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A similar rule governs aircraft overflights. Where a plaintiff complains only of noise resulting from normal aircraft operations, not passing directly overhead, this court follows the general rules springing from Causby to deny recovery. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "34 S.Ct. 657, 657",
"parenthetical": "absent physical invasion of the property, there can be no recovery for \"noises and vibrations incident to the running of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and sparks from the locomotives, and similar annoyances inseparable from the normal and non-negligent operation of a railroad\"",
"sentence": "See Avery v. United States, 165 Ct.Cl. 357, 330 F.2d 640, 645 (1964); see also Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir.1962) (holding that where aircraft operations did not physically invade the landowner’s estate, incidental smoke, vibrations and noise were not compensable takings); cf. Richards, 233 U.S. at 554, 34 S.Ct. at 657 (absent physical invasion of the property, there can be no recovery for “noises and vibrations incident to the running of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and sparks from the locomotives, and similar annoyances inseparable from the normal and non-negligent operation of a railroad”). However, where, as here, plaintiffs complain of a peculiarly burdensome pattern of activity, including both intrusive and non-intrusive flights, that significantly impairs their use and enjoyment of their land, those plaintiffs may state a cause of action. Cf. Griggs, 369 U.S. at 87, 82 S.Ct. at 532 (affirming that taking occurred even though some of the activities of which the plaintiff complained were near, but not over, the plaintiffs property); Richards, 233 U.S. at 557, 34 S.Ct. at 658 (“Construing the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, they do not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial a burden upon plaintiffs property without compensation to him.”); Branning, 654 F.2d at 90 (finding that the United States took private land without violating the landowner’s airspace because its overflights were “peculiarly burdensome” to the landowner)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "306 F.2d 580, 585",
"parenthetical": "holding that where aircraft operations did not physically invade the landowner's estate, incidental smoke, vibrations and noise were not compensable takings",
"sentence": "See Avery v. United States, 165 Ct.Cl. 357, 330 F.2d 640, 645 (1964); see also Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir.1962) (holding that where aircraft operations did not physically invade the landowner’s estate, incidental smoke, vibrations and noise were not compensable takings); cf. Richards, 233 U.S. at 554, 34 S.Ct. at 657 (absent physical invasion of the property, there can be no recovery for “noises and vibrations incident to the running of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and sparks from the locomotives, and similar annoyances inseparable from the normal and non-negligent operation of a railroad”). However, where, as here, plaintiffs complain of a peculiarly burdensome pattern of activity, including both intrusive and non-intrusive flights, that significantly impairs their use and enjoyment of their land, those plaintiffs may state a cause of action. Cf. Griggs, 369 U.S. at 87, 82 S.Ct. at 532 (affirming that taking occurred even though some of the activities of which the plaintiff complained were near, but not over, the plaintiffs property); Richards, 233 U.S. at 557, 34 S.Ct. at 658 (“Construing the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, they do not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial a burden upon plaintiffs property without compensation to him.”); Branning, 654 F.2d at 90 (finding that the United States took private land without violating the landowner’s airspace because its overflights were “peculiarly burdensome” to the landowner)."
} | 969,450 | b |
A similar rule governs aircraft overflights. Where a plaintiff complains only of noise resulting from normal aircraft operations, not passing directly overhead, this court follows the general rules springing from Causby to deny recovery. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "82 S.Ct. 532, 532",
"parenthetical": "affirming that taking occurred even though some of the activities of which the plaintiff complained were near, but not over, the plaintiffs property",
"sentence": "See Avery v. United States, 165 Ct.Cl. 357, 330 F.2d 640, 645 (1964); see also Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir.1962) (holding that where aircraft operations did not physically invade the landowner’s estate, incidental smoke, vibrations and noise were not compensable takings); cf. Richards, 233 U.S. at 554, 34 S.Ct. at 657 (absent physical invasion of the property, there can be no recovery for “noises and vibrations incident to the running of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and sparks from the locomotives, and similar annoyances inseparable from the normal and non-negligent operation of a railroad”). However, where, as here, plaintiffs complain of a peculiarly burdensome pattern of activity, including both intrusive and non-intrusive flights, that significantly impairs their use and enjoyment of their land, those plaintiffs may state a cause of action. Cf. Griggs, 369 U.S. at 87, 82 S.Ct. at 532 (affirming that taking occurred even though some of the activities of which the plaintiff complained were near, but not over, the plaintiffs property); Richards, 233 U.S. at 557, 34 S.Ct. at 658 (“Construing the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, they do not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial a burden upon plaintiffs property without compensation to him.”); Branning, 654 F.2d at 90 (finding that the United States took private land without violating the landowner’s airspace because its overflights were “peculiarly burdensome” to the landowner)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "306 F.2d 580, 585",
"parenthetical": "holding that where aircraft operations did not physically invade the landowner's estate, incidental smoke, vibrations and noise were not compensable takings",
"sentence": "See Avery v. United States, 165 Ct.Cl. 357, 330 F.2d 640, 645 (1964); see also Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir.1962) (holding that where aircraft operations did not physically invade the landowner’s estate, incidental smoke, vibrations and noise were not compensable takings); cf. Richards, 233 U.S. at 554, 34 S.Ct. at 657 (absent physical invasion of the property, there can be no recovery for “noises and vibrations incident to the running of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and sparks from the locomotives, and similar annoyances inseparable from the normal and non-negligent operation of a railroad”). However, where, as here, plaintiffs complain of a peculiarly burdensome pattern of activity, including both intrusive and non-intrusive flights, that significantly impairs their use and enjoyment of their land, those plaintiffs may state a cause of action. Cf. Griggs, 369 U.S. at 87, 82 S.Ct. at 532 (affirming that taking occurred even though some of the activities of which the plaintiff complained were near, but not over, the plaintiffs property); Richards, 233 U.S. at 557, 34 S.Ct. at 658 (“Construing the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, they do not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial a burden upon plaintiffs property without compensation to him.”); Branning, 654 F.2d at 90 (finding that the United States took private land without violating the landowner’s airspace because its overflights were “peculiarly burdensome” to the landowner)."
} | 969,450 | b |
A similar rule governs aircraft overflights. Where a plaintiff complains only of noise resulting from normal aircraft operations, not passing directly overhead, this court follows the general rules springing from Causby to deny recovery. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "306 F.2d 580, 585",
"parenthetical": "holding that where aircraft operations did not physically invade the landowner's estate, incidental smoke, vibrations and noise were not compensable takings",
"sentence": "See Avery v. United States, 165 Ct.Cl. 357, 330 F.2d 640, 645 (1964); see also Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir.1962) (holding that where aircraft operations did not physically invade the landowner’s estate, incidental smoke, vibrations and noise were not compensable takings); cf. Richards, 233 U.S. at 554, 34 S.Ct. at 657 (absent physical invasion of the property, there can be no recovery for “noises and vibrations incident to the running of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and sparks from the locomotives, and similar annoyances inseparable from the normal and non-negligent operation of a railroad”). However, where, as here, plaintiffs complain of a peculiarly burdensome pattern of activity, including both intrusive and non-intrusive flights, that significantly impairs their use and enjoyment of their land, those plaintiffs may state a cause of action. Cf. Griggs, 369 U.S. at 87, 82 S.Ct. at 532 (affirming that taking occurred even though some of the activities of which the plaintiff complained were near, but not over, the plaintiffs property); Richards, 233 U.S. at 557, 34 S.Ct. at 658 (“Construing the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, they do not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial a burden upon plaintiffs property without compensation to him.”); Branning, 654 F.2d at 90 (finding that the United States took private land without violating the landowner’s airspace because its overflights were “peculiarly burdensome” to the landowner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "233 U.S. 557, 557",
"parenthetical": "\"Construing the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, they do not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial a burden upon plaintiffs property without compensation to him.\"",
"sentence": "See Avery v. United States, 165 Ct.Cl. 357, 330 F.2d 640, 645 (1964); see also Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir.1962) (holding that where aircraft operations did not physically invade the landowner’s estate, incidental smoke, vibrations and noise were not compensable takings); cf. Richards, 233 U.S. at 554, 34 S.Ct. at 657 (absent physical invasion of the property, there can be no recovery for “noises and vibrations incident to the running of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and sparks from the locomotives, and similar annoyances inseparable from the normal and non-negligent operation of a railroad”). However, where, as here, plaintiffs complain of a peculiarly burdensome pattern of activity, including both intrusive and non-intrusive flights, that significantly impairs their use and enjoyment of their land, those plaintiffs may state a cause of action. Cf. Griggs, 369 U.S. at 87, 82 S.Ct. at 532 (affirming that taking occurred even though some of the activities of which the plaintiff complained were near, but not over, the plaintiffs property); Richards, 233 U.S. at 557, 34 S.Ct. at 658 (“Construing the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, they do not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial a burden upon plaintiffs property without compensation to him.”); Branning, 654 F.2d at 90 (finding that the United States took private land without violating the landowner’s airspace because its overflights were “peculiarly burdensome” to the landowner)."
} | 969,450 | a |
A similar rule governs aircraft overflights. Where a plaintiff complains only of noise resulting from normal aircraft operations, not passing directly overhead, this court follows the general rules springing from Causby to deny recovery. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "306 F.2d 580, 585",
"parenthetical": "holding that where aircraft operations did not physically invade the landowner's estate, incidental smoke, vibrations and noise were not compensable takings",
"sentence": "See Avery v. United States, 165 Ct.Cl. 357, 330 F.2d 640, 645 (1964); see also Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir.1962) (holding that where aircraft operations did not physically invade the landowner’s estate, incidental smoke, vibrations and noise were not compensable takings); cf. Richards, 233 U.S. at 554, 34 S.Ct. at 657 (absent physical invasion of the property, there can be no recovery for “noises and vibrations incident to the running of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and sparks from the locomotives, and similar annoyances inseparable from the normal and non-negligent operation of a railroad”). However, where, as here, plaintiffs complain of a peculiarly burdensome pattern of activity, including both intrusive and non-intrusive flights, that significantly impairs their use and enjoyment of their land, those plaintiffs may state a cause of action. Cf. Griggs, 369 U.S. at 87, 82 S.Ct. at 532 (affirming that taking occurred even though some of the activities of which the plaintiff complained were near, but not over, the plaintiffs property); Richards, 233 U.S. at 557, 34 S.Ct. at 658 (“Construing the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, they do not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial a burden upon plaintiffs property without compensation to him.”); Branning, 654 F.2d at 90 (finding that the United States took private land without violating the landowner’s airspace because its overflights were “peculiarly burdensome” to the landowner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "34 S.Ct. 658, 658",
"parenthetical": "\"Construing the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, they do not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial a burden upon plaintiffs property without compensation to him.\"",
"sentence": "See Avery v. United States, 165 Ct.Cl. 357, 330 F.2d 640, 645 (1964); see also Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir.1962) (holding that where aircraft operations did not physically invade the landowner’s estate, incidental smoke, vibrations and noise were not compensable takings); cf. Richards, 233 U.S. at 554, 34 S.Ct. at 657 (absent physical invasion of the property, there can be no recovery for “noises and vibrations incident to the running of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and sparks from the locomotives, and similar annoyances inseparable from the normal and non-negligent operation of a railroad”). However, where, as here, plaintiffs complain of a peculiarly burdensome pattern of activity, including both intrusive and non-intrusive flights, that significantly impairs their use and enjoyment of their land, those plaintiffs may state a cause of action. Cf. Griggs, 369 U.S. at 87, 82 S.Ct. at 532 (affirming that taking occurred even though some of the activities of which the plaintiff complained were near, but not over, the plaintiffs property); Richards, 233 U.S. at 557, 34 S.Ct. at 658 (“Construing the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, they do not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial a burden upon plaintiffs property without compensation to him.”); Branning, 654 F.2d at 90 (finding that the United States took private land without violating the landowner’s airspace because its overflights were “peculiarly burdensome” to the landowner)."
