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It was a statutory adoption. More importantly, even if the proceedings had been in equity, that would not have given the trial court authority to require the Tribes to pay the attorney fees. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "714 P.2d 26, 80",
"parenthetical": "in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "125 Idaho 789, 791",
"parenthetical": "trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was \"[ajcting as a court of equity,\" because in Idaho \"there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally\"",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | 4,188,996 | a |
It was a statutory adoption. More importantly, even if the proceedings had been in equity, that would not have given the trial court authority to require the Tribes to pay the attorney fees. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 P.2d 600, 602",
"parenthetical": "trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was \"[ajcting as a court of equity,\" because in Idaho \"there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally\"",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "714 P.2d 26, 80",
"parenthetical": "in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute",
"sentence": "Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 80 (1986) (in an action in equity for relief from a judgment, attorney fees could only be awarded if authorized by statute); see also Excell Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 696, 116 P.3d 18, 26 (2005) (provision in Idaho Code section 72-708 that the practice and procedure under the worker’s compensation law be simple and “as far as possible in accord with the rules of equity” did not authorize the awarding of attorney fees); Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct.App.1994) (trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to a party on the ground that the court was “[ajcting as a court of equity,” because in Idaho “there is no equitable authority to award attorney fees generally”)."
} | 4,188,996 | b |
We begin with the NLRA. In Boston Harbor, the Supreme Court held that the NLRA does not preempt state or local government actions taken as a market participant. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We have held consistently that the NLRA was intended to supplant state labor regulation, not all legitimate state activity that affects labor.\"",
"sentence": "See 507 U.S. at 231-32, 113 S.Ct. 1190 (“In the absence of any express or implied indication by Congress that a State may not manage its own property when it pursues its purely proprietary interests, and where analogous private conduct would be permitted, this Court will not infer such a restriction.”); see also id. at 227, 113 S.Ct. 1190 (“We have held consistently that the NLRA was intended to supplant state labor regulation, not all legitimate state activity that affects labor.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "507 U.S. 231, 231-32",
"parenthetical": "\"In the absence of any express or implied indication by Congress that a State may not manage its own property when it pursues its purely proprietary interests, and where analogous private conduct would be permitted, this Court will not infer such a restriction.\"",
"sentence": "See 507 U.S. at 231-32, 113 S.Ct. 1190 (“In the absence of any express or implied indication by Congress that a State may not manage its own property when it pursues its purely proprietary interests, and where analogous private conduct would be permitted, this Court will not infer such a restriction.”); see also id. at 227, 113 S.Ct. 1190 (“We have held consistently that the NLRA was intended to supplant state labor regulation, not all legitimate state activity that affects labor.”)."
} | 12,266,741 | b |
We begin with the NLRA. In Boston Harbor, the Supreme Court held that the NLRA does not preempt state or local government actions taken as a market participant. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We have held consistently that the NLRA was intended to supplant state labor regulation, not all legitimate state activity that affects labor.\"",
"sentence": "See 507 U.S. at 231-32, 113 S.Ct. 1190 (“In the absence of any express or implied indication by Congress that a State may not manage its own property when it pursues its purely proprietary interests, and where analogous private conduct would be permitted, this Court will not infer such a restriction.”); see also id. at 227, 113 S.Ct. 1190 (“We have held consistently that the NLRA was intended to supplant state labor regulation, not all legitimate state activity that affects labor.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In the absence of any express or implied indication by Congress that a State may not manage its own property when it pursues its purely proprietary interests, and where analogous private conduct would be permitted, this Court will not infer such a restriction.\"",
"sentence": "See 507 U.S. at 231-32, 113 S.Ct. 1190 (“In the absence of any express or implied indication by Congress that a State may not manage its own property when it pursues its purely proprietary interests, and where analogous private conduct would be permitted, this Court will not infer such a restriction.”); see also id. at 227, 113 S.Ct. 1190 (“We have held consistently that the NLRA was intended to supplant state labor regulation, not all legitimate state activity that affects labor.”)."
} | 12,266,741 | b |
. Given our disposition of these issues, we need not address Tinsley's other challenges to his sentence. As to Tinsley's claim that the 120-month sentence imposed by the district court is unreasonably long, we note only that we have rejected similar sentences in cases involving defendants with extensive criminal records. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "445 F.3d 366, 372",
"parenthetical": "finding unreasonable a sentence of 120 months where advisory sentencing range was 30-37 months and defendant had more than twice the number of criminal history points needed to place him in category VI",
"sentence": "See United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 372 (4th Cir.2006) (finding unreasonable a sentence of 120 months where advisory sentencing range was 30-37 months and defendant had more than twice the number of criminal history points needed to place him in category VI); see also United States v. Tucker, 473 F.3d 556, 564-65 (4th Cir.2007) (in case where advisory sentencing range was 24-30 months, finding sentence of 144 months to be excessive notwithstanding district court’s reasonable belief that the defendant, who was before the court on her third conviction for embezzling from an employer, was highly likely to re-offend). The district court on remand should give due consideration to these cases when imposing and explaining Tinsley’s sentence."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 F.3d 556, 564-65",
"parenthetical": "in case where advisory sentencing range was 24-30 months, finding sentence of 144 months to be excessive notwithstanding district court's reasonable belief that the defendant, who was before the court on her third conviction for embezzling from an employer, was highly likely to re-offend",
"sentence": "See United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 372 (4th Cir.2006) (finding unreasonable a sentence of 120 months where advisory sentencing range was 30-37 months and defendant had more than twice the number of criminal history points needed to place him in category VI); see also United States v. Tucker, 473 F.3d 556, 564-65 (4th Cir.2007) (in case where advisory sentencing range was 24-30 months, finding sentence of 144 months to be excessive notwithstanding district court’s reasonable belief that the defendant, who was before the court on her third conviction for embezzling from an employer, was highly likely to re-offend). The district court on remand should give due consideration to these cases when imposing and explaining Tinsley’s sentence."
} | 5,690,029 | a |
(R. 187-38, Atlas Deck P 12; R. 187-59, Saviozzi Deck P 12; R. 187-48, James Deck P 15.) Nurses in SJH's emergency department frequently combine their paid rest break with their unpaid meal break. (R. 187-38, Atlas Deck P 11.) This evidence demonstrates that Defendants did not uniformly implement the meal period policy, but rather allowed each department to implement it in a way that addressed the particular needs of the department. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2011 WL 6372873, *7",
"parenthetical": "decertifying automatic meal deduction collective action, finding it relevant that \"[s]ome employees would not have a scheduled time for meal breaks and would take them when they could, other employees had regularly scheduled 30-minute breaks, and others had scheduled breaks that could not always be followed\"",
"sentence": "See White, 2011 WL 1883959, at *1 (decertifying automatic meal deduction collective action where, in implementing the automatic meal deduction policy, each of the defendants’ departments were “free to formulate ... procedure[s] that workfed] best for its employees”); see also Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., No. 09-85J, 2011 WL 6372873, *7 (W.D.Pa. Dee. 20, 2011) (decertifying automatic meal deduction collective action, finding it relevant that “[s]ome employees would not have a scheduled time for meal breaks and would take them when they could, other employees had regularly scheduled 30-minute breaks, and others had scheduled breaks that could not always be followed”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 1883959, at *1",
"parenthetical": "decertifying automatic meal deduction collective action where, in implementing the automatic meal deduction policy, each of the defendants' departments were \"free to formulate ... procedure[s] that workfed] best for its employees\"",
"sentence": "See White, 2011 WL 1883959, at *1 (decertifying automatic meal deduction collective action where, in implementing the automatic meal deduction policy, each of the defendants’ departments were “free to formulate ... procedure[s] that workfed] best for its employees”); see also Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., No. 09-85J, 2011 WL 6372873, *7 (W.D.Pa. Dee. 20, 2011) (decertifying automatic meal deduction collective action, finding it relevant that “[s]ome employees would not have a scheduled time for meal breaks and would take them when they could, other employees had regularly scheduled 30-minute breaks, and others had scheduled breaks that could not always be followed”)."
