instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
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int64 0
175k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hash_free( hashtable* ht,
FT_Memory memory )
{
if ( ht != 0 )
{
int i, sz = ht->size;
hashnode* bp = ht->table;
for ( i = 0; i < sz; i++, bp++ )
FT_FREE( *bp );
FT_FREE( ht->table );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType GetImageMean(const Image *image,double *mean,
double *standard_deviation,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
status=GetImageChannelMean(image,CompositeChannels,mean,standard_deviation,
exception);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jas_image_encode(jas_image_t *image, jas_stream_t *out, int fmt, char *optstr)
{
jas_image_fmtinfo_t *fmtinfo;
if (!(fmtinfo = jas_image_lookupfmtbyid(fmt))) {
return -1;
}
return (fmtinfo->ops.encode) ? (*fmtinfo->ops.encode)(image, out,
optstr) : (-1);
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void net_dec_egress_queue(void)
{
static_key_slow_dec(&egress_needed);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ReportPageHistogramAfterSave(
ClientPolicyController* policy_controller_,
const std::map<int64_t, OfflinePageItem>& offline_pages,
const OfflinePageItem& offline_page,
const base::Time& save_time) {
DCHECK(policy_controller_);
base::HistogramBase* histogram = base::Histogram::FactoryTimeGet(
AddHistogramSuffix(offline_page.client_id, "OfflinePages.SavePageTime"),
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(1), base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(10),
50, base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
histogram->AddTime(save_time - offline_page.creation_time);
histogram = base::Histogram::FactoryGet(
AddHistogramSuffix(offline_page.client_id, "OfflinePages.PageSize"), 1,
10000, 50, base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
histogram->Add(offline_page.file_size / 1024);
if (policy_controller_->IsSupportedByDownload(
offline_page.client_id.name_space)) {
int matching_url_count;
base::TimeDelta time_since_most_recent_duplicate;
if (GetMatchingURLCountAndMostRecentCreationTime(
offline_pages, offline_page.client_id.name_space, offline_page.url,
offline_page.creation_time, &matching_url_count,
&time_since_most_recent_duplicate)) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS(
"OfflinePages.DownloadSavedPageTimeSinceDuplicateSaved",
time_since_most_recent_duplicate.InSeconds(),
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(1).InSeconds(),
base::TimeDelta::FromDays(7).InSeconds(), 50);
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS("OfflinePages.DownloadSavedPageDuplicateCount",
matching_url_count, 1, 20, 10);
}
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Smb4KGlobal::removeWorkgroup( Smb4KWorkgroup *workgroup )
{
Q_ASSERT( workgroup );
bool removed = false;
mutex.lock();
int index = p->workgroupsList.indexOf( workgroup );
if ( index != -1 )
{
delete p->workgroupsList.takeAt( index );
removed = true;
}
else
{
Smb4KWorkgroup *wg = findWorkgroup( workgroup->workgroupName() );
if ( wg )
{
index = p->workgroupsList.indexOf( wg );
if ( index != -1 )
{
delete p->workgroupsList.takeAt( index );
removed = true;
}
else
{
}
}
else
{
}
delete workgroup;
}
mutex.unlock();
return removed;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::SizeChanged() {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "sizeChanged(" << (void*)this << ")";
DCHECK(HasVideo()); // "resize" makes no sense in absence of video.
if (ready_state_ > kHaveNothing && IsHTMLVideoElement())
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::resize);
if (GetLayoutObject())
GetLayoutObject()->UpdateFromElement();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rend_authorized_client_free(rend_authorized_client_t *client)
{
if (!client)
return;
if (client->client_key)
crypto_pk_free(client->client_key);
if (client->client_name)
memwipe(client->client_name, 0, strlen(client->client_name));
tor_free(client->client_name);
memwipe(client->descriptor_cookie, 0, sizeof(client->descriptor_cookie));
tor_free(client);
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532 | 0 | 69,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HFSBTreeIterator::SeekToNode(uint32_t node_id) {
if (node_id >= header_.totalNodes)
return false;
size_t offset = node_id * header_.nodeSize;
if (stream_->Seek(offset, SEEK_SET) != -1) {
current_leaf_number_ = node_id;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned long __user *__fetch_reg_addr_user(unsigned int reg,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
BUG_ON(reg < 16);
BUG_ON(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV);
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
struct reg_window32 __user *win32;
win32 = (struct reg_window32 __user *)((unsigned long)((u32)regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]));
return (unsigned long __user *)&win32->locals[reg - 16];
} else {
struct reg_window __user *win;
win = (struct reg_window __user *)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS);
return &win->locals[reg - 16];
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,708 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: version( void )
{
printf( "%s\n%s\n", CondorVersion(), CondorPlatform() );
exit( 0 );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_destroy_dirty_bitmap(struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot)
{
if (!memslot->dirty_bitmap)
return;
kvm_kvfree(memslot->dirty_bitmap);
memslot->dirty_bitmap = NULL;
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PersistentHistogramAllocator::FinalizeHistogram(Reference ref,
bool registered) {
if (registered) {
memory_allocator_->MakeIterable(ref);
} else {
memory_allocator_->ChangeType(ref, 0,
PersistentHistogramData::kPersistentTypeId,
/*clear=*/false);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mcs_out_domain_params(STREAM s, int max_channels, int max_users, int max_tokens, int max_pdusize)
{
ber_out_header(s, MCS_TAG_DOMAIN_PARAMS, 32);
ber_out_integer(s, max_channels);
ber_out_integer(s, max_users);
ber_out_integer(s, max_tokens);
ber_out_integer(s, 1); /* num_priorities */
ber_out_integer(s, 0); /* min_throughput */
ber_out_integer(s, 1); /* max_height */
ber_out_integer(s, max_pdusize);
ber_out_integer(s, 2); /* ver_protocol */
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Editor::ReplaceSelection(const String& text) {
DCHECK(!GetFrame().GetDocument()->NeedsLayoutTreeUpdate());
bool select_replacement = Behavior().ShouldSelectReplacement();
bool smart_replace = true;
ReplaceSelectionWithText(text, select_replacement, smart_replace,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertReplacementText);
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_proc_get_root(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
struct nfs_fsinfo *info)
{
int minor_version = server->nfs_client->cl_minorversion;
int status = nfs4_lookup_root(server, fhandle, info);
if ((status == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC) && !(server->flags & NFS_MOUNT_SECFLAVOUR))
/*
* A status of -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC will be mapped to -EPERM
* by nfs4_map_errors() as this function exits.
*/
status = nfs_v4_minor_ops[minor_version]->find_root_sec(server, fhandle, info);
if (status == 0)
status = nfs4_server_capabilities(server, fhandle);
if (status == 0)
status = nfs4_do_fsinfo(server, fhandle, info);
return nfs4_map_errors(status);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServiceWorkerContextCore::PerformStorageCleanup(
base::OnceClosure callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
storage()->PerformStorageCleanup(std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vp7_fade_frame(VP8Context *s, VP56RangeCoder *c)
{
int alpha = (int8_t) vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 8);
int beta = (int8_t) vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 8);
int ret;
if (!s->keyframe && (alpha || beta)) {
int width = s->mb_width * 16;
int height = s->mb_height * 16;
AVFrame *src, *dst;
if (!s->framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS] ||
!s->framep[VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN]) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Discarding interframe without a prior keyframe!\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
dst =
src = s->framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS]->tf.f;
/* preserve the golden frame, write a new previous frame */
if (s->framep[VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN] == s->framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS]) {
s->framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS] = vp8_find_free_buffer(s);
if ((ret = vp8_alloc_frame(s, s->framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS], 1)) < 0)
return ret;
dst = s->framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS]->tf.f;
copy_chroma(dst, src, width, height);
