instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
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int64 0
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int64 0
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::SetFocusToLocationBar(bool select_all) {
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (!force_location_bar_focus_ && !IsActive())
return;
#endif
std::unique_ptr<ImmersiveRevealedLock> focus_reveal_lock(
immersive_mode_controller_->GetRevealedLock(
ImmersiveModeController::ANIMATE_REVEAL_YES));
LocationBarView* location_bar = GetLocationBarView();
if (location_bar->omnibox_view()->IsFocusable()) {
location_bar->FocusLocation(select_all);
} else {
views::FocusManager* focus_manager = GetFocusManager();
DCHECK(focus_manager);
focus_manager->ClearFocus();
}
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::InstallFeatureName(
v8::Isolate* isolate,
const DOMWrapperWorld& world,
v8::Local<v8::Object> instance,
v8::Local<v8::Object> prototype,
v8::Local<v8::Function> interface) {
v8::Local<v8::FunctionTemplate> interface_template =
V8TestObject::GetWrapperTypeInfo()->DomTemplate(isolate, world);
v8::Local<v8::Signature> signature = v8::Signature::New(isolate, interface_template);
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(signature);
static constexpr V8DOMConfiguration::AccessorConfiguration
kAccessorConfigurations[] = {
{ "originTrialEnabledLongAttribute", V8TestObject::OriginTrialEnabledLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::OriginTrialEnabledLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "unscopableOriginTrialEnabledLongAttribute", V8TestObject::UnscopableOriginTrialEnabledLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::UnscopableOriginTrialEnabledLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
};
V8DOMConfiguration::InstallAccessors(
isolate, world, instance, prototype, interface,
signature, kAccessorConfigurations,
base::size(kAccessorConfigurations));
static constexpr V8DOMConfiguration::MethodConfiguration
kOriginTrialEnabledVoidMethodConfigurations[] = {
{"originTrialEnabledVoidMethod", V8TestObject::OriginTrialEnabledVoidMethodMethodCallback, 0, v8::None, V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kDoNotCheckAccess, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds}
};
for (const auto& config : kOriginTrialEnabledVoidMethodConfigurations) {
V8DOMConfiguration::InstallMethod(
isolate, world, instance, prototype,
interface, signature, config);
}
static constexpr V8DOMConfiguration::MethodConfiguration
kPerWorldBindingsOriginTrialEnabledVoidMethodConfigurations[] = {
{"perWorldBindingsOriginTrialEnabledVoidMethod", V8TestObject::PerWorldBindingsOriginTrialEnabledVoidMethodMethodCallbackForMainWorld, 0, v8::None, V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kDoNotCheckAccess, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kMainWorld},
{"perWorldBindingsOriginTrialEnabledVoidMethod", V8TestObject::PerWorldBindingsOriginTrialEnabledVoidMethodMethodCallback, 0, v8::None, V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kDoNotCheckAccess, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kNonMainWorlds}
};
for (const auto& config : kPerWorldBindingsOriginTrialEnabledVoidMethodConfigurations) {
V8DOMConfiguration::InstallMethod(
isolate, world, instance, prototype,
interface, signature, config);
}
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t WebMediaPlayerImpl::VideoDecodedByteCount() const {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
return GetPipelineStatistics().video_bytes_decoded;
}
Commit Message: Fix HasSingleSecurityOrigin for HLS
HLS manifests can request segments from a different origin than the
original manifest's origin. We do not inspect HLS manifests within
Chromium, and instead delegate to Android's MediaPlayer. This means we
need to be conservative, and always assume segments might come from a
different origin. HasSingleSecurityOrigin should always return false
when decoding HLS.
Bug: 864283
Change-Id: Ie16849ac6f29ae7eaa9caf342ad0509a226228ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142691
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Thomas Guilbert <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576378}
CWE ID: CWE-346 | 0 | 154,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void createSharedObjects(void) {
int j;
shared.crlf = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew("\r\n"));
shared.ok = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew("+OK\r\n"));
shared.err = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew("-ERR\r\n"));
shared.emptybulk = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew("$0\r\n\r\n"));
shared.czero = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(":0\r\n"));
shared.cone = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(":1\r\n"));
shared.cnegone = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(":-1\r\n"));
shared.nullbulk = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew("$-1\r\n"));
shared.nullmultibulk = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew("*-1\r\n"));
shared.emptymultibulk = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew("*0\r\n"));
shared.pong = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew("+PONG\r\n"));
shared.queued = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew("+QUEUED\r\n"));
shared.emptyscan = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew("*2\r\n$1\r\n0\r\n*0\r\n"));
shared.wrongtypeerr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-WRONGTYPE Operation against a key holding the wrong kind of value\r\n"));
shared.nokeyerr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-ERR no such key\r\n"));
shared.syntaxerr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-ERR syntax error\r\n"));
shared.sameobjecterr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-ERR source and destination objects are the same\r\n"));
shared.outofrangeerr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-ERR index out of range\r\n"));
shared.noscripterr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-NOSCRIPT No matching script. Please use EVAL.\r\n"));
shared.loadingerr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-LOADING Redis is loading the dataset in memory\r\n"));
shared.slowscripterr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-BUSY Redis is busy running a script. You can only call SCRIPT KILL or SHUTDOWN NOSAVE.\r\n"));
shared.masterdownerr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-MASTERDOWN Link with MASTER is down and slave-serve-stale-data is set to 'no'.\r\n"));
shared.bgsaveerr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-MISCONF Redis is configured to save RDB snapshots, but is currently not able to persist on disk. Commands that may modify the data set are disabled. Please check Redis logs for details about the error.\r\n"));
shared.roslaveerr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-READONLY You can't write against a read only slave.\r\n"));
shared.noautherr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-NOAUTH Authentication required.\r\n"));
shared.oomerr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-OOM command not allowed when used memory > 'maxmemory'.\r\n"));
shared.execaborterr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-EXECABORT Transaction discarded because of previous errors.\r\n"));
shared.noreplicaserr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-NOREPLICAS Not enough good slaves to write.\r\n"));
shared.busykeyerr = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(
"-BUSYKEY Target key name already exists.\r\n"));
shared.space = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(" "));
shared.colon = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew(":"));
shared.plus = createObject(OBJ_STRING,sdsnew("+"));
for (j = 0; j < PROTO_SHARED_SELECT_CMDS; j++) {
char dictid_str[64];
int dictid_len;
dictid_len = ll2string(dictid_str,sizeof(dictid_str),j);
shared.select[j] = createObject(OBJ_STRING,
sdscatprintf(sdsempty(),
"*2\r\n$6\r\nSELECT\r\n$%d\r\n%s\r\n",
dictid_len, dictid_str));
}
shared.messagebulk = createStringObject("$7\r\nmessage\r\n",13);
shared.pmessagebulk = createStringObject("$8\r\npmessage\r\n",14);
shared.subscribebulk = createStringObject("$9\r\nsubscribe\r\n",15);
shared.unsubscribebulk = createStringObject("$11\r\nunsubscribe\r\n",18);
shared.psubscribebulk = createStringObject("$10\r\npsubscribe\r\n",17);
shared.punsubscribebulk = createStringObject("$12\r\npunsubscribe\r\n",19);
shared.del = createStringObject("DEL",3);
shared.rpop = createStringObject("RPOP",4);
shared.lpop = createStringObject("LPOP",4);
shared.lpush = createStringObject("LPUSH",5);
for (j = 0; j < OBJ_SHARED_INTEGERS; j++) {
shared.integers[j] = createObject(OBJ_STRING,(void*)(long)j);
shared.integers[j]->encoding = OBJ_ENCODING_INT;
}
for (j = 0; j < OBJ_SHARED_BULKHDR_LEN; j++) {
shared.mbulkhdr[j] = createObject(OBJ_STRING,
sdscatprintf(sdsempty(),"*%d\r\n",j));
shared.bulkhdr[j] = createObject(OBJ_STRING,
sdscatprintf(sdsempty(),"$%d\r\n",j));
}
/* The following two shared objects, minstring and maxstrings, are not
* actually used for their value but as a special object meaning
* respectively the minimum possible string and the maximum possible
* string in string comparisons for the ZRANGEBYLEX command. */
shared.minstring = createStringObject("minstring",9);
shared.maxstring = createStringObject("maxstring",9);
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 70,009 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FT_Bitmap_Copy( FT_Library library,
const FT_Bitmap *source,
FT_Bitmap *target)
{
FT_Memory memory = library->memory;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_Int pitch = source->pitch;
FT_ULong size;
if ( source == target )
return FT_Err_Ok;
if ( source->buffer == NULL )
{
*target = *source;
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
if ( pitch < 0 )
pitch = -pitch;
size = (FT_ULong)( pitch * source->rows );
if ( target->buffer )
{
FT_Int target_pitch = target->pitch;
FT_ULong target_size;
if ( target_pitch < 0 )
target_pitch = -target_pitch;
target_size = (FT_ULong)( target_pitch * target->rows );
if ( target_size != size )
(void)FT_QREALLOC( target->buffer, target_size, size );
}
else
(void)FT_QALLOC( target->buffer, size );
if ( !error )
{
unsigned char *p;
p = target->buffer;
*target = *source;
target->buffer = p;
FT_MEM_COPY( target->buffer, source->buffer, size );
}
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 164,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
{
int len = strlen(opt);
return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
}
Commit Message: x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB
The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack
Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attacks,
making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to
BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+).
Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on
context switch when the generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled.
