context
stringlengths 58
1.13k
| citation_a
dict | citation_b
dict | case_id
int64 475
12.5M
| label
stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Unlike the Remmer facts, we find no evidence of deliberate coercion in the record and no evidence of an unintended effect tantamount to FBI questioning of a juror during deliberations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailiff statement that he \"assumed ... judge would 'like' a verdict\" harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deputy marshal's comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | 10,548,216 | a |
Unlike the Remmer facts, we find no evidence of deliberate coercion in the record and no evidence of an unintended effect tantamount to FBI questioning of a juror during deliberations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailiff statement that he \"assumed ... judge would 'like' a verdict\" harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deputy marshal's comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | 10,548,216 | a |
Unlike the Remmer facts, we find no evidence of deliberate coercion in the record and no evidence of an unintended effect tantamount to FBI questioning of a juror during deliberations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailiff statement that he \"assumed ... judge would 'like' a verdict\" harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deputy marshal's comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | 10,548,216 | a |
Unlike the Remmer facts, we find no evidence of deliberate coercion in the record and no evidence of an unintended effect tantamount to FBI questioning of a juror during deliberations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailiff statement that he \"assumed ... judge would 'like' a verdict\" harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | 10,548,216 | a |
Unlike the Remmer facts, we find no evidence of deliberate coercion in the record and no evidence of an unintended effect tantamount to FBI questioning of a juror during deliberations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailiff statement that he \"assumed ... judge would 'like' a verdict\" harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | 10,548,216 | a |
Unlike the Remmer facts, we find no evidence of deliberate coercion in the record and no evidence of an unintended effect tantamount to FBI questioning of a juror during deliberations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailiff statement that he \"assumed ... judge would 'like' a verdict\" harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | 10,548,216 | b |
Unlike the Remmer facts, we find no evidence of deliberate coercion in the record and no evidence of an unintended effect tantamount to FBI questioning of a juror during deliberations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailiff statement that he \"assumed ... judge would 'like' a verdict\" harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | 10,548,216 | a |
Unlike the Remmer facts, we find no evidence of deliberate coercion in the record and no evidence of an unintended effect tantamount to FBI questioning of a juror during deliberations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "223 F.2d 171, 180-81",
"parenthetical": "deputy marshal's comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailiff statement that he \"assumed ... judge would 'like' a verdict\" harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | 10,548,216 | b |
Unlike the Remmer facts, we find no evidence of deliberate coercion in the record and no evidence of an unintended effect tantamount to FBI questioning of a juror during deliberations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deputy marshal's comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailiff statement that he \"assumed ... judge would 'like' a verdict\" harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | 10,548,216 | b |
Unlike the Remmer facts, we find no evidence of deliberate coercion in the record and no evidence of an unintended effect tantamount to FBI questioning of a juror during deliberations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailiff statement that he \"assumed ... judge would 'like' a verdict\" harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deputy marshal's comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | 10,548,216 | a |
Unlike the Remmer facts, we find no evidence of deliberate coercion in the record and no evidence of an unintended effect tantamount to FBI questioning of a juror during deliberations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailiff statement that he \"assumed ... judge would 'like' a verdict\" harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deputy marshal's comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless",
"sentence": "See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1032, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982) (numerous ex parte contacts deemed harmless, including court note to “return a verdict” following rescission of jury note saying jury “deadlock[ed]”); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (bailiff statement that he “assumed ... judge would ‘like’ a verdict” harmless); see also United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2732, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973) (bailiff comments urging speedy decision and inquiring as to numerical division of jury deemed harmless); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862, 76 S.Ct. 102, 100 L.Ed. 764 (1955) (deputy marshal’s comments that hung jury not permitted and jurors to be confined until decision reached deemed harmless)."
} | 10,548,216 | a |
. Wire fraud, like mail fraud, is a racketeering activity and thus a predicate offense for money laundering. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "169 F.3d 806, 806",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]ire fraud consists of (1) a scheme to defraud and (2) a use of a wire transmission for the purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, the scheme\"",
"sentence": "See Morelli, 169 F.3d at 806 (stating that \"[w]ire fraud consists of (1) a scheme to defraud and (2) a use of a wire transmission for the purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, the scheme”); see also id. at 806 n. 9 (explaining that the federal wire fraud and mail fraud statutes \"differ only in form, not in substance, and cases ... interpreting one govern the other as well”); see also United Stales v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir.1977) (\"[T]he cases interpreting the mail fraud statute are applicable to the wire fraud statute as well.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "561 F.2d 466, 475",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he cases interpreting the mail fraud statute are applicable to the wire fraud statute as well.\"",
"sentence": "See Morelli, 169 F.3d at 806 (stating that \"[w]ire fraud consists of (1) a scheme to defraud and (2) a use of a wire transmission for the purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, the scheme”); see also id. at 806 n. 9 (explaining that the federal wire fraud and mail fraud statutes \"differ only in form, not in substance, and cases ... interpreting one govern the other as well”); see also United Stales v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir.1977) (\"[T]he cases interpreting the mail fraud statute are applicable to the wire fraud statute as well.”)."
} | 5,762,424 | a |
Similarly, the Federal Circuit has found that claims directed to a "new and useful technique" for performing a particular task were not abstract. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "850 F.3d 1343, 1349",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform\" were not abstract",
"sentence": "Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform” were not abstract); Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims directed to “a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,” a type of liver cell, were not abstract); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981) (holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "450 U.S. 175, 177",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract",
"sentence": "Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform” were not abstract); Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims directed to “a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,” a type of liver cell, were not abstract); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981) (holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract)."
} | 12,274,385 | a |
Similarly, the Federal Circuit has found that claims directed to a "new and useful technique" for performing a particular task were not abstract. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract",
"sentence": "Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform” were not abstract); Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims directed to “a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,” a type of liver cell, were not abstract); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981) (holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "850 F.3d 1343, 1349",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform\" were not abstract",
"sentence": "Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform” were not abstract); Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims directed to “a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,” a type of liver cell, were not abstract); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981) (holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract)."
} | 12,274,385 | b |
Similarly, the Federal Circuit has found that claims directed to a "new and useful technique" for performing a particular task were not abstract. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract",
"sentence": "Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform” were not abstract); Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims directed to “a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,” a type of liver cell, were not abstract); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981) (holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "850 F.3d 1343, 1349",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform\" were not abstract",
"sentence": "Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform” were not abstract); Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims directed to “a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,” a type of liver cell, were not abstract); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981) (holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract)."
} | 12,274,385 | b |
Similarly, the Federal Circuit has found that claims directed to a "new and useful technique" for performing a particular task were not abstract. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "450 U.S. 175, 177",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract",
"sentence": "Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform” were not abstract); Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims directed to “a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,” a type of liver cell, were not abstract); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981) (holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims directed to \"a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,\" a type of liver cell, were not abstract",
"sentence": "Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform” were not abstract); Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims directed to “a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,” a type of liver cell, were not abstract); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981) (holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract)."
} | 12,274,385 | b |
Similarly, the Federal Circuit has found that claims directed to a "new and useful technique" for performing a particular task were not abstract. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract",
"sentence": "Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform” were not abstract); Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims directed to “a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,” a type of liver cell, were not abstract); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981) (holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims directed to \"a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,\" a type of liver cell, were not abstract",
"sentence": "Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform” were not abstract); Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims directed to “a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,” a type of liver cell, were not abstract); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981) (holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract)."
} | 12,274,385 | b |
Similarly, the Federal Circuit has found that claims directed to a "new and useful technique" for performing a particular task were not abstract. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract",
"sentence": "Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform” were not abstract); Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims directed to “a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,” a type of liver cell, were not abstract); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981) (holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims directed to \"a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,\" a type of liver cell, were not abstract",
"sentence": "Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform” were not abstract); Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims directed to “a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,” a type of liver cell, were not abstract); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981) (holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract)."
} | 12,274,385 | b |
Since plaintiff has presented no objective evidence to disprove defendant's asserted sound levels, those figures must be assumed to be true for purposes of this motion. If in fact, as the LIRR asserts, the sound levels of its horns were in compliance with both the FRSA minimum standard and with OSHA's regulations, the plaintiff will have a difficult, if not impossible, time establishing that the railroad was negligent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "700 So.2d 542, 550",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"simply establishing that the workplace is noisy fails to meet the legal requirements for proving negligence\"",
"sentence": "See Lessee v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 38 Wash. App. 802, 804-07, 690 P.2d 596, 598-600 (Wash.Ct.App.1984) (finding that where the time weighted average of noise exposure was below OSHA levels requiring protection, plaintiff had failed to demonstrate negligence); see also Broussard v. Union Pac. R. Co.,. 700 So.2d 542, 550 (La.Ct.App.1997) (holding that “simply establishing that the workplace is noisy fails to meet the legal requirements for proving negligence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "38 Wash. App. 802, 804-07",
"parenthetical": "finding that where the time weighted average of noise exposure was below OSHA levels requiring protection, plaintiff had failed to demonstrate negligence",
"sentence": "See Lessee v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 38 Wash. App. 802, 804-07, 690 P.2d 596, 598-600 (Wash.Ct.App.1984) (finding that where the time weighted average of noise exposure was below OSHA levels requiring protection, plaintiff had failed to demonstrate negligence); see also Broussard v. Union Pac. R. Co.,. 700 So.2d 542, 550 (La.Ct.App.1997) (holding that “simply establishing that the workplace is noisy fails to meet the legal requirements for proving negligence”)."
} | 9,008,017 | b |
Since plaintiff has presented no objective evidence to disprove defendant's asserted sound levels, those figures must be assumed to be true for purposes of this motion. If in fact, as the LIRR asserts, the sound levels of its horns were in compliance with both the FRSA minimum standard and with OSHA's regulations, the plaintiff will have a difficult, if not impossible, time establishing that the railroad was negligent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "700 So.2d 542, 550",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"simply establishing that the workplace is noisy fails to meet the legal requirements for proving negligence\"",
"sentence": "See Lessee v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 38 Wash. App. 802, 804-07, 690 P.2d 596, 598-600 (Wash.Ct.App.1984) (finding that where the time weighted average of noise exposure was below OSHA levels requiring protection, plaintiff had failed to demonstrate negligence); see also Broussard v. Union Pac. R. Co.,. 700 So.2d 542, 550 (La.Ct.App.1997) (holding that “simply establishing that the workplace is noisy fails to meet the legal requirements for proving negligence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "690 P.2d 596, 598-600",
"parenthetical": "finding that where the time weighted average of noise exposure was below OSHA levels requiring protection, plaintiff had failed to demonstrate negligence",
"sentence": "See Lessee v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 38 Wash. App. 802, 804-07, 690 P.2d 596, 598-600 (Wash.Ct.App.1984) (finding that where the time weighted average of noise exposure was below OSHA levels requiring protection, plaintiff had failed to demonstrate negligence); see also Broussard v. Union Pac. R. Co.,. 700 So.2d 542, 550 (La.Ct.App.1997) (holding that “simply establishing that the workplace is noisy fails to meet the legal requirements for proving negligence”)."
} | 9,008,017 | b |
If the issue is whether the costs of arbitration will make the arbitral forum prohibitively expensive for the individual plaintiff, then determining whether the actual costs of completed arbitration reach that level would be much simpler than determining, in advance, whether the projected costs of arbitration will reach that level. Requiring plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims and then argue, either to the arbitrator or to the reviewing court, that the costs were prohibitive avoids the problem identified in Green Tree, namely the "speculative" or "conjectural" nature of the costs of arbitration. The reviewing court would have before it the actual costs and would be charged with the task of determining whether those actual costs make the arbitral forum prohibitively costly. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "56 F.Supp.2d 355, 355",
"parenthetical": "\"At this point in the litigation it is not clear how large the fees of the arbitration will be or whether plaintiff will be required to pay any portion of it....\"",
"sentence": "See Klinedinst, 2001 WL 1561821, at *14 (“By the time the arbitrator reaches the costs and fees issues, the record will obviously be far less vague and speculative than it is now.”); see also Arakawa, 56 F.Supp.2d at 355 (“At this point in the litigation it is not clear how large the fees of the arbitration will be or whether plaintiff will be required to pay any portion of it....”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2001 WL 1561821, at *14",
"parenthetical": "\"By the time the arbitrator reaches the costs and fees issues, the record will obviously be far less vague and speculative than it is now.\"",
"sentence": "See Klinedinst, 2001 WL 1561821, at *14 (“By the time the arbitrator reaches the costs and fees issues, the record will obviously be far less vague and speculative than it is now.”); see also Arakawa, 56 F.Supp.2d at 355 (“At this point in the litigation it is not clear how large the fees of the arbitration will be or whether plaintiff will be required to pay any portion of it....”)."
} | 9,340,399 | b |
Landers has not fallen on deaf ears. The Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue -- the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits -- have cited Landers with approval. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "142 F.3d 520, 525",
"parenthetical": "\"In calculating the amount of 'improper benefit[ ]' [under SS 2E5.1(b",
"sentence": "See United States v. Glick, 142 F.3d 520, 525 (2d Cir.1998) (“In calculating the amount of ‘improper benefit[ ]’ [under § 2E5.1(b)(2) ] only direct costs, not indirect costs, should be subtracted from the gross value received.”); Sapoznik, 161 F.3d at 1119 (agreeing that fixed costs should be included in net value but finding it unclear whether the costs at issue were indeed fixed); United States v. DeVegter, 439 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir.2006) (“We agree with the Fifth Circuit’s approach which subtracts direct costs, but not indirect costs, from profits to determine the net improper benefit [under § 2B4.1(b)(l) ].”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 F.Supp.2d 592, 596",
"parenthetical": "\"I hold that only 'direct costs' are deductible in calculating the amount of the benefit conferred [under SS 2B4.1(b",
"sentence": "See also Cohen, 171 F.3d at 803 (citing Landers generally); United States v. Leon, 2 F.Supp.2d 592, 596 (D.N.J.1998) (“I hold that only ‘direct costs’ are deductible in calculating the amount of the benefit conferred [under § 2B4.1(b)(l)]____ Indirect costs are not deductible.”)."
