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stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
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Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_set_usecmap(fz_context *ctx, pdf_cmap *cmap, pdf_cmap *usecmap)
{
int i;
pdf_drop_cmap(ctx, cmap->usecmap);
cmap->usecmap = pdf_keep_cmap(ctx, usecmap);
if (cmap->codespace_len == 0)
{
cmap->codespace_len = usecmap->codespace_len;
for (i = 0; i < usecmap->codespace_len; i++)
cmap->codespace[i] = usecmap->codespace[i];
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType CheckMemoryOverflow(const size_t count,
const size_t quantum)
{
size_t
size;
size=count*quantum;
if ((count == 0) || (quantum != (size/count)))
{
errno=ENOMEM;
return(MagickTrue);
}
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 71,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __vma_link_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct file *file;
file = vma->vm_file;
if (file) {
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_DENYWRITE)
atomic_dec(&file_inode(file)->i_writecount);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)
atomic_inc(&mapping->i_mmap_writable);
flush_dcache_mmap_lock(mapping);
vma_interval_tree_insert(vma, &mapping->i_mmap);
flush_dcache_mmap_unlock(mapping);
}
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_encode_get_async_reply(const struct ofp_header *oh,
const struct ofputil_async_cfg *ac)
{
struct ofpbuf *buf;
enum ofpraw raw = (oh->version < OFP14_VERSION
? OFPRAW_OFPT13_GET_ASYNC_REPLY
: OFPRAW_OFPT14_GET_ASYNC_REPLY);
struct ofpbuf *reply = ofpraw_alloc_reply(raw, oh, 0);
ofputil_put_async_config__(ac, reply,
raw == OFPRAW_OFPT14_GET_ASYNC_REPLY,
oh->version, UINT32_MAX);
return reply;
return buf;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint8_t arcmsr_abort_allcmd(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
uint8_t rtnval = 0;
switch (acb->adapter_type) {
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_A: {
rtnval = arcmsr_hbaA_abort_allcmd(acb);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_B: {
rtnval = arcmsr_hbaB_abort_allcmd(acb);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_C: {
rtnval = arcmsr_hbaC_abort_allcmd(acb);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_D:
rtnval = arcmsr_hbaD_abort_allcmd(acb);
break;
}
return rtnval;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::ReleaseSurface() {
if (!context_.get())
return;
if (WasContextLost()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Trying to release lost context.";
return;
}
context_->ReleaseCurrent(surface_.get());
surface_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: update_info_linux_lvm2_lv (Device *device)
{
const gchar *lv_name;
const gchar *vg_name;
const gchar *uuid;
gchar *lv_uuid;
gchar *vg_uuid;
gboolean is_lv;
is_lv = FALSE;
lv_uuid = NULL;
vg_uuid = NULL;
lv_name = g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "DM_LV_NAME");
vg_name = g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "DM_VG_NAME");
if (lv_name == NULL || vg_name == NULL)
goto out;
uuid = g_udev_device_get_sysfs_attr (device->priv->d, "dm/uuid");
if (uuid == NULL || !g_str_has_prefix (uuid, "LVM-"))
goto out;
vg_uuid = extract_lvm_uuid (uuid + 4);
if (vg_uuid == NULL)
goto out;
lv_uuid = extract_lvm_uuid (uuid + 4 + 32);
if (lv_uuid == NULL)
goto out;
is_lv = TRUE;
device_set_linux_lvm2_lv_name (device, lv_name);
device_set_linux_lvm2_lv_uuid (device, lv_uuid);
device_set_linux_lvm2_lv_group_name (device, vg_name);
device_set_linux_lvm2_lv_group_uuid (device, vg_uuid);
device_set_device_is_drive (device, FALSE);
device_set_device_is_partition (device, FALSE);
out:
device_set_device_is_linux_lvm2_lv (device, is_lv);
g_free (vg_uuid);
g_free (lv_uuid);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void posix_cpu_timers_init_group(struct signal_struct *sig)
{
/* Thread group counters. */
thread_group_cputime_init(sig);
/* Expiration times and increments. */
sig->it[CPUCLOCK_PROF].expires = cputime_zero;
sig->it[CPUCLOCK_PROF].incr = cputime_zero;
sig->it[CPUCLOCK_VIRT].expires = cputime_zero;
sig->it[CPUCLOCK_VIRT].incr = cputime_zero;
/* Cached expiration times. */
sig->cputime_expires.prof_exp = cputime_zero;
sig->cputime_expires.virt_exp = cputime_zero;
sig->cputime_expires.sched_exp = 0;
if (sig->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
sig->cputime_expires.prof_exp =
secs_to_cputime(sig->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur);
sig->cputimer.running = 1;
}
/* The timer lists. */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sig->cpu_timers[0]);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sig->cpu_timers[1]);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sig->cpu_timers[2]);
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after failure of clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, parent's io_context->nr_tasks is incremented, but never
decremented whenever copy_process() fails afterwards, which prevents
exit_io_context() from calling IO schedulers exit functions.
Give a task_struct to exit_io_context(), and call exit_io_context() instead of
put_io_context() in copy_process() cleanup path.
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 94,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintSettingsInitializerWin::InitPrintSettings(
HDC hdc,
const DEVMODE& dev_mode,
const PageRanges& new_ranges,
const std::wstring& new_device_name,
bool print_selection_only,
PrintSettings* print_settings) {
DCHECK(hdc);
DCHECK(print_settings);
print_settings->set_printer_name(dev_mode.dmDeviceName);
print_settings->set_device_name(new_device_name);
print_settings->ranges = new_ranges;
print_settings->set_landscape(dev_mode.dmOrientation == DMORIENT_LANDSCAPE);
print_settings->selection_only = print_selection_only;
int dpi = GetDeviceCaps(hdc, LOGPIXELSX);
print_settings->set_dpi(dpi);
const int kAlphaCaps = SB_CONST_ALPHA | SB_PIXEL_ALPHA;
print_settings->set_supports_alpha_blend(
(GetDeviceCaps(hdc, SHADEBLENDCAPS) & kAlphaCaps) == kAlphaCaps);
DCHECK_EQ(dpi, GetDeviceCaps(hdc, LOGPIXELSY));
DCHECK_EQ(GetDeviceCaps(hdc, SCALINGFACTORX), 0);
DCHECK_EQ(GetDeviceCaps(hdc, SCALINGFACTORY), 0);
gfx::Size physical_size_device_units(GetDeviceCaps(hdc, PHYSICALWIDTH),
GetDeviceCaps(hdc, PHYSICALHEIGHT));
gfx::Rect printable_area_device_units(GetDeviceCaps(hdc, PHYSICALOFFSETX),
GetDeviceCaps(hdc, PHYSICALOFFSETY),
GetDeviceCaps(hdc, HORZRES),
GetDeviceCaps(hdc, VERTRES));
print_settings->SetPrinterPrintableArea(physical_size_device_units,
printable_area_device_units,
dpi);
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContainsManifestForbiddenPermission(const APIPermissionSet& apis,
string16* error) {
CHECK(error);
for (APIPermissionSet::const_iterator i = apis.begin();
i != apis.end(); ++i) {
if ((*i)->ManifestEntryForbidden()) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kPermissionNotAllowedInManifest,
(*i)->info()->name());
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 114,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void restore_nameidata(void)
{
struct nameidata *now = current->nameidata, *old = now->saved;
current->nameidata = old;
if (old)
old->total_link_count = now->total_link_count;
if (now->stack != now->internal)
kfree(now->stack);
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 51,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
const struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert;
FILE *f = NULL;
int r, ok, found_principal = 0;
int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
pid_t pid;
char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
char *ca_fp = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *catext = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
char serial_s[16], uidstr[32];
void (*osigchld)(int);
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
return 0;
if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, "
"skipping");
return 0;
}
/*
* NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
* ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
*/
osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
"u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
runas_pw = getpwnam(username);
if (runas_pw == NULL) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
username, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
if (argv_split(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
"invalid quotes", command);
goto out;
}
if (ac == 0) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
command);
goto out;
}
if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(cert->signature_key, &catext)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
snprintf(serial_s, sizeof(serial_s), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)cert->serial);
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
"U", uidstr,
"u", user_pw->pw_name,
"h", user_pw->pw_dir,
"t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
"T", sshkey_ssh_name(cert->signature_key),
"f", key_fp,
"F", ca_fp,
"k", keytext,
"K", catext,
"i", cert->key_id,
"s", serial_s,
(char *)NULL);
if (tmp == NULL)
fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
free(av[i]);
av[i] = tmp;
}
/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
ac, av, &f,
SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;
temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
ok = process_principals(ssh, f, "(command)", cert, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
f = NULL;
if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, 0) != 0)
goto out;
/* Read completed successfully */
found_principal = ok;
out:
if (f != NULL)
fclose(f);
signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
free(av[i]);
free(av);
if (uid_swapped)
restore_uid();
free(command);
free(username);
free(ca_fp);
free(key_fp);
free(catext);
free(keytext);
return found_principal;
}
Commit Message: delay bailout for invalid authenticating user until after the packet
containing the request has been fully parsed. Reported by Dariusz Tytko
and Michał Sajdak; ok deraadt
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 79,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __acquires(rcu_bh)
{
rcu_read_lock_bh();
return if6_get_first(seq, *pos);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CopyOutputRequestCallbackRunsOnceCallback(
int* n_called,
std::unique_ptr<CopyOutputResult> result) {
++*n_called;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
/* Call helper to do the real work for both simulataneous and
* duplicate INIT chunk handling.
