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We agree that he received something, and that it would be hard to call it anything but an appeal, but we cannot agree that what he received passed constitutional muster. The purpose of having counsel on appeal is to get a decision on the merits of the appealable issues the record presents. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is ... the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing\"",
"sentence": "See Lucey, supra, at 393, 105 S.Ct. 830 (“the services of a lawyer will for virtually every layman be necessary to present an appeal in a form suitable for appellate consideration on the merits”); 394 n. 6 (counsel is necessary “for the defendant to obtain a decision at all — much less a favorable decision — on the merits of the case”); 395 (“the Constitution cannot tolerate trials in which counsel, though present in name, is unable to assist the defendant to obtain a fair* decision on the merits”); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (“[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is ... the right of the accused to require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the services of a lawyer will for virtually every layman be necessary to present an appeal in a form suitable for appellate consideration on the merits\"",
"sentence": "See Lucey, supra, at 393, 105 S.Ct. 830 (“the services of a lawyer will for virtually every layman be necessary to present an appeal in a form suitable for appellate consideration on the merits”); 394 n. 6 (counsel is necessary “for the defendant to obtain a decision at all — much less a favorable decision — on the merits of the case”); 395 (“the Constitution cannot tolerate trials in which counsel, though present in name, is unable to assist the defendant to obtain a fair* decision on the merits”); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (“[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is ... the right of the accused to require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing”)."
} | 11,145,856 | b |
We agree that he received something, and that it would be hard to call it anything but an appeal, but we cannot agree that what he received passed constitutional muster. The purpose of having counsel on appeal is to get a decision on the merits of the appealable issues the record presents. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the services of a lawyer will for virtually every layman be necessary to present an appeal in a form suitable for appellate consideration on the merits\"",
"sentence": "See Lucey, supra, at 393, 105 S.Ct. 830 (“the services of a lawyer will for virtually every layman be necessary to present an appeal in a form suitable for appellate consideration on the merits”); 394 n. 6 (counsel is necessary “for the defendant to obtain a decision at all — much less a favorable decision — on the merits of the case”); 395 (“the Constitution cannot tolerate trials in which counsel, though present in name, is unable to assist the defendant to obtain a fair* decision on the merits”); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (“[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is ... the right of the accused to require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is ... the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing\"",
"sentence": "See Lucey, supra, at 393, 105 S.Ct. 830 (“the services of a lawyer will for virtually every layman be necessary to present an appeal in a form suitable for appellate consideration on the merits”); 394 n. 6 (counsel is necessary “for the defendant to obtain a decision at all — much less a favorable decision — on the merits of the case”); 395 (“the Constitution cannot tolerate trials in which counsel, though present in name, is unable to assist the defendant to obtain a fair* decision on the merits”); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (“[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is ... the right of the accused to require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing”)."
} | 11,145,856 | a |
The policy of the United States Supreme Court is that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who con curred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, though taking a narrower view, has differentiated between the reasoning of a plurality decision, which is not binding authority, and the "conclusion" of such a decision, which is still "binding on the parties in that particular case." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 797, 805",
"parenthetical": "looking to the \"last explained state-court judgment\" to determine state courts' basis for rejecting a habeas petitioner's claims, ignoring only a \"silent\" disposition by a higher court",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (looking to the “last explained state-court judgment” to determine state courts’ basis for rejecting a habeas petitioner’s claims, ignoring only a “silent” disposition by a higher court)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "568 F.3d 1091, 1099",
"parenthetical": "reviewing a state appellate court decision in an AEDPA case where the state supreme court had denied the petition for review of that decision without comment",
"sentence": "Cf. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir.2009) (reviewing a state appellate court decision in an AEDPA case where the state supreme court had denied the petition for review of that decision without comment); Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 (6th Cir.2006) (treating state supreme court decision as “last reasoned decision” as to claims that it explicitly decided, and state appeals court ruling as “last reasoned decision” as to claims the supreme court declined to address). Therefore, we look to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in our review under AEDPA."
} | 5,755,856 | a |
The policy of the United States Supreme Court is that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who con curred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, though taking a narrower view, has differentiated between the reasoning of a plurality decision, which is not binding authority, and the "conclusion" of such a decision, which is still "binding on the parties in that particular case." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 797, 805",
"parenthetical": "looking to the \"last explained state-court judgment\" to determine state courts' basis for rejecting a habeas petitioner's claims, ignoring only a \"silent\" disposition by a higher court",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (looking to the “last explained state-court judgment” to determine state courts’ basis for rejecting a habeas petitioner’s claims, ignoring only a “silent” disposition by a higher court)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "treating state supreme court decision as \"last reasoned decision\" as to claims that it explicitly decided, and state appeals court ruling as \"last reasoned decision\" as to claims the supreme court declined to address",
"sentence": "Cf. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir.2009) (reviewing a state appellate court decision in an AEDPA case where the state supreme court had denied the petition for review of that decision without comment); Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 (6th Cir.2006) (treating state supreme court decision as “last reasoned decision” as to claims that it explicitly decided, and state appeals court ruling as “last reasoned decision” as to claims the supreme court declined to address). Therefore, we look to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in our review under AEDPA."
} | 5,755,856 | a |
The policy of the United States Supreme Court is that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who con curred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, though taking a narrower view, has differentiated between the reasoning of a plurality decision, which is not binding authority, and the "conclusion" of such a decision, which is still "binding on the parties in that particular case." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "568 F.3d 1091, 1099",
"parenthetical": "reviewing a state appellate court decision in an AEDPA case where the state supreme court had denied the petition for review of that decision without comment",
"sentence": "Cf. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir.2009) (reviewing a state appellate court decision in an AEDPA case where the state supreme court had denied the petition for review of that decision without comment); Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 (6th Cir.2006) (treating state supreme court decision as “last reasoned decision” as to claims that it explicitly decided, and state appeals court ruling as “last reasoned decision” as to claims the supreme court declined to address). Therefore, we look to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in our review under AEDPA."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "looking to the \"last explained state-court judgment\" to determine state courts' basis for rejecting a habeas petitioner's claims, ignoring only a \"silent\" disposition by a higher court",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (looking to the “last explained state-court judgment” to determine state courts’ basis for rejecting a habeas petitioner’s claims, ignoring only a “silent” disposition by a higher court)."
} | 5,755,856 | b |
The policy of the United States Supreme Court is that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who con curred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, though taking a narrower view, has differentiated between the reasoning of a plurality decision, which is not binding authority, and the "conclusion" of such a decision, which is still "binding on the parties in that particular case." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "looking to the \"last explained state-court judgment\" to determine state courts' basis for rejecting a habeas petitioner's claims, ignoring only a \"silent\" disposition by a higher court",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (looking to the “last explained state-court judgment” to determine state courts’ basis for rejecting a habeas petitioner’s claims, ignoring only a “silent” disposition by a higher court)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "treating state supreme court decision as \"last reasoned decision\" as to claims that it explicitly decided, and state appeals court ruling as \"last reasoned decision\" as to claims the supreme court declined to address",
"sentence": "Cf. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir.2009) (reviewing a state appellate court decision in an AEDPA case where the state supreme court had denied the petition for review of that decision without comment); Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 (6th Cir.2006) (treating state supreme court decision as “last reasoned decision” as to claims that it explicitly decided, and state appeals court ruling as “last reasoned decision” as to claims the supreme court declined to address). Therefore, we look to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in our review under AEDPA."
} | 5,755,856 | a |
The policy of the United States Supreme Court is that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who con curred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, though taking a narrower view, has differentiated between the reasoning of a plurality decision, which is not binding authority, and the "conclusion" of such a decision, which is still "binding on the parties in that particular case." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "568 F.3d 1091, 1099",
"parenthetical": "reviewing a state appellate court decision in an AEDPA case where the state supreme court had denied the petition for review of that decision without comment",
"sentence": "Cf. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir.2009) (reviewing a state appellate court decision in an AEDPA case where the state supreme court had denied the petition for review of that decision without comment); Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 (6th Cir.2006) (treating state supreme court decision as “last reasoned decision” as to claims that it explicitly decided, and state appeals court ruling as “last reasoned decision” as to claims the supreme court declined to address). Therefore, we look to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in our review under AEDPA."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "looking to the \"last explained state-court judgment\" to determine state courts' basis for rejecting a habeas petitioner's claims, ignoring only a \"silent\" disposition by a higher court",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (looking to the “last explained state-court judgment” to determine state courts’ basis for rejecting a habeas petitioner’s claims, ignoring only a “silent” disposition by a higher court)."
} | 5,755,856 | b |
The policy of the United States Supreme Court is that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who con curred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, though taking a narrower view, has differentiated between the reasoning of a plurality decision, which is not binding authority, and the "conclusion" of such a decision, which is still "binding on the parties in that particular case." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "looking to the \"last explained state-court judgment\" to determine state courts' basis for rejecting a habeas petitioner's claims, ignoring only a \"silent\" disposition by a higher court",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (looking to the “last explained state-court judgment” to determine state courts’ basis for rejecting a habeas petitioner’s claims, ignoring only a “silent” disposition by a higher court)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "treating state supreme court decision as \"last reasoned decision\" as to claims that it explicitly decided, and state appeals court ruling as \"last reasoned decision\" as to claims the supreme court declined to address",
"sentence": "Cf. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir.2009) (reviewing a state appellate court decision in an AEDPA case where the state supreme court had denied the petition for review of that decision without comment); Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 (6th Cir.2006) (treating state supreme court decision as “last reasoned decision” as to claims that it explicitly decided, and state appeals court ruling as “last reasoned decision” as to claims the supreme court declined to address). Therefore, we look to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in our review under AEDPA."