}
fade(dst->data[0], dst->linesize[0],
src->data[0], src->linesize[0],
width, height, alpha, beta);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 3)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
const String& str(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
float a(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toFloat(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
if (exec->argumentCount() > 2 && !exec->argument(2).isUndefinedOrNull() && !exec->argument(2).inherits(&JSint::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
int* b(toint(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 2, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(impl->strictFunction(str, a, b, ec)));
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mcryptd_enqueue_request(struct mcryptd_queue *queue,
struct crypto_async_request *request,
struct mcryptd_hash_request_ctx *rctx)
{
int cpu, err;
struct mcryptd_cpu_queue *cpu_queue;
cpu = get_cpu();
cpu_queue = this_cpu_ptr(queue->cpu_queue);
rctx->tag.cpu = cpu;
err = crypto_enqueue_request(&cpu_queue->queue, request);
pr_debug("enqueue request: cpu %d cpu_queue %p request %p\n",
cpu, cpu_queue, request);
queue_work_on(cpu, kcrypto_wq, &cpu_queue->work);
put_cpu();
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: connect_socket(struct mg_context *ctx /* may be NULL */,
const char *host,
int port,
int use_ssl,
char *ebuf,
size_t ebuf_len,
SOCKET *sock /* output: socket, must not be NULL */,
union usa *sa /* output: socket address, must not be NULL */
)
{
int ip_ver = 0;
int conn_ret = -1;
*sock = INVALID_SOCKET;
memset(sa, 0, sizeof(*sa));
if (ebuf_len > 0) {
*ebuf = 0;
}
if (host == NULL) {
mg_snprintf(NULL,
NULL, /* No truncation check for ebuf */
ebuf,
ebuf_len,
"%s",
"NULL host");
return 0;
}
if ((port <= 0) || !is_valid_port((unsigned)port)) {
mg_snprintf(NULL,
NULL, /* No truncation check for ebuf */
ebuf,
ebuf_len,
"%s",
"invalid port");
return 0;
}
#if !defined(NO_SSL)
#if !defined(NO_SSL_DL)
#if defined(OPENSSL_API_1_1)
if (use_ssl && (TLS_client_method == NULL)) {
mg_snprintf(NULL,
NULL, /* No truncation check for ebuf */
ebuf,
ebuf_len,
"%s",
"SSL is not initialized");
return 0;
}
#else
if (use_ssl && (SSLv23_client_method == NULL)) {
mg_snprintf(NULL,
NULL, /* No truncation check for ebuf */
ebuf,
ebuf_len,
"%s",
"SSL is not initialized");
return 0;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_API_1_1 */
#else
(void)use_ssl;
#endif /* NO_SSL_DL */
#else
(void)use_ssl;
#endif /* !defined(NO_SSL) */
if (mg_inet_pton(AF_INET, host, &sa->sin, sizeof(sa->sin))) {
sa->sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sa->sin.sin_port = htons((uint16_t)port);
ip_ver = 4;
#if defined(USE_IPV6)
} else if (mg_inet_pton(AF_INET6, host, &sa->sin6, sizeof(sa->sin6))) {
sa->sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sa->sin6.sin6_port = htons((uint16_t)port);
ip_ver = 6;
} else if (host[0] == '[') {
/* While getaddrinfo on Windows will work with [::1],
* getaddrinfo on Linux only works with ::1 (without []). */
size_t l = strlen(host + 1);
char *h = (l > 1) ? mg_strdup_ctx(host + 1, ctx) : NULL;
if (h) {
h[l - 1] = 0;
if (mg_inet_pton(AF_INET6, h, &sa->sin6, sizeof(sa->sin6))) {
sa->sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sa->sin6.sin6_port = htons((uint16_t)port);
ip_ver = 6;
}
mg_free(h);
}
#endif
}
if (ip_ver == 0) {
mg_snprintf(NULL,
NULL, /* No truncation check for ebuf */
ebuf,
ebuf_len,
"%s",
"host not found");
return 0;
}
if (ip_ver == 4) {
*sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
}
#if defined(USE_IPV6)
else if (ip_ver == 6) {
*sock = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
}
#endif
if (*sock == INVALID_SOCKET) {
mg_snprintf(NULL,
NULL, /* No truncation check for ebuf */
ebuf,
ebuf_len,
"socket(): %s",
strerror(ERRNO));
return 0;
}
if (0 != set_non_blocking_mode(*sock)) {
mg_snprintf(NULL,
NULL, /* No truncation check for ebuf */
ebuf,
ebuf_len,
"Cannot set socket to non-blocking: %s",
strerror(ERRNO));
closesocket(*sock);
*sock = INVALID_SOCKET;
return 0;
}
set_close_on_exec(*sock, fc(ctx));
if (ip_ver == 4) {
/* connected with IPv4 */
conn_ret = connect(*sock,
(struct sockaddr *)((void *)&sa->sin),
sizeof(sa->sin));
}
#if defined(USE_IPV6)
else if (ip_ver == 6) {
/* connected with IPv6 */
conn_ret = connect(*sock,
(struct sockaddr *)((void *)&sa->sin6),
sizeof(sa->sin6));
}
#endif
#if defined(_WIN32)
if (conn_ret != 0) {
DWORD err = WSAGetLastError(); /* could return WSAEWOULDBLOCK */
conn_ret = (int)err;
#if !defined(EINPROGRESS)
#define EINPROGRESS (WSAEWOULDBLOCK) /* Winsock equivalent */
#endif /* if !defined(EINPROGRESS) */
}
#endif
if ((conn_ret != 0) && (conn_ret != EINPROGRESS)) {
/* Data for getsockopt */
int sockerr = -1;
void *psockerr = &sockerr;
#if defined(_WIN32)
int len = (int)sizeof(sockerr);
#else
socklen_t len = (socklen_t)sizeof(sockerr);
#endif
/* Data for poll */
struct pollfd pfd[1];
int pollres;
int ms_wait = 10000; /* 10 second timeout */
/* For a non-blocking socket, the connect sequence is:
* 1) call connect (will not block)
* 2) wait until the socket is ready for writing (select or poll)
* 3) check connection state with getsockopt
*/
pfd[0].fd = *sock;
pfd[0].events = POLLOUT;
pollres = mg_poll(pfd, 1, (int)(ms_wait), &(ctx->stop_flag));
if (pollres != 1) {
/* Not connected */
mg_snprintf(NULL,
NULL, /* No truncation check for ebuf */
ebuf,
ebuf_len,
"connect(%s:%d): timeout",
host,
port);
closesocket(*sock);
*sock = INVALID_SOCKET;
return 0;
}
#if defined(_WIN32)
getsockopt(*sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, (char *)psockerr, &len);
#else
getsockopt(*sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, psockerr, &len);
#endif
if (sockerr != 0) {
/* Not connected */
mg_snprintf(NULL,
NULL, /* No truncation check for ebuf */
ebuf,
ebuf_len,
"connect(%s:%d): error %s",
host,
port,
strerror(sockerr));
closesocket(*sock);
*sock = INVALID_SOCKET;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Check length of memcmp
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 81,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vhost_vq_reset_user_be(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
{
}
Commit Message: vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_timer_exec ()
{
struct timeval tv_time;
struct t_hook *ptr_hook, *next_hook;
hook_timer_check_system_clock ();
gettimeofday (&tv_time, NULL);
hook_exec_start ();
ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_TIMER];
while (ptr_hook)
{
next_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook;
if (!ptr_hook->deleted
&& !ptr_hook->running
&& (util_timeval_cmp (&HOOK_TIMER(ptr_hook, next_exec),
&tv_time) <= 0))
{
ptr_hook->running = 1;
(void) (HOOK_TIMER(ptr_hook, callback))
(ptr_hook->callback_data,
(HOOK_TIMER(ptr_hook, remaining_calls) > 0) ?
HOOK_TIMER(ptr_hook, remaining_calls) - 1 : -1);
ptr_hook->running = 0;
if (!ptr_hook->deleted)
{
HOOK_TIMER(ptr_hook, last_exec).tv_sec = tv_time.tv_sec;
HOOK_TIMER(ptr_hook, last_exec).tv_usec = tv_time.tv_usec;
util_timeval_add (&HOOK_TIMER(ptr_hook, next_exec),
HOOK_TIMER(ptr_hook, interval));
if (HOOK_TIMER(ptr_hook, remaining_calls) > 0)
{
HOOK_TIMER(ptr_hook, remaining_calls)--;
if (HOOK_TIMER(ptr_hook, remaining_calls) == 0)
unhook (ptr_hook);
}
}
}
ptr_hook = next_hook;
}
hook_exec_end ();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String HTMLFormElement::action() const {
Document& document = GetDocument();
KURL action_url = document.CompleteURL(attributes_.Action().IsEmpty()
? document.Url().GetString()
: attributes_.Action());
return action_url.GetString();
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API zval* ZEND_FASTCALL _zend_hash_str_add_new(HashTable *ht, const char *str, size_t len, zval *pData ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
zend_string *key = zend_string_init(str, len, ht->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_PERSISTENT);
zval *ret = _zend_hash_add_or_update_i(ht, key, pData, HASH_ADD_NEW ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
zend_string_delref(key);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 69,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport Image *RollImage(const Image *image,const ssize_t x_offset,
const ssize_t y_offset,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RollImageTag "Roll/Image"
Image
*roll_image;
MagickStatusType
status;
RectangleInfo
offset;
/*
Initialize roll image attributes.
*/
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
roll_image=CloneImage(image,image->columns,image->rows,MagickTrue,exception);
if (roll_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
offset.x=x_offset;
offset.y=y_offset;
while (offset.x < 0)
offset.x+=(ssize_t) image->columns;
while (offset.x >= (ssize_t) image->columns)
offset.x-=(ssize_t) image->columns;
while (offset.y < 0)
offset.y+=(ssize_t) image->rows;
while (offset.y >= (ssize_t) image->rows)
offset.y-=(ssize_t) image->rows;
/*
Roll image.