[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
CWE ID: | 0 | 79,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::UpdatePrintSettings(
const DictionaryValue& job_settings, bool is_preview) {
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params settings;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_UpdatePrintSettings(routing_id(),
print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie, job_settings, &settings));
if (settings.params.dpi < kMinDpi || !settings.params.document_cookie) {
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_UPDATING_PRINT_SETTINGS);
return false;
}
if (is_preview) {
if (!job_settings.GetString(printing::kPreviewUIAddr,
&(settings.params.preview_ui_addr)) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kPreviewRequestID,
&(settings.params.preview_request_id)) ||
!job_settings.GetBoolean(printing::kIsFirstRequest,
&(settings.params.is_first_request))) {
NOTREACHED();
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING);
return false;
}
if (settings.params.is_first_request &&
!print_preview_context_.IsModifiable()) {
settings.params.display_header_footer = false;
}
PageSizeMargins default_page_layout;
GetPageSizeAndMarginsInPoints(NULL, -1, settings.params,
&default_page_layout);
if (!old_print_pages_params_.get() ||
!PageLayoutIsEqual(*old_print_pages_params_, settings)) {
Send(new PrintHostMsg_DidGetDefaultPageLayout(routing_id(),
default_page_layout));
}
SetCustomMarginsIfSelected(job_settings, &settings);
if (settings.params.display_header_footer) {
header_footer_info_.reset(new DictionaryValue());
header_footer_info_->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterDate,
settings.params.date);
header_footer_info_->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterURL,
settings.params.url);
header_footer_info_->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterTitle,
settings.params.title);
}
}
print_pages_params_.reset(new PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params(settings));
Send(new PrintHostMsg_DidGetDocumentCookie(routing_id(),
settings.params.document_cookie));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ut8 bin_reloc_size(RBinReloc *reloc) {
#define CASE(T) case R_BIN_RELOC_ ## T: return (T) / 8
switch (reloc->type) {
CASE(8);
CASE(16);
CASE(32);
CASE(64);
}
return 0;
#undef CASE
}
Commit Message: More fixes for the CVE-2019-14745
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 96,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DateTimeFieldElement::supportsFocus() const
{
return true;
}
Commit Message: INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 103,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ActivateImplicitGrab(DeviceIntPtr dev, ClientPtr client, WindowPtr win,
xEvent *event, Mask deliveryMask)
{
GrabPtr tempGrab;
OtherInputMasks *inputMasks;
CARD8 type = event->u.u.type;
enum InputLevel grabtype;
if (type == ButtonPress)
grabtype = CORE;
else if (type == DeviceButtonPress)
grabtype = XI;
else if ((type = xi2_get_type(event)) == XI_ButtonPress)
grabtype = XI2;
else
return FALSE;
tempGrab = AllocGrab(NULL);
if (!tempGrab)
return FALSE;
tempGrab->next = NULL;
tempGrab->device = dev;
tempGrab->resource = client->clientAsMask;
tempGrab->window = win;
tempGrab->ownerEvents = (deliveryMask & OwnerGrabButtonMask) ? TRUE : FALSE;
tempGrab->eventMask = deliveryMask;
tempGrab->keyboardMode = GrabModeAsync;
tempGrab->pointerMode = GrabModeAsync;
tempGrab->confineTo = NullWindow;
tempGrab->cursor = NullCursor;
tempGrab->type = type;
tempGrab->grabtype = grabtype;
/* get the XI and XI2 device mask */
inputMasks = wOtherInputMasks(win);
tempGrab->deviceMask = (inputMasks) ? inputMasks->inputEvents[dev->id] : 0;
if (inputMasks)
xi2mask_merge(tempGrab->xi2mask, inputMasks->xi2mask);
(*dev->deviceGrab.ActivateGrab) (dev, tempGrab,
currentTime, TRUE | ImplicitGrabMask);
FreeGrab(tempGrab);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void scsi_disk_release(struct device *dev)
{
struct scsi_disk *sdkp = to_scsi_disk(dev);
struct gendisk *disk = sdkp->disk;
spin_lock(&sd_index_lock);
ida_remove(&sd_index_ida, sdkp->index);
spin_unlock(&sd_index_lock);
disk->private_data = NULL;
put_disk(disk);
put_device(&sdkp->device->sdev_gendev);
kfree(sdkp);
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 94,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void svc_rdma_put_context(struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt, int free_pages)
{
struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt = ctxt->xprt;
int i;
if (free_pages)
for (i = 0; i < ctxt->count; i++)
put_page(ctxt->pages[i]);
spin_lock(&xprt->sc_ctxt_lock);
xprt->sc_ctxt_used--;
list_add(&ctxt->list, &xprt->sc_ctxts);
spin_unlock(&xprt->sc_ctxt_lock);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 66,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderThreadImpl::SharedMainThreadContextProvider() {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (SynchronousCompositorFactory* factory =
SynchronousCompositorFactory::GetInstance())
return factory->GetSharedOffscreenContextProviderForMainThread();
#endif
if (!shared_main_thread_contexts_ ||
shared_main_thread_contexts_->DestroyedOnMainThread()) {
shared_main_thread_contexts_ = ContextProviderCommandBuffer::Create(
CreateOffscreenContext3d(), "Offscreen-MainThread");
}
if (shared_main_thread_contexts_ &&
!shared_main_thread_contexts_->BindToCurrentThread())
shared_main_thread_contexts_ = NULL;
return shared_main_thread_contexts_;
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DOMWindow* Document::open(LocalDOMWindow* current_window,
LocalDOMWindow* entered_window,
const USVStringOrTrustedURL& stringOrUrl,
const AtomicString& name,
const AtomicString& features,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (!domWindow()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidAccessError,
"The document has no window associated.");
return nullptr;
}
AtomicString frame_name = name.IsEmpty() ? "_blank" : name;
return domWindow()->open(stringOrUrl, frame_name, features, current_window,
entered_window, exception_state);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::nodeWillBeRemoved(Node* n)
{
HashSet<NodeIterator*>::const_iterator nodeIteratorsEnd = m_nodeIterators.end();
for (HashSet<NodeIterator*>::const_iterator it = m_nodeIterators.begin(); it != nodeIteratorsEnd; ++it)
(*it)->nodeWillBeRemoved(n);
if (!m_ranges.isEmpty()) {
HashSet<Range*>::const_iterator rangesEnd = m_ranges.end();
for (HashSet<Range*>::const_iterator it = m_ranges.begin(); it != rangesEnd; ++it)
(*it)->nodeWillBeRemoved(n);
}
if (Frame* frame = this->frame()) {
frame->eventHandler()->nodeWillBeRemoved(n);
frame->selection().nodeWillBeRemoved(n);
frame->page()->dragCaretController().nodeWillBeRemoved(n);
}
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fht16x16_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fht16x16_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PresentationConnection::didFailLoadingBlob(
FileError::ErrorCode errorCode) {
ASSERT(!m_messages.isEmpty() && m_messages.first()->type == MessageTypeBlob);
m_messages.removeFirst();
m_blobLoader.clear();
handleMessageQueue();
}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputDispatcher::onDispatchCycleFinishedLocked(
nsecs_t currentTime, const sp<Connection>& connection, uint32_t seq, bool handled) {
CommandEntry* commandEntry = postCommandLocked(
& InputDispatcher::doDispatchCycleFinishedLockedInterruptible);
commandEntry->connection = connection;
commandEntry->eventTime = currentTime;
commandEntry->seq = seq;
commandEntry->handled = handled;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 163,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hrtick_start(struct rq *rq, u64 delay)
{
struct hrtimer *timer = &rq->hrtick_timer;
ktime_t time = ktime_add_ns(timer->base->get_time(), delay);
hrtimer_set_expires(timer, time);
if (rq == this_rq()) {
hrtimer_restart(timer);
} else if (!rq->hrtick_csd_pending) {
__smp_call_function_single(cpu_of(rq), &rq->hrtick_csd, 0);
rq->hrtick_csd_pending = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int posix_cpu_timer_del(struct k_itimer *timer)
{
struct task_struct *p = timer->it.cpu.task;
int ret = 0;
if (likely(p != NULL)) {
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
if (unlikely(p->signal == NULL)) {
/*
* We raced with the reaping of the task.
* The deletion should have cleared us off the list.
*/
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&timer->it.cpu.entry));
} else {
spin_lock(&p->sighand->siglock);
if (timer->it.cpu.firing)
ret = TIMER_RETRY;
else
list_del(&timer->it.cpu.entry);
spin_unlock(&p->sighand->siglock);
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
if (!ret)
put_task_struct(p);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tun_set_sndbuf(struct tun_struct *tun)
{
struct tun_file *tfile;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < tun->numqueues; i++) {
tfile = rtnl_dereference(tun->tfiles[i]);
tfile->socket.sk->sk_sndbuf = tun->sndbuf;
}
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: errors_show(struct md_rdev *rdev, char *page)
{
return sprintf(page, "%d\n", atomic_read(&rdev->corrected_errors));
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evdns_base_config_windows_nameservers(struct evdns_base *base)
{
int r;
char *fname;
if (base == NULL)
base = current_base;
if (base == NULL)
return -1;
EVDNS_LOCK(base);
fname = evdns_get_default_hosts_filename();
log(EVDNS_LOG_DEBUG, "Loading hosts entries from %s", fname);
evdns_base_load_hosts(base, fname);
if (fname)
mm_free(fname);
if (load_nameservers_with_getnetworkparams(base) == 0) {
EVDNS_UNLOCK(base);
return 0;
}
r = load_nameservers_from_registry(base);
EVDNS_UNLOCK(base);
return r;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetAndResetHasTouchEventHandlerCallCount(bool state) {
int value = has_touch_event_handler_count_[state];
has_touch_event_handler_count_[state] = 0;
return value;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::enableTargetedStyleRecalc(bool enable)
{
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::setTargetedStyleRecalcEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove SpeechSynthesis runtime flag (status=stable)
BUG=402536
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/482273005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180763 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 0 | 116,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool btif_config_set_bin(const char *section, const char *key, const uint8_t *value, size_t length) {
const char *lookup = "0123456789abcdef";
assert(config != NULL);
assert(section != NULL);
assert(key != NULL);
if (length > 0)
assert(value != NULL);
char *str = (char *)osi_calloc(length * 2 + 1);
if (!str)
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
str[(i * 2) + 0] = lookup[(value[i] >> 4) & 0x0F];
str[(i * 2) + 1] = lookup[value[i] & 0x0F];
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&lock);
config_set_string(config, section, key, str);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&lock);
osi_free(str);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int iwgif_read_screen_descriptor(struct iwgifrcontext *rctx)
{
int has_global_ct;
int global_ct_size;
int aspect_ratio_code;
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,7)) return 0;
rctx->screen_width = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[0]);
rctx->screen_height = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[2]);
has_global_ct = (int)((rctx->rbuf[4]>>7)&0x01);
if(has_global_ct) {
global_ct_size = (int)(rctx->rbuf[4]&0x07);
rctx->colortable.num_entries = 1<<(1+global_ct_size);
rctx->bg_color_index = (int)rctx->rbuf[5];
if(rctx->bg_color_index < rctx->colortable.num_entries)
rctx->has_bg_color = 1;
}
aspect_ratio_code = (int)rctx->rbuf[6];
if(aspect_ratio_code!=0) {
rctx->img->density_code = IW_DENSITY_UNITS_UNKNOWN;
rctx->img->density_x = 64000.0/(double)(aspect_ratio_code + 15);
rctx->img->density_y = 1000.0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a GIF decoding bug (divide by zero)
Fixes issue #15
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 66,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
size_t buflen)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
struct key *mkey;
const u8 *master_key;
size_t master_keylen;
char derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
char *ascii_buf;
size_t asciiblob_len;
int ret;
epayload = dereference_key_locked(key);
/* returns the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data, and hmac as ascii */
asciiblob_len = epayload->datablob_len + ivsize + 1
+ roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize)
+ (HASH_SIZE * 2);
if (!buffer || buflen < asciiblob_len)
return asciiblob_len;
mkey = request_master_key(epayload, &master_key, &master_keylen);
if (IS_ERR(mkey))
return PTR_ERR(mkey);
ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, ENC_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = derived_key_encrypt(epayload, derived_key, sizeof derived_key);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = datablob_hmac_append(epayload, master_key, master_keylen);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ascii_buf = datablob_format(epayload, asciiblob_len);
if (!ascii_buf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
up_read(&mkey->sem);
key_put(mkey);
memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
kzfree(ascii_buf);
return asciiblob_len;
out:
up_read(&mkey->sem);
key_put(mkey);
memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_run_lazyinit_thread(void)
{
ext4_lazyinit_task = kthread_run(ext4_lazyinit_thread,
ext4_li_info, "ext4lazyinit");
if (IS_ERR(ext4_lazyinit_task)) {
int err = PTR_ERR(ext4_lazyinit_task);
ext4_clear_request_list();
del_timer_sync(&ext4_li_info->li_timer);
kfree(ext4_li_info);
ext4_li_info = NULL;
printk(KERN_CRIT "EXT4: error %d creating inode table "
"initialization thread\n",
err);
return err;
}
ext4_li_info->li_state |= EXT4_LAZYINIT_RUNNING;
wait_event(ext4_li_info->li_wait_task, ext4_li_info->li_task != NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: init timer earlier to avoid a kernel panic in __save_error_info
During mount, when we fail to open journal inode or root inode, the
__save_error_info will mod_timer. But actually s_err_report isn't
initialized yet and the kernel oops. The detailed information can
be found https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32082.