} | 5,755,856 | a |
Our precedent, however, leads to the conclusion that SS 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) overcomes this presumption and places claims like Leyva's beyond the limits of our jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 F.3d 649, 653",
"parenthetical": "concluding that, even if the petitioner had asserted properly a denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment, SS 1252(a",
"sentence": "See Dave v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir.2004) (concluding that, even if the petitioner had asserted properly a denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) would have precluded the court’s jurisdiction, but allowing jurisdiction over constitutional claims which may present “bizarre miscar riages of justice.”); Kharkhan, 336 F.3d at 604 (concluding that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precluded jurisdiction over the petitioner’s constitutional claim); see also Bosede v. Ashcroft, 309 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir.2002) (concluding that a jurisdiction-limiting provision precluded our consideration of the petitioner’s “claim that his Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated”); Samirah v. O’Connell, 335 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir.2003) (concluding that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precluded jurisdiction over the petitioner’s challenge, outside the context of a habeas proceeding, to the revocation of his advance parole)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "309 F.3d 441, 446",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a jurisdiction-limiting provision precluded our consideration of the petitioner's \"claim that his Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated\"",
"sentence": "See Dave v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir.2004) (concluding that, even if the petitioner had asserted properly a denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) would have precluded the court’s jurisdiction, but allowing jurisdiction over constitutional claims which may present “bizarre miscar riages of justice.”); Kharkhan, 336 F.3d at 604 (concluding that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precluded jurisdiction over the petitioner’s constitutional claim); see also Bosede v. Ashcroft, 309 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir.2002) (concluding that a jurisdiction-limiting provision precluded our consideration of the petitioner’s “claim that his Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated”); Samirah v. O’Connell, 335 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir.2003) (concluding that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precluded jurisdiction over the petitioner’s challenge, outside the context of a habeas proceeding, to the revocation of his advance parole)."
} | 9,210,061 | a |
The Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury requires "criminal convie-tions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the erime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt." However, a judgment of NGRI does not constitute a conviction; rather, it operates as an acquittal of the charged offenses. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "869 P.2d 207, 209",
"parenthetical": "stating that a person committed after a finding of insanity \"will not actually have been convicted of the crime charged\"",
"sentence": "See Jacobs v. Carmel, 869 P.2d 207, 209 (Colo.1994) (stating that a person committed after a finding of insanity \"will not actually have been convicted of the crime charged\"); see also Parks v. Dist. Court, 180 Colo. 202, 503 P.2d 1029, 1033 (1972) (holding that insanity is \"a complete defense to the criminal charge\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that insanity is \"a complete defense to the criminal charge\"",
"sentence": "See Jacobs v. Carmel, 869 P.2d 207, 209 (Colo.1994) (stating that a person committed after a finding of insanity \"will not actually have been convicted of the crime charged\"); see also Parks v. Dist. Court, 180 Colo. 202, 503 P.2d 1029, 1033 (1972) (holding that insanity is \"a complete defense to the criminal charge\")."
} | 6,985,109 | a |
The Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury requires "criminal convie-tions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the erime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt." However, a judgment of NGRI does not constitute a conviction; rather, it operates as an acquittal of the charged offenses. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "503 P.2d 1029, 1033",
"parenthetical": "holding that insanity is \"a complete defense to the criminal charge\"",
"sentence": "See Jacobs v. Carmel, 869 P.2d 207, 209 (Colo.1994) (stating that a person committed after a finding of insanity \"will not actually have been convicted of the crime charged\"); see also Parks v. Dist. Court, 180 Colo. 202, 503 P.2d 1029, 1033 (1972) (holding that insanity is \"a complete defense to the criminal charge\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "869 P.2d 207, 209",
"parenthetical": "stating that a person committed after a finding of insanity \"will not actually have been convicted of the crime charged\"",
"sentence": "See Jacobs v. Carmel, 869 P.2d 207, 209 (Colo.1994) (stating that a person committed after a finding of insanity \"will not actually have been convicted of the crime charged\"); see also Parks v. Dist. Court, 180 Colo. 202, 503 P.2d 1029, 1033 (1972) (holding that insanity is \"a complete defense to the criminal charge\")."
} | 6,985,109 | b |
Because defendants were put on notice of the factual predicate for all of the potential antitrust claims -- whether federal or state-- of class members, regardless of whether they stayed in the class or opted out and filed individual actions, no "potential for unfair surprise" would be created by tolling the statutes of limitations for plaintiffs' state law claims. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "462 U.S. 353, 353",
"parenthetical": "once class action is filed, \"[t]he defendant will be aware of the need to preserve evidence and witnesses respecting the claims of all the members of the class\"",
"sentence": "Crown, Cork, 462 U.S. at 353, 103 S.Ct. 2392 (once class action is filed, “[t]he defendant will be aware of the need to preserve evidence and witnesses respecting the claims of all the members of the class”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "763 N.E.2d 163, 163",
"parenthetical": "when a class action is filed, \"the defendant is put on notice of the substance and nature of the claims against it\" as to any subsequent individual claims that might be asserted arising out of the same set of facts",
"sentence": "See also Vaccariello, 763 N.E.2d at 163 (when a class action is filed, “the defendant is put on notice of the substance and nature of the claims against it” as to any subsequent individual claims that might be asserted arising out of the same set of facts); Staub, 726 A.2d at 967 (“although defendants did not know of the specific claim of these plaintiffs until they commenced this suit, defendants knew within the period of limitations that if they were successful in defeating class certification, they would probably face individual suits”)."
} | 1,336,434 | a |
Because defendants were put on notice of the factual predicate for all of the potential antitrust claims -- whether federal or state-- of class members, regardless of whether they stayed in the class or opted out and filed individual actions, no "potential for unfair surprise" would be created by tolling the statutes of limitations for plaintiffs' state law claims. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "726 A.2d 967, 967",
"parenthetical": "\"although defendants did not know of the specific claim of these plaintiffs until they commenced this suit, defendants knew within the period of limitations that if they were successful in defeating class certification, they would probably face individual suits\"",
"sentence": "See also Vaccariello, 763 N.E.2d at 163 (when a class action is filed, “the defendant is put on notice of the substance and nature of the claims against it” as to any subsequent individual claims that might be asserted arising out of the same set of facts); Staub, 726 A.2d at 967 (“although defendants did not know of the specific claim of these plaintiffs until they commenced this suit, defendants knew within the period of limitations that if they were successful in defeating class certification, they would probably face individual suits”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "462 U.S. 353, 353",
"parenthetical": "once class action is filed, \"[t]he defendant will be aware of the need to preserve evidence and witnesses respecting the claims of all the members of the class\"",
"sentence": "Crown, Cork, 462 U.S. at 353, 103 S.Ct. 2392 (once class action is filed, “[t]he defendant will be aware of the need to preserve evidence and witnesses respecting the claims of all the members of the class”)."
} | 1,336,434 | b |
Because defendants were put on notice of the factual predicate for all of the potential antitrust claims -- whether federal or state-- of class members, regardless of whether they stayed in the class or opted out and filed individual actions, no "potential for unfair surprise" would be created by tolling the statutes of limitations for plaintiffs' state law claims. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "once class action is filed, \"[t]he defendant will be aware of the need to preserve evidence and witnesses respecting the claims of all the members of the class\"",
"sentence": "Crown, Cork, 462 U.S. at 353, 103 S.Ct. 2392 (once class action is filed, “[t]he defendant will be aware of the need to preserve evidence and witnesses respecting the claims of all the members of the class”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "763 N.E.2d 163, 163",
"parenthetical": "when a class action is filed, \"the defendant is put on notice of the substance and nature of the claims against it\" as to any subsequent individual claims that might be asserted arising out of the same set of facts",
"sentence": "See also Vaccariello, 763 N.E.2d at 163 (when a class action is filed, “the defendant is put on notice of the substance and nature of the claims against it” as to any subsequent individual claims that might be asserted arising out of the same set of facts); Staub, 726 A.2d at 967 (“although defendants did not know of the specific claim of these plaintiffs until they commenced this suit, defendants knew within the period of limitations that if they were successful in defeating class certification, they would probably face individual suits”)."
} | 1,336,434 | a |
Because defendants were put on notice of the factual predicate for all of the potential antitrust claims -- whether federal or state-- of class members, regardless of whether they stayed in the class or opted out and filed individual actions, no "potential for unfair surprise" would be created by tolling the statutes of limitations for plaintiffs' state law claims. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "once class action is filed, \"[t]he defendant will be aware of the need to preserve evidence and witnesses respecting the claims of all the members of the class\"",
"sentence": "Crown, Cork, 462 U.S. at 353, 103 S.Ct. 2392 (once class action is filed, “[t]he defendant will be aware of the need to preserve evidence and witnesses respecting the claims of all the members of the class”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "726 A.2d 967, 967",
"parenthetical": "\"although defendants did not know of the specific claim of these plaintiffs until they commenced this suit, defendants knew within the period of limitations that if they were successful in defeating class certification, they would probably face individual suits\"",
"sentence": "See also Vaccariello, 763 N.E.2d at 163 (when a class action is filed, “the defendant is put on notice of the substance and nature of the claims against it” as to any subsequent individual claims that might be asserted arising out of the same set of facts); Staub, 726 A.2d at 967 (“although defendants did not know of the specific claim of these plaintiffs until they commenced this suit, defendants knew within the period of limitations that if they were successful in defeating class certification, they would probably face individual suits”)."
} | 1,336,434 | a |
. In contrast, if the worker accepts an assignment from the temporary agency, but refuses without good cause to complete that specific assignment, the worker may face disqualification under the "quit" provisions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "349 N.W.2d 339, 341",
"parenthetical": "disqualifying relator for quitting when he accepted two-week assignment from temporary agency, but worked only one day and then refused to complete assignment",
"sentence": "See McDonnell v. Anytime Temporaries, 349 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Minn.App.1984) (disqualifying relator for quitting when he accepted two-week assignment from temporary agency, but worked only one day and then refused to complete assignment); see also Holman v. Olsten Corp., 389 N.W.2d 236, 240-41 (Minn.App.1986) (relator who accepted six-week assignment with temporary agency, then quit after two days, was not disqualified, but her benefits were suspended for period she would have held temporary assignment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "389 N.W.2d 236, 240-41",
"parenthetical": "relator who accepted six-week assignment with temporary agency, then quit after two days, was not disqualified, but her benefits were suspended for period she would have held temporary assignment",
"sentence": "See McDonnell v. Anytime Temporaries, 349 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Minn.App.1984) (disqualifying relator for quitting when he accepted two-week assignment from temporary agency, but worked only one day and then refused to complete assignment); see also Holman v. Olsten Corp., 389 N.W.2d 236, 240-41 (Minn.App.1986) (relator who accepted six-week assignment with temporary agency, then quit after two days, was not disqualified, but her benefits were suspended for period she would have held temporary assignment)."