} | 969,450 | a |
A similar rule governs aircraft overflights. Where a plaintiff complains only of noise resulting from normal aircraft operations, not passing directly overhead, this court follows the general rules springing from Causby to deny recovery. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "654 F.2d 90, 90",
"parenthetical": "finding that the United States took private land without violating the landowner's airspace because its overflights were \"peculiarly burdensome\" to the landowner",
"sentence": "See Avery v. United States, 165 Ct.Cl. 357, 330 F.2d 640, 645 (1964); see also Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir.1962) (holding that where aircraft operations did not physically invade the landowner’s estate, incidental smoke, vibrations and noise were not compensable takings); cf. Richards, 233 U.S. at 554, 34 S.Ct. at 657 (absent physical invasion of the property, there can be no recovery for “noises and vibrations incident to the running of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and sparks from the locomotives, and similar annoyances inseparable from the normal and non-negligent operation of a railroad”). However, where, as here, plaintiffs complain of a peculiarly burdensome pattern of activity, including both intrusive and non-intrusive flights, that significantly impairs their use and enjoyment of their land, those plaintiffs may state a cause of action. Cf. Griggs, 369 U.S. at 87, 82 S.Ct. at 532 (affirming that taking occurred even though some of the activities of which the plaintiff complained were near, but not over, the plaintiffs property); Richards, 233 U.S. at 557, 34 S.Ct. at 658 (“Construing the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, they do not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial a burden upon plaintiffs property without compensation to him.”); Branning, 654 F.2d at 90 (finding that the United States took private land without violating the landowner’s airspace because its overflights were “peculiarly burdensome” to the landowner)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "306 F.2d 580, 585",
"parenthetical": "holding that where aircraft operations did not physically invade the landowner's estate, incidental smoke, vibrations and noise were not compensable takings",
"sentence": "See Avery v. United States, 165 Ct.Cl. 357, 330 F.2d 640, 645 (1964); see also Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir.1962) (holding that where aircraft operations did not physically invade the landowner’s estate, incidental smoke, vibrations and noise were not compensable takings); cf. Richards, 233 U.S. at 554, 34 S.Ct. at 657 (absent physical invasion of the property, there can be no recovery for “noises and vibrations incident to the running of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and sparks from the locomotives, and similar annoyances inseparable from the normal and non-negligent operation of a railroad”). However, where, as here, plaintiffs complain of a peculiarly burdensome pattern of activity, including both intrusive and non-intrusive flights, that significantly impairs their use and enjoyment of their land, those plaintiffs may state a cause of action. Cf. Griggs, 369 U.S. at 87, 82 S.Ct. at 532 (affirming that taking occurred even though some of the activities of which the plaintiff complained were near, but not over, the plaintiffs property); Richards, 233 U.S. at 557, 34 S.Ct. at 658 (“Construing the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, they do not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial a burden upon plaintiffs property without compensation to him.”); Branning, 654 F.2d at 90 (finding that the United States took private land without violating the landowner’s airspace because its overflights were “peculiarly burdensome” to the landowner)."
} | 969,450 | b |
The court finds that interpreting N.J.S.A. 54:3-27 as advocated by Randolph, would ran contrary to the well established principle that local property taxes are liens against property, and not a personal obligation of the taxpayer. It would also appear to give municipalities a new judicially crafted means of collecting delinquencies outside of the avenues already authorized by the Legislature. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1 N.J.Tax 574, 574",
"parenthetical": "\"These statutory methods of collection of delinquent taxes evidence the legislative determination that real estate taxes are liens or levies on land and are not the personal obligation of the owner of the land.\"",
"sentence": "See Newark, supra, 150 N.J.Super. at 21, 374 A.2d 504 (“Since Newark has concededly not begun to avail itself of the statutory means to enforce collection, much less exhausted them, we are of the view that the trial judge erred in expanding the manner in which real estate taxes could be collected.”); see also Garden State Racing Ass’n, supra, 1 N.J.Tax at 574 (“These statutory methods of collection of delinquent taxes evidence the legislative determination that real estate taxes are liens or levies on land and are not the personal obligation of the owner of the land.”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "150 N.J.Super. 21, 21",
"parenthetical": "\"Since Newark has concededly not begun to avail itself of the statutory means to enforce collection, much less exhausted them, we are of the view that the trial judge erred in expanding the manner in which real estate taxes could be collected.\"",
"sentence": "See Newark, supra, 150 N.J.Super. at 21, 374 A.2d 504 (“Since Newark has concededly not begun to avail itself of the statutory means to enforce collection, much less exhausted them, we are of the view that the trial judge erred in expanding the manner in which real estate taxes could be collected.”); see also Garden State Racing Ass’n, supra, 1 N.J.Tax at 574 (“These statutory methods of collection of delinquent taxes evidence the legislative determination that real estate taxes are liens or levies on land and are not the personal obligation of the owner of the land.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 4,305,122 | b |
The court finds that interpreting N.J.S.A. 54:3-27 as advocated by Randolph, would ran contrary to the well established principle that local property taxes are liens against property, and not a personal obligation of the taxpayer. It would also appear to give municipalities a new judicially crafted means of collecting delinquencies outside of the avenues already authorized by the Legislature. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Since Newark has concededly not begun to avail itself of the statutory means to enforce collection, much less exhausted them, we are of the view that the trial judge erred in expanding the manner in which real estate taxes could be collected.\"",
"sentence": "See Newark, supra, 150 N.J.Super. at 21, 374 A.2d 504 (“Since Newark has concededly not begun to avail itself of the statutory means to enforce collection, much less exhausted them, we are of the view that the trial judge erred in expanding the manner in which real estate taxes could be collected.”); see also Garden State Racing Ass’n, supra, 1 N.J.Tax at 574 (“These statutory methods of collection of delinquent taxes evidence the legislative determination that real estate taxes are liens or levies on land and are not the personal obligation of the owner of the land.”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1 N.J.Tax 574, 574",
"parenthetical": "\"These statutory methods of collection of delinquent taxes evidence the legislative determination that real estate taxes are liens or levies on land and are not the personal obligation of the owner of the land.\"",
"sentence": "See Newark, supra, 150 N.J.Super. at 21, 374 A.2d 504 (“Since Newark has concededly not begun to avail itself of the statutory means to enforce collection, much less exhausted them, we are of the view that the trial judge erred in expanding the manner in which real estate taxes could be collected.”); see also Garden State Racing Ass’n, supra, 1 N.J.Tax at 574 (“These statutory methods of collection of delinquent taxes evidence the legislative determination that real estate taxes are liens or levies on land and are not the personal obligation of the owner of the land.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 4,305,122 | a |
Kedei filled out his asylum application himself, he checked that he is fluent in English and later testified in English, and the differences between his application and oral testimony go to the heart of his claim. Accordingly, we hold that the IJ's adverse credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "904 F.2d 519, 520",
"parenthetical": "holding that substantial evidence supported an adverse credibility finding where, inter alia, the petitioners claimed guerrilla persecution on their asylum applications but later claimed government persecution",
"sentence": "See Valderrama v. INS, 260 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (holding that substantial evidence supported an adverse credibility finding where the petitioner’s two asylum applications differed significantly regarding past persecution); see also Ceballos-Castillo v. INS, 904 F.2d 519, 520 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that substantial evidence supported an adverse credibility finding where, inter alia, the petitioners claimed guerrilla persecution on their asylum applications but later claimed government persecution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "260 F.3d 1083, 1085",
"parenthetical": "holding that substantial evidence supported an adverse credibility finding where the petitioner's two asylum applications differed significantly regarding past persecution",
"sentence": "See Valderrama v. INS, 260 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (holding that substantial evidence supported an adverse credibility finding where the petitioner’s two asylum applications differed significantly regarding past persecution); see also Ceballos-Castillo v. INS, 904 F.2d 519, 520 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that substantial evidence supported an adverse credibility finding where, inter alia, the petitioners claimed guerrilla persecution on their asylum applications but later claimed government persecution)."
} | 2,177,590 | b |
P 12. Our past decisions do not distinguish voluntary conveyances of tenancy by entirety property from involuntary attachments. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 A.2d 398, 400",
"parenthetical": "\"[H]usband and wife are seized, not merely of equal interests, but of the whole estate during their lives and the interest of neither of them can be sold, attached or liened except by the joint act of both husband and wife.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Corey v. McLean, 100 Vt. 90, 91, 135 A. 10, 11 (1926) (holding that marital property “was not attachable for the [sole] debts of the husband” because it was held in tenancy by entirety). Furthermore, despite RBS’s contention that numerous decisions from other jurisdictions support its proposition that tenancy by entirety property may be attached, most jurisdictions recognizing the estate do not allow a creditor of a single debtor to attach property held jointly by the debtor and the nondebtor in a tenancy by entirety. See Brown, supra, § 6:84 (“Most jurisdictions that recognize tenancies by the entirety hold that a creditor of one spouse cannot reach the debtor spouse’s share in the property.”); see also Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 400 (Del. 1978) (“[H]usband and wife are seized, not merely of equal interests, but of the whole estate during their lives and the interest of neither of them can be sold, attached or liened except by the joint act of both husband and wife.”) (quotation omitted); Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2001) (explaining elements of tenancy by entirety); Keen v. Keen, 60 A.2d 200, 204 (Md. 1948) (noting property held as tenancy by entirety could not be “levied upon or attached for the debts of either the husband or the wife.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "100 Vt. 90, 91",
"parenthetical": "holding that marital property \"was not attachable for the [sole] debts of the husband\" because it was held in tenancy by entirety",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Corey v. McLean, 100 Vt. 90, 91, 135 A. 10, 11 (1926) (holding that marital property “was not attachable for the [sole] debts of the husband” because it was held in tenancy by entirety). Furthermore, despite RBS’s contention that numerous decisions from other jurisdictions support its proposition that tenancy by entirety property may be attached, most jurisdictions recognizing the estate do not allow a creditor of a single debtor to attach property held jointly by the debtor and the nondebtor in a tenancy by entirety. See Brown, supra, § 6:84 (“Most jurisdictions that recognize tenancies by the entirety hold that a creditor of one spouse cannot reach the debtor spouse’s share in the property.”); see also Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 400 (Del. 1978) (“[H]usband and wife are seized, not merely of equal interests, but of the whole estate during their lives and the interest of neither of them can be sold, attached or liened except by the joint act of both husband and wife.”) (quotation omitted); Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2001) (explaining elements of tenancy by entirety); Keen v. Keen, 60 A.2d 200, 204 (Md. 1948) (noting property held as tenancy by entirety could not be “levied upon or attached for the debts of either the husband or the wife.”)."
} | 3,700,895 | b |
P 12. Our past decisions do not distinguish voluntary conveyances of tenancy by entirety property from involuntary attachments. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "100 Vt. 90, 91",
"parenthetical": "holding that marital property \"was not attachable for the [sole] debts of the husband\" because it was held in tenancy by entirety",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Corey v. McLean, 100 Vt. 90, 91, 135 A. 10, 11 (1926) (holding that marital property “was not attachable for the [sole] debts of the husband” because it was held in tenancy by entirety). Furthermore, despite RBS’s contention that numerous decisions from other jurisdictions support its proposition that tenancy by entirety property may be attached, most jurisdictions recognizing the estate do not allow a creditor of a single debtor to attach property held jointly by the debtor and the nondebtor in a tenancy by entirety. See Brown, supra, § 6:84 (“Most jurisdictions that recognize tenancies by the entirety hold that a creditor of one spouse cannot reach the debtor spouse’s share in the property.”); see also Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 400 (Del. 1978) (“[H]usband and wife are seized, not merely of equal interests, but of the whole estate during their lives and the interest of neither of them can be sold, attached or liened except by the joint act of both husband and wife.”) (quotation omitted); Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2001) (explaining elements of tenancy by entirety); Keen v. Keen, 60 A.2d 200, 204 (Md. 1948) (noting property held as tenancy by entirety could not be “levied upon or attached for the debts of either the husband or the wife.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "60 A.2d 200, 204",
"parenthetical": "noting property held as tenancy by entirety could not be \"levied upon or attached for the debts of either the husband or the wife.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Corey v. McLean, 100 Vt. 90, 91, 135 A. 10, 11 (1926) (holding that marital property “was not attachable for the [sole] debts of the husband” because it was held in tenancy by entirety). Furthermore, despite RBS’s contention that numerous decisions from other jurisdictions support its proposition that tenancy by entirety property may be attached, most jurisdictions recognizing the estate do not allow a creditor of a single debtor to attach property held jointly by the debtor and the nondebtor in a tenancy by entirety. See Brown, supra, § 6:84 (“Most jurisdictions that recognize tenancies by the entirety hold that a creditor of one spouse cannot reach the debtor spouse’s share in the property.”); see also Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 400 (Del. 1978) (“[H]usband and wife are seized, not merely of equal interests, but of the whole estate during their lives and the interest of neither of them can be sold, attached or liened except by the joint act of both husband and wife.”) (quotation omitted); Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2001) (explaining elements of tenancy by entirety); Keen v. Keen, 60 A.2d 200, 204 (Md. 1948) (noting property held as tenancy by entirety could not be “levied upon or attached for the debts of either the husband or the wife.”)."
} | 3,700,895 | a |
P 12. Our past decisions do not distinguish voluntary conveyances of tenancy by entirety property from involuntary attachments. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "135 A. 10, 11",
"parenthetical": "holding that marital property \"was not attachable for the [sole] debts of the husband\" because it was held in tenancy by entirety",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Corey v. McLean, 100 Vt. 90, 91, 135 A. 10, 11 (1926) (holding that marital property “was not attachable for the [sole] debts of the husband” because it was held in tenancy by entirety). Furthermore, despite RBS’s contention that numerous decisions from other jurisdictions support its proposition that tenancy by entirety property may be attached, most jurisdictions recognizing the estate do not allow a creditor of a single debtor to attach property held jointly by the debtor and the nondebtor in a tenancy by entirety. See Brown, supra, § 6:84 (“Most jurisdictions that recognize tenancies by the entirety hold that a creditor of one spouse cannot reach the debtor spouse’s share in the property.”); see also Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 400 (Del. 1978) (“[H]usband and wife are seized, not merely of equal interests, but of the whole estate during their lives and the interest of neither of them can be sold, attached or liened except by the joint act of both husband and wife.”) (quotation omitted); Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2001) (explaining elements of tenancy by entirety); Keen v. Keen, 60 A.2d 200, 204 (Md. 1948) (noting property held as tenancy by entirety could not be “levied upon or attached for the debts of either the husband or the wife.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 A.2d 398, 400",
"parenthetical": "\"[H]usband and wife are seized, not merely of equal interests, but of the whole estate during their lives and the interest of neither of them can be sold, attached or liened except by the joint act of both husband and wife.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Corey v. McLean, 100 Vt. 90, 91, 135 A. 10, 11 (1926) (holding that marital property “was not attachable for the [sole] debts of the husband” because it was held in tenancy by entirety). Furthermore, despite RBS’s contention that numerous decisions from other jurisdictions support its proposition that tenancy by entirety property may be attached, most jurisdictions recognizing the estate do not allow a creditor of a single debtor to attach property held jointly by the debtor and the nondebtor in a tenancy by entirety. See Brown, supra, § 6:84 (“Most jurisdictions that recognize tenancies by the entirety hold that a creditor of one spouse cannot reach the debtor spouse’s share in the property.”); see also Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 400 (Del. 1978) (“[H]usband and wife are seized, not merely of equal interests, but of the whole estate during their lives and the interest of neither of them can be sold, attached or liened except by the joint act of both husband and wife.”) (quotation omitted); Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2001) (explaining elements of tenancy by entirety); Keen v. Keen, 60 A.2d 200, 204 (Md. 1948) (noting property held as tenancy by entirety could not be “levied upon or attached for the debts of either the husband or the wife.”)."