The best way is to check whether the timer s_err_report is initialized
or not. But it seems that in include/linux/timer.h, we can't find a
good function to check the status of this timer, so this patch just
move the initializtion of s_err_report earlier so that we can avoid
the kernel panic. The corresponding del_timer is also added in the
error path.
Reported-by: Sami Liedes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_v6_from_sk(union sctp_addr *addr, struct sock *sk)
{
addr->v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
addr->v6.sin6_port = 0;
addr->v6.sin6_addr = inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit
Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:
SCTP + IPv4:
22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):
SCTP + IPv6:
22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]
Moreover, Alan says:
This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.
In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):
...
0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000 ]p.......}.l....
0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000 ....plaintext...
Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.
SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.
SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.
Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:
SCTP + IPv6:
08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296
This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.
[1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
Reported-by: Alan Chester <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 29,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: prev_nonnull_line(Line *line)
{
Line *l;
for (l = line; l != NULL && l->len == 0; l = l->prev) ;
if (l == NULL || l->len == 0)
return -1;
Currentbuf->currentLine = l;
if (l != line)
Currentbuf->pos = Currentbuf->currentLine->len;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 84,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int webp_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data, int *got_frame,
AVPacket *avpkt)
{
AVFrame * const p = data;
WebPContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
GetByteContext gb;
int ret;
uint32_t chunk_type, chunk_size;
int vp8x_flags = 0;
s->avctx = avctx;
s->width = 0;
s->height = 0;
*got_frame = 0;
s->has_alpha = 0;
s->has_exif = 0;
bytestream2_init(&gb, avpkt->data, avpkt->size);
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&gb) < 12)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (bytestream2_get_le32(&gb) != MKTAG('R', 'I', 'F', 'F')) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "missing RIFF tag\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
chunk_size = bytestream2_get_le32(&gb);
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&gb) < chunk_size)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (bytestream2_get_le32(&gb) != MKTAG('W', 'E', 'B', 'P')) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "missing WEBP tag\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
while (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&gb) > 8) {
char chunk_str[5] = { 0 };
chunk_type = bytestream2_get_le32(&gb);
chunk_size = bytestream2_get_le32(&gb);
if (chunk_size == UINT32_MAX)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
chunk_size += chunk_size & 1;
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&gb) < chunk_size)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
switch (chunk_type) {
case MKTAG('V', 'P', '8', ' '):
if (!*got_frame) {
ret = vp8_lossy_decode_frame(avctx, p, got_frame,
avpkt->data + bytestream2_tell(&gb),
chunk_size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
bytestream2_skip(&gb, chunk_size);
break;
case MKTAG('V', 'P', '8', 'L'):
if (!*got_frame) {
ret = vp8_lossless_decode_frame(avctx, p, got_frame,
avpkt->data + bytestream2_tell(&gb),
chunk_size, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
avctx->properties |= FF_CODEC_PROPERTY_LOSSLESS;
}
bytestream2_skip(&gb, chunk_size);
break;
case MKTAG('V', 'P', '8', 'X'):
if (s->width || s->height || *got_frame) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Canvas dimensions are already set\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
vp8x_flags = bytestream2_get_byte(&gb);
bytestream2_skip(&gb, 3);
s->width = bytestream2_get_le24(&gb) + 1;
s->height = bytestream2_get_le24(&gb) + 1;
ret = av_image_check_size(s->width, s->height, 0, avctx);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
break;
case MKTAG('A', 'L', 'P', 'H'): {
int alpha_header, filter_m, compression;
if (!(vp8x_flags & VP8X_FLAG_ALPHA)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"ALPHA chunk present, but alpha bit not set in the "
"VP8X header\n");
}
if (chunk_size == 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid ALPHA chunk size\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
alpha_header = bytestream2_get_byte(&gb);
s->alpha_data = avpkt->data + bytestream2_tell(&gb);
s->alpha_data_size = chunk_size - 1;
bytestream2_skip(&gb, s->alpha_data_size);
filter_m = (alpha_header >> 2) & 0x03;
compression = alpha_header & 0x03;
if (compression > ALPHA_COMPRESSION_VP8L) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE,
"skipping unsupported ALPHA chunk\n");
} else {
s->has_alpha = 1;
s->alpha_compression = compression;
s->alpha_filter = filter_m;
}
break;
}
case MKTAG('E', 'X', 'I', 'F'): {
int le, ifd_offset, exif_offset = bytestream2_tell(&gb);
AVDictionary *exif_metadata = NULL;
GetByteContext exif_gb;
if (s->has_exif) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Ignoring extra EXIF chunk\n");
goto exif_end;
}
if (!(vp8x_flags & VP8X_FLAG_EXIF_METADATA))
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"EXIF chunk present, but Exif bit not set in the "
"VP8X header\n");
s->has_exif = 1;
bytestream2_init(&exif_gb, avpkt->data + exif_offset,
avpkt->size - exif_offset);
if (ff_tdecode_header(&exif_gb, &le, &ifd_offset) < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid TIFF header "
"in Exif data\n");
goto exif_end;
}
bytestream2_seek(&exif_gb, ifd_offset, SEEK_SET);
if (avpriv_exif_decode_ifd(avctx, &exif_gb, le, 0, &exif_metadata) < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "error decoding Exif data\n");
goto exif_end;
}
av_dict_copy(&((AVFrame *) data)->metadata, exif_metadata, 0);
exif_end:
av_dict_free(&exif_metadata);
bytestream2_skip(&gb, chunk_size);
break;
}
case MKTAG('I', 'C', 'C', 'P'):
case MKTAG('A', 'N', 'I', 'M'):
case MKTAG('A', 'N', 'M', 'F'):
case MKTAG('X', 'M', 'P', ' '):
AV_WL32(chunk_str, chunk_type);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "skipping unsupported chunk: %s\n",
chunk_str);
bytestream2_skip(&gb, chunk_size);
break;
default:
AV_WL32(chunk_str, chunk_type);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "skipping unknown chunk: %s\n",
chunk_str);
bytestream2_skip(&gb, chunk_size);
break;
}
}
if (!*got_frame) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "image data not found\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
return avpkt->size;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 64,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void qemu_spice_destroy_primary_surface(SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd,
uint32_t id, qxl_async_io async)
{
trace_qemu_spice_destroy_primary_surface(ssd->qxl.id, id, async);
if (async != QXL_SYNC) {
spice_qxl_destroy_primary_surface_async(&ssd->qxl, id,
(uintptr_t)qxl_cookie_new(QXL_COOKIE_TYPE_IO,
QXL_IO_DESTROY_PRIMARY_ASYNC));
} else {
spice_qxl_destroy_primary_surface(&ssd->qxl, id);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 12,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FetchManager::Loader::Start() {
if (!ContentSecurityPolicy::ShouldBypassMainWorld(execution_context_) &&
!execution_context_->GetContentSecurityPolicy()->AllowConnectToSource(
fetch_request_data_->Url())) {
PerformNetworkError(
"Refused to connect to '" + fetch_request_data_->Url().ElidedString() +
"' because it violates the document's Content Security Policy.");
return;
}
if ((SecurityOrigin::Create(fetch_request_data_->Url())
->IsSameSchemeHostPort(fetch_request_data_->Origin().get())) ||
(fetch_request_data_->Url().ProtocolIsData() &&
fetch_request_data_->SameOriginDataURLFlag()) ||
(fetch_request_data_->Mode() == FetchRequestMode::kNavigate)) {
PerformSchemeFetch();
return;
}
if (fetch_request_data_->Mode() == FetchRequestMode::kSameOrigin) {
PerformNetworkError("Fetch API cannot load " +
fetch_request_data_->Url().GetString() +
". Request mode is \"same-origin\" but the URL\'s "
"origin is not same as the request origin " +
fetch_request_data_->Origin()->ToString() + ".");
return;
}
if (fetch_request_data_->Mode() == FetchRequestMode::kNoCORS) {
fetch_request_data_->SetResponseTainting(FetchRequestData::kOpaqueTainting);
PerformSchemeFetch();
return;
}
if (!SchemeRegistry::ShouldTreatURLSchemeAsSupportingFetchAPI(
fetch_request_data_->Url().Protocol())) {
PerformNetworkError(
"Fetch API cannot load " + fetch_request_data_->Url().GetString() +
". URL scheme must be \"http\" or \"https\" for CORS request.");
return;
}
fetch_request_data_->SetResponseTainting(FetchRequestData::kCORSTainting);
PerformHTTPFetch();
}
Commit Message: [Fetch API] Fix redirect leak on "no-cors" requests
The spec issue is now fixed, and this CL follows the spec change[1].