} | 4,252,243 | b |
The state therefore proved nothing more than that Deputy Gardinier had only a bare suspicion that the car which he stopped contained the suspects. "Although appellant fit the general description of the anonymous tip, that description could have fit many men." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "495 So.2d 191, 192",
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing",
"sentence": "Strong v. State, 495 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "556 So.2d 791, 793",
"parenthetical": "\"the color of a person's skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer's identification\"",
"sentence": "See also James v. State, 556 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“the color of a person’s skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer’s identification”); Ross v. State, 419 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area); Williams v. State, 454 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front)."
} | 7,449,535 | a |
The state therefore proved nothing more than that Deputy Gardinier had only a bare suspicion that the car which he stopped contained the suspects. "Although appellant fit the general description of the anonymous tip, that description could have fit many men." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "495 So.2d 191, 192",
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing",
"sentence": "Strong v. State, 495 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area",
"sentence": "See also James v. State, 556 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“the color of a person’s skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer’s identification”); Ross v. State, 419 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area); Williams v. State, 454 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front)."
} | 7,449,535 | a |
The state therefore proved nothing more than that Deputy Gardinier had only a bare suspicion that the car which he stopped contained the suspects. "Although appellant fit the general description of the anonymous tip, that description could have fit many men." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "495 So.2d 191, 192",
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing",
"sentence": "Strong v. State, 495 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front",
"sentence": "See also James v. State, 556 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“the color of a person’s skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer’s identification”); Ross v. State, 419 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area); Williams v. State, 454 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front)."
} | 7,449,535 | a |
The state therefore proved nothing more than that Deputy Gardinier had only a bare suspicion that the car which he stopped contained the suspects. "Although appellant fit the general description of the anonymous tip, that description could have fit many men." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing",
"sentence": "Strong v. State, 495 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "556 So.2d 791, 793",
"parenthetical": "\"the color of a person's skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer's identification\"",
"sentence": "See also James v. State, 556 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“the color of a person’s skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer’s identification”); Ross v. State, 419 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area); Williams v. State, 454 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front)."
} | 7,449,535 | a |
The state therefore proved nothing more than that Deputy Gardinier had only a bare suspicion that the car which he stopped contained the suspects. "Although appellant fit the general description of the anonymous tip, that description could have fit many men." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing",
"sentence": "Strong v. State, 495 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area",
"sentence": "See also James v. State, 556 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“the color of a person’s skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer’s identification”); Ross v. State, 419 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area); Williams v. State, 454 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front)."
} | 7,449,535 | a |
The state therefore proved nothing more than that Deputy Gardinier had only a bare suspicion that the car which he stopped contained the suspects. "Although appellant fit the general description of the anonymous tip, that description could have fit many men." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing",
"sentence": "Strong v. State, 495 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front",
"sentence": "See also James v. State, 556 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“the color of a person’s skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer’s identification”); Ross v. State, 419 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area); Williams v. State, 454 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front)."
} | 7,449,535 | a |
The state therefore proved nothing more than that Deputy Gardinier had only a bare suspicion that the car which he stopped contained the suspects. "Although appellant fit the general description of the anonymous tip, that description could have fit many men." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing",
"sentence": "Strong v. State, 495 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "556 So.2d 791, 793",
"parenthetical": "\"the color of a person's skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer's identification\"",
"sentence": "See also James v. State, 556 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“the color of a person’s skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer’s identification”); Ross v. State, 419 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area); Williams v. State, 454 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front)."
} | 7,449,535 | a |
The state therefore proved nothing more than that Deputy Gardinier had only a bare suspicion that the car which he stopped contained the suspects. "Although appellant fit the general description of the anonymous tip, that description could have fit many men." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area",
"sentence": "See also James v. State, 556 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“the color of a person’s skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer’s identification”); Ross v. State, 419 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area); Williams v. State, 454 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing",
"sentence": "Strong v. State, 495 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987)."
} | 7,449,535 | b |
The state therefore proved nothing more than that Deputy Gardinier had only a bare suspicion that the car which he stopped contained the suspects. "Although appellant fit the general description of the anonymous tip, that description could have fit many men." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front",
"sentence": "See also James v. State, 556 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“the color of a person’s skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer’s identification”); Ross v. State, 419 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area); Williams v. State, 454 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing",
"sentence": "Strong v. State, 495 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987)."
} | 7,449,535 | b |
The state therefore proved nothing more than that Deputy Gardinier had only a bare suspicion that the car which he stopped contained the suspects. "Although appellant fit the general description of the anonymous tip, that description could have fit many men." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "556 So.2d 791, 793",
"parenthetical": "\"the color of a person's skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer's identification\"",
"sentence": "See also James v. State, 556 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“the color of a person’s skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer’s identification”); Ross v. State, 419 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area); Williams v. State, 454 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing",
"sentence": "Strong v. State, 495 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987)."
} | 7,449,535 | b |
The state therefore proved nothing more than that Deputy Gardinier had only a bare suspicion that the car which he stopped contained the suspects. "Although appellant fit the general description of the anonymous tip, that description could have fit many men." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area",
"sentence": "See also James v. State, 556 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“the color of a person’s skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer’s identification”); Ross v. State, 419 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area); Williams v. State, 454 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing",
"sentence": "Strong v. State, 495 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987)."
} | 7,449,535 | b |
The state therefore proved nothing more than that Deputy Gardinier had only a bare suspicion that the car which he stopped contained the suspects. "Although appellant fit the general description of the anonymous tip, that description could have fit many men." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front",
"sentence": "See also James v. State, 556 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“the color of a person’s skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer’s identification”); Ross v. State, 419 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area); Williams v. State, 454 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing",
"sentence": "Strong v. State, 495 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987)."
} | 7,449,535 | b |
The state therefore proved nothing more than that Deputy Gardinier had only a bare suspicion that the car which he stopped contained the suspects. "Although appellant fit the general description of the anonymous tip, that description could have fit many men." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "556 So.2d 791, 793",
"parenthetical": "\"the color of a person's skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer's identification\"",
"sentence": "See also James v. State, 556 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“the color of a person’s skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer’s identification”); Ross v. State, 419 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area); Williams v. State, 454 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing",
"sentence": "Strong v. State, 495 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987)."
} | 7,449,535 | b |
The state therefore proved nothing more than that Deputy Gardinier had only a bare suspicion that the car which he stopped contained the suspects. "Although appellant fit the general description of the anonymous tip, that description could have fit many men." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing",
"sentence": "Strong v. State, 495 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area",
"sentence": "See also James v. State, 556 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“the color of a person’s skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer’s identification”); Ross v. State, 419 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area); Williams v. State, 454 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front)."
} | 7,449,535 | a |
The state therefore proved nothing more than that Deputy Gardinier had only a bare suspicion that the car which he stopped contained the suspects. "Although appellant fit the general description of the anonymous tip, that description could have fit many men." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing",
"sentence": "Strong v. State, 495 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that black male wearing dark clothing had a handgun at a particular convenience store, and officer patted down one of two black men at the store, who was wearing the darker clothing), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front",
"sentence": "See also James v. State, 556 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“the color of a person’s skin, although an identifying factor, is insufficient by itself to adequately narrow the scope of an officer’s identification”); Ross v. State, 419 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no founded suspicion when officer heard BOLO regarding an assault near a bar involving a black male with short, cropped hair, wearing white t-shirt and blue jeans, last seen heading north, and 25 minutes later, officer stopped defendant, who fit the description except that he had plaited hair and was heading south, because the description could have fit many people in the area); Williams v. State, 454 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (no founded suspicion when officer received tip that tall, black male was selling pot in front of a particular bar, and officers observed bulge in pocket of defendant sitting out front)."