*/
return sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]>
CC: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 31,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl* ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl::GetInstance() {
return ExtensionTtsPlatformImplLinux::GetInstance();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<HistogramSamples> SparseHistogram::SnapshotFinalDelta() const {
DCHECK(!final_delta_created_);
final_delta_created_ = true;
std::unique_ptr<SampleMap> snapshot(new SampleMap(name_hash()));
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
snapshot->Add(*samples_);
snapshot->Subtract(*logged_samples_);
return std::move(snapshot);
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 140,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct msr_data apic_base_msr;
u64 cr0;
vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
vmx->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = get_rdx_init_val();
kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, 0);
if (!init_event) {
apic_base_msr.data = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE |
MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE;
if (kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(vcpu))
apic_base_msr.data |= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP;
apic_base_msr.host_initiated = true;
kvm_set_apic_base(vcpu, &apic_base_msr);
}
vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_CS);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, 0xf000);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_CS_BASE, 0xffff0000ul);
seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_DS);
seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_ES);
seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_FS);
seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_GS);
seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_SS);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_TR_SELECTOR, 0);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, 0);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, 0x008b);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR, 0);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_LDTR_BASE, 0);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES, 0x00082);
if (!init_event) {
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, 0);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, 0);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, 0);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0);
}
vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, 0x02);
kvm_rip_write(vcpu, 0xfff0);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, 0);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, 0);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, 0);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS, 0);
setup_msrs(vmx);
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0); /* 22.2.1 */
if (cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow() && !init_event) {
vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, 0);
if (cpu_need_tpr_shadow(vcpu))
vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR,
__pa(vcpu->arch.apic->regs));
vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, 0);
}
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu);
if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
memset(&vmx->pi_desc, 0, sizeof(struct pi_desc));
if (vmx->vpid != 0)
vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->vpid);
cr0 = X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_ET;
vmx->vcpu.arch.cr0 = cr0;
vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, cr0); /* enter rmode */
vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, 0);
vmx_set_efer(vcpu, 0);
update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
vpid_sync_context(vmx->vpid);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 63,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OxideQQuickWebView::mouseMoveEvent(QMouseEvent* event) {
Q_D(OxideQQuickWebView);
QQuickItem::mouseMoveEvent(event);
d->contents_view_->handleMouseMoveEvent(event);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int PDFiumEngine::StartPaint(int page_index, const pp::Rect& dirty) {
ProgressivePaint progressive;
progressive.rect = dirty;
progressive.page_index = page_index;
progressive.bitmap = nullptr;
progressive.painted_ = false;
progressive_paints_.push_back(progressive);
return progressive_paints_.size() - 1;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mac80211_hwsim_start(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
{
struct mac80211_hwsim_data *data = hw->priv;
wiphy_dbg(hw->wiphy, "%s\n", __func__);
data->started = true;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int br_ip4_multicast_igmp3_report(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port *port,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct igmpv3_report *ih;
struct igmpv3_grec *grec;
int i;
int len;
int num;
int type;
int err = 0;
__be32 group;
u16 vid = 0;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*ih)))
return -EINVAL;
br_vlan_get_tag(skb, &vid);
ih = igmpv3_report_hdr(skb);
num = ntohs(ih->ngrec);
len = sizeof(*ih);
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
len += sizeof(*grec);
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, len))
return -EINVAL;
grec = (void *)(skb->data + len - sizeof(*grec));
group = grec->grec_mca;
type = grec->grec_type;
len += ntohs(grec->grec_nsrcs) * 4;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, len))
return -EINVAL;
/* We treat this as an IGMPv2 report for now. */
switch (type) {
case IGMPV3_MODE_IS_INCLUDE:
case IGMPV3_MODE_IS_EXCLUDE:
case IGMPV3_CHANGE_TO_INCLUDE:
case IGMPV3_CHANGE_TO_EXCLUDE:
case IGMPV3_ALLOW_NEW_SOURCES:
case IGMPV3_BLOCK_OLD_SOURCES:
break;
default:
continue;
}
err = br_ip4_multicast_add_group(br, port, group, vid);
if (err)
break;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <[email protected]>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
int depth = ext_depth(inode);
struct ext4_extent *ex;
__le32 border;
int k, err = 0;
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
if (unlikely(ex == NULL || eh == NULL)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode,
"ex %p == NULL or eh %p == NULL", ex, eh);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (depth == 0) {
/* there is no tree at all */
return 0;
}
if (ex != EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh)) {
/* we correct tree if first leaf got modified only */
return 0;
}
/*
* TODO: we need correction if border is smaller than current one
*/
k = depth - 1;
border = path[depth].p_ext->ee_block;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + k);
if (err)
return err;
path[k].p_idx->ei_block = border;
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + k);
if (err)
return err;
while (k--) {
/* change all left-side indexes */
if (path[k+1].p_idx != EXT_FIRST_INDEX(path[k+1].p_hdr))
break;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + k);
if (err)
break;
path[k].p_idx->ei_block = border;
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + k);
if (err)
break;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sched_numa_warn(const char *str)
{
static int done = false;
int i,j;
if (done)
return;
done = true;
printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: %s\n\n", str);
for (i = 0; i < nr_node_ids; i++) {
printk(KERN_WARNING " ");
for (j = 0; j < nr_node_ids; j++)
printk(KERN_CONT "%02d ", node_distance(i,j));
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
}
printk(KERN_WARNING "\n");
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void unkn_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_UnknownBox *ptr = (GF_UnknownBox *) s;
if (!s) return;
if (ptr->data) gf_free(ptr->data);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct snd_seq_client *snd_seq_client_use_ptr(int clientid)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct snd_seq_client *client;
if (clientid < 0 || clientid >= SNDRV_SEQ_MAX_CLIENTS) {
pr_debug("ALSA: seq: oops. Trying to get pointer to client %d\n",
clientid);
return NULL;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&clients_lock, flags);
client = clientptr(clientid);
if (client)
goto __lock;
if (clienttablock[clientid]) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&clients_lock, flags);
return NULL;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&clients_lock, flags);
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
if (!in_interrupt()) {
static char client_requested[SNDRV_SEQ_GLOBAL_CLIENTS];
static char card_requested[SNDRV_CARDS];
if (clientid < SNDRV_SEQ_GLOBAL_CLIENTS) {
int idx;
if (!client_requested[clientid]) {
client_requested[clientid] = 1;
for (idx = 0; idx < 15; idx++) {
if (seq_client_load[idx] < 0)
break;
if (seq_client_load[idx] == clientid) {
request_module("snd-seq-client-%i",
clientid);
break;
}
}
}
} else if (clientid < SNDRV_SEQ_DYNAMIC_CLIENTS_BEGIN) {
int card = (clientid - SNDRV_SEQ_GLOBAL_CLIENTS) /
SNDRV_SEQ_CLIENTS_PER_CARD;
if (card < snd_ecards_limit) {
if (! card_requested[card]) {
card_requested[card] = 1;
snd_request_card(card);
}
snd_seq_device_load_drivers();
}
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&clients_lock, flags);
client = clientptr(clientid);
if (client)
goto __lock;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&clients_lock, flags);
}
#endif
return NULL;
__lock:
snd_use_lock_use(&client->use_lock);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&clients_lock, flags);
return client;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Notification::close()
{
if (m_state != NotificationStateShowing)
return;
if (m_persistentId == kInvalidPersistentId) {
executionContext()->postTask(BLINK_FROM_HERE, createSameThreadTask(&Notification::dispatchCloseEvent, this));
m_state = NotificationStateClosing;
notificationManager()->close(this);
} else {
m_state = NotificationStateClosed;
SecurityOrigin* origin = executionContext()->securityOrigin();
ASSERT(origin);
notificationManager()->closePersistent(WebSecurityOrigin(origin), m_persistentId);
}
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID: | 0 | 119,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int orangefs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
struct orangefs_inode_s *orangefs_inode = ORANGEFS_I(inode);
int error = 0;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
const char *name = NULL;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
/*
* can we represent this with the traditional file
* mode permission bits?
*/
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
if (error < 0) {
gossip_err("%s: posix_acl_equiv_mode err: %d\n",
__func__,
error);
return error;
}
if (inode->i_mode != mode)
SetModeFlag(orangefs_inode);
inode->i_mode = mode;
mark_inode_dirty_sync(inode);
if (error == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
gossip_err("%s: invalid type %d!\n", __func__, type);
return -EINVAL;
}
gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
"%s: inode %pU, key %s type %d\n",
__func__, get_khandle_from_ino(inode),
name,
type);
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
value = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return -ENOMEM;
error = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (error < 0)
goto out;
}
gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
"%s: name %s, value %p, size %zd, acl %p\n",
__func__, name, value, size, acl);
/*
* Go ahead and set the extended attribute now. NOTE: Suppose acl
* was NULL, then value will be NULL and size will be 0 and that
* will xlate to a removexattr. However, we don't want removexattr
* complain if attributes does not exist.
