instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
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Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btrfs_find_actor(struct inode *inode, void *opaque)
{
struct btrfs_iget_args *args = opaque;
return args->location->objectid == BTRFS_I(inode)->location.objectid &&
args->root == BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetShaderSource(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::GetShaderSource& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::GetShaderSource*>(cmd_data);
GLuint shader_id = c.shader;
uint32_t bucket_id = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.bucket_id);
Bucket* bucket = CreateBucket(bucket_id);
Shader* shader = GetShaderInfoNotProgram(shader_id, "glGetShaderSource");
if (!shader || shader->source().empty()) {
bucket->SetSize(0);
return error::kNoError;
}
bucket->SetFromString(shader->source().c_str());
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gsf_infile_tar_constructor (GType type,
guint n_construct_properties,
GObjectConstructParam *construct_params)
{
GsfInfileTar *tar = (GsfInfileTar *)
(parent_class->constructor (type,
n_construct_properties,
construct_params));
if (tar->source)
tar_init_info (tar);
return (GObject *)tar;
}
Commit Message: tar: fix crash on broken tar file.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 47,703 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AtomicString& TextTrack::ChaptersKeyword() {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(const AtomicString, chapters, ("chapters"));
return chapters;
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_address_from_payload(tor_addr_t *addr_out, const uint8_t *payload,
int payload_len)
{
if (payload_len < 2)
return NULL;
if (payload_len < 2+payload[1])
return NULL;
switch (payload[0]) {
case RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4:
if (payload[1] != 4)
return NULL;
tor_addr_from_ipv4n(addr_out, get_uint32(payload+2));
break;
case RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6:
if (payload[1] != 16)
return NULL;
tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(addr_out, (char*)(payload+2));
break;
default:
tor_addr_make_unspec(addr_out);
break;
}
return payload + 2 + payload[1];
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 69,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: keepalived_running(unsigned long mode)
{
if (process_running(main_pidfile))
return true;
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
if (__test_bit(DAEMON_VRRP, &mode) && process_running(vrrp_pidfile))
return true;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
if (__test_bit(DAEMON_CHECKERS, &mode) && process_running(checkers_pidfile))
return true;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
if (__test_bit(DAEMON_BFD, &mode) && process_running(bfd_pidfile))
return true;
#endif
return false;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 75,917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool is_device_path(const char *path) {
/* Returns true on paths that refer to a device, either in
* sysfs or in /dev */
return
path_startswith(path, "/dev/") ||
path_startswith(path, "/sys/");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebLocalFrameImpl::WebLocalFrameImpl(
WebRemoteFrame* old_web_frame,
WebLocalFrameClient* client,
blink::InterfaceRegistry* interface_registry)
: WebLocalFrameImpl(old_web_frame->InShadowTree()
? WebTreeScopeType::kShadow
: WebTreeScopeType::kDocument,
client,
interface_registry) {}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: store_read_imp(png_store *ps, png_bytep pb, png_size_t st)
{
if (ps->current == NULL || ps->next == NULL)
png_error(ps->pread, "store state damaged");
while (st > 0)
{
size_t cbAvail = store_read_buffer_size(ps) - ps->readpos;
if (cbAvail > 0)
{
if (cbAvail > st) cbAvail = st;
memcpy(pb, ps->next->buffer + ps->readpos, cbAvail);
st -= cbAvail;
pb += cbAvail;
ps->readpos += cbAvail;
}
else if (!store_read_buffer_next(ps))
png_error(ps->pread, "read beyond end of file");
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ReadonlyEventTargetOrNullAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueFast(info, WTF::GetPtr(impl->readonlyEventTargetOrNullAttribute()), impl);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: flatpak_proxy_set_property (GObject *object,
guint prop_id,
const GValue *value,
GParamSpec *pspec)
{
FlatpakProxy *proxy = FLATPAK_PROXY (object);
switch (prop_id)
{
case PROP_DBUS_ADDRESS:
proxy->dbus_address = g_value_dup_string (value);
break;
case PROP_SOCKET_PATH:
proxy->socket_path = g_value_dup_string (value);
break;
default:
G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID (object, prop_id, pspec);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 84,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlStringDecodeEntities(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *str, int what,
xmlChar end, xmlChar end2, xmlChar end3) {
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (str == NULL)) return(NULL);
return(xmlStringLenDecodeEntities(ctxt, str, xmlStrlen(str), what,
end, end2, end3));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_dec_cp_prepare(jpc_dec_cp_t *cp)
{
jpc_dec_ccp_t *ccp;
int compno;
int i;
for (compno = 0, ccp = cp->ccps; compno < cp->numcomps;
++compno, ++ccp) {
if (!(ccp->csty & JPC_COX_PRT)) {
for (i = 0; i < JPC_MAXRLVLS; ++i) {
ccp->prcwidthexpns[i] = 15;
ccp->prcheightexpns[i] = 15;
}
}
if (ccp->qsty == JPC_QCX_SIQNT) {
calcstepsizes(ccp->stepsizes[0], ccp->numrlvls, ccp->stepsizes);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t btrfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
void *buffer, size_t size)
{
/*
* If this is a request for a synthetic attribute in the system.*
* namespace use the generic infrastructure to resolve a handler
* for it via sb->s_xattr.
*/
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN))
return generic_getxattr(dentry, name, buffer, size);
if (!btrfs_is_valid_xattr(name))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return __btrfs_getxattr(dentry->d_inode, name, buffer, size);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 45,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionRegistry::AddDisabled(
const scoped_refptr<const Extension>& extension) {
return disabled_extensions_.Insert(extension);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MYSQLND_METHOD(mysqlnd_conn_data, list_fields)(MYSQLND_CONN_DATA * conn, const char *table, const char *achtung_wild TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t this_func = STRUCT_OFFSET(struct st_mysqlnd_conn_data_methods, list_fields);
/* db + \0 + wild + \0 (for wild) */
zend_uchar buff[MYSQLND_MAX_ALLOWED_DB_LEN * 2 + 1 + 1], *p;
size_t table_len, wild_len;
MYSQLND_RES * result = NULL;
DBG_ENTER("mysqlnd_conn_data::list_fields");
DBG_INF_FMT("conn=%llu table=%s wild=%s", conn->thread_id, table? table:"",achtung_wild? achtung_wild:"");
if (PASS == conn->m->local_tx_start(conn, this_func TSRMLS_CC)) {
do {
p = buff;
if (table && (table_len = strlen(table))) {
size_t to_copy = MIN(table_len, MYSQLND_MAX_ALLOWED_DB_LEN);
memcpy(p, table, to_copy);
p += to_copy;
*p++ = '\0';
}
if (achtung_wild && (wild_len = strlen(achtung_wild))) {
size_t to_copy = MIN(wild_len, MYSQLND_MAX_ALLOWED_DB_LEN);
memcpy(p, achtung_wild, to_copy);
p += to_copy;
*p++ = '\0';
}
if (PASS != conn->m->simple_command(conn, COM_FIELD_LIST, buff, p - buff,
PROT_LAST /* we will handle the OK packet*/,
FALSE, TRUE TSRMLS_CC)) {
conn->m->local_tx_end(conn, 0, FAIL TSRMLS_CC);
break;
}
/*
Prepare for the worst case.
MyISAM goes to 2500 BIT columns, double it for safety.