} | 4,222,489 | a |
Landers has not fallen on deaf ears. The Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue -- the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits -- have cited Landers with approval. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 F.Supp.2d 592, 596",
"parenthetical": "\"I hold that only 'direct costs' are deductible in calculating the amount of the benefit conferred [under SS 2B4.1(b",
"sentence": "See also Cohen, 171 F.3d at 803 (citing Landers generally); United States v. Leon, 2 F.Supp.2d 592, 596 (D.N.J.1998) (“I hold that only ‘direct costs’ are deductible in calculating the amount of the benefit conferred [under § 2B4.1(b)(l)]____ Indirect costs are not deductible.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "161 F.3d 1119, 1119",
"parenthetical": "agreeing that fixed costs should be included in net value but finding it unclear whether the costs at issue were indeed fixed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Glick, 142 F.3d 520, 525 (2d Cir.1998) (“In calculating the amount of ‘improper benefit[ ]’ [under § 2E5.1(b)(2) ] only direct costs, not indirect costs, should be subtracted from the gross value received.”); Sapoznik, 161 F.3d at 1119 (agreeing that fixed costs should be included in net value but finding it unclear whether the costs at issue were indeed fixed); United States v. DeVegter, 439 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir.2006) (“We agree with the Fifth Circuit’s approach which subtracts direct costs, but not indirect costs, from profits to determine the net improper benefit [under § 2B4.1(b)(l) ].”)."
} | 4,222,489 | b |
Landers has not fallen on deaf ears. The Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue -- the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits -- have cited Landers with approval. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 F.Supp.2d 592, 596",
"parenthetical": "\"I hold that only 'direct costs' are deductible in calculating the amount of the benefit conferred [under SS 2B4.1(b",
"sentence": "See also Cohen, 171 F.3d at 803 (citing Landers generally); United States v. Leon, 2 F.Supp.2d 592, 596 (D.N.J.1998) (“I hold that only ‘direct costs’ are deductible in calculating the amount of the benefit conferred [under § 2B4.1(b)(l)]____ Indirect costs are not deductible.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 1299, 1304",
"parenthetical": "\"We agree with the Fifth Circuit's approach which subtracts direct costs, but not indirect costs, from profits to determine the net improper benefit [under SS 2B4.1(b",
"sentence": "See United States v. Glick, 142 F.3d 520, 525 (2d Cir.1998) (“In calculating the amount of ‘improper benefit[ ]’ [under § 2E5.1(b)(2) ] only direct costs, not indirect costs, should be subtracted from the gross value received.”); Sapoznik, 161 F.3d at 1119 (agreeing that fixed costs should be included in net value but finding it unclear whether the costs at issue were indeed fixed); United States v. DeVegter, 439 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir.2006) (“We agree with the Fifth Circuit’s approach which subtracts direct costs, but not indirect costs, from profits to determine the net improper benefit [under § 2B4.1(b)(l) ].”)."
} | 4,222,489 | b |
He also maintained that the information would factually support his entrapment defense. It is well settled that evidence that would enable effec tive cross-examination and impeachment may be material and that nondisclosure of such evidence may deprive an accused of a fair trial. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "473 U.S. 676, 676-78",
"parenthetical": "noting, however, that failure to disclose such evidence does not implicate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause",
"sentence": "Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676-78 (noting, however, that failure to disclose such evidence does not implicate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (“When the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [Brady].”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 U.S. 150, 154",
"parenthetical": "\"When the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [Brady].\"",
"sentence": "Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676-78 (noting, however, that failure to disclose such evidence does not implicate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (“When the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [Brady].”) (citation omitted)."
} | 8,557,805 | a |
Case law shows that it is not necessarily the immediate supervisor that is important for determining valid comparators, but rather the decision maker. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "408 F.Supp.2d 193, 206",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he employee must generally show the same decisionmaker made the disparate employment decisions.\"",
"sentence": "See Holtz v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 408 F.Supp.2d 193, 206 (M.D.N.C.2006) (“[T]he employee must generally show the same decisionmaker made the disparate employment decisions.”) (emphasis added), aff’d, 242 Fed.Appx. 75 (4th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (unpublished); see also Herron v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 366 F.Supp.2d 355, 368 n. 16 (E.D.Va.2004) (observing that the fact that an agent of the defendant “who took different action under allegedly similar circumstances involving other students who were outside the protected class was a different individual than the decisionmaker in Plaintiffs case, is a fatal distinction”) (emphasis added); see also Forrest, 245 Fed.Appx. 255 (“If different decision-makers are involved, employees are generally not similarly situated.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that the fact that an agent of the defendant \"who took different action under allegedly similar circumstances involving other students who were outside the protected class was a different individual than the decisionmaker in Plaintiffs case, is a fatal distinction\"",
"sentence": "See Holtz v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 408 F.Supp.2d 193, 206 (M.D.N.C.2006) (“[T]he employee must generally show the same decisionmaker made the disparate employment decisions.”) (emphasis added), aff’d, 242 Fed.Appx. 75 (4th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (unpublished); see also Herron v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 366 F.Supp.2d 355, 368 n. 16 (E.D.Va.2004) (observing that the fact that an agent of the defendant “who took different action under allegedly similar circumstances involving other students who were outside the protected class was a different individual than the decisionmaker in Plaintiffs case, is a fatal distinction”) (emphasis added); see also Forrest, 245 Fed.Appx. 255 (“If different decision-makers are involved, employees are generally not similarly situated.”)."
} | 3,791,171 | a |
Case law shows that it is not necessarily the immediate supervisor that is important for determining valid comparators, but rather the decision maker. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "408 F.Supp.2d 193, 206",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he employee must generally show the same decisionmaker made the disparate employment decisions.\"",
"sentence": "See Holtz v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 408 F.Supp.2d 193, 206 (M.D.N.C.2006) (“[T]he employee must generally show the same decisionmaker made the disparate employment decisions.”) (emphasis added), aff’d, 242 Fed.Appx. 75 (4th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (unpublished); see also Herron v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 366 F.Supp.2d 355, 368 n. 16 (E.D.Va.2004) (observing that the fact that an agent of the defendant “who took different action under allegedly similar circumstances involving other students who were outside the protected class was a different individual than the decisionmaker in Plaintiffs case, is a fatal distinction”) (emphasis added); see also Forrest, 245 Fed.Appx. 255 (“If different decision-makers are involved, employees are generally not similarly situated.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If different decision-makers are involved, employees are generally not similarly situated.\"",
"sentence": "See Holtz v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 408 F.Supp.2d 193, 206 (M.D.N.C.2006) (“[T]he employee must generally show the same decisionmaker made the disparate employment decisions.”) (emphasis added), aff’d, 242 Fed.Appx. 75 (4th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (unpublished); see also Herron v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 366 F.Supp.2d 355, 368 n. 16 (E.D.Va.2004) (observing that the fact that an agent of the defendant “who took different action under allegedly similar circumstances involving other students who were outside the protected class was a different individual than the decisionmaker in Plaintiffs case, is a fatal distinction”) (emphasis added); see also Forrest, 245 Fed.Appx. 255 (“If different decision-makers are involved, employees are generally not similarly situated.”)."
} | 3,791,171 | a |
Case law shows that it is not necessarily the immediate supervisor that is important for determining valid comparators, but rather the decision maker. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he employee must generally show the same decisionmaker made the disparate employment decisions.\"",
"sentence": "See Holtz v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 408 F.Supp.2d 193, 206 (M.D.N.C.2006) (“[T]he employee must generally show the same decisionmaker made the disparate employment decisions.”) (emphasis added), aff’d, 242 Fed.Appx. 75 (4th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (unpublished); see also Herron v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 366 F.Supp.2d 355, 368 n. 16 (E.D.Va.2004) (observing that the fact that an agent of the defendant “who took different action under allegedly similar circumstances involving other students who were outside the protected class was a different individual than the decisionmaker in Plaintiffs case, is a fatal distinction”) (emphasis added); see also Forrest, 245 Fed.Appx. 255 (“If different decision-makers are involved, employees are generally not similarly situated.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that the fact that an agent of the defendant \"who took different action under allegedly similar circumstances involving other students who were outside the protected class was a different individual than the decisionmaker in Plaintiffs case, is a fatal distinction\"",
"sentence": "See Holtz v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 408 F.Supp.2d 193, 206 (M.D.N.C.2006) (“[T]he employee must generally show the same decisionmaker made the disparate employment decisions.”) (emphasis added), aff’d, 242 Fed.Appx. 75 (4th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (unpublished); see also Herron v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 366 F.Supp.2d 355, 368 n. 16 (E.D.Va.2004) (observing that the fact that an agent of the defendant “who took different action under allegedly similar circumstances involving other students who were outside the protected class was a different individual than the decisionmaker in Plaintiffs case, is a fatal distinction”) (emphasis added); see also Forrest, 245 Fed.Appx. 255 (“If different decision-makers are involved, employees are generally not similarly situated.”)."
} | 3,791,171 | a |
Case law shows that it is not necessarily the immediate supervisor that is important for determining valid comparators, but rather the decision maker. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he employee must generally show the same decisionmaker made the disparate employment decisions.\"",
"sentence": "See Holtz v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 408 F.Supp.2d 193, 206 (M.D.N.C.2006) (“[T]he employee must generally show the same decisionmaker made the disparate employment decisions.”) (emphasis added), aff’d, 242 Fed.Appx. 75 (4th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (unpublished); see also Herron v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 366 F.Supp.2d 355, 368 n. 16 (E.D.Va.2004) (observing that the fact that an agent of the defendant “who took different action under allegedly similar circumstances involving other students who were outside the protected class was a different individual than the decisionmaker in Plaintiffs case, is a fatal distinction”) (emphasis added); see also Forrest, 245 Fed.Appx. 255 (“If different decision-makers are involved, employees are generally not similarly situated.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If different decision-makers are involved, employees are generally not similarly situated.\"",
"sentence": "See Holtz v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 408 F.Supp.2d 193, 206 (M.D.N.C.2006) (“[T]he employee must generally show the same decisionmaker made the disparate employment decisions.”) (emphasis added), aff’d, 242 Fed.Appx. 75 (4th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (unpublished); see also Herron v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 366 F.Supp.2d 355, 368 n. 16 (E.D.Va.2004) (observing that the fact that an agent of the defendant “who took different action under allegedly similar circumstances involving other students who were outside the protected class was a different individual than the decisionmaker in Plaintiffs case, is a fatal distinction”) (emphasis added); see also Forrest, 245 Fed.Appx. 255 (“If different decision-makers are involved, employees are generally not similarly situated.”)."
} | 3,791,171 | a |
"It is well established that an order awarding attorney fees in relation to an underlying case is, itself, an appealable judgment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "307 U.S. 161, 170",
"parenthetical": "giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is 'an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding'",
"sentence": "Cf. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 170, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939)(giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is ‘an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding’)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "887 So.2d 919, 923",
"parenthetical": "'[A]ttomey-fee matters are separate and distinct from matters going to the merits of a dispute and ... an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to either aspect of a case.'",
"sentence": "Niezer v. SouthTrust Bank, 887 So.2d 919, 923 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (‘[A]ttomey-fee matters are separate and distinct from matters going to the merits of a dispute and ... an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to either aspect of a case.'); Hunt v. NationsCredit Fin. Servs."
} | 7,024,113 | b |
"It is well established that an order awarding attorney fees in relation to an underlying case is, itself, an appealable judgment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is 'an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding'",
"sentence": "Cf. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 170, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939)(giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is ‘an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding’)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "887 So.2d 919, 923",
"parenthetical": "'[A]ttomey-fee matters are separate and distinct from matters going to the merits of a dispute and ... an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to either aspect of a case.'",
"sentence": "Niezer v. SouthTrust Bank, 887 So.2d 919, 923 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (‘[A]ttomey-fee matters are separate and distinct from matters going to the merits of a dispute and ... an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to either aspect of a case.'); Hunt v. NationsCredit Fin. Servs."
} | 7,024,113 | b |
"It is well established that an order awarding attorney fees in relation to an underlying case is, itself, an appealable judgment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is 'an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding'",
"sentence": "Cf. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 170, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939)(giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is ‘an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding’)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "887 So.2d 919, 923",
"parenthetical": "'[A]ttomey-fee matters are separate and distinct from matters going to the merits of a dispute and ... an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to either aspect of a case.'",
"sentence": "Niezer v. SouthTrust Bank, 887 So.2d 919, 923 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (‘[A]ttomey-fee matters are separate and distinct from matters going to the merits of a dispute and ... an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to either aspect of a case.'); Hunt v. NationsCredit Fin. Servs."
} | 7,024,113 | b |
"It is well established that an order awarding attorney fees in relation to an underlying case is, itself, an appealable judgment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing a trial court's order establishing and administering Calhoun County's indigent-defense system by way of an appeal",
"sentence": "Corp., 902 So.2d 75, 81 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (concluding that Niezer stands for the proposition that 'an order denying an award of attorney fees that is ancillary to an earlier decision and has completely adjudicated all matters in controversy between the parties is immediately appealable’ and is consistent with the United States Supreme Court decision in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988)); Sparks v. Parker, 368 So.2d 528 (Ala.1979) (reviewing a trial court's order establishing and administering Calhoun County's indigent-defense system by way of an appeal); C.A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3915.6 (2d ed.1992); Clark v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 459 (5th Cir.2002)(holding that an order denying compensation under the federal Criminal Justice Act for services performed before a state clemency board by counsel appointed to represent a state prisoner was final and appealable, despite the fact that the order was separate from the merits of the habeas corpus proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "307 U.S. 161, 170",
"parenthetical": "giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is 'an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding'",
"sentence": "Cf. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 170, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939)(giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is ‘an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding’)."