*/
status=CopyImageRegion(roll_image,image,(size_t) offset.x,
(size_t) offset.y,(ssize_t) image->columns-offset.x,(ssize_t) image->rows-
offset.y,0,0,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,RollImageTag,0,3);
status&=CopyImageRegion(roll_image,image,image->columns-offset.x,
(size_t) offset.y,0,(ssize_t) image->rows-offset.y,offset.x,0,
exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,RollImageTag,1,3);
status&=CopyImageRegion(roll_image,image,(size_t) offset.x,image->rows-
offset.y,(ssize_t) image->columns-offset.x,0,0,offset.y,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,RollImageTag,2,3);
status&=CopyImageRegion(roll_image,image,image->columns-offset.x,image->rows-
offset.y,0,0,offset.x,offset.y,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,RollImageTag,3,3);
roll_image->type=image->type;
if (status == MagickFalse)
roll_image=DestroyImage(roll_image);
return(roll_image);
}
Commit Message: Fixed out of bounds error in SpliceImage.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 74,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void usb_kick_hub_wq(struct usb_device *hdev)
{
struct usb_hub *hub = usb_hub_to_struct_hub(hdev);
if (hub)
kick_hub_wq(hub);
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,819 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long pmcraid_ioctl_driver(
struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance,
unsigned int cmd,
unsigned int buflen,
void __user *user_buffer
)
{
int rc = -ENOSYS;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, user_buffer, _IOC_SIZE(cmd))) {
pmcraid_err("ioctl_driver: access fault in request buffer\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
switch (cmd) {
case PMCRAID_IOCTL_RESET_ADAPTER:
pmcraid_reset_bringup(pinstance);
rc = 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool sock_needs_netstamp(const struct sock *sk)
{
switch (sk->sk_family) {
case AF_UNSPEC:
case AF_UNIX:
return false;
default:
return true;
}
}
Commit Message: net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 47,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: V8Proxy* V8Proxy::retrieve()
{
DOMWindow* window = retrieveWindow(currentContext());
ASSERT(window);
return retrieve(window->frame());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_REQ_get_attr(const X509_REQ *req, int loc)
{
return X509at_get_attr(req->req_info->attributes, loc);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HeadlessWebContents::Builder& HeadlessWebContents::Builder::SetInitialURL(
const GURL& initial_url) {
initial_url_ = initial_url;
return *this;
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
[email protected]
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_last(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
struct file *file, const struct open_flags *op,
int *opened, struct filename *name)
{
struct dentry *dir = nd->path.dentry;
int open_flag = op->open_flag;
bool will_truncate = (open_flag & O_TRUNC) != 0;
bool got_write = false;
int acc_mode = op->acc_mode;
struct inode *inode;
bool symlink_ok = false;
struct path save_parent = { .dentry = NULL, .mnt = NULL };
bool retried = false;
int error;
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
nd->flags |= op->intent;
if (nd->last_type != LAST_NORM) {
error = handle_dots(nd, nd->last_type);
if (error)
return error;
goto finish_open;
}
if (!(open_flag & O_CREAT)) {
if (nd->last.name[nd->last.len])
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
if (open_flag & O_PATH && !(nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW))
symlink_ok = true;
/* we _can_ be in RCU mode here */
error = lookup_fast(nd, path, &inode);
if (likely(!error))
goto finish_lookup;
if (error < 0)
goto out;
BUG_ON(nd->inode != dir->d_inode);
} else {
/* create side of things */
/*
* This will *only* deal with leaving RCU mode - LOOKUP_JUMPED
* has been cleared when we got to the last component we are
* about to look up
*/
error = complete_walk(nd);
if (error)
return error;
audit_inode(name, dir, LOOKUP_PARENT);
error = -EISDIR;
/* trailing slashes? */
if (nd->last.name[nd->last.len])
goto out;
}
retry_lookup:
if (op->open_flag & (O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY | O_RDWR)) {
error = mnt_want_write(nd->path.mnt);
if (!error)
got_write = true;
/*
* do _not_ fail yet - we might not need that or fail with
* a different error; let lookup_open() decide; we'll be
* dropping this one anyway.
*/
}
mutex_lock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
error = lookup_open(nd, path, file, op, got_write, opened);
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (error <= 0) {
if (error)
goto out;
if ((*opened & FILE_CREATED) ||
!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
will_truncate = false;
audit_inode(name, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
goto opened;
}
if (*opened & FILE_CREATED) {
/* Don't check for write permission, don't truncate */
open_flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
will_truncate = false;
acc_mode = MAY_OPEN;
path_to_nameidata(path, nd);
goto finish_open_created;
}
/*
* create/update audit record if it already exists.
*/
if (d_is_positive(path->dentry))
audit_inode(name, path->dentry, 0);
/*
* If atomic_open() acquired write access it is dropped now due to
* possible mount and symlink following (this might be optimized away if
* necessary...)
*/
if (got_write) {
mnt_drop_write(nd->path.mnt);
got_write = false;
}
error = -EEXIST;
if ((open_flag & (O_EXCL | O_CREAT)) == (O_EXCL | O_CREAT))
goto exit_dput;
error = follow_managed(path, nd->flags);
if (error < 0)
goto exit_dput;
if (error)
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
BUG_ON(nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU);
inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
error = -ENOENT;
if (d_is_negative(path->dentry)) {
path_to_nameidata(path, nd);
goto out;
}
finish_lookup:
/* we _can_ be in RCU mode here */
if (should_follow_link(path->dentry, !symlink_ok)) {
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
if (unlikely(nd->path.mnt != path->mnt ||
unlazy_walk(nd, path->dentry))) {
error = -ECHILD;
goto out;
}
}
BUG_ON(inode != path->dentry->d_inode);
return 1;
}
if ((nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) || nd->path.mnt != path->mnt) {
path_to_nameidata(path, nd);
} else {
save_parent.dentry = nd->path.dentry;
save_parent.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
nd->path.dentry = path->dentry;
}
nd->inode = inode;
/* Why this, you ask? _Now_ we might have grown LOOKUP_JUMPED... */
finish_open:
error = complete_walk(nd);
if (error) {
path_put(&save_parent);
return error;
}
audit_inode(name, nd->path.dentry, 0);
error = -EISDIR;
if ((open_flag & O_CREAT) && d_is_dir(nd->path.dentry))
goto out;
error = -ENOTDIR;
if ((nd->flags & LOOKUP_DIRECTORY) && !d_can_lookup(nd->path.dentry))
goto out;
if (!d_is_reg(nd->path.dentry))
will_truncate = false;
if (will_truncate) {
error = mnt_want_write(nd->path.mnt);
if (error)
goto out;
got_write = true;
}
finish_open_created:
error = may_open(&nd->path, acc_mode, open_flag);
if (error)
goto out;
BUG_ON(*opened & FILE_OPENED); /* once it's opened, it's opened */
error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file, current_cred());
if (!error) {
*opened |= FILE_OPENED;
} else {
if (error == -EOPENSTALE)
goto stale_open;
goto out;
}
opened:
error = open_check_o_direct(file);
if (error)
goto exit_fput;
error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode, *opened);
if (error)
goto exit_fput;
if (will_truncate) {
error = handle_truncate(file);
if (error)
goto exit_fput;
}
out:
if (got_write)
mnt_drop_write(nd->path.mnt);
path_put(&save_parent);
terminate_walk(nd);
return error;
exit_dput:
path_put_conditional(path, nd);
goto out;
exit_fput:
fput(file);
goto out;
stale_open:
/* If no saved parent or already retried then can't retry */
if (!save_parent.dentry || retried)
goto out;
BUG_ON(save_parent.dentry != dir);
path_put(&nd->path);
nd->path = save_parent;
nd->inode = dir->d_inode;
save_parent.mnt = NULL;
save_parent.dentry = NULL;
if (got_write) {
mnt_drop_write(nd->path.mnt);
got_write = false;
}
retried = true;
goto retry_lookup;
}
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: [email protected] # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 42,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _archive_write_disk_free(struct archive *_a)
{
struct archive_write_disk *a;
int ret;
if (_a == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
archive_check_magic(_a, ARCHIVE_WRITE_DISK_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_ANY | ARCHIVE_STATE_FATAL, "archive_write_disk_free");
a = (struct archive_write_disk *)_a;
ret = _archive_write_disk_close(&a->archive);
archive_write_disk_set_group_lookup(&a->archive, NULL, NULL, NULL);
archive_write_disk_set_user_lookup(&a->archive, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (a->entry)
archive_entry_free(a->entry);
archive_string_free(&a->_name_data);
archive_string_free(&a->archive.error_string);
archive_string_free(&a->path_safe);
a->archive.magic = 0;
__archive_clean(&a->archive);
free(a->decmpfs_header_p);
free(a->resource_fork);
free(a->compressed_buffer);
free(a->uncompressed_buffer);
#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(UF_COMPRESSED) && defined(HAVE_SYS_XATTR_H)\
&& defined(HAVE_ZLIB_H)
if (a->stream_valid) {
switch (deflateEnd(&a->stream)) {
case Z_OK:
break;
default:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Failed to clean up compressor");
ret = ARCHIVE_FATAL;
break;
}
}
#endif
free(a);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 43,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LUALIB_API int luaopen_struct (lua_State *L) {
luaL_register(L, "struct", thislib);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Security: fix Lua struct package offset handling.
After the first fix to the struct package I found another similar
problem, which is fixed by this patch. It could be reproduced easily by
running the following script:
return struct.unpack('f', "xxxxxxxxxxxxx",-3)
The above will access bytes before the 'data' pointer.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 83,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PromoResourceService::RegisterPrefs(PrefService* local_state) {
local_state->RegisterIntegerPref(prefs::kNtpPromoVersion, 0);
local_state->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kNtpPromoLocale, std::string());
}
Commit Message: Refresh promo notifications as they're fetched
The "guard" existed for notification scheduling was preventing
"turn-off a promo" and "update a promo" scenarios.
Yet I do not believe it was adding any actual safety: if things
on a server backend go wrong, the clients will be affected one
way or the other, and it is better to have an option to shut
the malformed promo down "as quickly as possible" (~in 12-24 hours).
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10696204
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromePaymentRequestDelegate::ShowErrorMessage() {
if (dialog_)
dialog_->ShowErrorMessage();
}
Commit Message: [Payments] Prohibit opening payments UI in background tab.
Before this patch, calling PaymentRequest.show() would bring the
background window to the foreground, which allows a page to open a
pop-under.