} | 7,449,535 | a |
Before concluding, we note that, although the district court did not expressly state that it was dismissing Mr. Abernathy's petition for lack of jurisdiction, when a federal petitioner fails to establish that he has satisfied SS 2255(e)'s savings clause test -- thus, precluding him from proceeding under SS 2241 -- the court lacks statutory jurisdiction to hear his habeas claims. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "617 F.3d 802, 807",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner's SS 2241 petition because he failed to meet the Fourth Circuit's savings clause test",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be entertained ... unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” (emphasis added)); Brace, 634 F.3d at 1169-70 (affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a petitioner’s § 2241 petition, where the petitioner could not meet § 2255(e)’s savings clause); see also Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir.2010) (concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner’s § 2241 petition because he failed to meet the Fourth Circuit’s savings clause test); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 961-62 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to meet the Ninth Circuit’s savings clause test); cf. Palma-Sala-zar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1038 (10th Cir.2012) (holding that a § 2241 petitioner’s claim was not cognizable under § 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "634 F.3d 1169, 1169-70",
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a petitioner's SS 2241 petition, where the petitioner could not meet SS 2255(e",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be entertained ... unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” (emphasis added)); Brace, 634 F.3d at 1169-70 (affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a petitioner’s § 2241 petition, where the petitioner could not meet § 2255(e)’s savings clause); see also Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir.2010) (concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner’s § 2241 petition because he failed to meet the Fourth Circuit’s savings clause test); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 961-62 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to meet the Ninth Circuit’s savings clause test); cf. Palma-Sala-zar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1038 (10th Cir.2012) (holding that a § 2241 petitioner’s claim was not cognizable under § 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction)."
} | 3,560,062 | b |
Before concluding, we note that, although the district court did not expressly state that it was dismissing Mr. Abernathy's petition for lack of jurisdiction, when a federal petitioner fails to establish that he has satisfied SS 2255(e)'s savings clause test -- thus, precluding him from proceeding under SS 2241 -- the court lacks statutory jurisdiction to hear his habeas claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "634 F.3d 1169, 1169-70",
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a petitioner's SS 2241 petition, where the petitioner could not meet SS 2255(e",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be entertained ... unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” (emphasis added)); Brace, 634 F.3d at 1169-70 (affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a petitioner’s § 2241 petition, where the petitioner could not meet § 2255(e)’s savings clause); see also Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir.2010) (concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner’s § 2241 petition because he failed to meet the Fourth Circuit’s savings clause test); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 961-62 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to meet the Ninth Circuit’s savings clause test); cf. Palma-Sala-zar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1038 (10th Cir.2012) (holding that a § 2241 petitioner’s claim was not cognizable under § 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "519 F.3d 952, 961-62",
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's dismissal of a SS 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to meet the Ninth Circuit's savings clause test",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be entertained ... unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” (emphasis added)); Brace, 634 F.3d at 1169-70 (affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a petitioner’s § 2241 petition, where the petitioner could not meet § 2255(e)’s savings clause); see also Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir.2010) (concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner’s § 2241 petition because he failed to meet the Fourth Circuit’s savings clause test); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 961-62 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to meet the Ninth Circuit’s savings clause test); cf. Palma-Sala-zar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1038 (10th Cir.2012) (holding that a § 2241 petitioner’s claim was not cognizable under § 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction)."
} | 3,560,062 | a |
Before concluding, we note that, although the district court did not expressly state that it was dismissing Mr. Abernathy's petition for lack of jurisdiction, when a federal petitioner fails to establish that he has satisfied SS 2255(e)'s savings clause test -- thus, precluding him from proceeding under SS 2241 -- the court lacks statutory jurisdiction to hear his habeas claims. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "677 F.3d 1031, 1038",
"parenthetical": "holding that a SS 2241 petitioner's claim was not cognizable under SS 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be entertained ... unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” (emphasis added)); Brace, 634 F.3d at 1169-70 (affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a petitioner’s § 2241 petition, where the petitioner could not meet § 2255(e)’s savings clause); see also Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir.2010) (concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner’s § 2241 petition because he failed to meet the Fourth Circuit’s savings clause test); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 961-62 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to meet the Ninth Circuit’s savings clause test); cf. Palma-Sala-zar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1038 (10th Cir.2012) (holding that a § 2241 petitioner’s claim was not cognizable under § 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "634 F.3d 1169, 1169-70",
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a petitioner's SS 2241 petition, where the petitioner could not meet SS 2255(e",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be entertained ... unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” (emphasis added)); Brace, 634 F.3d at 1169-70 (affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a petitioner’s § 2241 petition, where the petitioner could not meet § 2255(e)’s savings clause); see also Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir.2010) (concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner’s § 2241 petition because he failed to meet the Fourth Circuit’s savings clause test); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 961-62 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to meet the Ninth Circuit’s savings clause test); cf. Palma-Sala-zar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1038 (10th Cir.2012) (holding that a § 2241 petitioner’s claim was not cognizable under § 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction)."
} | 3,560,062 | b |
Before concluding, we note that, although the district court did not expressly state that it was dismissing Mr. Abernathy's petition for lack of jurisdiction, when a federal petitioner fails to establish that he has satisfied SS 2255(e)'s savings clause test -- thus, precluding him from proceeding under SS 2241 -- the court lacks statutory jurisdiction to hear his habeas claims. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "677 F.3d 1031, 1038",
"parenthetical": "holding that a SS 2241 petitioner's claim was not cognizable under SS 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be entertained ... unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” (emphasis added)); Brace, 634 F.3d at 1169-70 (affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a petitioner’s § 2241 petition, where the petitioner could not meet § 2255(e)’s savings clause); see also Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir.2010) (concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner’s § 2241 petition because he failed to meet the Fourth Circuit’s savings clause test); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 961-62 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to meet the Ninth Circuit’s savings clause test); cf. Palma-Sala-zar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1038 (10th Cir.2012) (holding that a § 2241 petitioner’s claim was not cognizable under § 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "617 F.3d 802, 807",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner's SS 2241 petition because he failed to meet the Fourth Circuit's savings clause test",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be entertained ... unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” (emphasis added)); Brace, 634 F.3d at 1169-70 (affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a petitioner’s § 2241 petition, where the petitioner could not meet § 2255(e)’s savings clause); see also Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir.2010) (concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner’s § 2241 petition because he failed to meet the Fourth Circuit’s savings clause test); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 961-62 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to meet the Ninth Circuit’s savings clause test); cf. Palma-Sala-zar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1038 (10th Cir.2012) (holding that a § 2241 petitioner’s claim was not cognizable under § 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction)."
} | 3,560,062 | b |
Before concluding, we note that, although the district court did not expressly state that it was dismissing Mr. Abernathy's petition for lack of jurisdiction, when a federal petitioner fails to establish that he has satisfied SS 2255(e)'s savings clause test -- thus, precluding him from proceeding under SS 2241 -- the court lacks statutory jurisdiction to hear his habeas claims. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "519 F.3d 952, 961-62",
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's dismissal of a SS 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to meet the Ninth Circuit's savings clause test",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be entertained ... unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” (emphasis added)); Brace, 634 F.3d at 1169-70 (affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a petitioner’s § 2241 petition, where the petitioner could not meet § 2255(e)’s savings clause); see also Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir.2010) (concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner’s § 2241 petition because he failed to meet the Fourth Circuit’s savings clause test); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 961-62 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to meet the Ninth Circuit’s savings clause test); cf. Palma-Sala-zar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1038 (10th Cir.2012) (holding that a § 2241 petitioner’s claim was not cognizable under § 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "677 F.3d 1031, 1038",
"parenthetical": "holding that a SS 2241 petitioner's claim was not cognizable under SS 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be entertained ... unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” (emphasis added)); Brace, 634 F.3d at 1169-70 (affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a petitioner’s § 2241 petition, where the petitioner could not meet § 2255(e)’s savings clause); see also Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir.2010) (concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner’s § 2241 petition because he failed to meet the Fourth Circuit’s savings clause test); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 961-62 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to meet the Ninth Circuit’s savings clause test); cf. Palma-Sala-zar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1038 (10th Cir.2012) (holding that a § 2241 petitioner’s claim was not cognizable under § 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction)."