} | 7,024,113 | a |
"It is well established that an order awarding attorney fees in relation to an underlying case is, itself, an appealable judgment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing a trial court's order establishing and administering Calhoun County's indigent-defense system by way of an appeal",
"sentence": "Corp., 902 So.2d 75, 81 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (concluding that Niezer stands for the proposition that 'an order denying an award of attorney fees that is ancillary to an earlier decision and has completely adjudicated all matters in controversy between the parties is immediately appealable’ and is consistent with the United States Supreme Court decision in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988)); Sparks v. Parker, 368 So.2d 528 (Ala.1979) (reviewing a trial court's order establishing and administering Calhoun County's indigent-defense system by way of an appeal); C.A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3915.6 (2d ed.1992); Clark v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 459 (5th Cir.2002)(holding that an order denying compensation under the federal Criminal Justice Act for services performed before a state clemency board by counsel appointed to represent a state prisoner was final and appealable, despite the fact that the order was separate from the merits of the habeas corpus proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is 'an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding'",
"sentence": "Cf. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 170, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939)(giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is ‘an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding’)."
} | 7,024,113 | a |
"It is well established that an order awarding attorney fees in relation to an underlying case is, itself, an appealable judgment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is 'an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding'",
"sentence": "Cf. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 170, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939)(giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is ‘an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding’)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing a trial court's order establishing and administering Calhoun County's indigent-defense system by way of an appeal",
"sentence": "Corp., 902 So.2d 75, 81 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (concluding that Niezer stands for the proposition that 'an order denying an award of attorney fees that is ancillary to an earlier decision and has completely adjudicated all matters in controversy between the parties is immediately appealable’ and is consistent with the United States Supreme Court decision in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988)); Sparks v. Parker, 368 So.2d 528 (Ala.1979) (reviewing a trial court's order establishing and administering Calhoun County's indigent-defense system by way of an appeal); C.A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3915.6 (2d ed.1992); Clark v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 459 (5th Cir.2002)(holding that an order denying compensation under the federal Criminal Justice Act for services performed before a state clemency board by counsel appointed to represent a state prisoner was final and appealable, despite the fact that the order was separate from the merits of the habeas corpus proceeding)."
} | 7,024,113 | b |
"It is well established that an order awarding attorney fees in relation to an underlying case is, itself, an appealable judgment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an order denying compensation under the federal Criminal Justice Act for services performed before a state clemency board by counsel appointed to represent a state prisoner was final and appealable, despite the fact that the order was separate from the merits of the habeas corpus proceeding",
"sentence": "Corp., 902 So.2d 75, 81 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (concluding that Niezer stands for the proposition that 'an order denying an award of attorney fees that is ancillary to an earlier decision and has completely adjudicated all matters in controversy between the parties is immediately appealable’ and is consistent with the United States Supreme Court decision in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988)); Sparks v. Parker, 368 So.2d 528 (Ala.1979) (reviewing a trial court's order establishing and administering Calhoun County's indigent-defense system by way of an appeal); C.A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3915.6 (2d ed.1992); Clark v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 459 (5th Cir.2002)(holding that an order denying compensation under the federal Criminal Justice Act for services performed before a state clemency board by counsel appointed to represent a state prisoner was final and appealable, despite the fact that the order was separate from the merits of the habeas corpus proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "307 U.S. 161, 170",
"parenthetical": "giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is 'an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding'",
"sentence": "Cf. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 170, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939)(giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is ‘an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding’)."
} | 7,024,113 | a |
"It is well established that an order awarding attorney fees in relation to an underlying case is, itself, an appealable judgment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is 'an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding'",
"sentence": "Cf. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 170, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939)(giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is ‘an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding’)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an order denying compensation under the federal Criminal Justice Act for services performed before a state clemency board by counsel appointed to represent a state prisoner was final and appealable, despite the fact that the order was separate from the merits of the habeas corpus proceeding",
"sentence": "Corp., 902 So.2d 75, 81 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (concluding that Niezer stands for the proposition that 'an order denying an award of attorney fees that is ancillary to an earlier decision and has completely adjudicated all matters in controversy between the parties is immediately appealable’ and is consistent with the United States Supreme Court decision in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988)); Sparks v. Parker, 368 So.2d 528 (Ala.1979) (reviewing a trial court's order establishing and administering Calhoun County's indigent-defense system by way of an appeal); C.A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3915.6 (2d ed.1992); Clark v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 459 (5th Cir.2002)(holding that an order denying compensation under the federal Criminal Justice Act for services performed before a state clemency board by counsel appointed to represent a state prisoner was final and appealable, despite the fact that the order was separate from the merits of the habeas corpus proceeding)."
} | 7,024,113 | b |
"It is well established that an order awarding attorney fees in relation to an underlying case is, itself, an appealable judgment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is 'an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding'",
"sentence": "Cf. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 170, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939)(giving certiorari review to an attorney-fee order appealed to the lower appellate court and observing that a petition for an attorney fee in equity is ‘an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding’)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an order denying compensation under the federal Criminal Justice Act for services performed before a state clemency board by counsel appointed to represent a state prisoner was final and appealable, despite the fact that the order was separate from the merits of the habeas corpus proceeding",
"sentence": "Corp., 902 So.2d 75, 81 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (concluding that Niezer stands for the proposition that 'an order denying an award of attorney fees that is ancillary to an earlier decision and has completely adjudicated all matters in controversy between the parties is immediately appealable’ and is consistent with the United States Supreme Court decision in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988)); Sparks v. Parker, 368 So.2d 528 (Ala.1979) (reviewing a trial court's order establishing and administering Calhoun County's indigent-defense system by way of an appeal); C.A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3915.6 (2d ed.1992); Clark v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 459 (5th Cir.2002)(holding that an order denying compensation under the federal Criminal Justice Act for services performed before a state clemency board by counsel appointed to represent a state prisoner was final and appealable, despite the fact that the order was separate from the merits of the habeas corpus proceeding)."
} | 7,024,113 | b |
Defendants note that there is a strong public policy supporting the right of a client to discharge an attorney at any time, despite contractual provisions to the contrary. From this they argue that, because an attorney has no contractual right to continued employment by his client, plaintiff has not stated a claim under SS 1981. However, even if one were to consider a contract between an attorney and client to be an agreement that is terminable at will by the client, such a contract could not be terminated for a discriminatory reason. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1994 WL 380620, at *3",
"parenthetical": "\"There is no 'at-will' defense to a federal discrimination complaint.\"",
"sentence": "See Campbell v. AT & T Communications, 1994 WL 380620, at *3 (N.D.Ill. July 18, 1994) (“There is no ‘at-will’ defense to a federal discrimination complaint.”); see also Baker v. Am. Juice, Inc., 870 F.Supp. 878, 883 (N.D.Ind. 1994) (§ 1981 applicable when at-will employee alleged that he had been discharged on the basis of his race)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "870 F.Supp. 878, 883",
"parenthetical": "SS 1981 applicable when at-will employee alleged that he had been discharged on the basis of his race",
"sentence": "See Campbell v. AT & T Communications, 1994 WL 380620, at *3 (N.D.Ill. July 18, 1994) (“There is no ‘at-will’ defense to a federal discrimination complaint.”); see also Baker v. Am. Juice, Inc., 870 F.Supp. 878, 883 (N.D.Ind. 1994) (§ 1981 applicable when at-will employee alleged that he had been discharged on the basis of his race)."
} | 7,828,655 | a |
We hold that this marijuana cigarette was not improperly seized by the Government and that the military judge did not err in admitting it as evidence at appellant's court-martial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "46 F.3d 1427, 1431",
"parenthetical": "\"defendant's response to even an invalid arrest or Terry stop may constitute independent grounds for arrest\" and search incident thereto",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1431 (8th Cir.1995) (“defendant’s response to even an invalid arrest or Terry stop may constitute independent grounds for arrest” and search incident thereto); see also United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 523 (7th Cir.1997) (lawful arrest on an outstanding warrant not tainted by illegal, but not bad faith, investigative stop)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "111 F.3d 515, 523",
"parenthetical": "lawful arrest on an outstanding warrant not tainted by illegal, but not bad faith, investigative stop",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1431 (8th Cir.1995) (“defendant’s response to even an invalid arrest or Terry stop may constitute independent grounds for arrest” and search incident thereto); see also United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 523 (7th Cir.1997) (lawful arrest on an outstanding warrant not tainted by illegal, but not bad faith, investigative stop)."
} | 80,928 | a |
We find that consideration of dismissed offenses as a basis for an upward departure under SS 4A1.3 is a breach of that structure. We adopt the reasoning outlined by the Ninth Circuit that a sentencing court should not be allowed to violate the bargain worked out between the defendant and the government. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "997 F.2d 343, 346",
"parenthetical": "allowing consideration of offenses dismissed pursuant to plea bargains prior to the presently charged offenses, distinguishing Castro-Cervantes on the grounds that it \"holds no more than that a defendant who pleads guilty receives the Guideline sentence for the crime to which he pleaded.\"",
"sentence": "Castro-Cervantes, 927 F.2d at 1082; United States v. Saldana, 12 F.3d 160, 163 (9th Cir.1993); see also United States v. Ruffin, 997 F.2d 343, 346 (7th Cir.1993) (allowing consideration of offenses dismissed pursuant to plea bargains prior to the presently charged offenses, distinguishing Castro-Cervantes on the grounds that it “holds no more than that a defendant who pleads guilty receives the Guideline sentence for the crime to which he pleaded.”); but see United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337, 341 (10th Cir.1990) (when a defendant pleads to one in a series of offenses, some of which are dismissed, an upward departure is allowable based on the dismissed counts.)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "905 F.2d 337, 341",
"parenthetical": "when a defendant pleads to one in a series of offenses, some of which are dismissed, an upward departure is allowable based on the dismissed counts.",
"sentence": "Castro-Cervantes, 927 F.2d at 1082; United States v. Saldana, 12 F.3d 160, 163 (9th Cir.1993); see also United States v. Ruffin, 997 F.2d 343, 346 (7th Cir.1993) (allowing consideration of offenses dismissed pursuant to plea bargains prior to the presently charged offenses, distinguishing Castro-Cervantes on the grounds that it “holds no more than that a defendant who pleads guilty receives the Guideline sentence for the crime to which he pleaded.”); but see United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337, 341 (10th Cir.1990) (when a defendant pleads to one in a series of offenses, some of which are dismissed, an upward departure is allowable based on the dismissed counts.)."
} | 10,515,009 | a |
Section 42-56-21(a). In comparable circumstances this Court has held that the statutory powers and obligations of the state cannot be contractually abdicated. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "587 A.2d 915, 915",
"parenthetical": "CBA was invalid because it conflicted with the statutory power of the director of the DOC to require correctional officers to work involuntary overtime",
"sentence": "Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d at 915 (CBA was invalid because it conflicted with the statutory power of the director of the DOC to require correctional officers to work involuntary overtime); see also State Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals v. Rhode Island Council 94, 692 A.2d 318, 324-25 (R.I. 1997) (department has statutory responsibility to provide for the health and safety of its patients and may not arbitrate whether employees can decide for themselves how many consecutive hours of overtime they will work); Pawtucket School Committee v. Pawtucket Teachers’ Alliance, Local No. 930, 652 A.2d 970, 972 (R.I.1995) (school committee cannot bargain away its responsibility of evaluating bilingual language programs for state law compliance)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "692 A.2d 318, 324-25",
"parenthetical": "department has statutory responsibility to provide for the health and safety of its patients and may not arbitrate whether employees can decide for themselves how many consecutive hours of overtime they will work",
"sentence": "Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d at 915 (CBA was invalid because it conflicted with the statutory power of the director of the DOC to require correctional officers to work involuntary overtime); see also State Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals v. Rhode Island Council 94, 692 A.2d 318, 324-25 (R.I. 1997) (department has statutory responsibility to provide for the health and safety of its patients and may not arbitrate whether employees can decide for themselves how many consecutive hours of overtime they will work); Pawtucket School Committee v. Pawtucket Teachers’ Alliance, Local No. 930, 652 A.2d 970, 972 (R.I.1995) (school committee cannot bargain away its responsibility of evaluating bilingual language programs for state law compliance)."
} | 11,713,698 | a |
Section 42-56-21(a). In comparable circumstances this Court has held that the statutory powers and obligations of the state cannot be contractually abdicated. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "587 A.2d 915, 915",
"parenthetical": "CBA was invalid because it conflicted with the statutory power of the director of the DOC to require correctional officers to work involuntary overtime",
"sentence": "Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d at 915 (CBA was invalid because it conflicted with the statutory power of the director of the DOC to require correctional officers to work involuntary overtime); see also State Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals v. Rhode Island Council 94, 692 A.2d 318, 324-25 (R.I. 1997) (department has statutory responsibility to provide for the health and safety of its patients and may not arbitrate whether employees can decide for themselves how many consecutive hours of overtime they will work); Pawtucket School Committee v. Pawtucket Teachers’ Alliance, Local No. 930, 652 A.2d 970, 972 (R.I.1995) (school committee cannot bargain away its responsibility of evaluating bilingual language programs for state law compliance)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "652 A.2d 970, 972",
"parenthetical": "school committee cannot bargain away its responsibility of evaluating bilingual language programs for state law compliance",
"sentence": "Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d at 915 (CBA was invalid because it conflicted with the statutory power of the director of the DOC to require correctional officers to work involuntary overtime); see also State Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals v. Rhode Island Council 94, 692 A.2d 318, 324-25 (R.I. 1997) (department has statutory responsibility to provide for the health and safety of its patients and may not arbitrate whether employees can decide for themselves how many consecutive hours of overtime they will work); Pawtucket School Committee v. Pawtucket Teachers’ Alliance, Local No. 930, 652 A.2d 970, 972 (R.I.1995) (school committee cannot bargain away its responsibility of evaluating bilingual language programs for state law compliance)."