This patch adds a check for the browser window being active (in
foreground) in PaymentRequest.show(). If the window is not active (in
background), then PaymentRequest.show() promise is rejected with
"AbortError: User cancelled request." No UI is shown in that case.
After this patch, calling PaymentRequest.show() does not bring the
background window to the foreground, thus preventing opening a pop-under.
Bug: 768230
Change-Id: I2b90f9086ceca5ed7b7bdf8045e44d7e99d566d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/681843
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504406}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void setJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceCachedValue(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface*>(thisObject);
TestSerializedScriptValueInterface* impl = static_cast<TestSerializedScriptValueInterface*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setCachedValue(SerializedScriptValue::create(exec, value));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const Extension* ExtensionService::LoadComponentExtension(
const ComponentExtensionInfo &info) {
JSONStringValueSerializer serializer(info.manifest);
scoped_ptr<Value> manifest(serializer.Deserialize(NULL, NULL));
if (!manifest.get()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to parse manifest for extension";
return NULL;
}
int flags = Extension::REQUIRE_KEY;
if (Extension::ShouldDoStrictErrorChecking(Extension::COMPONENT))
flags |= Extension::STRICT_ERROR_CHECKS;
std::string error;
scoped_refptr<const Extension> extension(Extension::Create(
info.root_directory,
Extension::COMPONENT,
*static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(manifest.get()),
flags,
&error));
if (!extension.get()) {
NOTREACHED() << error;
return NULL;
}
AddExtension(extension);
return extension;
}
Commit Message: Unrevert: Show the install dialog for the initial load of an unpacked extension
with plugins.
First landing broke some browser tests.
BUG=83273
TEST=in the extensions managmenet page, with developer mode enabled, Load an unpacked extension on an extension with NPAPI plugins. You should get an install dialog.
TBR=mihaip
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87738 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u32 hid_field_extract(const struct hid_device *hid, u8 *report,
unsigned offset, unsigned n)
{
if (n > 32) {
hid_warn(hid, "hid_field_extract() called with n (%d) > 32! (%s)\n",
n, current->comm);
n = 32;
}
return __extract(report, offset, n);
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 49,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dump_var_hash_as_event(gpointer k, gpointer v, gpointer ud) {
(void) ud;
uzbl_cmdprop *c = v;
GString *msg;
if(!c->dump)
return;
/* check for the variable type */
msg = g_string_new((char *)k);
if (c->type == TYPE_STR) {
g_string_append_printf(msg, " str %s", *c->ptr.s ? *c->ptr.s : " ");
} else if(c->type == TYPE_INT) {
g_string_append_printf(msg, " int %d", *c->ptr.i);
} else if (c->type == TYPE_FLOAT) {
g_string_append_printf(msg, " float %f", *c->ptr.f);
}
send_event(VARIABLE_SET, msg->str, NULL);
g_string_free(msg, TRUE);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostImpl::KeyPressListenersHandleEvent(
const NativeWebKeyboardEvent& event) {
if (event.skip_in_browser || event.type != WebKeyboardEvent::RawKeyDown)
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < key_press_event_callbacks_.size(); i++) {
size_t original_size = key_press_event_callbacks_.size();
if (key_press_event_callbacks_[i].Run(event))
return true;
size_t current_size = key_press_event_callbacks_.size();
if (current_size != original_size) {
DCHECK_EQ(original_size - 1, current_size);
--i;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exsltDateFormatDate (const exsltDateValDatePtr dt)
{
xmlChar buf[100], *cur = buf;
if ((dt == NULL) || !VALID_DATETIME(dt))
return NULL;
FORMAT_DATE(dt, cur);
if (dt->tz_flag || (dt->tzo != 0)) {
FORMAT_TZ(dt->tzo, cur);
}
*cur = 0;
return xmlStrdup(buf);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int aio_ring_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
vma->vm_ops = &generic_file_vm_ops;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: aio: fix kernel memory disclosure in io_getevents() introduced in v3.10
A kernel memory disclosure was introduced in aio_read_events_ring() in v3.10
by commit a31ad380bed817aa25f8830ad23e1a0480fef797. The changes made to
aio_read_events_ring() failed to correctly limit the index into
ctx->ring_pages[], allowing an attacked to cause the subsequent kmap() of
an arbitrary page with a copy_to_user() to copy the contents into userspace.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2014-0206. Thanks to Mateusz and
Petr for disclosing this issue.
This patch applies to v3.12+. A separate backport is needed for 3.10/3.11.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <[email protected]>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: | 0 | 39,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OVS_EXCLUDED(ofproto_mutex)
{
struct rule **orig_rules = rules;
if (*rules) {
struct ofproto *ofproto = rules[0]->ofproto;
unsigned long tables[BITMAP_N_LONGS(256)];
struct rule *rule;
size_t table_id;
memset(tables, 0, sizeof tables);
ovs_mutex_lock(&ofproto_mutex);
while ((rule = *rules++)) {
/* Defer once for each new table. This defers the subtable cleanup
* until later, so that when removing large number of flows the
* operation is faster. */
if (!bitmap_is_set(tables, rule->table_id)) {
struct classifier *cls = &ofproto->tables[rule->table_id].cls;
bitmap_set1(tables, rule->table_id);
classifier_defer(cls);
}
remove_rule_rcu__(rule);
}
BITMAP_FOR_EACH_1(table_id, 256, tables) {
struct classifier *cls = &ofproto->tables[table_id].cls;
classifier_publish(cls);
}
ovs_mutex_unlock(&ofproto_mutex);
}
free(orig_rules);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static_track_group_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
element e;
static_track_group_t *tg;
char* gname;
if (!strvec)
return;
if (vector_count(strvec) != 2) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "track_group must have a name - skipping");
skip_block(true);
return;
}
gname = strvec_slot(strvec, 1);
/* check group doesn't already exist */
LIST_FOREACH(vrrp_data->static_track_groups, tg, e) {
if (!strcmp(gname,tg->gname)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "track_group %s already defined", gname);
skip_block(true);
return;
}
}
alloc_static_track_group(gname);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 75,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SWFInput_getUInt32(SWFInput input)
{
unsigned long num = SWFInput_getChar(input);
num += SWFInput_getChar(input) << 8;
num += SWFInput_getChar(input) << 16;
num += SWFInput_getChar(input) << 24;
return num;
}
Commit Message: Fix left shift of a negative value in SWFInput_readSBits. Check for number before before left-shifting by (number-1).
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 89,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_sn2_setup_mappings(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long pte, rtc_phys_addr, map_addr;
int slot;
map_addr = KVM_VMM_BASE + (1UL << KVM_VMM_SHIFT);
rtc_phys_addr = LOCAL_MMR_OFFSET | SH_RTC;
pte = pte_val(mk_pte_phys(rtc_phys_addr, PAGE_KERNEL_UC));
slot = ia64_itr_entry(0x3, map_addr, pte, PAGE_SHIFT);
vcpu->arch.sn_rtc_tr_slot = slot;
if (slot < 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Mayday mayday! RTC mapping failed!\n");
slot = 0;
}
return slot;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TT_MulFix14_arm( FT_Int32 a,
FT_Int b )
{
FT_Int32 t, t2;
#if defined( __CC_ARM ) || defined( __ARMCC__ )
__asm
{
smull t2, t, b, a /* (lo=t2,hi=t) = a*b */
mov a, t, asr #31 /* a = (hi >> 31) */
add a, a, #0x2000 /* a += 0x2000 */
adds t2, t2, a /* t2 += a */
adc t, t, #0 /* t += carry */
mov a, t2, lsr #14 /* a = t2 >> 14 */
orr a, a, t, lsl #18 /* a |= t << 18 */
}
#elif defined( __GNUC__ )
__asm__ __volatile__ (
"smull %1, %2, %4, %3\n\t" /* (lo=%1,hi=%2) = a*b */
"mov %0, %2, asr #31\n\t" /* %0 = (hi >> 31) */
#if defined( __clang__ ) && defined( __thumb2__ )
"add.w %0, %0, #0x2000\n\t" /* %0 += 0x2000 */
#else
"add %0, %0, #0x2000\n\t" /* %0 += 0x2000 */
#endif
"adds %1, %1, %0\n\t" /* %1 += %0 */
"adc %2, %2, #0\n\t" /* %2 += carry */
"mov %0, %1, lsr #14\n\t" /* %0 = %1 >> 16 */
"orr %0, %0, %2, lsl #18\n\t" /* %0 |= %2 << 16 */
: "=r"(a), "=&r"(t2), "=&r"(t)
: "r"(a), "r"(b)
: "cc" );
#endif
return a;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
{
switch (sig_alg) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
#endif
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int srpt_check_stop_free(struct se_cmd *cmd)
{
struct srpt_send_ioctx *ioctx = container_of(cmd,
struct srpt_send_ioctx, cmd);
return target_put_sess_cmd(&ioctx->cmd);
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 50,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int BROTLI_NOINLINE SafeDecodeCommandBlockSwitch(BrotliState* s) {
return DecodeCommandBlockSwitchInternal(1, s);
}
Commit Message: Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold int init(AVFilterContext *ctx)
{
FPSContext *s = ctx->priv;
if (!(s->fifo = av_fifo_alloc(2*sizeof(AVFrame*))))
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
s->pts = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
s->first_pts = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "fps=%d/%d\n", s->framerate.num, s->framerate.den);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avfilter/vf_fps: make sure the fifo is not empty before using it
Fixes Ticket2905
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ImageLoader::HasPendingEvent() const {
if (image_content_ && !image_complete_ && !loading_image_document_)
return true;
if (pending_load_event_.IsActive() || pending_error_event_.IsActive())
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ucma_multicast* ucma_alloc_multicast(struct ucma_context *ctx)
{
struct ucma_multicast *mc;
mc = kzalloc(sizeof(*mc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mc)
return NULL;
mutex_lock(&mut);
mc->id = idr_alloc(&multicast_idr, mc, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
if (mc->id < 0)
goto error;
mc->ctx = ctx;
list_add_tail(&mc->list, &ctx->mc_list);
return mc;
error:
kfree(mc);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 169,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle GamepadProvider::GetSharedBufferHandle() {
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle = base::SharedMemory::DuplicateHandle(
gamepad_shared_buffer_->shared_memory()->handle());
return mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle(handle, sizeof(GamepadHardwareBuffer),
true /* read_only */);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 172,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutofillManager::AutofillManager(TabContentsWrapper* tab_contents)
: TabContentsObserver(tab_contents->tab_contents()),
tab_contents_wrapper_(tab_contents),
personal_data_(NULL),
download_manager_(tab_contents->profile()),
disable_download_manager_requests_(false),
metric_logger_(new AutofillMetrics),
has_logged_autofill_enabled_(false),
has_logged_address_suggestions_count_(false) {
DCHECK(tab_contents);
personal_data_ =
tab_contents->profile()->GetOriginalProfile()->GetPersonalDataManager();
download_manager_.SetObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int packet_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCOUTQ:
{
int amount = sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk);
return put_user(amount, (int __user *)arg);
}
case SIOCINQ:
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int amount = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (skb)
amount = skb->len;
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
return put_user(amount, (int __user *)arg);
}
case SIOCGSTAMP:
return sock_get_timestamp(sk, (struct timeval __user *)arg);
case SIOCGSTAMPNS:
return sock_get_timestampns(sk, (struct timespec __user *)arg);
#ifdef CONFIG_INET
case SIOCADDRT:
case SIOCDELRT:
case SIOCDARP:
case SIOCGARP:
case SIOCSARP:
case SIOCGIFADDR:
case SIOCSIFADDR:
case SIOCGIFBRDADDR:
case SIOCSIFBRDADDR:
case SIOCGIFNETMASK:
case SIOCSIFNETMASK:
case SIOCGIFDSTADDR:
case SIOCSIFDSTADDR:
case SIOCSIFFLAGS:
return inet_dgram_ops.ioctl(sock, cmd, arg);
#endif
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_packet: prevent information leak
In 2.6.27, commit 393e52e33c6c2 (packet: deliver VLAN TCI to userspace)
added a small information leak.