} | 3,560,062 | a |
Courts that have applied the Knights test have done so, in part, because they interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Knights as authorizing a general balancing test, rather than a special-needs test, when a person searched has a reduced expectation of privacy, regardless of whether the search is supported by individualized suspicion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "430 F.3d 665, 665",
"parenthetical": "\"Courts that have relied upon Knights as justifying the application of a general balancing test to DNA-indexing statutes have emphasized Knights's status as a probationer and his knowledge of the probation search condition, which reduced his expectation of privacy.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832 (reasoning that Knights affirmed the possibility that “conditional releasees’ diminished expectations of privacy may be sufficient to justify the judicial assessment of a parole or probation search’s reasonableness outside the strictures of special needs analysis”); see also Goord, 430 F.3d at 665 (“Courts that have relied upon Knights as justifying the application of a general balancing test to DNA-indexing statutes have emphasized Knights’s status as a probationer and his knowledge of the probation search condition, which reduced his expectation of privacy.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "379 F.3d 832, 832",
"parenthetical": "reasoning that Knights affirmed the possibility that \"conditional releasees' diminished expectations of privacy may be sufficient to justify the judicial assessment of a parole or probation search's reasonableness outside the strictures of special needs analysis\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832 (reasoning that Knights affirmed the possibility that “conditional releasees’ diminished expectations of privacy may be sufficient to justify the judicial assessment of a parole or probation search’s reasonableness outside the strictures of special needs analysis”); see also Goord, 430 F.3d at 665 (“Courts that have relied upon Knights as justifying the application of a general balancing test to DNA-indexing statutes have emphasized Knights’s status as a probationer and his knowledge of the probation search condition, which reduced his expectation of privacy.”)."
} | 72,811 | b |
Heartland chose instead to initiate the ordinary briefing process and to then file a full-throated opening brief that raised additional issues for our review beyond the contract-coverage dispute. Heartland's failure to reasonably mitigate the fees it incurred should factor into the court's decision to award fees for bad faith. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "522 F.2d 955, 958",
"parenthetical": "\"An award [of fees] for obstinacy, although a penalty, is only for the unnecessary efforts occasioned by the obstinacy.\"",
"sentence": "See Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir. 1975) (“An award [of fees] for obstinacy, although a penalty, is only for the unnecessary efforts occasioned by the obstinacy.”); cf. Leffler v. Meer, 936 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting “the duty to mitigate legal fees by promptly, where possible, disposing of baseless claims through summary procedures”); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 879 (5th Cir. 1988) (factoring into fee award “the extent to which the nonviolating party’s expenses and fees could have been avoided or were self-imposed”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "936 F.2d 981, 987",
"parenthetical": "noting \"the duty to mitigate legal fees by promptly, where possible, disposing of baseless claims through summary procedures\"",
"sentence": "See Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir. 1975) (“An award [of fees] for obstinacy, although a penalty, is only for the unnecessary efforts occasioned by the obstinacy.”); cf. Leffler v. Meer, 936 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting “the duty to mitigate legal fees by promptly, where possible, disposing of baseless claims through summary procedures”); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 879 (5th Cir. 1988) (factoring into fee award “the extent to which the nonviolating party’s expenses and fees could have been avoided or were self-imposed”)."
} | 12,172,313 | a |
Heartland chose instead to initiate the ordinary briefing process and to then file a full-throated opening brief that raised additional issues for our review beyond the contract-coverage dispute. Heartland's failure to reasonably mitigate the fees it incurred should factor into the court's decision to award fees for bad faith. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "522 F.2d 955, 958",
"parenthetical": "\"An award [of fees] for obstinacy, although a penalty, is only for the unnecessary efforts occasioned by the obstinacy.\"",
"sentence": "See Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir. 1975) (“An award [of fees] for obstinacy, although a penalty, is only for the unnecessary efforts occasioned by the obstinacy.”); cf. Leffler v. Meer, 936 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting “the duty to mitigate legal fees by promptly, where possible, disposing of baseless claims through summary procedures”); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 879 (5th Cir. 1988) (factoring into fee award “the extent to which the nonviolating party’s expenses and fees could have been avoided or were self-imposed”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "836 F.2d 866, 879",
"parenthetical": "factoring into fee award \"the extent to which the nonviolating party's expenses and fees could have been avoided or were self-imposed\"",
"sentence": "See Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir. 1975) (“An award [of fees] for obstinacy, although a penalty, is only for the unnecessary efforts occasioned by the obstinacy.”); cf. Leffler v. Meer, 936 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting “the duty to mitigate legal fees by promptly, where possible, disposing of baseless claims through summary procedures”); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 879 (5th Cir. 1988) (factoring into fee award “the extent to which the nonviolating party’s expenses and fees could have been avoided or were self-imposed”)."
} | 12,172,313 | a |
Johnson asserts that the jurors' findings on various "mitigating factors" are against the weight of the evidence, and thus, that she is entitled to a new trial, in the "penalty phase," if not in all phases, pursuant to Rule 33(a). Again, the court may grant a new trial even where there is substantial evidence to sustain the verdict, if the court nevertheless finds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "391 F.3d 934, 934",
"parenthetical": "providing for a new trial \"if the interest of justice so requires\"",
"sentence": "See Dodd, 391 F.3d at 934. However, the court does not find that the jury’s findings on the challenged “mitigating factors” were either against the weight of the evidence or that a “miscarriage of justice” will occur if the jury’s findings are allowed to stand. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a) (providing for a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires”); see also Campos, 306 F.3d at 579 (interpreting the “interest of justice” requirement for a new trial under Rule 33(a) to mean that a “miscarriage of justice” would otherwise occur)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "306 F.3d 579, 579",
"parenthetical": "interpreting the \"interest of justice\" requirement for a new trial under Rule 33(a) to mean that a \"miscarriage of justice\" would otherwise occur",
"sentence": "See Dodd, 391 F.3d at 934. However, the court does not find that the jury’s findings on the challenged “mitigating factors” were either against the weight of the evidence or that a “miscarriage of justice” will occur if the jury’s findings are allowed to stand. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a) (providing for a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires”); see also Campos, 306 F.3d at 579 (interpreting the “interest of justice” requirement for a new trial under Rule 33(a) to mean that a “miscarriage of justice” would otherwise occur)."
} | 884,580 | a |
Cases discussing the "due process" limitation on a court's inherent powers do not explicitly define the substantive content of those limitations. That said, however, the key factor in determining whether the entry of default violates due process appears to be whether the conduct for which default was entered related to the merits of the case, or only to a peripheral matter. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "666 F.2d 414, 416-17",
"parenthetical": "finding that default judgment against defendant for failure to pay a fine when the defendant had complied with an order to give a deposition was punitive and a violation of due process as the court could not presume that the case lacked merit",
"sentence": "Cf. SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 666 F.2d 414, 416-17 (9th Cir.1982) (finding that default judgment against defendant for failure to pay a fine when the defendant had complied with an order to give a deposition was punitive and a violation of due process as the court could not presume that the case lacked merit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "826 F.2d 917, 917",
"parenthetical": "upholding lower court's entry of default where appellant's perjury \"infected all of the pretrial procedures and interfered egregiously with the court's administration of justice\" and \"greatly disadvantaged the plaintiffs who had planned their strategy and developed then-case to respond to [appellant's] false evidence\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., TeleVideo, 826 F.2d at 917 (upholding lower court’s entry of default where appellant’s perjury “infected all of the pretrial procedures and interfered egregiously with the court’s administration of justice” and “greatly disadvantaged the plaintiffs who had planned their strategy and developed then-case to respond to [appellant’s] false evidence”)."