*/
result = conn->m->result_init(5000, conn->persistent TSRMLS_CC);
if (!result) {
break;
}
if (FAIL == result->m.read_result_metadata(result, conn TSRMLS_CC)) {
DBG_ERR("Error occurred while reading metadata");
result->m.free_result(result, TRUE TSRMLS_CC);
result = NULL;
break;
}
result->type = MYSQLND_RES_NORMAL;
result->m.fetch_row = result->m.fetch_row_normal_unbuffered;
result->unbuf = mnd_ecalloc(1, sizeof(MYSQLND_RES_UNBUFFERED));
if (!result->unbuf) {
/* OOM */
SET_OOM_ERROR(*conn->error_info);
result->m.free_result(result, TRUE TSRMLS_CC);
result = NULL;
break;
}
result->unbuf->eof_reached = TRUE;
} while (0);
conn->m->local_tx_end(conn, this_func, result == NULL? FAIL:PASS TSRMLS_CC);
}
DBG_RETURN(result);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 14,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t useGraphicBuffer(
node_id node, OMX_U32 port_index,
const sp<GraphicBuffer> &graphicBuffer, buffer_id *buffer) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32(port_index);
data.write(*graphicBuffer);
remote()->transact(USE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER, data, &reply);
status_t err = reply.readInt32();
if (err != OK) {
*buffer = 0;
return err;
}
*buffer = (buffer_id)reply.readInt32();
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix size check for OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits
since it doesn't follow the OMX convention. And remove support
for the kClientNeedsFrameBuffer flag.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: Ia2c119e2456ebf9e2f4e1de5104ef9032a212255
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err kind_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_KindBox *ptr = (GF_KindBox *)s;
ptr->size += strlen(ptr->schemeURI) + 1;
if (ptr->value) {
ptr->size += strlen(ptr->value) + 1;
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: STDMETHODIMP UrlmonUrlRequest::Authenticate(HWND* parent_window,
LPWSTR* user_name,
LPWSTR* password) {
if (!parent_window)
return E_INVALIDARG;
if (privileged_mode_)
return E_ACCESSDENIED;
DCHECK(::IsWindow(parent_window_));
*parent_window = parent_window_;
return S_OK;
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: update_zfs_share(sa_share_impl_t impl_share, const char *proto)
{
sa_handle_impl_t impl_handle = impl_share->handle;
zfs_handle_t *zhp;
update_cookie_t udata;
if (impl_handle->zfs_libhandle == NULL)
return (SA_SYSTEM_ERR);
assert(impl_share->dataset != NULL);
zhp = zfs_open(impl_share->handle->zfs_libhandle, impl_share->dataset,
ZFS_TYPE_FILESYSTEM);
if (zhp == NULL)
return (SA_SYSTEM_ERR);
udata.handle = impl_handle;
udata.proto = proto;
(void) update_zfs_shares_cb(zhp, &udata);
return (SA_OK);
}
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 96,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int r;
if (kvm->mm != current->mm)
return -EIO;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_CREATE_VCPU:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu(kvm, arg);
break;
case KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION: {
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region kvm_userspace_mem;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&kvm_userspace_mem, argp,
sizeof(kvm_userspace_mem)))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm, &kvm_userspace_mem);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG: {
struct kvm_dirty_log log;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&log, argp, sizeof(log)))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_dirty_log(kvm, &log);
break;
}
#ifdef KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_PAGE_OFFSET
case KVM_REGISTER_COALESCED_MMIO: {
struct kvm_coalesced_mmio_zone zone;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&zone, argp, sizeof(zone)))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_register_coalesced_mmio(kvm, &zone);
break;
}
case KVM_UNREGISTER_COALESCED_MMIO: {
struct kvm_coalesced_mmio_zone zone;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&zone, argp, sizeof(zone)))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_unregister_coalesced_mmio(kvm, &zone);
break;
}
#endif
case KVM_IRQFD: {
struct kvm_irqfd data;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&data, argp, sizeof(data)))
goto out;
r = kvm_irqfd(kvm, &data);
break;
}
case KVM_IOEVENTFD: {
struct kvm_ioeventfd data;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&data, argp, sizeof(data)))
goto out;
r = kvm_ioeventfd(kvm, &data);
break;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_MSI
case KVM_SIGNAL_MSI: {
struct kvm_msi msi;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&msi, argp, sizeof(msi)))
goto out;
r = kvm_send_userspace_msi(kvm, &msi);
break;
}
#endif
#ifdef __KVM_HAVE_IRQ_LINE
case KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS:
case KVM_IRQ_LINE: {
struct kvm_irq_level irq_event;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&irq_event, argp, sizeof(irq_event)))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_irq_line(kvm, &irq_event,
ioctl == KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (ioctl == KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS) {
if (copy_to_user(argp, &irq_event, sizeof(irq_event)))
goto out;
}
r = 0;
break;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQ_ROUTING
case KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING: {
struct kvm_irq_routing routing;
struct kvm_irq_routing __user *urouting;
struct kvm_irq_routing_entry *entries = NULL;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&routing, argp, sizeof(routing)))
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
if (routing.nr > KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES)
goto out;
if (routing.flags)
goto out;
if (routing.nr) {
r = -ENOMEM;
entries = vmalloc(routing.nr * sizeof(*entries));
if (!entries)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
urouting = argp;
if (copy_from_user(entries, urouting->entries,
routing.nr * sizeof(*entries)))
goto out_free_irq_routing;
}
r = kvm_set_irq_routing(kvm, entries, routing.nr,
routing.flags);
out_free_irq_routing:
vfree(entries);
break;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQ_ROUTING */
case KVM_CREATE_DEVICE: {
struct kvm_create_device cd;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&cd, argp, sizeof(cd)))
goto out;
r = kvm_ioctl_create_device(kvm, &cd);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &cd, sizeof(cd)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(kvm, arg);
break;
default:
r = kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(filp, ioctl, arg);
}
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 71,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* GLES2Implementation::MapBufferCHROMIUM(GLuint target, GLenum access) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glMapBufferCHROMIUM(" << target
<< ", " << GLES2Util::GetStringEnum(access) << ")");
switch (target) {
case GL_PIXEL_PACK_TRANSFER_BUFFER_CHROMIUM:
if (access != GL_READ_ONLY) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glMapBufferCHROMIUM", "bad access mode");
return nullptr;
}
break;
default:
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glMapBufferCHROMIUM", "invalid target");
return nullptr;
}
GLuint buffer_id;
GetBoundPixelTransferBuffer(target, "glMapBufferCHROMIUM", &buffer_id);
if (!buffer_id) {
return nullptr;
}
BufferTracker::Buffer* buffer = buffer_tracker_->GetBuffer(buffer_id);
if (!buffer) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glMapBufferCHROMIUM", "invalid buffer");
return nullptr;
}
if (buffer->mapped()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glMapBufferCHROMIUM", "already mapped");
return nullptr;
}
if (buffer->last_usage_token()) {
helper_->WaitForToken(buffer->last_usage_token());
buffer->set_last_usage_token(0);
}
buffer->set_mapped(true);
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" returned " << buffer->address());
CheckGLError();
return buffer->address();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SocketStreamDispatcherHost::OnSSLCertificateError(
net::SocketStream* socket, const net::SSLInfo& ssl_info, bool fatal) {
int socket_id = SocketStreamHost::SocketIdFromSocketStream(socket);
DVLOG(1) << "SocketStreamDispatcherHost::OnSSLCertificateError socket_id="
<< socket_id;
if (socket_id == content::kNoSocketId) {
LOG(ERROR) << "NoSocketId in OnSSLCertificateError";
return;
}
SocketStreamHost* socket_stream_host = hosts_.Lookup(socket_id);
DCHECK(socket_stream_host);
content::GlobalRequestID request_id(-1, socket_id);
SSLManager::OnSSLCertificateError(ssl_delegate_weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
request_id, ResourceType::SUB_RESOURCE, socket->url(),
render_process_id_, socket_stream_host->render_view_id(), ssl_info,
fatal);
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int write_pipe_buf(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf,
struct splice_desc *sd)
{
int ret;
void *data;
loff_t tmp = sd->pos;
data = kmap(buf->page);
ret = __kernel_write(sd->u.file, data + buf->offset, sd->len, &tmp);
kunmap(buf->page);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OMX::CallbackDispatcher::dispatch(std::list<omx_message> &messages) {
if (mOwner == NULL) {
ALOGV("Would have dispatched a message to a node that's already gone.");
return;
}
mOwner->onMessages(messages);
}
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 160,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __page_check_anon_rmap(struct page *page,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
/*
* The page's anon-rmap details (mapping and index) are guaranteed to
* be set up correctly at this point.
*
* We have exclusion against page_add_anon_rmap because the caller
* always holds the page locked, except if called from page_dup_rmap,
* in which case the page is already known to be setup.
*
* We have exclusion against page_add_new_anon_rmap because those pages
* are initially only visible via the pagetables, and the pte is locked
* over the call to page_add_new_anon_rmap.
*/
BUG_ON(page_anon_vma(page)->root != vma->anon_vma->root);
BUG_ON(page->index != linear_page_index(vma, address));
#endif
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 38,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lmp_print_data_link_subobjs(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *obj_tptr,
int total_subobj_len, int offset)
{
int hexdump = FALSE;
int subobj_type, subobj_len;
union { /* int to float conversion buffer */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
while (total_subobj_len > 0 && hexdump == FALSE ) {
subobj_type = EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset);
subobj_len = EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Subobject, Type: %s (%u), Length: %u",
tok2str(lmp_data_link_subobj,
"Unknown",
subobj_type),
subobj_type,
subobj_len));
if (subobj_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too short)"));
break;
}
if ((subobj_len % 4) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (not a multiple of 4)"));
break;
}
if (total_subobj_len < subobj_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (goes past the end of the object)"));
break;
}
switch(subobj_type) {
case INT_SWITCHING_TYPE_SUBOBJ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Switching Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 2)),
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 2)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Encoding Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 3)),
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 3)));
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 4);
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Min Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Max Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case WAVELENGTH_SUBOBJ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Wavelength: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)));
break;
default:
/* Any Unknown Subobject ==> Exit loop */
hexdump=TRUE;
break;
}
total_subobj_len-=subobj_len;
offset+=subobj_len;
}
return (hexdump);
trunc:
return -1;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) LMP: Add some missing bounds checks
In lmp_print_data_link_subobjs(), these problems were identified
through code review.
Moreover:
Add and use tstr[].