} | 11,457,524 | a |
As the district court held, "circuit law is not clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court and is not, alone, a basis for the Court to grant habeas relief." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "130 S.Ct. 1855, 1866",
"parenthetical": "stating a court of appeal's decision \"does not constitute clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, SS 2254(d)(1), so any failure to apply that decision cannot independently authorize habeas relief under AEDPA\"",
"sentence": "See Renico v. Lett, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1866, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (stating a court of appeal’s decision “does not constitute clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, § 2254(d)(1), so any failure to apply that decision cannot independently authorize habeas relief under AEDPA”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir.2010) (“[Cjlearly established law as determined by [the Supreme Court] refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s decisions].” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)); but see Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.2000) (stating Circuit law “may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and also may help [courts of appeals] determine what law is ‘clearly established’ ”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "200 F.3d 597, 600",
"parenthetical": "stating Circuit law \"may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an 'unreasonable application' of Supreme Court law, and also may help [courts of appeals] determine what law is 'clearly established' \"",
"sentence": "See Renico v. Lett, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1866, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (stating a court of appeal’s decision “does not constitute clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, § 2254(d)(1), so any failure to apply that decision cannot independently authorize habeas relief under AEDPA”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir.2010) (“[Cjlearly established law as determined by [the Supreme Court] refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s decisions].” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)); but see Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.2000) (stating Circuit law “may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and also may help [courts of appeals] determine what law is ‘clearly established’ ”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,514,925 | a |
As the district court held, "circuit law is not clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court and is not, alone, a basis for the Court to grant habeas relief." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "200 F.3d 597, 600",
"parenthetical": "stating Circuit law \"may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an 'unreasonable application' of Supreme Court law, and also may help [courts of appeals] determine what law is 'clearly established' \"",
"sentence": "See Renico v. Lett, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1866, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (stating a court of appeal’s decision “does not constitute clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, § 2254(d)(1), so any failure to apply that decision cannot independently authorize habeas relief under AEDPA”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir.2010) (“[Cjlearly established law as determined by [the Supreme Court] refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s decisions].” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)); but see Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.2000) (stating Circuit law “may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and also may help [courts of appeals] determine what law is ‘clearly established’ ”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating a court of appeal's decision \"does not constitute clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, SS 2254(d)(1), so any failure to apply that decision cannot independently authorize habeas relief under AEDPA\"",
"sentence": "See Renico v. Lett, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1866, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (stating a court of appeal’s decision “does not constitute clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, § 2254(d)(1), so any failure to apply that decision cannot independently authorize habeas relief under AEDPA”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir.2010) (“[Cjlearly established law as determined by [the Supreme Court] refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s decisions].” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)); but see Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.2000) (stating Circuit law “may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and also may help [courts of appeals] determine what law is ‘clearly established’ ”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,514,925 | b |
As the district court held, "circuit law is not clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court and is not, alone, a basis for the Court to grant habeas relief." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "598 F.3d 612, 617",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjlearly established law as determined by [the Supreme Court] refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's decisions].\" (alterations in original",
"sentence": "See Renico v. Lett, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1866, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (stating a court of appeal’s decision “does not constitute clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, § 2254(d)(1), so any failure to apply that decision cannot independently authorize habeas relief under AEDPA”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir.2010) (“[Cjlearly established law as determined by [the Supreme Court] refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s decisions].” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)); but see Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.2000) (stating Circuit law “may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and also may help [courts of appeals] determine what law is ‘clearly established’ ”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "200 F.3d 597, 600",
"parenthetical": "stating Circuit law \"may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an 'unreasonable application' of Supreme Court law, and also may help [courts of appeals] determine what law is 'clearly established' \"",
"sentence": "See Renico v. Lett, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1866, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (stating a court of appeal’s decision “does not constitute clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, § 2254(d)(1), so any failure to apply that decision cannot independently authorize habeas relief under AEDPA”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir.2010) (“[Cjlearly established law as determined by [the Supreme Court] refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s decisions].” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)); but see Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.2000) (stating Circuit law “may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and also may help [courts of appeals] determine what law is ‘clearly established’ ”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,514,925 | a |
The determination of what is reasonable falls squarely within the province of the fact finder -- "what is a reasonable time is a question of fact, varied by the circumstances of each case." Further, in the context of the supreme court's analysis of "the circumstances" of that case, the reference to "reasonable time" and "market fluctuations" was to the seller's efforts to make a fair resale, not the market's actual condition at the time. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "908 S.W.2d 415, 426",
"parenthetical": "injured party, following a breach, must exercise reasonable care to minimize his damages if it can be done with slight expense and reasonable effort",
"sentence": "See 65 Tex. at 591 (court discusses plaintiffs efforts to sell property after breach and not the actual market conditions during the period between breach and resale); cf. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. North Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1, 908 S.W.2d 415, 426 (Tex.1995) (injured party, following a breach, must exercise reasonable care to minimize his damages if it can be done with slight expense and reasonable effort)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "65 Tex. 591, 591",
"parenthetical": "court discusses plaintiffs efforts to sell property after breach and not the actual market conditions during the period between breach and resale",
"sentence": "See 65 Tex. at 591 (court discusses plaintiffs efforts to sell property after breach and not the actual market conditions during the period between breach and resale); cf. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. North Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1, 908 S.W.2d 415, 426 (Tex.1995) (injured party, following a breach, must exercise reasonable care to minimize his damages if it can be done with slight expense and reasonable effort)."
} | 7,322,821 | b |
The officer in this case asked one question relating to the name "Steve Snobl" on the rental agreement and was told by Mr. Williams that the individual was his uncle who had rented the car in Phoenix. The remaining questions, as well as the subsequent detention of Mr. Williams, focused on whether Mr. Williams was carrying drugs in his car. Thus, although the discrepancy provided the officer with justification to detain Mr. Williams for the purpose of determining whether he was in lawful possession of the car, detention for the purpose of the canine drug sniff was justified only if the officer had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Williams was transporting drugs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "264 F.3d 1230, 1230",
"parenthetical": "noting that investigations of traffic violations \" 'are circumscribed by Terry's scope requirement' \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir.1995) (questions regarding contraband that were concurrent with a legitimate detention were justified only on reasonable suspicion of drug activity); see also Holt II, 264 F.3d at 1230 (noting that investigations of traffic violations “ ‘are circumscribed by Terry’s scope requirement’ ”) (quoting United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 788 (10th Cir.1995))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "44 F.3d 860, 872",
"parenthetical": "questions regarding contraband that were concurrent with a legitimate detention were justified only on reasonable suspicion of drug activity",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir.1995) (questions regarding contraband that were concurrent with a legitimate detention were justified only on reasonable suspicion of drug activity); see also Holt II, 264 F.3d at 1230 (noting that investigations of traffic violations “ ‘are circumscribed by Terry’s scope requirement’ ”) (quoting United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 788 (10th Cir.1995))."
} | 9,467,870 | b |
One way that the Supreme Court has ensured that the Cronic exception will remain rare, the scope of the decision will be narrow, and the burden of establishing the exception will be heavy is by requiring that there be a complete denial or total failure of counsel, if not at trial generally, at least at a critical stage of the prosecution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "535 U.S. 697, 697",
"parenthetical": "noting that counsel's failure to test the prosecution's case \"at specific points\" does not rise to the level of Cronic error",
"sentence": "See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 (“The presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.”); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 697, 122 S.Ct. at 1851 (noting that counsel’s failure to test the prosecution’s case “at specific points” does not rise to the level of Cronic error)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "466 U.S. 659, 659",
"parenthetical": "\"The presumption that counsel's assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.\"",
"sentence": "See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 (“The presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.”); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 697, 122 S.Ct. at 1851 (noting that counsel’s failure to test the prosecution’s case “at specific points” does not rise to the level of Cronic error)."
} | 12,277,144 | b |
One way that the Supreme Court has ensured that the Cronic exception will remain rare, the scope of the decision will be narrow, and the burden of establishing the exception will be heavy is by requiring that there be a complete denial or total failure of counsel, if not at trial generally, at least at a critical stage of the prosecution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "466 U.S. 659, 659",
"parenthetical": "\"The presumption that counsel's assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.\"",
"sentence": "See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 (“The presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.”); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 697, 122 S.Ct. at 1851 (noting that counsel’s failure to test the prosecution’s case “at specific points” does not rise to the level of Cronic error)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "122 S.Ct. 1851, 1851",
"parenthetical": "noting that counsel's failure to test the prosecution's case \"at specific points\" does not rise to the level of Cronic error",
"sentence": "See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 (“The presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.”); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 697, 122 S.Ct. at 1851 (noting that counsel’s failure to test the prosecution’s case “at specific points” does not rise to the level of Cronic error)."
} | 12,277,144 | a |
One way that the Supreme Court has ensured that the Cronic exception will remain rare, the scope of the decision will be narrow, and the burden of establishing the exception will be heavy is by requiring that there be a complete denial or total failure of counsel, if not at trial generally, at least at a critical stage of the prosecution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "535 U.S. 697, 697",
"parenthetical": "noting that counsel's failure to test the prosecution's case \"at specific points\" does not rise to the level of Cronic error",
"sentence": "See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 (“The presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.”); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 697, 122 S.Ct. at 1851 (noting that counsel’s failure to test the prosecution’s case “at specific points” does not rise to the level of Cronic error)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 2047, 2047",
"parenthetical": "\"The presumption that counsel's assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.\"",
"sentence": "See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 (“The presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.”); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 697, 122 S.Ct. at 1851 (noting that counsel’s failure to test the prosecution’s case “at specific points” does not rise to the level of Cronic error)."