1: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/commit/14858d3e9402285a7ff3b5e47a22896ff3adc95d
Bug: 791324
Change-Id: Ic3e3955f43578b38fc44a5a6b2a1b43d56a2becb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023613
Reviewed-by: Tsuyoshi Horo <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552964}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 173,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void last_nettime(struct timeval *last)
{
rd_lock(&netacc_lock);
last->tv_sec = nettime.tv_sec;
last->tv_usec = nettime.tv_usec;
rd_unlock(&netacc_lock);
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cxusb_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
int num)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = i2c_get_adapdata(adap);
int ret;
int i;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&d->i2c_mutex) < 0)
return -EAGAIN;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
if (le16_to_cpu(d->udev->descriptor.idVendor) == USB_VID_MEDION)
switch (msg[i].addr) {
case 0x63:
cxusb_gpio_tuner(d, 0);
break;
default:
cxusb_gpio_tuner(d, 1);
break;
}
if (msg[i].flags & I2C_M_RD) {
/* read only */
u8 obuf[3], ibuf[MAX_XFER_SIZE];
if (1 + msg[i].len > sizeof(ibuf)) {
warn("i2c rd: len=%d is too big!\n",
msg[i].len);
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto unlock;
}
obuf[0] = 0;
obuf[1] = msg[i].len;
obuf[2] = msg[i].addr;
if (cxusb_ctrl_msg(d, CMD_I2C_READ,
obuf, 3,
ibuf, 1+msg[i].len) < 0) {
warn("i2c read failed");
break;
}
memcpy(msg[i].buf, &ibuf[1], msg[i].len);
} else if (i+1 < num && (msg[i+1].flags & I2C_M_RD) &&
msg[i].addr == msg[i+1].addr) {
/* write to then read from same address */
u8 obuf[MAX_XFER_SIZE], ibuf[MAX_XFER_SIZE];
if (3 + msg[i].len > sizeof(obuf)) {
warn("i2c wr: len=%d is too big!\n",
msg[i].len);
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto unlock;
}
if (1 + msg[i + 1].len > sizeof(ibuf)) {
warn("i2c rd: len=%d is too big!\n",
msg[i + 1].len);
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto unlock;
}
obuf[0] = msg[i].len;
obuf[1] = msg[i+1].len;
obuf[2] = msg[i].addr;
memcpy(&obuf[3], msg[i].buf, msg[i].len);
if (cxusb_ctrl_msg(d, CMD_I2C_READ,
obuf, 3+msg[i].len,
ibuf, 1+msg[i+1].len) < 0)
break;
if (ibuf[0] != 0x08)
deb_i2c("i2c read may have failed\n");
memcpy(msg[i+1].buf, &ibuf[1], msg[i+1].len);
i++;
} else {
/* write only */
u8 obuf[MAX_XFER_SIZE], ibuf;
if (2 + msg[i].len > sizeof(obuf)) {
warn("i2c wr: len=%d is too big!\n",
msg[i].len);
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto unlock;
}
obuf[0] = msg[i].addr;
obuf[1] = msg[i].len;
memcpy(&obuf[2], msg[i].buf, msg[i].len);
if (cxusb_ctrl_msg(d, CMD_I2C_WRITE, obuf,
2+msg[i].len, &ibuf,1) < 0)
break;
if (ibuf != 0x08)
deb_i2c("i2c write may have failed\n");
}
}
if (i == num)
ret = num;
else
ret = -EREMOTEIO;
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&d->i2c_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsFloatingVirtualKeyboardEnabled() {
std::string floating_virtual_keyboard_switch =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kFloatingVirtualKeyboard);
return floating_virtual_keyboard_switch ==
switches::kFloatingVirtualKeyboardEnabled;
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cli_parse_stat_resolvers(char **args, char *payload, struct appctx *appctx, void *private)
{
struct dns_resolvers *presolvers;
if (*args[2]) {
list_for_each_entry(presolvers, &dns_resolvers, list) {
if (strcmp(presolvers->id, args[2]) == 0) {
appctx->ctx.cli.p0 = presolvers;
break;
}
}
if (appctx->ctx.cli.p0 == NULL) {
appctx->ctx.cli.severity = LOG_ERR;
appctx->ctx.cli.msg = "Can't find that resolvers section\n";
appctx->st0 = CLI_ST_PRINT;
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Sp_valueOf(js_State *J)
{
js_Object *self = js_toobject(J, 0);
if (self->type != JS_CSTRING) js_typeerror(J, "not a string");
js_pushliteral(J, self->u.s.string);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 90,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rpc_pack(rpc_pkg *pkg, void **data, uint32_t *size)
{
static void *send_buf;
static size_t send_buf_size;
uint32_t pkg_size = RPC_PKG_HEAD_SIZE + pkg->ext_size + pkg->body_size;
if (send_buf_size < pkg_size) {
if (send_buf)
free(send_buf);
send_buf_size = pkg_size * 2;
send_buf = malloc(send_buf_size);
assert(send_buf != NULL);
}
memcpy(send_buf, pkg, RPC_PKG_HEAD_SIZE);
if (pkg->ext_size)
memcpy(send_buf + RPC_PKG_HEAD_SIZE, pkg->ext, pkg->ext_size);
if (pkg->body_size)
memcpy(send_buf + RPC_PKG_HEAD_SIZE + pkg->ext_size, pkg->body, pkg->body_size);
pkg = send_buf;
pkg->magic = htole32(RPC_PKG_MAGIC);
pkg->command = htole32(pkg->command);
pkg->pkg_type = htole16(pkg->pkg_type);
pkg->result = htole32(pkg->result);
pkg->sequence = htole32(pkg->sequence);
pkg->req_id = htole64(pkg->req_id);
pkg->body_size = htole32(pkg->body_size);
pkg->ext_size = htole16(pkg->ext_size);
pkg->crc32 = 0;
pkg->crc32 = htole32(generate_crc32c(send_buf, pkg_size));
*data = send_buf;
*size = pkg_size;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #131 from benjaminchodroff/master
fix memory corruption and other 32bit overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 169,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionApiTest::RunExtensionTestIncognito(
const std::string& extension_name) {
return RunExtensionTestImpl(extension_name,
std::string(),
NULL,
kFlagEnableIncognito | kFlagEnableFileAccess);
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
{
if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
return;
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, eoi_exit_bitmap[0]);
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, eoi_exit_bitmap[1]);
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, eoi_exit_bitmap[2]);
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, eoi_exit_bitmap[3]);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_set_sig_bytes(png_structp png_ptr, int num_bytes)
{
png_debug(1, "in png_set_sig_bytes");
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
if (num_bytes > 8)
png_error(png_ptr, "Too many bytes for PNG signature.");
png_ptr->sig_bytes = (png_byte)(num_bytes < 0 ? 0 : num_bytes);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ObjectBackedNativeHandler::SetPrivate(v8::Local<v8::Context> context,
v8::Local<v8::Object> obj,
const char* key,
v8::Local<v8::Value> value) {
obj->SetPrivate(context, v8::Private::ForApi(context->GetIsolate(),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
context->GetIsolate(), key)),
value)
.FromJust();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vfs_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
long ret;
if (offset < 0 || len <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* Return error if mode is not supported */
if (mode & ~FALLOC_FL_SUPPORTED_MASK)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Punch hole and zero range are mutually exclusive */
if ((mode & (FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE | FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE)) ==
(FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE | FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Punch hole must have keep size set */
if ((mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) &&
!(mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Collapse range should only be used exclusively. */
if ((mode & FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE) &&
(mode & ~FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE))
return -EINVAL;
/* Insert range should only be used exclusively. */
if ((mode & FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE) &&
(mode & ~FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE))
return -EINVAL;
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
return -EBADF;
/*
* We can only allow pure fallocate on append only files
*/
if ((mode & ~FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE) && IS_APPEND(inode))
return -EPERM;
if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode))
return -EPERM;
/*
* We cannot allow any fallocate operation on an active swapfile
*/
if (IS_SWAPFILE(inode))
return -ETXTBSY;
/*
* Revalidate the write permissions, in case security policy has
* changed since the files were opened.
*/
ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode))
return -ESPIPE;
/*
* Let individual file system decide if it supports preallocation
* for directories or not.
*/
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return -ENODEV;
/* Check for wrap through zero too */
if (((offset + len) > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) || ((offset + len) < 0))
return -EFBIG;
if (!file->f_op->fallocate)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
sb_start_write(inode->i_sb);
ret = file->f_op->fallocate(file, mode, offset, len);
/*
* Create inotify and fanotify events.
*
* To keep the logic simple always create events if fallocate succeeds.
* This implies that events are even created if the file size remains
* unchanged, e.g. when using flag FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE.