Update two tests outputs accordingly.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 169,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void copy_huge_page(struct page *dst, struct page *src)
{
int i;
struct hstate *h = page_hstate(src);
if (unlikely(pages_per_huge_page(h) > MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES)) {
copy_gigantic_page(dst, src);
return;
}
might_sleep();
for (i = 0; i < pages_per_huge_page(h); i++) {
cond_resched();
copy_highpage(dst + i, src + i);
}
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int n_tty_poll(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file *file,
poll_table *wait)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
unsigned int mask = 0;
poll_wait(file, &tty->read_wait, wait);
poll_wait(file, &tty->write_wait, wait);
if (input_available_p(tty, 1))
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (tty->packet && tty->link->ctrl_status)
mask |= POLLPRI | POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (test_bit(TTY_OTHER_CLOSED, &tty->flags))
mask |= POLLHUP;
if (tty_hung_up_p(file))
mask |= POLLHUP;
if (!(mask & (POLLHUP | POLLIN | POLLRDNORM))) {
if (MIN_CHAR(tty) && !TIME_CHAR(tty))
ldata->minimum_to_wake = MIN_CHAR(tty);
else
ldata->minimum_to_wake = 1;
}
if (tty->ops->write && !tty_is_writelocked(tty) &&
tty_chars_in_buffer(tty) < WAKEUP_CHARS &&
tty_write_room(tty) > 0)
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
return mask;
}
Commit Message: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 39,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TRBCCode xhci_configure_slot(XHCIState *xhci, unsigned int slotid,
uint64_t pictx, bool dc)
{
dma_addr_t ictx, octx;
uint32_t ictl_ctx[2];
uint32_t slot_ctx[4];
uint32_t islot_ctx[4];
uint32_t ep_ctx[5];
int i;
TRBCCode res;
trace_usb_xhci_slot_configure(slotid);
assert(slotid >= 1 && slotid <= xhci->numslots);
ictx = xhci_mask64(pictx);
octx = xhci->slots[slotid-1].ctx;
DPRINTF("xhci: input context at "DMA_ADDR_FMT"\n", ictx);
DPRINTF("xhci: output context at "DMA_ADDR_FMT"\n", octx);
if (dc) {
for (i = 2; i <= 31; i++) {
if (xhci->slots[slotid-1].eps[i-1]) {
xhci_disable_ep(xhci, slotid, i);
}
}
xhci_dma_read_u32s(xhci, octx, slot_ctx, sizeof(slot_ctx));
slot_ctx[3] &= ~(SLOT_STATE_MASK << SLOT_STATE_SHIFT);
slot_ctx[3] |= SLOT_ADDRESSED << SLOT_STATE_SHIFT;
DPRINTF("xhci: output slot context: %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
slot_ctx[0], slot_ctx[1], slot_ctx[2], slot_ctx[3]);
xhci_dma_write_u32s(xhci, octx, slot_ctx, sizeof(slot_ctx));
return CC_SUCCESS;
}
xhci_dma_read_u32s(xhci, ictx, ictl_ctx, sizeof(ictl_ctx));
if ((ictl_ctx[0] & 0x3) != 0x0 || (ictl_ctx[1] & 0x3) != 0x1) {
DPRINTF("xhci: invalid input context control %08x %08x\n",
ictl_ctx[0], ictl_ctx[1]);
return CC_TRB_ERROR;
}
xhci_dma_read_u32s(xhci, ictx+32, islot_ctx, sizeof(islot_ctx));
xhci_dma_read_u32s(xhci, octx, slot_ctx, sizeof(slot_ctx));
if (SLOT_STATE(slot_ctx[3]) < SLOT_ADDRESSED) {
DPRINTF("xhci: invalid slot state %08x\n", slot_ctx[3]);
return CC_CONTEXT_STATE_ERROR;
}
xhci_free_device_streams(xhci, slotid, ictl_ctx[0] | ictl_ctx[1]);
for (i = 2; i <= 31; i++) {
if (ictl_ctx[0] & (1<<i)) {
xhci_disable_ep(xhci, slotid, i);
}
if (ictl_ctx[1] & (1<<i)) {
xhci_dma_read_u32s(xhci, ictx+32+(32*i), ep_ctx, sizeof(ep_ctx));
DPRINTF("xhci: input ep%d.%d context: %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
i/2, i%2, ep_ctx[0], ep_ctx[1], ep_ctx[2],
ep_ctx[3], ep_ctx[4]);
xhci_disable_ep(xhci, slotid, i);
res = xhci_enable_ep(xhci, slotid, i, octx+(32*i), ep_ctx);
if (res != CC_SUCCESS) {
return res;
}
DPRINTF("xhci: output ep%d.%d context: %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
i/2, i%2, ep_ctx[0], ep_ctx[1], ep_ctx[2],
ep_ctx[3], ep_ctx[4]);
xhci_dma_write_u32s(xhci, octx+(32*i), ep_ctx, sizeof(ep_ctx));
}
}
res = xhci_alloc_device_streams(xhci, slotid, ictl_ctx[1]);
if (res != CC_SUCCESS) {
for (i = 2; i <= 31; i++) {
if (ictl_ctx[1] & (1u << i)) {
xhci_disable_ep(xhci, slotid, i);
}
}
return res;
}
slot_ctx[3] &= ~(SLOT_STATE_MASK << SLOT_STATE_SHIFT);
slot_ctx[3] |= SLOT_CONFIGURED << SLOT_STATE_SHIFT;
slot_ctx[0] &= ~(SLOT_CONTEXT_ENTRIES_MASK << SLOT_CONTEXT_ENTRIES_SHIFT);
slot_ctx[0] |= islot_ctx[0] & (SLOT_CONTEXT_ENTRIES_MASK <<
SLOT_CONTEXT_ENTRIES_SHIFT);
DPRINTF("xhci: output slot context: %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
slot_ctx[0], slot_ctx[1], slot_ctx[2], slot_ctx[3]);
xhci_dma_write_u32s(xhci, octx, slot_ctx, sizeof(slot_ctx));
return CC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Plugin::LengthComputable length_computable() const {
return length_computable_;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NTPResourceCache::CreateNewTabIncognitoHTML() {
base::DictionaryValue localized_strings;
localized_strings.SetString("title",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_NEW_TAB_TITLE));
int new_tab_description_ids = IDS_NEW_TAB_OTR_DESCRIPTION;
int new_tab_heading_ids = IDS_NEW_TAB_OTR_HEADING;
int new_tab_link_ids = IDS_NEW_TAB_OTR_LEARN_MORE_LINK;
int new_tab_warning_ids = IDS_NEW_TAB_OTR_MESSAGE_WARNING;
int new_tab_html_idr = IDR_INCOGNITO_TAB_HTML;
const char* new_tab_link = kLearnMoreIncognitoUrl;
if (profile_->IsGuestSession()) {
localized_strings.SetString("guestTabDescription",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(new_tab_description_ids));
localized_strings.SetString("guestTabHeading",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(new_tab_heading_ids));
} else {
localized_strings.SetString("incognitoTabDescription",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(new_tab_description_ids));
localized_strings.SetString("incognitoTabHeading",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(new_tab_heading_ids));
localized_strings.SetString("incognitoTabWarning",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(new_tab_warning_ids));
}
localized_strings.SetString("learnMore",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(new_tab_link_ids));
localized_strings.SetString("learnMoreLink",
GetUrlWithLang(GURL(new_tab_link)));
bool bookmark_bar_attached = profile_->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(
prefs::kShowBookmarkBar);
localized_strings.SetBoolean("bookmarkbarattached", bookmark_bar_attached);
webui::SetFontAndTextDirection(&localized_strings);
static const base::StringPiece incognito_tab_html(
ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetRawDataResource(
new_tab_html_idr));
std::string full_html = webui::GetI18nTemplateHtml(
incognito_tab_html, &localized_strings);
new_tab_incognito_html_ = base::RefCountedString::TakeString(&full_html);
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_Clientinfo_f( void ) {
Com_Printf( "--------- Client Information ---------\n" );
Com_Printf( "state: %i\n", clc.state );
Com_Printf( "Server: %s\n", clc.servername );
Com_Printf( "User info settings:\n" );
Info_Print( Cvar_InfoString( CVAR_USERINFO ) );
Com_Printf( "--------------------------------------\n" );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPageSerializerImpl::buildContentForNode(Node* node,
SerializeDomParam* param)
{
switch (node->nodeType()) {
case Node::ELEMENT_NODE:
openTagToString(toElement(node), param);
for (Node *child = node->firstChild(); child; child = child->nextSibling())
buildContentForNode(child, param);
endTagToString(toElement(node), param);
break;
case Node::TEXT_NODE:
saveHTMLContentToBuffer(createMarkup(node), param);
break;
case Node::ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
case Node::DOCUMENT_NODE:
case Node::DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE:
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
break;
case Node::DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:
param->haveSeenDocType = true;
default:
saveHTMLContentToBuffer(createMarkup(node), param);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Make WebPageSerializerImpl to escape URL attribute values in result.
This patch makes |WebPageSerializerImpl| to escape URL attribute values rather
than directly output URL attribute values into result.
BUG=542054
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.URLAttributeValues
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1398453005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#353712}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 124,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void cifs_stats_fail_inc(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, uint16_t code)
{
cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->stats.smb2_stats.smb2_com_failed[code]);
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
CC: Stable <[email protected]> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool isValidMIMEType(const String& type)
{
size_t slashPosition = type.find('/');
if (slashPosition == notFound || !slashPosition || slashPosition == type.length() - 1)
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < type.length(); ++i) {
if (!isRFC2616TokenCharacter(type[i]) && i != slashPosition)
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Layer::Update(ResourceUpdateQueue* queue,
const OcclusionTracker<Layer>* occlusion) {
DCHECK(layer_tree_host_);
DCHECK_EQ(layer_tree_host_->source_frame_number(),
paint_properties_.source_frame_number) <<
"SavePaintProperties must be called for any layer that is painted.";
return false;
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pipe2, int __user *, fildes, int, flags)
{
return do_pipe2(fildes, flags);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::BeginRequest(
ResourceRequesterInfo* requester_info,
int request_id,
const network::ResourceRequest& request_data,
bool is_sync_load,
int route_id,
uint32_t url_loader_options,
network::mojom::URLLoaderRequest mojo_request,
network::mojom::URLLoaderClientPtr url_loader_client,
const net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag& traffic_annotation) {
DCHECK(requester_info->IsRenderer() ||
requester_info->IsNavigationPreload() ||
requester_info->IsCertificateFetcherForSignedExchange());
int child_id = requester_info->child_id();
if (IsRequestIDInUse(GlobalRequestID(child_id, request_id))) {
DCHECK(requester_info->IsRenderer());
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(requester_info->filter(),
bad_message::RDH_INVALID_REQUEST_ID);
return;
}
if (IsResourceTypeFrame(
static_cast<ResourceType>(request_data.resource_type))) {
DCHECK(requester_info->IsRenderer());
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(requester_info->filter(),
bad_message::RDH_INVALID_URL);
return;
}
if (request_data.priority < net::MINIMUM_PRIORITY ||
request_data.priority > net::MAXIMUM_PRIORITY) {
DCHECK(requester_info->IsRenderer());
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(requester_info->filter(),
bad_message::RDH_INVALID_PRIORITY);
return;
}
DEBUG_ALIAS_FOR_GURL(url_buf, request_data.url);
ResourceContext* resource_context = nullptr;
net::URLRequestContext* request_context = nullptr;
requester_info->GetContexts(
static_cast<ResourceType>(request_data.resource_type), &resource_context,
&request_context);
if (is_shutdown_ ||
!ShouldServiceRequest(child_id, request_data, request_data.headers,
requester_info, resource_context)) {
AbortRequestBeforeItStarts(requester_info->filter(), request_id,
std::move(url_loader_client));
return;
}
BlobHandles blob_handles;
storage::BlobStorageContext* blob_context =
GetBlobStorageContext(requester_info->blob_storage_context());
if (request_data.request_body.get()) {
if (blob_context) {
if (!GetBodyBlobDataHandles(request_data.request_body.get(),
resource_context, &blob_handles)) {
AbortRequestBeforeItStarts(requester_info->filter(), request_id,
std::move(url_loader_client));
return;
}
}
}
for (net::HttpRequestHeaders::Iterator it(request_data.headers);
it.GetNext();) {
auto index = http_header_interceptor_map_.find(it.name());
if (index != http_header_interceptor_map_.end()) {
HeaderInterceptorInfo& interceptor_info = index->second;
bool call_interceptor = true;
if (!interceptor_info.starts_with.empty()) {
call_interceptor =
base::StartsWith(it.value(), interceptor_info.starts_with,
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII);
}
if (call_interceptor) {
interceptor_info.interceptor.Run(
it.name(), it.value(), child_id, resource_context,
base::Bind(
&ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::ContinuePendingBeginRequest,
base::Unretained(this), base::WrapRefCounted(requester_info),
request_id, request_data, is_sync_load, route_id,
request_data.headers, url_loader_options,
base::Passed(std::move(mojo_request)),
base::Passed(std::move(url_loader_client)),
base::Passed(std::move(blob_handles)), traffic_annotation));
return;
}
}
}
ContinuePendingBeginRequest(
requester_info, request_id, request_data, is_sync_load, route_id,
request_data.headers, url_loader_options, std::move(mojo_request),
std::move(url_loader_client), std::move(blob_handles), traffic_annotation,
HeaderInterceptorResult::CONTINUE);
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 151,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void adjust_tsc_offset_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
s64 adjustment)
{
kvm_x86_ops->adjust_tsc_offset_guest(vcpu, adjustment);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PasswordAutofillAgent::LogFirstFillingResult(
const PasswordFormFillData& form_data,
FillingResult result) {
if (recorded_first_filling_result_)
return;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("PasswordManager.FirstRendererFillingResult",
result);
DCHECK(form_data.has_renderer_ids);
GetPasswordManagerDriver()->LogFirstFillingResult(
form_data.form_renderer_id, base::strict_cast<int32_t>(result));
recorded_first_filling_result_ = true;
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 137,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::writeChar(char16_t val)
{
return writeInt32(int32_t(val));
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 163,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AwContents::InsertVisualStateCallback(
JNIEnv* env, jobject obj, jlong request_id, jobject callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject>* j_callback = new ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject>();
j_callback->Reset(env, callback);
web_contents_->GetMainFrame()->InsertVisualStateCallback(
base::Bind(&InvokeVisualStateCallback, java_ref_, request_id,
base::Owned(j_callback)));
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: keepalived_realloc(void *buffer, size_t size, const char *file,
const char *function, int line)
{
return keepalived_free_realloc_common(buffer, size, file, function, line, true);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::OnAbstractTextureDestroyed(
ValidatingAbstractTextureImpl* abstract_texture,
scoped_refptr<TextureRef> texture_ref) {
DCHECK(texture_ref);
abstract_textures_.erase(abstract_texture);
if (context_->IsCurrent(nullptr))
texture_refs_pending_destruction_.clear();
else
texture_refs_pending_destruction_.insert(std::move(texture_ref));
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int yyinput (yyscan_t yyscanner)
#else
static int input (yyscan_t yyscanner)
#endif
{
int c;
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
*yyg->yy_c_buf_p = yyg->yy_hold_char;
if ( *yyg->yy_c_buf_p == YY_END_OF_BUFFER_CHAR )
{
/* yy_c_buf_p now points to the character we want to return.