Add padding field and make sure its zeroed before copy to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HistoryModelWorker::CurrentThreadIsWorkThread() {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ipxitf_ioctl(unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
{
int rc = -EINVAL;
struct ifreq ifr;
int val;
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCSIFADDR: {
struct sockaddr_ipx *sipx;
struct ipx_interface_definition f;
rc = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ifr, arg, sizeof(ifr)))
break;
sipx = (struct sockaddr_ipx *)&ifr.ifr_addr;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (sipx->sipx_family != AF_IPX)
break;
f.ipx_network = sipx->sipx_network;
memcpy(f.ipx_device, ifr.ifr_name,
sizeof(f.ipx_device));
memcpy(f.ipx_node, sipx->sipx_node, IPX_NODE_LEN);
f.ipx_dlink_type = sipx->sipx_type;
f.ipx_special = sipx->sipx_special;
if (sipx->sipx_action == IPX_DLTITF)
rc = ipxitf_delete(&f);
else
rc = ipxitf_create(&f);
break;
}
case SIOCGIFADDR: {
struct sockaddr_ipx *sipx;
struct ipx_interface *ipxif;
struct net_device *dev;
rc = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ifr, arg, sizeof(ifr)))
break;
sipx = (struct sockaddr_ipx *)&ifr.ifr_addr;
dev = __dev_get_by_name(&init_net, ifr.ifr_name);
rc = -ENODEV;
if (!dev)
break;
ipxif = ipxitf_find_using_phys(dev,
ipx_map_frame_type(sipx->sipx_type));
rc = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!ipxif)
break;
sipx->sipx_family = AF_IPX;
sipx->sipx_network = ipxif->if_netnum;
memcpy(sipx->sipx_node, ipxif->if_node,
sizeof(sipx->sipx_node));
rc = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &ifr, sizeof(ifr)))
break;
ipxitf_put(ipxif);
rc = 0;
break;
}
case SIOCAIPXITFCRT:
rc = -EFAULT;
if (get_user(val, (unsigned char __user *) arg))
break;
rc = 0;
ipxcfg_auto_create_interfaces = val;
break;
case SIOCAIPXPRISLT:
rc = -EFAULT;
if (get_user(val, (unsigned char __user *) arg))
break;
rc = 0;
ipxcfg_set_auto_select(val);
break;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void TIFFSetEXIFProperties(TIFF *tiff,Image *image)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFREADEXIFDIRECTORY)
const char
*value;
register ssize_t
i;
uint32
offset;
/*
Write EXIF properties.
*/
offset=0;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBIFD,1,&offset);
for (i=0; exif_info[i].tag != 0; i++)
{
value=GetImageProperty(image,exif_info[i].property);
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
continue;
switch (exif_info[i].type)
{
case TIFF_ASCII:
{
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,exif_info[i].tag,value);
break;
}
case TIFF_SHORT:
{
uint16
field;
field=(uint16) StringToLong(value);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,exif_info[i].tag,field);
break;
}
case TIFF_LONG:
{
uint16
field;
field=(uint16) StringToLong(value);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,exif_info[i].tag,field);
break;
}
case TIFF_RATIONAL:
case TIFF_SRATIONAL:
{
float
field;
field=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,exif_info[i].tag,field);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
/* (void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_EXIFIFD,offset); */
#else
(void) tiff;
(void) image;
#endif
}
Commit Message: https://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=31161
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 69,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromotingInstance::OnConnectionState(
protocol::ConnectionToHost::State state,
protocol::ErrorCode error) {
scoped_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> data(new base::DictionaryValue());
data->SetString("state", ConnectionStateToString(state));
data->SetString("error", ConnectionErrorToString(error));
PostChromotingMessage("onConnectionStatus", data.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Restrict the Chromoting client plugin to use by extensions & apps.
BUG=160456
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11365276
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::SessionAbort(const Session& session) {
if (primary_session_id_ == session.id)
primary_session_id_ = kSessionIDInvalid;
DCHECK(session.recognizer.get());
session.recognizer->AbortRecognition();
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,319 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void dissect_hsdsch_common_channel_info(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
int offset, struct fp_info *p_fp_info,
void *data)
{
gboolean is_control_frame;
guint16 header_crc = 0;
proto_item * header_crc_pi = NULL;
guint header_length = 0;
/* Header CRC */
header_crc = tvb_get_bits8(tvb, 0, 7);
header_crc_pi = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_header_crc, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
/* Frame Type */
is_control_frame = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x01;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_ft, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, is_control_frame ? " [Control] " : " [Data] ");
if (is_control_frame) {
dissect_common_control(tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, p_fp_info);
/* For control frame the header CRC is actually frame CRC covering all
* bytes except the first */
if (preferences_header_checksum) {
verify_control_frame_crc(tvb, pinfo, header_crc_pi, header_crc);
}
}
else {
guint8 number_of_pdu_blocks;
gboolean drt_present = FALSE;
gboolean fach_present = FALSE;
guint16 user_buffer_size;
int n;
guint j;
#define MAX_PDU_BLOCKS 31
guint64 lchid[MAX_PDU_BLOCKS];
guint64 pdu_length[MAX_PDU_BLOCKS];
guint64 no_of_pdus[MAX_PDU_BLOCKS];
guint8 newieflags = 0;
umts_mac_info *macinf;
rlc_info *rlcinf;
rlcinf = (rlc_info *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_rlc, 0);
macinf = (umts_mac_info *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_umts_mac, 0);
/********************************/
/* HS-DCH type 2 data here */
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "(ehs)");
/* Frame Seq Nr (4 bits) */
if ((p_fp_info->release == 6) ||
(p_fp_info->release == 7)) {
guint8 frame_seq_no = (tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0xf0) >> 4;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_frame_seq_nr, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " seqno=%u", frame_seq_no);
}
/* CmCH-PI (4 bits) */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_cmch_pi, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
/* Total number of PDU blocks (5 bits) */
number_of_pdu_blocks = (tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) >> 3);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_total_pdu_blocks, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
if (p_fp_info->release == 7) {
/* Flush bit */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_flush, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
/* FSN/DRT reset bit */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_fsn_drt_reset, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
/* DRT Indicator */
drt_present = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x01;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_drt_indicator, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
}
offset++;
/* FACH Indicator flag */
fach_present = (tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x80) >> 7;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_fach_indicator, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
/* User buffer size */
user_buffer_size = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_user_buffer_size, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " User-Buffer-Size=%u", user_buffer_size);
/********************************************************************/