} | 3,700,895 | a |
P 12. Our past decisions do not distinguish voluntary conveyances of tenancy by entirety property from involuntary attachments. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "135 A. 10, 11",
"parenthetical": "holding that marital property \"was not attachable for the [sole] debts of the husband\" because it was held in tenancy by entirety",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Corey v. McLean, 100 Vt. 90, 91, 135 A. 10, 11 (1926) (holding that marital property “was not attachable for the [sole] debts of the husband” because it was held in tenancy by entirety). Furthermore, despite RBS’s contention that numerous decisions from other jurisdictions support its proposition that tenancy by entirety property may be attached, most jurisdictions recognizing the estate do not allow a creditor of a single debtor to attach property held jointly by the debtor and the nondebtor in a tenancy by entirety. See Brown, supra, § 6:84 (“Most jurisdictions that recognize tenancies by the entirety hold that a creditor of one spouse cannot reach the debtor spouse’s share in the property.”); see also Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 400 (Del. 1978) (“[H]usband and wife are seized, not merely of equal interests, but of the whole estate during their lives and the interest of neither of them can be sold, attached or liened except by the joint act of both husband and wife.”) (quotation omitted); Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2001) (explaining elements of tenancy by entirety); Keen v. Keen, 60 A.2d 200, 204 (Md. 1948) (noting property held as tenancy by entirety could not be “levied upon or attached for the debts of either the husband or the wife.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "60 A.2d 200, 204",
"parenthetical": "noting property held as tenancy by entirety could not be \"levied upon or attached for the debts of either the husband or the wife.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Corey v. McLean, 100 Vt. 90, 91, 135 A. 10, 11 (1926) (holding that marital property “was not attachable for the [sole] debts of the husband” because it was held in tenancy by entirety). Furthermore, despite RBS’s contention that numerous decisions from other jurisdictions support its proposition that tenancy by entirety property may be attached, most jurisdictions recognizing the estate do not allow a creditor of a single debtor to attach property held jointly by the debtor and the nondebtor in a tenancy by entirety. See Brown, supra, § 6:84 (“Most jurisdictions that recognize tenancies by the entirety hold that a creditor of one spouse cannot reach the debtor spouse’s share in the property.”); see also Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 400 (Del. 1978) (“[H]usband and wife are seized, not merely of equal interests, but of the whole estate during their lives and the interest of neither of them can be sold, attached or liened except by the joint act of both husband and wife.”) (quotation omitted); Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2001) (explaining elements of tenancy by entirety); Keen v. Keen, 60 A.2d 200, 204 (Md. 1948) (noting property held as tenancy by entirety could not be “levied upon or attached for the debts of either the husband or the wife.”)."
} | 3,700,895 | a |
Healthy defense in the course of the liability phase." Pls.' Mot. at 7. As the preceding discussion indicates, there is strong legal support for this argument; a harmless-error contention has been deemed an affirmative defense to liability for damages. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 246, 246",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he employer's burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "594 F.2d 816, 816",
"parenthetical": "\"the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | 50,096 | b |
Healthy defense in the course of the liability phase." Pls.' Mot. at 7. As the preceding discussion indicates, there is strong legal support for this argument; a harmless-error contention has been deemed an affirmative defense to liability for damages. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he employer's burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "594 F.2d 816, 816",
"parenthetical": "\"the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | 50,096 | b |
Healthy defense in the course of the liability phase." Pls.' Mot. at 7. As the preceding discussion indicates, there is strong legal support for this argument; a harmless-error contention has been deemed an affirmative defense to liability for damages. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "528 U.S. 20, 20-21",
"parenthetical": "\"even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "594 F.2d 816, 816",
"parenthetical": "\"the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | 50,096 | b |
Healthy defense in the course of the liability phase." Pls.' Mot. at 7. As the preceding discussion indicates, there is strong legal support for this argument; a harmless-error contention has been deemed an affirmative defense to liability for damages. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "594 F.2d 816, 816",
"parenthetical": "\"the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | 50,096 | b |
Healthy defense in the course of the liability phase." Pls.' Mot. at 7. As the preceding discussion indicates, there is strong legal support for this argument; a harmless-error contention has been deemed an affirmative defense to liability for damages. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 246, 246",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he employer's burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "678 F.2d 175, 175",
"parenthetical": "\"the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | 50,096 | b |
Healthy defense in the course of the liability phase." Pls.' Mot. at 7. As the preceding discussion indicates, there is strong legal support for this argument; a harmless-error contention has been deemed an affirmative defense to liability for damages. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he employer's burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "678 F.2d 175, 175",
"parenthetical": "\"the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | 50,096 | b |
Healthy defense in the course of the liability phase." Pls.' Mot. at 7. As the preceding discussion indicates, there is strong legal support for this argument; a harmless-error contention has been deemed an affirmative defense to liability for damages. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "528 U.S. 20, 20-21",
"parenthetical": "\"even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "678 F.2d 175, 175",
"parenthetical": "\"the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | 50,096 | b |
Healthy defense in the course of the liability phase." Pls.' Mot. at 7. As the preceding discussion indicates, there is strong legal support for this argument; a harmless-error contention has been deemed an affirmative defense to liability for damages. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "678 F.2d 175, 175",
"parenthetical": "\"the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sanders, 594 F.2d at 816 (“the ultimate burden should be on the party whose eiTor and obfuscation of the evidence caused the problem”); Engels, 678 F.2d at 175 (“the end-burden of persuasion falls to the government to show harmlessness”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the fact finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.”); Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20-21, 120 S.Ct. 467 (“even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration” (emphasis added))."
} | 50,096 | b |
A government need not produce all evidence necessary to ensure a conviction in order to obtain extradition. Thus, while Respondent identifies arguments that may help him at trial, he does not undermine the evidence establishing probable cause to believe that he is the person who killed the victim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "180 Fed.Appx. 522, 522",
"parenthetical": "upholding district court's finding of probable cause even though there was no eyewitness identifying respondent as the shooter, but there was circumstantial evidence including that respondent had \"quarreled with the victim and brandished a gun at him a few hours prior to the shooting\" and that respondent was in Reynosa, Tamaulipas, Mexico the night of the murder",
"sentence": "Salazar, 2010 WL 2925444, at *11 (stating that the Mexican government’s failure to interview potential witnesses or to provide the Court with all witness statements did not undermine the evidence establishing probable cause); see also Garza, 180 Fed.Appx. at 522 (upholding district court’s finding of probable cause even though there was no eyewitness identifying respondent as the shooter, but there was circumstantial evidence including that respondent had “quarreled with the victim and brandished a gun at him a few hours prior to the shooting” and that respondent was in Reynosa, Tamaulipas, Mexico the night of the murder)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2010 WL 2925444, at *11",
"parenthetical": "stating that the Mexican government's failure to interview potential witnesses or to provide the Court with all witness statements did not undermine the evidence establishing probable cause",
"sentence": "Salazar, 2010 WL 2925444, at *11 (stating that the Mexican government’s failure to interview potential witnesses or to provide the Court with all witness statements did not undermine the evidence establishing probable cause); see also Garza, 180 Fed.Appx. at 522 (upholding district court’s finding of probable cause even though there was no eyewitness identifying respondent as the shooter, but there was circumstantial evidence including that respondent had “quarreled with the victim and brandished a gun at him a few hours prior to the shooting” and that respondent was in Reynosa, Tamaulipas, Mexico the night of the murder)."
} | 3,970,558 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on McAfee's Eighth Amendment claim because McAfee failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Hill acted with deliberate indifference to McAfee's safety before the riot erupted in the dining hall, or as to whether Hill acted "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm" after he recognized that tensions were building and called for reinforcements. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 294, 297-98",
"parenthetical": "inmate must establish that prison officials \"possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind\" to implicate the Eighth Amendment",
"sentence": "Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 733-34 (9th Cir.2000) (the state-of-mind requirement for an Eighth Amendment claim “varies with the circumstances of the claim”); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (inmate must establish that prison officials “possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind” to implicate the Eighth Amendment)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 726, 733-34",
"parenthetical": "the state-of-mind requirement for an Eighth Amendment claim \"varies with the circumstances of the claim\"",
"sentence": "Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 733-34 (9th Cir.2000) (the state-of-mind requirement for an Eighth Amendment claim “varies with the circumstances of the claim”); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (inmate must establish that prison officials “possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind” to implicate the Eighth Amendment)."
} | 3,988,690 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on McAfee's Eighth Amendment claim because McAfee failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Hill acted with deliberate indifference to McAfee's safety before the riot erupted in the dining hall, or as to whether Hill acted "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm" after he recognized that tensions were building and called for reinforcements. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 726, 733-34",
"parenthetical": "the state-of-mind requirement for an Eighth Amendment claim \"varies with the circumstances of the claim\"",
"sentence": "Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 733-34 (9th Cir.2000) (the state-of-mind requirement for an Eighth Amendment claim “varies with the circumstances of the claim”); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (inmate must establish that prison officials “possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind” to implicate the Eighth Amendment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "inmate must establish that prison officials \"possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind\" to implicate the Eighth Amendment",
"sentence": "Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 733-34 (9th Cir.2000) (the state-of-mind requirement for an Eighth Amendment claim “varies with the circumstances of the claim”); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (inmate must establish that prison officials “possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind” to implicate the Eighth Amendment)."
} | 3,988,690 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on McAfee's Eighth Amendment claim because McAfee failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Hill acted with deliberate indifference to McAfee's safety before the riot erupted in the dining hall, or as to whether Hill acted "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm" after he recognized that tensions were building and called for reinforcements. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 726, 733-34",
"parenthetical": "the state-of-mind requirement for an Eighth Amendment claim \"varies with the circumstances of the claim\"",
"sentence": "Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 733-34 (9th Cir.2000) (the state-of-mind requirement for an Eighth Amendment claim “varies with the circumstances of the claim”); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (inmate must establish that prison officials “possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind” to implicate the Eighth Amendment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "inmate must establish that prison officials \"possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind\" to implicate the Eighth Amendment",
"sentence": "Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 733-34 (9th Cir.2000) (the state-of-mind requirement for an Eighth Amendment claim “varies with the circumstances of the claim”); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (inmate must establish that prison officials “possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind” to implicate the Eighth Amendment)."
} | 3,988,690 | a |
The sanction for making an intentional or knowing misrepresentation to a tribunal is a one-year suspension. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "427 Mass. 186, 191-192",
"parenthetical": "attorney emotionally traumatized by breakup of marriage suspended for three months for outrageous treatment of wife and contemptuous disregard of court orders entered in divorce action",
"sentence": "Contrast Matter of Ring, 427 Mass. 186, 191-192 (1998) (attorney emotionally traumatized by breakup of marriage suspended for three months for outrageous treatment of wife and contemptuous disregard of court orders entered in divorce action)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "416 Mass. 423, 431-432",
"parenthetical": "attorney elicited false testimony and offered false documents in proceeding before rent control board",
"sentence": "See Matter of McCarthy, 416 Mass. 423, 431-432 (1993) (attorney elicited false testimony and offered false documents in proceeding before rent control board); Matter of Neitlich, 413 Mass. 416, 421-423 (1992) (attorney perpetrated fraud on Probate and Family Court and opposing counsel by actively misrepresenting terms of client’s pending real estate transaction); Matter of Giuliotti, 10 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 133, 136-139 (1994) (attorney signed expert’s name to affidavit and filed it with court offering opinion that expert had not rendered)."