*/
error = orangefs_inode_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0);
out:
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 1 | 166,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static OPJ_OFF_T JP2SkipHandler(OPJ_OFF_T offset,void *context)
{
Image
*image;
image=(Image *) context;
return(SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_CUR) < 0 ? -1 : offset);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/501
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 62,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool check_dax_vmas(struct vm_area_struct **vmas, long nr_pages)
{
return false;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __init netdev_boot_setup(char *str)
{
int ints[5];
struct ifmap map;
str = get_options(str, ARRAY_SIZE(ints), ints);
if (!str || !*str)
return 0;
/* Save settings */
memset(&map, 0, sizeof(map));
if (ints[0] > 0)
map.irq = ints[1];
if (ints[0] > 1)
map.base_addr = ints[2];
if (ints[0] > 2)
map.mem_start = ints[3];
if (ints[0] > 3)
map.mem_end = ints[4];
/* Add new entry to the list */
return netdev_boot_setup_add(str, &map);
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoVertexAttrib2fv(
GLuint indx,
const volatile GLfloat* values) {
api()->glVertexAttrib2fvFn(indx, const_cast<const GLfloat*>(values));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NotificationsEngine::NotificationsEngine( QObject* parent, const QVariantList& args )
: Plasma::DataEngine( parent, args ), m_nextId( 1 ), m_alwaysReplaceAppsList({QStringLiteral("Clementine"), QStringLiteral("Spotify"), QStringLiteral("Amarok")})
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned hub_is_wusb(struct usb_hub *hub)
{
struct usb_hcd *hcd;
if (hub->hdev->parent != NULL) /* not a root hub? */
return 0;
hcd = bus_to_hcd(hub->hdev->bus);
return hcd->wireless;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 75,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: YYID (int yyi)
#else
static int
YYID (yyi)
int yyi;
#endif
{
return yyi;
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1593] ntpd abort in free() with logconfig syntax error.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int x25_addr_ntoa(unsigned char *p, struct x25_address *called_addr,
struct x25_address *calling_addr)
{
unsigned int called_len, calling_len;
char *called, *calling;
unsigned int i;
called_len = (*p >> 0) & 0x0F;
calling_len = (*p >> 4) & 0x0F;
called = called_addr->x25_addr;
calling = calling_addr->x25_addr;
p++;
for (i = 0; i < (called_len + calling_len); i++) {
if (i < called_len) {
if (i % 2 != 0) {
*called++ = ((*p >> 0) & 0x0F) + '0';
p++;
} else {
*called++ = ((*p >> 4) & 0x0F) + '0';
}
} else {
if (i % 2 != 0) {
*calling++ = ((*p >> 0) & 0x0F) + '0';
p++;
} else {
*calling++ = ((*p >> 4) & 0x0F) + '0';
}
}
}
*called = *calling = '\0';
return 1 + (called_len + calling_len + 1) / 2;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message,
ResourceMessageFilter* filter,
bool* message_was_ok) {
filter_ = filter;
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(ResourceDispatcherHostImpl, message, *message_was_ok)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ResourceHostMsg_RequestResource, OnRequestResource)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ResourceHostMsg_SyncLoad, OnSyncLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ResourceHostMsg_ReleaseDownloadedFile,
OnReleaseDownloadedFile)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ResourceHostMsg_DataReceived_ACK, OnDataReceivedACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ResourceHostMsg_DataDownloaded_ACK, OnDataDownloadedACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ResourceHostMsg_UploadProgress_ACK, OnUploadProgressACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ResourceHostMsg_CancelRequest, OnCancelRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ResourceHostMsg_TransferRequestToNewPage,
OnTransferRequestToNewPage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ResourceHostMsg_FollowRedirect, OnFollowRedirect)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_SwapOut_ACK, OnSwapOutACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_DidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache,
OnDidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP_EX()
if (message.type() == ViewHostMsg_DidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache::ID) {
handled = false;
}
filter_ = NULL;
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_RequestAuthorization( void ) {
char nums[64];
int i, j, l;
cvar_t *fs;
if ( !cls.authorizeServer.port ) {
Com_Printf( "Resolving %s\n", AUTHORIZE_SERVER_NAME );
if ( !NET_StringToAdr( AUTHORIZE_SERVER_NAME, &cls.authorizeServer, NA_IP ) ) {
Com_Printf( "Couldn't resolve address\n" );
return;
}
cls.authorizeServer.port = BigShort( PORT_AUTHORIZE );
Com_Printf( "%s resolved to %i.%i.%i.%i:%i\n", AUTHORIZE_SERVER_NAME,
cls.authorizeServer.ip[0], cls.authorizeServer.ip[1],
cls.authorizeServer.ip[2], cls.authorizeServer.ip[3],
BigShort( cls.authorizeServer.port ) );
}
if ( cls.authorizeServer.type == NA_BAD ) {
return;
}
j = 0;
l = strlen( cl_cdkey );
if ( l > 32 ) {
l = 32;
}
for ( i = 0 ; i < l ; i++ ) {
if ( ( cl_cdkey[i] >= '0' && cl_cdkey[i] <= '9' )
|| ( cl_cdkey[i] >= 'a' && cl_cdkey[i] <= 'z' )
|| ( cl_cdkey[i] >= 'A' && cl_cdkey[i] <= 'Z' )
) {
nums[j] = cl_cdkey[i];
j++;
}
}
nums[j] = 0;
fs = Cvar_Get ("cl_anonymous", "0", CVAR_INIT|CVAR_SYSTEMINFO );
NET_OutOfBandPrint(NS_CLIENT, cls.authorizeServer, "getKeyAuthorize %i %s", fs->integer, nums );
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jpc_ppxstab_grow(jpc_ppxstab_t *tab, int maxents)
{
jpc_ppxstabent_t **newents;
if (tab->maxents < maxents) {
newents = (tab->ents) ? jas_realloc2(tab->ents, maxents,
sizeof(jpc_ppxstabent_t *)) : jas_alloc2(maxents, sizeof(jpc_ppxstabent_t *));
if (!newents) {
return -1;
}
tab->ents = newents;
tab->maxents = maxents;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* Type_Data_Dup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void *Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
cmsICCData* BinData = (cmsICCData*) Ptr;
return _cmsDupMem(self ->ContextID, Ptr, sizeof(cmsICCData) + BinData ->len - 1);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int option_parse_unpack_unreachable(const struct option *opt,
const char *arg, int unset)
{
if (unset) {
unpack_unreachable = 0;
unpack_unreachable_expiration = 0;
}
else {
unpack_unreachable = 1;
if (arg)
unpack_unreachable_expiration = approxidate(arg);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GetEnabledFlags(const PrefService* prefs, std::set<std::string>* result) {
const ListValue* enabled_experiments = prefs->GetList(
prefs::kEnabledLabsExperiments);
if (!enabled_experiments)
return;
for (ListValue::const_iterator it = enabled_experiments->begin();
it != enabled_experiments->end();
++it) {
std::string experiment_name;
if (!(*it)->GetAsString(&experiment_name)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Invalid entry in " << prefs::kEnabledLabsExperiments;
continue;
}
result->insert(experiment_name);
}
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::FindCacheForGroup(int64_t group_id,
CacheRecord* record) {
DCHECK(record);
if (!LazyOpen(kDontCreate))
return false;
static const char kSql[] =
"SELECT cache_id, group_id, online_wildcard, update_time, cache_size"
" FROM Caches WHERE group_id = ?";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, group_id);
if (!statement.Step())
return false;
ReadCacheRecord(statement, record);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 172,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::computeContentBoxLogicalWidth(LayoutUnit width) const
{
if (style()->boxSizing() == BORDER_BOX)
width -= borderAndPaddingLogicalWidth();
return max(0, width);
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int object_common2(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, long elements)
{
zval *retval_ptr = NULL;
zval fname;
if (Z_TYPE_PP(rval) != IS_OBJECT) {
return 0;
}
if (!process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, Z_OBJPROP_PP(rval), elements, 1)) {
/* We've got partially constructed object on our hands here. Wipe it. */
if(Z_TYPE_PP(rval) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_hash_clean(Z_OBJPROP_PP(rval));
}
ZVAL_NULL(*rval);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(rval) != IS_OBJECT) {
return 0;
}
if (Z_OBJCE_PP(rval) != PHP_IC_ENTRY &&
zend_hash_exists(&Z_OBJCE_PP(rval)->function_table, "__wakeup", sizeof("__wakeup"))) {
INIT_PZVAL(&fname);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&fname, "__wakeup", sizeof("__wakeup") - 1, 0);
BG(serialize_lock)++;
call_user_function_ex(CG(function_table), rval, &fname, &retval_ptr, 0, 0, 1, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
BG(serialize_lock)--;
}
if (retval_ptr) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval_ptr);
}
if (EG(exception)) {
return 0;
}
return finish_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 166,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CreateProxyResolverFactory(
mojo::InterfaceRequest<net::interfaces::ProxyResolverFactory> request) {
new net::MojoProxyResolverFactoryImpl(request.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionInstalledBubbleGtk::Show(const Extension* extension,
Browser* browser,
const SkBitmap& icon) {
new ExtensionInstalledBubbleGtk(extension, browser, icon);
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int HTMLInputElement::selectionEndForBinding(ExceptionCode& ec) const
{
if (!canHaveSelection()) {
ec = INVALID_STATE_ERR;
return 0;
}
return HTMLTextFormControlElement::selectionEnd();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DoPort(const CHAR* spec,
const Component& port,
int default_port_for_scheme,
CanonOutput* output,
Component* out_port) {
int port_num = ParsePort(spec, port);
if (port_num == PORT_UNSPECIFIED || port_num == default_port_for_scheme) {
*out_port = Component();
return true; // Leave port empty.