} | 6,464,783 | b |
In fact, Walker's responsibilities specifically include both "[s]upervis[ing]" and "instructfing]" in order to "[c]om-plete[] assignments' using inmate labor." Nothing before us indicates that Walker exceeded the scope of his authority as that authority was defined by his supervisors and by the job description. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "846 So.2d 322, 331",
"parenthetical": "\"A State agent is ... immune from civil liability for exercising judgment in supervising personnel.\"",
"sentence": "See also Ex parte Spivey, 846 So.2d 322, 331 (Ala.2002) (“A State agent is ... immune from civil liability for exercising judgment in supervising personnel.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "852 So.2d 117, 122",
"parenthetical": "\"State-agent immunity protects state employees, as agents of the State, in the exercise of their judgment in executing their work responsibilities.\"",
"sentence": "Ex parte Hayles, 852 So.2d 117, 122 (Ala.2002) (“State-agent immunity protects state employees, as agents of the State, in the exercise of their judgment in executing their work responsibilities.”)."
} | 6,812,716 | b |
As such, some states employ the reasonable doubt standard in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. Others, however, have rejected the argument that the failure to require the jury to find that death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt renders a death penalty statute unconstitutional. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "again rejecting claim that U.S. Constitution requires instruction that jury must find death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Benson, 52 Cal.3d 754, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330, 362 (1990) (again rejecting claim that U.S. Constitution requires instruction that jury must find death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "jury need not be statutorily required to determine death penalty is appropriate where procedural safeguards ensure appropriateness",
"sentence": "See also State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264, 280 (1984) (jury need not be statutorily required to determine death penalty is appropriate where procedural safeguards ensure appropriateness)."
} | 7,324,122 | a |
As such, some states employ the reasonable doubt standard in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. Others, however, have rejected the argument that the failure to require the jury to find that death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt renders a death penalty statute unconstitutional. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "again rejecting claim that U.S. Constitution requires instruction that jury must find death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Benson, 52 Cal.3d 754, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330, 362 (1990) (again rejecting claim that U.S. Constitution requires instruction that jury must find death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 N.E.2d 264, 280",
"parenthetical": "jury need not be statutorily required to determine death penalty is appropriate where procedural safeguards ensure appropriateness",
"sentence": "See also State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264, 280 (1984) (jury need not be statutorily required to determine death penalty is appropriate where procedural safeguards ensure appropriateness)."
} | 7,324,122 | a |
As such, some states employ the reasonable doubt standard in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. Others, however, have rejected the argument that the failure to require the jury to find that death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt renders a death penalty statute unconstitutional. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "again rejecting claim that U.S. Constitution requires instruction that jury must find death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Benson, 52 Cal.3d 754, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330, 362 (1990) (again rejecting claim that U.S. Constitution requires instruction that jury must find death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "jury need not be statutorily required to determine death penalty is appropriate where procedural safeguards ensure appropriateness",
"sentence": "See also State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264, 280 (1984) (jury need not be statutorily required to determine death penalty is appropriate where procedural safeguards ensure appropriateness)."
} | 7,324,122 | a |
As such, some states employ the reasonable doubt standard in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. Others, however, have rejected the argument that the failure to require the jury to find that death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt renders a death penalty statute unconstitutional. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 N.E.2d 264, 280",
"parenthetical": "jury need not be statutorily required to determine death penalty is appropriate where procedural safeguards ensure appropriateness",
"sentence": "See also State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264, 280 (1984) (jury need not be statutorily required to determine death penalty is appropriate where procedural safeguards ensure appropriateness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "again rejecting claim that U.S. Constitution requires instruction that jury must find death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Benson, 52 Cal.3d 754, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330, 362 (1990) (again rejecting claim that U.S. Constitution requires instruction that jury must find death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 7,324,122 | b |
As such, some states employ the reasonable doubt standard in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. Others, however, have rejected the argument that the failure to require the jury to find that death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt renders a death penalty statute unconstitutional. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "802 P.2d 330, 362",
"parenthetical": "again rejecting claim that U.S. Constitution requires instruction that jury must find death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Benson, 52 Cal.3d 754, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330, 362 (1990) (again rejecting claim that U.S. Constitution requires instruction that jury must find death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "jury need not be statutorily required to determine death penalty is appropriate where procedural safeguards ensure appropriateness",
"sentence": "See also State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264, 280 (1984) (jury need not be statutorily required to determine death penalty is appropriate where procedural safeguards ensure appropriateness)."
} | 7,324,122 | a |
As such, some states employ the reasonable doubt standard in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. Others, however, have rejected the argument that the failure to require the jury to find that death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt renders a death penalty statute unconstitutional. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 N.E.2d 264, 280",
"parenthetical": "jury need not be statutorily required to determine death penalty is appropriate where procedural safeguards ensure appropriateness",
"sentence": "See also State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264, 280 (1984) (jury need not be statutorily required to determine death penalty is appropriate where procedural safeguards ensure appropriateness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "802 P.2d 330, 362",
"parenthetical": "again rejecting claim that U.S. Constitution requires instruction that jury must find death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Benson, 52 Cal.3d 754, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330, 362 (1990) (again rejecting claim that U.S. Constitution requires instruction that jury must find death is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 7,324,122 | b |
This vesting order, we are convinced, places Price's claim in respect of the Washington archive outside of the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. In a brief and well-reasoned opinion, the D.C. Circuit has read this exception to prevent efforts by plaintiffs to use the Federal Tort Claims Act to circumvent the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting a defamation claim based on the plaintiff being placed on a list of persons pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act that blocked them from engaging in certain transactions",
"sentence": "Gubbins v. United States, 192 F.2d 411 (D.C.Cir.1951) (rejecting a defamation claim based on the plaintiff being placed on a list of persons pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act that blocked them from engaging in certain transactions); see also Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 674-76, 80 S.Ct. 1288, 1294-95, 4 L.Ed.2d 1478 (1960) (holding that the Trading with the Enemy Act’s provisions for judicial review are exclusive of any other remedy, and rejecting arguments that judicial review of actions taken under the Trading with the Enemy Act is available via the Administrative Procedure Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "363 U.S. 666, 674-76",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Trading with the Enemy Act's provisions for judicial review are exclusive of any other remedy, and rejecting arguments that judicial review of actions taken under the Trading with the Enemy Act is available via the Administrative Procedure Act",
"sentence": "Gubbins v. United States, 192 F.2d 411 (D.C.Cir.1951) (rejecting a defamation claim based on the plaintiff being placed on a list of persons pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act that blocked them from engaging in certain transactions); see also Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 674-76, 80 S.Ct. 1288, 1294-95, 4 L.Ed.2d 1478 (1960) (holding that the Trading with the Enemy Act’s provisions for judicial review are exclusive of any other remedy, and rejecting arguments that judicial review of actions taken under the Trading with the Enemy Act is available via the Administrative Procedure Act)."
} | 7,409,356 | a |
This vesting order, we are convinced, places Price's claim in respect of the Washington archive outside of the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. In a brief and well-reasoned opinion, the D.C. Circuit has read this exception to prevent efforts by plaintiffs to use the Federal Tort Claims Act to circumvent the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "80 S.Ct. 1288, 1294-95",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Trading with the Enemy Act's provisions for judicial review are exclusive of any other remedy, and rejecting arguments that judicial review of actions taken under the Trading with the Enemy Act is available via the Administrative Procedure Act",
"sentence": "Gubbins v. United States, 192 F.2d 411 (D.C.Cir.1951) (rejecting a defamation claim based on the plaintiff being placed on a list of persons pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act that blocked them from engaging in certain transactions); see also Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 674-76, 80 S.Ct. 1288, 1294-95, 4 L.Ed.2d 1478 (1960) (holding that the Trading with the Enemy Act’s provisions for judicial review are exclusive of any other remedy, and rejecting arguments that judicial review of actions taken under the Trading with the Enemy Act is available via the Administrative Procedure Act)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting a defamation claim based on the plaintiff being placed on a list of persons pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act that blocked them from engaging in certain transactions",
"sentence": "Gubbins v. United States, 192 F.2d 411 (D.C.Cir.1951) (rejecting a defamation claim based on the plaintiff being placed on a list of persons pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act that blocked them from engaging in certain transactions); see also Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 674-76, 80 S.Ct. 1288, 1294-95, 4 L.Ed.2d 1478 (1960) (holding that the Trading with the Enemy Act’s provisions for judicial review are exclusive of any other remedy, and rejecting arguments that judicial review of actions taken under the Trading with the Enemy Act is available via the Administrative Procedure Act)."