} | 3,658,351 | b |
The sanction for making an intentional or knowing misrepresentation to a tribunal is a one-year suspension. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 Mass. 416, 421-423",
"parenthetical": "attorney perpetrated fraud on Probate and Family Court and opposing counsel by actively misrepresenting terms of client's pending real estate transaction",
"sentence": "See Matter of McCarthy, 416 Mass. 423, 431-432 (1993) (attorney elicited false testimony and offered false documents in proceeding before rent control board); Matter of Neitlich, 413 Mass. 416, 421-423 (1992) (attorney perpetrated fraud on Probate and Family Court and opposing counsel by actively misrepresenting terms of client’s pending real estate transaction); Matter of Giuliotti, 10 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 133, 136-139 (1994) (attorney signed expert’s name to affidavit and filed it with court offering opinion that expert had not rendered)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "427 Mass. 186, 191-192",
"parenthetical": "attorney emotionally traumatized by breakup of marriage suspended for three months for outrageous treatment of wife and contemptuous disregard of court orders entered in divorce action",
"sentence": "Contrast Matter of Ring, 427 Mass. 186, 191-192 (1998) (attorney emotionally traumatized by breakup of marriage suspended for three months for outrageous treatment of wife and contemptuous disregard of court orders entered in divorce action)."
} | 3,658,351 | a |
Therefore, it was not timely and prison officials returned it as such. Id. at 10. Plaintiff does not allege that his injuries prevented him from timely filing a grievance, nor could he make such a claim as he did timely file Grievance No. 2008040298. Similarly, the fact that he did not know the individual defendants' names did not prevent him from filing the untimely grievance, and he was able to set forth his claims without that information. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "212 F.3d 1205, 1207-10",
"parenthetical": "defendants need not be named in administrative grievance provided inmate provides officials with all relevant available information",
"sentence": "See Johnson, 385 F.3d at 517 (defendants’ names unnecessary where grievance provides enough detail to place prison officials on notice as to the specific problem); see also Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207-10 (11th Cir.2000) (defendants need not be named in administrative grievance provided inmate provides officials with all relevant available information)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "385 F.3d 517, 517",
"parenthetical": "defendants' names unnecessary where grievance provides enough detail to place prison officials on notice as to the specific problem",
"sentence": "See Johnson, 385 F.3d at 517 (defendants’ names unnecessary where grievance provides enough detail to place prison officials on notice as to the specific problem); see also Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207-10 (11th Cir.2000) (defendants need not be named in administrative grievance provided inmate provides officials with all relevant available information)."
} | 4,192,415 | b |
Similarly, courts may be more willing to grant equitable tolling in death penalty cases, particularly when the petitioner has been diligent in pursuing his rights. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "381 F.3d 587, 590-91",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the view that a different test applies to capital cases",
"sentence": "But see Johnson v. McBride, 381 F.3d 587, 590-91 (7th Cir.2004) (rejecting the view that a different test applies to capital cases); Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 253-56 (4th Cir.2003) (en bane) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "430 U.S. 349, 357",
"parenthetical": "\"[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir.2001); cf. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (“[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (“[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.”)."
} | 3,842,537 | b |
Similarly, courts may be more willing to grant equitable tolling in death penalty cases, particularly when the petitioner has been diligent in pursuing his rights. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir.2001); cf. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (“[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (“[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "381 F.3d 587, 590-91",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the view that a different test applies to capital cases",
"sentence": "But see Johnson v. McBride, 381 F.3d 587, 590-91 (7th Cir.2004) (rejecting the view that a different test applies to capital cases); Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 253-56 (4th Cir.2003) (en bane) (same)."
} | 3,842,537 | a |
Similarly, courts may be more willing to grant equitable tolling in death penalty cases, particularly when the petitioner has been diligent in pursuing his rights. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "381 F.3d 587, 590-91",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the view that a different test applies to capital cases",
"sentence": "But see Johnson v. McBride, 381 F.3d 587, 590-91 (7th Cir.2004) (rejecting the view that a different test applies to capital cases); Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 253-56 (4th Cir.2003) (en bane) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir.2001); cf. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (“[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (“[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.”)."
} | 3,842,537 | b |
In AHIF-Oregon's view, if classified information concerning national security demonstrates that an entity is supporting terrorism, OFAC either must decline to designate the entity or must reveal the classified information to the entity that OFAC believes supports terrorist activities. Common sense dictates that AHIF-Oregon is overreaching. Not surprisingly,, all federal courts to have considered this argument have rejected it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "251 F.3d 208, 208",
"parenthetical": "holding that, in a designation of a \"foreign terrorist organization\" under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (\"AED-PA\"",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | 6,051,328 | a |
In AHIF-Oregon's view, if classified information concerning national security demonstrates that an entity is supporting terrorism, OFAC either must decline to designate the entity or must reveal the classified information to the entity that OFAC believes supports terrorist activities. Common sense dictates that AHIF-Oregon is overreaching. Not surprisingly,, all federal courts to have considered this argument have rejected it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "251 F.3d 208, 208",
"parenthetical": "holding that, in a designation of a \"foreign terrorist organization\" under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (\"AED-PA\"",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | 6,051,328 | a |
In AHIF-Oregon's view, if classified information concerning national security demonstrates that an entity is supporting terrorism, OFAC either must decline to designate the entity or must reveal the classified information to the entity that OFAC believes supports terrorist activities. Common sense dictates that AHIF-Oregon is overreaching. Not surprisingly,, all federal courts to have considered this argument have rejected it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "251 F.3d 208, 208",
"parenthetical": "holding that, in a designation of a \"foreign terrorist organization\" under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (\"AED-PA\"",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | 6,051,328 | a |
In AHIF-Oregon's view, if classified information concerning national security demonstrates that an entity is supporting terrorism, OFAC either must decline to designate the entity or must reveal the classified information to the entity that OFAC believes supports terrorist activities. Common sense dictates that AHIF-Oregon is overreaching. Not surprisingly,, all federal courts to have considered this argument have rejected it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "251 F.3d 208, 208",
"parenthetical": "holding that, in a designation of a \"foreign terrorist organization\" under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (\"AED-PA\"",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. SS 17.17(a",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | 6,051,328 | a |
In AHIF-Oregon's view, if classified information concerning national security demonstrates that an entity is supporting terrorism, OFAC either must decline to designate the entity or must reveal the classified information to the entity that OFAC believes supports terrorist activities. Common sense dictates that AHIF-Oregon is overreaching. Not surprisingly,, all federal courts to have considered this argument have rejected it. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43",
"parenthetical": "following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | 6,051,328 | b |
In AHIF-Oregon's view, if classified information concerning national security demonstrates that an entity is supporting terrorism, OFAC either must decline to designate the entity or must reveal the classified information to the entity that OFAC believes supports terrorist activities. Common sense dictates that AHIF-Oregon is overreaching. Not surprisingly,, all federal courts to have considered this argument have rejected it. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43",
"parenthetical": "following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | 6,051,328 | b |
In AHIF-Oregon's view, if classified information concerning national security demonstrates that an entity is supporting terrorism, OFAC either must decline to designate the entity or must reveal the classified information to the entity that OFAC believes supports terrorist activities. Common sense dictates that AHIF-Oregon is overreaching. Not surprisingly,, all federal courts to have considered this argument have rejected it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43",
"parenthetical": "following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | 6,051,328 | a |
In AHIF-Oregon's view, if classified information concerning national security demonstrates that an entity is supporting terrorism, OFAC either must decline to designate the entity or must reveal the classified information to the entity that OFAC believes supports terrorist activities. Common sense dictates that AHIF-Oregon is overreaching. Not surprisingly,, all federal courts to have considered this argument have rejected it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43",
"parenthetical": "following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. SS 17.17(a",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | 6,051,328 | a |
In AHIF-Oregon's view, if classified information concerning national security demonstrates that an entity is supporting terrorism, OFAC either must decline to designate the entity or must reveal the classified information to the entity that OFAC believes supports terrorist activities. Common sense dictates that AHIF-Oregon is overreaching. Not surprisingly,, all federal courts to have considered this argument have rejected it. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "827 F.2d 473, 477",
"parenthetical": "holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government's use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant's due process rights",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | 6,051,328 | b |
In AHIF-Oregon's view, if classified information concerning national security demonstrates that an entity is supporting terrorism, OFAC either must decline to designate the entity or must reveal the classified information to the entity that OFAC believes supports terrorist activities. Common sense dictates that AHIF-Oregon is overreaching. Not surprisingly,, all federal courts to have considered this argument have rejected it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "827 F.2d 473, 477",
"parenthetical": "holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government's use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant's due process rights",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | 6,051,328 | a |
In AHIF-Oregon's view, if classified information concerning national security demonstrates that an entity is supporting terrorism, OFAC either must decline to designate the entity or must reveal the classified information to the entity that OFAC believes supports terrorist activities. Common sense dictates that AHIF-Oregon is overreaching. Not surprisingly,, all federal courts to have considered this argument have rejected it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "827 F.2d 473, 477",
"parenthetical": "holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government's use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant's due process rights",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | 6,051,328 | a |
In AHIF-Oregon's view, if classified information concerning national security demonstrates that an entity is supporting terrorism, OFAC either must decline to designate the entity or must reveal the classified information to the entity that OFAC believes supports terrorist activities. Common sense dictates that AHIF-Oregon is overreaching. Not surprisingly,, all federal courts to have considered this argument have rejected it. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. SS 17.17(a",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "827 F.2d 473, 477",
"parenthetical": "holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government's use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant's due process rights",
"sentence": "Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2442, 179 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”)."
} | 6,051,328 | b |
The government charged, and the jury found, that defendants engaged in a single, continuing conspiracy to rig bids on certain cost-plus contracts between 1981 and 1984. It is well-established that, as a participant in this conspiracy, MIA is legally liable for all the acts of its co-conspirators in furtherance of this crime. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "218 U.S. 601, 608",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "225 U.S. 347, 369",
"parenthetical": "the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | 10,521,039 | a |
The government charged, and the jury found, that defendants engaged in a single, continuing conspiracy to rig bids on certain cost-plus contracts between 1981 and 1984. It is well-established that, as a participant in this conspiracy, MIA is legally liable for all the acts of its co-conspirators in furtherance of this crime. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "218 U.S. 601, 608",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "32 S.Ct. 793, 803",
"parenthetical": "the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | 10,521,039 | a |
The government charged, and the jury found, that defendants engaged in a single, continuing conspiracy to rig bids on certain cost-plus contracts between 1981 and 1984. It is well-established that, as a participant in this conspiracy, MIA is legally liable for all the acts of its co-conspirators in furtherance of this crime. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "218 U.S. 601, 608",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | 10,521,039 | b |
The government charged, and the jury found, that defendants engaged in a single, continuing conspiracy to rig bids on certain cost-plus contracts between 1981 and 1984. It is well-established that, as a participant in this conspiracy, MIA is legally liable for all the acts of its co-conspirators in furtherance of this crime. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "225 U.S. 347, 369",
"parenthetical": "the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "31 S.Ct. 124, 126",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | 10,521,039 | b |
The government charged, and the jury found, that defendants engaged in a single, continuing conspiracy to rig bids on certain cost-plus contracts between 1981 and 1984. It is well-established that, as a participant in this conspiracy, MIA is legally liable for all the acts of its co-conspirators in furtherance of this crime. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "32 S.Ct. 793, 803",
"parenthetical": "the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "31 S.Ct. 124, 126",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | 10,521,039 | b |
The government charged, and the jury found, that defendants engaged in a single, continuing conspiracy to rig bids on certain cost-plus contracts between 1981 and 1984. It is well-established that, as a participant in this conspiracy, MIA is legally liable for all the acts of its co-conspirators in furtherance of this crime. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "31 S.Ct. 124, 126",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | 10,521,039 | a |
The government charged, and the jury found, that defendants engaged in a single, continuing conspiracy to rig bids on certain cost-plus contracts between 1981 and 1984. It is well-established that, as a participant in this conspiracy, MIA is legally liable for all the acts of its co-conspirators in furtherance of this crime. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "225 U.S. 347, 369",
"parenthetical": "the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | 10,521,039 | a |
The government charged, and the jury found, that defendants engaged in a single, continuing conspiracy to rig bids on certain cost-plus contracts between 1981 and 1984. It is well-established that, as a participant in this conspiracy, MIA is legally liable for all the acts of its co-conspirators in furtherance of this crime. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "32 S.Ct. 793, 803",
"parenthetical": "the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | 10,521,039 | b |
The government charged, and the jury found, that defendants engaged in a single, continuing conspiracy to rig bids on certain cost-plus contracts between 1981 and 1984. It is well-established that, as a participant in this conspiracy, MIA is legally liable for all the acts of its co-conspirators in furtherance of this crime. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910) (“[T]he conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.”) (“A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes ... [and] an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (the liability of an individual conspirator continues until the conspiracy accomplishes its goals or that conspirator withdraws, the latter of which requires an affirmative action)."