} | 12,277,144 | b |
One way that the Supreme Court has ensured that the Cronic exception will remain rare, the scope of the decision will be narrow, and the burden of establishing the exception will be heavy is by requiring that there be a complete denial or total failure of counsel, if not at trial generally, at least at a critical stage of the prosecution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "122 S.Ct. 1851, 1851",
"parenthetical": "noting that counsel's failure to test the prosecution's case \"at specific points\" does not rise to the level of Cronic error",
"sentence": "See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 (“The presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.”); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 697, 122 S.Ct. at 1851 (noting that counsel’s failure to test the prosecution’s case “at specific points” does not rise to the level of Cronic error)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 2047, 2047",
"parenthetical": "\"The presumption that counsel's assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.\"",
"sentence": "See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 (“The presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.”); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 697, 122 S.Ct. at 1851 (noting that counsel’s failure to test the prosecution’s case “at specific points” does not rise to the level of Cronic error)."
} | 12,277,144 | b |
6. Even if the court were to hold for plaintiff, any order would be limited to restoration of pay forfeited and rank, ex-pungement of reference to the Article 15 proceedings in plaintiff's records, and back-pay for the pay differential until plaintiff's enlistment expired. The court lacks the power to effect plaintiff's reenlistment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no jurisdiction over claim for refusal of reenlistment absent some special provision of law giving a right to reenlist",
"sentence": "United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402, 96 S.Ct. 948, 955, 47 L.Ed. 114 (1976) (“The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....”); see Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 983 (Fed.Cir.1985) (no jurisdiction to award relief beyond current enlistment); Thompson v. United States, 221 Ct.Cl. 983 (1979) (no jurisdiction over claim for refusal of reenlistment absent some special provision of law giving a right to reenlist); Austin v. United States, 206 Ct.Cl. at 723 (“United States has undertaken to pay ... [enlisted men] only to the end of the current enlistment, unless it properly discharges them prior to that time....”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "424 U.S. 392, 402",
"parenthetical": "\"The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402, 96 S.Ct. 948, 955, 47 L.Ed. 114 (1976) (“The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....”); see Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 983 (Fed.Cir.1985) (no jurisdiction to award relief beyond current enlistment); Thompson v. United States, 221 Ct.Cl. 983 (1979) (no jurisdiction over claim for refusal of reenlistment absent some special provision of law giving a right to reenlist); Austin v. United States, 206 Ct.Cl. at 723 (“United States has undertaken to pay ... [enlisted men] only to the end of the current enlistment, unless it properly discharges them prior to that time....”) (citations omitted)."
} | 3,350,629 | b |
6. Even if the court were to hold for plaintiff, any order would be limited to restoration of pay forfeited and rank, ex-pungement of reference to the Article 15 proceedings in plaintiff's records, and back-pay for the pay differential until plaintiff's enlistment expired. The court lacks the power to effect plaintiff's reenlistment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "424 U.S. 392, 402",
"parenthetical": "\"The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402, 96 S.Ct. 948, 955, 47 L.Ed. 114 (1976) (“The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....”); see Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 983 (Fed.Cir.1985) (no jurisdiction to award relief beyond current enlistment); Thompson v. United States, 221 Ct.Cl. 983 (1979) (no jurisdiction over claim for refusal of reenlistment absent some special provision of law giving a right to reenlist); Austin v. United States, 206 Ct.Cl. at 723 (“United States has undertaken to pay ... [enlisted men] only to the end of the current enlistment, unless it properly discharges them prior to that time....”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "206 Ct.Cl. 723, 723",
"parenthetical": "\"United States has undertaken to pay ... [enlisted men] only to the end of the current enlistment, unless it properly discharges them prior to that time....\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402, 96 S.Ct. 948, 955, 47 L.Ed. 114 (1976) (“The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....”); see Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 983 (Fed.Cir.1985) (no jurisdiction to award relief beyond current enlistment); Thompson v. United States, 221 Ct.Cl. 983 (1979) (no jurisdiction over claim for refusal of reenlistment absent some special provision of law giving a right to reenlist); Austin v. United States, 206 Ct.Cl. at 723 (“United States has undertaken to pay ... [enlisted men] only to the end of the current enlistment, unless it properly discharges them prior to that time....”) (citations omitted)."
} | 3,350,629 | a |
6. Even if the court were to hold for plaintiff, any order would be limited to restoration of pay forfeited and rank, ex-pungement of reference to the Article 15 proceedings in plaintiff's records, and back-pay for the pay differential until plaintiff's enlistment expired. The court lacks the power to effect plaintiff's reenlistment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "96 S.Ct. 948, 955",
"parenthetical": "\"The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402, 96 S.Ct. 948, 955, 47 L.Ed. 114 (1976) (“The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....”); see Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 983 (Fed.Cir.1985) (no jurisdiction to award relief beyond current enlistment); Thompson v. United States, 221 Ct.Cl. 983 (1979) (no jurisdiction over claim for refusal of reenlistment absent some special provision of law giving a right to reenlist); Austin v. United States, 206 Ct.Cl. at 723 (“United States has undertaken to pay ... [enlisted men] only to the end of the current enlistment, unless it properly discharges them prior to that time....”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no jurisdiction over claim for refusal of reenlistment absent some special provision of law giving a right to reenlist",
"sentence": "United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402, 96 S.Ct. 948, 955, 47 L.Ed. 114 (1976) (“The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....”); see Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 983 (Fed.Cir.1985) (no jurisdiction to award relief beyond current enlistment); Thompson v. United States, 221 Ct.Cl. 983 (1979) (no jurisdiction over claim for refusal of reenlistment absent some special provision of law giving a right to reenlist); Austin v. United States, 206 Ct.Cl. at 723 (“United States has undertaken to pay ... [enlisted men] only to the end of the current enlistment, unless it properly discharges them prior to that time....”) (citations omitted)."
} | 3,350,629 | a |
6. Even if the court were to hold for plaintiff, any order would be limited to restoration of pay forfeited and rank, ex-pungement of reference to the Article 15 proceedings in plaintiff's records, and back-pay for the pay differential until plaintiff's enlistment expired. The court lacks the power to effect plaintiff's reenlistment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "96 S.Ct. 948, 955",
"parenthetical": "\"The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402, 96 S.Ct. 948, 955, 47 L.Ed. 114 (1976) (“The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....”); see Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 983 (Fed.Cir.1985) (no jurisdiction to award relief beyond current enlistment); Thompson v. United States, 221 Ct.Cl. 983 (1979) (no jurisdiction over claim for refusal of reenlistment absent some special provision of law giving a right to reenlist); Austin v. United States, 206 Ct.Cl. at 723 (“United States has undertaken to pay ... [enlisted men] only to the end of the current enlistment, unless it properly discharges them prior to that time....”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "206 Ct.Cl. 723, 723",
"parenthetical": "\"United States has undertaken to pay ... [enlisted men] only to the end of the current enlistment, unless it properly discharges them prior to that time....\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402, 96 S.Ct. 948, 955, 47 L.Ed. 114 (1976) (“The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....”); see Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 983 (Fed.Cir.1985) (no jurisdiction to award relief beyond current enlistment); Thompson v. United States, 221 Ct.Cl. 983 (1979) (no jurisdiction over claim for refusal of reenlistment absent some special provision of law giving a right to reenlist); Austin v. United States, 206 Ct.Cl. at 723 (“United States has undertaken to pay ... [enlisted men] only to the end of the current enlistment, unless it properly discharges them prior to that time....”) (citations omitted)."
} | 3,350,629 | a |
6. Even if the court were to hold for plaintiff, any order would be limited to restoration of pay forfeited and rank, ex-pungement of reference to the Article 15 proceedings in plaintiff's records, and back-pay for the pay differential until plaintiff's enlistment expired. The court lacks the power to effect plaintiff's reenlistment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no jurisdiction over claim for refusal of reenlistment absent some special provision of law giving a right to reenlist",
"sentence": "United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402, 96 S.Ct. 948, 955, 47 L.Ed. 114 (1976) (“The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....”); see Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 983 (Fed.Cir.1985) (no jurisdiction to award relief beyond current enlistment); Thompson v. United States, 221 Ct.Cl. 983 (1979) (no jurisdiction over claim for refusal of reenlistment absent some special provision of law giving a right to reenlist); Austin v. United States, 206 Ct.Cl. at 723 (“United States has undertaken to pay ... [enlisted men] only to the end of the current enlistment, unless it properly discharges them prior to that time....”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402, 96 S.Ct. 948, 955, 47 L.Ed. 114 (1976) (“The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....”); see Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 983 (Fed.Cir.1985) (no jurisdiction to award relief beyond current enlistment); Thompson v. United States, 221 Ct.Cl. 983 (1979) (no jurisdiction over claim for refusal of reenlistment absent some special provision of law giving a right to reenlist); Austin v. United States, 206 Ct.Cl. at 723 (“United States has undertaken to pay ... [enlisted men] only to the end of the current enlistment, unless it properly discharges them prior to that time....”) (citations omitted)."
} | 3,350,629 | b |
6. Even if the court were to hold for plaintiff, any order would be limited to restoration of pay forfeited and rank, ex-pungement of reference to the Article 15 proceedings in plaintiff's records, and back-pay for the pay differential until plaintiff's enlistment expired. The court lacks the power to effect plaintiff's reenlistment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402, 96 S.Ct. 948, 955, 47 L.Ed. 114 (1976) (“The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....”); see Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 983 (Fed.Cir.1985) (no jurisdiction to award relief beyond current enlistment); Thompson v. United States, 221 Ct.Cl. 983 (1979) (no jurisdiction over claim for refusal of reenlistment absent some special provision of law giving a right to reenlist); Austin v. United States, 206 Ct.Cl. at 723 (“United States has undertaken to pay ... [enlisted men] only to the end of the current enlistment, unless it properly discharges them prior to that time....”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "206 Ct.Cl. 723, 723",
"parenthetical": "\"United States has undertaken to pay ... [enlisted men] only to the end of the current enlistment, unless it properly discharges them prior to that time....\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402, 96 S.Ct. 948, 955, 47 L.Ed. 114 (1976) (“The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefits of a position until he has been duly appointed to it....”); see Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 983 (Fed.Cir.1985) (no jurisdiction to award relief beyond current enlistment); Thompson v. United States, 221 Ct.Cl. 983 (1979) (no jurisdiction over claim for refusal of reenlistment absent some special provision of law giving a right to reenlist); Austin v. United States, 206 Ct.Cl. at 723 (“United States has undertaken to pay ... [enlisted men] only to the end of the current enlistment, unless it properly discharges them prior to that time....”) (citations omitted)."
