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. The issue of whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief has divided the circuits. The majority hold that such use is not constitutionally permissible. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "774 F.2d 530, 538",
"parenthetical": "testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 1563, 1568",
"parenthetical": "dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir.1985) (testimony of defendants' pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence properly admitted; no fundamental unfairness in admitting evidence of non-Miranda-induced silence); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir.2005) (comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1991) (dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions)."
} | 3,752,988 | a |
. The issue of whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief has divided the circuits. The majority hold that such use is not constitutionally permissible. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "205 F.3d 269, 283",
"parenthetical": "\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "637 F.2d 869, 876",
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government's direct case\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | 3,752,988 | a |
. The issue of whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief has divided the circuits. The majority hold that such use is not constitutionally permissible. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "408 F.3d 1102, 1111",
"parenthetical": "comment on defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir.1985) (testimony of defendants' pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence properly admitted; no fundamental unfairness in admitting evidence of non-Miranda-induced silence); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir.2005) (comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1991) (dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "205 F.3d 269, 283",
"parenthetical": "\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | 3,752,988 | b |
. The issue of whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief has divided the circuits. The majority hold that such use is not constitutionally permissible. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 1563, 1568",
"parenthetical": "dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir.1985) (testimony of defendants' pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence properly admitted; no fundamental unfairness in admitting evidence of non-Miranda-induced silence); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir.2005) (comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1991) (dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "205 F.3d 269, 283",
"parenthetical": "\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | 3,752,988 | b |
. The issue of whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief has divided the circuits. The majority hold that such use is not constitutionally permissible. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "269 F.3d 1023, 1033",
"parenthetical": "district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "637 F.2d 869, 876",
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government's direct case\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | 3,752,988 | a |
. The issue of whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief has divided the circuits. The majority hold that such use is not constitutionally permissible. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "269 F.3d 1023, 1033",
"parenthetical": "district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "408 F.3d 1102, 1111",
"parenthetical": "comment on defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir.1985) (testimony of defendants' pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence properly admitted; no fundamental unfairness in admitting evidence of non-Miranda-induced silence); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir.2005) (comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1991) (dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions)."
} | 3,752,988 | a |
. The issue of whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief has divided the circuits. The majority hold that such use is not constitutionally permissible. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 1563, 1568",
"parenthetical": "dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir.1985) (testimony of defendants' pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence properly admitted; no fundamental unfairness in admitting evidence of non-Miranda-induced silence); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir.2005) (comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1991) (dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "269 F.3d 1023, 1033",
"parenthetical": "district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | 3,752,988 | b |
. The issue of whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief has divided the circuits. The majority hold that such use is not constitutionally permissible. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01",
"parenthetical": "admission into evidence of defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "637 F.2d 869, 876",
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government's direct case\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | 3,752,988 | a |
. The issue of whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief has divided the circuits. The majority hold that such use is not constitutionally permissible. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "408 F.3d 1102, 1111",
"parenthetical": "comment on defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir.1985) (testimony of defendants' pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence properly admitted; no fundamental unfairness in admitting evidence of non-Miranda-induced silence); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir.2005) (comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1991) (dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01",
"parenthetical": "admission into evidence of defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | 3,752,988 | b |
. The issue of whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief has divided the circuits. The majority hold that such use is not constitutionally permissible. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 1563, 1568",
"parenthetical": "dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir.1985) (testimony of defendants' pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence properly admitted; no fundamental unfairness in admitting evidence of non-Miranda-induced silence); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir.2005) (comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1991) (dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01",
"parenthetical": "admission into evidence of defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | 3,752,988 | b |
. The issue of whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief has divided the circuits. The majority hold that such use is not constitutionally permissible. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "637 F.2d 869, 876",
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government's direct case\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "408 F.3d 1102, 1111",
"parenthetical": "comment on defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir.1985) (testimony of defendants' pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence properly admitted; no fundamental unfairness in admitting evidence of non-Miranda-induced silence); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir.2005) (comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1991) (dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions)."
} | 3,752,988 | a |
. The issue of whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief has divided the circuits. The majority hold that such use is not constitutionally permissible. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "637 F.2d 869, 876",
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government's direct case\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 1563, 1568",
"parenthetical": "dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir.1985) (testimony of defendants' pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence properly admitted; no fundamental unfairness in admitting evidence of non-Miranda-induced silence); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir.2005) (comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1991) (dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions)."
} | 3,752,988 | a |
Dist. Ct. Op. at 27; JA 134. The "ignored her client's wishes" reference, however, is an oblique one because it comes at the end of a paragraph that discusses only specific instances in which trial counsel failed to adhere to Coddington's wishes and because it never says Coddington specifically instructed his appellate counsel (Pilette) to appeal the issue. That trial counsel allegedly failed to follow Coddington's wishes merely confirms that Coddington had a strong issue to appeal. In the absence of a directive from Coddington to Pilette to appeal his plea, however, we are left with a situation in which Coddington conveyed at most an ambiguous interest in altering his sentence but not "express instructions" regarding the appeal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 U.S. 470, 478",
"parenthetical": "\"If counsel has consulted with the defendant, the question of deficient performance is easily answered: Counsel performs in a professionally unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant's express instructions with respect to an appeal.\"",
"sentence": "See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (“If counsel has consulted with the defendant, the question of deficient performance is easily answered: Counsel performs in a professionally unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant’s express instructions with respect to an appeal.”) (emphasis added); see also Regalado v. United States, 334 F.3d 520, 525-26 (6th Cir.2003) (attorney’s performance not deficient when client expressed a desire to appeal, but did not expressly instruct her attorney to do so)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "334 F.3d 520, 525-26",
"parenthetical": "attorney's performance not deficient when client expressed a desire to appeal, but did not expressly instruct her attorney to do so",
"sentence": "See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (“If counsel has consulted with the defendant, the question of deficient performance is easily answered: Counsel performs in a professionally unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant’s express instructions with respect to an appeal.”) (emphasis added); see also Regalado v. United States, 334 F.3d 520, 525-26 (6th Cir.2003) (attorney’s performance not deficient when client expressed a desire to appeal, but did not expressly instruct her attorney to do so)."
} | 168,694 | a |
Dist. Ct. Op. at 27; JA 134. The "ignored her client's wishes" reference, however, is an oblique one because it comes at the end of a paragraph that discusses only specific instances in which trial counsel failed to adhere to Coddington's wishes and because it never says Coddington specifically instructed his appellate counsel (Pilette) to appeal the issue. That trial counsel allegedly failed to follow Coddington's wishes merely confirms that Coddington had a strong issue to appeal. In the absence of a directive from Coddington to Pilette to appeal his plea, however, we are left with a situation in which Coddington conveyed at most an ambiguous interest in altering his sentence but not "express instructions" regarding the appeal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If counsel has consulted with the defendant, the question of deficient performance is easily answered: Counsel performs in a professionally unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant's express instructions with respect to an appeal.\"",
"sentence": "See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (“If counsel has consulted with the defendant, the question of deficient performance is easily answered: Counsel performs in a professionally unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant’s express instructions with respect to an appeal.”) (emphasis added); see also Regalado v. United States, 334 F.3d 520, 525-26 (6th Cir.2003) (attorney’s performance not deficient when client expressed a desire to appeal, but did not expressly instruct her attorney to do so)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "334 F.3d 520, 525-26",
"parenthetical": "attorney's performance not deficient when client expressed a desire to appeal, but did not expressly instruct her attorney to do so",
"sentence": "See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (“If counsel has consulted with the defendant, the question of deficient performance is easily answered: Counsel performs in a professionally unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant’s express instructions with respect to an appeal.”) (emphasis added); see also Regalado v. United States, 334 F.3d 520, 525-26 (6th Cir.2003) (attorney’s performance not deficient when client expressed a desire to appeal, but did not expressly instruct her attorney to do so)."