/* Now read number_of_pdu_blocks header entries */
for (n=0; n < number_of_pdu_blocks; n++) {
proto_item *pdu_block_header_ti;
proto_tree *pdu_block_header_tree;
int block_header_start_offset = offset;
/* Add PDU block header subtree */
pdu_block_header_ti = proto_tree_add_string_format(tree, hf_fp_hsdsch_pdu_block_header,
tvb, offset, 0,
"",
"PDU Block Header");
pdu_block_header_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(pdu_block_header_ti,
ett_fp_hsdsch_pdu_block_header);
/* MAC-d/c PDU length in this block (11 bits) */
proto_tree_add_bits_ret_val(pdu_block_header_tree, hf_fp_pdu_length_in_block, tvb,
(offset*8) + ((n % 2) ? 4 : 0), 11,
&pdu_length[n], ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
if ((n % 2) == 0)
offset++;
else
offset += 2;
/* # PDUs in this block (4 bits) */
proto_tree_add_bits_ret_val(pdu_block_header_tree, hf_fp_pdus_in_block, tvb,
(offset*8) + ((n % 2) ? 0 : 4), 4,
&no_of_pdus[n], ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
if ((n % 2) == 0) {
offset++;
}
/* Logical channel ID in block (4 bits) */
proto_tree_add_bits_ret_val(pdu_block_header_tree, hf_fp_lchid, tvb,
(offset*8) + ((n % 2) ? 4 : 0), 4,
&lchid[n], ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
if ((n % 2) == 1) {
offset++;
}
else {
if (n == (number_of_pdu_blocks-1)) {
/* Byte is padded out for last block */
offset++;
}
}
/* Append summary to header tree root */
proto_item_append_text(pdu_block_header_ti,
" (lch:%u, %u pdus of %u bytes)",
(guint16)lchid[n],
(guint16)no_of_pdus[n],
(guint16)pdu_length[n]);
/* Set length of header tree item */
if (((n % 2) == 0) && (n < (number_of_pdu_blocks-1))) {
proto_item_set_len(pdu_block_header_ti,
offset - block_header_start_offset+1);
}
else {
proto_item_set_len(pdu_block_header_ti,
offset - block_header_start_offset);
}
}
if (header_length == 0) {
header_length = offset;
}
/**********************************************/
/* Optional fields indicated by earlier flags */
if (drt_present) {
/* DRT */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_drt, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
}
if (fach_present) {
/* H-RNTI: */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_hrnti, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
/* RACH Measurement Result */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_rach_measurement_result, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
}
/********************************************************************/
/* Now read the MAC-d/c PDUs for each block using info from headers */
for (n=0; n < number_of_pdu_blocks; n++) {
tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
for (j=0; j<no_of_pdus[n]; j++) {
/* If all bits are set, then this is BCCH or PCCH according to: 25.435 paragraph: 6.2.7.31 */
if (lchid[n] == 0xF) {
/* In the very few test cases I've seen, this seems to be
* BCCH with transparent MAC layer. Therefore skip right to
* rlc_bcch and hope for the best. */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_length(tvb, offset, (gint)pdu_length[n]);
call_dissector_with_data(rlc_bcch_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, top_level_tree, data);
offset += (gint)pdu_length[n];
} else { /* Else go for CCCH UM, this seems to work. */
p_fp_info->hsdsch_entity = ehs; /* HSDSCH type 2 */
/* TODO: use cur_tb or subnum everywhere. */
p_fp_info->cur_tb = j; /* set cur_tb for MAC */
pinfo->fd->subnum = j; /* set subframe number for RRC */
macinf->content[j] = MAC_CONTENT_CCCH;
macinf->lchid[j] = (guint8)lchid[n]+1; /*Add 1 since it is zero indexed? */
macinf->macdflow_id[j] = p_fp_info->hsdsch_macflowd_id;
macinf->ctmux[j] = FALSE;
rlcinf->li_size[j] = RLC_LI_7BITS;
rlcinf->ciphered[j] = FALSE;
rlcinf->deciphered[j] = FALSE;
rlcinf->rbid[j] = (guint8)lchid[n]+1;
rlcinf->urnti[j] = p_fp_info->channel; /*We need to fake urnti*/
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_length(tvb, offset, (gint)pdu_length[n]);
call_dissector_with_data(mac_fdd_hsdsch_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, top_level_tree, data);
offset += (gint)pdu_length[n];
}
}
}
/* New IE Flags */
newieflags = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
/* If newieflags == 0000 0010 then this indicates that there is a
* HS-DSCH physical layer category and no other New IE flags. */
if (newieflags == 2) {
/* HS-DSCH physical layer category presence bit. */
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_fp_hsdsch_new_ie_flag[6], tvb, offset, 1, newieflags);
offset++;
/* HS-DSCH physical layer category. */
proto_tree_add_bits_item(tree, hf_fp_hsdsch_physical_layer_category, tvb, offset*8, 6, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
}
if (preferences_header_checksum) {
verify_header_crc(tvb, pinfo, header_crc_pi, header_crc, header_length);
}
/* Spare Extension and Payload CRC */
dissect_spare_extension_and_crc(tvb, pinfo, tree, 1, offset, header_length);
}
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 51,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DevToolsWindow* DevToolsWindow::Create(
Profile* profile,
const GURL& frontend_url,
content::WebContents* inspected_web_contents,
bool shared_worker_frontend,
bool v8_only_frontend,
const std::string& remote_frontend,
bool can_dock,
const std::string& settings,
const std::string& panel) {
if (profile->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kDevToolsDisabled) ||
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kKioskMode))
return nullptr;
if (inspected_web_contents) {
Browser* browser = NULL;
int tab;
if (!FindInspectedBrowserAndTabIndex(inspected_web_contents,
&browser, &tab) ||
browser->is_type_popup()) {
can_dock = false;
}
}
GURL url(GetDevToolsURL(profile, frontend_url, shared_worker_frontend,
v8_only_frontend, remote_frontend, can_dock, panel));
std::unique_ptr<WebContents> main_web_contents(
WebContents::Create(WebContents::CreateParams(profile)));
main_web_contents->GetController().LoadURL(
DecorateFrontendURL(url), content::Referrer(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL, std::string());
DevToolsUIBindings* bindings =
DevToolsUIBindings::ForWebContents(main_web_contents.get());
if (!bindings)
return nullptr;
if (!settings.empty())
SetPreferencesFromJson(profile, settings);
return new DevToolsWindow(profile, main_web_contents.release(), bindings,
inspected_web_contents, can_dock);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 138,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CustomButton* CustomButton::AsCustomButton(views::View* view) {
if (view) {
const char* classname = view->GetClassName();
if (!strcmp(classname, Checkbox::kViewClassName) ||
!strcmp(classname, CustomButton::kViewClassName) ||
!strcmp(classname, ImageButton::kViewClassName) ||
!strcmp(classname, LabelButton::kViewClassName) ||
!strcmp(classname, RadioButton::kViewClassName) ||
!strcmp(classname, MenuButton::kViewClassName)) {
return static_cast<CustomButton*>(view);
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Custom buttons should only handle accelerators when focused.
BUG=541415
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1437523005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360130}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltGatherNamespaces(xsltStylesheetPtr style) {
xmlNodePtr cur;
const xmlChar *URI;
if (style == NULL)
return;
/*
* TODO: basically if the stylesheet uses the same prefix for different
* patterns, well they may be in problem, hopefully they will get
* a warning first.
*/
/*
* TODO: Eliminate the use of the hash for XPath expressions.
* An expression should be evaluated in the context of the in-scope
* namespaces; eliminate the restriction of an XML document to contain
* no duplicate prefixes for different namespace names.