} | 3,350,629 | a |
By the time the officers arrived at Dagdagan's home, any emergency or exigency that might have justified their warrantless entry had long since passed. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "547 U.S. 406, 406",
"parenthetical": "finding warrantless entry justified to provide assistance where officers witnessed, through a window, a young man striking an adult in the face, \"sending the adult to the sink spitting blood\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 907 (9th Cir.2001) (“[T]he critical time for determining whether any exigency exists is the moment the officer makes the warrantless entry.”); cf. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406, 126 S.Ct. at 1949 (finding warrantless entry justified to provide assistance where officers witnessed, through a window, a young man striking an adult in the face, “sending the adult to the sink spitting blood”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "256 F.3d 895, 907",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he critical time for determining whether any exigency exists is the moment the officer makes the warrantless entry.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 907 (9th Cir.2001) (“[T]he critical time for determining whether any exigency exists is the moment the officer makes the warrantless entry.”); cf. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406, 126 S.Ct. at 1949 (finding warrantless entry justified to provide assistance where officers witnessed, through a window, a young man striking an adult in the face, “sending the adult to the sink spitting blood”)."
} | 5,702,013 | b |
By the time the officers arrived at Dagdagan's home, any emergency or exigency that might have justified their warrantless entry had long since passed. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "256 F.3d 895, 907",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he critical time for determining whether any exigency exists is the moment the officer makes the warrantless entry.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 907 (9th Cir.2001) (“[T]he critical time for determining whether any exigency exists is the moment the officer makes the warrantless entry.”); cf. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406, 126 S.Ct. at 1949 (finding warrantless entry justified to provide assistance where officers witnessed, through a window, a young man striking an adult in the face, “sending the adult to the sink spitting blood”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "126 S.Ct. 1949, 1949",
"parenthetical": "finding warrantless entry justified to provide assistance where officers witnessed, through a window, a young man striking an adult in the face, \"sending the adult to the sink spitting blood\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 907 (9th Cir.2001) (“[T]he critical time for determining whether any exigency exists is the moment the officer makes the warrantless entry.”); cf. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406, 126 S.Ct. at 1949 (finding warrantless entry justified to provide assistance where officers witnessed, through a window, a young man striking an adult in the face, “sending the adult to the sink spitting blood”)."
} | 5,702,013 | a |
122 This rationale of full disclosure similarly applies in situations in which defendants raise other mental conditions to aid in their defense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 P.2d 908, 914",
"parenthetical": "construing provisions in the context of the statute as a whole",
"sentence": "See People v. Herrera, 87 P.3d 240, 247 (Colo.App.2003) (noting that the provision precluding defense expert testimony on mental condition unless the defendant cooperates with compulsory mental examination \"is simply another means to discourage defendants from raising an insanity defense and then refusing to cooperate in the testing process that is necessary to determine the validity of the defense\"); see also City & County of Denver v. Casados, 862 P.2d 908, 914 (Colo.1993) (construing provisions in the context of the statute as a whole). Accordingly, we conclude that the statute, although affecting the procedure of the courts, also concerns the public policy of full disclosure in criminal cases involving a defense based on a defendant's mental condition."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "87 P.3d 240, 247",
"parenthetical": "noting that the provision precluding defense expert testimony on mental condition unless the defendant cooperates with compulsory mental examination \"is simply another means to discourage defendants from raising an insanity defense and then refusing to cooperate in the testing process that is necessary to determine the validity of the defense\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Herrera, 87 P.3d 240, 247 (Colo.App.2003) (noting that the provision precluding defense expert testimony on mental condition unless the defendant cooperates with compulsory mental examination \"is simply another means to discourage defendants from raising an insanity defense and then refusing to cooperate in the testing process that is necessary to determine the validity of the defense\"); see also City & County of Denver v. Casados, 862 P.2d 908, 914 (Colo.1993) (construing provisions in the context of the statute as a whole). Accordingly, we conclude that the statute, although affecting the procedure of the courts, also concerns the public policy of full disclosure in criminal cases involving a defense based on a defendant's mental condition."
} | 6,973,406 | b |
New York courts are not bound by Second Circuit interpretations of state case law. This is true even if the Second Circuit has placed a gloss on a state court decision in order to rescue that decision from federal constitutional shoals. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 N.Y.2d 60, 60",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].\"",
"sentence": "See Kin Kan, 78 N.Y.2d at 60, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 574 N.E.2d 1042, (“[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].”); cf. People v. Joyner, 303 A.D.2d 421, 755 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (2d Dep’t 2003) (rejecting a lower federal court’s conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting a lower federal court's conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution",
"sentence": "See Kin Kan, 78 N.Y.2d at 60, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 574 N.E.2d 1042, (“[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].”); cf. People v. Joyner, 303 A.D.2d 421, 755 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (2d Dep’t 2003) (rejecting a lower federal court’s conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution)."
} | 12,122,596 | a |
New York courts are not bound by Second Circuit interpretations of state case law. This is true even if the Second Circuit has placed a gloss on a state court decision in order to rescue that decision from federal constitutional shoals. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 N.Y.2d 60, 60",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].\"",
"sentence": "See Kin Kan, 78 N.Y.2d at 60, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 574 N.E.2d 1042, (“[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].”); cf. People v. Joyner, 303 A.D.2d 421, 755 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (2d Dep’t 2003) (rejecting a lower federal court’s conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "755 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867",
"parenthetical": "rejecting a lower federal court's conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution",
"sentence": "See Kin Kan, 78 N.Y.2d at 60, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 574 N.E.2d 1042, (“[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].”); cf. People v. Joyner, 303 A.D.2d 421, 755 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (2d Dep’t 2003) (rejecting a lower federal court’s conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution)."
} | 12,122,596 | a |
New York courts are not bound by Second Circuit interpretations of state case law. This is true even if the Second Circuit has placed a gloss on a state court decision in order to rescue that decision from federal constitutional shoals. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].\"",
"sentence": "See Kin Kan, 78 N.Y.2d at 60, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 574 N.E.2d 1042, (“[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].”); cf. People v. Joyner, 303 A.D.2d 421, 755 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (2d Dep’t 2003) (rejecting a lower federal court’s conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting a lower federal court's conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution",
"sentence": "See Kin Kan, 78 N.Y.2d at 60, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 574 N.E.2d 1042, (“[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].”); cf. People v. Joyner, 303 A.D.2d 421, 755 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (2d Dep’t 2003) (rejecting a lower federal court’s conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution)."
} | 12,122,596 | a |
New York courts are not bound by Second Circuit interpretations of state case law. This is true even if the Second Circuit has placed a gloss on a state court decision in order to rescue that decision from federal constitutional shoals. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "755 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867",
"parenthetical": "rejecting a lower federal court's conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution",
"sentence": "See Kin Kan, 78 N.Y.2d at 60, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 574 N.E.2d 1042, (“[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].”); cf. People v. Joyner, 303 A.D.2d 421, 755 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (2d Dep’t 2003) (rejecting a lower federal court’s conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].\"",
"sentence": "See Kin Kan, 78 N.Y.2d at 60, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 574 N.E.2d 1042, (“[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].”); cf. People v. Joyner, 303 A.D.2d 421, 755 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (2d Dep’t 2003) (rejecting a lower federal court’s conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution)."
} | 12,122,596 | b |
New York courts are not bound by Second Circuit interpretations of state case law. This is true even if the Second Circuit has placed a gloss on a state court decision in order to rescue that decision from federal constitutional shoals. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].\"",
"sentence": "See Kin Kan, 78 N.Y.2d at 60, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 574 N.E.2d 1042, (“[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].”); cf. People v. Joyner, 303 A.D.2d 421, 755 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (2d Dep’t 2003) (rejecting a lower federal court’s conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting a lower federal court's conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution",
"sentence": "See Kin Kan, 78 N.Y.2d at 60, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 574 N.E.2d 1042, (“[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].”); cf. People v. Joyner, 303 A.D.2d 421, 755 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (2d Dep’t 2003) (rejecting a lower federal court’s conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution)."
} | 12,122,596 | a |
New York courts are not bound by Second Circuit interpretations of state case law. This is true even if the Second Circuit has placed a gloss on a state court decision in order to rescue that decision from federal constitutional shoals. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].\"",
"sentence": "See Kin Kan, 78 N.Y.2d at 60, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 574 N.E.2d 1042, (“[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].”); cf. People v. Joyner, 303 A.D.2d 421, 755 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (2d Dep’t 2003) (rejecting a lower federal court’s conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "755 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867",
"parenthetical": "rejecting a lower federal court's conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution",
"sentence": "See Kin Kan, 78 N.Y.2d at 60, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 574 N.E.2d 1042, (“[T]he interpretation of a Federal constitutional question by the lower Federal courts ... [is] not binding [on the New York Court of Appeals].”); cf. People v. Joyner, 303 A.D.2d 421, 755 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (2d Dep’t 2003) (rejecting a lower federal court’s conclusion that state law violated the federal constitution)."
