y, y);
/* Wheel support is in the form of a single-event
* firing.
*/
if (aiptek->curSetting.wheel != AIPTEK_WHEEL_DISABLE) {
input_report_rel(inputdev, REL_WHEEL,
aiptek->curSetting.wheel);
aiptek->curSetting.wheel = AIPTEK_WHEEL_DISABLE;
}
if (aiptek->lastMacro != -1) {
input_report_key(inputdev,
macroKeyEvents[aiptek->lastMacro], 0);
aiptek->lastMacro = -1;
}
input_sync(inputdev);
}
}
/* Report 2 is delivered only by the stylus, and delivers
* absolute coordinates.
*/
else if (data[0] == 2) {
if (aiptek->curSetting.coordinateMode == AIPTEK_COORDINATE_RELATIVE_MODE) {
aiptek->diagnostic = AIPTEK_DIAGNOSTIC_SENDING_ABSOLUTE_IN_RELATIVE;
} else if (!AIPTEK_POINTER_ALLOW_STYLUS_MODE
(aiptek->curSetting.pointerMode)) {
aiptek->diagnostic = AIPTEK_DIAGNOSTIC_TOOL_DISALLOWED;
} else {
x = get_unaligned_le16(data + 1);
y = get_unaligned_le16(data + 3);
z = get_unaligned_le16(data + 6);
dv = (data[5] & 0x01) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
p = (data[5] & 0x02) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
tip = (data[5] & 0x04) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
/* Use jitterable to re-arrange button masks
*/
jitterable = data[5] & 0x18;
bs = (data[5] & aiptek->curSetting.stylusButtonLower) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
pck = (data[5] & aiptek->curSetting.stylusButtonUpper) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
/* dv indicates 'data valid' (e.g., the tablet is in sync
* and has delivered a "correct" report) We will ignore
* all 'bad' reports...
*/
if (dv != 0) {
/* If the selected tool changed, reset the old
* tool key, and set the new one.
*/
if (aiptek->previousToolMode !=
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode) {
input_report_key(inputdev,
aiptek->previousToolMode, 0);
input_report_key(inputdev,
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode,
1);
aiptek->previousToolMode =
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode;
}
if (p != 0) {
input_report_abs(inputdev, ABS_X, x);
input_report_abs(inputdev, ABS_Y, y);
input_report_abs(inputdev, ABS_PRESSURE, z);
input_report_key(inputdev, BTN_TOUCH, tip);
input_report_key(inputdev, BTN_STYLUS, bs);
input_report_key(inputdev, BTN_STYLUS2, pck);
if (aiptek->curSetting.xTilt !=
AIPTEK_TILT_DISABLE) {
input_report_abs(inputdev,
ABS_TILT_X,
aiptek->curSetting.xTilt);
}
if (aiptek->curSetting.yTilt != AIPTEK_TILT_DISABLE) {
input_report_abs(inputdev,
ABS_TILT_Y,
aiptek->curSetting.yTilt);
}
/* Wheel support is in the form of a single-event
* firing.
*/
if (aiptek->curSetting.wheel !=
AIPTEK_WHEEL_DISABLE) {
input_report_abs(inputdev,
ABS_WHEEL,
aiptek->curSetting.wheel);
aiptek->curSetting.wheel = AIPTEK_WHEEL_DISABLE;
}
}
input_report_abs(inputdev, ABS_MISC, p | AIPTEK_REPORT_TOOL_STYLUS);
if (aiptek->lastMacro != -1) {
input_report_key(inputdev,
macroKeyEvents[aiptek->lastMacro], 0);
aiptek->lastMacro = -1;
}
input_sync(inputdev);
}
}
}
/* Report 3's come from the mouse in absolute mode.
*/
else if (data[0] == 3) {
if (aiptek->curSetting.coordinateMode == AIPTEK_COORDINATE_RELATIVE_MODE) {
aiptek->diagnostic = AIPTEK_DIAGNOSTIC_SENDING_ABSOLUTE_IN_RELATIVE;
} else if (!AIPTEK_POINTER_ALLOW_MOUSE_MODE
(aiptek->curSetting.pointerMode)) {
aiptek->diagnostic = AIPTEK_DIAGNOSTIC_TOOL_DISALLOWED;
} else {
x = get_unaligned_le16(data + 1);
y = get_unaligned_le16(data + 3);
jitterable = data[5] & 0x1c;
dv = (data[5] & 0x01) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
p = (data[5] & 0x02) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
left = (data[5] & aiptek->curSetting.mouseButtonLeft) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
right = (data[5] & aiptek->curSetting.mouseButtonRight) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
middle = (data[5] & aiptek->curSetting.mouseButtonMiddle) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
if (dv != 0) {
/* If the selected tool changed, reset the old
* tool key, and set the new one.