*/
if (ret == 0)
fsnotify_modify(file);
sb_end_write(inode->i_sb);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: vfs: add vfs_select_inode() helper
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 94,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static dma_addr_t mptsas_ld_sg_base(MPTSASState *s, uint32_t flags_and_length,
dma_addr_t *sgaddr)
{
PCIDevice *pci = (PCIDevice *) s;
dma_addr_t addr;
if (flags_and_length & MPI_SGE_FLAGS_64_BIT_ADDRESSING) {
addr = ldq_le_pci_dma(pci, *sgaddr + 4);
*sgaddr += 12;
} else {
addr = ldl_le_pci_dma(pci, *sgaddr + 4);
*sgaddr += 8;
}
return addr;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillManager::UploadFormData(const FormStructure& submitted_form) {
if (disable_download_manager_requests_)
return;
bool was_autofilled = false;
std::string form_signature = submitted_form.FormSignature();
for (std::list<std::string>::const_iterator it =
autofilled_form_signatures_.begin();
it != autofilled_form_signatures_.end() && !was_autofilled;
++it) {
if (*it == form_signature)
was_autofilled = true;
}
FieldTypeSet non_empty_types;
personal_data_->GetNonEmptyTypes(&non_empty_types);
download_manager_.StartUploadRequest(submitted_form, was_autofilled,
non_empty_types);
}
Commit Message: Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct rtable *__rt_cache_get_next(struct seq_file *seq,
struct rtable *r)
{
struct rt_cache_iter_state *st = seq->private;
r = rcu_dereference_bh(r->dst.rt_next);
while (!r) {
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
do {
if (--st->bucket < 0)
return NULL;
} while (!rcu_dereference_raw(rt_hash_table[st->bucket].chain));
rcu_read_lock_bh();
r = rcu_dereference_bh(rt_hash_table[st->bucket].chain);
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int highlight_string(zval *str, zend_syntax_highlighter_ini *syntax_highlighter_ini, char *str_name TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_lex_state original_lex_state;
zval tmp = *str;
str = &tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(str);
zend_save_lexical_state(&original_lex_state TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_prepare_string_for_scanning(str, str_name TSRMLS_CC)==FAILURE) {
zend_restore_lexical_state(&original_lex_state TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
BEGIN(INITIAL);
zend_highlight(syntax_highlighter_ini TSRMLS_CC);
if (SCNG(script_filtered)) {
efree(SCNG(script_filtered));
SCNG(script_filtered) = NULL;
}
zend_restore_lexical_state(&original_lex_state TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(str);
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fix bug #64660 - yyparse can return 2, not only 1
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 30,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: krb5_init_creds_get_error(krb5_context context,
krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
KRB_ERROR *error)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
ret = copy_KRB_ERROR(&ctx->error, error);
if (ret)
krb5_enomem(context);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320 | 0 | 89,922 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sm_looptest_path_length(p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl, fm_mgr_type_t mgr, int argc, char *argv[]) {
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
fm_msg_ret_code_t ret_code;
int plen=3;
uint8_t data[BUF_SZ];
if (argc > 1) {
printf("Error: only 1 argument expected\n");
return 0;
}
if (argc == 1) {
plen = atol(argv[0]);
if (plen < 2 || plen > 4) {
printf("Error: length must be 2-4\n");
return 0;
}
}
*(int*)data = plen;
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_SM_LOOP_TEST_PATH_LEN, mgr,
BUF_SZ, data, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sm_looptest_path_length: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("Successfully sent Loop Test Path Length set to %d control to local SM instance\n", plen);
data[BUF_SZ-1]=0;
printf("%s", (char*) data);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 96,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tun_net_close(struct net_device *dev)
{
netif_tx_stop_all_queues(dev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void transmit_fragment(BT_HDR *packet, bool send_transmit_finished) {
uint16_t event = packet->event & MSG_EVT_MASK;
serial_data_type_t type = event_to_data_type(event);
btsnoop->capture(packet, false);
hal->transmit_data(type, packet->data + packet->offset, packet->len);
if (event != MSG_STACK_TO_HC_HCI_CMD && send_transmit_finished)
buffer_allocator->free(packet);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_deep_fifo(struct sb_uart_port *port, int status)
{
int afr_status = 0;
afr_status = sb1054_get_register(port, PAGE_4, SB105X_AFR);
if(status == ENABLE)
{
afr_status |= SB105X_AFR_AFEN;
}
else
{
afr_status &= ~SB105X_AFR_AFEN;
}
sb1054_set_register(port,PAGE_4,SB105X_AFR,afr_status);
sb1054_set_register(port,PAGE_4,SB105X_TTR,ttr[port->line]);
sb1054_set_register(port,PAGE_4,SB105X_RTR,rtr[port->line]);
afr_status = sb1054_get_register(port, PAGE_4, SB105X_AFR);
return afr_status;
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *direct_chunkreader(lua_State *lvm, void *udata,
size_t *plen)
{
const char *p;
struct cr_ctx *ctx = udata;
if (ctx->startline) {
*plen = ctx->startline > N_LF ? N_LF : ctx->startline;
ctx->startline -= *plen;
return lf;
}
*plen = config_getstr(ctx->cfp, ctx->buf, HUGE_STRING_LEN);
for (p = ctx->buf; isspace(*p); ++p);
if (p[0] == '<' && p[1] == '/') {
apr_size_t i = 0;
while (i < strlen(ctx->endstr)) {
if (tolower(p[i + 2]) != ctx->endstr[i])
return ctx->buf;
++i;
}
*plen = 0;
return NULL;
}
/*fprintf(stderr, "buf read: %s\n", ctx->buf); */
return ctx->buf;
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RenderBox::lineHeight(bool /*firstLine*/, LineDirectionMode direction, LinePositionMode /*linePositionMode*/) const
{
if (isReplaced())
return direction == HorizontalLine ? m_marginTop + height() + m_marginBottom : m_marginRight + width() + m_marginLeft;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ATSParser::PTSTimeDeltaEstablished() {
if (mPrograms.isEmpty()) {
return false;
}
return mPrograms.editItemAt(0)->PTSTimeDeltaEstablished();
}
Commit Message: Check section size when verifying CRC
Bug: 28333006
Change-Id: Ief7a2da848face78f0edde21e2f2009316076679
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void arcmsr_message_isr_bh_fn(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct AdapterControlBlock *acb = container_of(work,
struct AdapterControlBlock, arcmsr_do_message_isr_bh);
char *acb_dev_map = (char *)acb->device_map;
uint32_t __iomem *signature = NULL;
char __iomem *devicemap = NULL;
int target, lun;
struct scsi_device *psdev;
char diff, temp;
switch (acb->adapter_type) {
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_A: {
struct MessageUnit_A __iomem *reg = acb->pmuA;
signature = (uint32_t __iomem *)(®->message_rwbuffer[0]);
devicemap = (char __iomem *)(®->message_rwbuffer[21]);
break;
}
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_B: {
struct MessageUnit_B *reg = acb->pmuB;
signature = (uint32_t __iomem *)(®->message_rwbuffer[0]);
devicemap = (char __iomem *)(®->message_rwbuffer[21]);
break;
}
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_C: {
struct MessageUnit_C __iomem *reg = acb->pmuC;
signature = (uint32_t __iomem *)(®->msgcode_rwbuffer[0]);
devicemap = (char __iomem *)(®->msgcode_rwbuffer[21]);
break;
}
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_D: {
struct MessageUnit_D *reg = acb->pmuD;
signature = (uint32_t __iomem *)(®->msgcode_rwbuffer[0]);
devicemap = (char __iomem *)(®->msgcode_rwbuffer[21]);
break;
}
}
atomic_inc(&acb->rq_map_token);
if (readl(signature) != ARCMSR_SIGNATURE_GET_CONFIG)
return;
for (target = 0; target < ARCMSR_MAX_TARGETID - 1;
target++) {
temp = readb(devicemap);
diff = (*acb_dev_map) ^ temp;
if (diff != 0) {
*acb_dev_map = temp;
for (lun = 0; lun < ARCMSR_MAX_TARGETLUN;
lun++) {
if ((diff & 0x01) == 1 &&
(temp & 0x01) == 1) {
scsi_add_device(acb->host,
0, target, lun);
} else if ((diff & 0x01) == 1
&& (temp & 0x01) == 0) {
psdev = scsi_device_lookup(acb->host,
0, target, lun);
if (psdev != NULL) {
scsi_remove_device(psdev);
scsi_device_put(psdev);
}
}
temp >>= 1;
diff >>= 1;
}
}
devicemap++;
acb_dev_map++;
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleMultiDrawArraysCHROMIUM(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::MultiDrawArraysCHROMIUM& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::MultiDrawArraysCHROMIUM*>(
cmd_data);
if (!features().webgl_multi_draw) {
return error::kUnknownCommand;
}
GLenum mode = static_cast<GLenum>(c.mode);
GLsizei drawcount = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.drawcount);
uint32_t firsts_size, counts_size;
base::CheckedNumeric<uint32_t> checked_size(drawcount);
if (!(checked_size * sizeof(GLint)).AssignIfValid(&firsts_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (!(checked_size * sizeof(GLsizei)).AssignIfValid(&counts_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
const GLint* firsts = GetSharedMemoryAs<const GLint*>(
c.firsts_shm_id, c.firsts_shm_offset, firsts_size);
const GLsizei* counts = GetSharedMemoryAs<const GLsizei*>(
c.counts_shm_id, c.counts_shm_offset, counts_size);
if (firsts == nullptr) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (counts == nullptr) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (!multi_draw_manager_->MultiDrawArrays(mode, firsts, counts, drawcount)) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mp_chars_in_buffer(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct sb_uart_state *state = tty->driver_data;
return uart_circ_chars_pending(&state->info->xmit);
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_RCVT( INS_ARG )
{
DO_RCVT
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: futex_wake_op(u32 __user *uaddr1, int fshared, u32 __user *uaddr2,
int nr_wake, int nr_wake2, int op)
{
union futex_key key1 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT, key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1, *hb2;
struct plist_head *head;
struct futex_q *this, *next;
int ret, op_ret;
retry:
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr1, fshared, &key1);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, fshared, &key2);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out_put_key1;
hb1 = hash_futex(&key1);
hb2 = hash_futex(&key2);
retry_private:
double_lock_hb(hb1, hb2);
op_ret = futex_atomic_op_inuser(op, uaddr2);
if (unlikely(op_ret < 0)) {
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
/*
* we don't get EFAULT from MMU faults if we don't have an MMU,