} | 12,122,596 | a |
At oral argument, counsel for the Secretary was unable to provide any explanation for why Matthews's request for a hearing on the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue went unheeded. In light of the Secretary's unexplained failure to provide Matthews a requested hearing and the fact that the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue was ultimately presented to the Secretary and considered by him in the ALJ's April 20, 2000 decision on whether Matthews was entitled to coverage for the full period of his stay at Gardens at Manhattan SNF, we, like the District Court, do not reject plaintiffs' claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "466 U.S. 602, 618",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "424 U.S. 319, 328",
"parenthetical": "providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. SS 405(g",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | 6,046,253 | b |
At oral argument, counsel for the Secretary was unable to provide any explanation for why Matthews's request for a hearing on the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue went unheeded. In light of the Secretary's unexplained failure to provide Matthews a requested hearing and the fact that the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue was ultimately presented to the Secretary and considered by him in the ALJ's April 20, 2000 decision on whether Matthews was entitled to coverage for the full period of his stay at Gardens at Manhattan SNF, we, like the District Court, do not reject plaintiffs' claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "424 U.S. 319, 328",
"parenthetical": "providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. SS 405(g",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | 6,046,253 | b |
At oral argument, counsel for the Secretary was unable to provide any explanation for why Matthews's request for a hearing on the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue went unheeded. In light of the Secretary's unexplained failure to provide Matthews a requested hearing and the fact that the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue was ultimately presented to the Secretary and considered by him in the ALJ's April 20, 2000 decision on whether Matthews was entitled to coverage for the full period of his stay at Gardens at Manhattan SNF, we, like the District Court, do not reject plaintiffs' claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "424 U.S. 319, 328",
"parenthetical": "providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. SS 405(g",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | 6,046,253 | a |
At oral argument, counsel for the Secretary was unable to provide any explanation for why Matthews's request for a hearing on the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue went unheeded. In light of the Secretary's unexplained failure to provide Matthews a requested hearing and the fact that the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue was ultimately presented to the Secretary and considered by him in the ALJ's April 20, 2000 decision on whether Matthews was entitled to coverage for the full period of his stay at Gardens at Manhattan SNF, we, like the District Court, do not reject plaintiffs' claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. SS 405(g",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "466 U.S. 602, 618",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | 6,046,253 | a |
At oral argument, counsel for the Secretary was unable to provide any explanation for why Matthews's request for a hearing on the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue went unheeded. In light of the Secretary's unexplained failure to provide Matthews a requested hearing and the fact that the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue was ultimately presented to the Secretary and considered by him in the ALJ's April 20, 2000 decision on whether Matthews was entitled to coverage for the full period of his stay at Gardens at Manhattan SNF, we, like the District Court, do not reject plaintiffs' claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. SS 405(g",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | 6,046,253 | b |
At oral argument, counsel for the Secretary was unable to provide any explanation for why Matthews's request for a hearing on the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue went unheeded. In light of the Secretary's unexplained failure to provide Matthews a requested hearing and the fact that the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue was ultimately presented to the Secretary and considered by him in the ALJ's April 20, 2000 decision on whether Matthews was entitled to coverage for the full period of his stay at Gardens at Manhattan SNF, we, like the District Court, do not reject plaintiffs' claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. SS 405(g",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | 6,046,253 | b |
At oral argument, counsel for the Secretary was unable to provide any explanation for why Matthews's request for a hearing on the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue went unheeded. In light of the Secretary's unexplained failure to provide Matthews a requested hearing and the fact that the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue was ultimately presented to the Secretary and considered by him in the ALJ's April 20, 2000 decision on whether Matthews was entitled to coverage for the full period of his stay at Gardens at Manhattan SNF, we, like the District Court, do not reject plaintiffs' claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "466 U.S. 602, 618",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. SS 405(g",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | 6,046,253 | b |
At oral argument, counsel for the Secretary was unable to provide any explanation for why Matthews's request for a hearing on the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue went unheeded. In light of the Secretary's unexplained failure to provide Matthews a requested hearing and the fact that the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue was ultimately presented to the Secretary and considered by him in the ALJ's April 20, 2000 decision on whether Matthews was entitled to coverage for the full period of his stay at Gardens at Manhattan SNF, we, like the District Court, do not reject plaintiffs' claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. SS 405(g",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | 6,046,253 | a |
At oral argument, counsel for the Secretary was unable to provide any explanation for why Matthews's request for a hearing on the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue went unheeded. In light of the Secretary's unexplained failure to provide Matthews a requested hearing and the fact that the Garden Gate Manor SNF discharge issue was ultimately presented to the Secretary and considered by him in the ALJ's April 20, 2000 decision on whether Matthews was entitled to coverage for the full period of his stay at Gardens at Manhattan SNF, we, like the District Court, do not reject plaintiffs' claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. SS 405(g",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (providing that under the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), ''[t]he waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted” and that ”[t]he nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary”); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (”[I]n certain special cases, deference to the Secretary's conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1984) (commenting that judicial waiver of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s exhaustion requirement may be appropriate where \"plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits”)."
} | 6,046,253 | a |
First, the medical records from the relevant period provide substantial evidence for the ALJ's implicit finding that Christina did not meet or medically equal the criteria for subsections B or C of Listing 103.03. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that ALJ's failure to address specific listing is not reversible error if record supports overall conclusion",
"sentence": "See Moore ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 413 F.3d 718, 721 n. 3 (8th Cir.2005) (noting that ALJ’s failure to address specific listing is not reversible error if record supports overall conclusion); Johnson v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 1067, 1070 (8th Cir.2004) (burden is on claimant to show she meets or equals listing’s requirements; to meet listing, impairment must meet all specified criteria); see also Neal ex rel. Walker v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2005) (child’s impairment is medically equal to listing if it is at least equal in severity and duration to listing’s medical criteria)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 F.3d 685, 689",
"parenthetical": "child's impairment is medically equal to listing if it is at least equal in severity and duration to listing's medical criteria",
"sentence": "See Moore ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 413 F.3d 718, 721 n. 3 (8th Cir.2005) (noting that ALJ’s failure to address specific listing is not reversible error if record supports overall conclusion); Johnson v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 1067, 1070 (8th Cir.2004) (burden is on claimant to show she meets or equals listing’s requirements; to meet listing, impairment must meet all specified criteria); see also Neal ex rel. Walker v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2005) (child’s impairment is medically equal to listing if it is at least equal in severity and duration to listing’s medical criteria)."
} | 3,886,925 | a |
See, e.g., RAP 2.2(b)(6) (providing that the State or a local government may appeal only "[a] sentence in a criminal case which is outside the standard range for the offense or which the state or local government believes involves a miscalculation of the standard range"); RCW 9.94A.585(1) ("A sentence within the standard sentence range for the offense shall not be appealed."). This precept arises from the notion that, so long as the sentence falls within the proper presumptive sentencing ranges set by the legislature, there can be no abuse of discretion, as a matter of law as to the sentence's length. However, this prohibition does not bar a party's right to challenge the underlying legal conclusions and determinations by which a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 Wn.2d 707, 712",
"parenthetical": "permitting appellate review of a criminal sentence where a defendant can demonstrate that the \"sentencing court had a duty to follow some specific procedure required by the [Sentencing Reform Act], and that the court failed to do so\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Mail, 121 Wn.2d 707, 712, 854 P.2d 1042 (1993) (permitting appellate review of a criminal sentence where a defendant can demonstrate that the “sentencing court had a duty to follow some specific procedure required by the [Sentencing Reform Act], and that the court failed to do so”). Thus, it is well established that appellate review is still available for the correction of legal errors or abuses of discretion in the determination of what sentence applies."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "112 Wn.2d 419, 423",
"parenthetical": "noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution",
"sentence": "App. 869, 876, 20 P.3d 476 (2001) (determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of sentencing); see also State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989) (noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution)."
} | 1,292,595 | a |
See, e.g., RAP 2.2(b)(6) (providing that the State or a local government may appeal only "[a] sentence in a criminal case which is outside the standard range for the offense or which the state or local government believes involves a miscalculation of the standard range"); RCW 9.94A.585(1) ("A sentence within the standard sentence range for the offense shall not be appealed."). This precept arises from the notion that, so long as the sentence falls within the proper presumptive sentencing ranges set by the legislature, there can be no abuse of discretion, as a matter of law as to the sentence's length. However, this prohibition does not bar a party's right to challenge the underlying legal conclusions and determinations by which a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 Wn.2d 707, 712",
"parenthetical": "permitting appellate review of a criminal sentence where a defendant can demonstrate that the \"sentencing court had a duty to follow some specific procedure required by the [Sentencing Reform Act], and that the court failed to do so\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Mail, 121 Wn.2d 707, 712, 854 P.2d 1042 (1993) (permitting appellate review of a criminal sentence where a defendant can demonstrate that the “sentencing court had a duty to follow some specific procedure required by the [Sentencing Reform Act], and that the court failed to do so”). Thus, it is well established that appellate review is still available for the correction of legal errors or abuses of discretion in the determination of what sentence applies."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution",
"sentence": "App. 869, 876, 20 P.3d 476 (2001) (determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of sentencing); see also State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989) (noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution)."
} | 1,292,595 | a |
See, e.g., RAP 2.2(b)(6) (providing that the State or a local government may appeal only "[a] sentence in a criminal case which is outside the standard range for the offense or which the state or local government believes involves a miscalculation of the standard range"); RCW 9.94A.585(1) ("A sentence within the standard sentence range for the offense shall not be appealed."). This precept arises from the notion that, so long as the sentence falls within the proper presumptive sentencing ranges set by the legislature, there can be no abuse of discretion, as a matter of law as to the sentence's length. However, this prohibition does not bar a party's right to challenge the underlying legal conclusions and determinations by which a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "112 Wn.2d 419, 423",
"parenthetical": "noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution",
"sentence": "App. 869, 876, 20 P.3d 476 (2001) (determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of sentencing); see also State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989) (noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "permitting appellate review of a criminal sentence where a defendant can demonstrate that the \"sentencing court had a duty to follow some specific procedure required by the [Sentencing Reform Act], and that the court failed to do so\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Mail, 121 Wn.2d 707, 712, 854 P.2d 1042 (1993) (permitting appellate review of a criminal sentence where a defendant can demonstrate that the “sentencing court had a duty to follow some specific procedure required by the [Sentencing Reform Act], and that the court failed to do so”). Thus, it is well established that appellate review is still available for the correction of legal errors or abuses of discretion in the determination of what sentence applies."
} | 1,292,595 | b |
See, e.g., RAP 2.2(b)(6) (providing that the State or a local government may appeal only "[a] sentence in a criminal case which is outside the standard range for the offense or which the state or local government believes involves a miscalculation of the standard range"); RCW 9.94A.585(1) ("A sentence within the standard sentence range for the offense shall not be appealed."). This precept arises from the notion that, so long as the sentence falls within the proper presumptive sentencing ranges set by the legislature, there can be no abuse of discretion, as a matter of law as to the sentence's length. However, this prohibition does not bar a party's right to challenge the underlying legal conclusions and determinations by which a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "permitting appellate review of a criminal sentence where a defendant can demonstrate that the \"sentencing court had a duty to follow some specific procedure required by the [Sentencing Reform Act], and that the court failed to do so\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Mail, 121 Wn.2d 707, 712, 854 P.2d 1042 (1993) (permitting appellate review of a criminal sentence where a defendant can demonstrate that the “sentencing court had a duty to follow some specific procedure required by the [Sentencing Reform Act], and that the court failed to do so”). Thus, it is well established that appellate review is still available for the correction of legal errors or abuses of discretion in the determination of what sentence applies."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution",
"sentence": "App. 869, 876, 20 P.3d 476 (2001) (determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of sentencing); see also State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989) (noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution)."