}
if (port_num == PORT_INVALID) {
output->push_back(':');
out_port->begin = output->length();
AppendInvalidNarrowString(spec, port.begin, port.end(), output);
out_port->len = output->length() - out_port->begin;
return false;
}
const int buf_size = 6;
char buf[buf_size];
WritePortInt(buf, buf_size, port_num);
output->push_back(':');
out_port->begin = output->length();
for (int i = 0; i < buf_size && buf[i]; i++)
output->push_back(buf[i]);
out_port->len = output->length() - out_port->begin;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Percent-encode UTF8 characters in URL fragment identifiers.
This brings us into line with Firefox, Safari, and the spec.
Bug: 758523
Change-Id: I7e354ab441222d9fd08e45f0e70f91ad4e35fafe
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/668363
Commit-Queue: Mike West <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507481}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 149,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_get_copyright(png_structp png_ptr)
{
PNG_UNUSED(png_ptr) /* Silence compiler warning about unused png_ptr */
#ifdef PNG_STRING_COPYRIGHT
return PNG_STRING_COPYRIGHT
#else
#ifdef __STDC__
return ((png_charp) PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"libpng version 1.2.52 - November 20, 2014" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Glenn Randers-Pehrson" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc." \
PNG_STRING_NEWLINE);
#else
return ((png_charp) "libpng version 1.2.52 - November 20, 2014\
Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Glenn Randers-Pehrson\
Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger\
Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc.");
#endif
#endif
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 172,162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DeviceTokenFetcher::HandleRegisterResponse(
const em::DeviceRegisterResponse& response) {
if (response.has_device_management_token()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(kMetricToken, kMetricTokenFetchOK,
kMetricTokenSize);
data_store_->SetDeviceToken(response.device_management_token(), false);
SetState(STATE_TOKEN_AVAILABLE);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(kMetricToken, kMetricTokenFetchBadResponse,
kMetricTokenSize);
SetState(STATE_ERROR);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,789 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *modestr(char *str, int mode)
{
int i;
strcpy(str, "----------");
for(i = 0; table[i].mask != 0; i++) {
if((mode & table[i].mask) == table[i].value)
str[table[i].position] = table[i].mode;
}
return str;
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 74,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::RequestCompositorFrameSink(
viz::mojom::CompositorFrameSinkRequest compositor_frame_sink_request,
viz::mojom::CompositorFrameSinkClientPtr compositor_frame_sink_client) {
if (enable_viz_) {
auto callback = base::BindOnce(
[](viz::HostFrameSinkManager* manager,
viz::mojom::CompositorFrameSinkRequest request,
viz::mojom::CompositorFrameSinkClientPtr client,
const viz::FrameSinkId& frame_sink_id) {
manager->CreateCompositorFrameSink(
frame_sink_id, std::move(request), std::move(client));
},
base::Unretained(GetHostFrameSinkManager()),
std::move(compositor_frame_sink_request),
std::move(compositor_frame_sink_client));
if (view_)
std::move(callback).Run(view_->GetFrameSinkId());
else
create_frame_sink_callback_ = std::move(callback);
return;
}
for (const auto& id : owned_bitmaps_)
shared_bitmap_manager_->ChildDeletedSharedBitmap(id);
owned_bitmaps_.clear();
if (compositor_frame_sink_binding_.is_bound())
compositor_frame_sink_binding_.Close();
compositor_frame_sink_binding_.Bind(
std::move(compositor_frame_sink_request),
BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()->GetResizeTaskRunner());
if (view_) {
view_->DidCreateNewRendererCompositorFrameSink(
compositor_frame_sink_client.get());
}
renderer_compositor_frame_sink_ = std::move(compositor_frame_sink_client);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServiceManagerConnectionImpl::Start() {
context_->Start(
base::Bind(&ServiceManagerConnectionImpl::OnConnectionLost,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 127,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage long sys_recv(int fd, void __user *ubuf, size_t size,
unsigned int flags)
{
return sys_recvfrom(fd, ubuf, size, flags, NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t PrintBegin(const PP_PrintSettings_Dev& print_settings) {
if (ppp_printing_ != NULL) {
return ppp_printing_->Begin(plugin_->pp_instance(), &print_settings);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StyleResolver::applyMatchedProperties(StyleResolverState& state, const MatchResult& matchResult, Element* animatingElement)
{
const Element* element = state.element();
ASSERT(element);
INCREMENT_STYLE_STATS_COUNTER(*this, matchedPropertyApply);
unsigned cacheHash = matchResult.isCacheable ? computeMatchedPropertiesHash(matchResult.matchedProperties.data(), matchResult.matchedProperties.size()) : 0;
bool applyInheritedOnly = false;
const CachedMatchedProperties* cachedMatchedProperties = 0;
if (cacheHash && (cachedMatchedProperties = m_matchedPropertiesCache.find(cacheHash, state, matchResult))
&& MatchedPropertiesCache::isCacheable(element, state.style(), state.parentStyle())) {
INCREMENT_STYLE_STATS_COUNTER(*this, matchedPropertyCacheHit);
state.style()->copyNonInheritedFrom(cachedMatchedProperties->renderStyle.get());
if (state.parentStyle()->inheritedDataShared(cachedMatchedProperties->parentRenderStyle.get()) && !isAtShadowBoundary(element)) {
INCREMENT_STYLE_STATS_COUNTER(*this, matchedPropertyCacheInheritedHit);
EInsideLink linkStatus = state.style()->insideLink();
state.style()->inheritFrom(cachedMatchedProperties->renderStyle.get());
state.style()->setInsideLink(linkStatus);
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::webAnimationsCSSEnabled()
&& (animatingElement->hasActiveAnimations()
|| (state.style()->transitions() && !state.style()->transitions()->isEmpty())
|| (state.style()->animations() && !state.style()->animations()->isEmpty())))
applyAnimatedProperties(state, animatingElement);
return;
}
applyInheritedOnly = true;
}
applyMatchedProperties<VariableDefinitions>(state, matchResult, false, 0, matchResult.matchedProperties.size() - 1, applyInheritedOnly);
applyMatchedProperties<VariableDefinitions>(state, matchResult, true, matchResult.ranges.firstAuthorRule, matchResult.ranges.lastAuthorRule, applyInheritedOnly);
applyMatchedProperties<VariableDefinitions>(state, matchResult, true, matchResult.ranges.firstUserRule, matchResult.ranges.lastUserRule, applyInheritedOnly);
applyMatchedProperties<VariableDefinitions>(state, matchResult, true, matchResult.ranges.firstUARule, matchResult.ranges.lastUARule, applyInheritedOnly);
applyMatchedProperties<AnimationProperties>(state, matchResult, false, 0, matchResult.matchedProperties.size() - 1, applyInheritedOnly);
applyMatchedProperties<AnimationProperties>(state, matchResult, true, matchResult.ranges.firstAuthorRule, matchResult.ranges.lastAuthorRule, applyInheritedOnly);
applyMatchedProperties<AnimationProperties>(state, matchResult, true, matchResult.ranges.firstUserRule, matchResult.ranges.lastUserRule, applyInheritedOnly);
applyMatchedProperties<AnimationProperties>(state, matchResult, true, matchResult.ranges.firstUARule, matchResult.ranges.lastUARule, applyInheritedOnly);
state.style()->adjustAnimations();
state.style()->adjustTransitions();
state.setLineHeightValue(0);
applyMatchedProperties<HighPriorityProperties>(state, matchResult, false, 0, matchResult.matchedProperties.size() - 1, applyInheritedOnly);
applyMatchedProperties<HighPriorityProperties>(state, matchResult, true, matchResult.ranges.firstAuthorRule, matchResult.ranges.lastAuthorRule, applyInheritedOnly);
applyMatchedProperties<HighPriorityProperties>(state, matchResult, true, matchResult.ranges.firstUserRule, matchResult.ranges.lastUserRule, applyInheritedOnly);
applyMatchedProperties<HighPriorityProperties>(state, matchResult, true, matchResult.ranges.firstUARule, matchResult.ranges.lastUARule, applyInheritedOnly);
if (cachedMatchedProperties && cachedMatchedProperties->renderStyle->effectiveZoom() != state.style()->effectiveZoom()) {
state.fontBuilder().setFontDirty(true);
applyInheritedOnly = false;
}
updateFont(state);
if (state.lineHeightValue())
StyleBuilder::applyProperty(CSSPropertyLineHeight, state, state.lineHeightValue());
if (cachedMatchedProperties && cachedMatchedProperties->renderStyle->fontDescription() != state.style()->fontDescription())
applyInheritedOnly = false;
applyMatchedProperties<LowPriorityProperties>(state, matchResult, false, matchResult.ranges.firstUARule, matchResult.ranges.lastUARule, applyInheritedOnly);
state.cacheUserAgentBorderAndBackground();
applyMatchedProperties<LowPriorityProperties>(state, matchResult, false, matchResult.ranges.lastUARule + 1, matchResult.matchedProperties.size() - 1, applyInheritedOnly);
applyMatchedProperties<LowPriorityProperties>(state, matchResult, true, matchResult.ranges.firstAuthorRule, matchResult.ranges.lastAuthorRule, applyInheritedOnly);
applyMatchedProperties<LowPriorityProperties>(state, matchResult, true, matchResult.ranges.firstUserRule, matchResult.ranges.lastUserRule, applyInheritedOnly);
applyMatchedProperties<LowPriorityProperties>(state, matchResult, true, matchResult.ranges.firstUARule, matchResult.ranges.lastUARule, applyInheritedOnly);
m_styleResourceLoader.loadPendingResources(state.style(), state.elementStyleResources());
if (!cachedMatchedProperties && cacheHash && MatchedPropertiesCache::isCacheable(element, state.style(), state.parentStyle())) {
INCREMENT_STYLE_STATS_COUNTER(*this, matchedPropertyCacheAdded);
m_matchedPropertiesCache.add(state.style(), state.parentStyle(), cacheHash, matchResult);
}
applyAnimatedProperties(state, animatingElement);
ASSERT(!state.fontBuilder().fontDirty());
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PlatformFontSkia::SetDefaultFontDescription(
const std::string& font_description) {
delete default_font_description_;
default_font_description_ = new std::string(font_description);
}
Commit Message: Take default system font size from PlatformFont
The default font returned by Skia should take the initial size from the
default value kDefaultBaseFontSize specified in PlatformFont.