*/
if (aiptek->previousToolMode !=
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode) {
input_report_key(inputdev,
aiptek->previousToolMode, 0);
input_report_key(inputdev,
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode,
1);
aiptek->previousToolMode =
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode;
}
if (p != 0) {
input_report_abs(inputdev, ABS_X, x);
input_report_abs(inputdev, ABS_Y, y);
input_report_key(inputdev, BTN_LEFT, left);
input_report_key(inputdev, BTN_MIDDLE, middle);
input_report_key(inputdev, BTN_RIGHT, right);
/* Wheel support is in the form of a single-event
* firing.
*/
if (aiptek->curSetting.wheel != AIPTEK_WHEEL_DISABLE) {
input_report_abs(inputdev,
ABS_WHEEL,
aiptek->curSetting.wheel);
aiptek->curSetting.wheel = AIPTEK_WHEEL_DISABLE;
}
}
input_report_abs(inputdev, ABS_MISC, p | AIPTEK_REPORT_TOOL_MOUSE);
if (aiptek->lastMacro != -1) {
input_report_key(inputdev,
macroKeyEvents[aiptek->lastMacro], 0);
aiptek->lastMacro = -1;
}
input_sync(inputdev);
}
}
}
/* Report 4s come from the macro keys when pressed by stylus
*/
else if (data[0] == 4) {
jitterable = data[1] & 0x18;
dv = (data[1] & 0x01) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
p = (data[1] & 0x02) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
tip = (data[1] & 0x04) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
bs = (data[1] & aiptek->curSetting.stylusButtonLower) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
pck = (data[1] & aiptek->curSetting.stylusButtonUpper) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
macro = dv && p && tip && !(data[3] & 1) ? (data[3] >> 1) : -1;
z = get_unaligned_le16(data + 4);
if (dv) {
/* If the selected tool changed, reset the old
* tool key, and set the new one.
*/
if (aiptek->previousToolMode !=
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode) {
input_report_key(inputdev,
aiptek->previousToolMode, 0);
input_report_key(inputdev,
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode,
1);
aiptek->previousToolMode =
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode;
}
}
if (aiptek->lastMacro != -1 && aiptek->lastMacro != macro) {
input_report_key(inputdev, macroKeyEvents[aiptek->lastMacro], 0);
aiptek->lastMacro = -1;
}
if (macro != -1 && macro != aiptek->lastMacro) {
input_report_key(inputdev, macroKeyEvents[macro], 1);
aiptek->lastMacro = macro;
}
input_report_abs(inputdev, ABS_MISC,
p | AIPTEK_REPORT_TOOL_STYLUS);
input_sync(inputdev);
}
/* Report 5s come from the macro keys when pressed by mouse
*/
else if (data[0] == 5) {
jitterable = data[1] & 0x1c;
dv = (data[1] & 0x01) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
p = (data[1] & 0x02) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
left = (data[1]& aiptek->curSetting.mouseButtonLeft) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
right = (data[1] & aiptek->curSetting.mouseButtonRight) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
middle = (data[1] & aiptek->curSetting.mouseButtonMiddle) != 0 ? 1 : 0;
macro = dv && p && left && !(data[3] & 1) ? (data[3] >> 1) : 0;
if (dv) {
/* If the selected tool changed, reset the old
* tool key, and set the new one.