} | 1,292,595 | a |
See, e.g., RAP 2.2(b)(6) (providing that the State or a local government may appeal only "[a] sentence in a criminal case which is outside the standard range for the offense or which the state or local government believes involves a miscalculation of the standard range"); RCW 9.94A.585(1) ("A sentence within the standard sentence range for the offense shall not be appealed."). This precept arises from the notion that, so long as the sentence falls within the proper presumptive sentencing ranges set by the legislature, there can be no abuse of discretion, as a matter of law as to the sentence's length. However, this prohibition does not bar a party's right to challenge the underlying legal conclusions and determinations by which a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "112 Wn.2d 419, 423",
"parenthetical": "noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution",
"sentence": "App. 869, 876, 20 P.3d 476 (2001) (determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of sentencing); see also State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989) (noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "137 Wn.2d 472, 479",
"parenthetical": "misclassification of out-of-state convictions for purposes of calculating offender score",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 479, 973 P.2d 452 (1999) (misclassification of out-of-state convictions for purposes of calculating offender score); State v. Channon, 105 Wn."
} | 1,292,595 | b |
See, e.g., RAP 2.2(b)(6) (providing that the State or a local government may appeal only "[a] sentence in a criminal case which is outside the standard range for the offense or which the state or local government believes involves a miscalculation of the standard range"); RCW 9.94A.585(1) ("A sentence within the standard sentence range for the offense shall not be appealed."). This precept arises from the notion that, so long as the sentence falls within the proper presumptive sentencing ranges set by the legislature, there can be no abuse of discretion, as a matter of law as to the sentence's length. However, this prohibition does not bar a party's right to challenge the underlying legal conclusions and determinations by which a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution",
"sentence": "App. 869, 876, 20 P.3d 476 (2001) (determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of sentencing); see also State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989) (noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "137 Wn.2d 472, 479",
"parenthetical": "misclassification of out-of-state convictions for purposes of calculating offender score",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 479, 973 P.2d 452 (1999) (misclassification of out-of-state convictions for purposes of calculating offender score); State v. Channon, 105 Wn."
} | 1,292,595 | b |
See, e.g., RAP 2.2(b)(6) (providing that the State or a local government may appeal only "[a] sentence in a criminal case which is outside the standard range for the offense or which the state or local government believes involves a miscalculation of the standard range"); RCW 9.94A.585(1) ("A sentence within the standard sentence range for the offense shall not be appealed."). This precept arises from the notion that, so long as the sentence falls within the proper presumptive sentencing ranges set by the legislature, there can be no abuse of discretion, as a matter of law as to the sentence's length. However, this prohibition does not bar a party's right to challenge the underlying legal conclusions and determinations by which a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "112 Wn.2d 419, 423",
"parenthetical": "noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution",
"sentence": "App. 869, 876, 20 P.3d 476 (2001) (determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of sentencing); see also State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989) (noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "misclassification of out-of-state convictions for purposes of calculating offender score",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 479, 973 P.2d 452 (1999) (misclassification of out-of-state convictions for purposes of calculating offender score); State v. Channon, 105 Wn."
} | 1,292,595 | b |
See, e.g., RAP 2.2(b)(6) (providing that the State or a local government may appeal only "[a] sentence in a criminal case which is outside the standard range for the offense or which the state or local government believes involves a miscalculation of the standard range"); RCW 9.94A.585(1) ("A sentence within the standard sentence range for the offense shall not be appealed."). This precept arises from the notion that, so long as the sentence falls within the proper presumptive sentencing ranges set by the legislature, there can be no abuse of discretion, as a matter of law as to the sentence's length. However, this prohibition does not bar a party's right to challenge the underlying legal conclusions and determinations by which a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "misclassification of out-of-state convictions for purposes of calculating offender score",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 479, 973 P.2d 452 (1999) (misclassification of out-of-state convictions for purposes of calculating offender score); State v. Channon, 105 Wn."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution",
"sentence": "App. 869, 876, 20 P.3d 476 (2001) (determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of sentencing); see also State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989) (noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution)."
} | 1,292,595 | a |
See, e.g., RAP 2.2(b)(6) (providing that the State or a local government may appeal only "[a] sentence in a criminal case which is outside the standard range for the offense or which the state or local government believes involves a miscalculation of the standard range"); RCW 9.94A.585(1) ("A sentence within the standard sentence range for the offense shall not be appealed."). This precept arises from the notion that, so long as the sentence falls within the proper presumptive sentencing ranges set by the legislature, there can be no abuse of discretion, as a matter of law as to the sentence's length. However, this prohibition does not bar a party's right to challenge the underlying legal conclusions and determinations by which a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "112 Wn.2d 419, 423",
"parenthetical": "noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution",
"sentence": "App. 869, 876, 20 P.3d 476 (2001) (determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of sentencing); see also State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989) (noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the \"same criminal conduct\" for purposes of sentencing",
"sentence": "App. 869, 876, 20 P.3d 476 (2001) (determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of sentencing); see also State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989) (noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution)."
} | 1,292,595 | b |
See, e.g., RAP 2.2(b)(6) (providing that the State or a local government may appeal only "[a] sentence in a criminal case which is outside the standard range for the offense or which the state or local government believes involves a miscalculation of the standard range"); RCW 9.94A.585(1) ("A sentence within the standard sentence range for the offense shall not be appealed."). This precept arises from the notion that, so long as the sentence falls within the proper presumptive sentencing ranges set by the legislature, there can be no abuse of discretion, as a matter of law as to the sentence's length. However, this prohibition does not bar a party's right to challenge the underlying legal conclusions and determinations by which a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution",
"sentence": "App. 869, 876, 20 P.3d 476 (2001) (determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of sentencing); see also State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989) (noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the \"same criminal conduct\" for purposes of sentencing",
"sentence": "App. 869, 876, 20 P.3d 476 (2001) (determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of sentencing); see also State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989) (noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution)."
} | 1,292,595 | b |
In sum, despite defendants' admirable attempts to suggest that individual issues will abound, the court is unpersuaded. This case involves horizontal price-fixing allegations and common issues will clearly predominate. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "521 U.S. 625, 625",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging ... violations of the antitrust laws\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Vitamins Antitrust Lit., 209 F.R.D. at 262-70 (rejecting arguments similar to those raised by defendants in this case and concluding the predominance requirement was satisfied in a horizontal price-fixing case involving purchasers of vitamins); Linerboard Antitrust Lit., 203 F.R.D. at 214-23 (same in case involving purchasers of corrugated paper made using linerboard); In re Flat Glass Antitrust Lit., 191 F.R.D. 472, 484-88 (W.D.Pa.1999) (same in case involving purchasers of flat glass products); cf. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (observing that “predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging ... violations of the antitrust laws”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "209 F.R.D. 262, 262-70",
"parenthetical": "rejecting arguments similar to those raised by defendants in this case and concluding the predominance requirement was satisfied in a horizontal price-fixing case involving purchasers of vitamins",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Vitamins Antitrust Lit., 209 F.R.D. at 262-70 (rejecting arguments similar to those raised by defendants in this case and concluding the predominance requirement was satisfied in a horizontal price-fixing case involving purchasers of vitamins); Linerboard Antitrust Lit., 203 F.R.D. at 214-23 (same in case involving purchasers of corrugated paper made using linerboard); In re Flat Glass Antitrust Lit., 191 F.R.D. 472, 484-88 (W.D.Pa.1999) (same in case involving purchasers of flat glass products); cf. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (observing that “predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging ... violations of the antitrust laws”)."
} | 633,435 | b |
In sum, despite defendants' admirable attempts to suggest that individual issues will abound, the court is unpersuaded. This case involves horizontal price-fixing allegations and common issues will clearly predominate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "209 F.R.D. 262, 262-70",
"parenthetical": "rejecting arguments similar to those raised by defendants in this case and concluding the predominance requirement was satisfied in a horizontal price-fixing case involving purchasers of vitamins",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Vitamins Antitrust Lit., 209 F.R.D. at 262-70 (rejecting arguments similar to those raised by defendants in this case and concluding the predominance requirement was satisfied in a horizontal price-fixing case involving purchasers of vitamins); Linerboard Antitrust Lit., 203 F.R.D. at 214-23 (same in case involving purchasers of corrugated paper made using linerboard); In re Flat Glass Antitrust Lit., 191 F.R.D. 472, 484-88 (W.D.Pa.1999) (same in case involving purchasers of flat glass products); cf. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (observing that “predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging ... violations of the antitrust laws”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging ... violations of the antitrust laws\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Vitamins Antitrust Lit., 209 F.R.D. at 262-70 (rejecting arguments similar to those raised by defendants in this case and concluding the predominance requirement was satisfied in a horizontal price-fixing case involving purchasers of vitamins); Linerboard Antitrust Lit., 203 F.R.D. at 214-23 (same in case involving purchasers of corrugated paper made using linerboard); In re Flat Glass Antitrust Lit., 191 F.R.D. 472, 484-88 (W.D.Pa.1999) (same in case involving purchasers of flat glass products); cf. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (observing that “predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging ... violations of the antitrust laws”)."