} | 11,713,698 | a |
Prior to Ubiles, one Superior Court judge observed that "[rjead together, the plain language of the statutes [23 V.I.C. SSSS 488 and 14 V.I.C. SS 2253(a)] suggests a legislative intent to make the mere carrying of a firearm illegal." Likewise, after Ubiles and before Lewis, several Superior Court judges have recognized the potential implications of section 488. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"stop and frisk\" of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements",
"sentence": "See Allen v. State, 85 Md. App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer’s lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88 (Md. 1990) (holding “stop and frisk” of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "55 V.I. 380, 393",
"parenthetical": "\"The language under 23 V.I.C. SS 488 is clear concerning an officer['s] encounter with someone who has a firearm. Prior to arrest, and in the absence of evidence supporting probable cause that other criminal activity is afoot, the police must inquire of the person as to whether he has a license to possess a firearm.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Matthew, 55 V.I. 380, 393 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2011) (“The language under 23 V.I.C. § 488 is clear concerning an officer[’s] encounter with someone who has a firearm. Prior to arrest, and in the absence of evidence supporting probable cause that other criminal activity is afoot, the police must inquire of the person as to whether he has a license to possess a firearm.”); People v. Fredericks, 54 V.I. 161 at 166 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2011) (“[I]n the Virgin Islands when investigating crimes involving firearms, the authority of law enforcement officers to conduct a limited search of a suspect is governed by V.I. CODE Ann. tit. 23, § 488.”); People v. Samuel, Super. Ct. Nos. 556/2009, 557/2009 (STX), 2010 V.I. LEXIS 80, at *17 (V.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2010) (noting that “Virgin Islands law expressly authorizes law enforcement officers to investigate a person’s possession of a firearm” and holding that “Section 488 plainly lays out the procedures of an officer[’s] encounter with someone who has a firearm.”). The Third Circuit, however, never cited or discussed section 488 or these Superior Court decisions in either Ubiles or Lewis. Significantly, section 488 contains virtually identical language to the former article 27, section 36D of the Maryland Code, and Maryland appellate courts have held that this statute permits a search of any individual suspected of possessing a concealed gun, without also requiring reasonable suspicion that the gun is not licensed."
} | 3,661,768 | b |
Prior to Ubiles, one Superior Court judge observed that "[rjead together, the plain language of the statutes [23 V.I.C. SSSS 488 and 14 V.I.C. SS 2253(a)] suggests a legislative intent to make the mere carrying of a firearm illegal." Likewise, after Ubiles and before Lewis, several Superior Court judges have recognized the potential implications of section 488. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88",
"parenthetical": "holding \"stop and frisk\" of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements",
"sentence": "See Allen v. State, 85 Md. App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer’s lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88 (Md. 1990) (holding “stop and frisk” of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "55 V.I. 380, 393",
"parenthetical": "\"The language under 23 V.I.C. SS 488 is clear concerning an officer['s] encounter with someone who has a firearm. Prior to arrest, and in the absence of evidence supporting probable cause that other criminal activity is afoot, the police must inquire of the person as to whether he has a license to possess a firearm.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Matthew, 55 V.I. 380, 393 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2011) (“The language under 23 V.I.C. § 488 is clear concerning an officer[’s] encounter with someone who has a firearm. Prior to arrest, and in the absence of evidence supporting probable cause that other criminal activity is afoot, the police must inquire of the person as to whether he has a license to possess a firearm.”); People v. Fredericks, 54 V.I. 161 at 166 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2011) (“[I]n the Virgin Islands when investigating crimes involving firearms, the authority of law enforcement officers to conduct a limited search of a suspect is governed by V.I. CODE Ann. tit. 23, § 488.”); People v. Samuel, Super. Ct. Nos. 556/2009, 557/2009 (STX), 2010 V.I. LEXIS 80, at *17 (V.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2010) (noting that “Virgin Islands law expressly authorizes law enforcement officers to investigate a person’s possession of a firearm” and holding that “Section 488 plainly lays out the procedures of an officer[’s] encounter with someone who has a firearm.”). The Third Circuit, however, never cited or discussed section 488 or these Superior Court decisions in either Ubiles or Lewis. Significantly, section 488 contains virtually identical language to the former article 27, section 36D of the Maryland Code, and Maryland appellate courts have held that this statute permits a search of any individual suspected of possessing a concealed gun, without also requiring reasonable suspicion that the gun is not licensed."
} | 3,661,768 | b |
Prior to Ubiles, one Superior Court judge observed that "[rjead together, the plain language of the statutes [23 V.I.C. SSSS 488 and 14 V.I.C. SS 2253(a)] suggests a legislative intent to make the mere carrying of a firearm illegal." Likewise, after Ubiles and before Lewis, several Superior Court judges have recognized the potential implications of section 488. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "54 V.I. 161, at 166",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n the Virgin Islands when investigating crimes involving firearms, the authority of law enforcement officers to conduct a limited search of a suspect is governed by V.I. CODE Ann. tit. 23, SS 488.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Matthew, 55 V.I. 380, 393 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2011) (“The language under 23 V.I.C. § 488 is clear concerning an officer[’s] encounter with someone who has a firearm. Prior to arrest, and in the absence of evidence supporting probable cause that other criminal activity is afoot, the police must inquire of the person as to whether he has a license to possess a firearm.”); People v. Fredericks, 54 V.I. 161 at 166 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2011) (“[I]n the Virgin Islands when investigating crimes involving firearms, the authority of law enforcement officers to conduct a limited search of a suspect is governed by V.I. CODE Ann. tit. 23, § 488.”); People v. Samuel, Super. Ct. Nos. 556/2009, 557/2009 (STX), 2010 V.I. LEXIS 80, at *17 (V.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2010) (noting that “Virgin Islands law expressly authorizes law enforcement officers to investigate a person’s possession of a firearm” and holding that “Section 488 plainly lays out the procedures of an officer[’s] encounter with someone who has a firearm.”). The Third Circuit, however, never cited or discussed section 488 or these Superior Court decisions in either Ubiles or Lewis. Significantly, section 488 contains virtually identical language to the former article 27, section 36D of the Maryland Code, and Maryland appellate courts have held that this statute permits a search of any individual suspected of possessing a concealed gun, without also requiring reasonable suspicion that the gun is not licensed."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"stop and frisk\" of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements",
"sentence": "See Allen v. State, 85 Md. App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer’s lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88 (Md. 1990) (holding “stop and frisk” of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements)."
} | 3,661,768 | a |
Prior to Ubiles, one Superior Court judge observed that "[rjead together, the plain language of the statutes [23 V.I.C. SSSS 488 and 14 V.I.C. SS 2253(a)] suggests a legislative intent to make the mere carrying of a firearm illegal." Likewise, after Ubiles and before Lewis, several Superior Court judges have recognized the potential implications of section 488. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "54 V.I. 161, at 166",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n the Virgin Islands when investigating crimes involving firearms, the authority of law enforcement officers to conduct a limited search of a suspect is governed by V.I. CODE Ann. tit. 23, SS 488.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Matthew, 55 V.I. 380, 393 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2011) (“The language under 23 V.I.C. § 488 is clear concerning an officer[’s] encounter with someone who has a firearm. Prior to arrest, and in the absence of evidence supporting probable cause that other criminal activity is afoot, the police must inquire of the person as to whether he has a license to possess a firearm.”); People v. Fredericks, 54 V.I. 161 at 166 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2011) (“[I]n the Virgin Islands when investigating crimes involving firearms, the authority of law enforcement officers to conduct a limited search of a suspect is governed by V.I. CODE Ann. tit. 23, § 488.”); People v. Samuel, Super. Ct. Nos. 556/2009, 557/2009 (STX), 2010 V.I. LEXIS 80, at *17 (V.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2010) (noting that “Virgin Islands law expressly authorizes law enforcement officers to investigate a person’s possession of a firearm” and holding that “Section 488 plainly lays out the procedures of an officer[’s] encounter with someone who has a firearm.”). The Third Circuit, however, never cited or discussed section 488 or these Superior Court decisions in either Ubiles or Lewis. Significantly, section 488 contains virtually identical language to the former article 27, section 36D of the Maryland Code, and Maryland appellate courts have held that this statute permits a search of any individual suspected of possessing a concealed gun, without also requiring reasonable suspicion that the gun is not licensed."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88",
"parenthetical": "holding \"stop and frisk\" of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements",
"sentence": "See Allen v. State, 85 Md. App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer’s lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88 (Md. 1990) (holding “stop and frisk” of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements)."
} | 3,661,768 | a |
Prior to Ubiles, one Superior Court judge observed that "[rjead together, the plain language of the statutes [23 V.I.C. SSSS 488 and 14 V.I.C. SS 2253(a)] suggests a legislative intent to make the mere carrying of a firearm illegal." Likewise, after Ubiles and before Lewis, several Superior Court judges have recognized the potential implications of section 488. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"stop and frisk\" of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements",
"sentence": "See Allen v. State, 85 Md. App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer’s lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88 (Md. 1990) (holding “stop and frisk” of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2010 V.I. LEXIS 80, at *17",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"Virgin Islands law expressly authorizes law enforcement officers to investigate a person's possession of a firearm\" and holding that \"Section 488 plainly lays out the procedures of an officer['s] encounter with someone who has a firearm.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Matthew, 55 V.I. 380, 393 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2011) (“The language under 23 V.I.C. § 488 is clear concerning an officer[’s] encounter with someone who has a firearm. Prior to arrest, and in the absence of evidence supporting probable cause that other criminal activity is afoot, the police must inquire of the person as to whether he has a license to possess a firearm.”); People v. Fredericks, 54 V.I. 161 at 166 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2011) (“[I]n the Virgin Islands when investigating crimes involving firearms, the authority of law enforcement officers to conduct a limited search of a suspect is governed by V.I. CODE Ann. tit. 23, § 488.”); People v. Samuel, Super. Ct. Nos. 556/2009, 557/2009 (STX), 2010 V.I. LEXIS 80, at *17 (V.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2010) (noting that “Virgin Islands law expressly authorizes law enforcement officers to investigate a person’s possession of a firearm” and holding that “Section 488 plainly lays out the procedures of an officer[’s] encounter with someone who has a firearm.”). The Third Circuit, however, never cited or discussed section 488 or these Superior Court decisions in either Ubiles or Lewis. Significantly, section 488 contains virtually identical language to the former article 27, section 36D of the Maryland Code, and Maryland appellate courts have held that this statute permits a search of any individual suspected of possessing a concealed gun, without also requiring reasonable suspicion that the gun is not licensed."
} | 3,661,768 | b |
Prior to Ubiles, one Superior Court judge observed that "[rjead together, the plain language of the statutes [23 V.I.C. SSSS 488 and 14 V.I.C. SS 2253(a)] suggests a legislative intent to make the mere carrying of a firearm illegal." Likewise, after Ubiles and before Lewis, several Superior Court judges have recognized the potential implications of section 488. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2010 V.I. LEXIS 80, at *17",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"Virgin Islands law expressly authorizes law enforcement officers to investigate a person's possession of a firearm\" and holding that \"Section 488 plainly lays out the procedures of an officer['s] encounter with someone who has a firearm.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Matthew, 55 V.I. 380, 393 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2011) (“The language under 23 V.I.C. § 488 is clear concerning an officer[’s] encounter with someone who has a firearm. Prior to arrest, and in the absence of evidence supporting probable cause that other criminal activity is afoot, the police must inquire of the person as to whether he has a license to possess a firearm.”); People v. Fredericks, 54 V.I. 161 at 166 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2011) (“[I]n the Virgin Islands when investigating crimes involving firearms, the authority of law enforcement officers to conduct a limited search of a suspect is governed by V.I. CODE Ann. tit. 23, § 488.”); People v. Samuel, Super. Ct. Nos. 556/2009, 557/2009 (STX), 2010 V.I. LEXIS 80, at *17 (V.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2010) (noting that “Virgin Islands law expressly authorizes law enforcement officers to investigate a person’s possession of a firearm” and holding that “Section 488 plainly lays out the procedures of an officer[’s] encounter with someone who has a firearm.”). The Third Circuit, however, never cited or discussed section 488 or these Superior Court decisions in either Ubiles or Lewis. Significantly, section 488 contains virtually identical language to the former article 27, section 36D of the Maryland Code, and Maryland appellate courts have held that this statute permits a search of any individual suspected of possessing a concealed gun, without also requiring reasonable suspicion that the gun is not licensed."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88",
"parenthetical": "holding \"stop and frisk\" of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements",
"sentence": "See Allen v. State, 85 Md. App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer’s lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88 (Md. 1990) (holding “stop and frisk” of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements)."
} | 3,661,768 | a |
Prior to Ubiles, one Superior Court judge observed that "[rjead together, the plain language of the statutes [23 V.I.C. SSSS 488 and 14 V.I.C. SS 2253(a)] suggests a legislative intent to make the mere carrying of a firearm illegal." Likewise, after Ubiles and before Lewis, several Superior Court judges have recognized the potential implications of section 488. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer's lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun",
"sentence": "See Allen v. State, 85 Md. App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer’s lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88 (Md. 1990) (holding “stop and frisk” of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"stop and frisk\" of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements",
"sentence": "See Allen v. State, 85 Md. App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer’s lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88 (Md. 1990) (holding “stop and frisk” of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements)."
} | 3,661,768 | a |
Prior to Ubiles, one Superior Court judge observed that "[rjead together, the plain language of the statutes [23 V.I.C. SSSS 488 and 14 V.I.C. SS 2253(a)] suggests a legislative intent to make the mere carrying of a firearm illegal." Likewise, after Ubiles and before Lewis, several Superior Court judges have recognized the potential implications of section 488. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88",
"parenthetical": "holding \"stop and frisk\" of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements",
"sentence": "See Allen v. State, 85 Md. App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer’s lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88 (Md. 1990) (holding “stop and frisk” of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer's lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun",
"sentence": "See Allen v. State, 85 Md. App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer’s lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88 (Md. 1990) (holding “stop and frisk” of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements)."