*/
if (aiptek->previousToolMode !=
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode) {
input_report_key(inputdev,
aiptek->previousToolMode, 0);
input_report_key(inputdev,
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode, 1);
aiptek->previousToolMode = aiptek->curSetting.toolMode;
}
}
if (aiptek->lastMacro != -1 && aiptek->lastMacro != macro) {
input_report_key(inputdev, macroKeyEvents[aiptek->lastMacro], 0);
aiptek->lastMacro = -1;
}
if (macro != -1 && macro != aiptek->lastMacro) {
input_report_key(inputdev, macroKeyEvents[macro], 1);
aiptek->lastMacro = macro;
}
input_report_abs(inputdev, ABS_MISC,
p | AIPTEK_REPORT_TOOL_MOUSE);
input_sync(inputdev);
}
/* We have no idea which tool can generate a report 6. Theoretically,
* neither need to, having been given reports 4 & 5 for such use.
* However, report 6 is the 'official-looking' report for macroKeys;
* reports 4 & 5 supposively are used to support unnamed, unknown
* hat switches (which just so happen to be the macroKeys.)
*/
else if (data[0] == 6) {
macro = get_unaligned_le16(data + 1);
if (macro > 0) {
input_report_key(inputdev, macroKeyEvents[macro - 1],
0);
}
if (macro < 25) {
input_report_key(inputdev, macroKeyEvents[macro + 1],
0);
}
/* If the selected tool changed, reset the old
tool key, and set the new one.
*/
if (aiptek->previousToolMode !=
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode) {
input_report_key(inputdev,
aiptek->previousToolMode, 0);
input_report_key(inputdev,
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode,
1);
aiptek->previousToolMode =
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode;
}
input_report_key(inputdev, macroKeyEvents[macro], 1);
input_report_abs(inputdev, ABS_MISC,
1 | AIPTEK_REPORT_TOOL_UNKNOWN);
input_sync(inputdev);
} else {
dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "Unknown report %d\n", data[0]);
}
/* Jitter may occur when the user presses a button on the stlyus
* or the mouse. What we do to prevent that is wait 'x' milliseconds
* following a 'jitterable' event, which should give the hand some time
* stabilize itself.
*
* We just introduced aiptek->previousJitterable to carry forth the
* notion that jitter occurs when the button state changes from on to off:
* a person drawing, holding a button down is not subject to jittering.
* With that in mind, changing from upper button depressed to lower button
* WILL transition through a jitter delay.
*/
if (aiptek->previousJitterable != jitterable &&
aiptek->curSetting.jitterDelay != 0 && aiptek->inDelay != 1) {
aiptek->endDelay = jiffies +
((aiptek->curSetting.jitterDelay * HZ) / 1000);
aiptek->inDelay = 1;
}
aiptek->previousJitterable = jitterable;
exit:
retval = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (retval != 0) {
dev_err(&intf->dev,
"%s - usb_submit_urb failed with result %d\n",
__func__, retval);
}
}
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int discard_single_l2(BlockDriverState *bs, uint64_t offset,
unsigned int nb_clusters, enum qcow2_discard_type type)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
uint64_t *l2_table;
int l2_index;
int ret;
int i;
ret = get_cluster_table(bs, offset, &l2_table, &l2_index);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
/* Limit nb_clusters to one L2 table */
nb_clusters = MIN(nb_clusters, s->l2_size - l2_index);
for (i = 0; i < nb_clusters; i++) {
uint64_t old_offset;
old_offset = be64_to_cpu(l2_table[l2_index + i]);
/*
* Make sure that a discarded area reads back as zeroes for v3 images
* (we cannot do it for v2 without actually writing a zero-filled
* buffer). We can skip the operation if the cluster is already marked
* as zero, or if it's unallocated and we don't have a backing file.
*
* TODO We might want to use bdrv_get_block_status(bs) here, but we're
* holding s->lock, so that doesn't work today.