} | 168,694 | a |
Dist. Ct. Op. at 27; JA 134. The "ignored her client's wishes" reference, however, is an oblique one because it comes at the end of a paragraph that discusses only specific instances in which trial counsel failed to adhere to Coddington's wishes and because it never says Coddington specifically instructed his appellate counsel (Pilette) to appeal the issue. That trial counsel allegedly failed to follow Coddington's wishes merely confirms that Coddington had a strong issue to appeal. In the absence of a directive from Coddington to Pilette to appeal his plea, however, we are left with a situation in which Coddington conveyed at most an ambiguous interest in altering his sentence but not "express instructions" regarding the appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "334 F.3d 520, 525-26",
"parenthetical": "attorney's performance not deficient when client expressed a desire to appeal, but did not expressly instruct her attorney to do so",
"sentence": "See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (“If counsel has consulted with the defendant, the question of deficient performance is easily answered: Counsel performs in a professionally unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant’s express instructions with respect to an appeal.”) (emphasis added); see also Regalado v. United States, 334 F.3d 520, 525-26 (6th Cir.2003) (attorney’s performance not deficient when client expressed a desire to appeal, but did not expressly instruct her attorney to do so)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If counsel has consulted with the defendant, the question of deficient performance is easily answered: Counsel performs in a professionally unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant's express instructions with respect to an appeal.\"",
"sentence": "See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (“If counsel has consulted with the defendant, the question of deficient performance is easily answered: Counsel performs in a professionally unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant’s express instructions with respect to an appeal.”) (emphasis added); see also Regalado v. United States, 334 F.3d 520, 525-26 (6th Cir.2003) (attorney’s performance not deficient when client expressed a desire to appeal, but did not expressly instruct her attorney to do so)."
} | 168,694 | b |
As such, claim 10 is inconsistent with claim 1 and, indeed, contradicts claim 1. A dependent claim that contradicts, rather than harrows, the claim from which it depends is invalid. See 35 U.S.C. SS 112(d) (requiring that "a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed" (emphasis added)); Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "811 F.3d 1359, 1366-67",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims that were internally contradictory were invalid as indefinite",
"sentence": "Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 for claiming subject matter that was “non-overlapping” with the claim from which it depended); Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that a dependent claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4); see also Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims that were internally contradictory were invalid as indefinite); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite). “[Wjhere ... claims are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and that interpretation results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a whole, the claim must be invalidated.... ” Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92",
"parenthetical": "holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. SS 112 P 4 for claiming subject matter that was \"non-overlapping\" with the claim from which it depended",
"sentence": "Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 for claiming subject matter that was “non-overlapping” with the claim from which it depended); Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that a dependent claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4); see also Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims that were internally contradictory were invalid as indefinite); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite). “[Wjhere ... claims are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and that interpretation results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a whole, the claim must be invalidated.... ” Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)."
} | 6,055,794 | b |
As such, claim 10 is inconsistent with claim 1 and, indeed, contradicts claim 1. A dependent claim that contradicts, rather than harrows, the claim from which it depends is invalid. See 35 U.S.C. SS 112(d) (requiring that "a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed" (emphasis added)); Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "299 F.3d 1336, 1349",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite",
"sentence": "Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 for claiming subject matter that was “non-overlapping” with the claim from which it depended); Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that a dependent claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4); see also Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims that were internally contradictory were invalid as indefinite); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite). “[Wjhere ... claims are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and that interpretation results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a whole, the claim must be invalidated.... ” Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92",
"parenthetical": "holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. SS 112 P 4 for claiming subject matter that was \"non-overlapping\" with the claim from which it depended",
"sentence": "Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 for claiming subject matter that was “non-overlapping” with the claim from which it depended); Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that a dependent claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4); see also Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims that were internally contradictory were invalid as indefinite); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite). “[Wjhere ... claims are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and that interpretation results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a whole, the claim must be invalidated.... ” Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)."
} | 6,055,794 | b |
As such, claim 10 is inconsistent with claim 1 and, indeed, contradicts claim 1. A dependent claim that contradicts, rather than harrows, the claim from which it depends is invalid. See 35 U.S.C. SS 112(d) (requiring that "a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed" (emphasis added)); Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92",
"parenthetical": "holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. SS 112 P 4 for claiming subject matter that was \"non-overlapping\" with the claim from which it depended",
"sentence": "Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 for claiming subject matter that was “non-overlapping” with the claim from which it depended); Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that a dependent claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4); see also Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims that were internally contradictory were invalid as indefinite); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite). “[Wjhere ... claims are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and that interpretation results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a whole, the claim must be invalidated.... ” Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "190 F.3d 1350, 1357",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite",
"sentence": "Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 for claiming subject matter that was “non-overlapping” with the claim from which it depended); Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that a dependent claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4); see also Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims that were internally contradictory were invalid as indefinite); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite). “[Wjhere ... claims are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and that interpretation results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a whole, the claim must be invalidated.... ” Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)."
} | 6,055,794 | a |
As such, claim 10 is inconsistent with claim 1 and, indeed, contradicts claim 1. A dependent claim that contradicts, rather than harrows, the claim from which it depends is invalid. See 35 U.S.C. SS 112(d) (requiring that "a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed" (emphasis added)); Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "438 F.3d 1374, 1380",
"parenthetical": "noting that a dependent claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. SS 112 P 4",
"sentence": "Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 for claiming subject matter that was “non-overlapping” with the claim from which it depended); Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that a dependent claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4); see also Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims that were internally contradictory were invalid as indefinite); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite). “[Wjhere ... claims are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and that interpretation results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a whole, the claim must be invalidated.... ” Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "811 F.3d 1359, 1366-67",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims that were internally contradictory were invalid as indefinite",
"sentence": "Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 for claiming subject matter that was “non-overlapping” with the claim from which it depended); Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that a dependent claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4); see also Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims that were internally contradictory were invalid as indefinite); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite). “[Wjhere ... claims are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and that interpretation results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a whole, the claim must be invalidated.... ” Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)."
} | 6,055,794 | a |
As such, claim 10 is inconsistent with claim 1 and, indeed, contradicts claim 1. A dependent claim that contradicts, rather than harrows, the claim from which it depends is invalid. See 35 U.S.C. SS 112(d) (requiring that "a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed" (emphasis added)); Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "299 F.3d 1336, 1349",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite",
"sentence": "Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 for claiming subject matter that was “non-overlapping” with the claim from which it depended); Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that a dependent claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4); see also Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims that were internally contradictory were invalid as indefinite); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite). “[Wjhere ... claims are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and that interpretation results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a whole, the claim must be invalidated.... ” Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "438 F.3d 1374, 1380",
"parenthetical": "noting that a dependent claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. SS 112 P 4",
"sentence": "Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 for claiming subject matter that was “non-overlapping” with the claim from which it depended); Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that a dependent claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4); see also Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims that were internally contradictory were invalid as indefinite); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite). “[Wjhere ... claims are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and that interpretation results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a whole, the claim must be invalidated.... ” Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)."