} | 3,661,768 | b |
Prior to Ubiles, one Superior Court judge observed that "[rjead together, the plain language of the statutes [23 V.I.C. SSSS 488 and 14 V.I.C. SS 2253(a)] suggests a legislative intent to make the mere carrying of a firearm illegal." Likewise, after Ubiles and before Lewis, several Superior Court judges have recognized the potential implications of section 488. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85",
"parenthetical": "permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer's lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun",
"sentence": "See Allen v. State, 85 Md. App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer’s lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88 (Md. 1990) (holding “stop and frisk” of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"stop and frisk\" of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements",
"sentence": "See Allen v. State, 85 Md. App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer’s lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88 (Md. 1990) (holding “stop and frisk” of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements)."
} | 3,661,768 | a |
Prior to Ubiles, one Superior Court judge observed that "[rjead together, the plain language of the statutes [23 V.I.C. SSSS 488 and 14 V.I.C. SS 2253(a)] suggests a legislative intent to make the mere carrying of a firearm illegal." Likewise, after Ubiles and before Lewis, several Superior Court judges have recognized the potential implications of section 488. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85",
"parenthetical": "permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer's lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun",
"sentence": "See Allen v. State, 85 Md. App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer’s lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88 (Md. 1990) (holding “stop and frisk” of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88",
"parenthetical": "holding \"stop and frisk\" of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements",
"sentence": "See Allen v. State, 85 Md. App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer’s lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88 (Md. 1990) (holding “stop and frisk” of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible, even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements)."
} | 3,661,768 | a |
The defendants use the terms "conditions of'payment" and "conditions of participation" to draw an 'unnecessarily sharp line betiveen different types of problematic behayior. Whatever label the defendants wish to apply to the conduct at issue, the relators have properly alleged an FCA violation if they have described deficient conduct that would have been material to.the government's decision to provide payment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "461 F.3d 1166, 1176",
"parenthetical": "labeling the condition of participation versus condition of payment distinction nothing more than \"a distinction without a difference\"",
"sentence": "See Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir.2006) (labeling the condition of participation versus condition of payment distinction nothing more than “a distinction without a difference”); see also United States ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc., 784 F.3d 1198, 1207-08 (8th Cir.2015) (in a case arising in the fi'audulent inducement context, citing Hendow favorably and noting Hendow’s rejec tion of the distinction between conditions of participation and payment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "784 F.3d 1198, 1207-08",
"parenthetical": "in a case arising in the fi'audulent inducement context, citing Hendow favorably and noting Hendow's rejec tion of the distinction between conditions of participation and payment",
"sentence": "See Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir.2006) (labeling the condition of participation versus condition of payment distinction nothing more than “a distinction without a difference”); see also United States ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc., 784 F.3d 1198, 1207-08 (8th Cir.2015) (in a case arising in the fi'audulent inducement context, citing Hendow favorably and noting Hendow’s rejec tion of the distinction between conditions of participation and payment)."
} | 4,178,076 | a |
Moreover, the government will be at the mercy of a private company hired and paid for by defendant, which the government has not itself chosen and over which the government exercises no hiring, training, or supervisory control. As the Court noted during the hearing on March 20, the questions about the legal authorization for the private security firm to use force against defendant should he violate the terms of his release, and the questions over whether the guards can or should be armed, underscore the legal and practical uncertainties^ -- indeed, the imperfections- -- -of the private jail-like concept envisioned by defendant, as compared to the more secure option of an actual jail. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "986 F.2d 632, 632-33",
"parenthetical": "\"Safety of the community will be assured only if the government provides trustworthy trained staff to carry out the extensive monitoring of homes, telephones, and travel that would be necessary to ensure compliance with the conditions of bail.\"",
"sentence": "See Banki, 369 Fed.Appx. at 153-54 (rejecting argument that district court erred by denying bail where defendant proposed that home confinement would be enforced by private security guards financed by his own expense and noting that “issues regarding the nature of the security that would be provided by such an arrangement, and the additional costs to the government in supervising such an arrangement ... persuade us that it is not legal error for a district court to decline to accept such a condition of release as a substitute for detention”); see also Orena, 986 F.2d at 632-33 (“Safety of the community will be assured only if the government provides trustworthy trained staff to carry out the extensive monitoring of homes, telephones, and travel that would be necessary to ensure compliance with the conditions of bail.”); Colorado-Cebado, 2013 WL 5852621, at *6 (“What more, compelling case for an order of detention is there than a case in which only an armed guard and the threat of deadly force is sufficient to assure the defendant’s appearance?"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "369 Fed.Appx. 153, 153-54",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that district court erred by denying bail where defendant proposed that home confinement would be enforced by private security guards financed by his own expense and noting that \"issues regarding the nature of the security that would be provided by such an arrangement, and the additional costs to the government in supervising such an arrangement ... persuade us that it is not legal error for a district court to decline to accept such a condition of release as a substitute for detention\"",
"sentence": "See Banki, 369 Fed.Appx. at 153-54 (rejecting argument that district court erred by denying bail where defendant proposed that home confinement would be enforced by private security guards financed by his own expense and noting that “issues regarding the nature of the security that would be provided by such an arrangement, and the additional costs to the government in supervising such an arrangement ... persuade us that it is not legal error for a district court to decline to accept such a condition of release as a substitute for detention”); see also Orena, 986 F.2d at 632-33 (“Safety of the community will be assured only if the government provides trustworthy trained staff to carry out the extensive monitoring of homes, telephones, and travel that would be necessary to ensure compliance with the conditions of bail.”); Colorado-Cebado, 2013 WL 5852621, at *6 (“What more, compelling case for an order of detention is there than a case in which only an armed guard and the threat of deadly force is sufficient to assure the defendant’s appearance?"
} | 4,210,570 | b |
But appellant, who was present with counsel, did not object when panelists 114, 76, and 38 were disqualified, nor did he object when the fourth panelist interviewed at the bench was deemed qualified for service. Independent of any duty imposed on the court reporter by rule 13.1(a) to record the bench conferences, it was appellant's duty to object to any improper ruling by the trial court regarding the qualifications for jury service. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "4 S.W.3d 9, 12",
"parenthetical": "defendant must timely object or show significant harm from service by disqualified juror",
"sentence": "P. 33.1; see also Mayo v. State, 4 S.W.3d 9, 12 (Tex.Crim. App.1999) (defendant must timely object or show significant harm from service by disqualified juror); Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 562 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (failure to object when panelist excused for cause forfeits issue on appeal); Mays v. State, 726 S.W.2d 937, 950 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (failure to object when panelist excused for economic hardship forfeits issue on appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "47 S.W.3d 678, 678",
"parenthetical": "reporter's failure to record bench conferences did not excuse defendant from duty to properly preserve error in rulings on challenges for cause",
"sentence": "See Tanguma, 47 S.W.3d at 678 (reporter’s failure to record bench conferences did not excuse defendant from duty to properly preserve error in rulings on challenges for cause); Tex.R.App."
} | 11,436,555 | b |
But appellant, who was present with counsel, did not object when panelists 114, 76, and 38 were disqualified, nor did he object when the fourth panelist interviewed at the bench was deemed qualified for service. Independent of any duty imposed on the court reporter by rule 13.1(a) to record the bench conferences, it was appellant's duty to object to any improper ruling by the trial court regarding the qualifications for jury service. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "47 S.W.3d 678, 678",
"parenthetical": "reporter's failure to record bench conferences did not excuse defendant from duty to properly preserve error in rulings on challenges for cause",
"sentence": "See Tanguma, 47 S.W.3d at 678 (reporter’s failure to record bench conferences did not excuse defendant from duty to properly preserve error in rulings on challenges for cause); Tex.R.App."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "3 S.W.3d 547, 562",
"parenthetical": "failure to object when panelist excused for cause forfeits issue on appeal",
"sentence": "P. 33.1; see also Mayo v. State, 4 S.W.3d 9, 12 (Tex.Crim. App.1999) (defendant must timely object or show significant harm from service by disqualified juror); Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 562 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (failure to object when panelist excused for cause forfeits issue on appeal); Mays v. State, 726 S.W.2d 937, 950 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (failure to object when panelist excused for economic hardship forfeits issue on appeal)."
} | 11,436,555 | a |
But appellant, who was present with counsel, did not object when panelists 114, 76, and 38 were disqualified, nor did he object when the fourth panelist interviewed at the bench was deemed qualified for service. Independent of any duty imposed on the court reporter by rule 13.1(a) to record the bench conferences, it was appellant's duty to object to any improper ruling by the trial court regarding the qualifications for jury service. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "47 S.W.3d 678, 678",
"parenthetical": "reporter's failure to record bench conferences did not excuse defendant from duty to properly preserve error in rulings on challenges for cause",
"sentence": "See Tanguma, 47 S.W.3d at 678 (reporter’s failure to record bench conferences did not excuse defendant from duty to properly preserve error in rulings on challenges for cause); Tex.R.App."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "726 S.W.2d 937, 950",
"parenthetical": "failure to object when panelist excused for economic hardship forfeits issue on appeal",
"sentence": "P. 33.1; see also Mayo v. State, 4 S.W.3d 9, 12 (Tex.Crim. App.1999) (defendant must timely object or show significant harm from service by disqualified juror); Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 562 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (failure to object when panelist excused for cause forfeits issue on appeal); Mays v. State, 726 S.W.2d 937, 950 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (failure to object when panelist excused for economic hardship forfeits issue on appeal)."
} | 11,436,555 | a |
Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice SS 4.29, at 284 (8th ed.2002). Hence the Supreme Court's summary disposition in Cooper cannot be interpreted as endorsing the Oregon Supreme Court's reasoning, particularly since that reasoning flatly contradicts Widmar. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, even though a lower court's interpretation of a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court was \"plausible,\" it was improper because it would \"leave little vitality\" to an earlier Supreme Court decision",
"sentence": "See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 388-89 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 533, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975) (stating that, even though a lower court's interpretation of a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court was “plausible,” it was improper because it would “leave little vitality” to an earlier Supreme Court decision); see also id. at 391-92, 95 S.Ct. 533 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (\"An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.\"",
"sentence": "See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 388-89 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 533, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975) (stating that, even though a lower court's interpretation of a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court was “plausible,” it was improper because it would “leave little vitality” to an earlier Supreme Court decision); see also id. at 391-92, 95 S.Ct. 533 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (\"An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.”)."
} | 11,404,389 | a |
Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice SS 4.29, at 284 (8th ed.2002). Hence the Supreme Court's summary disposition in Cooper cannot be interpreted as endorsing the Oregon Supreme Court's reasoning, particularly since that reasoning flatly contradicts Widmar. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, even though a lower court's interpretation of a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court was \"plausible,\" it was improper because it would \"leave little vitality\" to an earlier Supreme Court decision",
"sentence": "See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 388-89 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 533, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975) (stating that, even though a lower court's interpretation of a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court was “plausible,” it was improper because it would “leave little vitality” to an earlier Supreme Court decision); see also id. at 391-92, 95 S.Ct. 533 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (\"An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.\"",
"sentence": "See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 388-89 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 533, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975) (stating that, even though a lower court's interpretation of a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court was “plausible,” it was improper because it would “leave little vitality” to an earlier Supreme Court decision); see also id. at 391-92, 95 S.Ct. 533 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (\"An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.”)."
} | 11,404,389 | a |
Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice SS 4.29, at 284 (8th ed.2002). Hence the Supreme Court's summary disposition in Cooper cannot be interpreted as endorsing the Oregon Supreme Court's reasoning, particularly since that reasoning flatly contradicts Widmar. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, even though a lower court's interpretation of a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court was \"plausible,\" it was improper because it would \"leave little vitality\" to an earlier Supreme Court decision",
"sentence": "See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 388-89 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 533, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975) (stating that, even though a lower court's interpretation of a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court was “plausible,” it was improper because it would “leave little vitality” to an earlier Supreme Court decision); see also id. at 391-92, 95 S.Ct. 533 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (\"An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.\"",
"sentence": "See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 388-89 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 533, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975) (stating that, even though a lower court's interpretation of a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court was “plausible,” it was improper because it would “leave little vitality” to an earlier Supreme Court decision); see also id. at 391-92, 95 S.Ct. 533 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (\"An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.”)."
} | 11,404,389 | a |
Indeed, courts have held that prosecutorial misconduct must rise to an egregious level for double jeopardy to bar a retrial. A defendant cannot be retried only "where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken ... to prevent an acquittal that [he] believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 912, 916",
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "456 U.S. 667, 679",
"parenthetical": "retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where \"the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | 7,627,225 | a |
Indeed, courts have held that prosecutorial misconduct must rise to an egregious level for double jeopardy to bar a retrial. A defendant cannot be retried only "where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken ... to prevent an acquittal that [he] believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 912, 916",
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92",
"parenthetical": "retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where \"the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | 7,627,225 | a |
Indeed, courts have held that prosecutorial misconduct must rise to an egregious level for double jeopardy to bar a retrial. A defendant cannot be retried only "where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken ... to prevent an acquittal that [he] believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where \"the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 912, 916",
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | 7,627,225 | b |
Indeed, courts have held that prosecutorial misconduct must rise to an egregious level for double jeopardy to bar a retrial. A defendant cannot be retried only "where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken ... to prevent an acquittal that [he] believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 912, 916",
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 706, 714-15",
"parenthetical": "when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant's successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | 7,627,225 | a |
Indeed, courts have held that prosecutorial misconduct must rise to an egregious level for double jeopardy to bar a retrial. A defendant cannot be retried only "where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken ... to prevent an acquittal that [he] believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "456 U.S. 667, 679",
"parenthetical": "retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where \"the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | 7,627,225 | b |
Indeed, courts have held that prosecutorial misconduct must rise to an egregious level for double jeopardy to bar a retrial. A defendant cannot be retried only "where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken ... to prevent an acquittal that [he] believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92",
"parenthetical": "retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where \"the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | 7,627,225 | a |
Indeed, courts have held that prosecutorial misconduct must rise to an egregious level for double jeopardy to bar a retrial. A defendant cannot be retried only "where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken ... to prevent an acquittal that [he] believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where \"the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | 7,627,225 | b |
Indeed, courts have held that prosecutorial misconduct must rise to an egregious level for double jeopardy to bar a retrial. A defendant cannot be retried only "where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken ... to prevent an acquittal that [he] believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 706, 714-15",
"parenthetical": "when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant's successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | 7,627,225 | b |
Indeed, courts have held that prosecutorial misconduct must rise to an egregious level for double jeopardy to bar a retrial. A defendant cannot be retried only "where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken ... to prevent an acquittal that [he] believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "456 U.S. 667, 679",
"parenthetical": "retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where \"the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | 7,627,225 | a |
Indeed, courts have held that prosecutorial misconduct must rise to an egregious level for double jeopardy to bar a retrial. A defendant cannot be retried only "where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken ... to prevent an acquittal that [he] believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92",
"parenthetical": "retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where \"the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | 7,627,225 | a |
Indeed, courts have held that prosecutorial misconduct must rise to an egregious level for double jeopardy to bar a retrial. A defendant cannot be retried only "where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken ... to prevent an acquittal that [he] believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where \"the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | 7,627,225 | b |
Indeed, courts have held that prosecutorial misconduct must rise to an egregious level for double jeopardy to bar a retrial. A defendant cannot be retried only "where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken ... to prevent an acquittal that [he] believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 706, 714-15",
"parenthetical": "when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant's successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met",
"sentence": "United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”); United States v. Cartagenar-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant’s successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy)."