} | 10,521,039 | b |
Certainly, Gao never alleged that he told the immigration officer his girlfriend had a forced abortion. Because Gao's explanations for the discrepancy between his testimony and the airport interview would not compel a fact-finder to excuse the discrepancy, and because the discrepancy involved the sole basis for his asylum claim, it properly supported the IJ's adverse credibility findings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "357 F.3d 179, 179-80",
"parenthetical": "setting forth the criteria that the Court generally looks to when evaluating the reliability of statements made by applicants during airport interviews",
"sentence": "See Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308-09 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that to form the basis of an adverse credibility determination, a discrepancy must be “substantial” when measured against the record as a whole); see, e.g., Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 395-98 (2d Cir.2005) (determination supported by entirely different accounts of persecution provided by applicant at her airport interview and subsequent hearing); see also Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 179-80 (setting forth the criteria that the Court generally looks to when evaluating the reliability of statements made by applicants during airport interviews)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "331 F.3d 297, 308-09",
"parenthetical": "finding that to form the basis of an adverse credibility determination, a discrepancy must be \"substantial\" when measured against the record as a whole",
"sentence": "See Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308-09 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that to form the basis of an adverse credibility determination, a discrepancy must be “substantial” when measured against the record as a whole); see, e.g., Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 395-98 (2d Cir.2005) (determination supported by entirely different accounts of persecution provided by applicant at her airport interview and subsequent hearing); see also Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 179-80 (setting forth the criteria that the Court generally looks to when evaluating the reliability of statements made by applicants during airport interviews)."
} | 3,972,303 | b |
Certainly, Gao never alleged that he told the immigration officer his girlfriend had a forced abortion. Because Gao's explanations for the discrepancy between his testimony and the airport interview would not compel a fact-finder to excuse the discrepancy, and because the discrepancy involved the sole basis for his asylum claim, it properly supported the IJ's adverse credibility findings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "357 F.3d 179, 179-80",
"parenthetical": "setting forth the criteria that the Court generally looks to when evaluating the reliability of statements made by applicants during airport interviews",
"sentence": "See Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308-09 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that to form the basis of an adverse credibility determination, a discrepancy must be “substantial” when measured against the record as a whole); see, e.g., Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 395-98 (2d Cir.2005) (determination supported by entirely different accounts of persecution provided by applicant at her airport interview and subsequent hearing); see also Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 179-80 (setting forth the criteria that the Court generally looks to when evaluating the reliability of statements made by applicants during airport interviews)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "432 F.3d 391, 395-98",
"parenthetical": "determination supported by entirely different accounts of persecution provided by applicant at her airport interview and subsequent hearing",
"sentence": "See Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308-09 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that to form the basis of an adverse credibility determination, a discrepancy must be “substantial” when measured against the record as a whole); see, e.g., Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 395-98 (2d Cir.2005) (determination supported by entirely different accounts of persecution provided by applicant at her airport interview and subsequent hearing); see also Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 179-80 (setting forth the criteria that the Court generally looks to when evaluating the reliability of statements made by applicants during airport interviews)."
} | 3,972,303 | b |
Upon the filing of a voluntary petition, 11 U.S.C. SS 362 imposes an automatic stay against the continuation of actions against the debtor commenced before the commencement of the debtor's bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. SS 362(a)(1). With exceptions not applicable here, the automatic stay "prevents creditors from taking further action against ... [the debt- or] except through the bankruptcy court." Actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "907 F.2d 953, 956",
"parenthetical": "\"Ordinarily, any action taken in violation of the stay is void and without effect, even where there is no actual notice of the existence of the stay.\"",
"sentence": "See also In re Calder, 907 F.2d 953, 956 (10th Cir.1990) (“Ordinarily, any action taken in violation of the stay is void and without effect, even where there is no actual notice of the existence of the stay.”) (internal citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "894 F.2d 371, 372",
"parenthetical": "\"It is well established that any action taken in violation of the stay is void and without effect.\"",
"sentence": "Ellis v. Consol. Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371, 372 (10th Cir.1990) (“It is well established that any action taken in violation of the stay is void and without effect.”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,115,636 | b |
"A district court's finding that a defendant does not qualify for a minor or minimal participant status is heavily dependant on the facts of the particular case, and we uphold such a finding unless it is clearly erroneous." Amuchastegui's role in the armed bank robbery, including giving his co-defendant the gun, driving the getaway car, and receiving a share of the loot, does not entitle him to either a minor or minimal role adjustment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "189 F.3d 1151, 1160",
"parenthetical": "stating that the appellant has the burden to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that he is substantially less culpable than the average co-participant",
"sentence": "United States v. Hernandez-Franco, 189 F.3d 1151, 1160 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that the appellant has the burden to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that he is substantially less culpable than the average co-participant); see also United States v. Pinkney, 15 F.3d 825, 828, (9th Cir.1994) (stating that “one kind of average participant in a robbery would be the person who drove the robber to the scene and then drove him or her away again, and expected a share of the loot”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "15 F.3d 825, 828",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"one kind of average participant in a robbery would be the person who drove the robber to the scene and then drove him or her away again, and expected a share of the loot\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Hernandez-Franco, 189 F.3d 1151, 1160 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that the appellant has the burden to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that he is substantially less culpable than the average co-participant); see also United States v. Pinkney, 15 F.3d 825, 828, (9th Cir.1994) (stating that “one kind of average participant in a robbery would be the person who drove the robber to the scene and then drove him or her away again, and expected a share of the loot”)."
} | 438,281 | a |
Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not have believed he was free "to disregard the police and go about his business." Canales was, therefore, detained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87",
"parenthetical": "where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer \"provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "186 Ariz. 510, 510-11",
"parenthetical": "defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, \"we need to talk to you\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | 4,047,476 | b |
Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not have believed he was free "to disregard the police and go about his business." Canales was, therefore, detained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "932 P.2d 1381, 1387",
"parenthetical": "noting courts have found detention exists when police car \"wholly blocks the defendant's ability to leave\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "186 Ariz. 510, 510-11",
"parenthetical": "defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, \"we need to talk to you\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | 4,047,476 | b |
Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not have believed he was free "to disregard the police and go about his business." Canales was, therefore, detained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "892 A.2d 370, 374",
"parenthetical": "detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "186 Ariz. 510, 510-11",
"parenthetical": "defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, \"we need to talk to you\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | 4,047,476 | b |
Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not have believed he was free "to disregard the police and go about his business." Canales was, therefore, detained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "186 Ariz. 510, 510-11",
"parenthetical": "defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, \"we need to talk to you\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | 4,047,476 | b |
Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not have believed he was free "to disregard the police and go about his business." Canales was, therefore, detained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63",
"parenthetical": "defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "186 Ariz. 510, 510-11",
"parenthetical": "defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, \"we need to talk to you\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | 4,047,476 | b |
Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not have believed he was free "to disregard the police and go about his business." Canales was, therefore, detained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "988 P.2d 1071, 1075",
"parenthetical": "noting use of police ear to block defendant's car has been found to constitute seizure",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "186 Ariz. 510, 510-11",
"parenthetical": "defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, \"we need to talk to you\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | 4,047,476 | b |
Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not have believed he was free "to disregard the police and go about his business." Canales was, therefore, detained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87",
"parenthetical": "where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer \"provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "924 P.2d 1029, 1029-30",
"parenthetical": "defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, \"we need to talk to you\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | 4,047,476 | b |
Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not have believed he was free "to disregard the police and go about his business." Canales was, therefore, detained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "932 P.2d 1381, 1387",
"parenthetical": "noting courts have found detention exists when police car \"wholly blocks the defendant's ability to leave\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "924 P.2d 1029, 1029-30",
"parenthetical": "defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, \"we need to talk to you\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | 4,047,476 | b |
Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not have believed he was free "to disregard the police and go about his business." Canales was, therefore, detained. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "924 P.2d 1029, 1029-30",
"parenthetical": "defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, \"we need to talk to you\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "892 A.2d 370, 374",
"parenthetical": "detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | 4,047,476 | a |
Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not have believed he was free "to disregard the police and go about his business." Canales was, therefore, detained. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "924 P.2d 1029, 1029-30",
"parenthetical": "defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, \"we need to talk to you\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | 4,047,476 | a |
Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not have believed he was free "to disregard the police and go about his business." Canales was, therefore, detained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63",
"parenthetical": "defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "924 P.2d 1029, 1029-30",
"parenthetical": "defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, \"we need to talk to you\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | 4,047,476 | b |
Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not have believed he was free "to disregard the police and go about his business." Canales was, therefore, detained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "988 P.2d 1071, 1075",
"parenthetical": "noting use of police ear to block defendant's car has been found to constitute seizure",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "924 P.2d 1029, 1029-30",
"parenthetical": "defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, \"we need to talk to you\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510-11, 924 P.2d at 1029-30 (defendant detained when officers approached on foot, displayed badge, and said, “we need to talk to you”); see also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1987) (where police officer in marked vehicle blocked driveway as defendant attempted to back out, officer “provided [defendant] with no reasonable alternative except an encounter with the police”); People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo.1997) (noting courts have found detention exists when police car “wholly blocks the defendant’s ability to leave”); Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (detention occurred when police approached vehicle with badges and flashlights, after parking their vehicle in such a way as to prevent defendant from driving away); State v. Jestice, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (2004) (defendant detained where defendant would have had to back up and maneuver around police car and officer to exit parking lot and officer shined headlights into vehicle); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (noting use of police ear to block defendant’s car has been found to constitute seizure)."
} | 4,047,476 | b |
Despite McNemar's shortcomings, at least one circuit has indicated a willingness to adopt the Third Circuit's approach, albeit not applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel per se. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "128 F.3d 68, 74",
"parenthetical": "applying judicial estoppel in an age discrimination case, but specifically stating that the applicability of judicial estoppel to ADA cases will be \"left for another day\"",
"sentence": "See Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481-82 (9th Cir.1996) (holding, without applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel, that the plaintiff, who made sworn statements of total disability in a social security disability application and then testified at her deposition that she was not totally disabled, failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA); see also Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir.1997) (applying judicial estoppel in an age discrimination case, but specifically stating that the applicability of judicial estoppel to ADA cases will be “left for another day”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "90 F.3d 1477, 1481-82",
"parenthetical": "holding, without applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel, that the plaintiff, who made sworn statements of total disability in a social security disability application and then testified at her deposition that she was not totally disabled, failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA",
"sentence": "See Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481-82 (9th Cir.1996) (holding, without applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel, that the plaintiff, who made sworn statements of total disability in a social security disability application and then testified at her deposition that she was not totally disabled, failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA); see also Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir.1997) (applying judicial estoppel in an age discrimination case, but specifically stating that the applicability of judicial estoppel to ADA cases will be “left for another day”)."
} | 268,445 | b |
Robinson's trial predated Deck and, under the AEDPA, state courts are only held to laws clearly established by the Supreme Court at the time of the alleged violation. However, the Deck Court was clear that the constitutional ban on routine shackling, at least during the guilt phase of the trial, had been long-established. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "465 U.S. 168, 188",
"parenthetical": "a state defendant \"may not normally be forced to appear in court in shackles\"",
"sentence": "See Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2010 (“The answer is clear: The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase.”); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 188, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (a state defendant “may not normally be forced to appear in court in shackles”) (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)); Lakin v. Stine, 431 F.3d 959, 963 (6th Cir.2005) (“[T]he principle that shackling a defendant at trial without the individualized determination as to necessity violates the due process clause was clearly established long before Deck was decided.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 S.Ct. 2010, 2010",
"parenthetical": "\"The answer is clear: The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase.\"",
"sentence": "See Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2010 (“The answer is clear: The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase.”); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 188, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (a state defendant “may not normally be forced to appear in court in shackles”) (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)); Lakin v. Stine, 431 F.3d 959, 963 (6th Cir.2005) (“[T]he principle that shackling a defendant at trial without the individualized determination as to necessity violates the due process clause was clearly established long before Deck was decided.”)."
} | 3,315,140 | b |
Robinson's trial predated Deck and, under the AEDPA, state courts are only held to laws clearly established by the Supreme Court at the time of the alleged violation. However, the Deck Court was clear that the constitutional ban on routine shackling, at least during the guilt phase of the trial, had been long-established. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a state defendant \"may not normally be forced to appear in court in shackles\"",
"sentence": "See Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2010 (“The answer is clear: The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase.”); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 188, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (a state defendant “may not normally be forced to appear in court in shackles”) (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)); Lakin v. Stine, 431 F.3d 959, 963 (6th Cir.2005) (“[T]he principle that shackling a defendant at trial without the individualized determination as to necessity violates the due process clause was clearly established long before Deck was decided.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 S.Ct. 2010, 2010",
"parenthetical": "\"The answer is clear: The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase.\"",
"sentence": "See Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2010 (“The answer is clear: The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase.”); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 188, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (a state defendant “may not normally be forced to appear in court in shackles”) (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)); Lakin v. Stine, 431 F.3d 959, 963 (6th Cir.2005) (“[T]he principle that shackling a defendant at trial without the individualized determination as to necessity violates the due process clause was clearly established long before Deck was decided.”)."
} | 3,315,140 | b |
Robinson's trial predated Deck and, under the AEDPA, state courts are only held to laws clearly established by the Supreme Court at the time of the alleged violation. However, the Deck Court was clear that the constitutional ban on routine shackling, at least during the guilt phase of the trial, had been long-established. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 S.Ct. 2010, 2010",
"parenthetical": "\"The answer is clear: The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase.\"",
"sentence": "See Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2010 (“The answer is clear: The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase.”); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 188, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (a state defendant “may not normally be forced to appear in court in shackles”) (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)); Lakin v. Stine, 431 F.3d 959, 963 (6th Cir.2005) (“[T]he principle that shackling a defendant at trial without the individualized determination as to necessity violates the due process clause was clearly established long before Deck was decided.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a state defendant \"may not normally be forced to appear in court in shackles\"",
"sentence": "See Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2010 (“The answer is clear: The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase.”); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 188, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (a state defendant “may not normally be forced to appear in court in shackles”) (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)); Lakin v. Stine, 431 F.3d 959, 963 (6th Cir.2005) (“[T]he principle that shackling a defendant at trial without the individualized determination as to necessity violates the due process clause was clearly established long before Deck was decided.”)."