*/
if (old_offset & QCOW_OFLAG_ZERO) {
continue;
}
if ((old_offset & L2E_OFFSET_MASK) == 0 && !bs->backing_hd) {
continue;
}
/* First remove L2 entries */
qcow2_cache_entry_mark_dirty(s->l2_table_cache, l2_table);
if (s->qcow_version >= 3) {
l2_table[l2_index + i] = cpu_to_be64(QCOW_OFLAG_ZERO);
} else {
l2_table[l2_index + i] = cpu_to_be64(0);
}
/* Then decrease the refcount */
qcow2_free_any_clusters(bs, old_offset, 1, type);
}
ret = qcow2_cache_put(bs, s->l2_table_cache, (void**) &l2_table);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
return nb_clusters;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RelayTruncatePlatformFile(base::PlatformFile file,
int64 length,
base::FileUtilProxy::StatusCallback* callback)
: RelayWithStatusCallback(callback),
file_(file),
length_(length) {
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofproto_unixctl_list(struct unixctl_conn *conn, int argc OVS_UNUSED,
const char *argv[] OVS_UNUSED, void *aux OVS_UNUSED)
{
struct ofproto *ofproto;
struct ds results;
ds_init(&results);
HMAP_FOR_EACH (ofproto, hmap_node, &all_ofprotos) {
ds_put_format(&results, "%s\n", ofproto->name);
}
unixctl_command_reply(conn, ds_cstr(&results));
ds_destroy(&results);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: path_npoints(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
PATH *path = PG_GETARG_PATH_P(0);
PG_RETURN_INT32(path->npts);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::setCurrentTime(double time) {
if (m_readyState == kHaveNothing) {
m_defaultPlaybackStartPosition = time;
return;
}
seek(time);
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadItemImpl* DownloadManagerImpl::CreateActiveItem(
uint32_t id,
const DownloadCreateInfo& info) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(!base::ContainsKey(downloads_, id));
DownloadItemImpl* download = item_factory_->CreateActiveItem(this, id, info);
downloads_[id] = base::WrapUnique(download);
downloads_by_guid_[download->GetGuid()] = download;
return download;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd_inject_forget_clients(u64 max)
{
u64 count = 0;
struct nfs4_client *clp, *next;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(current->nsproxy->net_ns,
nfsd_net_id);
LIST_HEAD(reaplist);
if (!nfsd_netns_ready(nn))
return count;
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(clp, next, &nn->client_lru, cl_lru) {
if (mark_client_expired_locked(clp) == nfs_ok) {
list_add(&clp->cl_lru, &reaplist);
if (max != 0 && ++count >= max)
break;
}
}
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(clp, next, &reaplist, cl_lru)
expire_client(clp);
return count;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cx24116_readreg(struct cx24116_state *state, u8 reg)
{
int ret;
u8 b0[] = { reg };
u8 b1[] = { 0 };
struct i2c_msg msg[] = {
{ .addr = state->config->demod_address, .flags = 0,
.buf = b0, .len = 1 },
{ .addr = state->config->demod_address, .flags = I2C_M_RD,
.buf = b1, .len = 1 }
};
ret = i2c_transfer(state->i2c, msg, 2);
if (ret != 2) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: reg=0x%x (error=%d)\n",
__func__, reg, ret);
return ret;
}
if (debug > 1)
printk(KERN_INFO "cx24116: read reg 0x%02x, value 0x%02x\n",
reg, b1[0]);
return b1[0];
}
Commit Message: [media] cx24116: fix a buffer overflow when checking userspace params
The maximum size for a DiSEqC command is 6, according to the
userspace API. However, the code allows to write up much more values:
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c:983 cx24116_send_diseqc_msg() error: buffer overflow 'd->msg' 6 <= 23
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OperationID FileSystemOperationRunner::Remove(const FileSystemURL& url,
bool recursive,
StatusCallback callback) {
base::File::Error error = base::File::FILE_OK;
std::unique_ptr<FileSystemOperation> operation = base::WrapUnique(
file_system_context_->CreateFileSystemOperation(url, &error));
FileSystemOperation* operation_raw = operation.get();
OperationID id = BeginOperation(std::move(operation));
base::AutoReset<bool> beginning(&is_beginning_operation_, true);
if (!operation_raw) {
DidFinish(id, std::move(callback), error);
return id;
}
PrepareForWrite(id, url);
operation_raw->Remove(url, recursive,
base::BindOnce(&FileSystemOperationRunner::DidFinish,
weak_ptr_, id, std::move(callback)));
return id;
}
Commit Message: [FileSystem] Harden against overflows of OperationID a bit better.
Rather than having a UAF when OperationID overflows instead overwrite
the old operation with the new one. Can still cause weirdness, but at
least won't result in UAF. Also update OperationID to uint64_t to
make sure we don't overflow to begin with.
Bug: 925864
Change-Id: Ifdf3fa0935ab5ea8802d91bba39601f02b0dbdc9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1441498
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#627115}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,189 |
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