} | 7,627,225 | b |
Finally, the judge concluded that under governing law in the Lebanese Jaafarite Court, the mother would not have been awarded custody of the sons after the age of two had she sought custody in that court. These subsidiary and ultimate findings and rulings support a determination that the mother's agreement to give guardianship of the children to the father was obtained under duress and was thus unenforceable. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "278 N.J. Super. 218, 222",
"parenthetical": "one-sided settlement agreement obtained in exchange for granting wife Jewish divorce was unenforceable as a product of duress",
"sentence": "Cf. Segal v. Segal, 278 N.J. Super. 218, 222 (1994) (one-sided settlement agreement obtained in exchange for granting wife Jewish divorce was unenforceable as a product of duress); Golding v. Golding, 176 A.D.2d 20, 21-24 (N.Y. 1992) (wife compelled to enter into agreement by husband’s invocation of his power to refuse to give her a Jewish divorce)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "448 Mass. 629, 637",
"parenthetical": "\"It is well established that a contract entered into under duress is voidable\"",
"sentence": "See Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 448 Mass. 629, 637 (2007) (“It is well established that a contract entered into under duress is voidable”). To avoid enforcement of a contract, a contracting party may prevail on a theory of duress if she demonstrates “(1) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms of another; (2) that circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) that said circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite party.”"
} | 3,840,961 | b |
Finally, the judge concluded that under governing law in the Lebanese Jaafarite Court, the mother would not have been awarded custody of the sons after the age of two had she sought custody in that court. These subsidiary and ultimate findings and rulings support a determination that the mother's agreement to give guardianship of the children to the father was obtained under duress and was thus unenforceable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "448 Mass. 629, 637",
"parenthetical": "\"It is well established that a contract entered into under duress is voidable\"",
"sentence": "See Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 448 Mass. 629, 637 (2007) (“It is well established that a contract entered into under duress is voidable”). To avoid enforcement of a contract, a contracting party may prevail on a theory of duress if she demonstrates “(1) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms of another; (2) that circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) that said circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite party.”"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "176 A.D.2d 20, 21-24",
"parenthetical": "wife compelled to enter into agreement by husband's invocation of his power to refuse to give her a Jewish divorce",
"sentence": "Cf. Segal v. Segal, 278 N.J. Super. 218, 222 (1994) (one-sided settlement agreement obtained in exchange for granting wife Jewish divorce was unenforceable as a product of duress); Golding v. Golding, 176 A.D.2d 20, 21-24 (N.Y. 1992) (wife compelled to enter into agreement by husband’s invocation of his power to refuse to give her a Jewish divorce)."
} | 3,840,961 | a |
. Galbreath does not address the ALJ's adverse credibility determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "issue is deemed abandoned when it is not raised or discussed in brief",
"sentence": "See Tellez v. Barnhart, 403 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir.2005) (claimant failed to recognize that ALJ’s RFC determination was influenced by determination that her allegations were less than credible); see also Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 937 n. 2 (8th Cir.2006) (issue is deemed abandoned when it is not raised or discussed in brief)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "403 F.3d 953, 957",
"parenthetical": "claimant failed to recognize that ALJ's RFC determination was influenced by determination that her allegations were less than credible",
"sentence": "See Tellez v. Barnhart, 403 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir.2005) (claimant failed to recognize that ALJ’s RFC determination was influenced by determination that her allegations were less than credible); see also Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 937 n. 2 (8th Cir.2006) (issue is deemed abandoned when it is not raised or discussed in brief)."
} | 3,600,312 | b |
Third, the ALJ did not err in assessing the plaintiffs credibility with respect to her subjective complaints. The ALJ properly considered the record as a whole, including the available medical evidence and the nature and extent of the plaintiffs daily activities, in determining that the plaintiffs subjective complaints were not fully credible. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "67 F.3d 558, 565",
"parenthetical": "considering a plaintiffs daily activities as support for the ALJ's findings that the plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work",
"sentence": "See Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1384-85 (5th Cir.1988) (explaining that the lack of objective factors supporting subjective allegations of pain were properly considered in determining credibility); see also Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 565 (5th Cir.1995) (considering a plaintiffs daily activities as support for the ALJ’s findings that the plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "837 F.2d 1378, 1384-85",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the lack of objective factors supporting subjective allegations of pain were properly considered in determining credibility",
"sentence": "See Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1384-85 (5th Cir.1988) (explaining that the lack of objective factors supporting subjective allegations of pain were properly considered in determining credibility); see also Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 565 (5th Cir.1995) (considering a plaintiffs daily activities as support for the ALJ’s findings that the plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work)."
} | 3,779,126 | b |
This standard is strict -- courts have held that vague references in a contract to a general class of documents are not sufficient to incorporate an extrinsic document by reference in the contract. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "3 F.Supp.3d 163, 163",
"parenthetical": "granting a motion to dismiss and finding that a statement in the contract at issue -- \"may contain other terms and conditions\" -- was not sufficient to incorporate extrinsic representations into the contract",
"sentence": "Ward, 3 F.Supp.3d at 163 (granting a motion to dismiss and finding that a statement in the contract at issue — “may contain other terms and conditions” — was not sufficient to incorporate extrinsic representations into the contract); see also Sea Trade Co. v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 03 CIV. 10254(JFK), 2007 WL 1288592, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2007) (denying motion for summary judgment and finding that a separate document containing additional terms and conditions was not incorporated by reference into the contract because the contract only made reference to the general “regulations” and “rules” of the Bank and did not “expressly name the Terms and Conditions as the document that contained the applicable regulations”); Shark Info. Servs."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2007 WL 1288592, at *4",
"parenthetical": "denying motion for summary judgment and finding that a separate document containing additional terms and conditions was not incorporated by reference into the contract because the contract only made reference to the general \"regulations\" and \"rules\" of the Bank and did not \"expressly name the Terms and Conditions as the document that contained the applicable regulations\"",
"sentence": "Ward, 3 F.Supp.3d at 163 (granting a motion to dismiss and finding that a statement in the contract at issue — “may contain other terms and conditions” — was not sufficient to incorporate extrinsic representations into the contract); see also Sea Trade Co. v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 03 CIV. 10254(JFK), 2007 WL 1288592, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2007) (denying motion for summary judgment and finding that a separate document containing additional terms and conditions was not incorporated by reference into the contract because the contract only made reference to the general “regulations” and “rules” of the Bank and did not “expressly name the Terms and Conditions as the document that contained the applicable regulations”); Shark Info. Servs."
} | 4,173,417 | a |
The "reasonable speculation" standard is materially different from the Jackson standard in that it prohibits convictions from resting on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. This new standard strongly disfavors circumstantial evidence, contrary to our long-standing recognition that a criminal conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence alone. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "329 F.3d 253, 261",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e do not favor direct evidence over circumstantial evidence, as either type of evidence may satisfactorily support a conviction.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rodríguez-Durán, 507 F.3d 749, 758 (1st Cir.2007) (“[Cjircumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to provide a basis for conviction.”); see also United States v. Downs-Moses, 329 F.3d 253, 261 (1st Cir.2003) (“[W]e do not favor direct evidence over circumstantial evidence, as either type of evidence may satisfactorily support a conviction.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "507 F.3d 749, 758",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjircumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to provide a basis for conviction.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rodríguez-Durán, 507 F.3d 749, 758 (1st Cir.2007) (“[Cjircumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to provide a basis for conviction.”); see also United States v. Downs-Moses, 329 F.3d 253, 261 (1st Cir.2003) (“[W]e do not favor direct evidence over circumstantial evidence, as either type of evidence may satisfactorily support a conviction.”)."
} | 4,042,335 | b |
Lindner had twenty-five years experience as a professional photographer when defendants hired him and defendants "do not question [plaintiffs] application of technical skill, which was the reason he was hired." (Defs.' Br. at 3; Munn Reply Aff. P 8.) The record is bereft of any evidence that defendants possessed any technical photographic skills. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "photographer is not merely a \"mechanical\" extension of hiring party",
"sentence": "See Marco, 969 F.2d at 1551 (noting that defendant although himself an art director had hired a' professional photographer because the photographer is “the person who makes the shot work,” and describing the photographer as “certainly skilled in the sense that Reid, the sculptor in the Reid case, was skilled”); cf. Morita v. Omni Publications, Int’l, Ltd., 741 F.Supp. 1107 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (photographer is not merely a “mechanical” extension of hiring party)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "969 F.2d 1551, 1551",
"parenthetical": "noting that defendant although himself an art director had hired a' professional photographer because the photographer is \"the person who makes the shot work,\" and describing the photographer as \"certainly skilled in the sense that Reid, the sculptor in the Reid case, was skilled\"",
"sentence": "See Marco, 969 F.2d at 1551 (noting that defendant although himself an art director had hired a' professional photographer because the photographer is “the person who makes the shot work,” and describing the photographer as “certainly skilled in the sense that Reid, the sculptor in the Reid case, was skilled”); cf. Morita v. Omni Publications, Int’l, Ltd., 741 F.Supp. 1107 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (photographer is not merely a “mechanical” extension of hiring party)."
} | 11,223,552 | b |
Consequently, in the "rare instances" where New York courts have recognized a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment context, the claims have alleged not merely sexual harassment, but "more significantly, battery." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of motion to dismiss where plaintiff had been subjected to physical sexual contact, jokes, pornography, and erotica",
"sentence": "Gerzog v. London Fog Corp., 907 F.Supp. 590, 604 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (citing Foster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 609 F.Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Leisure, J.) (finding conduct sufficiently outrageous where employer forced plaintiff into an ongoing sexual relationship); O’Reilly v. Executone, Inc., 121 A.D.2d 772, 503 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (3d Dep’t 1986) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss where plaintiff had been subjected to physical sexual contact, jokes, pornography, and erotica); Collins v. Willcox, Inc., 158 Misc.2d 54, 600 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885-86 (Sup. Ct.1992) (holding that “a pattern of behavior that continually put [plaintiff] in embarrassing, humiliating and demeaning positions” that included sexual harassment and battery “might well rise to the level of outrageous”)); see also Salvatore, 1999 WL 796172, at *2-*3 (finding that plaintiffs who alleged episodes of harassment, including “minor physical abuse,” had stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Sowemimo, 43 F.Supp.2d at 491 (“Courts have observed that a plaintiff must allege sexual battery in order to survive ... summary judgment in the sexual harassment context."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that plaintiffs who alleged episodes of harassment, including \"minor physical abuse,\" had stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress",
"sentence": "Gerzog v. London Fog Corp., 907 F.Supp. 590, 604 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (citing Foster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 609 F.Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Leisure, J.) (finding conduct sufficiently outrageous where employer forced plaintiff into an ongoing sexual relationship); O’Reilly v. Executone, Inc., 121 A.D.2d 772, 503 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (3d Dep’t 1986) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss where plaintiff had been subjected to physical sexual contact, jokes, pornography, and erotica); Collins v. Willcox, Inc., 158 Misc.2d 54, 600 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885-86 (Sup. Ct.1992) (holding that “a pattern of behavior that continually put [plaintiff] in embarrassing, humiliating and demeaning positions” that included sexual harassment and battery “might well rise to the level of outrageous”)); see also Salvatore, 1999 WL 796172, at *2-*3 (finding that plaintiffs who alleged episodes of harassment, including “minor physical abuse,” had stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Sowemimo, 43 F.Supp.2d at 491 (“Courts have observed that a plaintiff must allege sexual battery in order to survive ... summary judgment in the sexual harassment context."