} | 3,315,140 | a |
Robinson's trial predated Deck and, under the AEDPA, state courts are only held to laws clearly established by the Supreme Court at the time of the alleged violation. However, the Deck Court was clear that the constitutional ban on routine shackling, at least during the guilt phase of the trial, had been long-established. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "431 F.3d 959, 963",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he principle that shackling a defendant at trial without the individualized determination as to necessity violates the due process clause was clearly established long before Deck was decided.\"",
"sentence": "See Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2010 (“The answer is clear: The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase.”); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 188, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (a state defendant “may not normally be forced to appear in court in shackles”) (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)); Lakin v. Stine, 431 F.3d 959, 963 (6th Cir.2005) (“[T]he principle that shackling a defendant at trial without the individualized determination as to necessity violates the due process clause was clearly established long before Deck was decided.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 S.Ct. 2010, 2010",
"parenthetical": "\"The answer is clear: The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase.\"",
"sentence": "See Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2010 (“The answer is clear: The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase.”); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 188, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (a state defendant “may not normally be forced to appear in court in shackles”) (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)); Lakin v. Stine, 431 F.3d 959, 963 (6th Cir.2005) (“[T]he principle that shackling a defendant at trial without the individualized determination as to necessity violates the due process clause was clearly established long before Deck was decided.”)."
} | 3,315,140 | b |
We wonder what jury would not reach that conclusion. Moreover, the jury could have inferred solely from the possession of this large quantity of drugs that Defendant intended to further distribute it. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "246 Fed.Appx. 321, 330",
"parenthetical": "recovery of $1,900 from the defendant's pocket supported conclusion that the defendant was selling drugs",
"sentence": "See United States v. Wilson, 27 F.3d 1126, 1133 (6th Cir.1994) (recognizing “the connection between guns and drug trafficking”); United States v. Collier, 246 Fed.Appx. 321, 330 (6th Cir. 2007) (recovery of $1,900 from the defendant’s pocket supported conclusion that the defendant was selling drugs)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "280 F.3d 715, 724",
"parenthetical": "18 grams of crack cocaine sufficient for an inference of intent to distribute",
"sentence": "United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 724 (6th Cir.2002) (18 grams of crack cocaine sufficient for an inference of intent to distribute); United States v. Clemons, 9 Fed. Appx. 286, 289 (6th Cir.2001) (8.5 grams of crack cocaine “was large enough to draw an inference of intent to distribute”). In addition, Investigator Bryant testified that firearms were recovered nearby the drugs, $1,008 was recovered from the bedroom, and no drug paraphernalia to use the crack was recovered."
} | 4,075,441 | b |
We wonder what jury would not reach that conclusion. Moreover, the jury could have inferred solely from the possession of this large quantity of drugs that Defendant intended to further distribute it. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "9 Fed. Appx. 286, 289",
"parenthetical": "8.5 grams of crack cocaine \"was large enough to draw an inference of intent to distribute\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 724 (6th Cir.2002) (18 grams of crack cocaine sufficient for an inference of intent to distribute); United States v. Clemons, 9 Fed. Appx. 286, 289 (6th Cir.2001) (8.5 grams of crack cocaine “was large enough to draw an inference of intent to distribute”). In addition, Investigator Bryant testified that firearms were recovered nearby the drugs, $1,008 was recovered from the bedroom, and no drug paraphernalia to use the crack was recovered."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "246 Fed.Appx. 321, 330",
"parenthetical": "recovery of $1,900 from the defendant's pocket supported conclusion that the defendant was selling drugs",
"sentence": "See United States v. Wilson, 27 F.3d 1126, 1133 (6th Cir.1994) (recognizing “the connection between guns and drug trafficking”); United States v. Collier, 246 Fed.Appx. 321, 330 (6th Cir. 2007) (recovery of $1,900 from the defendant’s pocket supported conclusion that the defendant was selling drugs)."
} | 4,075,441 | a |
For this reason, the court to date has allowed Plaintiffs to add 15 other plaintiffs to this action. First Am. Compl. PP 5-19. The record, however, does not establish that joinder of the remaining potential plaintiffs in this case is impracticable. As the Government observed, the United States Court of Federal Claims and its predecessor frequently have managed cases with large numbers of claimants without the need to resort to class action. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "69 Fed.Cl. 454, 454-55",
"parenthetical": "holding that a potential class of 256 members did not satisfy numerosity",
"sentence": "Jaynes, 69 Fed.Cl. at 454-55 (holding that a potential class of 256 members did not satisfy numerosity); see also Buchan, 27 Fed.Cl. at 224 (“This court, however, has never had difficulty dealing with hundreds of party plaintiffs or with single plaintiff ‘test’ cases.”); O’Hanlon v. United States, 7 Cl.Ct. 204, 206-207 (1985) (holding joinder appropriate for 39 potential plaintiffs.)"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "27 Fed.Cl. 224, 224",
"parenthetical": "\"This court, however, has never had difficulty dealing with hundreds of party plaintiffs or with single plaintiff 'test' cases.\"",
"sentence": "Jaynes, 69 Fed.Cl. at 454-55 (holding that a potential class of 256 members did not satisfy numerosity); see also Buchan, 27 Fed.Cl. at 224 (“This court, however, has never had difficulty dealing with hundreds of party plaintiffs or with single plaintiff ‘test’ cases.”); O’Hanlon v. United States, 7 Cl.Ct. 204, 206-207 (1985) (holding joinder appropriate for 39 potential plaintiffs.)"
} | 4,283,404 | a |
Checkers's position amounts to an argument that section 362(a) disabled it from taking any action to fend off CRG's attempts to cancel Checkers's service mark registration. However, it is well settled in this circuit and others that the section 362(a) automatic stay does not require persons involved in litigation with a debtor to capitulate to the debt- or's every demand. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 1473, 1473",
"parenthetical": "\"Fulfillment of th[e] purpose [of the automatic stay] cannot require that every party who acts in resistance to the debtor's view of its rights violates SS 362(a",
"sentence": "See Inslaw, 932 F.2d at 1473 (“Fulfillment of th[e] purpose [of the automatic stay] cannot require that every party who acts in resistance to the debtor’s view of its rights violates § 362(a) if found in error by the bankruptcy court.”); see also In re Merrick, 175 B.R. 333, 338 (Bankr. 9th Cir.1994) (“The automatic stay should not tie the hands of a defendant while the plaintiff debtor is given free rein to litigate.”); Martin-Trigona, 892 F.2d at 577 (“There is ... no policy of preventing persons whom the bankrupt has sued from protecting their legal rights.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 B.R. 333, 338",
"parenthetical": "\"The automatic stay should not tie the hands of a defendant while the plaintiff debtor is given free rein to litigate.\"",
"sentence": "See Inslaw, 932 F.2d at 1473 (“Fulfillment of th[e] purpose [of the automatic stay] cannot require that every party who acts in resistance to the debtor’s view of its rights violates § 362(a) if found in error by the bankruptcy court.”); see also In re Merrick, 175 B.R. 333, 338 (Bankr. 9th Cir.1994) (“The automatic stay should not tie the hands of a defendant while the plaintiff debtor is given free rein to litigate.”); Martin-Trigona, 892 F.2d at 577 (“There is ... no policy of preventing persons whom the bankrupt has sued from protecting their legal rights.”)."
} | 11,362,914 | a |
Checkers's position amounts to an argument that section 362(a) disabled it from taking any action to fend off CRG's attempts to cancel Checkers's service mark registration. However, it is well settled in this circuit and others that the section 362(a) automatic stay does not require persons involved in litigation with a debtor to capitulate to the debt- or's every demand. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "892 F.2d 577, 577",
"parenthetical": "\"There is ... no policy of preventing persons whom the bankrupt has sued from protecting their legal rights.\"",
"sentence": "See Inslaw, 932 F.2d at 1473 (“Fulfillment of th[e] purpose [of the automatic stay] cannot require that every party who acts in resistance to the debtor’s view of its rights violates § 362(a) if found in error by the bankruptcy court.”); see also In re Merrick, 175 B.R. 333, 338 (Bankr. 9th Cir.1994) (“The automatic stay should not tie the hands of a defendant while the plaintiff debtor is given free rein to litigate.”); Martin-Trigona, 892 F.2d at 577 (“There is ... no policy of preventing persons whom the bankrupt has sued from protecting their legal rights.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 1473, 1473",
"parenthetical": "\"Fulfillment of th[e] purpose [of the automatic stay] cannot require that every party who acts in resistance to the debtor's view of its rights violates SS 362(a",
"sentence": "See Inslaw, 932 F.2d at 1473 (“Fulfillment of th[e] purpose [of the automatic stay] cannot require that every party who acts in resistance to the debtor’s view of its rights violates § 362(a) if found in error by the bankruptcy court.”); see also In re Merrick, 175 B.R. 333, 338 (Bankr. 9th Cir.1994) (“The automatic stay should not tie the hands of a defendant while the plaintiff debtor is given free rein to litigate.”); Martin-Trigona, 892 F.2d at 577 (“There is ... no policy of preventing persons whom the bankrupt has sued from protecting their legal rights.”)."
} | 11,362,914 | b |
As defendant acknowledges, we have never concluded that drawing an analogy between a defense tactic and "smoke" is inherently prejudicial, and we have not reversed based on such a statement alone. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "282 Kan. 201, 210-12",
"parenthetical": "approving prosecutor's colorful analogy of defense theory to the Wizard of Oz",
"sentence": "See State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 643-45, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor’s comments in arson case, which involved burning a dog, to effect that defense counsel had attempted to divert jury’s attention by arguing State did not know who dog’s owner was, labeling of tactic was “puff of smoke” not prosecutorial misconduct; comments not beyond bounds of legitimate rhetoric; puff of smoke argument responsive to defense counsel’s strained interpretation of evidence regarding defendant’s beliefs about who, if anyone, owned dog); State v. McCray, 267 Kan. 339, 348-51, 979 P.2d 134 (1999) (prosecutor’s “smoke screen” statement made in course of more egregious comments insinuating defense counsel’s “deception” was attempt to “fool,” “intimidare],” and “scare” jury; remarks outside bounds of proper argument but little likelihood they changed result); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718-20, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor called defense closing argument “a lot of smoke,” said “[i]t’s smoke and mirrors . . . trying to confuse you“; no intent to mislead and within permissible bounds of rhetoric); State v. Baker, 249 Kan. 431, 447, 819 P.2d 1173 (1991) (prosecutor argued defendant’s “nice boy image . . . [was] nonexistent,” “[i]t’s a smoke screen“; statements not gross nor flagrant, did not deprive defendant of fair trial); City of Dodge City v. Ingram, 33 Kan. App. 2d 829, 837-38, 109 P.3d 1272 (2005) (prosecutor’s comments that defense “simply arguing smoke and mir rors” and “[g]rasping at straws,” not improper, not outside wide latitude allowed in discussing evidence); State v. Lockhart, 24 Kan. App. 2d 488, 490-93, 947 P.2d 461, rev. denied 263 Kan. 889 (1997) (prosecutor s “smoke screen” argument noted but not found improper; basis for reversal in prosecutor’s references to defendant and defense counsel as liars); see also State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 210-12, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (approving prosecutor’s colorful analogy of defense theory to the Wizard of Oz); State v. Collier, No. 93,589, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion filed March 31, 2006, rev. denied 282 Kan. 792 (2006), slip op. at 8-9 (simple “smoke and mirrors” comments not considered prosecutorial misconduct; even if improper, no prejudice)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "33 Kan. App. 2d 829, 837-38",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments that defense \"simply arguing smoke and mir rors\" and \"[g]rasping at straws,\" not improper, not outside wide latitude allowed in discussing evidence",
"sentence": "See State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 643-45, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor’s comments in arson case, which involved burning a dog, to effect that defense counsel had attempted to divert jury’s attention by arguing State did not know who dog’s owner was, labeling of tactic was “puff of smoke” not prosecutorial misconduct; comments not beyond bounds of legitimate rhetoric; puff of smoke argument responsive to defense counsel’s strained interpretation of evidence regarding defendant’s beliefs about who, if anyone, owned dog); State v. McCray, 267 Kan. 339, 348-51, 979 P.2d 134 (1999) (prosecutor’s “smoke screen” statement made in course of more egregious comments insinuating defense counsel’s “deception” was attempt to “fool,” “intimidare],” and “scare” jury; remarks outside bounds of proper argument but little likelihood they changed result); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718-20, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor called defense closing argument “a lot of smoke,” said “[i]t’s smoke and mirrors . . . trying to confuse you“; no intent to mislead and within permissible bounds of rhetoric); State v. Baker, 249 Kan. 431, 447, 819 P.2d 1173 (1991) (prosecutor argued defendant’s “nice boy image . . . [was] nonexistent,” “[i]t’s a smoke screen“; statements not gross nor flagrant, did not deprive defendant of fair trial); City of Dodge City v. Ingram, 33 Kan. App. 2d 829, 837-38, 109 P.3d 1272 (2005) (prosecutor’s comments that defense “simply arguing smoke and mir rors” and “[g]rasping at straws,” not improper, not outside wide latitude allowed in discussing evidence); State v. Lockhart, 24 Kan. App. 2d 488, 490-93, 947 P.2d 461, rev. denied 263 Kan. 889 (1997) (prosecutor s “smoke screen” argument noted but not found improper; basis for reversal in prosecutor’s references to defendant and defense counsel as liars); see also State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 210-12, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (approving prosecutor’s colorful analogy of defense theory to the Wizard of Oz); State v. Collier, No. 93,589, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion filed March 31, 2006, rev. denied 282 Kan. 792 (2006), slip op. at 8-9 (simple “smoke and mirrors” comments not considered prosecutorial misconduct; even if improper, no prejudice)."