} | 7,409,356 | b |
This vesting order, we are convinced, places Price's claim in respect of the Washington archive outside of the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. In a brief and well-reasoned opinion, the D.C. Circuit has read this exception to prevent efforts by plaintiffs to use the Federal Tort Claims Act to circumvent the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting a defamation claim based on the plaintiff being placed on a list of persons pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act that blocked them from engaging in certain transactions",
"sentence": "Gubbins v. United States, 192 F.2d 411 (D.C.Cir.1951) (rejecting a defamation claim based on the plaintiff being placed on a list of persons pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act that blocked them from engaging in certain transactions); see also Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 674-76, 80 S.Ct. 1288, 1294-95, 4 L.Ed.2d 1478 (1960) (holding that the Trading with the Enemy Act’s provisions for judicial review are exclusive of any other remedy, and rejecting arguments that judicial review of actions taken under the Trading with the Enemy Act is available via the Administrative Procedure Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Trading with the Enemy Act's provisions for judicial review are exclusive of any other remedy, and rejecting arguments that judicial review of actions taken under the Trading with the Enemy Act is available via the Administrative Procedure Act",
"sentence": "Gubbins v. United States, 192 F.2d 411 (D.C.Cir.1951) (rejecting a defamation claim based on the plaintiff being placed on a list of persons pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act that blocked them from engaging in certain transactions); see also Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 674-76, 80 S.Ct. 1288, 1294-95, 4 L.Ed.2d 1478 (1960) (holding that the Trading with the Enemy Act’s provisions for judicial review are exclusive of any other remedy, and rejecting arguments that judicial review of actions taken under the Trading with the Enemy Act is available via the Administrative Procedure Act)."
} | 7,409,356 | a |
As a "vessel of the United States," the MADAM CHAPEL was not governed by the state of New York's system for titling and recording of security interests. We agree with the Third Circuit that once a vessel has been federally documented, the validity of security interests is determined by federal law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "634 F.2d 952, 956",
"parenthetical": "vessel becomes \"vessel of the United States\" when the completed Application for Documentation is received by the Coast Guard",
"sentence": "In re Alberto, 823 F.2d 712, 716 (3d Cir.1987) (to permit state law to govern security interests in federally documented vessels would undermine congressional intent); see also Merchants National Bank of Mobile v. Ward Rig, No. 7, 634 F.2d 952, 956 (5th Cir.1981) (vessel becomes “vessel of the United States” when the completed Application for Documentation is received by the Coast Guard)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "823 F.2d 712, 716",
"parenthetical": "to permit state law to govern security interests in federally documented vessels would undermine congressional intent",
"sentence": "In re Alberto, 823 F.2d 712, 716 (3d Cir.1987) (to permit state law to govern security interests in federally documented vessels would undermine congressional intent); see also Merchants National Bank of Mobile v. Ward Rig, No. 7, 634 F.2d 952, 956 (5th Cir.1981) (vessel becomes “vessel of the United States” when the completed Application for Documentation is received by the Coast Guard)."
} | 7,412,712 | b |
As a result, neither the police officers' warrantless entry into Rush's yard or their subsequent observation of the beer and liquor containers through the basement window violated Rush's Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, we reject Rush's argument that the police officers' actions were improper. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that when a police officer observes something from an area where the officer is lawfully entitled to be, anything that is in \"open view\" may be observed without having to obtain a search warrant because making such \"open view\" observations does not constitute a search in the constitutional sense",
"sentence": "See Trimble, 842 N.E.2d at 801 (recognizing that a police officer’s observation or inspection of contraband during the course of a legitimate investigation does not necessarily result in an unconstitutional search); see also Kendall v. State, 825 N.E.2d 439 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), ajfd in part and vacated in part on other grounds (holding that when a police officer observes something from an area where the officer is lawfully entitled to be, anything that is in “open view” may be observed without having to obtain a search warrant because making such “open view” observations does not constitute a search in the constitutional sense)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "842 N.E.2d 801, 801",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a police officer's observation or inspection of contraband during the course of a legitimate investigation does not necessarily result in an unconstitutional search",
"sentence": "See Trimble, 842 N.E.2d at 801 (recognizing that a police officer’s observation or inspection of contraband during the course of a legitimate investigation does not necessarily result in an unconstitutional search); see also Kendall v. State, 825 N.E.2d 439 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), ajfd in part and vacated in part on other grounds (holding that when a police officer observes something from an area where the officer is lawfully entitled to be, anything that is in “open view” may be observed without having to obtain a search warrant because making such “open view” observations does not constitute a search in the constitutional sense)."
} | 8,384,592 | b |
[P 21] Although much later in the course of the interrogation, the detectives stated that Holloway was not under arrest and not "in custody" in response to his inquiries, the detectives never stated to Holloway at any time prior to his formal arrest that he was free to leave or free to not answer their questions. The detectives immediately took control of the situation, dictated the terms of the questioning, and later in the interview indicated that someone could be sent to retrieve breakfast, while denying Holloway's request for beer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "922 F.2d 1352, 1352",
"parenthetical": "noting \"The Miranda court was deeply concerned with the effect of an incommunicado, police dominated atmosphere on a criminal suspect's will to resist self-incrimination during interrogation.\"",
"sentence": "See Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1352 (noting “The Miranda court was deeply concerned with the effect of an incommunicado, police dominated atmosphere on a criminal suspect’s will to resist self-incrimination during interrogation.”); see also United States v. Johnson, 64 F.3d 1120, 1126 (8th Cir.1995) (noting a useful factor when making a determination of custody was “whether the atmosphere was police dominated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "64 F.3d 1120, 1126",
"parenthetical": "noting a useful factor when making a determination of custody was \"whether the atmosphere was police dominated\"",
"sentence": "See Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1352 (noting “The Miranda court was deeply concerned with the effect of an incommunicado, police dominated atmosphere on a criminal suspect’s will to resist self-incrimination during interrogation.”); see also United States v. Johnson, 64 F.3d 1120, 1126 (8th Cir.1995) (noting a useful factor when making a determination of custody was “whether the atmosphere was police dominated”)."
} | 11,182,807 | a |
3. The district court properly denied Kalilikane an opportunity to continue his testimony, because of Kalilikane's disruptive behavior and the inadmissibility of Kalilikane's proffered testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "820 F.2d 1065, 1074",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] defendant can waive [the] right to testify through contumacious conduct.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir.1999) (“[A] defendant’s right to testify is not unduly restricted by rules limiting a defendant’s testimony to relevant matters ... ”) (citation omitted) (emphasis in the original); see also United States v. Johnson, 820 F.2d 1065, 1074 (9th Cir.1987) (“[A] defendant can waive [the] right to testify through contumacious conduct.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "189 F.3d 1089, 1095",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] defendant's right to testify is not unduly restricted by rules limiting a defendant's testimony to relevant matters ... \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir.1999) (“[A] defendant’s right to testify is not unduly restricted by rules limiting a defendant’s testimony to relevant matters ... ”) (citation omitted) (emphasis in the original); see also United States v. Johnson, 820 F.2d 1065, 1074 (9th Cir.1987) (“[A] defendant can waive [the] right to testify through contumacious conduct.”) (citation omitted)."