} | 11,532,480 | a |
Consequently, in the "rare instances" where New York courts have recognized a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment context, the claims have alleged not merely sexual harassment, but "more significantly, battery." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that plaintiffs who alleged episodes of harassment, including \"minor physical abuse,\" had stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress",
"sentence": "Gerzog v. London Fog Corp., 907 F.Supp. 590, 604 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (citing Foster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 609 F.Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Leisure, J.) (finding conduct sufficiently outrageous where employer forced plaintiff into an ongoing sexual relationship); O’Reilly v. Executone, Inc., 121 A.D.2d 772, 503 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (3d Dep’t 1986) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss where plaintiff had been subjected to physical sexual contact, jokes, pornography, and erotica); Collins v. Willcox, Inc., 158 Misc.2d 54, 600 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885-86 (Sup. Ct.1992) (holding that “a pattern of behavior that continually put [plaintiff] in embarrassing, humiliating and demeaning positions” that included sexual harassment and battery “might well rise to the level of outrageous”)); see also Salvatore, 1999 WL 796172, at *2-*3 (finding that plaintiffs who alleged episodes of harassment, including “minor physical abuse,” had stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Sowemimo, 43 F.Supp.2d at 491 (“Courts have observed that a plaintiff must allege sexual battery in order to survive ... summary judgment in the sexual harassment context."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "503 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186",
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of motion to dismiss where plaintiff had been subjected to physical sexual contact, jokes, pornography, and erotica",
"sentence": "Gerzog v. London Fog Corp., 907 F.Supp. 590, 604 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (citing Foster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 609 F.Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Leisure, J.) (finding conduct sufficiently outrageous where employer forced plaintiff into an ongoing sexual relationship); O’Reilly v. Executone, Inc., 121 A.D.2d 772, 503 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (3d Dep’t 1986) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss where plaintiff had been subjected to physical sexual contact, jokes, pornography, and erotica); Collins v. Willcox, Inc., 158 Misc.2d 54, 600 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885-86 (Sup. Ct.1992) (holding that “a pattern of behavior that continually put [plaintiff] in embarrassing, humiliating and demeaning positions” that included sexual harassment and battery “might well rise to the level of outrageous”)); see also Salvatore, 1999 WL 796172, at *2-*3 (finding that plaintiffs who alleged episodes of harassment, including “minor physical abuse,” had stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Sowemimo, 43 F.Supp.2d at 491 (“Courts have observed that a plaintiff must allege sexual battery in order to survive ... summary judgment in the sexual harassment context."
} | 11,532,480 | b |
Consequently, in the "rare instances" where New York courts have recognized a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment context, the claims have alleged not merely sexual harassment, but "more significantly, battery." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that plaintiffs who alleged episodes of harassment, including \"minor physical abuse,\" had stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress",
"sentence": "Gerzog v. London Fog Corp., 907 F.Supp. 590, 604 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (citing Foster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 609 F.Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Leisure, J.) (finding conduct sufficiently outrageous where employer forced plaintiff into an ongoing sexual relationship); O’Reilly v. Executone, Inc., 121 A.D.2d 772, 503 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (3d Dep’t 1986) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss where plaintiff had been subjected to physical sexual contact, jokes, pornography, and erotica); Collins v. Willcox, Inc., 158 Misc.2d 54, 600 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885-86 (Sup. Ct.1992) (holding that “a pattern of behavior that continually put [plaintiff] in embarrassing, humiliating and demeaning positions” that included sexual harassment and battery “might well rise to the level of outrageous”)); see also Salvatore, 1999 WL 796172, at *2-*3 (finding that plaintiffs who alleged episodes of harassment, including “minor physical abuse,” had stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Sowemimo, 43 F.Supp.2d at 491 (“Courts have observed that a plaintiff must allege sexual battery in order to survive ... summary judgment in the sexual harassment context."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a pattern of behavior that continually put [plaintiff] in embarrassing, humiliating and demeaning positions\" that included sexual harassment and battery \"might well rise to the level of outrageous\"",
"sentence": "Gerzog v. London Fog Corp., 907 F.Supp. 590, 604 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (citing Foster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 609 F.Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Leisure, J.) (finding conduct sufficiently outrageous where employer forced plaintiff into an ongoing sexual relationship); O’Reilly v. Executone, Inc., 121 A.D.2d 772, 503 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (3d Dep’t 1986) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss where plaintiff had been subjected to physical sexual contact, jokes, pornography, and erotica); Collins v. Willcox, Inc., 158 Misc.2d 54, 600 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885-86 (Sup. Ct.1992) (holding that “a pattern of behavior that continually put [plaintiff] in embarrassing, humiliating and demeaning positions” that included sexual harassment and battery “might well rise to the level of outrageous”)); see also Salvatore, 1999 WL 796172, at *2-*3 (finding that plaintiffs who alleged episodes of harassment, including “minor physical abuse,” had stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Sowemimo, 43 F.Supp.2d at 491 (“Courts have observed that a plaintiff must allege sexual battery in order to survive ... summary judgment in the sexual harassment context."
} | 11,532,480 | b |
Consequently, in the "rare instances" where New York courts have recognized a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment context, the claims have alleged not merely sexual harassment, but "more significantly, battery." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that plaintiffs who alleged episodes of harassment, including \"minor physical abuse,\" had stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress",
"sentence": "Gerzog v. London Fog Corp., 907 F.Supp. 590, 604 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (citing Foster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 609 F.Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Leisure, J.) (finding conduct sufficiently outrageous where employer forced plaintiff into an ongoing sexual relationship); O’Reilly v. Executone, Inc., 121 A.D.2d 772, 503 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (3d Dep’t 1986) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss where plaintiff had been subjected to physical sexual contact, jokes, pornography, and erotica); Collins v. Willcox, Inc., 158 Misc.2d 54, 600 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885-86 (Sup. Ct.1992) (holding that “a pattern of behavior that continually put [plaintiff] in embarrassing, humiliating and demeaning positions” that included sexual harassment and battery “might well rise to the level of outrageous”)); see also Salvatore, 1999 WL 796172, at *2-*3 (finding that plaintiffs who alleged episodes of harassment, including “minor physical abuse,” had stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Sowemimo, 43 F.Supp.2d at 491 (“Courts have observed that a plaintiff must allege sexual battery in order to survive ... summary judgment in the sexual harassment context."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "600 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885-86",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a pattern of behavior that continually put [plaintiff] in embarrassing, humiliating and demeaning positions\" that included sexual harassment and battery \"might well rise to the level of outrageous\"",
"sentence": "Gerzog v. London Fog Corp., 907 F.Supp. 590, 604 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (citing Foster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 609 F.Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Leisure, J.) (finding conduct sufficiently outrageous where employer forced plaintiff into an ongoing sexual relationship); O’Reilly v. Executone, Inc., 121 A.D.2d 772, 503 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (3d Dep’t 1986) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss where plaintiff had been subjected to physical sexual contact, jokes, pornography, and erotica); Collins v. Willcox, Inc., 158 Misc.2d 54, 600 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885-86 (Sup. Ct.1992) (holding that “a pattern of behavior that continually put [plaintiff] in embarrassing, humiliating and demeaning positions” that included sexual harassment and battery “might well rise to the level of outrageous”)); see also Salvatore, 1999 WL 796172, at *2-*3 (finding that plaintiffs who alleged episodes of harassment, including “minor physical abuse,” had stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Sowemimo, 43 F.Supp.2d at 491 (“Courts have observed that a plaintiff must allege sexual battery in order to survive ... summary judgment in the sexual harassment context."
} | 11,532,480 | b |
"Our determination that the statutes must be construed to require a hearing before the employment of a person who has once acquired status as a tenure teacher can be terminated also finds support in constitutional principles. A tenure teacher has a property right in continued employment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "408 U.S. 564, 576-78",
"parenthetical": "teacher without tenure and without contractual right to renewal of employment has no protectible interest in reemployment",
"sentence": "Howell v. Woodlin School Dist. R-104, 198 Colo. 40, 45-46, 596 P.2d 56, 60 (1979); accord Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956); see also deKoevend v. Board of Educ. of West End School, 688 P.2d 219, 227-28 (Colo.1984) (irregular procedures violated tenure teacher’s ‘due process right to a fair and impartial determination by the board.’); cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708-10, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (teacher without tenure and without contractual right to renewal of employment has no protectible interest in reemployment). The state cannot deprive a person of such a right without due process."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "688 P.2d 219, 227-28",
"parenthetical": "irregular procedures violated tenure teacher's 'due process right to a fair and impartial determination by the board.'",
"sentence": "Howell v. Woodlin School Dist. R-104, 198 Colo. 40, 45-46, 596 P.2d 56, 60 (1979); accord Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956); see also deKoevend v. Board of Educ. of West End School, 688 P.2d 219, 227-28 (Colo.1984) (irregular procedures violated tenure teacher’s ‘due process right to a fair and impartial determination by the board.’); cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708-10, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (teacher without tenure and without contractual right to renewal of employment has no protectible interest in reemployment). The state cannot deprive a person of such a right without due process."
} | 7,042,298 | b |
"Our determination that the statutes must be construed to require a hearing before the employment of a person who has once acquired status as a tenure teacher can be terminated also finds support in constitutional principles. A tenure teacher has a property right in continued employment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708-10",
"parenthetical": "teacher without tenure and without contractual right to renewal of employment has no protectible interest in reemployment",
"sentence": "Howell v. Woodlin School Dist. R-104, 198 Colo. 40, 45-46, 596 P.2d 56, 60 (1979); accord Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956); see also deKoevend v. Board of Educ. of West End School, 688 P.2d 219, 227-28 (Colo.1984) (irregular procedures violated tenure teacher’s ‘due process right to a fair and impartial determination by the board.’); cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708-10, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (teacher without tenure and without contractual right to renewal of employment has no protectible interest in reemployment). The state cannot deprive a person of such a right without due process."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "688 P.2d 219, 227-28",
"parenthetical": "irregular procedures violated tenure teacher's 'due process right to a fair and impartial determination by the board.'",
"sentence": "Howell v. Woodlin School Dist. R-104, 198 Colo. 40, 45-46, 596 P.2d 56, 60 (1979); accord Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956); see also deKoevend v. Board of Educ. of West End School, 688 P.2d 219, 227-28 (Colo.1984) (irregular procedures violated tenure teacher’s ‘due process right to a fair and impartial determination by the board.’); cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708-10, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (teacher without tenure and without contractual right to renewal of employment has no protectible interest in reemployment). The state cannot deprive a person of such a right without due process."
} | 7,042,298 | b |
"Our determination that the statutes must be construed to require a hearing before the employment of a person who has once acquired status as a tenure teacher can be terminated also finds support in constitutional principles. A tenure teacher has a property right in continued employment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "688 P.2d 219, 227-28",
"parenthetical": "irregular procedures violated tenure teacher's 'due process right to a fair and impartial determination by the board.'",
"sentence": "Howell v. Woodlin School Dist. R-104, 198 Colo. 40, 45-46, 596 P.2d 56, 60 (1979); accord Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956); see also deKoevend v. Board of Educ. of West End School, 688 P.2d 219, 227-28 (Colo.1984) (irregular procedures violated tenure teacher’s ‘due process right to a fair and impartial determination by the board.’); cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708-10, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (teacher without tenure and without contractual right to renewal of employment has no protectible interest in reemployment). The state cannot deprive a person of such a right without due process."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "teacher without tenure and without contractual right to renewal of employment has no protectible interest in reemployment",
"sentence": "Howell v. Woodlin School Dist. R-104, 198 Colo. 40, 45-46, 596 P.2d 56, 60 (1979); accord Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956); see also deKoevend v. Board of Educ. of West End School, 688 P.2d 219, 227-28 (Colo.1984) (irregular procedures violated tenure teacher’s ‘due process right to a fair and impartial determination by the board.’); cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708-10, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (teacher without tenure and without contractual right to renewal of employment has no protectible interest in reemployment). The state cannot deprive a person of such a right without due process."
} | 7,042,298 | a |
However, in the Second Circuit, that deference is diminished when "plain tiff is a corporation doing business abroad and can expect to litigate in foreign courts." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1993 WL 227663, at *4",
"parenthetical": "notwithstanding plaintiffs American citizenship and residency, dismissal in favor of Greece is warranted because operative facts on which the litigation was based bore little connection to New York",
"sentence": "See also Zweig, 1993 WL 227663, at *4 (notwithstanding plaintiffs American citizenship and residency, dismissal in favor of Greece is warranted because operative facts on which the litigation was based bore little connection to New York)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "224 F.3d 147, 147",
"parenthetical": "\"The private interest of plaintiffs in suing in its [sic] home location is diluted because it chose to do business with Japanese firms and to seek their custom, making it logical that they be required to litigate there, a result which should not expose plaintiff to surprise.\"",
"sentence": "Guidi, 224 F.3d at 147. See Morrison Law Firm v. Clarion Co., Ltd., 158 F.R.D. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (“The private interest of plaintiffs in suing in its [sic] home location is diluted because it chose to do business with Japanese firms and to seek their custom, making it logical that they be required to litigate there, a result which should not expose plaintiff to surprise.”); CCS Int’l, Ltd. v. ECI Telesystems, Ltd., No. 97 Civ. 4646, 1998 WL 512951, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1998) (while “it remains defendants’ burden to overcome the forum choice made by these American-eitizen plaintiffs,” for plaintiffs “who are involved in a decidedly international dispute such as this, their American citizenship and . residence do not constitute the powerful, near-decisive factors for which they contend”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Sussman, 801 F.Supp. at 1073 (‘Where an American plaintiff chooses to invest in a foreign country and then complains of fraudulent acts occurring primarily in that country, the plaintiffs ability to rely upon citizenship as a talisman against forum non con-veniens dismissal is diminished.”). A plaintiffs choice of forum is also “given reduced emphasis where ... the operative facts upon which the litigation is brought bear little material connection to the chosen forum.”"
} | 3,693,227 | b |
However, in the Second Circuit, that deference is diminished when "plain tiff is a corporation doing business abroad and can expect to litigate in foreign courts." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "158 F.R.D. 285, 287",
"parenthetical": "\"The private interest of plaintiffs in suing in its [sic] home location is diluted because it chose to do business with Japanese firms and to seek their custom, making it logical that they be required to litigate there, a result which should not expose plaintiff to surprise.\"",
"sentence": "Guidi, 224 F.3d at 147. See Morrison Law Firm v. Clarion Co., Ltd., 158 F.R.D. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (“The private interest of plaintiffs in suing in its [sic] home location is diluted because it chose to do business with Japanese firms and to seek their custom, making it logical that they be required to litigate there, a result which should not expose plaintiff to surprise.”); CCS Int’l, Ltd. v. ECI Telesystems, Ltd., No. 97 Civ. 4646, 1998 WL 512951, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1998) (while “it remains defendants’ burden to overcome the forum choice made by these American-eitizen plaintiffs,” for plaintiffs “who are involved in a decidedly international dispute such as this, their American citizenship and . residence do not constitute the powerful, near-decisive factors for which they contend”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Sussman, 801 F.Supp. at 1073 (‘Where an American plaintiff chooses to invest in a foreign country and then complains of fraudulent acts occurring primarily in that country, the plaintiffs ability to rely upon citizenship as a talisman against forum non con-veniens dismissal is diminished.”). A plaintiffs choice of forum is also “given reduced emphasis where ... the operative facts upon which the litigation is brought bear little material connection to the chosen forum.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1993 WL 227663, at *4",
"parenthetical": "notwithstanding plaintiffs American citizenship and residency, dismissal in favor of Greece is warranted because operative facts on which the litigation was based bore little connection to New York",
"sentence": "See also Zweig, 1993 WL 227663, at *4 (notwithstanding plaintiffs American citizenship and residency, dismissal in favor of Greece is warranted because operative facts on which the litigation was based bore little connection to New York)."