* If this occurs *before* the EOB characters, then it's a
* valid NUL; if not, then we've hit the end of the buffer.
*/
if ( yyg->yy_c_buf_p < &YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf[yyg->yy_n_chars] )
/* This was really a NUL. */
*yyg->yy_c_buf_p = '\0';
else
{ /* need more input */
yy_size_t offset = yyg->yy_c_buf_p - yyg->yytext_ptr;
++yyg->yy_c_buf_p;
switch ( yy_get_next_buffer( yyscanner ) )
{
case EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH:
/* This happens because yy_g_n_b()
* sees that we've accumulated a
* token and flags that we need to
* try matching the token before
* proceeding. But for input(),
* there's no matching to consider.
* So convert the EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH
* to EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE.
*/
/* Reset buffer status. */
re_yyrestart(yyin ,yyscanner);
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE:
{
if ( re_yywrap(yyscanner ) )
return EOF;
if ( ! yyg->yy_did_buffer_switch_on_eof )
YY_NEW_FILE;
#ifdef __cplusplus
return yyinput(yyscanner);
#else
return input(yyscanner);
#endif
}
case EOB_ACT_CONTINUE_SCAN:
yyg->yy_c_buf_p = yyg->yytext_ptr + offset;
break;
}
}
}
c = *(unsigned char *) yyg->yy_c_buf_p; /* cast for 8-bit char's */
*yyg->yy_c_buf_p = '\0'; /* preserve yytext */
yyg->yy_hold_char = *++yyg->yy_c_buf_p;
if ( c == '\n' )
do{ yylineno++;
yycolumn=0;
}while(0)
;
return c;
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 168,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmxnet3_physical_memory_writev(const struct iovec *iov,
size_t start_iov_off,
hwaddr target_addr,
size_t bytes_to_copy)
{
size_t curr_off = 0;
size_t copied = 0;
while (bytes_to_copy) {
if (start_iov_off < (curr_off + iov->iov_len)) {
size_t chunk_len =
MIN((curr_off + iov->iov_len) - start_iov_off, bytes_to_copy);
cpu_physical_memory_write(target_addr + copied,
iov->iov_base + start_iov_off - curr_off,
chunk_len);
copied += chunk_len;
start_iov_off += chunk_len;
curr_off = start_iov_off;
bytes_to_copy -= chunk_len;
} else {
curr_off += iov->iov_len;
}
iov++;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::AppendRendererCommandLine(
base::CommandLine* command_line) {
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kProcessType,
switches::kRendererProcess);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
command_line->AppendArg(switches::kPrefetchArgumentRenderer);
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line =
*base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
PropagateBrowserCommandLineToRenderer(browser_command_line, command_line);
const std::string locale =
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetApplicationLocale();
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kLang, locale);
if (!base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()
->GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kRendererCmdPrefix)
.empty()) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kNoZygote);
}
GetContentClient()->browser()->AppendExtraCommandLineSwitches(command_line,
GetID());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kDeviceScaleFactor,
base::NumberToString(display::win::GetDPIScale()));
#endif
AppendCompositorCommandLineFlags(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kServiceRequestChannelToken,
child_connection_->service_token());
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kRendererClientId,
std::to_string(GetID()));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_int8(QEMUFile *f, void *pv, size_t size)
{
int8_t *v = pv;
qemu_put_s8s(f, v);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChooserController::OnStartDiscoverySessionFailed() {
if (chooser_.get()) {
chooser_->ShowDiscoveryState(
BluetoothChooser::DiscoveryState::FAILED_TO_START);
}
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnRenderFrameProxyVisibilityChanged(bool visible) {
if (visible)
WasShown();
else
WasHidden();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: put_param_pdf14_spot_names(gx_device * pdev,
gs_separations * pseparations, gs_param_list * plist)
{
int code, num_spot_colors, i;
gs_param_string str;
/* Check if the given keyname is present. */
code = param_read_int(plist, PDF14NumSpotColorsParamName,
&num_spot_colors);
switch (code) {
default:
param_signal_error(plist, PDF14NumSpotColorsParamName, code);
break;
case 1:
return 0;
case 0:
if (num_spot_colors < 1 ||
num_spot_colors > GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
for (i = 0; i < num_spot_colors; i++) {
char buff[20];
byte * sep_name;
gs_sprintf(buff, "PDF14SpotName_%d", i);
code = param_read_string(plist, buff, &str);
switch (code) {
default:
param_signal_error(plist, buff, code);
break;
case 0:
sep_name = gs_alloc_bytes(pdev->memory,
str.size, "put_param_pdf14_spot_names");
memcpy(sep_name, str.data, str.size);
pseparations->names[i].size = str.size;
pseparations->names[i].data = sep_name;
}
}
pseparations->num_separations = num_spot_colors;
break;
}
return 0;;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: krb5_gss_unwrap(minor_status, context_handle,
input_message_buffer, output_message_buffer,
conf_state, qop_state)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer;
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_qop_t *qop_state;
{
OM_uint32 rstat;
rstat = kg_unseal(minor_status, context_handle,
input_message_buffer, output_message_buffer,
conf_state, qop_state, KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG);
return(rstat);
}
Commit Message: Handle invalid RFC 1964 tokens [CVE-2014-4341...]
Detect the following cases which would otherwise cause invalid memory
accesses and/or integer underflow:
* An RFC 1964 token being processed by an RFC 4121-only context
[CVE-2014-4342]
* A header with fewer than 22 bytes after the token ID or an
incomplete checksum [CVE-2014-4341 CVE-2014-4342]
* A ciphertext shorter than the confounder [CVE-2014-4341]
* A declared padding length longer than the plaintext [CVE-2014-4341]
If we detect a bad pad byte, continue on to compute the checksum to
avoid creating a padding oracle, but treat the checksum as invalid
even if it compares equal.
CVE-2014-4341:
In MIT krb5, an unauthenticated remote attacker with the ability to
inject packets into a legitimately established GSSAPI application
session can cause a program crash due to invalid memory references
when attempting to read beyond the end of a buffer.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
CVE-2014-4342:
In MIT krb5 releases krb5-1.7 and later, an unauthenticated remote
attacker with the ability to inject packets into a legitimately
established GSSAPI application session can cause a program crash due
to invalid memory references when reading beyond the end of a buffer
or by causing a null pointer dereference.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: CVE summaries, CVSS]
(cherry picked from commit fb99962cbd063ac04c9a9d2cc7c75eab73f3533d)
ticket: 7949
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 36,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::enableWebGLDraftExtensions(bool enable)
{
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::setWebGLDraftExtensionsEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove SpeechSynthesis runtime flag (status=stable)
BUG=402536
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/482273005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180763 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 0 | 116,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NodeIterator::NodePointer::NodePointer()
{
}
Commit Message: Fix detached Attr nodes interaction with NodeIterator
- Don't register NodeIterator to document when attaching to Attr node.
-- NodeIterator is registered to its document to receive updateForNodeRemoval notifications.
-- However it wouldn't make sense on Attr nodes, as they never have children.