[email protected], [email protected]
[email protected]
Bug: 944227
Change-Id: I6b230b80c349abbe5968edb3cebdd6e89db4c4a6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1642738
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Etienne Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#666299}
CWE ID: CWE-862 | 0 | 155,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_t1_init_timer_expire(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *repl = NULL;
struct sctp_bind_addr *bp;
int attempts = asoc->init_err_counter + 1;
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("Timer T1 expired (INIT).\n");
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_T1_INIT_EXPIREDS);
if (attempts <= asoc->max_init_attempts) {
bp = (struct sctp_bind_addr *) &asoc->base.bind_addr;
repl = sctp_make_init(asoc, bp, GFP_ATOMIC, 0);
if (!repl)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
/* Choose transport for INIT. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_CHOOSE_TRANSPORT,
SCTP_CHUNK(repl));
/* Issue a sideeffect to do the needed accounting. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_RESTART,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_INIT));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(repl));
} else {
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("Giving up on INIT, attempts: %d"
" max_init_attempts: %d\n",
attempts, asoc->max_init_attempts);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
SCTP_ERROR(ETIMEDOUT));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_FAILED,
SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DELETE_TCB;
}
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]>
CC: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 31,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nautilus_directory_schedule_dequeue_pending (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
if (directory->details->dequeue_pending_idle_id == 0)
{
directory->details->dequeue_pending_idle_id
= g_idle_add (dequeue_pending_idle_callback, directory);
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: acpi_status acpi_os_remove_interrupt_handler(u32 gsi, acpi_osd_handler handler)
{
if (gsi != acpi_gbl_FADT.sci_interrupt || !acpi_sci_irq_valid())
return AE_BAD_PARAMETER;
free_irq(acpi_sci_irq, acpi_irq);
acpi_irq_handler = NULL;
acpi_sci_irq = INVALID_ACPI_IRQ;
return AE_OK;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void vm_entry_controls_set(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 val)
{
if (vmx->vm_entry_controls_shadow != val)
vm_entry_controls_init(vmx, val);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
struct mm_struct *mm = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
if (task) {
mm = mm_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS);
put_task_struct(task);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) {
/* ensure this mm_struct can't be freed */
atomic_inc(&mm->mm_count);
/* but do not pin its memory */
mmput(mm);
}
}
return mm;
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Emese Revfy <[email protected]>
Cc: Pax Team <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 49,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SupervisedUserService::OnSafeSitesSettingChanged() {
bool use_blacklist = supervised_users::IsSafeSitesBlacklistEnabled(profile_);
if (use_blacklist != url_filter_.HasBlacklist()) {
if (use_blacklist && blacklist_state_ == BlacklistLoadState::NOT_LOADED) {
LoadBlacklist(GetBlacklistPath(), GURL(kBlacklistURL));
} else if (!use_blacklist ||
blacklist_state_ == BlacklistLoadState::LOADED) {
UpdateBlacklist();
}
}
bool use_online_check =
supervised_users::IsSafeSitesOnlineCheckEnabled(profile_);
if (use_online_check != url_filter_.HasAsyncURLChecker()) {
if (use_online_check)
url_filter_.InitAsyncURLChecker(
content::BrowserContext::GetDefaultStoragePartition(profile_)
->GetURLLoaderFactoryForBrowserProcess());
else
url_filter_.ClearAsyncURLChecker();
}
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipv4_link_failure(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rtable *rt;
icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0);
rt = skb_rtable(skb);
if (rt)
dst_set_expires(&rt->dst, 0);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void dev_queue_xmit_nit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct packet_type *ptype;
struct sk_buff *skb2 = NULL;
struct packet_type *pt_prev = NULL;
struct list_head *ptype_list = &ptype_all;
rcu_read_lock();
again:
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptype, ptype_list, list) {
/* Never send packets back to the socket
* they originated from - MvS ([email protected])
*/
if (skb_loop_sk(ptype, skb))
continue;
if (pt_prev) {
deliver_skb(skb2, pt_prev, skb->dev);
pt_prev = ptype;
continue;
}
/* need to clone skb, done only once */
skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb2)
goto out_unlock;
net_timestamp_set(skb2);
/* skb->nh should be correctly
* set by sender, so that the second statement is
* just protection against buggy protocols.