* but we might get them from range checking
*/
ret = op_ret;
goto out_put_keys;
#endif
if (unlikely(op_ret != -EFAULT)) {
ret = op_ret;
goto out_put_keys;
}
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr2);
if (ret)
goto out_put_keys;
if (!fshared)
goto retry_private;
put_futex_key(fshared, &key2);
put_futex_key(fshared, &key1);
goto retry;
}
head = &hb1->chain;
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, head, list) {
if (match_futex (&this->key, &key1)) {
wake_futex(this);
if (++ret >= nr_wake)
break;
}
}
if (op_ret > 0) {
head = &hb2->chain;
op_ret = 0;
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, head, list) {
if (match_futex (&this->key, &key2)) {
wake_futex(this);
if (++op_ret >= nr_wake2)
break;
}
}
ret += op_ret;
}
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
out_put_keys:
put_futex_key(fshared, &key2);
out_put_key1:
put_futex_key(fshared, &key1);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<[email protected]>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: John Kacur <[email protected]>
Cc: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 39,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_fast_conn_param(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
/* Disable L2CAP connection parameter updates while bonding since
some peripherals are not able to revert to fast connection parameters
during the start of service discovery. Connection paramter updates
get enabled again once service discovery completes. */
L2CA_EnableUpdateBleConnParams(p_cb->pairing_bda, false);
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nicklist_set_own(CHANNEL_REC *channel, NICK_REC *nick)
{
NICK_REC *first, *next;
channel->ownnick = nick;
/* move our nick in the list to first, makes some things easier
(like handling multiple identical nicks in fe-messages.c) */
first = g_hash_table_lookup(channel->nicks, nick->nick);
if (first->next == NULL)
return;
next = nick->next;
nick->next = first;
while (first->next != nick)
first = first->next;
first->next = next;
g_hash_table_insert(channel->nicks, nick->nick, nick);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 63,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::RegenerateRenderbufferIfNeeded(
Renderbuffer* renderbuffer) {
if (!renderbuffer->RegenerateAndBindBackingObjectIfNeeded(workarounds())) {
return false;
}
if (renderbuffer != state_.bound_renderbuffer.get()) {
state_.bound_renderbuffer_valid = false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static SQLITE_NOINLINE int btreePrevious(BtCursor *pCur, int *pRes){
int rc;
MemPage *pPage;
assert( cursorOwnsBtShared(pCur) );
assert( pRes!=0 );
assert( *pRes==0 );
assert( pCur->skipNext==0 || pCur->eState!=CURSOR_VALID );
assert( (pCur->curFlags & (BTCF_AtLast|BTCF_ValidOvfl|BTCF_ValidNKey))==0 );
assert( pCur->info.nSize==0 );
if( pCur->eState!=CURSOR_VALID ){
rc = restoreCursorPosition(pCur);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ){
return rc;
}
if( CURSOR_INVALID==pCur->eState ){
*pRes = 1;
return SQLITE_OK;
}
if( pCur->skipNext ){
assert( pCur->eState==CURSOR_VALID || pCur->eState==CURSOR_SKIPNEXT );
pCur->eState = CURSOR_VALID;
if( pCur->skipNext<0 ){
pCur->skipNext = 0;
return SQLITE_OK;
}
pCur->skipNext = 0;
}
}
pPage = pCur->apPage[pCur->iPage];
assert( pPage->isInit );
if( !pPage->leaf ){
int idx = pCur->aiIdx[pCur->iPage];
rc = moveToChild(pCur, get4byte(findCell(pPage, idx)));
if( rc ) return rc;
rc = moveToRightmost(pCur);
}else{
while( pCur->aiIdx[pCur->iPage]==0 ){
if( pCur->iPage==0 ){
pCur->eState = CURSOR_INVALID;
*pRes = 1;
return SQLITE_OK;
}
moveToParent(pCur);
}
assert( pCur->info.nSize==0 );
assert( (pCur->curFlags & (BTCF_ValidOvfl))==0 );
pCur->aiIdx[pCur->iPage]--;
pPage = pCur->apPage[pCur->iPage];
if( pPage->intKey && !pPage->leaf ){
rc = sqlite3BtreePrevious(pCur, pRes);
}else{
rc = SQLITE_OK;
}
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sas_ata_printk(const char *level, const struct domain_device *ddev,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
struct ata_port *ap = ddev->sata_dev.ap;
struct device *dev = &ddev->rphy->dev;
struct va_format vaf;
va_list args;
int r;
va_start(args, fmt);
vaf.fmt = fmt;
vaf.va = &args;
r = printk("%ssas: ata%u: %s: %pV",
level, ap->print_id, dev_name(dev), &vaf);
va_end(args);
return r;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
CC: Ewan Milne <[email protected]>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
CC: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
CC: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 85,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BindNetworkContextOnUI(network::mojom::CustomProxyConfigPtr config,
network::mojom::NetworkContextRequest request,
const std::string& user_agent) {
auto params = network::mojom::NetworkContextParams::New();
params->user_agent = user_agent;
params->initial_custom_proxy_config = std::move(config);
content::GetNetworkService()->CreateNetworkContext(std::move(request),
std::move(params));
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dcbnl_cee_notify(struct net_device *dev, int event, int cmd,
u32 seq, u32 portid)
{
return dcbnl_notify(dev, event, cmd, seq, portid, DCB_CAP_DCBX_VER_CEE);
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static cmsHTRANSFORM *DestroyTransformThreadSet(cmsHTRANSFORM *transform)
{
register ssize_t
i;
assert(transform != (cmsHTRANSFORM *) NULL);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource); i++)
if (transform[i] != (cmsHTRANSFORM) NULL)
cmsDeleteTransform(transform[i]);
transform=(cmsHTRANSFORM *) RelinquishMagickMemory(transform);
return(transform);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/354
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 69,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void udp_offload_free_routine(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct udp_offload_priv *ou_priv = container_of(head, struct udp_offload_priv, rcu);
kfree(ou_priv);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void uwbd_event_queue(struct uwb_event *evt)
{
struct uwb_rc *rc = evt->rc;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&rc->uwbd.event_list_lock, flags);
if (rc->uwbd.pid != 0) {
list_add(&evt->list_node, &rc->uwbd.event_list);
wake_up_all(&rc->uwbd.wq);
} else {
__uwb_rc_put(evt->rc);
if (evt->type == UWB_EVT_TYPE_NOTIF)
kfree(evt->notif.rceb);
kfree(evt);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rc->uwbd.event_list_lock, flags);
return;
}
Commit Message: uwb: properly check kthread_run return value
uwbd_start() calls kthread_run() and checks that the return value is
not NULL. But the return value is not NULL in case kthread_run() fails,
it takes the form of ERR_PTR(-EINTR).
Use IS_ERR() instead.
Also add a check to uwbd_stop().
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 60,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t mem_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
char *page;
unsigned long src = *ppos;
int ret = -ESRCH;
struct mm_struct *mm;
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;
if (check_mem_permission(task))
goto out;
ret = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
if (!page)
goto out;
ret = 0;
mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (!mm)
goto out_free;
ret = -EIO;
if (file->private_data != (void*)((long)current->self_exec_id))
goto out_put;
ret = 0;
while (count > 0) {
int this_len, retval;
this_len = (count > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : count;
retval = access_process_vm(task, src, page, this_len, 0);
if (!retval || check_mem_permission(task)) {
if (!ret)
ret = -EIO;
break;
}
if (copy_to_user(buf, page, retval)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
ret += retval;
src += retval;
buf += retval;
count -= retval;
}
*ppos = src;
out_put:
mmput(mm);
out_free:
free_page((unsigned long) page);
out:
put_task_struct(task);
out_no_task:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
{
while (!list_empty(keys)) {
struct key *key =
list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link);
list_del(&key->graveyard_link);
kdebug("- %u", key->serial);
key_check(key);
/* Throw away the key data */
if (key->type->destroy)
key->type->destroy(key);
security_key_free(key);
/* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
key->user->qnkeys--;
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
}
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
key_user_put(key->user);
kfree(key->description);
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC_X;
#endif
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull key handling fixes from David Howells:
"Here are two patches, the first of which at least should go upstream
immediately:
(1) Prevent a user-triggerable crash in the keyrings destructor when a
negatively instantiated keyring is garbage collected. I have also
seen this triggered for user type keys.
(2) Prevent the user from using requesting that a keyring be created
and instantiated through an upcall. Doing so is probably safe
since the keyring type ignores the arguments to its instantiation
function - but we probably shouldn't let keyrings be created in
this manner"
* 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring
KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyring
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 166,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno,
enum reg_arg_type t)
{
if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) {
verbose("R%d is invalid\n", regno);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (t == SRC_OP) {
/* check whether register used as source operand can be read */
if (regs[regno].type == NOT_INIT) {
verbose("R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
return -EACCES;
}
} else {
/* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */
if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) {
verbose("frame pointer is read only\n");
return -EACCES;
}
if (t == DST_OP)
mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
The patch fixes two things at once:
1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 65,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void syn_ack_recalc(struct request_sock *req, const int thresh,
const int max_retries,
const u8 rskq_defer_accept,
int *expire, int *resend)
{
if (!rskq_defer_accept) {
*expire = req->retrans >= thresh;
*resend = 1;
return;
}
*expire = req->retrans >= thresh &&
(!inet_rsk(req)->acked || req->retrans >= max_retries);
/*
* Do not resend while waiting for data after ACK,
* start to resend on end of deferring period to give
* last chance for data or ACK to create established socket.