*
*/
cur = xmlDocGetRootElement(style->doc);
while (cur != NULL) {
if (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
xmlNsPtr ns = cur->nsDef;
while (ns != NULL) {
if (ns->prefix != NULL) {
if (style->nsHash == NULL) {
style->nsHash = xmlHashCreate(10);
if (style->nsHash == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"xsltGatherNamespaces: failed to create hash table\n");
style->errors++;
return;
}
}
URI = xmlHashLookup(style->nsHash, ns->prefix);
if ((URI != NULL) && (!xmlStrEqual(URI, ns->href))) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"Namespaces prefix %s used for multiple namespaces\n",ns->prefix);
style->warnings++;
} else if (URI == NULL) {
xmlHashUpdateEntry(style->nsHash, ns->prefix,
(void *) ns->href, (xmlHashDeallocator)xmlFree);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PARSING
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Added namespace: %s mapped to %s\n", ns->prefix, ns->href);
#endif
}
}
ns = ns->next;
}
}
/*
* Skip to next node
*/
if (cur->children != NULL) {
if (cur->children->type != XML_ENTITY_DECL) {
cur = cur->children;
continue;
}
}
if (cur->next != NULL) {
cur = cur->next;
continue;
}
do {
cur = cur->parent;
if (cur == NULL)
break;
if (cur == (xmlNodePtr) style->doc) {
cur = NULL;
break;
}
if (cur->next != NULL) {
cur = cur->next;
break;
}
} while (cur != NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btsock_thread_create(btsock_signaled_cb callback, btsock_cmd_cb cmd_callback)
{
asrt(callback || cmd_callback);
pthread_mutex_lock(&thread_slot_lock);
int h = alloc_thread_slot();
pthread_mutex_unlock(&thread_slot_lock);
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("alloc_thread_slot ret:%d", h);
if(h >= 0)
{
init_poll(h);
pthread_t thread;
int status = create_thread(sock_poll_thread, (void*)(uintptr_t)h, &thread);
if (status)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("create_thread failed: %s", strerror(status));
free_thread_slot(h);
return -1;
}
ts[h].thread_id = thread;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("h:%d, thread id:%d", h, ts[h].thread_id);
ts[h].callback = callback;
ts[h].cmd_callback = cmd_callback;
}
return h;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __btrfs_submit_bio_start(struct inode *inode, int rw,
struct bio *bio, int mirror_num,
unsigned long bio_flags,
u64 bio_offset)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
int ret = 0;
ret = btrfs_csum_one_bio(root, inode, bio, 0, 0);
BUG_ON(ret); /* -ENOMEM */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_async_msg_type_to_string(enum ofputil_async_msg_type type)
{
switch (type) {
case OAM_PACKET_IN: return "PACKET_IN";
case OAM_PORT_STATUS: return "PORT_STATUS";
case OAM_FLOW_REMOVED: return "FLOW_REMOVED";
case OAM_ROLE_STATUS: return "ROLE_STATUS";
case OAM_TABLE_STATUS: return "TABLE_STATUS";
case OAM_REQUESTFORWARD: return "REQUESTFORWARD";
case OAM_N_TYPES:
default:
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MetricsLog::IndependentMetricsLoader::IndependentMetricsLoader(
std::unique_ptr<MetricsLog> log)
: log_(std::move(log)),
flattener_(new IndependentFlattener(log_.get())),
snapshot_manager_(new base::HistogramSnapshotManager(flattener_.get())) {}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fmov_reg_dec(struct sh_fpu_soft_struct *fregs, struct pt_regs *regs, int m,
int n)
{
if (FPSCR_SZ) {
FMOV_EXT(m);
Rn -= 8;
WRITE(FRm, Rn + 4);
m++;
WRITE(FRm, Rn);
} else {
Rn -= 4;
WRITE(FRm, Rn);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: remove_reserved_job(conn c, job j)
{
return remove_this_reserved_job(c, find_reserved_job_in_conn(c, j));
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContextState::RestoreUnpackState() const {
api()->glPixelStoreiFn(GL_UNPACK_ALIGNMENT, unpack_alignment);
if (bound_pixel_unpack_buffer.get()) {
api()->glBindBufferFn(GL_PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER,
GetBufferId(bound_pixel_unpack_buffer.get()));
api()->glPixelStoreiFn(GL_UNPACK_ROW_LENGTH, unpack_row_length);
api()->glPixelStoreiFn(GL_UNPACK_IMAGE_HEIGHT, unpack_image_height);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 150,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RootWindowHostLinux::IsWindowManagerPresent() {
return XGetSelectionOwner(
xdisplay_,
X11AtomCache::GetInstance()->GetAtom(ui::ATOM_WM_S0)) != None;
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: update_info_in_idle (Device *device)
{
UpdateInfoInIdleData *data;
data = g_new0 (UpdateInfoInIdleData, 1);
data->device = device;
data->idle_id = g_idle_add_full (G_PRIORITY_HIGH_IDLE,
update_info_in_idle_cb,
data,
(GDestroyNotify) update_info_in_idle_data_free);
g_object_weak_ref (G_OBJECT (device), update_info_in_idle_device_unreffed, data);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void log_access(request * req)
{
if (!access_log_name)
return;
if (virtualhost) {
printf("%s ", req->local_ip_addr);
} else if (vhost_root) {
printf("%s ", (req->host ? req->host : "(null)"));
}
print_remote_ip (req, stdout);
printf(" - - %s\"%s\" %d %zu \"%s\" \"%s\"\n",
get_commonlog_time(),
req->logline ? req->logline : "-",
req->response_status,
req->bytes_written,
(req->header_referer ? req->header_referer : "-"),
(req->header_user_agent ? req->header_user_agent : "-"));
}
Commit Message: misc oom and possible memory leak fix
CWE ID: | 0 | 91,842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *defParams =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
if (defParams->nPortIndex >= mPorts.size()
|| defParams->nSize
!= sizeof(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
const PortInfo *port =
&mPorts.itemAt(defParams->nPortIndex);
memcpy(defParams, &port->mDef, sizeof(port->mDef));
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
old_browser_client_ = content::GetContentClient()->browser();
content::GetContentClient()->set_browser(&browser_client_);
url_util::AddStandardScheme(kPrivilegedScheme);
url_util::AddStandardScheme(chrome::kChromeUIScheme);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 171,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lua_access_checker_harness(request_rec *r)
{
return lua_request_rec_hook_harness(r, "access_checker", APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SendAutomationJSONRequest(AutomationMessageSender* sender,
const std::string& request,
int timeout_ms,
std::string* reply,
bool* success) {
return sender->Send(new AutomationMsg_SendJSONRequest(
-1, request, reply, success), timeout_ms);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::IsMouseFocusable() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit crypto_cmac_module_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_cmac_tmpl);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_open_and_get_state(struct nfs4_opendata *opendata,
fmode_t fmode,
int flags,
struct nfs_open_context *ctx)
{
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp = opendata->owner;
struct nfs_server *server = sp->so_server;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct nfs4_state *state;
unsigned int seq;
int ret;
seq = raw_seqcount_begin(&sp->so_reclaim_seqcount);
ret = _nfs4_proc_open(opendata);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
state = nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(opendata);
ret = PTR_ERR(state);
if (IS_ERR(state))
goto out;
if (server->caps & NFS_CAP_POSIX_LOCK)
set_bit(NFS_STATE_POSIX_LOCKS, &state->flags);
dentry = opendata->dentry;
if (d_really_is_negative(dentry)) {
/* FIXME: Is this d_drop() ever needed? */
d_drop(dentry);
dentry = d_add_unique(dentry, igrab(state->inode));
if (dentry == NULL) {
dentry = opendata->dentry;
} else if (dentry != ctx->dentry) {
dput(ctx->dentry);
ctx->dentry = dget(dentry);
}
nfs_set_verifier(dentry,
nfs_save_change_attribute(d_inode(opendata->dir)));
}
ret = nfs4_opendata_access(sp->so_cred, opendata, state, fmode, flags);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
ctx->state = state;
if (d_inode(dentry) == state->inode) {
nfs_inode_attach_open_context(ctx);
if (read_seqcount_retry(&sp->so_reclaim_seqcount, seq))
nfs4_schedule_stateid_recovery(server, state);
}
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: [email protected] # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __hwahc_op_mmcie_rm(struct wusbhc *wusbhc, u8 handle)
{
struct hwahc *hwahc = container_of(wusbhc, struct hwahc, wusbhc);
struct wahc *wa = &hwahc->wa;
u8 iface_no = wa->usb_iface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber;
return usb_control_msg(wa->usb_dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(wa->usb_dev, 0),
WUSB_REQ_REMOVE_MMC_IE,
USB_DIR_OUT | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
0, handle << 8 | iface_no,
NULL, 0, USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 75,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaintPatcher::RefPatch() {
if (refcount_ == 0) {
DCHECK(!begin_paint_.is_patched());
DCHECK(!end_paint_.is_patched());
begin_paint_.Patch(L"riched20.dll", "user32.dll", "BeginPaint",
&BeginPaintIntercept);
end_paint_.Patch(L"riched20.dll", "user32.dll", "EndPaint",
&EndPaintIntercept);
}
++refcount_;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::ScanningClient::RunRequestScanningStartCallback(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult result) {
if (result == blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SUCCESS) {
auto scanning_result =
blink::mojom::RequestScanningStartResult::NewOptions(options_.Clone());
std::move(callback_).Run(std::move(scanning_result));
} else if (result == blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SCANNING_BLOCKED ||
result == blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::PROMPT_CANCELED) {
auto scanning_result =
blink::mojom::RequestScanningStartResult::NewErrorResult(result);
std::move(callback_).Run(std::move(scanning_result));
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int PKCS7_type_is_other(PKCS7 *p7)
{
int isOther = 1;
int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
switch (nid) {
case NID_pkcs7_data:
case NID_pkcs7_signed:
case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
case NID_pkcs7_digest:
case NID_pkcs7_encrypted:
isOther = 0;
break;
default:
isOther = 1;
}
return isOther;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OfflinePageModelTaskified::AddObserver(Observer* observer) {
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void dumpInnerHTML(WebCore::HTMLElement* element)
{
printf("%s\n", element->innerHTML().ascii().data());
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptValue WebGLRenderingContextBase::GetBooleanArrayParameter(
ScriptState* script_state,
GLenum pname) {
if (pname != GL_COLOR_WRITEMASK) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return WebGLAny(script_state, 0, 0);
}
GLboolean value[4] = {0};
if (!isContextLost())
ContextGL()->GetBooleanv(pname, value);
bool bool_value[4];
for (int ii = 0; ii < 4; ++ii)
bool_value[ii] = static_cast<bool>(value[ii]);
return WebGLAny(script_state, bool_value, 4);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProtoVector> GDataDirectory::ToProtoVector() const {
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProtoVector> entries(new GDataEntryProtoVector);
for (GDataFileCollection::const_iterator iter = child_files().begin();
iter != child_files().end(); ++iter) {
GDataEntryProto proto;
iter->second->ToProto(&proto);
entries->push_back(proto);
}
for (GDataDirectoryCollection::const_iterator iter =
child_directories().begin();
iter != child_directories().end(); ++iter) {
GDataEntryProto proto;
static_cast<const GDataEntry*>(iter->second)->ToProtoFull(&proto);
entries->push_back(proto);
}
return entries.Pass();
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err iSLT_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_ISMACrypSaltBox *p = (GF_ISMACrypSaltBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "ISMACrypSaltBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "salt=\""LLU"\">\n", p->salt);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("ISMACrypSaltBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int qcow2_expand_zero_clusters(BlockDriverState *bs)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
uint64_t *l1_table = NULL;
uint64_t nb_clusters;
uint8_t *expanded_clusters;
int ret;
int i, j;
nb_clusters = size_to_clusters(s, bs->file->total_sectors *
BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
expanded_clusters = g_malloc0((nb_clusters + 7) / 8);
ret = expand_zero_clusters_in_l1(bs, s->l1_table, s->l1_size,
&expanded_clusters, &nb_clusters);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
/* Inactive L1 tables may point to active L2 tables - therefore it is
* necessary to flush the L2 table cache before trying to access the L2
* tables pointed to by inactive L1 entries (else we might try to expand
* zero clusters that have already been expanded); furthermore, it is also
* necessary to empty the L2 table cache, since it may contain tables which
* are now going to be modified directly on disk, bypassing the cache.