*/
skb_reset_mac_header(skb2);
if (skb_network_header(skb2) < skb2->data ||
skb_network_header(skb2) > skb_tail_pointer(skb2)) {
net_crit_ratelimited("protocol %04x is buggy, dev %s\n",
ntohs(skb2->protocol),
dev->name);
skb_reset_network_header(skb2);
}
skb2->transport_header = skb2->network_header;
skb2->pkt_type = PACKET_OUTGOING;
pt_prev = ptype;
}
if (ptype_list == &ptype_all) {
ptype_list = &dev->ptype_all;
goto again;
}
out_unlock:
if (pt_prev) {
if (!skb_orphan_frags_rx(skb2, GFP_ATOMIC))
pt_prev->func(skb2, skb->dev, pt_prev, skb->dev);
else
kfree_skb(skb2);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderingHelper::Initialize(
bool suppress_swap_to_display,
int num_windows,
int width,
int height,
base::WaitableEvent* done) {
if (width_) {
base::WaitableEvent done(false, false);
UnInitialize(&done);
done.Wait();
}
suppress_swap_to_display_ = suppress_swap_to_display;
CHECK_GT(width, 0);
CHECK_GT(height, 0);
width_ = width;
height_ = height;
message_loop_ = MessageLoop::current();
CHECK_GT(num_windows, 0);
PlatformInitialize();
egl_display_ = PlatformGetDisplay();
EGLint major;
EGLint minor;
CHECK(eglInitialize(egl_display_, &major, &minor)) << eglGetError();
static EGLint rgba8888[] = {
EGL_RED_SIZE, 8,
EGL_GREEN_SIZE, 8,
EGL_BLUE_SIZE, 8,
EGL_ALPHA_SIZE, 8,
EGL_SURFACE_TYPE, EGL_WINDOW_BIT,
EGL_NONE,
};
EGLConfig egl_config;
int num_configs;
CHECK(eglChooseConfig(egl_display_, rgba8888, &egl_config, 1, &num_configs))
<< eglGetError();
CHECK_GE(num_configs, 1);
static EGLint context_attribs[] = {EGL_CONTEXT_CLIENT_VERSION, 2, EGL_NONE};
egl_context_ = eglCreateContext(
egl_display_, egl_config, EGL_NO_CONTEXT, context_attribs);
CHECK_NE(egl_context_, EGL_NO_CONTEXT) << eglGetError();
for (int i = 0; i < num_windows; ++i) {
int top_left_x = (width + 20) * (i % 4);
int top_left_y = (height + 12) * (i % 3);
EGLNativeWindowType window = PlatformCreateWindow(top_left_x, top_left_y);
EGLSurface egl_surface =
eglCreateWindowSurface(egl_display_, egl_config, window, NULL);
egl_surfaces_.push_back(egl_surface);
CHECK_NE(egl_surface, EGL_NO_SURFACE);
}
CHECK(eglMakeCurrent(egl_display_, egl_surfaces_[0],
egl_surfaces_[0], egl_context_)) << eglGetError();
static const float kVertices[] =
{ -1.f, 1.f, -1.f, -1.f, 1.f, 1.f, 1.f, -1.f, };
static const float kTextureCoordsEgl[] = { 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, };
static const char kVertexShader[] = STRINGIZE(
varying vec2 interp_tc;
attribute vec4 in_pos;
attribute vec2 in_tc;
void main() {
interp_tc = in_tc;
gl_Position = in_pos;
}
);
static const char kFragmentShaderEgl[] = STRINGIZE(
precision mediump float;
varying vec2 interp_tc;
uniform sampler2D tex;
void main() {
gl_FragColor = texture2D(tex, interp_tc);
}
);
GLuint program = glCreateProgram();
CreateShader(program, GL_VERTEX_SHADER,
kVertexShader, arraysize(kVertexShader));
CreateShader(program, GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER,
kFragmentShaderEgl, arraysize(kFragmentShaderEgl));
glLinkProgram(program);
int result = GL_FALSE;
glGetProgramiv(program, GL_LINK_STATUS, &result);
if (!result) {
char log[4096];
glGetShaderInfoLog(program, arraysize(log), NULL, log);
LOG(FATAL) << log;
}
glUseProgram(program);
glDeleteProgram(program);
glUniform1i(glGetUniformLocation(program, "tex"), 0);
int pos_location = glGetAttribLocation(program, "in_pos");
glEnableVertexAttribArray(pos_location);
glVertexAttribPointer(pos_location, 2, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0, kVertices);
int tc_location = glGetAttribLocation(program, "in_tc");
glEnableVertexAttribArray(tc_location);
glVertexAttribPointer(tc_location, 2, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0,
kTextureCoordsEgl);
done->Signal();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int php_stream_memory_seek(php_stream *stream, off_t offset, int whence, off_t *newoffs TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_memory_data *ms = (php_stream_memory_data*)stream->abstract;
assert(ms != NULL);
switch(whence) {
case SEEK_CUR:
if (offset < 0) {
if (ms->fpos < (size_t)(-offset)) {
ms->fpos = 0;
*newoffs = -1;
return -1;
} else {
ms->fpos = ms->fpos + offset;
*newoffs = ms->fpos;
stream->eof = 0;
return 0;
}
} else {
if (ms->fpos + (size_t)(offset) > ms->fsize) {
ms->fpos = ms->fsize;
*newoffs = -1;
return -1;
} else {
ms->fpos = ms->fpos + offset;
*newoffs = ms->fpos;
stream->eof = 0;
return 0;
}
}
case SEEK_SET:
if (ms->fsize < (size_t)(offset)) {
ms->fpos = ms->fsize;
*newoffs = -1;
return -1;
} else {
ms->fpos = offset;
*newoffs = ms->fpos;
stream->eof = 0;
return 0;
}
case SEEK_END:
if (offset > 0) {
ms->fpos = ms->fsize;
*newoffs = -1;
return -1;
} else if (ms->fsize < (size_t)(-offset)) {
ms->fpos = 0;
*newoffs = -1;
return -1;
} else {
ms->fpos = ms->fsize + offset;
*newoffs = ms->fpos;
stream->eof = 0;
return 0;
}
default:
*newoffs = ms->fpos;
return -1;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int recv_stream(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *m, size_t buf_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct tipc_port *tport = tipc_sk_port(sk);
struct sk_buff *buf;
struct tipc_msg *msg;
long timeout;
unsigned int sz;
int sz_to_copy, target, needed;
int sz_copied = 0;
u32 err;
int res = 0;
/* Catch invalid receive attempts */
if (unlikely(!buf_len))
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely((sock->state == SS_UNCONNECTED) ||
(sock->state == SS_CONNECTING))) {
res = -ENOTCONN;
goto exit;
}
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, buf_len);
timeout = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
restart:
/* Look for a message in receive queue; wait if necessary */
while (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
if (sock->state == SS_DISCONNECTING) {
res = -ENOTCONN;
goto exit;
}
if (timeout <= 0L) {
res = timeout ? timeout : -EWOULDBLOCK;
goto exit;
}
release_sock(sk);
timeout = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(*sk_sleep(sk),
tipc_rx_ready(sock),
timeout);
lock_sock(sk);
}
/* Look at first message in receive queue */
buf = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
msg = buf_msg(buf);
sz = msg_data_sz(msg);
err = msg_errcode(msg);
/* Discard an empty non-errored message & try again */
if ((!sz) && (!err)) {
advance_rx_queue(sk);
goto restart;
}
/* Optionally capture sender's address & ancillary data of first msg */
if (sz_copied == 0) {
set_orig_addr(m, msg);
res = anc_data_recv(m, msg, tport);
if (res)
goto exit;
}
/* Capture message data (if valid) & compute return value (always) */
if (!err) {
u32 offset = (u32)(unsigned long)(TIPC_SKB_CB(buf)->handle);
sz -= offset;
needed = (buf_len - sz_copied);
sz_to_copy = (sz <= needed) ? sz : needed;
res = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(buf, msg_hdr_sz(msg) + offset,
m->msg_iov, sz_to_copy);
if (res)
goto exit;
sz_copied += sz_to_copy;
if (sz_to_copy < sz) {
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
TIPC_SKB_CB(buf)->handle =
(void *)(unsigned long)(offset + sz_to_copy);
goto exit;
}
} else {
if (sz_copied != 0)
goto exit; /* can't add error msg to valid data */
if ((err == TIPC_CONN_SHUTDOWN) || m->msg_control)
res = 0;
else
res = -ECONNRESET;
}
/* Consume received message (optional) */
if (likely(!(flags & MSG_PEEK))) {
if (unlikely(++tport->conn_unacked >= TIPC_FLOW_CONTROL_WIN))
tipc_acknowledge(tport->ref, tport->conn_unacked);
advance_rx_queue(sk);
}
/* Loop around if more data is required */
if ((sz_copied < buf_len) && /* didn't get all requested data */
(!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue) ||
(sz_copied < target)) && /* and more is ready or required */
(!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) && /* and aren't just peeking at data */
(!err)) /* and haven't reached a FIN */
goto restart;
exit:
release_sock(sk);
return sz_copied ? sz_copied : res;
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix info leaks via msg_name in recv_msg/recv_stream
The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union
is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() --
the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the
msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c.
Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update
the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e.
"success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will
lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with
memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it
will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Cc: Allan Stephens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 166,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GSF_CLASS (GsfInfileTar, gsf_infile_tar,
gsf_infile_tar_class_init, gsf_infile_tar_init,
GSF_INFILE_TYPE)
/**
* gsf_infile_tar_new:
* @source: A base #GsfInput
* @err: A #GError, optionally %NULL
*
* Opens the root directory of a Tar file.
* <note>This adds a reference to @source.</note>
*
* Returns: the new tar file handler
**/
GsfInfile *
gsf_infile_tar_new (GsfInput *source, GError **err)
{
GsfInfileTar *tar;
g_return_val_if_fail (GSF_IS_INPUT (source), NULL);
tar = g_object_new (GSF_INFILE_TAR_TYPE,
"source", source,
NULL);
if (tar->err) {
if (err)
*err = g_error_copy (tar->err);
g_object_unref (tar);
return NULL;
}
return GSF_INFILE (tar);
}
Commit Message: tar: fix crash on broken tar file.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 47,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *AcquireImageCanvas(const Image *images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const Image
*p,
*q;
size_t
columns,
rows;
q=images;
columns=images->columns;
rows=images->rows;
for (p=images; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
{
if (p->number_channels > q->number_channels)
q=p;
if (p->columns > columns)
columns=p->columns;
if (p->rows > rows)
rows=p->rows;
}
return(CloneImage(q,columns,rows,MagickTrue,exception));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 96,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cupsdCloseAllClients(void)
{
cupsd_client_t *con; /* Current client */
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "cupsdCloseAllClients() Clients=%d", cupsArrayCount(Clients));
for (con = (cupsd_client_t *)cupsArrayFirst(Clients);
con;
con = (cupsd_client_t *)cupsArrayNext(Clients))
if (cupsdCloseClient(con))
cupsdCloseClient(con);
}
Commit Message: Don't treat "localhost.localdomain" as an allowed replacement for localhost, since it isn't.