} | 4,253,032 | b |
As defendant acknowledges, we have never concluded that drawing an analogy between a defense tactic and "smoke" is inherently prejudicial, and we have not reversed based on such a statement alone. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "approving prosecutor's colorful analogy of defense theory to the Wizard of Oz",
"sentence": "See State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 643-45, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor’s comments in arson case, which involved burning a dog, to effect that defense counsel had attempted to divert jury’s attention by arguing State did not know who dog’s owner was, labeling of tactic was “puff of smoke” not prosecutorial misconduct; comments not beyond bounds of legitimate rhetoric; puff of smoke argument responsive to defense counsel’s strained interpretation of evidence regarding defendant’s beliefs about who, if anyone, owned dog); State v. McCray, 267 Kan. 339, 348-51, 979 P.2d 134 (1999) (prosecutor’s “smoke screen” statement made in course of more egregious comments insinuating defense counsel’s “deception” was attempt to “fool,” “intimidare],” and “scare” jury; remarks outside bounds of proper argument but little likelihood they changed result); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718-20, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor called defense closing argument “a lot of smoke,” said “[i]t’s smoke and mirrors . . . trying to confuse you“; no intent to mislead and within permissible bounds of rhetoric); State v. Baker, 249 Kan. 431, 447, 819 P.2d 1173 (1991) (prosecutor argued defendant’s “nice boy image . . . [was] nonexistent,” “[i]t’s a smoke screen“; statements not gross nor flagrant, did not deprive defendant of fair trial); City of Dodge City v. Ingram, 33 Kan. App. 2d 829, 837-38, 109 P.3d 1272 (2005) (prosecutor’s comments that defense “simply arguing smoke and mir rors” and “[g]rasping at straws,” not improper, not outside wide latitude allowed in discussing evidence); State v. Lockhart, 24 Kan. App. 2d 488, 490-93, 947 P.2d 461, rev. denied 263 Kan. 889 (1997) (prosecutor s “smoke screen” argument noted but not found improper; basis for reversal in prosecutor’s references to defendant and defense counsel as liars); see also State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 210-12, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (approving prosecutor’s colorful analogy of defense theory to the Wizard of Oz); State v. Collier, No. 93,589, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion filed March 31, 2006, rev. denied 282 Kan. 792 (2006), slip op. at 8-9 (simple “smoke and mirrors” comments not considered prosecutorial misconduct; even if improper, no prejudice)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "33 Kan. App. 2d 829, 837-38",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments that defense \"simply arguing smoke and mir rors\" and \"[g]rasping at straws,\" not improper, not outside wide latitude allowed in discussing evidence",
"sentence": "See State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 643-45, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor’s comments in arson case, which involved burning a dog, to effect that defense counsel had attempted to divert jury’s attention by arguing State did not know who dog’s owner was, labeling of tactic was “puff of smoke” not prosecutorial misconduct; comments not beyond bounds of legitimate rhetoric; puff of smoke argument responsive to defense counsel’s strained interpretation of evidence regarding defendant’s beliefs about who, if anyone, owned dog); State v. McCray, 267 Kan. 339, 348-51, 979 P.2d 134 (1999) (prosecutor’s “smoke screen” statement made in course of more egregious comments insinuating defense counsel’s “deception” was attempt to “fool,” “intimidare],” and “scare” jury; remarks outside bounds of proper argument but little likelihood they changed result); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718-20, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor called defense closing argument “a lot of smoke,” said “[i]t’s smoke and mirrors . . . trying to confuse you“; no intent to mislead and within permissible bounds of rhetoric); State v. Baker, 249 Kan. 431, 447, 819 P.2d 1173 (1991) (prosecutor argued defendant’s “nice boy image . . . [was] nonexistent,” “[i]t’s a smoke screen“; statements not gross nor flagrant, did not deprive defendant of fair trial); City of Dodge City v. Ingram, 33 Kan. App. 2d 829, 837-38, 109 P.3d 1272 (2005) (prosecutor’s comments that defense “simply arguing smoke and mir rors” and “[g]rasping at straws,” not improper, not outside wide latitude allowed in discussing evidence); State v. Lockhart, 24 Kan. App. 2d 488, 490-93, 947 P.2d 461, rev. denied 263 Kan. 889 (1997) (prosecutor s “smoke screen” argument noted but not found improper; basis for reversal in prosecutor’s references to defendant and defense counsel as liars); see also State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 210-12, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (approving prosecutor’s colorful analogy of defense theory to the Wizard of Oz); State v. Collier, No. 93,589, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion filed March 31, 2006, rev. denied 282 Kan. 792 (2006), slip op. at 8-9 (simple “smoke and mirrors” comments not considered prosecutorial misconduct; even if improper, no prejudice)."
} | 4,253,032 | b |
As defendant acknowledges, we have never concluded that drawing an analogy between a defense tactic and "smoke" is inherently prejudicial, and we have not reversed based on such a statement alone. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "282 Kan. 201, 210-12",
"parenthetical": "approving prosecutor's colorful analogy of defense theory to the Wizard of Oz",
"sentence": "See State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 643-45, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor’s comments in arson case, which involved burning a dog, to effect that defense counsel had attempted to divert jury’s attention by arguing State did not know who dog’s owner was, labeling of tactic was “puff of smoke” not prosecutorial misconduct; comments not beyond bounds of legitimate rhetoric; puff of smoke argument responsive to defense counsel’s strained interpretation of evidence regarding defendant’s beliefs about who, if anyone, owned dog); State v. McCray, 267 Kan. 339, 348-51, 979 P.2d 134 (1999) (prosecutor’s “smoke screen” statement made in course of more egregious comments insinuating defense counsel’s “deception” was attempt to “fool,” “intimidare],” and “scare” jury; remarks outside bounds of proper argument but little likelihood they changed result); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718-20, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor called defense closing argument “a lot of smoke,” said “[i]t’s smoke and mirrors . . . trying to confuse you“; no intent to mislead and within permissible bounds of rhetoric); State v. Baker, 249 Kan. 431, 447, 819 P.2d 1173 (1991) (prosecutor argued defendant’s “nice boy image . . . [was] nonexistent,” “[i]t’s a smoke screen“; statements not gross nor flagrant, did not deprive defendant of fair trial); City of Dodge City v. Ingram, 33 Kan. App. 2d 829, 837-38, 109 P.3d 1272 (2005) (prosecutor’s comments that defense “simply arguing smoke and mir rors” and “[g]rasping at straws,” not improper, not outside wide latitude allowed in discussing evidence); State v. Lockhart, 24 Kan. App. 2d 488, 490-93, 947 P.2d 461, rev. denied 263 Kan. 889 (1997) (prosecutor s “smoke screen” argument noted but not found improper; basis for reversal in prosecutor’s references to defendant and defense counsel as liars); see also State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 210-12, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (approving prosecutor’s colorful analogy of defense theory to the Wizard of Oz); State v. Collier, No. 93,589, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion filed March 31, 2006, rev. denied 282 Kan. 792 (2006), slip op. at 8-9 (simple “smoke and mirrors” comments not considered prosecutorial misconduct; even if improper, no prejudice)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments that defense \"simply arguing smoke and mir rors\" and \"[g]rasping at straws,\" not improper, not outside wide latitude allowed in discussing evidence",
"sentence": "See State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 643-45, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor’s comments in arson case, which involved burning a dog, to effect that defense counsel had attempted to divert jury’s attention by arguing State did not know who dog’s owner was, labeling of tactic was “puff of smoke” not prosecutorial misconduct; comments not beyond bounds of legitimate rhetoric; puff of smoke argument responsive to defense counsel’s strained interpretation of evidence regarding defendant’s beliefs about who, if anyone, owned dog); State v. McCray, 267 Kan. 339, 348-51, 979 P.2d 134 (1999) (prosecutor’s “smoke screen” statement made in course of more egregious comments insinuating defense counsel’s “deception” was attempt to “fool,” “intimidare],” and “scare” jury; remarks outside bounds of proper argument but little likelihood they changed result); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718-20, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor called defense closing argument “a lot of smoke,” said “[i]t’s smoke and mirrors . . . trying to confuse you“; no intent to mislead and within permissible bounds of rhetoric); State v. Baker, 249 Kan. 431, 447, 819 P.2d 1173 (1991) (prosecutor argued defendant’s “nice boy image . . . [was] nonexistent,” “[i]t’s a smoke screen“; statements not gross nor flagrant, did not deprive defendant of fair trial); City of Dodge City v. Ingram, 33 Kan. App. 2d 829, 837-38, 109 P.3d 1272 (2005) (prosecutor’s comments that defense “simply arguing smoke and mir rors” and “[g]rasping at straws,” not improper, not outside wide latitude allowed in discussing evidence); State v. Lockhart, 24 Kan. App. 2d 488, 490-93, 947 P.2d 461, rev. denied 263 Kan. 889 (1997) (prosecutor s “smoke screen” argument noted but not found improper; basis for reversal in prosecutor’s references to defendant and defense counsel as liars); see also State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 210-12, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (approving prosecutor’s colorful analogy of defense theory to the Wizard of Oz); State v. Collier, No. 93,589, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion filed March 31, 2006, rev. denied 282 Kan. 792 (2006), slip op. at 8-9 (simple “smoke and mirrors” comments not considered prosecutorial misconduct; even if improper, no prejudice)."
} | 4,253,032 | b |
As defendant acknowledges, we have never concluded that drawing an analogy between a defense tactic and "smoke" is inherently prejudicial, and we have not reversed based on such a statement alone. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments that defense \"simply arguing smoke and mir rors\" and \"[g]rasping at straws,\" not improper, not outside wide latitude allowed in discussing evidence",
"sentence": "See State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 643-45, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor’s comments in arson case, which involved burning a dog, to effect that defense counsel had attempted to divert jury’s attention by arguing State did not know who dog’s owner was, labeling of tactic was “puff of smoke” not prosecutorial misconduct; comments not beyond bounds of legitimate rhetoric; puff of smoke argument responsive to defense counsel’s strained interpretation of evidence regarding defendant’s beliefs about who, if anyone, owned dog); State v. McCray, 267 Kan. 339, 348-51, 979 P.2d 134 (1999) (prosecutor’s “smoke screen” statement made in course of more egregious comments insinuating defense counsel’s “deception” was attempt to “fool,” “intimidare],” and “scare” jury; remarks outside bounds of proper argument but little likelihood they changed result); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718-20, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor called defense closing argument “a lot of smoke,” said “[i]t’s smoke and mirrors . . . trying to confuse you“; no intent to mislead and within permissible bounds of rhetoric); State v. Baker, 249 Kan. 431, 447, 819 P.2d 1173 (1991) (prosecutor argued defendant’s “nice boy image . . . [was] nonexistent,” “[i]t’s a smoke screen“; statements not gross nor flagrant, did not deprive defendant of fair trial); City of Dodge City v. Ingram, 33 Kan. App. 2d 829, 837-38, 109 P.3d 1272 (2005) (prosecutor’s comments that defense “simply arguing smoke and mir rors” and “[g]rasping at straws,” not improper, not outside wide latitude allowed in discussing evidence); State v. Lockhart, 24 Kan. App. 2d 488, 490-93, 947 P.2d 461, rev. denied 263 Kan. 889 (1997) (prosecutor s “smoke screen” argument noted but not found improper; basis for reversal in prosecutor’s references to defendant and defense counsel as liars); see also State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 210-12, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (approving prosecutor’s colorful analogy of defense theory to the Wizard of Oz); State v. Collier, No. 93,589, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion filed March 31, 2006, rev. denied 282 Kan. 792 (2006), slip op. at 8-9 (simple “smoke and mirrors” comments not considered prosecutorial misconduct; even if improper, no prejudice)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "approving prosecutor's colorful analogy of defense theory to the Wizard of Oz",
"sentence": "See State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 643-45, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor’s comments in arson case, which involved burning a dog, to effect that defense counsel had attempted to divert jury’s attention by arguing State did not know who dog’s owner was, labeling of tactic was “puff of smoke” not prosecutorial misconduct; comments not beyond bounds of legitimate rhetoric; puff of smoke argument responsive to defense counsel’s strained interpretation of evidence regarding defendant’s beliefs about who, if anyone, owned dog); State v. McCray, 267 Kan. 339, 348-51, 979 P.2d 134 (1999) (prosecutor’s “smoke screen” statement made in course of more egregious comments insinuating defense counsel’s “deception” was attempt to “fool,” “intimidare],” and “scare” jury; remarks outside bounds of proper argument but little likelihood they changed result); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718-20, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor called defense closing argument “a lot of smoke,” said “[i]t’s smoke and mirrors . . . trying to confuse you“; no intent to mislead and within permissible bounds of rhetoric); State v. Baker, 249 Kan. 431, 447, 819 P.2d 1173 (1991) (prosecutor argued defendant’s “nice boy image . . . [was] nonexistent,” “[i]t’s a smoke screen“; statements not gross nor flagrant, did not deprive defendant of fair trial); City of Dodge City v. Ingram, 33 Kan. App. 2d 829, 837-38, 109 P.3d 1272 (2005) (prosecutor’s comments that defense “simply arguing smoke and mir rors” and “[g]rasping at straws,” not improper, not outside wide latitude allowed in discussing evidence); State v. Lockhart, 24 Kan. App. 2d 488, 490-93, 947 P.2d 461, rev. denied 263 Kan. 889 (1997) (prosecutor s “smoke screen” argument noted but not found improper; basis for reversal in prosecutor’s references to defendant and defense counsel as liars); see also State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 210-12, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (approving prosecutor’s colorful analogy of defense theory to the Wizard of Oz); State v. Collier, No. 93,589, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion filed March 31, 2006, rev. denied 282 Kan. 792 (2006), slip op. at 8-9 (simple “smoke and mirrors” comments not considered prosecutorial misconduct; even if improper, no prejudice)."