BUG=572537
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1577213003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#369687}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void release_existing_page_budget(struct ubifs_info *c)
{
struct ubifs_budget_req req = { .dd_growth = c->bi.page_budget};
ubifs_release_budget(c, &req);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void spl_array_rewind_ex(spl_array_object *intern, HashTable *aht TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(aht, &intern->pos);
spl_array_update_pos(intern);
spl_array_skip_protected(intern, aht TSRMLS_CC);
} /* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *print_object( cJSON *item, int depth, int fmt )
{
char **entries = 0, **names = 0;
char *out = 0, *ptr, *ret, *str;
int len = 7, i = 0, j;
cJSON *child = item->child;
int numentries = 0, fail = 0;
/* Count the number of entries. */
while ( child ) {
++numentries;
child = child->next;
}
/* Allocate space for the names and the objects. */
if ( ! ( entries = (char**) cJSON_malloc( numentries * sizeof(char*) ) ) )
return 0;
if ( ! ( names = (char**) cJSON_malloc( numentries * sizeof(char*) ) ) ) {
cJSON_free( entries );
return 0;
}
memset( entries, 0, sizeof(char*) * numentries );
memset( names, 0, sizeof(char*) * numentries );
/* Collect all the results into our arrays. */
child = item->child;
++depth;
if ( fmt )
len += depth;
while ( child ) {
names[i] = str = print_string_ptr( child->string );
entries[i++] = ret = print_value( child, depth, fmt );
if ( str && ret )
len += strlen( ret ) + strlen( str ) + 2 + ( fmt ? 2 + depth : 0 );
else
fail = 1;
child = child->next;
}
/* Try to allocate the output string. */
if ( ! fail ) {
out = (char*) cJSON_malloc( len );
if ( ! out )
fail = 1;
}
/* Handle failure. */
if ( fail ) {
for ( i = 0; i < numentries; ++i ) {
if ( names[i] )
cJSON_free( names[i] );
if ( entries[i] )
cJSON_free( entries[i] );
}
cJSON_free( names );
cJSON_free( entries );
return 0;
}
/* Compose the output. */
*out = '{';
ptr = out + 1;
if ( fmt )
*ptr++ = '\n';
*ptr = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < numentries; ++i ) {
if ( fmt )
for ( j = 0; j < depth; ++j )
*ptr++ = '\t';
strcpy( ptr, names[i] );
ptr += strlen( names[i] );
*ptr++ = ':';
if ( fmt )
*ptr++ = '\t';
strcpy( ptr, entries[i] );
ptr += strlen( entries[i] );
if ( i != numentries - 1 )
*ptr++ = ',';
if ( fmt )
*ptr++ = '\n';
*ptr = 0;
cJSON_free( names[i] );
cJSON_free( entries[i] );
}
cJSON_free( names );
cJSON_free( entries );
if ( fmt )
for ( i = 0; i < depth - 1; ++i )
*ptr++ = '\t';
*ptr++ = '}';
*ptr++ = 0;
return out;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ip_rfc1001_connect(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
int rc = 0;
/*
* some servers require RFC1001 sessinit before sending
* negprot - BB check reconnection in case where second
* sessinit is sent but no second negprot
*/
struct rfc1002_session_packet *ses_init_buf;
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
ses_init_buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rfc1002_session_packet),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (ses_init_buf) {
ses_init_buf->trailer.session_req.called_len = 32;
if (server->server_RFC1001_name &&
server->server_RFC1001_name[0] != 0)
rfc1002mangle(ses_init_buf->trailer.
session_req.called_name,
server->server_RFC1001_name,
RFC1001_NAME_LEN_WITH_NULL);
else
rfc1002mangle(ses_init_buf->trailer.
session_req.called_name,
DEFAULT_CIFS_CALLED_NAME,
RFC1001_NAME_LEN_WITH_NULL);
ses_init_buf->trailer.session_req.calling_len = 32;
/*
* calling name ends in null (byte 16) from old smb
* convention.
*/
if (server->workstation_RFC1001_name &&
server->workstation_RFC1001_name[0] != 0)
rfc1002mangle(ses_init_buf->trailer.
session_req.calling_name,
server->workstation_RFC1001_name,
RFC1001_NAME_LEN_WITH_NULL);
else
rfc1002mangle(ses_init_buf->trailer.
session_req.calling_name,
"LINUX_CIFS_CLNT",
RFC1001_NAME_LEN_WITH_NULL);
ses_init_buf->trailer.session_req.scope1 = 0;
ses_init_buf->trailer.session_req.scope2 = 0;
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)ses_init_buf;
/* sizeof RFC1002_SESSION_REQUEST with no scope */
smb_buf->smb_buf_length = 0x81000044;
rc = smb_send(server, smb_buf, 0x44);
kfree(ses_init_buf);
/*
* RFC1001 layer in at least one server
* requires very short break before negprot
* presumably because not expecting negprot
* to follow so fast. This is a simple
* solution that works without
* complicating the code and causes no
* significant slowing down on mount
* for everyone else
*/
usleep_range(1000, 2000);
}
/*
* else the negprot may still work without this
* even though malloc failed
*/
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_core_note(struct magic_set *ms, unsigned char *nbuf, uint32_t type,
int swap, uint32_t namesz, uint32_t descsz,
size_t noff, size_t doff, int *flags, size_t size, int clazz)
{
#ifdef ELFCORE
int os_style = -1;
/*
* Sigh. The 2.0.36 kernel in Debian 2.1, at
* least, doesn't correctly implement name
* sections, in core dumps, as specified by
* the "Program Linking" section of "UNIX(R) System
* V Release 4 Programmer's Guide: ANSI C and
* Programming Support Tools", because my copy
* clearly says "The first 'namesz' bytes in 'name'
* contain a *null-terminated* [emphasis mine]
* character representation of the entry's owner
* or originator", but the 2.0.36 kernel code
* doesn't include the terminating null in the
* name....
*/
if ((namesz == 4 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE", 4) == 0) ||
(namesz == 5 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_SVR4;
}
if ((namesz == 8 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "FreeBSD") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_FREEBSD;
}
if ((namesz >= 11 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD-CORE", 11)
== 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_NETBSD;
}
if (os_style != -1 && (*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE) == 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s-style", os_style_names[os_style])
== -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE;
*flags |= os_style;
}
switch (os_style) {
case OS_STYLE_NETBSD:
if (type == NT_NETBSD_CORE_PROCINFO) {
char sbuf[512];
struct NetBSD_elfcore_procinfo pi;
memset(&pi, 0, sizeof(pi));
memcpy(&pi, nbuf + doff, descsz);
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.31s', pid=%u, uid=%u, "
"gid=%u, nlwps=%u, lwp=%u (signal %u/code %u)",
file_printable(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf),
CAST(char *, pi.cpi_name)),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_pid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_euid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_egid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_nlwps),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_siglwp),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_signo),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_sigcode)) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
}
break;
default:
if (type == NT_PRPSINFO && *flags & FLAGS_IS_CORE) {
size_t i, j;
unsigned char c;
/*
* Extract the program name. We assume
* it to be 16 characters (that's what it
* is in SunOS 5.x and Linux).
*
* Unfortunately, it's at a different offset
* in various OSes, so try multiple offsets.
* If the characters aren't all printable,
* reject it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < NOFFSETS; i++) {
unsigned char *cname, *cp;
size_t reloffset = prpsoffsets(i);
size_t noffset = doff + reloffset;
size_t k;
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++, noffset++,
reloffset++) {
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the buffer; if
* we are, just give up.
*/
if (noffset >= size)
goto tryanother;
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the contents;
* if we are, this obviously
* isn't the right offset.
*/
if (reloffset >= descsz)
goto tryanother;
c = nbuf[noffset];
if (c == '\0') {
/*
* A '\0' at the
* beginning is
* obviously wrong.
* Any other '\0'
* means we're done.
*/
if (j == 0)
goto tryanother;
else
break;
} else {
/*
* A nonprintable
* character is also
* wrong.
*/
if (!isprint(c) || isquote(c))
goto tryanother;
}
}
/*
* Well, that worked.
*/
/*
* Try next offsets, in case this match is
* in the middle of a string.
*/
for (k = i + 1 ; k < NOFFSETS; k++) {
size_t no;
int adjust = 1;
if (prpsoffsets(k) >= prpsoffsets(i))
continue;
for (no = doff + prpsoffsets(k);
no < doff + prpsoffsets(i); no++)
adjust = adjust
&& isprint(nbuf[no]);
if (adjust)
i = k;
}
cname = (unsigned char *)
&nbuf[doff + prpsoffsets(i)];
for (cp = cname; *cp && isprint(*cp); cp++)
continue;
/*
* Linux apparently appends a space at the end
* of the command line: remove it.