} | 6,055,794 | b |
As such, claim 10 is inconsistent with claim 1 and, indeed, contradicts claim 1. A dependent claim that contradicts, rather than harrows, the claim from which it depends is invalid. See 35 U.S.C. SS 112(d) (requiring that "a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed" (emphasis added)); Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "190 F.3d 1350, 1357",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite",
"sentence": "Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 for claiming subject matter that was “non-overlapping” with the claim from which it depended); Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that a dependent claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4); see also Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims that were internally contradictory were invalid as indefinite); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite). “[Wjhere ... claims are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and that interpretation results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a whole, the claim must be invalidated.... ” Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "438 F.3d 1374, 1380",
"parenthetical": "noting that a dependent claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. SS 112 P 4",
"sentence": "Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 for claiming subject matter that was “non-overlapping” with the claim from which it depended); Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that a dependent claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4); see also Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims that were internally contradictory were invalid as indefinite); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite). “[Wjhere ... claims are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and that interpretation results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a whole, the claim must be invalidated.... ” Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)."
} | 6,055,794 | b |
In the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, law enforcement officials are free to conduct a warrantless search notwithstanding whether the search is also justified by exigent circumstances or some other exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Prisoners have little, if any, reasonable expectation of privacy while incarcerated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities, chief among which is internal security",
"sentence": "People v. Salaz, 953 P.2d 1275 (Colo.1998); see United States v. Peoples, 71 F.Supp.2d 967 (W.D.Mo.1999)(curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities, chief among which is internal security); see also People v. Blehm, 44 Colo.App. 472, 623 P.2d 411 (1980)(defendant had no justifiable expectation that her conversations in jail with her husband were private)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant had no justifiable expectation that her conversations in jail with her husband were private",
"sentence": "People v. Salaz, 953 P.2d 1275 (Colo.1998); see United States v. Peoples, 71 F.Supp.2d 967 (W.D.Mo.1999)(curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities, chief among which is internal security); see also People v. Blehm, 44 Colo.App. 472, 623 P.2d 411 (1980)(defendant had no justifiable expectation that her conversations in jail with her husband were private)."
} | 9,224,545 | a |
In the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, law enforcement officials are free to conduct a warrantless search notwithstanding whether the search is also justified by exigent circumstances or some other exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Prisoners have little, if any, reasonable expectation of privacy while incarcerated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities, chief among which is internal security",
"sentence": "People v. Salaz, 953 P.2d 1275 (Colo.1998); see United States v. Peoples, 71 F.Supp.2d 967 (W.D.Mo.1999)(curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities, chief among which is internal security); see also People v. Blehm, 44 Colo.App. 472, 623 P.2d 411 (1980)(defendant had no justifiable expectation that her conversations in jail with her husband were private)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant had no justifiable expectation that her conversations in jail with her husband were private",
"sentence": "People v. Salaz, 953 P.2d 1275 (Colo.1998); see United States v. Peoples, 71 F.Supp.2d 967 (W.D.Mo.1999)(curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities, chief among which is internal security); see also People v. Blehm, 44 Colo.App. 472, 623 P.2d 411 (1980)(defendant had no justifiable expectation that her conversations in jail with her husband were private)."
} | 9,224,545 | a |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States\" if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "459 F.3d 618, 623",
"parenthetical": "rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | a |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States\" if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | b |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States\" if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | b |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States\" if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "373 F.3d 952, 973",
"parenthetical": "\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.\" (emphasis in original",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | a |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "459 F.3d 618, 623",
"parenthetical": "rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States\" if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | b |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States\" if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | b |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States\" if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | b |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "373 F.3d 952, 973",
"parenthetical": "\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.\" (emphasis in original",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States\" if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | b |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "459 F.3d 618, 623",
"parenthetical": "rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States\" if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | b |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States\" if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | b |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States\" if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | b |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "373 F.3d 952, 973",
"parenthetical": "\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.\" (emphasis in original",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States\" if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | b |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "459 F.3d 618, 623",
"parenthetical": "rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 F.2d 644, 647",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | b |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 F.2d 644, 647",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | a |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 F.2d 644, 647",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | b |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "373 F.3d 952, 973",
"parenthetical": "\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.\" (emphasis in original",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 F.2d 644, 647",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | b |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "179 F.2d 628, 630",
"parenthetical": "alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not 'in the United States' ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "459 F.3d 618, 623",
"parenthetical": "rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | a |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "179 F.2d 628, 630",
"parenthetical": "alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not 'in the United States' ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | b |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "179 F.2d 628, 630",
"parenthetical": "alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not 'in the United States' ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | b |
. The Supreme Court's decisions and our own invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "179 F.2d 628, 630",
"parenthetical": "alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not 'in the United States' ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "373 F.3d 952, 973",
"parenthetical": "\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.\" (emphasis in original",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien \"within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s \"discretionary power to suspend deportation” did not apply to aliens \"within the country on parole,” because parole, \"by statute[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island \"is not ‘in the United States’ ... [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization”); see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir.) (rejecting appli cation of the entry fiction to Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 837, 166 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (\"The entry fiction is best seen ... as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.” (emphasis in original))."
} | 4,031,147 | a |
The wrongful discharge statute states quite clearly that it is remedial. The very title conveys this fact: "Indemnity for Discharge Without Just Cause". The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has also confirmed this fact. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that section 185a of Title 29 is remedial in nature",
"sentence": "Beauchamp v. Holsum Bakers of P.R., 116 D.P.R. 522 (1985) (holding that section 185a of Title 29 is remedial in nature). Because the wrongful termination statute is meant to make the plaintiff whole, and the compensatory damages granted under the state anti-discrimination statute have already accomplished this goal, we must strike the $20,000 granted for unjust termination."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "865 F.2d 1331, 1345",
"parenthetical": "\"a plaintiff is entitled to only one full recovery, no matter how many legal grounds may support the verdict\"",
"sentence": "See Freeman v. Package Machinery Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1345 (1st Cir.1988) (“a plaintiff is entitled to only one full recovery, no matter how many legal grounds may support the verdict”)."
} | 7,403,759 | a |
These waiver principles apply to unpreserved constitutional claims for good reason. The narrow Golding exception to the general rule that a reviewing court will not consider a claim not previously raised at trial is justified by the overriding importance of protecting the fundamental constitutional rights of the accused. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "165 Conn. 61, 70",
"parenthetical": "predecessor to Golding identified \" 'exceptional circumstance' \" that arises when \"the record adequately supports a claim that a litigant has clearly been deprived of a fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 238-39 (explaining “exceptional” circumstance presented by unpreserved claim of constitutional violation if record sufficient for review); see also State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973) (predecessor to Golding identified “ ‘exceptional circumstance’ ” that arises when “the record adequately supports a claim that a litigant has clearly been deprived of a fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining \"exceptional\" circumstance presented by unpreserved claim of constitutional violation if record sufficient for review",
"sentence": "See State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 238-39 (explaining “exceptional” circumstance presented by unpreserved claim of constitutional violation if record sufficient for review); see also State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973) (predecessor to Golding identified “ ‘exceptional circumstance’ ” that arises when “the record adequately supports a claim that a litigant has clearly been deprived of a fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial”)."