} | 4,253,032 | a |
. Lacour also argues that the court should apply the rule of lenity because Congress' intent is not clear as to sentencing under SS 841(b)(1)(C). Because a reading of the Guidelines and statutory sections removes any potential ambiguity, we decline to invoke the rule of lenity here. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "9 F.3d 1455, 1455",
"parenthetical": "\"There is no ambiguity upon which the rule of lenity can operate\"",
"sentence": "See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463, 111 S.Ct. at 1926 (\"The rule of lenity, however, is not applicable unless there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of [a congressional act] ... ”); see also United States v. Nelson, 29 F.3d 261, 264 (7th Cir.1994); Crowell, 9 F.3d at 1455 (\"There is no ambiguity upon which the rule of lenity can operate”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 463, 463",
"parenthetical": "\"The rule of lenity, however, is not applicable unless there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of [a congressional act] ... \"",
"sentence": "See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463, 111 S.Ct. at 1926 (\"The rule of lenity, however, is not applicable unless there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of [a congressional act] ... ”); see also United States v. Nelson, 29 F.3d 261, 264 (7th Cir.1994); Crowell, 9 F.3d at 1455 (\"There is no ambiguity upon which the rule of lenity can operate”)."
} | 1,844,612 | b |
. Lacour also argues that the court should apply the rule of lenity because Congress' intent is not clear as to sentencing under SS 841(b)(1)(C). Because a reading of the Guidelines and statutory sections removes any potential ambiguity, we decline to invoke the rule of lenity here. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 S.Ct. 1926, 1926",
"parenthetical": "\"The rule of lenity, however, is not applicable unless there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of [a congressional act] ... \"",
"sentence": "See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463, 111 S.Ct. at 1926 (\"The rule of lenity, however, is not applicable unless there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of [a congressional act] ... ”); see also United States v. Nelson, 29 F.3d 261, 264 (7th Cir.1994); Crowell, 9 F.3d at 1455 (\"There is no ambiguity upon which the rule of lenity can operate”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "9 F.3d 1455, 1455",
"parenthetical": "\"There is no ambiguity upon which the rule of lenity can operate\"",
"sentence": "See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463, 111 S.Ct. at 1926 (\"The rule of lenity, however, is not applicable unless there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of [a congressional act] ... ”); see also United States v. Nelson, 29 F.3d 261, 264 (7th Cir.1994); Crowell, 9 F.3d at 1455 (\"There is no ambiguity upon which the rule of lenity can operate”)."
} | 1,844,612 | a |
Neither the affiant nor the informant reported having witnessed a drug transaction in the residence or a drug transaction involving anyone who was there or resided there. The affidavit contains no statement which asserts that anyone saw drugs in the residence or on a person at the residence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "22 Va.App. 646, 653-54",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer's] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable \"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "9 Va.App. 464, 464",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained \"a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment\"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | 1,080,268 | a |
Neither the affiant nor the informant reported having witnessed a drug transaction in the residence or a drug transaction involving anyone who was there or resided there. The affidavit contains no statement which asserts that anyone saw drugs in the residence or on a person at the residence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "22 Va.App. 646, 653-54",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer's] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable \"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "389 S.E.2d 180, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained \"a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment\"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | 1,080,268 | a |
Neither the affiant nor the informant reported having witnessed a drug transaction in the residence or a drug transaction involving anyone who was there or resided there. The affidavit contains no statement which asserts that anyone saw drugs in the residence or on a person at the residence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "472 S.E.2d 649, 653",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer's] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable \"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "9 Va.App. 464, 464",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained \"a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment\"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | 1,080,268 | a |
Neither the affiant nor the informant reported having witnessed a drug transaction in the residence or a drug transaction involving anyone who was there or resided there. The affidavit contains no statement which asserts that anyone saw drugs in the residence or on a person at the residence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "389 S.E.2d 180, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained \"a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment\"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "472 S.E.2d 649, 653",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer's] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable \"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | 1,080,268 | b |
Neither the affiant nor the informant reported having witnessed a drug transaction in the residence or a drug transaction involving anyone who was there or resided there. The affidavit contains no statement which asserts that anyone saw drugs in the residence or on a person at the residence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "9 Va.App. 464, 464",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained \"a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment\"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer's] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable \"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | 1,080,268 | b |
Neither the affiant nor the informant reported having witnessed a drug transaction in the residence or a drug transaction involving anyone who was there or resided there. The affidavit contains no statement which asserts that anyone saw drugs in the residence or on a person at the residence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer's] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable \"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "389 S.E.2d 180, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained \"a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment\"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | 1,080,268 | a |
Neither the affiant nor the informant reported having witnessed a drug transaction in the residence or a drug transaction involving anyone who was there or resided there. The affidavit contains no statement which asserts that anyone saw drugs in the residence or on a person at the residence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "9 Va.App. 464, 464",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained \"a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment\"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer's] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable \"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | 1,080,268 | b |
Neither the affiant nor the informant reported having witnessed a drug transaction in the residence or a drug transaction involving anyone who was there or resided there. The affidavit contains no statement which asserts that anyone saw drugs in the residence or on a person at the residence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer's] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable \"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "389 S.E.2d 180, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained \"a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment\"",
"sentence": "See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (holding that the “affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location, rendering [the officer’s] belief in probable cause, based solely on the affidavit, objectively unreasonable ”), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); see also Atkins, 9 Va.App. at 464, 389 S.E.2d at 180 (holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained “a detailed description of the nature of the offense, the premises to be searched, the items for which they were searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment”)."
} | 1,080,268 | a |
Notwithstanding Defendants' oral assertions they are not waiving counsel, but see Memoranda at 1 (wherein each Defendant states "this Defendant now makes this [his/her] knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to be represented by counsel and asserts [his/her] right to waive the right to counsel and to proceed Pro Se"), the Court concludes Defendants have at this point knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived their right to counsel and invoked their right to self-representation. It is also noted either may later waive the right to proceed pro se, either explicitly or by their conduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "665 F.2d 611, 611",
"parenthetical": "\"Even if defendant requests to represent himself, however, the right may be waived through defendant's subsequent conduct indicating he is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned his request altogether.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 665 F.2d at 611 (“Even if defendant requests to represent himself, however, the right may be waived through defendant’s subsequent conduct indicating he is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned his request altogether.”); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[T] he trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T] he trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 665 F.2d at 611 (“Even if defendant requests to represent himself, however, the right may be waived through defendant’s subsequent conduct indicating he is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned his request altogether.”); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[T] he trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.”)."
} | 11,530,885 | a |
Notwithstanding Defendants' oral assertions they are not waiving counsel, but see Memoranda at 1 (wherein each Defendant states "this Defendant now makes this [his/her] knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to be represented by counsel and asserts [his/her] right to waive the right to counsel and to proceed Pro Se"), the Court concludes Defendants have at this point knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived their right to counsel and invoked their right to self-representation. It is also noted either may later waive the right to proceed pro se, either explicitly or by their conduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T] he trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 665 F.2d at 611 (“Even if defendant requests to represent himself, however, the right may be waived through defendant’s subsequent conduct indicating he is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned his request altogether.”); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[T] he trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "665 F.2d 611, 611",
"parenthetical": "\"Even if defendant requests to represent himself, however, the right may be waived through defendant's subsequent conduct indicating he is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned his request altogether.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 665 F.2d at 611 (“Even if defendant requests to represent himself, however, the right may be waived through defendant’s subsequent conduct indicating he is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned his request altogether.”); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[T] he trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.”)."
} | 11,530,885 | b |
Prosecutors and witnesses both enjoy absolute immunity at common law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ruling that witnesses, including police officer-witnesses, are entitled to absolute immunity from SS 1983 liability",
"sentence": "See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (ruling that witnesses, including police officer-witnesses, are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (holding that the considerations underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity at common law “dictate the same absolute immunity under § 1983”). Absolute immunity even applies to those who prosecute and appear as witnesses in the course of an adjudication before an administrative agency."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "438 U.S. 478, 515-17",
"parenthetical": "concluding that agency officials performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to such acts",
"sentence": "Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515-17, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (concluding that agency officials performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to such acts)."
} | 11,529,769 | a |
Prosecutors and witnesses both enjoy absolute immunity at common law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ruling that witnesses, including police officer-witnesses, are entitled to absolute immunity from SS 1983 liability",
"sentence": "See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (ruling that witnesses, including police officer-witnesses, are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (holding that the considerations underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity at common law “dictate the same absolute immunity under § 1983”). Absolute immunity even applies to those who prosecute and appear as witnesses in the course of an adjudication before an administrative agency."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that agency officials performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to such acts",
"sentence": "Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515-17, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (concluding that agency officials performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to such acts)."
} | 11,529,769 | a |
Prosecutors and witnesses both enjoy absolute immunity at common law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that agency officials performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to such acts",
"sentence": "Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515-17, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (concluding that agency officials performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to such acts)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ruling that witnesses, including police officer-witnesses, are entitled to absolute immunity from SS 1983 liability",
"sentence": "See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (ruling that witnesses, including police officer-witnesses, are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (holding that the considerations underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity at common law “dictate the same absolute immunity under § 1983”). Absolute immunity even applies to those who prosecute and appear as witnesses in the course of an adjudication before an administrative agency."
} | 11,529,769 | b |
Prosecutors and witnesses both enjoy absolute immunity at common law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ruling that witnesses, including police officer-witnesses, are entitled to absolute immunity from SS 1983 liability",
"sentence": "See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (ruling that witnesses, including police officer-witnesses, are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (holding that the considerations underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity at common law “dictate the same absolute immunity under § 1983”). Absolute immunity even applies to those who prosecute and appear as witnesses in the course of an adjudication before an administrative agency."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "438 U.S. 478, 515-17",
"parenthetical": "concluding that agency officials performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to such acts",
"sentence": "Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515-17, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (concluding that agency officials performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to such acts)."
} | 11,529,769 | a |
Prosecutors and witnesses both enjoy absolute immunity at common law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ruling that witnesses, including police officer-witnesses, are entitled to absolute immunity from SS 1983 liability",
"sentence": "See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (ruling that witnesses, including police officer-witnesses, are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (holding that the considerations underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity at common law “dictate the same absolute immunity under § 1983”). Absolute immunity even applies to those who prosecute and appear as witnesses in the course of an adjudication before an administrative agency."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that agency officials performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to such acts",
"sentence": "Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515-17, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (concluding that agency officials performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to such acts)."
} | 11,529,769 | a |
Prosecutors and witnesses both enjoy absolute immunity at common law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that agency officials performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to such acts",
"sentence": "Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515-17, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (concluding that agency officials performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to such acts)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ruling that witnesses, including police officer-witnesses, are entitled to absolute immunity from SS 1983 liability",
"sentence": "See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (ruling that witnesses, including police officer-witnesses, are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (holding that the considerations underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity at common law “dictate the same absolute immunity under § 1983”). Absolute immunity even applies to those who prosecute and appear as witnesses in the course of an adjudication before an administrative agency."
} | 11,529,769 | b |
Prosecutors and witnesses both enjoy absolute immunity at common law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "438 U.S. 478, 515-17",
"parenthetical": "concluding that agency officials performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to such acts",
"sentence": "Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515-17, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (concluding that agency officials performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to such acts)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ruling that witnesses, including police officer-witnesses, are entitled to absolute immunity from SS 1983 liability",
"sentence": "See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (ruling that witnesses, including police officer-witnesses, are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (holding that the considerations underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity at common law “dictate the same absolute immunity under § 1983”). Absolute immunity even applies to those who prosecute and appear as witnesses in the course of an adjudication before an administrative agency."
} | 11,529,769 | b |
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