*/
while (cp > cname && isspace(cp[-1]))
cp--;
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.*s'",
(int)(cp - cname), cname) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
tryanother:
;
}
}
break;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix always true condition (Thomas Jarosch)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 58,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintRenderFrameHelper::CopyMetafileDataToSharedMem(
const PdfMetafileSkia& metafile,
base::SharedMemoryHandle* shared_mem_handle) {
uint32_t buf_size = metafile.GetDataSize();
if (buf_size == 0)
return false;
std::unique_ptr<base::SharedMemory> shared_buf(
content::RenderThread::Get()->HostAllocateSharedMemoryBuffer(buf_size));
if (!shared_buf)
return false;
if (!shared_buf->Map(buf_size))
return false;
if (!metafile.GetData(shared_buf->memory(), buf_size))
return false;
*shared_mem_handle =
base::SharedMemory::DuplicateHandle(shared_buf->handle());
return true;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 149,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL update_write_bitmap_update(rdpUpdate* update, wStream* s,
const BITMAP_UPDATE* bitmapUpdate)
{
int i;
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(s, 32))
return FALSE;
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, UPDATE_TYPE_BITMAP); /* updateType */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, bitmapUpdate->number); /* numberRectangles (2 bytes) */
/* rectangles */
for (i = 0; i < (int) bitmapUpdate->number; i++)
{
if (!update_write_bitmap_data(update, s, &bitmapUpdate->rectangles[i]))
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void update_perf_cpu_limits(void)
{
u64 tmp = perf_sample_period_ns;
tmp *= sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent;
do_div(tmp, 100);
ACCESS_ONCE(perf_sample_allowed_ns) = tmp;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: blink::WebString MediaRecorderHandler::ActualMimeType() {
DCHECK(main_render_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(client_) << __func__ << " should be called after Initialize()";
const bool has_video_tracks = !media_stream_.VideoTracks().empty();
const bool has_audio_tracks = !media_stream_.AudioTracks().empty();
if (!has_video_tracks && !has_audio_tracks)
return blink::WebString();
std::string mime_type;
if (!has_video_tracks && has_audio_tracks) {
mime_type.append("audio/webm;codecs=");
} else {
switch (video_codec_id_) {
case VideoTrackRecorder::CodecId::VP8:
case VideoTrackRecorder::CodecId::VP9:
mime_type.append("video/webm;codecs=");
break;
#if BUILDFLAG(RTC_USE_H264)
case VideoTrackRecorder::CodecId::H264:
mime_type.append("video/x-matroska;codecs=");
break;
#endif
case VideoTrackRecorder::CodecId::LAST:
break;
}
}
if (has_video_tracks) {
switch (video_codec_id_) {
case VideoTrackRecorder::CodecId::VP8:
mime_type.append("vp8");
break;
case VideoTrackRecorder::CodecId::VP9:
mime_type.append("vp9");
break;
#if BUILDFLAG(RTC_USE_H264)
case VideoTrackRecorder::CodecId::H264:
mime_type.append("avc1");
break;
#endif
case VideoTrackRecorder::CodecId::LAST:
DCHECK_NE(audio_codec_id_, AudioTrackRecorder::CodecId::LAST);
}
}
if (has_video_tracks && has_audio_tracks) {
if (video_codec_id_ != VideoTrackRecorder::CodecId::LAST &&
audio_codec_id_ != AudioTrackRecorder::CodecId::LAST) {
mime_type.append(",");
}
}
if (has_audio_tracks) {
switch (audio_codec_id_) {
case AudioTrackRecorder::CodecId::OPUS:
mime_type.append("opus");
break;
case AudioTrackRecorder::CodecId::PCM:
mime_type.append("pcm");
break;
case AudioTrackRecorder::CodecId::LAST:
DCHECK_NE(video_codec_id_, VideoTrackRecorder::CodecId::LAST);
}
}
return blink::WebString::FromUTF8(mime_type);
}
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::SetIsEffectivelyFullscreen(
blink::WebFullscreenVideoStatus fullscreen_video_status) {
delegate_->SetIsEffectivelyFullscreen(delegate_id_, fullscreen_video_status);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Editor::Command::IdForHistogram() const {
return IsSupported() ? static_cast<int>(command_->command_type) : 0;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Layer::Layer()
: needs_push_properties_(false),
num_dependents_need_push_properties_(false),
stacking_order_changed_(false),
layer_id_(s_next_layer_id++),
ignore_set_needs_commit_(false),
parent_(NULL),
layer_tree_host_(NULL),
scroll_clip_layer_id_(INVALID_ID),
should_scroll_on_main_thread_(false),
have_wheel_event_handlers_(false),
user_scrollable_horizontal_(true),
user_scrollable_vertical_(true),
is_root_for_isolated_group_(false),
is_container_for_fixed_position_layers_(false),
is_drawable_(false),
hide_layer_and_subtree_(false),
masks_to_bounds_(false),
contents_opaque_(false),
double_sided_(true),
should_flatten_transform_(true),
use_parent_backface_visibility_(false),
draw_checkerboard_for_missing_tiles_(false),
force_render_surface_(false),
is_3d_sorted_(false),
anchor_point_(0.5f, 0.5f),
background_color_(0),
opacity_(1.f),
blend_mode_(SkXfermode::kSrcOver_Mode),
anchor_point_z_(0.f),
scroll_parent_(NULL),
clip_parent_(NULL),
replica_layer_(NULL),
raster_scale_(0.f),
client_(NULL) {
if (layer_id_ == INT_MAX) {
s_next_layer_id = 1;
}
layer_animation_controller_ = LayerAnimationController::Create(layer_id_);
layer_animation_controller_->AddValueObserver(this);
layer_animation_controller_->set_value_provider(this);
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void get_openreq4(const struct request_sock *req,
struct seq_file *f, int i)
{
const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
long delta = req->rsk_timer.expires - jiffies;
seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5u %8d %u %d %pK",
i,
ireq->ir_loc_addr,
ireq->ir_num,
ireq->ir_rmt_addr,
ntohs(ireq->ir_rmt_port),
TCP_SYN_RECV,
0, 0, /* could print option size, but that is af dependent. */
1, /* timers active (only the expire timer) */
jiffies_delta_to_clock_t(delta),
req->num_timeout,
from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(f),
sock_i_uid(req->rsk_listener)),
0, /* non standard timer */
0, /* open_requests have no inode */
0,
req);
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 49,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_da_shrink_inode(
xfs_da_args_t *args,
xfs_dablk_t dead_blkno,
struct xfs_buf *dead_buf)
{
xfs_inode_t *dp;
int done, error, w, count;
xfs_trans_t *tp;
xfs_mount_t *mp;
trace_xfs_da_shrink_inode(args);
dp = args->dp;
w = args->whichfork;
tp = args->trans;
mp = dp->i_mount;
if (w == XFS_DATA_FORK)
count = mp->m_dirblkfsbs;
else
count = 1;
for (;;) {
/*
* Remove extents. If we get ENOSPC for a dir we have to move
* the last block to the place we want to kill.
*/
error = xfs_bunmapi(tp, dp, dead_blkno, count,
xfs_bmapi_aflag(w)|XFS_BMAPI_METADATA,
0, args->firstblock, args->flist, &done);
if (error == ENOSPC) {
if (w != XFS_DATA_FORK)
break;
error = xfs_da3_swap_lastblock(args, &dead_blkno,
&dead_buf);
if (error)
break;
} else {
break;
}
}
xfs_trans_binval(tp, dead_buf);
return error;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix directory hash ordering bug
Commit f5ea1100 ("xfs: add CRCs to dir2/da node blocks") introduced
in 3.10 incorrectly converted the btree hash index array pointer in
xfs_da3_fixhashpath(). It resulted in the the current hash always
being compared against the first entry in the btree rather than the
current block index into the btree block's hash entry array. As a
result, it was comparing the wrong hashes, and so could misorder the
entries in the btree.
For most cases, this doesn't cause any problems as it requires hash
collisions to expose the ordering problem. However, when there are
hash collisions within a directory there is a very good probability
that the entries will be ordered incorrectly and that actually
matters when duplicate hashes are placed into or removed from the
btree block hash entry array.
This bug results in an on-disk directory corruption and that results
in directory verifier functions throwing corruption warnings into
the logs. While no data or directory entries are lost, access to
them may be compromised, and attempts to remove entries from a
directory that has suffered from this corruption may result in a
filesystem shutdown. xfs_repair will fix the directory hash
ordering without data loss occuring.
[dchinner: wrote useful a commit message]
cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Tinguely <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool did_trigger_history_navigation() const {
return did_trigger_history_navigation_;
}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::clearBufferiv(GLenum buffer,
GLint drawbuffer,
const Vector<GLint>& value,
GLuint src_offset) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateClearBuffer("clearBufferiv", buffer, value.size(), src_offset))
return;
ScopedRGBEmulationColorMask emulation_color_mask(this, color_mask_,
drawing_buffer_.get());
ContextGL()->ClearBufferiv(buffer, drawbuffer, value.data() + src_offset);
UpdateBuffersToAutoClear(kClearBufferiv, buffer, drawbuffer);
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 153,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 AuthenticatorSelectAccountSheetModel::GetAcceptButtonLabel()
const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_WELCOME_SCREEN_NEXT);
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::ReportViolation(
const String& directive_text,
const DirectiveType& effective_type,
const String& console_message,
const KURL& blocked_url,
const Vector<String>& report_endpoints,
bool use_reporting_api,
const String& header,
ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderType header_type,
ViolationType violation_type,
std::unique_ptr<SourceLocation> source_location,
LocalFrame* context_frame,
RedirectStatus redirect_status,
Element* element,
const String& source) {
DCHECK(violation_type == kURLViolation || blocked_url.IsEmpty());
if (!execution_context_ && !context_frame) {
DCHECK(effective_type == DirectiveType::kChildSrc ||
effective_type == DirectiveType::kFrameSrc ||
effective_type == DirectiveType::kPluginTypes);
return;
}
DCHECK((execution_context_ && !context_frame) ||
((effective_type == DirectiveType::kFrameAncestors) && context_frame));
SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit* violation_data =
SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit::Create();
ExecutionContext* relevant_context =
context_frame ? context_frame->GetDocument() : execution_context_;
DCHECK(relevant_context);
GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData(
violation_data, relevant_context, directive_text, effective_type,
blocked_url, header, redirect_status, header_type, violation_type,
std::move(source_location), source);
if (!violation_data->sourceFile().IsEmpty() &&
ShouldBypassContentSecurityPolicy(KURL(violation_data->sourceFile()),
execution_context_)) {
return;
}
PostViolationReport(violation_data, context_frame, report_endpoints,
use_reporting_api);
if (execution_context_) {
execution_context_->GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kNetworking)
->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&ContentSecurityPolicy::DispatchViolationEvents,
WrapPersistent(this), WrapPersistent(violation_data),
WrapPersistent(element)));
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btreeCursor(
Btree *p, /* The btree */
int iTable, /* Root page of table to open */
int wrFlag, /* 1 to write. 0 read-only */
struct KeyInfo *pKeyInfo, /* First arg to comparison function */
BtCursor *pCur /* Space for new cursor */
){
BtShared *pBt = p->pBt; /* Shared b-tree handle */
BtCursor *pX; /* Looping over other all cursors */
assert( sqlite3BtreeHoldsMutex(p) );
assert( wrFlag==0
|| wrFlag==BTREE_WRCSR
|| wrFlag==(BTREE_WRCSR|BTREE_FORDELETE)
);
/* The following assert statements verify that if this is a sharable
** b-tree database, the connection is holding the required table locks,
** and that no other connection has any open cursor that conflicts with
** this lock. */
assert( hasSharedCacheTableLock(p, iTable, pKeyInfo!=0, (wrFlag?2:1)) );
assert( wrFlag==0 || !hasReadConflicts(p, iTable) );
/* Assert that the caller has opened the required transaction. */
assert( p->inTrans>TRANS_NONE );
assert( wrFlag==0 || p->inTrans==TRANS_WRITE );
assert( pBt->pPage1 && pBt->pPage1->aData );
assert( wrFlag==0 || (pBt->btsFlags & BTS_READ_ONLY)==0 );
if( wrFlag ){
allocateTempSpace(pBt);
if( pBt->pTmpSpace==0 ) return SQLITE_NOMEM_BKPT;
}
if( iTable==1 && btreePagecount(pBt)==0 ){
assert( wrFlag==0 );
iTable = 0;
}
/* Now that no other errors can occur, finish filling in the BtCursor
** variables and link the cursor into the BtShared list. */
pCur->pgnoRoot = (Pgno)iTable;
pCur->iPage = -1;
pCur->pKeyInfo = pKeyInfo;
pCur->pBtree = p;
pCur->pBt = pBt;
pCur->curFlags = wrFlag ? BTCF_WriteFlag : 0;
pCur->curPagerFlags = wrFlag ? 0 : PAGER_GET_READONLY;
/* If there are two or more cursors on the same btree, then all such
** cursors *must* have the BTCF_Multiple flag set. */
for(pX=pBt->pCursor; pX; pX=pX->pNext){
if( pX->pgnoRoot==(Pgno)iTable ){
pX->curFlags |= BTCF_Multiple;
pCur->curFlags |= BTCF_Multiple;
}
}
pCur->pNext = pBt->pCursor;
pBt->pCursor = pCur;
pCur->eState = CURSOR_INVALID;
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::importContainerNodeChildren(ContainerNode* oldContainerNode, PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ContainerNode> newContainerNode, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
for (Node& oldChild : NodeTraversal::childrenOf(*oldContainerNode)) {
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> newChild = importNode(&oldChild, true, exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.hadException())
return false;
newContainerNode->appendChild(newChild.release(), exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.hadException())
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mdiobus_unregister_device(struct mdio_device *mdiodev)
{
if (mdiodev->bus->mdio_map[mdiodev->addr] != mdiodev)
return -EINVAL;
mdiodev->bus->mdio_map[mdiodev->addr] = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mdio_bus: Fix use-after-free on device_register fails
KASAN has found use-after-free in fixed_mdio_bus_init,
commit 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call
put_device on device_register() failure") call put_device()
while device_register() fails,give up the last reference
to the device and allow mdiobus_release to be executed
,kfreeing the bus. However in most drives, mdiobus_free
be called to free the bus while mdiobus_register fails.
use-after-free occurs when access bus again, this patch
revert it to let mdiobus_free free the bus.