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 0 | 86,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct timer_rand_state *get_timer_rand_state(unsigned int irq)
{
struct irq_desc *desc;
desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
return desc->timer_rand_state;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int b43_dma_init(struct b43_wldev *dev)
{
struct b43_dma *dma = &dev->dma;
int err;
u64 dmamask;
enum b43_dmatype type;
dmamask = supported_dma_mask(dev);
type = dma_mask_to_engine_type(dmamask);
err = b43_dma_set_mask(dev, dmamask);
if (err)
return err;
err = -ENOMEM;
/* setup TX DMA channels. */
dma->tx_ring_AC_BK = b43_setup_dmaring(dev, 0, 1, type);
if (!dma->tx_ring_AC_BK)
goto out;
dma->tx_ring_AC_BE = b43_setup_dmaring(dev, 1, 1, type);
if (!dma->tx_ring_AC_BE)
goto err_destroy_bk;
dma->tx_ring_AC_VI = b43_setup_dmaring(dev, 2, 1, type);
if (!dma->tx_ring_AC_VI)
goto err_destroy_be;
dma->tx_ring_AC_VO = b43_setup_dmaring(dev, 3, 1, type);
if (!dma->tx_ring_AC_VO)
goto err_destroy_vi;
dma->tx_ring_mcast = b43_setup_dmaring(dev, 4, 1, type);
if (!dma->tx_ring_mcast)
goto err_destroy_vo;
/* setup RX DMA channel. */
dma->rx_ring = b43_setup_dmaring(dev, 0, 0, type);
if (!dma->rx_ring)
goto err_destroy_mcast;
/* No support for the TX status DMA ring. */
B43_WARN_ON(dev->dev->id.revision < 5);
b43dbg(dev->wl, "%u-bit DMA initialized\n",
(unsigned int)type);
err = 0;
out:
return err;
err_destroy_mcast:
destroy_ring(dma, tx_ring_mcast);
err_destroy_vo:
destroy_ring(dma, tx_ring_AC_VO);
err_destroy_vi:
destroy_ring(dma, tx_ring_AC_VI);
err_destroy_be:
destroy_ring(dma, tx_ring_AC_BE);
err_destroy_bk:
destroy_ring(dma, tx_ring_AC_BK);
return err;
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int fb_get_options(char *name, char **option)
{
char *opt, *options = NULL;
int retval = 0;
int name_len = strlen(name), i;
if (name_len && ofonly && strncmp(name, "offb", 4))
retval = 1;
if (name_len && !retval) {
for (i = 0; i < FB_MAX; i++) {
if (video_options[i] == NULL)
continue;
if (!video_options[i][0])
continue;
opt = video_options[i];
if (!strncmp(name, opt, name_len) &&
opt[name_len] == ':')
options = opt + name_len + 1;
}
}
if (options && !strncmp(options, "off", 3))
retval = 1;
if (option)
*option = options;
return retval;
}
Commit Message: vm: convert fb_mmap to vm_iomap_memory() helper
This is my example conversion of a few existing mmap users. The
fb_mmap() case is a good example because it is a bit more complicated
than some: fb_mmap() mmaps one of two different memory areas depending
on the page offset of the mmap (but happily there is never any mixing of
the two, so the helper function still works).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_pgsql_escape_internal(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int escape_literal) /* {{{ */ {
char *from = NULL;
zval *pgsql_link = NULL;
PGconn *pgsql;
size_t from_len;
int id = -1;
char *tmp;
switch (ZEND_NUM_ARGS()) {
case 1:
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &from, &from_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
pgsql_link = NULL;
id = FETCH_DEFAULT_LINK();
break;
default:
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "rs", &pgsql_link, &from, &from_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
break;
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING,"Cannot get default pgsql link");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (pgsql == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING,"Cannot get pgsql link");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (escape_literal) {
tmp = PGSQLescapeLiteral(pgsql, from, (size_t)from_len);
} else {
tmp = PGSQLescapeIdentifier(pgsql, from, (size_t)from_len);
}
if (!tmp) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING,"Failed to escape");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_STRING(tmp);
PGSQLfree(tmp);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t SupervisedUserService::FindEnabledPermissionRequestCreator(
size_t start) {
for (size_t i = start; i < permissions_creators_.size(); ++i) {
if (permissions_creators_[i]->IsEnabled())
return i;
}
return permissions_creators_.size();
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mgr_log_level(p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl, fm_mgr_type_t mgr, int argc, char *argv[]) {
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
fm_msg_ret_code_t ret_code;
uint32_t loglevel=0;
if (mgr == FM_MGR_PM) {
fprintf(stderr, "pmLogLevel:\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\tThis command is not supported any more. The logging of the\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\tPerformance Manager(PM) is now\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\tbased on the logging of the Subnet manager(SM). Use the\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\tsmLogLevel command for changing the logging level of the\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\tSM and PM\n");
} else if (argc == 1) {
loglevel = atol(argv[0]);
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_LOG_LEVEL, mgr, sizeof(loglevel), (void *)&loglevel, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "mgr_log_level: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("mgr_log_level: Successfully sent Log Level control to local mgr instance\n");
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "mgr_log_level: must specify the log level parameter (1 > 5): \n");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 96,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err tssy_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_TimeStampSynchronyBox *ptr = (GF_TimeStampSynchronyBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_int(bs, 0, 6);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->timestamp_sync, 2);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_NOTIFY_INFO_DATA(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
proto_item *item;
proto_tree *subtree;
guint32 count;
guint16 type, field;
const char *field_string;
subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 0, ett_NOTIFY_INFO_DATA, &item, "");
offset = dissect_ndr_uint16(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep,
hf_notify_info_data_type, &type);
offset = dissect_notify_field(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep, type, &field);
switch(type) {
case PRINTER_NOTIFY_TYPE:
field_string = val_to_str_ext(
field, &printer_notify_option_data_vals_ext,
"Unknown (%d)");
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_TYPE:
field_string = val_to_str_ext(
field, &job_notify_option_data_vals_ext,
"Unknown (%d)");
break;
default:
field_string = "Unknown field";
break;
}
proto_item_append_text(
item, "%s, %s",
val_to_str(type, printer_notify_types, "Unknown (%d)"),
field_string);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep,
hf_notify_info_data_count, &count);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep,
hf_notify_info_data_id, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep,
hf_notify_info_data_count, NULL);
/* The value here depends on (type, field) */
switch (type) {
case PRINTER_NOTIFY_TYPE:
offset = dissect_NOTIFY_INFO_DATA_printer(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, item, di, drep, field);
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_TYPE:
offset = dissect_NOTIFY_INFO_DATA_job(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, item, di, drep, field);
break;
default:
expert_add_info(pinfo, item, &ei_notify_info_data_type);
break;
}
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 52,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Extension::UpdateTabSpecificPermissions(
int tab_id,
scoped_refptr<const PermissionSet> permissions) const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_data_lock_);
runtime_data_.UpdateTabSpecificPermissions(tab_id, permissions);
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 114,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Box *btrt_New()
{
GF_BitRateBox *tmp = (GF_BitRateBox *) gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_BitRateBox));
if (tmp == NULL) return NULL;
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(GF_BitRateBox));
tmp->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_BTRT;
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void build_file_streams(void)
{
FFServerStream *stream;
AVFormatContext *infile;
int i, ret;
/* gather all streams */
for(stream = config.first_stream; stream; stream = stream->next) {
infile = NULL;
if (stream->stream_type != STREAM_TYPE_LIVE || stream->feed)
continue;
/* the stream comes from a file */
/* try to open the file */
/* open stream */
/* specific case: if transport stream output to RTP,
* we use a raw transport stream reader */
if (stream->fmt && !strcmp(stream->fmt->name, "rtp"))
av_dict_set(&stream->in_opts, "mpeg2ts_compute_pcr", "1", 0);
if (!stream->feed_filename[0]) {
http_log("Unspecified feed file for stream '%s'\n",
stream->filename);
goto fail;
}
http_log("Opening feed file '%s' for stream '%s'\n",
stream->feed_filename, stream->filename);
ret = avformat_open_input(&infile, stream->feed_filename,
stream->ifmt, &stream->in_opts);
if (ret < 0) {
http_log("Could not open '%s': %s\n", stream->feed_filename,
av_err2str(ret));
/* remove stream (no need to spend more time on it) */
fail:
remove_stream(stream);
} else {
/* find all the AVStreams inside and reference them in
* 'stream' */
if (avformat_find_stream_info(infile, NULL) < 0) {
http_log("Could not find codec parameters from '%s'\n",
stream->feed_filename);
avformat_close_input(&infile);
goto fail;
}
for(i=0;i<infile->nb_streams;i++)
add_av_stream1(stream, infile->streams[i]->codec, 1);
avformat_close_input(&infile);
}
}
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageBitmapFactories::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(pending_loaders_);
Supplement<LocalDOMWindow>::Trace(visitor);
Supplement<WorkerGlobalScope>::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAP in ImageBitmapLoader/FileReaderLoader
FileReaderLoader stores its client as a raw pointer, so in cases like
ImageBitmapLoader where the FileReaderLoaderClient really is garbage
collected we have to make sure to destroy the FileReaderLoader when
the ExecutionContext that owns it is destroyed.