} | 4,343,690 | b |
These waiver principles apply to unpreserved constitutional claims for good reason. The narrow Golding exception to the general rule that a reviewing court will not consider a claim not previously raised at trial is justified by the overriding importance of protecting the fundamental constitutional rights of the accused. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "predecessor to Golding identified \" 'exceptional circumstance' \" that arises when \"the record adequately supports a claim that a litigant has clearly been deprived of a fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 238-39 (explaining “exceptional” circumstance presented by unpreserved claim of constitutional violation if record sufficient for review); see also State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973) (predecessor to Golding identified “ ‘exceptional circumstance’ ” that arises when “the record adequately supports a claim that a litigant has clearly been deprived of a fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining \"exceptional\" circumstance presented by unpreserved claim of constitutional violation if record sufficient for review",
"sentence": "See State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 238-39 (explaining “exceptional” circumstance presented by unpreserved claim of constitutional violation if record sufficient for review); see also State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973) (predecessor to Golding identified “ ‘exceptional circumstance’ ” that arises when “the record adequately supports a claim that a litigant has clearly been deprived of a fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial”)."
} | 4,343,690 | b |
We therefore endeavor to set forth the procedures to be used in reviewing a claim concerning the crime-fraud exception and the type of evidence permissible for a threshold factual showing in future cases. The proponent of the exception may, in appropriate circumstances, request an in camera review of the privileged information to allow the court to make a determination regarding the applicability of the exception. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where concerns for secrecy are weak, in camera proceeding may not be justified",
"sentence": "Id., 570-71; see also In re John Doe, Inc., supra, 13 F.3d 636 (where concerns for secrecy are weak, in camera proceeding may not be justified). We have permitted an in camera review in other contexts and conclude that, in certain circum stances, it may be an appropriate means of examining the allegedly privileged material without abrogating the privilege itself."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that neither Federal Rules of Evidence nor federal common law prohibits party opposing privilege on crime-fraud grounds from relying on in camera review of communications",
"sentence": "See United States v. Zolin, supra, 491 U.S. 568-69 (concluding that neither Federal Rules of Evidence nor federal common law prohibits party opposing privilege on crime-fraud grounds from relying on in camera review of communications). We recognize that encouraging an in camera review in all cases is ill-advised due to the fact that “[t]oo much judicial inquiry into the claim of privilege would force disclosure of the thing the privilege was meant to protect . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)"
} | 1,116,759 | b |
Attorney fees are awarded when the defendant commits "truly egregious, purposeful infringement, or other purposeful wrongdoing." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no attorney fees when defendant made a conscious effort to create elements of dissimilarity between products",
"sentence": "Badger Meter, Inc., 13 F.3d at 1159 (no attorney fees when “the question of functionality was close enough to remove the case from the ambit of an ‘exceptional case’ ”) (quoting Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1125 (7th Cir.1988)); see also, Roulo, 886 F.2d 931 (no attorney fees when defendant made a conscious effort to create elements of dissimilarity between products); Cf. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc., 754 F.2d at 746 (the defendant’s ‘targeting’ of the plaintiff in its literature created exceptional case for attorney fees); Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435, 437 (7th Cir.1989) (upholding attorney fee award when the defendants were “holding the trademark hostage as a bargaining tactic” and litigated the suit in bad faith)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "13 F.3d 1159, 1159",
"parenthetical": "no attorney fees when \"the question of functionality was close enough to remove the case from the ambit of an 'exceptional case' \"",
"sentence": "Badger Meter, Inc., 13 F.3d at 1159 (no attorney fees when “the question of functionality was close enough to remove the case from the ambit of an ‘exceptional case’ ”) (quoting Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1125 (7th Cir.1988)); see also, Roulo, 886 F.2d 931 (no attorney fees when defendant made a conscious effort to create elements of dissimilarity between products); Cf. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc., 754 F.2d at 746 (the defendant’s ‘targeting’ of the plaintiff in its literature created exceptional case for attorney fees); Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435, 437 (7th Cir.1989) (upholding attorney fee award when the defendants were “holding the trademark hostage as a bargaining tactic” and litigated the suit in bad faith)."
} | 11,529,462 | b |
Attorney fees are awarded when the defendant commits "truly egregious, purposeful infringement, or other purposeful wrongdoing." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "13 F.3d 1159, 1159",
"parenthetical": "no attorney fees when \"the question of functionality was close enough to remove the case from the ambit of an 'exceptional case' \"",
"sentence": "Badger Meter, Inc., 13 F.3d at 1159 (no attorney fees when “the question of functionality was close enough to remove the case from the ambit of an ‘exceptional case’ ”) (quoting Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1125 (7th Cir.1988)); see also, Roulo, 886 F.2d 931 (no attorney fees when defendant made a conscious effort to create elements of dissimilarity between products); Cf. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc., 754 F.2d at 746 (the defendant’s ‘targeting’ of the plaintiff in its literature created exceptional case for attorney fees); Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435, 437 (7th Cir.1989) (upholding attorney fee award when the defendants were “holding the trademark hostage as a bargaining tactic” and litigated the suit in bad faith)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "754 F.2d 746, 746",
"parenthetical": "the defendant's 'targeting' of the plaintiff in its literature created exceptional case for attorney fees",
"sentence": "Badger Meter, Inc., 13 F.3d at 1159 (no attorney fees when “the question of functionality was close enough to remove the case from the ambit of an ‘exceptional case’ ”) (quoting Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1125 (7th Cir.1988)); see also, Roulo, 886 F.2d 931 (no attorney fees when defendant made a conscious effort to create elements of dissimilarity between products); Cf. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc., 754 F.2d at 746 (the defendant’s ‘targeting’ of the plaintiff in its literature created exceptional case for attorney fees); Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435, 437 (7th Cir.1989) (upholding attorney fee award when the defendants were “holding the trademark hostage as a bargaining tactic” and litigated the suit in bad faith)."
} | 11,529,462 | a |
Attorney fees are awarded when the defendant commits "truly egregious, purposeful infringement, or other purposeful wrongdoing." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 431, 435, 437",
"parenthetical": "upholding attorney fee award when the defendants were \"holding the trademark hostage as a bargaining tactic\" and litigated the suit in bad faith",
"sentence": "Badger Meter, Inc., 13 F.3d at 1159 (no attorney fees when “the question of functionality was close enough to remove the case from the ambit of an ‘exceptional case’ ”) (quoting Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1125 (7th Cir.1988)); see also, Roulo, 886 F.2d 931 (no attorney fees when defendant made a conscious effort to create elements of dissimilarity between products); Cf. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc., 754 F.2d at 746 (the defendant’s ‘targeting’ of the plaintiff in its literature created exceptional case for attorney fees); Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435, 437 (7th Cir.1989) (upholding attorney fee award when the defendants were “holding the trademark hostage as a bargaining tactic” and litigated the suit in bad faith)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "13 F.3d 1159, 1159",
"parenthetical": "no attorney fees when \"the question of functionality was close enough to remove the case from the ambit of an 'exceptional case' \"",
"sentence": "Badger Meter, Inc., 13 F.3d at 1159 (no attorney fees when “the question of functionality was close enough to remove the case from the ambit of an ‘exceptional case’ ”) (quoting Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1125 (7th Cir.1988)); see also, Roulo, 886 F.2d 931 (no attorney fees when defendant made a conscious effort to create elements of dissimilarity between products); Cf. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc., 754 F.2d at 746 (the defendant’s ‘targeting’ of the plaintiff in its literature created exceptional case for attorney fees); Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435, 437 (7th Cir.1989) (upholding attorney fee award when the defendants were “holding the trademark hostage as a bargaining tactic” and litigated the suit in bad faith)."