} | 4,122,310 | b |
Exh. 26, P 16. The box provided on the form for "retaliation/reprisal" was not checked. At the time the administrative complaint was filed, plaintiff was represented by experienced counsel well-versed in the nuances of federal employment discrimination law, yet nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff even mention the terms "hostile work environment" or "retaliation." Moreover, this court's reading of the allegations asserted in Paragraph 15 of the administrative complaint reveals no facts to support a plausible Title VII claim based on hostile work environment or retaliation, or to support a finding that such claims might reasonably have fallen within the scope of the EEOC investigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "510 U.S. 17, 21",
"parenthetical": "hostile work environment exists \"[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Fleming v. Verizon New York, Inc., 419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found “inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit.”); Gambrell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2003 WL 282182, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (“mere the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency’s investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64",
"parenthetical": "EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found \"inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Fleming v. Verizon New York, Inc., 419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found “inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit.”); Gambrell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2003 WL 282182, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (“mere the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency’s investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.”)."
} | 3,836,798 | a |
Exh. 26, P 16. The box provided on the form for "retaliation/reprisal" was not checked. At the time the administrative complaint was filed, plaintiff was represented by experienced counsel well-versed in the nuances of federal employment discrimination law, yet nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff even mention the terms "hostile work environment" or "retaliation." Moreover, this court's reading of the allegations asserted in Paragraph 15 of the administrative complaint reveals no facts to support a plausible Title VII claim based on hostile work environment or retaliation, or to support a finding that such claims might reasonably have fallen within the scope of the EEOC investigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "510 U.S. 17, 21",
"parenthetical": "hostile work environment exists \"[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Fleming v. Verizon New York, Inc., 419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found “inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit.”); Gambrell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2003 WL 282182, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (“mere the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency’s investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2003 WL 282182, at *8",
"parenthetical": "\"mere the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency's investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Fleming v. Verizon New York, Inc., 419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found “inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit.”); Gambrell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2003 WL 282182, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (“mere the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency’s investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.”)."
} | 3,836,798 | a |
Exh. 26, P 16. The box provided on the form for "retaliation/reprisal" was not checked. At the time the administrative complaint was filed, plaintiff was represented by experienced counsel well-versed in the nuances of federal employment discrimination law, yet nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff even mention the terms "hostile work environment" or "retaliation." Moreover, this court's reading of the allegations asserted in Paragraph 15 of the administrative complaint reveals no facts to support a plausible Title VII claim based on hostile work environment or retaliation, or to support a finding that such claims might reasonably have fallen within the scope of the EEOC investigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hostile work environment exists \"[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Fleming v. Verizon New York, Inc., 419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found “inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit.”); Gambrell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2003 WL 282182, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (“mere the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency’s investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64",
"parenthetical": "EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found \"inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Fleming v. Verizon New York, Inc., 419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found “inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit.”); Gambrell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2003 WL 282182, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (“mere the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency’s investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.”)."
} | 3,836,798 | a |
Exh. 26, P 16. The box provided on the form for "retaliation/reprisal" was not checked. At the time the administrative complaint was filed, plaintiff was represented by experienced counsel well-versed in the nuances of federal employment discrimination law, yet nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff even mention the terms "hostile work environment" or "retaliation." Moreover, this court's reading of the allegations asserted in Paragraph 15 of the administrative complaint reveals no facts to support a plausible Title VII claim based on hostile work environment or retaliation, or to support a finding that such claims might reasonably have fallen within the scope of the EEOC investigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hostile work environment exists \"[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Fleming v. Verizon New York, Inc., 419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found “inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit.”); Gambrell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2003 WL 282182, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (“mere the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency’s investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2003 WL 282182, at *8",
"parenthetical": "\"mere the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency's investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Fleming v. Verizon New York, Inc., 419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found “inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit.”); Gambrell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2003 WL 282182, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (“mere the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency’s investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.”)."
} | 3,836,798 | a |
Exh. 26, P 16. The box provided on the form for "retaliation/reprisal" was not checked. At the time the administrative complaint was filed, plaintiff was represented by experienced counsel well-versed in the nuances of federal employment discrimination law, yet nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff even mention the terms "hostile work environment" or "retaliation." Moreover, this court's reading of the allegations asserted in Paragraph 15 of the administrative complaint reveals no facts to support a plausible Title VII claim based on hostile work environment or retaliation, or to support a finding that such claims might reasonably have fallen within the scope of the EEOC investigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hostile work environment exists \"[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Fleming v. Verizon New York, Inc., 419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found “inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit.”); Gambrell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2003 WL 282182, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (“mere the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency’s investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64",
"parenthetical": "EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found \"inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Fleming v. Verizon New York, Inc., 419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found “inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit.”); Gambrell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2003 WL 282182, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (“mere the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency’s investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.”)."
} | 3,836,798 | a |
Exh. 26, P 16. The box provided on the form for "retaliation/reprisal" was not checked. At the time the administrative complaint was filed, plaintiff was represented by experienced counsel well-versed in the nuances of federal employment discrimination law, yet nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff even mention the terms "hostile work environment" or "retaliation." Moreover, this court's reading of the allegations asserted in Paragraph 15 of the administrative complaint reveals no facts to support a plausible Title VII claim based on hostile work environment or retaliation, or to support a finding that such claims might reasonably have fallen within the scope of the EEOC investigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hostile work environment exists \"[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Fleming v. Verizon New York, Inc., 419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found “inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit.”); Gambrell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2003 WL 282182, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (“mere the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency’s investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2003 WL 282182, at *8",
"parenthetical": "\"mere the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency's investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Fleming v. Verizon New York, Inc., 419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found “inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit.”); Gambrell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2003 WL 282182, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (“mere the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency’s investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.”)."
} | 3,836,798 | a |
Our determination the statute is ambiguous is further supported by viewing the language in its context as part of the overall statutory scheme. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "136 S.Ct. 1061, 1070",
"parenthetical": "\"Statutory language 'cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.'\"",
"sentence": "See also Sturgeon v. Frost, — U.S.-,-, 136 S.Ct. 1061, 1070, 194 L.Ed.2d 108 (2016) (“Statutory language ‘cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "81 A.3d 822, 822",
"parenthetical": "statutory words not to be interpreted in isolation but read with reference to context in which they appear",
"sentence": "See, e.g., 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a) (sec tions of statute should be read together and construed to give effect to all provisions); Roethlein, 81 A.3d at 822 (statutory words not to be interpreted in isolation but read with reference to context in which they appear); Mishoe, 824 A.2d at 1155 (same)."
} | 12,280,055 | b |
Our determination the statute is ambiguous is further supported by viewing the language in its context as part of the overall statutory scheme. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "81 A.3d 822, 822",
"parenthetical": "statutory words not to be interpreted in isolation but read with reference to context in which they appear",
"sentence": "See, e.g., 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a) (sec tions of statute should be read together and construed to give effect to all provisions); Roethlein, 81 A.3d at 822 (statutory words not to be interpreted in isolation but read with reference to context in which they appear); Mishoe, 824 A.2d at 1155 (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Statutory language 'cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.'\"",
"sentence": "See also Sturgeon v. Frost, — U.S.-,-, 136 S.Ct. 1061, 1070, 194 L.Ed.2d 108 (2016) (“Statutory language ‘cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’”)."
} | 12,280,055 | a |
Keeping in mind that notice by regular mail, with the deemed delivery provision, serves the dual function of protecting those minors whose parents cannot be located and providing actual notice to a parent when a physician chooses this method of notification, we believe that the legislature appropriately stipulated a constructive delivery time that approximated -- or that, in all probability, was less than -- delivery time by regular mail. Thus, the constructive delivery provision, in conjunction with the waiting period, survives constitutional scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "110 S.Ct. 2972, 2972",
"parenthetical": "upholding Ohio statute that permits a physician, who after a \"reasonable effort\" has been unable to notify a minor's parent in person or by telephone, to perform an abortion after forty-eight hours constructive notice by both ordinary and certified mail",
"sentence": "See Hodgson, — U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2926 (upholding Minnesota notice statute with an effective waiting period of seventy-two hours: a one day “deemed delivery” constructive notice period followed by a forty-eight hour waiting period); see also Akron II, — U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2972 (upholding Ohio statute that permits a physician, who after a “reasonable effort” has been unable to notify a minor’s parent in person or by telephone, to perform an abortion after forty-eight hours constructive notice by both ordinary and certified mail)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "110 S.Ct. 2926, 2926",
"parenthetical": "upholding Minnesota notice statute with an effective waiting period of seventy-two hours: a one day \"deemed delivery\" constructive notice period followed by a forty-eight hour waiting period",
"sentence": "See Hodgson, — U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2926 (upholding Minnesota notice statute with an effective waiting period of seventy-two hours: a one day “deemed delivery” constructive notice period followed by a forty-eight hour waiting period); see also Akron II, — U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2972 (upholding Ohio statute that permits a physician, who after a “reasonable effort” has been unable to notify a minor’s parent in person or by telephone, to perform an abortion after forty-eight hours constructive notice by both ordinary and certified mail)."