KASAN report details as below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881dc824d78 by task syz-executor.0/3524
CPU: 1 PID: 3524 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x283/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f6215c19c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f6215c19c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6215c1a6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
Allocated by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:496
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
mdiobus_alloc_size+0x54/0x1b0 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:143
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x163/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:458
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1436 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2986 [inline]
kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3938
device_release+0x78/0x200 drivers/base/core.c:919
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:662 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:691 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:67 [inline]
kobject_put+0x146/0x240 lib/kobject.c:708
put_device+0x1c/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:2060
__mdiobus_register+0x483/0x560 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:382
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x26b/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881dc824c80
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 248 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff8881dc824c80, ffff8881dc825480)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007720800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c02800 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 02fffc0000010200 0000000000000000 0000000500000001 ffff8881f6c02800
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8881dc824c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8881dc824c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8881dc824d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8881dc824d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8881dc824e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call put_device on device_register() failure")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 89,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionsAPIClient::ExtensionsAPIClient() { g_instance = this; }
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mmtimer_tasklet(unsigned long data)
{
int nodeid = data;
struct mmtimer_node *mn = &timers[nodeid];
struct mmtimer *x = rb_entry(mn->next, struct mmtimer, list);
struct k_itimer *t;
unsigned long flags;
/* Send signal and deal with periodic signals */
spin_lock_irqsave(&mn->lock, flags);
if (!mn->next)
goto out;
x = rb_entry(mn->next, struct mmtimer, list);
t = x->timer;
if (t->it.mmtimer.clock == TIMER_OFF)
goto out;
t->it_overrun = 0;
mn->next = rb_next(&x->list);
rb_erase(&x->list, &mn->timer_head);
if (posix_timer_event(t, 0) != 0)
t->it_overrun++;
if(t->it.mmtimer.incr) {
t->it.mmtimer.expires += t->it.mmtimer.incr;
mmtimer_add_list(x);
} else {
/* Ensure we don't false trigger in mmtimer_interrupt */
t->it.mmtimer.clock = TIMER_OFF;
t->it.mmtimer.expires = 0;
kfree(x);
}
/* Set comparator for next timer, if there is one */
mmtimer_set_next_timer(nodeid);
t->it_overrun_last = t->it_overrun;
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mn->lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::UpdateMaxPageIDForSiteInstance(
SiteInstance* site_instance, int32 page_id) {
if (GetMaxPageIDForSiteInstance(site_instance) < page_id)
max_page_ids_[site_instance->GetId()] = page_id;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcm_loop_driver_probe(struct device *dev)
{
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba;
struct Scsi_Host *sh;
int error;
tl_hba = to_tcm_loop_hba(dev);
sh = scsi_host_alloc(&tcm_loop_driver_template,
sizeof(struct tcm_loop_hba));
if (!sh) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to allocate struct scsi_host\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
tl_hba->sh = sh;
/*
* Assign the struct tcm_loop_hba pointer to struct Scsi_Host->hostdata
*/
*((struct tcm_loop_hba **)sh->hostdata) = tl_hba;
/*
* Setup single ID, Channel and LUN for now..
*/
sh->max_id = 2;
sh->max_lun = 0;
sh->max_channel = 0;
sh->max_cmd_len = TL_SCSI_MAX_CMD_LEN;
error = scsi_add_host(sh, &tl_hba->dev);
if (error) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: scsi_add_host failed\n", __func__);
scsi_host_put(sh);
return -ENODEV;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderViewHostManager::~RenderViewHostManager() {
if (pending_render_view_host_)
CancelPending();
RenderViewHostImpl* render_view_host = render_view_host_;
render_view_host_ = NULL;
if (render_view_host)
render_view_host->Shutdown();
for (RenderViewHostMap::iterator iter = swapped_out_hosts_.begin();
iter != swapped_out_hosts_.end();
++iter) {
iter->second->Shutdown();
}
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline static char xml_decode_us_ascii(unsigned short c)
{
return (char)(c > 0x7f ? '?' : c);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,000 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_set_vet(E1000ECore *core, int index, uint32_t val)
{
core->mac[VET] = val & 0xffff;
core->vet = le16_to_cpu(core->mac[VET]);
trace_e1000e_vlan_vet(core->vet);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 6,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_main_run_string_with_length(gs_main_instance * minst, const char *str,
uint length, int user_errors, int *pexit_code, ref * perror_object)
{
int code;
code = gs_main_run_string_begin(minst, user_errors,
pexit_code, perror_object);
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = gs_main_run_string_continue(minst, str, length, user_errors,
pexit_code, perror_object);
if (code != gs_error_NeedInput)
return code;
return gs_main_run_string_end(minst, user_errors,
pexit_code, perror_object);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 2,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainSetUserPassword(virDomainPtr dom,
const char *user,
const char *password,
unsigned int flags)
{
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(dom, "user=%s, password=%s, flags=%x",
NULLSTR(user), NULLSTR(password), flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(dom, -1);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(dom->conn->flags, error);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(user, error);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(password, error);
if (dom->conn->driver->domainSetUserPassword) {
int ret = dom->conn->driver->domainSetUserPassword(dom, user, password,
flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(dom->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_set_color(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, int what, float *v)
{
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
pdf_material *mat;
gstate = pdf_flush_text(ctx, pr);
mat = what == PDF_FILL ? &gstate->fill : &gstate->stroke;
switch (mat->kind)
{
case PDF_MAT_PATTERN:
case PDF_MAT_COLOR:
fz_clamp_color(ctx, mat->colorspace, v, mat->v);
break;
default:
fz_warn(ctx, "color incompatible with material");
}
mat->gstate_num = pr->gparent;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int X509_REQ_add_extensions_nid(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts,
int nid)
{
ASN1_TYPE *at = NULL;
X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr = NULL;
if (!(at = ASN1_TYPE_new()) || !(at->value.sequence = ASN1_STRING_new()))
goto err;
at->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
/* Generate encoding of extensions */
at->value.sequence->length =
ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)exts,
&at->value.sequence->data,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_EXTENSIONS));
if (!(attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_new()))
goto err;
if (!(attr->value.set = sk_ASN1_TYPE_new_null()))
goto err;
if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(attr->value.set, at))
goto err;
at = NULL;
attr->single = 0;
attr->object = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
if (!req->req_info->attributes) {
if (!(req->req_info->attributes = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null()))
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_push(req->req_info->attributes, attr))
goto err;
return 1;
err:
X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
ASN1_TYPE_free(at);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SampleIterator::seekTo(uint32_t sampleIndex) {
ALOGV("seekTo(%d)", sampleIndex);
if (sampleIndex >= mTable->mNumSampleSizes) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
if (mTable->mSampleToChunkOffset < 0
|| mTable->mChunkOffsetOffset < 0
|| mTable->mSampleSizeOffset < 0
|| mTable->mTimeToSampleCount == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mInitialized && mCurrentSampleIndex == sampleIndex) {
return OK;
}
if (!mInitialized || sampleIndex < mFirstChunkSampleIndex) {
reset();
}
if (sampleIndex >= mStopChunkSampleIndex) {
status_t err;
if ((err = findChunkRange(sampleIndex)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findChunkRange failed");
return err;
}
}
CHECK(sampleIndex < mStopChunkSampleIndex);
uint32_t chunk =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) / mSamplesPerChunk
+ mFirstChunk;
if (!mInitialized || chunk != mCurrentChunkIndex) {
mCurrentChunkIndex = chunk;
status_t err;
if ((err = getChunkOffset(chunk, &mCurrentChunkOffset)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getChunkOffset return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.clear();
uint32_t firstChunkSampleIndex =
mFirstChunkSampleIndex
+ mSamplesPerChunk * (mCurrentChunkIndex - mFirstChunk);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSamplesPerChunk; ++i) {
size_t sampleSize;
if ((err = getSampleSizeDirect(
firstChunkSampleIndex + i, &sampleSize)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getSampleSizeDirect return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.push(sampleSize);
}
}
uint32_t chunkRelativeSampleIndex =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) % mSamplesPerChunk;
mCurrentSampleOffset = mCurrentChunkOffset;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < chunkRelativeSampleIndex; ++i) {
mCurrentSampleOffset += mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[i];
}
mCurrentSampleSize = mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[chunkRelativeSampleIndex];
if (sampleIndex < mTTSSampleIndex) {
mTimeToSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleTime = 0;
mTTSCount = 0;
mTTSDuration = 0;
}
status_t err;
if ((err = findSampleTimeAndDuration(
sampleIndex, &mCurrentSampleTime, &mCurrentSampleDuration)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findSampleTime return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentSampleIndex = sampleIndex;
mInitialized = true;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void do_release_file_info(struct file_info *f)
{
if (!f)
return;
free(f->controller);
free(f->cgroup);
free(f->file);
free(f->buf);
free(f);
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnMemoryPressure(
base::MemoryPressureListener::MemoryPressureLevel memory_pressure_level) {
DVLOG(2) << __func__ << " memory_pressure_level=" << memory_pressure_level;
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kMemoryPressureBasedSourceBufferGC));
DCHECK(chunk_demuxer_);
bool force_instant_gc =
(enable_instant_source_buffer_gc_ &&
memory_pressure_level ==
base::MemoryPressureListener::MEMORY_PRESSURE_LEVEL_CRITICAL);
media_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&ChunkDemuxer::OnMemoryPressure,
base::Unretained(chunk_demuxer_),
base::TimeDelta::FromSecondsD(CurrentTime()),
memory_pressure_level, force_instant_gc));
}
Commit Message: Fix HasSingleSecurityOrigin for HLS
HLS manifests can request segments from a different origin than the
original manifest's origin. We do not inspect HLS manifests within
Chromium, and instead delegate to Android's MediaPlayer. This means we
need to be conservative, and always assume segments might come from a
different origin. HasSingleSecurityOrigin should always return false
when decoding HLS.