} | 11,529,462 | b |
Attorney fees are awarded when the defendant commits "truly egregious, purposeful infringement, or other purposeful wrongdoing." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no attorney fees when defendant made a conscious effort to create elements of dissimilarity between products",
"sentence": "Badger Meter, Inc., 13 F.3d at 1159 (no attorney fees when “the question of functionality was close enough to remove the case from the ambit of an ‘exceptional case’ ”) (quoting Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1125 (7th Cir.1988)); see also, Roulo, 886 F.2d 931 (no attorney fees when defendant made a conscious effort to create elements of dissimilarity between products); Cf. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc., 754 F.2d at 746 (the defendant’s ‘targeting’ of the plaintiff in its literature created exceptional case for attorney fees); Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435, 437 (7th Cir.1989) (upholding attorney fee award when the defendants were “holding the trademark hostage as a bargaining tactic” and litigated the suit in bad faith)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "754 F.2d 746, 746",
"parenthetical": "the defendant's 'targeting' of the plaintiff in its literature created exceptional case for attorney fees",
"sentence": "Badger Meter, Inc., 13 F.3d at 1159 (no attorney fees when “the question of functionality was close enough to remove the case from the ambit of an ‘exceptional case’ ”) (quoting Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1125 (7th Cir.1988)); see also, Roulo, 886 F.2d 931 (no attorney fees when defendant made a conscious effort to create elements of dissimilarity between products); Cf. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc., 754 F.2d at 746 (the defendant’s ‘targeting’ of the plaintiff in its literature created exceptional case for attorney fees); Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435, 437 (7th Cir.1989) (upholding attorney fee award when the defendants were “holding the trademark hostage as a bargaining tactic” and litigated the suit in bad faith)."
} | 11,529,462 | a |
Attorney fees are awarded when the defendant commits "truly egregious, purposeful infringement, or other purposeful wrongdoing." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no attorney fees when defendant made a conscious effort to create elements of dissimilarity between products",
"sentence": "Badger Meter, Inc., 13 F.3d at 1159 (no attorney fees when “the question of functionality was close enough to remove the case from the ambit of an ‘exceptional case’ ”) (quoting Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1125 (7th Cir.1988)); see also, Roulo, 886 F.2d 931 (no attorney fees when defendant made a conscious effort to create elements of dissimilarity between products); Cf. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc., 754 F.2d at 746 (the defendant’s ‘targeting’ of the plaintiff in its literature created exceptional case for attorney fees); Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435, 437 (7th Cir.1989) (upholding attorney fee award when the defendants were “holding the trademark hostage as a bargaining tactic” and litigated the suit in bad faith)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 431, 435, 437",
"parenthetical": "upholding attorney fee award when the defendants were \"holding the trademark hostage as a bargaining tactic\" and litigated the suit in bad faith",
"sentence": "Badger Meter, Inc., 13 F.3d at 1159 (no attorney fees when “the question of functionality was close enough to remove the case from the ambit of an ‘exceptional case’ ”) (quoting Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1125 (7th Cir.1988)); see also, Roulo, 886 F.2d 931 (no attorney fees when defendant made a conscious effort to create elements of dissimilarity between products); Cf. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc., 754 F.2d at 746 (the defendant’s ‘targeting’ of the plaintiff in its literature created exceptional case for attorney fees); Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435, 437 (7th Cir.1989) (upholding attorney fee award when the defendants were “holding the trademark hostage as a bargaining tactic” and litigated the suit in bad faith)."
} | 11,529,462 | a |
While Jiang argues that the evidence he submitted demonstrates that he will be subject to China's family planning policy for having two children, the BIA reasonably gave little or no evidentiary weight to Jiang's documents in light of the adverse credibility determination that was made in his underlying proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 F.3d 143, 146-48",
"parenthetical": "holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reopen supported by allegedly unavailable evidence regarding changed country conditions where there had been a previous adverse credibility finding in the underlying asylum hearing",
"sentence": "See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146-48 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reopen supported by allegedly unavailable evidence regarding changed country conditions where there had been a previous adverse credibility finding in the underlying asylum hearing); see also Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006) (finding that the weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "471 F.3d 315, 342",
"parenthetical": "finding that the weight afforded to the applicant's evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency",
"sentence": "See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146-48 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reopen supported by allegedly unavailable evidence regarding changed country conditions where there had been a previous adverse credibility finding in the underlying asylum hearing); see also Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006) (finding that the weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency)."
} | 3,991,764 | a |
the Ninth Circuit consistently characterizes the EEOC's pre-litigation requirements under 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e-5(b) as jurisdictional limitations to EEOC's initiating civil actions in federal court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the EEOC cannot \" 'leapfrog[ ]' Title VII administrative procedures, which serve as jurisdictional prerequisites, by bringing an action to enforce a predetermination settlement agreement.\" (quoting Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 609",
"sentence": "Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 607 (“Genuine investigation, reasonable cause determination and conciliation are jurisdictional conditions precedent to suit by the EEOC....”); EEOC v. Bruno’s Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 288 (9th Cir.1993) (“Concili ation is a jurisdictional condition precedent to suit by the EEOC.”); see also Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 861 n. 3 (9th Cir.2010) (noting that the EEOC cannot “ ‘leapfrog[ ]’ Title VII administrative procedures, which serve as jurisdictional prerequisites, by bringing an action to enforce a predetermination settlement agreement.” (quoting Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 609)). Furthermore, district courts in this Circuit treat Title VII’s pre-litigation requirements as jurisdictional limitations."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "669 F.2d 607, 607",
"parenthetical": "\"Genuine investigation, reasonable cause determination and conciliation are jurisdictional conditions precedent to suit by the EEOC....\"",
"sentence": "Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 607 (“Genuine investigation, reasonable cause determination and conciliation are jurisdictional conditions precedent to suit by the EEOC....”); EEOC v. Bruno’s Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 288 (9th Cir.1993) (“Concili ation is a jurisdictional condition precedent to suit by the EEOC.”); see also Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 861 n. 3 (9th Cir.2010) (noting that the EEOC cannot “ ‘leapfrog[ ]’ Title VII administrative procedures, which serve as jurisdictional prerequisites, by bringing an action to enforce a predetermination settlement agreement.” (quoting Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 609)). Furthermore, district courts in this Circuit treat Title VII’s pre-litigation requirements as jurisdictional limitations."