* qcow2_cache_empty() does both for us. */
ret = qcow2_cache_empty(bs, s->l2_table_cache);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_snapshots; i++) {
int l1_sectors = (s->snapshots[i].l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t) +
BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE - 1) / BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE;
l1_table = g_realloc(l1_table, l1_sectors * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
ret = bdrv_read(bs->file, s->snapshots[i].l1_table_offset /
BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE, (void *)l1_table, l1_sectors);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
for (j = 0; j < s->snapshots[i].l1_size; j++) {
be64_to_cpus(&l1_table[j]);
}
ret = expand_zero_clusters_in_l1(bs, l1_table, s->snapshots[i].l1_size,
&expanded_clusters, &nb_clusters);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
}
ret = 0;
fail:
g_free(expanded_clusters);
g_free(l1_table);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(nl_langinfo)
{
zend_long item;
char *value;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "l", &item) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
switch(item) { /* {{{ */
#ifdef ABDAY_1
case ABDAY_1:
case ABDAY_2:
case ABDAY_3:
case ABDAY_4:
case ABDAY_5:
case ABDAY_6:
case ABDAY_7:
#endif
#ifdef DAY_1
case DAY_1:
case DAY_2:
case DAY_3:
case DAY_4:
case DAY_5:
case DAY_6:
case DAY_7:
#endif
#ifdef ABMON_1
case ABMON_1:
case ABMON_2:
case ABMON_3:
case ABMON_4:
case ABMON_5:
case ABMON_6:
case ABMON_7:
case ABMON_8:
case ABMON_9:
case ABMON_10:
case ABMON_11:
case ABMON_12:
#endif
#ifdef MON_1
case MON_1:
case MON_2:
case MON_3:
case MON_4:
case MON_5:
case MON_6:
case MON_7:
case MON_8:
case MON_9:
case MON_10:
case MON_11:
case MON_12:
#endif
#ifdef AM_STR
case AM_STR:
#endif
#ifdef PM_STR
case PM_STR:
#endif
#ifdef D_T_FMT
case D_T_FMT:
#endif
#ifdef D_FMT
case D_FMT:
#endif
#ifdef T_FMT
case T_FMT:
#endif
#ifdef T_FMT_AMPM
case T_FMT_AMPM:
#endif
#ifdef ERA
case ERA:
#endif
#ifdef ERA_YEAR
case ERA_YEAR:
#endif
#ifdef ERA_D_T_FMT
case ERA_D_T_FMT:
#endif
#ifdef ERA_D_FMT
case ERA_D_FMT:
#endif
#ifdef ERA_T_FMT
case ERA_T_FMT:
#endif
#ifdef ALT_DIGITS
case ALT_DIGITS:
#endif
#ifdef INT_CURR_SYMBOL
case INT_CURR_SYMBOL:
#endif
#ifdef CURRENCY_SYMBOL
case CURRENCY_SYMBOL:
#endif
#ifdef CRNCYSTR
case CRNCYSTR:
#endif
#ifdef MON_DECIMAL_POINT
case MON_DECIMAL_POINT:
#endif
#ifdef MON_THOUSANDS_SEP
case MON_THOUSANDS_SEP:
#endif
#ifdef MON_GROUPING
case MON_GROUPING:
#endif
#ifdef POSITIVE_SIGN
case POSITIVE_SIGN:
#endif
#ifdef NEGATIVE_SIGN
case NEGATIVE_SIGN:
#endif
#ifdef INT_FRAC_DIGITS
case INT_FRAC_DIGITS:
#endif
#ifdef FRAC_DIGITS
case FRAC_DIGITS:
#endif
#ifdef P_CS_PRECEDES
case P_CS_PRECEDES:
#endif
#ifdef P_SEP_BY_SPACE
case P_SEP_BY_SPACE:
#endif
#ifdef N_CS_PRECEDES
case N_CS_PRECEDES:
#endif
#ifdef N_SEP_BY_SPACE
case N_SEP_BY_SPACE:
#endif
#ifdef P_SIGN_POSN
case P_SIGN_POSN:
#endif
#ifdef N_SIGN_POSN
case N_SIGN_POSN:
#endif
#ifdef DECIMAL_POINT
case DECIMAL_POINT:
#elif defined(RADIXCHAR)
case RADIXCHAR:
#endif
#ifdef THOUSANDS_SEP
case THOUSANDS_SEP:
#elif defined(THOUSEP)
case THOUSEP:
#endif
#ifdef GROUPING
case GROUPING:
#endif
#ifdef YESEXPR
case YESEXPR:
#endif
#ifdef NOEXPR
case NOEXPR:
#endif
#ifdef YESSTR
case YESSTR:
#endif
#ifdef NOSTR
case NOSTR:
#endif
#ifdef CODESET
case CODESET:
#endif
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Item '" ZEND_LONG_FMT "' is not valid", item);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* }}} */
value = nl_langinfo(item);
if (value == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
RETURN_STRING(value);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 14,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AppCacheHost::AppCacheHost(int host_id, AppCacheFrontend* frontend,
AppCacheServiceImpl* service)
: host_id_(host_id),
spawning_host_id_(kAppCacheNoHostId), spawning_process_id_(0),
parent_host_id_(kAppCacheNoHostId), parent_process_id_(0),
pending_main_resource_cache_id_(kAppCacheNoCacheId),
pending_selected_cache_id_(kAppCacheNoCacheId),
was_select_cache_called_(false),
is_cache_selection_enabled_(true),
frontend_(frontend), service_(service),
storage_(service->storage()),
pending_callback_param_(NULL),
main_resource_was_namespace_entry_(false),
main_resource_blocked_(false),
associated_cache_info_pending_(false) {
service_->AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint::CreateURLLoaderFactory() {
return blink::Platform::Current()->CreateDefaultURLLoaderFactory();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PrintWebViewHelperTestBase() {}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewViews::GetAccessibleNodeData(ui::AXNodeData* node_data) {
node_data->role = ui::AX_ROLE_TEXT_FIELD;
node_data->SetName(l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_ACCNAME_LOCATION));
node_data->SetValue(GetText());
node_data->html_attributes.push_back(std::make_pair("type", "url"));
base::string16::size_type entry_start;
base::string16::size_type entry_end;
if (saved_selection_for_focus_change_.IsValid()) {
entry_start = saved_selection_for_focus_change_.start();
entry_end = saved_selection_for_focus_change_.end();
} else {
GetSelectionBounds(&entry_start, &entry_end);
}
node_data->AddIntAttribute(ui::AX_ATTR_TEXT_SEL_START, entry_start);
node_data->AddIntAttribute(ui::AX_ATTR_TEXT_SEL_END, entry_end);
if (popup_window_mode_) {
node_data->AddIntAttribute(ui::AX_ATTR_RESTRICTION,
ui::AX_RESTRICTION_READ_ONLY);
} else {
node_data->AddState(ui::AX_STATE_EDITABLE);
}
}
Commit Message: Strip JavaScript schemas on Linux text drop
When dropping text onto the Omnibox, any leading JavaScript schemes
should be stripped to avoid a "self-XSS" attack. This stripping already
occurs in all cases except when plaintext is dropped on Linux. This CL
corrects that oversight.
Bug: 768910
Change-Id: I43af24ace4a13cf61d15a32eb9382dcdd498a062
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/685638
Reviewed-by: Justin Donnelly <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504695}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 150,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t push_ucs2(void *dest, const char *src, size_t dest_len, int flags)
{
size_t len=0;
size_t src_len = strlen(src);
size_t size = 0;
bool ret;
if (flags & STR_UPPER) {
char *tmpbuf = strupper_talloc(NULL, src);
ssize_t retval;
if (tmpbuf == NULL) {
return -1;
}
retval = push_ucs2(dest, tmpbuf, dest_len, flags & ~STR_UPPER);
talloc_free(tmpbuf);
return retval;
}
if (flags & STR_TERMINATE)
src_len++;
if (ucs2_align(NULL, dest, flags)) {
*(char *)dest = 0;
dest = (void *)((char *)dest + 1);
if (dest_len) dest_len--;
len++;
}
/* ucs2 is always a multiple of 2 bytes */
dest_len &= ~1;
ret = convert_string(CH_UNIX, CH_UTF16, src, src_len, dest, dest_len, &size);
if (ret == false) {
return 0;
}
len += size;
return (ssize_t)len;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,298 |
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