Bug: 864283
Change-Id: Ie16849ac6f29ae7eaa9caf342ad0509a226228ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142691
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Thomas Guilbert <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576378}
CWE ID: CWE-346 | 0 | 154,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hash_dma_done(struct hash_ctx *ctx)
{
struct dma_chan *chan;
chan = ctx->device->dma.chan_mem2hash;
dmaengine_device_control(chan, DMA_TERMINATE_ALL, 0);
dma_unmap_sg(chan->device->dev, ctx->device->dma.sg,
ctx->device->dma.sg_len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bitfromint8(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
int64 a = PG_GETARG_INT64(0);
int32 typmod = PG_GETARG_INT32(1);
VarBit *result;
bits8 *r;
int rlen;
int destbitsleft,
srcbitsleft;
if (typmod <= 0)
typmod = 1; /* default bit length */
rlen = VARBITTOTALLEN(typmod);
result = (VarBit *) palloc(rlen);
SET_VARSIZE(result, rlen);
VARBITLEN(result) = typmod;
r = VARBITS(result);
destbitsleft = typmod;
srcbitsleft = 64;
/* drop any input bits that don't fit */
srcbitsleft = Min(srcbitsleft, destbitsleft);
/* sign-fill any excess bytes in output */
while (destbitsleft >= srcbitsleft + 8)
{
*r++ = (bits8) ((a < 0) ? BITMASK : 0);
destbitsleft -= 8;
}
/* store first fractional byte */
if (destbitsleft > srcbitsleft)
{
int val = (int) (a >> (destbitsleft - 8));
/* Force sign-fill in case the compiler implements >> as zero-fill */
if (a < 0)
val |= (-1) << (srcbitsleft + 8 - destbitsleft);
*r++ = (bits8) (val & BITMASK);
destbitsleft -= 8;
}
/* Now srcbitsleft and destbitsleft are the same, need not track both */
/* store whole bytes */
while (destbitsleft >= 8)
{
*r++ = (bits8) ((a >> (destbitsleft - 8)) & BITMASK);
destbitsleft -= 8;
}
/* store last fractional byte */
if (destbitsleft > 0)
*r = (bits8) ((a << (8 - destbitsleft)) & BITMASK);
PG_RETURN_VARBIT_P(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(radius_add_server)
{
char *hostname, *secret;
int hostname_len, secret_len;
long port, timeout, maxtries;
radius_descriptor *raddesc;
zval *z_radh;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rslsll", &z_radh,
&hostname, &hostname_len,
&port,
&secret, &secret_len,
&timeout, &maxtries) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(raddesc, radius_descriptor *, &z_radh, -1, "rad_handle", le_radius);
if (rad_add_server(raddesc->radh, hostname, port, secret, timeout, maxtries) == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document::Document(const DocumentInit& initializer,
DocumentClassFlags document_classes)
: ContainerNode(0, kCreateDocument),
TreeScope(*this),
has_nodes_with_placeholder_style_(false),
evaluate_media_queries_on_style_recalc_(false),
pending_sheet_layout_(kNoLayoutWithPendingSheets),
frame_(initializer.GetFrame()),
dom_window_(frame_ ? frame_->DomWindow() : nullptr),
imports_controller_(this, initializer.ImportsController()),
parser_(this, nullptr),
context_features_(ContextFeatures::DefaultSwitch()),
well_formed_(false),
implementation_(this, nullptr),
printing_(kNotPrinting),
paginated_for_screen_(false),
compatibility_mode_(kNoQuirksMode),
compatibility_mode_locked_(false),
has_autofocused_(false),
clear_focused_element_timer_(
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kUnspecedTimer, this),
this,
&Document::ClearFocusedElementTimerFired),
dom_tree_version_(++global_tree_version_),
style_version_(0),
listener_types_(0),
mutation_observer_types_(0),
style_engine_(this, nullptr),
style_sheet_list_(this, nullptr),
visited_link_state_(VisitedLinkState::Create(*this)),
visually_ordered_(false),
ready_state_(kComplete),
parsing_state_(kFinishedParsing),
goto_anchor_needed_after_stylesheets_load_(false),
contains_validity_style_rules_(false),
contains_plugins_(false),
ignore_destructive_write_count_(0),
throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_(0),
markers_(new DocumentMarkerController(*this)),
update_focus_appearance_timer_(
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kUnspecedTimer, this),
this,
&Document::UpdateFocusAppearanceTimerFired),
css_target_(nullptr),
load_event_progress_(kLoadEventCompleted),
start_time_(CurrentTime()),
script_runner_(ScriptRunner::Create(this)),
xml_version_("1.0"),
xml_standalone_(kStandaloneUnspecified),
has_xml_declaration_(0),
design_mode_(false),
is_running_exec_command_(false),
has_annotated_regions_(false),
annotated_regions_dirty_(false),
document_classes_(document_classes),
is_view_source_(false),
saw_elements_in_known_namespaces_(false),
is_srcdoc_document_(initializer.ShouldTreatURLAsSrcdocDocument()),
is_mobile_document_(false),
layout_view_(0),
context_document_(initializer.ContextDocument()),
has_fullscreen_supplement_(false),
load_event_delay_count_(0),
load_event_delay_timer_(
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kNetworking, this),
this,
&Document::LoadEventDelayTimerFired),
plugin_loading_timer_(
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kUnspecedLoading, this),
this,
&Document::PluginLoadingTimerFired),
document_timing_(*this),
write_recursion_is_too_deep_(false),
write_recursion_depth_(0),
registration_context_(initializer.RegistrationContext(this)),
element_data_cache_clear_timer_(
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kUnspecedTimer, this),
this,
&Document::ElementDataCacheClearTimerFired),
timeline_(DocumentTimeline::Create(this)),
compositor_pending_animations_(new CompositorPendingAnimations(*this)),
template_document_host_(nullptr),
did_associate_form_controls_timer_(
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kUnspecedLoading, this),
this,
&Document::DidAssociateFormControlsTimerFired),
timers_(TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kTimer, this)),
has_viewport_units_(false),
parser_sync_policy_(kAllowAsynchronousParsing),
node_count_(0),
would_load_reason_(WouldLoadReason::kInvalid),
password_count_(0),
logged_field_edit_(false),
engagement_level_(mojom::blink::EngagementLevel::NONE) {
if (frame_) {
DCHECK(frame_->GetPage());
ProvideContextFeaturesToDocumentFrom(*this, *frame_->GetPage());
fetcher_ = frame_->Loader().GetDocumentLoader()->Fetcher();
FrameFetchContext::ProvideDocumentToContext(fetcher_->Context(), this);
CustomElementRegistry* registry =
frame_->DomWindow() ? frame_->DomWindow()->MaybeCustomElements()
: nullptr;
if (registry && registration_context_)
registry->Entangle(registration_context_);
} else if (imports_controller_) {
fetcher_ = FrameFetchContext::CreateFetcherFromDocument(this);
} else {
fetcher_ = ResourceFetcher::Create(
nullptr, Platform::Current()->CurrentThread()->GetWebTaskRunner());
}
DCHECK(fetcher_);
root_scroller_controller_ = RootScrollerController::Create(*this);
if (initializer.ShouldSetURL()) {
SetURL(initializer.Url());
} else {
UpdateBaseURL();
}
InitSecurityContext(initializer);
InitDNSPrefetch();
InstanceCounters::IncrementCounter(InstanceCounters::kDocumentCounter);
lifecycle_.AdvanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::kInactive);
style_engine_ = StyleEngine::Create(*this);
DCHECK(!ParentDocument() || !ParentDocument()->IsContextSuspended());
#ifndef NDEBUG
liveDocumentSet().insert(this);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::OnBoundsChanged(const gfx::Rect& previous_bounds) {
if (!interactive_resize_)
return;
auto now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (!interactive_resize_->last_resize_timestamp.is_null()) {
const auto& current_size = size();
if (current_size == previous_bounds.size())
return;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_TIMES("BrowserWindow.Resize.StepInterval",
now - interactive_resize_->last_resize_timestamp,
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(1),
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(1), 50);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS(
"BrowserWindow.Resize.StepBoundsChange.Width",
std::abs(previous_bounds.size().width() - current_size.width()),
1 /* min */, 300 /* max */, 100 /* buckets */);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS(
"BrowserWindow.Resize.StepBoundsChange.Height",
std::abs(previous_bounds.size().height() - current_size.height()),
1 /* min */, 300 /* max */, 100 /* buckets */);
}
++interactive_resize_->step_count;
interactive_resize_->last_resize_timestamp = now;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lua_map_to_storage_harness(request_rec *r)
{
return lua_request_rec_hook_harness(r, "map_to_storage", APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fbFetch_x4a4 (const FbBits *bits, int x, int width, CARD32 *buffer, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
const CARD8 *pixel = (const CARD8 *)bits + x;
const CARD8 *end = pixel + width;
while (pixel < end) {
CARD8 p = READ(pixel++) & 0xf;
WRITE(buffer++, (p | (p << 4)) << 24);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cleanup_exit(int i)
{
cleanup_socket();
_exit(i);
}
Commit Message: add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load (via
ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@
CWE ID: CWE-426 | 0 | 72,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t Notification::maxActions()
{
if (!notificationManager())
return 2;
return notificationManager()->maxActions();
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID: | 0 | 119,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: reverse(u8 *out, size_t outlen, const u8 *in, size_t inlen)
{
if (inlen > outlen)
return SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
outlen = inlen;
while (inlen--)
*out++ = in[inlen];
return outlen;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,465 |
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