} | 633,435 | a |
In sum, despite defendants' admirable attempts to suggest that individual issues will abound, the court is unpersuaded. This case involves horizontal price-fixing allegations and common issues will clearly predominate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "203 F.R.D. 214, 214-23",
"parenthetical": "same in case involving purchasers of corrugated paper made using linerboard",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Vitamins Antitrust Lit., 209 F.R.D. at 262-70 (rejecting arguments similar to those raised by defendants in this case and concluding the predominance requirement was satisfied in a horizontal price-fixing case involving purchasers of vitamins); Linerboard Antitrust Lit., 203 F.R.D. at 214-23 (same in case involving purchasers of corrugated paper made using linerboard); In re Flat Glass Antitrust Lit., 191 F.R.D. 472, 484-88 (W.D.Pa.1999) (same in case involving purchasers of flat glass products); cf. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (observing that “predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging ... violations of the antitrust laws”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "521 U.S. 625, 625",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging ... violations of the antitrust laws\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Vitamins Antitrust Lit., 209 F.R.D. at 262-70 (rejecting arguments similar to those raised by defendants in this case and concluding the predominance requirement was satisfied in a horizontal price-fixing case involving purchasers of vitamins); Linerboard Antitrust Lit., 203 F.R.D. at 214-23 (same in case involving purchasers of corrugated paper made using linerboard); In re Flat Glass Antitrust Lit., 191 F.R.D. 472, 484-88 (W.D.Pa.1999) (same in case involving purchasers of flat glass products); cf. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (observing that “predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging ... violations of the antitrust laws”)."
} | 633,435 | a |
In sum, despite defendants' admirable attempts to suggest that individual issues will abound, the court is unpersuaded. This case involves horizontal price-fixing allegations and common issues will clearly predominate. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging ... violations of the antitrust laws\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Vitamins Antitrust Lit., 209 F.R.D. at 262-70 (rejecting arguments similar to those raised by defendants in this case and concluding the predominance requirement was satisfied in a horizontal price-fixing case involving purchasers of vitamins); Linerboard Antitrust Lit., 203 F.R.D. at 214-23 (same in case involving purchasers of corrugated paper made using linerboard); In re Flat Glass Antitrust Lit., 191 F.R.D. 472, 484-88 (W.D.Pa.1999) (same in case involving purchasers of flat glass products); cf. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (observing that “predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging ... violations of the antitrust laws”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "203 F.R.D. 214, 214-23",
"parenthetical": "same in case involving purchasers of corrugated paper made using linerboard",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Vitamins Antitrust Lit., 209 F.R.D. at 262-70 (rejecting arguments similar to those raised by defendants in this case and concluding the predominance requirement was satisfied in a horizontal price-fixing case involving purchasers of vitamins); Linerboard Antitrust Lit., 203 F.R.D. at 214-23 (same in case involving purchasers of corrugated paper made using linerboard); In re Flat Glass Antitrust Lit., 191 F.R.D. 472, 484-88 (W.D.Pa.1999) (same in case involving purchasers of flat glass products); cf. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (observing that “predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging ... violations of the antitrust laws”)."
} | 633,435 | b |
To establish the second element (that the defendants "obtained]" the plaintiffs information), it is sufficient for a plaintiff to show that "people with access to the DVS Database viewed [the plaintiffs] personal driver's license information." Here again, the Eighth Circuit has also recently reached the same conclusion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2013 WL 5888235, at *2",
"parenthetical": "\"In the Court's view, information may be 'obtained' simply through viewing.\"",
"sentence": "McDonough, 799 F.3d at 944 (“In the context of the DPPA, the word ‘obtain’ unambiguously includes access and observation of the data.”); see also Nelson v. Jesson, No: 13-340, 2013 WL 5888235, at *2 (D.Minn. Nov. 1, 2013) (“In the Court’s view, information may be ‘obtained’ simply through viewing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "799 F.3d 944, 944",
"parenthetical": "\"In the context of the DPPA, the word 'obtain' unambiguously includes access and observation of the data.\"",
"sentence": "McDonough, 799 F.3d at 944 (“In the context of the DPPA, the word ‘obtain’ unambiguously includes access and observation of the data.”); see also Nelson v. Jesson, No: 13-340, 2013 WL 5888235, at *2 (D.Minn. Nov. 1, 2013) (“In the Court’s view, information may be ‘obtained’ simply through viewing.”)."
} | 4,180,635 | b |
. The administrative judge's decision is the final decision of the Board, and our jurisdiction over these appeals arises under 28 U.S.C. SS 1291. In the proceedings below, Twyman and Garcia also asserted discrimination claims, but they voluntarily dismissed those claims before the district court granted summary judgment. Our jurisdiction is not affected by the dismissal of the discrimination claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing the jurisdictional issues arising in appeals from the Board and holding that in a mixed case involving a good-faith discrimination claim and a nondiscrimination claim, the district court does not lose jurisdiction over the nondiscrimination claim when the discrimination claim is disposed of",
"sentence": "See Afifi v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 924 F.2d 61 (4th Cir.1991) (discussing the jurisdictional issues arising in appeals from the Board and holding that in a mixed case involving a good-faith discrimination claim and a nondiscrimination claim, the district court does not lose jurisdiction over the nondiscrimination claim when the discrimination claim is disposed of); see also Porsche Cars N.A., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248, 255 (4th Cir.2002) (noting that there is “no support for the ... proposition that the conditions that create subject-matter jurisdiction must necessarily persist throughout the life of a case”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "302 F.3d 248, 255",
"parenthetical": "noting that there is \"no support for the ... proposition that the conditions that create subject-matter jurisdiction must necessarily persist throughout the life of a case\"",
"sentence": "See Afifi v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 924 F.2d 61 (4th Cir.1991) (discussing the jurisdictional issues arising in appeals from the Board and holding that in a mixed case involving a good-faith discrimination claim and a nondiscrimination claim, the district court does not lose jurisdiction over the nondiscrimination claim when the discrimination claim is disposed of); see also Porsche Cars N.A., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248, 255 (4th Cir.2002) (noting that there is “no support for the ... proposition that the conditions that create subject-matter jurisdiction must necessarily persist throughout the life of a case”)."
} | 3,476,668 | a |
Parol evidence may be used, however, to show that false representations were made when the contract was executed. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parol evidence admissible where defendant agreed to fill in certain terms in contract but did not do so",
"sentence": "Kero v. Terminal Construction Corp., 6 N.J. 361, 78 A.2d 814 (1951) (parol evidence admissible where defendant agreed to fill in certain terms in contract but did not do so). Such an exception is limited, though, to those instances where one party seeks to disaffirm the contract rather than alter or change the agreement."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "300 A.2d 189, 189",
"parenthetical": "parole evidence \"does not preclude evidence that would tend to subvert or overthrow the writing entirely\"",
"sentence": "May v. Shohan, 131 N.J.L. 321, 36 A.2d 409 (1944); See also Emerson, 300 A.2d at 189 (parole evidence “does not preclude evidence that would tend to subvert or overthrow the writing entirely”)."
} | 7,381,318 | a |
Parol evidence may be used, however, to show that false representations were made when the contract was executed. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "300 A.2d 189, 189",
"parenthetical": "parole evidence \"does not preclude evidence that would tend to subvert or overthrow the writing entirely\"",
"sentence": "May v. Shohan, 131 N.J.L. 321, 36 A.2d 409 (1944); See also Emerson, 300 A.2d at 189 (parole evidence “does not preclude evidence that would tend to subvert or overthrow the writing entirely”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parol evidence admissible where defendant agreed to fill in certain terms in contract but did not do so",
"sentence": "Kero v. Terminal Construction Corp., 6 N.J. 361, 78 A.2d 814 (1951) (parol evidence admissible where defendant agreed to fill in certain terms in contract but did not do so). Such an exception is limited, though, to those instances where one party seeks to disaffirm the contract rather than alter or change the agreement."
} | 7,381,318 | b |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "69 F.3d 222, 229",
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "135 F.3d 1226, 1231",
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | b |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "135 F.3d 1226, 1231",
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | b |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "135 F.3d 1226, 1231",
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | a |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "135 F.3d 1226, 1231",
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | b |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "69 F.3d 222, 229",
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | a |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | a |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | b |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | b |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "69 F.3d 222, 229",
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | a |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | b |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | a |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | a |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "69 F.3d 222, 229",
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | b |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | b |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | b |
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, given its finding that Bennett belatedly reported a post-plea arrest to pretrial services. Further, the court did not plainly err in ordering restitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5El.l(a)(l) (1995) (requiring restitution); United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1231 (8th Cir.) (plain-error review where defendant fails to object to restitution order at sentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 944, 118 S.Ct. 2356, 141 L.Ed.2d 725 (1998); see also United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995) (restitution may be ordered even though defendant is indigent at time of sentencing). We have reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues."
} | 9,128,871 | a |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel's ineffectiveness",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | b |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "795 A.2d 935, 939-40",
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel's ineffectiveness",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | b |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel's ineffectiveness",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | b |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "795 A.2d 935, 939-40",
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel's ineffectiveness",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | b |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude\" in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | b |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude\" in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "795 A.2d 935, 939-40",
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | a |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "782 A.2d 517, 525",
"parenthetical": "\"a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude\" in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | a |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "795 A.2d 935, 939-40",
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "782 A.2d 517, 525",
"parenthetical": "\"a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude\" in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | b |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | a |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "795 A.2d 935, 939-40",
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | a |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | b |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "795 A.2d 935, 939-40",
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | b |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are \"properly layered\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | b |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are \"properly layered\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "795 A.2d 935, 939-40",
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | a |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are \"properly layered\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | a |
I disagree with the conclusion of the Majority that these ineffectiveness claims are waived. See Majority Op. at p. 328. After much reflection upon, and study of, our precedent in this area, I believe that Appellant, through tag lines and boilerplate language, has sufficiently presented all of these claims for our review, despite framing some as trial court error, constitutional violations, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel ineffectiveness. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are \"properly layered\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "795 A.2d 935, 939-40",
"parenthetical": "claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292 (2001) (reviewing merits of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for failing to raise prior counsel’s ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 525 (2001) (“a majority of this Court would presently continue to allow a degree of latitude” in developing layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims in briefs); Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 598 n. 3 (2000) (noting that “these ineffectiveness claims are properly layered because appellant argues that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to assert the claims of trial court error”); Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202, 204 n. 1 (2000) (claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness accompanied by claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are “properly layered”); but see Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 939-40 (2001) (claims of trial court error, constitutional error, and prosecuto-rial misconduct are waived despite being accompanied by tag line asserting ineffectiveness of prior counsel for failing to raise such claims); Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.2001) (same)."
} | 11,424,113 | a |
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