Bug: 913970
Change-Id: I40b02115367cf7bf5bbbbb8e9b57874d2510f861
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1374511
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616342}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 173,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::FinishConfigureDataTypesOnFrontendLoop() {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), frontend_loop_);
VLOG(1) << "Syncer in config mode. SBH executing"
<< "FinishConfigureDataTypesOnFrontendLoop";
if (pending_config_mode_state_->deleted_type) {
core_thread_.message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(core_.get(),
&SyncBackendHost::Core::DeferNudgeForCleanup));
}
if (pending_config_mode_state_->added_types.none() &&
!core_->syncapi()->InitialSyncEndedForAllEnabledTypes()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No new types, but initial sync not finished."
<< "Possible sync db corruption / removal.";
pending_config_mode_state_->added_types =
syncable::ModelTypeBitSetFromSet(
pending_config_mode_state_->initial_types);
}
if (pending_config_mode_state_->added_types.none()) {
VLOG(1) << "SyncBackendHost(" << this << "): No new types added. "
<< "Calling ready_task directly";
pending_config_mode_state_->ready_task->Run();
} else {
pending_download_state_.reset(pending_config_mode_state_.release());
syncable::ModelTypeBitSet types_copy(pending_download_state_->added_types);
if (IsNigoriEnabled())
types_copy.set(syncable::NIGORI);
VLOG(1) << "SyncBackendHost(" << this << "):New Types added. "
<< "Calling DoRequestConfig";
core_thread_.message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(core_.get(),
&SyncBackendHost::Core::DoRequestConfig,
types_copy,
pending_download_state_->reason));
}
pending_config_mode_state_.reset();
core_thread_.message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(core_.get(),
&SyncBackendHost::Core::DoUpdateEnabledTypes));
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FS_SV_Rename( const char *from, const char *to, qboolean safe ) {
char *from_ospath, *to_ospath;
if ( !fs_searchpaths ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization" );
}
S_ClearSoundBuffer();
from_ospath = FS_BuildOSPath( fs_homepath->string, from, "" );
to_ospath = FS_BuildOSPath( fs_homepath->string, to, "" );
from_ospath[strlen(from_ospath)-1] = '\0';
to_ospath[strlen(to_ospath)-1] = '\0';
if ( fs_debug->integer ) {
Com_Printf( "FS_SV_Rename: %s --> %s\n", from_ospath, to_ospath );
}
if ( safe ) {
FS_CheckFilenameIsMutable( to_ospath, __func__ );
}
rename(from_ospath, to_ospath);
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 96,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pushquery(QPRS_STATE *state, int32 type, int32 val, int32 distance, int32 lenval, uint16 flag)
{
NODE *tmp = (NODE *) palloc(sizeof(NODE));
tmp->type = type;
tmp->val = val;
tmp->flag = flag;
if (distance > 0xffff)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("value is too big")));
if (lenval > 0xff)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("operand is too long")));
tmp->distance = distance;
tmp->length = lenval;
tmp->next = state->str;
state->str = tmp;
state->num++;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,789 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameView::updateAcceleratedCompositingSettings()
{
if (RenderView* renderView = this->renderView())
renderView->compositor()->updateAcceleratedCompositingSettings();
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigateNewSubframe(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
bool is_same_document,
bool replace_entry) {
DCHECK(ui::PageTransitionCoreTypeIs(params.transition,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_MANUAL_SUBFRAME));
DCHECK(GetLastCommittedEntry()) << "ClassifyNavigation should guarantee "
<< "that a last committed entry exists.";
DCHECK(!replace_entry);
scoped_refptr<FrameNavigationEntry> frame_entry(new FrameNavigationEntry(
rfh->frame_tree_node()->unique_name(), params.item_sequence_number,
params.document_sequence_number, rfh->GetSiteInstance(), nullptr,
params.url, params.referrer, params.redirects, params.page_state,
params.method, params.post_id, nullptr /* blob_url_loader_factory */));
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl> new_entry =
GetLastCommittedEntry()->CloneAndReplace(
frame_entry.get(), is_same_document, rfh->frame_tree_node(),
delegate_->GetFrameTree()->root());
InsertOrReplaceEntry(std::move(new_entry), replace_entry);
}
Commit Message: Preserve renderer-initiated bit when reloading in a new process.
BUG=847718
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Change-Id: I6c3461793fbb23f1a4d731dc27b4e77312f29227
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1080235
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563312}
CWE ID: | 0 | 153,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void jpc_com_destroyparms(jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_com_t *com = &ms->parms.com;
if (com->data) {
jas_free(com->data);
}
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: disk_cache::ScopedEntryPtr CreateDiskCacheEntry(disk_cache::Backend* cache,
const char* key,
const std::string& data) {
disk_cache::Entry* temp_entry = nullptr;
net::TestCompletionCallback callback;
int rv = cache->CreateEntry(key, &temp_entry, callback.callback());
if (callback.GetResult(rv) != net::OK)
return nullptr;
disk_cache::ScopedEntryPtr entry(temp_entry);
scoped_refptr<net::StringIOBuffer> iobuffer = new net::StringIOBuffer(data);
rv = entry->WriteData(kTestDiskCacheStreamIndex, 0, iobuffer.get(),
iobuffer->size(), callback.callback(), false);
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<int>(data.size()), callback.GetResult(rv));
return entry;
}
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 150,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::IsTranslucentWindowOpacitySupported() const {
return ui::XVisualManager::GetInstance()->ArgbVisualAvailable();
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: enne <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 140,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
int ret;
switch (nlh->nlmsg_type) {
case TCPDIAG_GETSOCK:
case DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK:
if (inet_rcv_compat == NULL)
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d-type-%d", PF_NETLINK,
NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG, AF_INET);
mutex_lock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
if (inet_rcv_compat != NULL)
ret = inet_rcv_compat(skb, nlh);
else
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
return ret;
case SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY:
return __sock_diag_rcv_msg(skb, nlh);
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadHALDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
cube_size,
level;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Create HALD color lookup table image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
level=0;
if (*image_info->filename != '\0')
level=StringToUnsignedLong(image_info->filename);
if (level < 2)
level=8;
status=MagickTrue;
cube_size=level*level;
image->columns=(size_t) (level*cube_size);
image->rows=(size_t) (level*cube_size);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=(ssize_t) level)
{
ssize_t
blue,
green,
red;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,(size_t) level,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
blue=y/(ssize_t) level;
for (green=0; green < (ssize_t) cube_size; green++)
{
for (red=0; red < (ssize_t) cube_size; red++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType)
(QuantumRange*red/(cube_size-1.0))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType)
(QuantumRange*green/(cube_size-1.0))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType)
(QuantumRange*blue/(cube_size-1.0))));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void JSTestActiveDOMObjectOwner::finalize(JSC::Handle<JSC::Unknown> handle, void* context)
{
JSTestActiveDOMObject* jsTestActiveDOMObject = jsCast<JSTestActiveDOMObject*>(handle.get().asCell());
DOMWrapperWorld* world = static_cast<DOMWrapperWorld*>(context);
uncacheWrapper(world, jsTestActiveDOMObject->impl(), jsTestActiveDOMObject);
jsTestActiveDOMObject->releaseImpl();
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CStarter::RemoteHold( int )
{
if( jic ) {
jic->gotHold();
}
if ( this->Hold( ) ) {
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, "Got Hold when no jobs running\n" );
this->allJobsDone();
return ( true );
}
return ( false );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: identity::mojom::IdentityManager& DriveFsHost::GetIdentityManager() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
if (!identity_manager_) {
delegate_->GetConnector()->BindInterface(
identity::mojom::kServiceName, mojo::MakeRequest(&identity_manager_));
}
return *identity_manager_;
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void address_space_stl(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr, uint32_t val,
MemTxAttrs attrs, MemTxResult *result)
{
address_space_stl_internal(as, addr, val, attrs, result,
DEVICE_NATIVE_ENDIAN);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hmac_sha1_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm,
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
return hash_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, HASH_ALGO_SHA1);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ewk_frame_load_finished(Evas_Object* ewkFrame, const char* errorDomain, int errorCode, bool isCancellation, const char* errorDescription, const char* failingUrl)
{
Ewk_Frame_Load_Error buffer, *error;
if (!errorDomain) {
DBG("ewkFrame=%p, success.", ewkFrame);
error = 0;
} else {
DBG("ewkFrame=%p, error=%s (%d, cancellation=%hhu) \"%s\", url=%s",
ewkFrame, errorDomain, errorCode, isCancellation,
errorDescription, failingUrl);
buffer.domain = errorDomain;
buffer.code = errorCode;
buffer.is_cancellation = isCancellation;
buffer.description = errorDescription;
buffer.failing_url = failingUrl;
buffer.resource_identifier = 0;
buffer.frame = ewkFrame;
error = &buffer;
}
evas_object_smart_callback_call(ewkFrame, "load,finished", error);
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData);
ewk_view_load_finished(smartData->view, error);
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <[email protected]> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,667 |
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