} | 4,319,422 | b |
the Ninth Circuit consistently characterizes the EEOC's pre-litigation requirements under 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e-5(b) as jurisdictional limitations to EEOC's initiating civil actions in federal court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "669 F.2d 609, 609",
"parenthetical": "noting that the EEOC cannot \" 'leapfrog[ ]' Title VII administrative procedures, which serve as jurisdictional prerequisites, by bringing an action to enforce a predetermination settlement agreement.\" (quoting Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 609",
"sentence": "Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 607 (“Genuine investigation, reasonable cause determination and conciliation are jurisdictional conditions precedent to suit by the EEOC....”); EEOC v. Bruno’s Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 288 (9th Cir.1993) (“Concili ation is a jurisdictional condition precedent to suit by the EEOC.”); see also Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 861 n. 3 (9th Cir.2010) (noting that the EEOC cannot “ ‘leapfrog[ ]’ Title VII administrative procedures, which serve as jurisdictional prerequisites, by bringing an action to enforce a predetermination settlement agreement.” (quoting Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 609)). Furthermore, district courts in this Circuit treat Title VII’s pre-litigation requirements as jurisdictional limitations."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "669 F.2d 607, 607",
"parenthetical": "\"Genuine investigation, reasonable cause determination and conciliation are jurisdictional conditions precedent to suit by the EEOC....\"",
"sentence": "Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 607 (“Genuine investigation, reasonable cause determination and conciliation are jurisdictional conditions precedent to suit by the EEOC....”); EEOC v. Bruno’s Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 288 (9th Cir.1993) (“Concili ation is a jurisdictional condition precedent to suit by the EEOC.”); see also Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 861 n. 3 (9th Cir.2010) (noting that the EEOC cannot “ ‘leapfrog[ ]’ Title VII administrative procedures, which serve as jurisdictional prerequisites, by bringing an action to enforce a predetermination settlement agreement.” (quoting Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 609)). Furthermore, district courts in this Circuit treat Title VII’s pre-litigation requirements as jurisdictional limitations."
} | 4,319,422 | b |
the Ninth Circuit consistently characterizes the EEOC's pre-litigation requirements under 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e-5(b) as jurisdictional limitations to EEOC's initiating civil actions in federal court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the EEOC cannot \" 'leapfrog[ ]' Title VII administrative procedures, which serve as jurisdictional prerequisites, by bringing an action to enforce a predetermination settlement agreement.\" (quoting Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 609",
"sentence": "Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 607 (“Genuine investigation, reasonable cause determination and conciliation are jurisdictional conditions precedent to suit by the EEOC....”); EEOC v. Bruno’s Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 288 (9th Cir.1993) (“Concili ation is a jurisdictional condition precedent to suit by the EEOC.”); see also Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 861 n. 3 (9th Cir.2010) (noting that the EEOC cannot “ ‘leapfrog[ ]’ Title VII administrative procedures, which serve as jurisdictional prerequisites, by bringing an action to enforce a predetermination settlement agreement.” (quoting Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 609)). Furthermore, district courts in this Circuit treat Title VII’s pre-litigation requirements as jurisdictional limitations."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "13 F.3d 285, 288",
"parenthetical": "\"Concili ation is a jurisdictional condition precedent to suit by the EEOC.\"",
"sentence": "Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 607 (“Genuine investigation, reasonable cause determination and conciliation are jurisdictional conditions precedent to suit by the EEOC....”); EEOC v. Bruno’s Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 288 (9th Cir.1993) (“Concili ation is a jurisdictional condition precedent to suit by the EEOC.”); see also Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 861 n. 3 (9th Cir.2010) (noting that the EEOC cannot “ ‘leapfrog[ ]’ Title VII administrative procedures, which serve as jurisdictional prerequisites, by bringing an action to enforce a predetermination settlement agreement.” (quoting Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 609)). Furthermore, district courts in this Circuit treat Title VII’s pre-litigation requirements as jurisdictional limitations."
} | 4,319,422 | b |
the Ninth Circuit consistently characterizes the EEOC's pre-litigation requirements under 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e-5(b) as jurisdictional limitations to EEOC's initiating civil actions in federal court. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "13 F.3d 285, 288",
"parenthetical": "\"Concili ation is a jurisdictional condition precedent to suit by the EEOC.\"",
"sentence": "Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 607 (“Genuine investigation, reasonable cause determination and conciliation are jurisdictional conditions precedent to suit by the EEOC....”); EEOC v. Bruno’s Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 288 (9th Cir.1993) (“Concili ation is a jurisdictional condition precedent to suit by the EEOC.”); see also Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 861 n. 3 (9th Cir.2010) (noting that the EEOC cannot “ ‘leapfrog[ ]’ Title VII administrative procedures, which serve as jurisdictional prerequisites, by bringing an action to enforce a predetermination settlement agreement.” (quoting Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 609)). Furthermore, district courts in this Circuit treat Title VII’s pre-litigation requirements as jurisdictional limitations."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "669 F.2d 609, 609",
"parenthetical": "noting that the EEOC cannot \" 'leapfrog[ ]' Title VII administrative procedures, which serve as jurisdictional prerequisites, by bringing an action to enforce a predetermination settlement agreement.\" (quoting Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 609",
"sentence": "Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 607 (“Genuine investigation, reasonable cause determination and conciliation are jurisdictional conditions precedent to suit by the EEOC....”); EEOC v. Bruno’s Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 288 (9th Cir.1993) (“Concili ation is a jurisdictional condition precedent to suit by the EEOC.”); see also Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 861 n. 3 (9th Cir.2010) (noting that the EEOC cannot “ ‘leapfrog[ ]’ Title VII administrative procedures, which serve as jurisdictional prerequisites, by bringing an action to enforce a predetermination settlement agreement.” (quoting Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 609)). Furthermore, district courts in this Circuit treat Title VII’s pre-litigation requirements as jurisdictional limitations."
} | 4,319,422 | a |
It appears the district court may have mistakenly applied the line of cases giving law enforcement officers authority to detain occupants of a home during the execution of a search warrant authorizing a search of the home, without any particularized suspicion of criminal activity by the individuals detained. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "452 U.S. 692, 705",
"parenthetical": "holding \"that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 U.S. 85, 93-94",
"parenthetical": "search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | 3,689,006 | a |
It appears the district court may have mistakenly applied the line of cases giving law enforcement officers authority to detain occupants of a home during the execution of a search warrant authorizing a search of the home, without any particularized suspicion of criminal activity by the individuals detained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "452 U.S. 692, 705",
"parenthetical": "holding \"that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | 3,689,006 | b |
It appears the district court may have mistakenly applied the line of cases giving law enforcement officers authority to detain occupants of a home during the execution of a search warrant authorizing a search of the home, without any particularized suspicion of criminal activity by the individuals detained. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "452 U.S. 692, 705",
"parenthetical": "holding \"that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | 3,689,006 | a |
It appears the district court may have mistakenly applied the line of cases giving law enforcement officers authority to detain occupants of a home during the execution of a search warrant authorizing a search of the home, without any particularized suspicion of criminal activity by the individuals detained. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 U.S. 85, 93-94",
"parenthetical": "search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | 3,689,006 | a |
It appears the district court may have mistakenly applied the line of cases giving law enforcement officers authority to detain occupants of a home during the execution of a search warrant authorizing a search of the home, without any particularized suspicion of criminal activity by the individuals detained. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | 3,689,006 | a |
It appears the district court may have mistakenly applied the line of cases giving law enforcement officers authority to detain occupants of a home during the execution of a search warrant authorizing a search of the home, without any particularized suspicion of criminal activity by the individuals detained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | 3,689,006 | b |
It appears the district court may have mistakenly applied the line of cases giving law enforcement officers authority to detain occupants of a home during the execution of a search warrant authorizing a search of the home, without any particularized suspicion of criminal activity by the individuals detained. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 U.S. 85, 93-94",
"parenthetical": "search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | 3,689,006 | a |
It appears the district court may have mistakenly applied the line of cases giving law enforcement officers authority to detain occupants of a home during the execution of a search warrant authorizing a search of the home, without any particularized suspicion of criminal activity by the individuals detained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | 3,689,006 | b |
It appears the district court may have mistakenly applied the line of cases giving law enforcement officers authority to detain occupants of a home during the execution of a search warrant authorizing a search of the home, without any particularized suspicion of criminal activity by the individuals detained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) (search or frisk of occupants of residence during execution of search warrant is unlawful unless based upon a particularized, reasonable suspicion that the individual subjected to the pat-down search is armed and dangerous)."