} | 3,693,227 | a |
However, in the Second Circuit, that deference is diminished when "plain tiff is a corporation doing business abroad and can expect to litigate in foreign courts." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1993 WL 227663, at *4",
"parenthetical": "notwithstanding plaintiffs American citizenship and residency, dismissal in favor of Greece is warranted because operative facts on which the litigation was based bore little connection to New York",
"sentence": "See also Zweig, 1993 WL 227663, at *4 (notwithstanding plaintiffs American citizenship and residency, dismissal in favor of Greece is warranted because operative facts on which the litigation was based bore little connection to New York)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "801 F.Supp. 1073, 1073",
"parenthetical": "'Where an American plaintiff chooses to invest in a foreign country and then complains of fraudulent acts occurring primarily in that country, the plaintiffs ability to rely upon citizenship as a talisman against forum non con-veniens dismissal is diminished.\"",
"sentence": "Guidi, 224 F.3d at 147. See Morrison Law Firm v. Clarion Co., Ltd., 158 F.R.D. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (“The private interest of plaintiffs in suing in its [sic] home location is diluted because it chose to do business with Japanese firms and to seek their custom, making it logical that they be required to litigate there, a result which should not expose plaintiff to surprise.”); CCS Int’l, Ltd. v. ECI Telesystems, Ltd., No. 97 Civ. 4646, 1998 WL 512951, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1998) (while “it remains defendants’ burden to overcome the forum choice made by these American-eitizen plaintiffs,” for plaintiffs “who are involved in a decidedly international dispute such as this, their American citizenship and . residence do not constitute the powerful, near-decisive factors for which they contend”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Sussman, 801 F.Supp. at 1073 (‘Where an American plaintiff chooses to invest in a foreign country and then complains of fraudulent acts occurring primarily in that country, the plaintiffs ability to rely upon citizenship as a talisman against forum non con-veniens dismissal is diminished.”). A plaintiffs choice of forum is also “given reduced emphasis where ... the operative facts upon which the litigation is brought bear little material connection to the chosen forum.”"
} | 3,693,227 | b |
The second Pacific Indemnity factor incorporated into the Johnson analysis is the distinction between repairs and capital improvements. Because a delivery system on the whole is routinely subject to modification or expansion, these changes are considered repairs to the ongoing service, and not capital improvements for the property owner. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "469 N.W.2d 519, 519",
"parenthetical": "noting that alleged improvements were designed to meet needs of cooperative distribution system",
"sentence": "See Johnson, 469 N.W.2d at 519 (noting that alleged improvements were designed to meet needs of cooperative distribution system); see also Aquila, 718 N.W.2d at 885 n. 1 (noting that claim in Johnson involved alleged improvements that “were part of a larger distribution system ... installed for the benefit of the power cooperative”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that claim in Johnson involved alleged improvements that \"were part of a larger distribution system ... installed for the benefit of the power cooperative\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, 469 N.W.2d at 519 (noting that alleged improvements were designed to meet needs of cooperative distribution system); see also Aquila, 718 N.W.2d at 885 n. 1 (noting that claim in Johnson involved alleged improvements that “were part of a larger distribution system ... installed for the benefit of the power cooperative”)."
} | 8,210,668 | a |
This approach had been followed in other circuits. In instances of joint occupancy in which the government fails to demonstrate a nexus between the defendant and the contraband, they have concluded that the government's evidence of constructive possession was insufficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "957 F.2d 106, 107-08",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the government's contention that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol underneath his seat when the only evidence of a nexus was an officer's testimony that the defendant dipped his shoulder as the officer approached ",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106, 107-08 (4th Cir.1992) (rejecting the government’s contention that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol underneath his seat when the only evidence of a nexus was an officer’s testimony that the defendant dipped his shoulder as the officer approached ); United States v. Kelso, 942 F.2d 680, 681-82 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting government’s argument, offered in support of a sentencing enhancement, that the defendant passenger constructively possessed a gun discovered behind the driver’s seat because “[although [the defendant] may have had access to the gun, there is no evidence he owned it, or even was aware of its presence”); United States v. Whitfield, 629 F.2d 136, 142-43 (D.C.Cir.1980) (finding evidence sufficient that the defendant driver, who owned the car, constructively possessed pistols under the driver’s and passenger’s seats but holding that the evidence was insufficient as to the defendant passenger); cf. United States v. Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1396 (1st Cir.1992) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol discovered behind the front seats of a van in which he was a passenger when the government presented testimony that the pistol had been taken to the defendant’s residence on the preceding day and that the defendant was in charge of the impeding drug transaction)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "968 F.2d 1393, 1396",
"parenthetical": "concluding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol discovered behind the front seats of a van in which he was a passenger when the government presented testimony that the pistol had been taken to the defendant's residence on the preceding day and that the defendant was in charge of the impeding drug transaction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106, 107-08 (4th Cir.1992) (rejecting the government’s contention that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol underneath his seat when the only evidence of a nexus was an officer’s testimony that the defendant dipped his shoulder as the officer approached ); United States v. Kelso, 942 F.2d 680, 681-82 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting government’s argument, offered in support of a sentencing enhancement, that the defendant passenger constructively possessed a gun discovered behind the driver’s seat because “[although [the defendant] may have had access to the gun, there is no evidence he owned it, or even was aware of its presence”); United States v. Whitfield, 629 F.2d 136, 142-43 (D.C.Cir.1980) (finding evidence sufficient that the defendant driver, who owned the car, constructively possessed pistols under the driver’s and passenger’s seats but holding that the evidence was insufficient as to the defendant passenger); cf. United States v. Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1396 (1st Cir.1992) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol discovered behind the front seats of a van in which he was a passenger when the government presented testimony that the pistol had been taken to the defendant’s residence on the preceding day and that the defendant was in charge of the impeding drug transaction)."
} | 11,170,977 | a |
This approach had been followed in other circuits. In instances of joint occupancy in which the government fails to demonstrate a nexus between the defendant and the contraband, they have concluded that the government's evidence of constructive possession was insufficient. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "968 F.2d 1393, 1396",
"parenthetical": "concluding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol discovered behind the front seats of a van in which he was a passenger when the government presented testimony that the pistol had been taken to the defendant's residence on the preceding day and that the defendant was in charge of the impeding drug transaction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106, 107-08 (4th Cir.1992) (rejecting the government’s contention that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol underneath his seat when the only evidence of a nexus was an officer’s testimony that the defendant dipped his shoulder as the officer approached ); United States v. Kelso, 942 F.2d 680, 681-82 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting government’s argument, offered in support of a sentencing enhancement, that the defendant passenger constructively possessed a gun discovered behind the driver’s seat because “[although [the defendant] may have had access to the gun, there is no evidence he owned it, or even was aware of its presence”); United States v. Whitfield, 629 F.2d 136, 142-43 (D.C.Cir.1980) (finding evidence sufficient that the defendant driver, who owned the car, constructively possessed pistols under the driver’s and passenger’s seats but holding that the evidence was insufficient as to the defendant passenger); cf. United States v. Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1396 (1st Cir.1992) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol discovered behind the front seats of a van in which he was a passenger when the government presented testimony that the pistol had been taken to the defendant’s residence on the preceding day and that the defendant was in charge of the impeding drug transaction)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "942 F.2d 680, 681-82",
"parenthetical": "rejecting government's argument, offered in support of a sentencing enhancement, that the defendant passenger constructively possessed a gun discovered behind the driver's seat because \"[although [the defendant] may have had access to the gun, there is no evidence he owned it, or even was aware of its presence\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106, 107-08 (4th Cir.1992) (rejecting the government’s contention that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol underneath his seat when the only evidence of a nexus was an officer’s testimony that the defendant dipped his shoulder as the officer approached ); United States v. Kelso, 942 F.2d 680, 681-82 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting government’s argument, offered in support of a sentencing enhancement, that the defendant passenger constructively possessed a gun discovered behind the driver’s seat because “[although [the defendant] may have had access to the gun, there is no evidence he owned it, or even was aware of its presence”); United States v. Whitfield, 629 F.2d 136, 142-43 (D.C.Cir.1980) (finding evidence sufficient that the defendant driver, who owned the car, constructively possessed pistols under the driver’s and passenger’s seats but holding that the evidence was insufficient as to the defendant passenger); cf. United States v. Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1396 (1st Cir.1992) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol discovered behind the front seats of a van in which he was a passenger when the government presented testimony that the pistol had been taken to the defendant’s residence on the preceding day and that the defendant was in charge of the impeding drug transaction)."
} | 11,170,977 | b |
This approach had been followed in other circuits. In instances of joint occupancy in which the government fails to demonstrate a nexus between the defendant and the contraband, they have concluded that the government's evidence of constructive possession was insufficient. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "968 F.2d 1393, 1396",
"parenthetical": "concluding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol discovered behind the front seats of a van in which he was a passenger when the government presented testimony that the pistol had been taken to the defendant's residence on the preceding day and that the defendant was in charge of the impeding drug transaction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106, 107-08 (4th Cir.1992) (rejecting the government’s contention that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol underneath his seat when the only evidence of a nexus was an officer’s testimony that the defendant dipped his shoulder as the officer approached ); United States v. Kelso, 942 F.2d 680, 681-82 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting government’s argument, offered in support of a sentencing enhancement, that the defendant passenger constructively possessed a gun discovered behind the driver’s seat because “[although [the defendant] may have had access to the gun, there is no evidence he owned it, or even was aware of its presence”); United States v. Whitfield, 629 F.2d 136, 142-43 (D.C.Cir.1980) (finding evidence sufficient that the defendant driver, who owned the car, constructively possessed pistols under the driver’s and passenger’s seats but holding that the evidence was insufficient as to the defendant passenger); cf. United States v. Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1396 (1st Cir.1992) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol discovered behind the front seats of a van in which he was a passenger when the government presented testimony that the pistol had been taken to the defendant’s residence on the preceding day and that the defendant was in charge of the impeding drug transaction)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "629 F.2d 136, 142-43",
"parenthetical": "finding evidence sufficient that the defendant driver, who owned the car, constructively possessed pistols under the driver's and passenger's seats but holding that the evidence was insufficient as to the defendant passenger",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106, 107-08 (4th Cir.1992) (rejecting the government’s contention that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol underneath his seat when the only evidence of a nexus was an officer’s testimony that the defendant dipped his shoulder as the officer approached ); United States v. Kelso, 942 F.2d 680, 681-82 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting government’s argument, offered in support of a sentencing enhancement, that the defendant passenger constructively possessed a gun discovered behind the driver’s seat because “[although [the defendant] may have had access to the gun, there is no evidence he owned it, or even was aware of its presence”); United States v. Whitfield, 629 F.2d 136, 142-43 (D.C.Cir.1980) (finding evidence sufficient that the defendant driver, who owned the car, constructively possessed pistols under the driver’s and passenger’s seats but holding that the evidence was insufficient as to the defendant passenger); cf. United States v. Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1396 (1st Cir.1992) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol discovered behind the front seats of a van in which he was a passenger when the government presented testimony that the pistol had been taken to the defendant’s residence on the preceding day and that the defendant was in charge of the impeding drug transaction)."
} | 11,170,977 | b |
It was a statutory adoption. More importantly, even if the proceedings had been in equity, that would not have given the trial court authority to require the Tribes to pay the attorney fees. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "110 Idaho 57, 61",
"parenthetical": "in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "141 Idaho 688, 696",
"parenthetical": "provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker's compensation law be simple and \"as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity\" did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | 4,188,996 | a |
It was a statutory adoption. More importantly, even if the proceedings had been in equity, that would not have given the trial court authority to require the Tribes to pay the attorney fees. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "116 P.3d 18, 26",
"parenthetical": "provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker's compensation law be simple and \"as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity\" did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "110 Idaho 57, 61",
"parenthetical": "in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | 4,188,996 | b |
It was a statutory adoption. More importantly, even if the proceedings had been in equity, that would not have given the trial court authority to require the Tribes to pay the attorney fees. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "125 Idaho 789, 791",
"parenthetical": "trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was \"[ajcting as a court of equity,\" because in Idaho \"there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally\"",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "110 Idaho 57, 61",
"parenthetical": "in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | 4,188,996 | b |
It was a statutory adoption. More importantly, even if the proceedings had been in equity, that would not have given the trial court authority to require the Tribes to pay the attorney fees. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "110 Idaho 57, 61",
"parenthetical": "in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 P.2d 600, 602",
"parenthetical": "trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was \"[ajcting as a court of equity,\" because in Idaho \"there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally\"",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | 4,188,996 | a |
It was a statutory adoption. More importantly, even if the proceedings had been in equity, that would not have given the trial court authority to require the Tribes to pay the attorney fees. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "141 Idaho 688, 696",
"parenthetical": "provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker's compensation law be simple and \"as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity\" did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "714 P.2d 26, 80",
"parenthetical": "in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | 4,188,996 | b |
It was a statutory adoption. More importantly, even if the proceedings had been in equity, that would not have given the trial court authority to require the Tribes to pay the attorney fees. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "116 P.3d 18, 26",
"parenthetical": "provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker's compensation law be simple and \"as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity\" did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "714 P.2d 26, 80",
"parenthetical": "in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | 4,188,996 | b |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.