*/
*resend = !inet_rsk(req)->acked ||
req->retrans >= rskq_defer_accept - 1;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static status_t getFrameSizeByOffset(const sp<DataSource> &source,
off64_t offset, bool isWide, size_t *frameSize) {
uint8_t header;
ssize_t count = source->readAt(offset, &header, 1);
if (count == 0) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
} else if (count < 0) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
unsigned FT = (header >> 3) & 0x0f;
*frameSize = getFrameSize(isWide, FT);
if (*frameSize == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 162,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool did_replace_entry() {
EXPECT_EQ(1U, did_replace_entries_.size());
return did_replace_entries_[0];
}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::SetFocusedElement(Element* new_focused_element,
const FocusParams& params) {
DCHECK(!lifecycle_.InDetach());
clear_focused_element_timer_.Stop();
if (new_focused_element && (new_focused_element->GetDocument() != this))
return true;
if (NodeChildRemovalTracker::IsBeingRemoved(new_focused_element))
return true;
if (focused_element_ == new_focused_element)
return true;
bool focus_change_blocked = false;
Element* old_focused_element = focused_element_;
focused_element_ = nullptr;
UpdateDistribution();
Node* ancestor = (old_focused_element && old_focused_element->isConnected() &&
new_focused_element)
? FlatTreeTraversal::CommonAncestor(*old_focused_element,
*new_focused_element)
: nullptr;
if (old_focused_element) {
old_focused_element->SetFocused(false, params.type);
old_focused_element->SetHasFocusWithinUpToAncestor(false, ancestor);
if (GetPage() && (GetPage()->GetFocusController().IsFocused())) {
old_focused_element->DispatchBlurEvent(new_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
new_focused_element = nullptr;
}
old_focused_element->DispatchFocusOutEvent(EventTypeNames::focusout,
new_focused_element,
params.source_capabilities);
old_focused_element->DispatchFocusOutEvent(EventTypeNames::DOMFocusOut,
new_focused_element,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
new_focused_element = nullptr;
}
}
}
if (new_focused_element)
UpdateStyleAndLayoutTreeForNode(new_focused_element);
if (new_focused_element && new_focused_element->IsFocusable()) {
if (IsRootEditableElement(*new_focused_element) &&
!AcceptsEditingFocus(*new_focused_element)) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
focused_element_ = new_focused_element;
SetSequentialFocusNavigationStartingPoint(focused_element_.Get());
focused_element_->SetFocused(true, params.type);
focused_element_->SetHasFocusWithinUpToAncestor(true, ancestor);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
CancelFocusAppearanceUpdate();
focused_element_->UpdateFocusAppearanceWithOptions(
params.selection_behavior, params.options);
if (GetPage() && (GetPage()->GetFocusController().IsFocused())) {
focused_element_->DispatchFocusEvent(old_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
focused_element_->DispatchFocusInEvent(EventTypeNames::focusin,
old_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
focused_element_->DispatchFocusInEvent(EventTypeNames::DOMFocusIn,
old_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
}
}
if (!focus_change_blocked && focused_element_) {
if (AXObjectCache* cache = GetOrCreateAXObjectCache()) {
cache->HandleFocusedUIElementChanged(old_focused_element,
new_focused_element);
}
}
if (!focus_change_blocked && GetPage()) {
GetPage()->GetChromeClient().FocusedNodeChanged(old_focused_element,
focused_element_.Get());
}
SetFocusedElementDone:
UpdateStyleAndLayoutTree();
if (LocalFrame* frame = GetFrame())
frame->Selection().DidChangeFocus();
return !focus_change_blocked;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 146,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UsbChooserContext::UsbChooserContext(Profile* profile)
: ChooserContextBase(profile,
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_USB_GUARD,
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_USB_CHOOSER_DATA),
is_incognito_(profile->IsOffTheRecord()),
client_binding_(this),
weak_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AccessibilityRole AXNodeObject::nativeAccessibilityRoleIgnoringAria() const {
if (!getNode())
return UnknownRole;
if (getNode()->isLink())
return LinkRole;
if (isHTMLAnchorElement(*getNode())) {
if (isClickable())
return LinkRole;
return AnchorRole;
}
if (isHTMLButtonElement(*getNode()))
return buttonRoleType();
if (isHTMLDetailsElement(*getNode()))
return DetailsRole;
if (isHTMLSummaryElement(*getNode())) {
ContainerNode* parent = FlatTreeTraversal::parent(*getNode());
if (parent && isHTMLDetailsElement(parent))
return DisclosureTriangleRole;
return UnknownRole;
}
if (isHTMLInputElement(*getNode())) {
HTMLInputElement& input = toHTMLInputElement(*getNode());
const AtomicString& type = input.type();
if (input.dataList())
return ComboBoxRole;
if (type == InputTypeNames::button) {
if ((getNode()->parentNode() &&
isHTMLMenuElement(getNode()->parentNode())) ||
(parentObject() && parentObject()->roleValue() == MenuRole))
return MenuItemRole;
return buttonRoleType();
}
if (type == InputTypeNames::checkbox) {
if ((getNode()->parentNode() &&
isHTMLMenuElement(getNode()->parentNode())) ||
(parentObject() && parentObject()->roleValue() == MenuRole))
return MenuItemCheckBoxRole;
return CheckBoxRole;
}
if (type == InputTypeNames::date)
return DateRole;
if (type == InputTypeNames::datetime ||
type == InputTypeNames::datetime_local ||
type == InputTypeNames::month || type == InputTypeNames::week)
return DateTimeRole;
if (type == InputTypeNames::file)
return ButtonRole;
if (type == InputTypeNames::radio) {
if ((getNode()->parentNode() &&
isHTMLMenuElement(getNode()->parentNode())) ||
(parentObject() && parentObject()->roleValue() == MenuRole))
return MenuItemRadioRole;
return RadioButtonRole;
}
if (type == InputTypeNames::number)
return SpinButtonRole;
if (input.isTextButton())
return buttonRoleType();
if (type == InputTypeNames::range)
return SliderRole;
if (type == InputTypeNames::color)
return ColorWellRole;
if (type == InputTypeNames::time)
return InputTimeRole;
return TextFieldRole;
}
if (isHTMLSelectElement(*getNode())) {
HTMLSelectElement& selectElement = toHTMLSelectElement(*getNode());
return selectElement.isMultiple() ? ListBoxRole : PopUpButtonRole;
}
if (isHTMLTextAreaElement(*getNode()))
return TextFieldRole;
if (headingLevel())
return HeadingRole;
if (isHTMLDivElement(*getNode()))
return DivRole;
if (isHTMLMeterElement(*getNode()))
return MeterRole;
if (isHTMLOutputElement(*getNode()))
return StatusRole;
if (isHTMLParagraphElement(*getNode()))
return ParagraphRole;
if (isHTMLLabelElement(*getNode()))
return LabelRole;
if (isHTMLLegendElement(*getNode()))
return LegendRole;
if (isHTMLRubyElement(*getNode()))
return RubyRole;
if (isHTMLDListElement(*getNode()))
return DescriptionListRole;
if (isHTMLAudioElement(*getNode()))
return AudioRole;
if (isHTMLVideoElement(*getNode()))
return VideoRole;
if (getNode()->hasTagName(ddTag))
return DescriptionListDetailRole;
if (getNode()->hasTagName(dtTag))
return DescriptionListTermRole;
if (getNode()->nodeName() == "math")
return MathRole;
if (getNode()->hasTagName(rpTag) || getNode()->hasTagName(rtTag))
return AnnotationRole;
if (isHTMLFormElement(*getNode()))
return FormRole;
if (getNode()->hasTagName(abbrTag))
return AbbrRole;
if (getNode()->hasTagName(articleTag))
return ArticleRole;
if (getNode()->hasTagName(mainTag))
return MainRole;
if (getNode()->hasTagName(markTag))
return MarkRole;
if (getNode()->hasTagName(navTag))
return NavigationRole;
if (getNode()->hasTagName(asideTag))
return ComplementaryRole;
if (getNode()->hasTagName(preTag))
return PreRole;
if (getNode()->hasTagName(sectionTag))
return RegionRole;
if (getNode()->hasTagName(addressTag))
return ContentInfoRole;
if (isHTMLDialogElement(*getNode()))
return DialogRole;
if (isHTMLHtmlElement(*getNode()))
return IgnoredRole;
if (isHTMLIFrameElement(*getNode())) {
const AtomicString& ariaRole =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kRole);
if (ariaRole == "none" || ariaRole == "presentation")
return IframePresentationalRole;
return IframeRole;
}
if (getNode()->hasTagName(headerTag)) {
if (isDescendantOfElementType(getLandmarkRolesNotAllowed()))
return GroupRole;
return BannerRole;
}
if (getNode()->hasTagName(footerTag)) {
if (isDescendantOfElementType(getLandmarkRolesNotAllowed()))
return GroupRole;
return FooterRole;
}
if (getNode()->hasTagName(blockquoteTag))
return BlockquoteRole;
if (getNode()->hasTagName(captionTag))
return CaptionRole;
if (getNode()->hasTagName(figcaptionTag))
return FigcaptionRole;
if (getNode()->hasTagName(figureTag))
return FigureRole;
if (getNode()->nodeName() == "TIME")
return TimeRole;
if (isEmbeddedObject())
return EmbeddedObjectRole;
if (isHTMLHRElement(*getNode()))
return SplitterRole;
if (isFieldset())
return GroupRole;
return UnknownRole;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,198 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_clean(HashTable *ht)
{
Bucket *p, *end;
IS_CONSISTENT(ht);
HT_ASSERT(GC_REFCOUNT(ht) == 1);
if (ht->nNumUsed) {
p = ht->arData;
end = p + ht->nNumUsed;
if (ht->pDestructor) {
if (ht->u.flags & (HASH_FLAG_PACKED|HASH_FLAG_STATIC_KEYS)) {
if (ht->nNumUsed == ht->nNumOfElements) {
do {
ht->pDestructor(&p->val);
} while (++p != end);
} else {
do {
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE(p->val) != IS_UNDEF)) {
ht->pDestructor(&p->val);
}
} while (++p != end);
}
} else if (ht->nNumUsed == ht->nNumOfElements) {
do {
ht->pDestructor(&p->val);
if (EXPECTED(p->key)) {
zend_string_release(p->key);
}
} while (++p != end);
} else {
do {
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE(p->val) != IS_UNDEF)) {
ht->pDestructor(&p->val);
if (EXPECTED(p->key)) {
zend_string_release(p->key);
}
}
} while (++p != end);
}
} else {
if (!(ht->u.flags & (HASH_FLAG_PACKED|HASH_FLAG_STATIC_KEYS))) {
if (ht->nNumUsed == ht->nNumOfElements) {
do {
if (EXPECTED(p->key)) {
zend_string_release(p->key);
}
} while (++p != end);
} else {
do {
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE(p->val) != IS_UNDEF)) {
if (EXPECTED(p->key)) {
zend_string_release(p->key);
}
}
} while (++p != end);