} | 3,689,006 | b |
. Although the parties similarly failed to propose it, we have considered remanding to the BIA for a precedential opinion in the first instance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "remanding petitioner's appeal of BIA's streamlined affirmance of IJ's opinion to allow the BIA to address petitioner's novel issue of law, in the first instance, in a precedential opinion",
"sentence": "See Smriko, 387 F.3d 279 (remanding petitioner's appeal of BIA's streamlined affirmance of IJ’s opinion to allow the BIA to address petitioner’s novel issue of law, in the first instance, in a precedential opinion); see also Dobrova v. Holder, 607 F.3d 297, 300 (2d Cir.2010) (\"[S]ince here we determine that the text of the relevant statute is clear, and the only question presented on appeal is a purely legal one, remand to the BIA for precedential interpretation in the first instance is unnecessary.”); Gutnik v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683, 691 (7th Cir.2006) (reading 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(5) together to require only that the BIA not review cases resolving novel issues by affirmance without opinion, but not requiring a single BIA member to refer an appeal to a three-member panel)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "607 F.3d 297, 300",
"parenthetical": "\"[S]ince here we determine that the text of the relevant statute is clear, and the only question presented on appeal is a purely legal one, remand to the BIA for precedential interpretation in the first instance is unnecessary.\"",
"sentence": "See Smriko, 387 F.3d 279 (remanding petitioner's appeal of BIA's streamlined affirmance of IJ’s opinion to allow the BIA to address petitioner’s novel issue of law, in the first instance, in a precedential opinion); see also Dobrova v. Holder, 607 F.3d 297, 300 (2d Cir.2010) (\"[S]ince here we determine that the text of the relevant statute is clear, and the only question presented on appeal is a purely legal one, remand to the BIA for precedential interpretation in the first instance is unnecessary.”); Gutnik v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683, 691 (7th Cir.2006) (reading 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(5) together to require only that the BIA not review cases resolving novel issues by affirmance without opinion, but not requiring a single BIA member to refer an appeal to a three-member panel)."
} | 3,787,926 | a |
A public proceeding on a record can serve as a check on malicious or wrongful conduct by commission members, and this militates in favor of granting the defendants absolute immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "377 F.3d 157, 173",
"parenthetical": "fact that \"[tjhere is no requirement for a formal hearing\" related to an attorney's application to become certified to represent indigent litigants, no \"recor-dation of statements by witnesses or the applicant,\" and no \"requirement that the Committee reveal the reasons for its decisions\" militates against granting absolute immunity",
"sentence": "See Butz, 438 U.S. at 513, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (noting, in support of its finding that absolute immunity was warranted, that, “[t]he parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record”); see also Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 173 (2d Cir. 2004) (fact that “[tjhere is no requirement for a formal hearing” related to an attorney’s application to become certified to represent indigent litigants, no “recor-dation of statements by witnesses or the applicant,” and no “requirement that the Committee reveal the reasons for its decisions” militates against granting absolute immunity); see also Young, 41 F.3d at 53 (“access to a verbatim transcript” constitutes a procedural safeguard under this factor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "438 U.S. 513, 513",
"parenthetical": "noting, in support of its finding that absolute immunity was warranted, that, \"[t]he parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record\"",
"sentence": "See Butz, 438 U.S. at 513, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (noting, in support of its finding that absolute immunity was warranted, that, “[t]he parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record”); see also Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 173 (2d Cir. 2004) (fact that “[tjhere is no requirement for a formal hearing” related to an attorney’s application to become certified to represent indigent litigants, no “recor-dation of statements by witnesses or the applicant,” and no “requirement that the Committee reveal the reasons for its decisions” militates against granting absolute immunity); see also Young, 41 F.3d at 53 (“access to a verbatim transcript” constitutes a procedural safeguard under this factor)."
} | 12,271,680 | b |
A public proceeding on a record can serve as a check on malicious or wrongful conduct by commission members, and this militates in favor of granting the defendants absolute immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 F.3d 53, 53",
"parenthetical": "\"access to a verbatim transcript\" constitutes a procedural safeguard under this factor",
"sentence": "See Butz, 438 U.S. at 513, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (noting, in support of its finding that absolute immunity was warranted, that, “[t]he parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record”); see also Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 173 (2d Cir. 2004) (fact that “[tjhere is no requirement for a formal hearing” related to an attorney’s application to become certified to represent indigent litigants, no “recor-dation of statements by witnesses or the applicant,” and no “requirement that the Committee reveal the reasons for its decisions” militates against granting absolute immunity); see also Young, 41 F.3d at 53 (“access to a verbatim transcript” constitutes a procedural safeguard under this factor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "438 U.S. 513, 513",
"parenthetical": "noting, in support of its finding that absolute immunity was warranted, that, \"[t]he parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record\"",
"sentence": "See Butz, 438 U.S. at 513, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (noting, in support of its finding that absolute immunity was warranted, that, “[t]he parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record”); see also Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 173 (2d Cir. 2004) (fact that “[tjhere is no requirement for a formal hearing” related to an attorney’s application to become certified to represent indigent litigants, no “recor-dation of statements by witnesses or the applicant,” and no “requirement that the Committee reveal the reasons for its decisions” militates against granting absolute immunity); see also Young, 41 F.3d at 53 (“access to a verbatim transcript” constitutes a procedural safeguard under this factor)."
} | 12,271,680 | b |
A public proceeding on a record can serve as a check on malicious or wrongful conduct by commission members, and this militates in favor of granting the defendants absolute immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "377 F.3d 157, 173",
"parenthetical": "fact that \"[tjhere is no requirement for a formal hearing\" related to an attorney's application to become certified to represent indigent litigants, no \"recor-dation of statements by witnesses or the applicant,\" and no \"requirement that the Committee reveal the reasons for its decisions\" militates against granting absolute immunity",
"sentence": "See Butz, 438 U.S. at 513, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (noting, in support of its finding that absolute immunity was warranted, that, “[t]he parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record”); see also Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 173 (2d Cir. 2004) (fact that “[tjhere is no requirement for a formal hearing” related to an attorney’s application to become certified to represent indigent litigants, no “recor-dation of statements by witnesses or the applicant,” and no “requirement that the Committee reveal the reasons for its decisions” militates against granting absolute immunity); see also Young, 41 F.3d at 53 (“access to a verbatim transcript” constitutes a procedural safeguard under this factor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting, in support of its finding that absolute immunity was warranted, that, \"[t]he parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record\"",
"sentence": "See Butz, 438 U.S. at 513, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (noting, in support of its finding that absolute immunity was warranted, that, “[t]he parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record”); see also Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 173 (2d Cir. 2004) (fact that “[tjhere is no requirement for a formal hearing” related to an attorney’s application to become certified to represent indigent litigants, no “recor-dation of statements by witnesses or the applicant,” and no “requirement that the Committee reveal the reasons for its decisions” militates against granting absolute immunity); see also Young, 41 F.3d at 53 (“access to a verbatim transcript” constitutes a procedural safeguard under this factor)."
} | 12,271,680 | b |
A public proceeding on a record can serve as a check on malicious or wrongful conduct by commission members, and this militates in favor of granting the defendants absolute immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting, in support of its finding that absolute immunity was warranted, that, \"[t]he parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record\"",
"sentence": "See Butz, 438 U.S. at 513, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (noting, in support of its finding that absolute immunity was warranted, that, “[t]he parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record”); see also Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 173 (2d Cir. 2004) (fact that “[tjhere is no requirement for a formal hearing” related to an attorney’s application to become certified to represent indigent litigants, no “recor-dation of statements by witnesses or the applicant,” and no “requirement that the Committee reveal the reasons for its decisions” militates against granting absolute immunity); see also Young, 41 F.3d at 53 (“access to a verbatim transcript” constitutes a procedural safeguard under this factor)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 F.3d 53, 53",
"parenthetical": "\"access to a verbatim transcript\" constitutes a procedural safeguard under this factor",
"sentence": "See Butz, 438 U.S. at 513, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (noting, in support of its finding that absolute immunity was warranted, that, “[t]he parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record”); see also Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 173 (2d Cir. 2004) (fact that “[tjhere is no requirement for a formal hearing” related to an attorney’s application to become certified to represent indigent litigants, no “recor-dation of statements by witnesses or the applicant,” and no “requirement that the Committee reveal the reasons for its decisions” militates against granting absolute immunity); see also Young, 41 F.3d at 53 (“access to a verbatim transcript” constitutes a procedural safeguard under this factor)."
} | 12,271,680 | a |
Additionally, Fox raises claims relating to the conditions of his confinement. These claims are not addressed here because they are more appropriately raised in a petition for habeas corpus relief or in a civil action under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 (2012). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that delinquent minor could not challenge the conditions of his confinement on direct appeal from his commitment because the record would not be sufficiently developed on this issue to permit review",
"sentence": "See Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn.1979) (stating that habeas corpus may be used to challenge prison conditions as cruel and unusual punishment); see also In re J.A.G., 113 Ill.App.3d 140, 68 Ill.Dec. 697, 446 N.E.2d 868, 870 (1983) (holding that delinquent minor could not challenge the conditions of his confinement on direct appeal from his commitment because the record would not be sufficiently developed on this issue to permit review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "283 N.W.2d 892, 895",
"parenthetical": "stating that habeas corpus may be used to challenge prison conditions as cruel and unusual punishment",
"sentence": "See Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn.1979) (stating that habeas corpus may be used to challenge prison conditions as cruel and unusual punishment); see also In re J.A.G., 113 Ill.App.3d 140, 68 Ill.Dec. 697, 446 N.E.2d 868, 870 (1983) (holding that delinquent minor could not challenge the conditions of his confinement on direct appeal from his commitment because the record would not be sufficiently developed on this issue to permit review)."
} | 6,856,821 | b |
Additionally, Fox raises claims relating to the conditions of his confinement. These claims are not addressed here because they are more appropriately raised in a petition for habeas corpus relief or in a civil action under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 (2012). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that delinquent minor could not challenge the conditions of his confinement on direct appeal from his commitment because the record would not be sufficiently developed on this issue to permit review",
"sentence": "See Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn.1979) (stating that habeas corpus may be used to challenge prison conditions as cruel and unusual punishment); see also In re J.A.G., 113 Ill.App.3d 140, 68 Ill.Dec. 697, 446 N.E.2d 868, 870 (1983) (holding that delinquent minor could not challenge the conditions of his confinement on direct appeal from his commitment because the record would not be sufficiently developed on this issue to permit review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "283 N.W.2d 892, 895",
"parenthetical": "stating that habeas corpus may be used to challenge prison conditions as cruel and unusual punishment",
"sentence": "See Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn.1979) (stating that habeas corpus may be used to challenge prison conditions as cruel and unusual punishment); see also In re J.A.G., 113 Ill.App.3d 140, 68 Ill.Dec. 697, 446 N.E.2d 868, 870 (1983) (holding that delinquent minor could not challenge the conditions of his confinement on direct appeal from his commitment because the record would not be sufficiently developed on this issue to permit review)."
} | 6,856,821 | b |
Additionally, Fox raises claims relating to the conditions of his confinement. These claims are not addressed here because they are more appropriately raised in a petition for habeas corpus relief or in a civil action under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 (2012). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "446 N.E.2d 868, 870",
"parenthetical": "holding that delinquent minor could not challenge the conditions of his confinement on direct appeal from his commitment because the record would not be sufficiently developed on this issue to permit review",
"sentence": "See Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn.1979) (stating that habeas corpus may be used to challenge prison conditions as cruel and unusual punishment); see also In re J.A.G., 113 Ill.App.3d 140, 68 Ill.Dec. 697, 446 N.E.2d 868, 870 (1983) (holding that delinquent minor could not challenge the conditions of his confinement on direct appeal from his commitment because the record would not be sufficiently developed on this issue to permit review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "283 N.W.2d 892, 895",
"parenthetical": "stating that habeas corpus may be used to challenge prison conditions as cruel and unusual punishment",
"sentence": "See Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn.1979) (stating that habeas corpus may be used to challenge prison conditions as cruel and unusual punishment); see also In re J.A.G., 113 Ill.App.3d 140, 68 Ill.Dec. 697, 446 N.E.2d 868, 870 (1983) (holding that delinquent minor could not challenge the conditions of his confinement on direct appeal from his commitment because the record would not be sufficiently developed on this issue to permit review)."
} | 6,856,821 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile's conviction because of police's failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant's right to due process and self-incrimination rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile's conviction because of police's failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant's right to due process and self-incrimination rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile's conviction because of police's failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant's right to due process and self-incrimination rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile's conviction because of police's failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant's right to due process and self-incrimination rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody \"is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody \"is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody \"is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody \"is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody \"is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody \"is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody \"is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody \"is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "708 N.E.2d 806, 811",
"parenthetical": "noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody \"is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "708 N.E.2d 806, 811",
"parenthetical": "noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody \"is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "708 N.E.2d 806, 811",
"parenthetical": "noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody \"is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "708 N.E.2d 806, 811",
"parenthetical": "noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody \"is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that police's \"flagrant[ ] violation]\" of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant's statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that police's \"flagrant[ ] violation]\" of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant's statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
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