}
}
}
if (!(ht->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_PACKED)) {
HT_HASH_RESET(ht);
}
}
ht->nNumUsed = 0;
ht->nNumOfElements = 0;
ht->nNextFreeElement = 0;
ht->nInternalPointer = HT_INVALID_IDX;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 69,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u64 evmcs_read64(unsigned long field) { return 0; }
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 80,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs_alloc_unique_id(struct rb_root *root, struct nfs_unique_id *new,
__u64 minval, int maxbits)
{
struct rb_node **p, *parent;
struct nfs_unique_id *pos;
__u64 mask = ~0ULL;
if (maxbits < 64)
mask = (1ULL << maxbits) - 1ULL;
/* Ensure distribution is more or less flat */
get_random_bytes(&new->id, sizeof(new->id));
new->id &= mask;
if (new->id < minval)
new->id += minval;
retry:
p = &root->rb_node;
parent = NULL;
while (*p != NULL) {
parent = *p;
pos = rb_entry(parent, struct nfs_unique_id, rb_node);
if (new->id < pos->id)
p = &(*p)->rb_left;
else if (new->id > pos->id)
p = &(*p)->rb_right;
else
goto id_exists;
}
rb_link_node(&new->rb_node, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(&new->rb_node, root);
return;
id_exists:
for (;;) {
new->id++;
if (new->id < minval || (new->id & mask) != new->id) {
new->id = minval;
break;
}
parent = rb_next(parent);
if (parent == NULL)
break;
pos = rb_entry(parent, struct nfs_unique_id, rb_node);
if (new->id < pos->id)
break;
}
goto retry;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoFlush() {
api()->glFlushFn();
error::Error error = ProcessReadPixels(false);
if (error != error::kNoError) {
return error;
}
return ProcessQueries(false);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int zl100313_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *d)
{
d->fe_adap[0].fe = dvb_attach(mt312_attach, &zl313_config,
&d->dev->i2c_adap);
if (d->fe_adap[0].fe != NULL) {
if (dvb_attach(zl10039_attach, d->fe_adap[0].fe, 0x60,
&d->dev->i2c_adap)) {
d->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.set_voltage = dw210x_set_voltage;
info("Attached zl100313+zl10039!");
return 0;
}
}
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: [media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[[email protected]: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __each_dev(struct device *dev, void *data)
{
struct each_dev_arg *arg = (struct each_dev_arg *)data;
/* There are struct usb_interface on the same bus, filter them out */
if (!is_usb_device(dev))
return 0;
return arg->fn(to_usb_device(dev), arg->data);
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 75,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NO_INLINE void jsError(const char *fmt, ...) {
jsiConsoleRemoveInputLine();
jsiConsolePrint("ERROR: ");
va_list argp;
va_start(argp, fmt);
vcbprintf((vcbprintf_callback)jsiConsolePrintString,0, fmt, argp);
va_end(argp);
jsiConsolePrint("\n");
}
Commit Message: Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 82,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::PepperCancelComposition(
PepperPluginInstanceImpl* instance) {
if (instance != render_view_->focused_pepper_plugin())
return;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_ImeCancelComposition(render_view_->GetRoutingID()));;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(USE_AURA)
GetRenderWidget()->UpdateCompositionInfo(true);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void jsR_setproperty(js_State *J, js_Object *obj, const char *name)
{
js_Value *value = stackidx(J, -1);
js_Property *ref;
int k;
int own;
if (obj->type == JS_CARRAY) {
if (!strcmp(name, "length")) {
double rawlen = jsV_tonumber(J, value);
int newlen = jsV_numbertointeger(rawlen);
if (newlen != rawlen)
js_rangeerror(J, "array length");
jsV_resizearray(J, obj, newlen);
return;
}
if (js_isarrayindex(J, name, &k))
if (k >= obj->u.a.length)
obj->u.a.length = k + 1;
}
else if (obj->type == JS_CSTRING) {
if (!strcmp(name, "length"))
goto readonly;
if (js_isarrayindex(J, name, &k))
if (js_runeat(J, obj->u.s.string, k))
goto readonly;
}
else if (obj->type == JS_CREGEXP) {
if (!strcmp(name, "source")) goto readonly;
if (!strcmp(name, "global")) goto readonly;
if (!strcmp(name, "ignoreCase")) goto readonly;
if (!strcmp(name, "multiline")) goto readonly;
if (!strcmp(name, "lastIndex")) {
obj->u.r.last = jsV_tointeger(J, value);
return;
}
}
else if (obj->type == JS_CUSERDATA) {
if (obj->u.user.put && obj->u.user.put(J, obj->u.user.data, name))
return;
}
/* First try to find a setter in prototype chain */
ref = jsV_getpropertyx(J, obj, name, &own);
if (ref && ref->setter) {
js_pushobject(J, ref->setter);
js_pushobject(J, obj);
js_pushvalue(J, *value);
js_call(J, 1);
js_pop(J, 1);
return;
}
/* Property not found on this object, so create one */
if (!ref || !own)
ref = jsV_setproperty(J, obj, name);
if (ref) {
if (!(ref->atts & JS_READONLY))
ref->value = *value;
else
goto readonly;
}
return;
readonly:
if (J->strict)
js_typeerror(J, "'%s' is read-only", name);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int svm_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
int ret;
if (!gif_set(svm) ||
(vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK))
return 0;
ret = !!(kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF);
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
return ret && !(svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & HF_VINTR_MASK);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::HasOpener() const {
return opener_ != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static rsRetVal parseSubscriptions(char* subscribes, sublist** subList){
char* tok = strtok(subscribes, ",");
sublist* currentSub;
sublist* head;
DEFiRet;
/* create empty list */
CHKmalloc(*subList = (sublist*)MALLOC(sizeof(sublist)));
head = *subList;
head->next = NULL;
head->subscribe=NULL;
currentSub=head;
if(tok) {
head->subscribe=strdup(tok);
for(tok=strtok(NULL, ","); tok!=NULL;tok=strtok(NULL, ",")) {
CHKmalloc(currentSub->next = (sublist*)MALLOC(sizeof(sublist)));
currentSub=currentSub->next;
currentSub->subscribe=strdup(tok);
currentSub->next=NULL;
}
} else {
/* make empty subscription ie subscribe="" */
head->subscribe=strdup("");
}
/* TODO: temporary logging */
currentSub = head;
DBGPRINTF("imzmq3: Subscriptions:");
for(currentSub = head; currentSub != NULL; currentSub=currentSub->next) {
DBGPRINTF("'%s'", currentSub->subscribe);
}
DBGPRINTF("\n");
finalize_it:
RETiRet;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1565 from Whissi/fix-format-security-issue-in-zmq-modules
Fix format security issue in zmq3 modules
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 62,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int __btrfs_submit_dio_bio(struct bio *bio, struct inode *inode,
int rw, u64 file_offset, int skip_sum,
int async_submit)
{
struct btrfs_dio_private *dip = bio->bi_private;
int write = rw & REQ_WRITE;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
int ret;
if (async_submit)
async_submit = !atomic_read(&BTRFS_I(inode)->sync_writers);
bio_get(bio);
if (!write) {
ret = btrfs_bio_wq_end_io(root->fs_info, bio,
BTRFS_WQ_ENDIO_DATA);
if (ret)
goto err;
}
if (skip_sum)
goto map;
if (write && async_submit) {
ret = btrfs_wq_submit_bio(root->fs_info,
inode, rw, bio, 0, 0,
file_offset,
__btrfs_submit_bio_start_direct_io,
__btrfs_submit_bio_done);
goto err;
} else if (write) {
/*
* If we aren't doing async submit, calculate the csum of the
* bio now.
*/
ret = btrfs_csum_one_bio(root, inode, bio, file_offset, 1);
if (ret)
goto err;
} else {
ret = btrfs_lookup_and_bind_dio_csum(root, inode, dip, bio,
file_offset);
if (ret)
goto err;
}
map:
ret = btrfs_map_bio(root, rw, bio, 0, async_submit);
err:
bio_put(bio);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: selSetName(SEL *sel,
const char *name)
{
PROCNAME("selSetName");
if (!sel)
return ERROR_INT("sel not defined", procName, 1);
return stringReplace(&sel->name, name);
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LimitCache(size_t cache_size) {
download_manager.set_max_form_cache_size(cache_size);
}
Commit Message: Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs3svc_decode_diropargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_diropargs *args)
{
if (!(p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh))
|| !(p = decode_filename(p, &args->name, &args->len)))
return 0;
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int drm_mode_getcrtc(struct drm_device *dev,
void *data, struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct drm_mode_crtc *crtc_resp = data;
struct drm_crtc *crtc;
struct drm_mode_object *obj;
int ret = 0;
if (!drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_MODESET))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, crtc_resp->crtc_id,
DRM_MODE_OBJECT_CRTC);
if (!obj) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
crtc = obj_to_crtc(obj);
crtc_resp->x = crtc->x;
crtc_resp->y = crtc->y;
crtc_resp->gamma_size = crtc->gamma_size;
if (crtc->fb)
crtc_resp->fb_id = crtc->fb->base.id;
else
crtc_resp->fb_id = 0;
if (crtc->enabled) {
drm_crtc_convert_to_umode(&crtc_resp->mode, &crtc->mode);
crtc_resp->mode_valid = 1;
} else {
crtc_resp->mode_valid = 0;
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 21,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jas_strtoopenmode(const char *s)
{
int openmode = 0;
while (*s != '\0') {
switch (*s) {
case 'r':
openmode |= JAS_STREAM_READ;
break;
case 'w':
openmode |= JAS_STREAM_WRITE | JAS_STREAM_CREATE;
break;
case 'b':
openmode |= JAS_STREAM_BINARY;
break;
case 'a':
openmode |= JAS_STREAM_APPEND;
break;
case '+':
openmode |= JAS_STREAM_READ | JAS_STREAM_WRITE;
break;
default:
break;
}
++s;
}
return openmode;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 67,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::EnsureRenderFrameHostVisibilityConsistent() {
if (render_frame_host_->GetView() &&
render_frame_host_->render_view_host()->GetWidget()->is_hidden() !=
delegate_->IsHidden()) {
if (delegate_->IsHidden()) {
render_frame_host_->GetView()->Hide();
} else {
render_frame_host_->GetView()->Show();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,321 |
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