} | 10,541,594 | b |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | 7,450,018 | a |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | 7,450,018 | b |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | 7,450,018 | b |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | 7,450,018 | a |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | 7,450,018 | b |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | 7,450,018 | a |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | 7,450,018 | b |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | 7,450,018 | b |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | 7,450,018 | b |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | 7,450,018 | b |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | 7,450,018 | a |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | 7,450,018 | a |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | 7,450,018 | a |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | 7,450,018 | b |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | 7,450,018 | b |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | 7,450,018 | b |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | 7,450,018 | b |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | 7,450,018 | a |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | 7,450,018 | b |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | 7,450,018 | a |
Several other cases have followed the Vaughn court's conclusion that the concept of abandonment is different under the Fourth Amendment than under property law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1991) (defendant who placed brown paper bag on steps and walked away from the bag had no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.1989) (defendant who left gym bag on the floor of a public hallway in an apartment building and walked down some stairs surrendered his expectation of privacy); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir.1982) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant left a sealed box of incriminating records in a barn in which the defendant had no legal interest or right of access); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.) (defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy when he placed jacket on coat rack in general working area of state office building), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701 (D.C.1992) (appellant stooping down and placing metal key case containing cocaine next to fence post and walking away has no Fourth Amendment protection against police recovering object even when the object itself is not evidence of a crime); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (defendant who hides marijuana under a rock seventy-five feet from his fishing equipment is afforded no protection against search and seizure of the marijuana)."
} | 7,450,018 | b |
Although B.H.M. styled his pleadings as an original petition, and we have determined he has standing to file an original petition pursuant to section 102.003(a)(9), which governs standing in original suits, this does not determine the nature of the suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "243 S.W.3d 217, 217",
"parenthetical": "describing action to modify custody order after managing conservator's death as suit to modify",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d at 217 (describing action to modify custody order after managing conservator’s death as suit to modify); P.D.M., 117 S.W.3d at 456 (holding provisions of Chapter 156 of Texas Family Code governing modifications clearly apply to suits that attempt to effect change in custody after entry of initial custody order); see also State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex.1980) (holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading, not merely title of pleading). First, it is undisputed there was a prior custody determination under the 2002 divorce decree."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 S.W.2d 829, 833",
"parenthetical": "holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading, not merely title of pleading",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d at 217 (describing action to modify custody order after managing conservator’s death as suit to modify); P.D.M., 117 S.W.3d at 456 (holding provisions of Chapter 156 of Texas Family Code governing modifications clearly apply to suits that attempt to effect change in custody after entry of initial custody order); see also State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex.1980) (holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading, not merely title of pleading). First, it is undisputed there was a prior custody determination under the 2002 divorce decree."
} | 7,318,446 | a |
Although B.H.M. styled his pleadings as an original petition, and we have determined he has standing to file an original petition pursuant to section 102.003(a)(9), which governs standing in original suits, this does not determine the nature of the suit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 S.W.2d 829, 833",
"parenthetical": "holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading, not merely title of pleading",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d at 217 (describing action to modify custody order after managing conservator’s death as suit to modify); P.D.M., 117 S.W.3d at 456 (holding provisions of Chapter 156 of Texas Family Code governing modifications clearly apply to suits that attempt to effect change in custody after entry of initial custody order); see also State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex.1980) (holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading, not merely title of pleading). First, it is undisputed there was a prior custody determination under the 2002 divorce decree."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "117 S.W.3d 456, 456",
"parenthetical": "holding provisions of Chapter 156 of Texas Family Code governing modifications clearly apply to suits that attempt to effect change in custody after entry of initial custody order",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d at 217 (describing action to modify custody order after managing conservator’s death as suit to modify); P.D.M., 117 S.W.3d at 456 (holding provisions of Chapter 156 of Texas Family Code governing modifications clearly apply to suits that attempt to effect change in custody after entry of initial custody order); see also State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex.1980) (holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading, not merely title of pleading). First, it is undisputed there was a prior custody determination under the 2002 divorce decree."
} | 7,318,446 | b |
P41 But nothing in Crawford suggests that the Supreme Court intended to change its prior decisions allowing the admission of hearsay at pretrial proceedings, such as a suppression hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "386 U.S. 300, 311-13",
"parenthetical": "no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's name at pretrial hearing",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "399 U.S. 149, 157",
"parenthetical": "\"it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause\"",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | 4,007,638 | a |
P41 But nothing in Crawford suggests that the Supreme Court intended to change its prior decisions allowing the admission of hearsay at pretrial proceedings, such as a suppression hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "386 U.S. 300, 311-13",
"parenthetical": "no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's name at pretrial hearing",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause\"",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | 4,007,638 | a |
P41 But nothing in Crawford suggests that the Supreme Court intended to change its prior decisions allowing the admission of hearsay at pretrial proceedings, such as a suppression hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "386 U.S. 300, 311-13",
"parenthetical": "no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's name at pretrial hearing",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause\"",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | 4,007,638 | a |
P41 But nothing in Crawford suggests that the Supreme Court intended to change its prior decisions allowing the admission of hearsay at pretrial proceedings, such as a suppression hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's name at pretrial hearing",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "399 U.S. 149, 157",
"parenthetical": "\"it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause\"",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | 4,007,638 | a |
P41 But nothing in Crawford suggests that the Supreme Court intended to change its prior decisions allowing the admission of hearsay at pretrial proceedings, such as a suppression hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's name at pretrial hearing",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause\"",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | 4,007,638 | a |
P41 But nothing in Crawford suggests that the Supreme Court intended to change its prior decisions allowing the admission of hearsay at pretrial proceedings, such as a suppression hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's name at pretrial hearing",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause\"",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | 4,007,638 | a |
P41 But nothing in Crawford suggests that the Supreme Court intended to change its prior decisions allowing the admission of hearsay at pretrial proceedings, such as a suppression hearing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "399 U.S. 149, 157",
"parenthetical": "\"it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause\"",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's name at pretrial hearing",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | 4,007,638 | b |
P41 But nothing in Crawford suggests that the Supreme Court intended to change its prior decisions allowing the admission of hearsay at pretrial proceedings, such as a suppression hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's name at pretrial hearing",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause\"",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | 4,007,638 | a |
P41 But nothing in Crawford suggests that the Supreme Court intended to change its prior decisions allowing the admission of hearsay at pretrial proceedings, such as a suppression hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's name at pretrial hearing",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause\"",
"sentence": "See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (no confrontation clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 54 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court “normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial.”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970) (“it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”)."
} | 4,007,638 | a |
. Barton contends that other courts have held a constructive eviction occurs when a lessor wrongfully serves a notice to quit upon a tenant who thereafter vacates. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[wjhen a wrongful demand or notice to quit or vacate leased premises is made by a lessor, or landlord, and is followed by immediate surrender of possession by the lessee, or tenant, a constructive eviction has been accomplished\"",
"sentence": "See Dobbins v. Paul, 71 N.C.App. 113, 321 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1984) (holding that \"[wjhen a wrongful demand or notice to quit or vacate leased premises is made by a lessor, or landlord, and is followed by immediate surrender of possession by the lessee, or tenant, a constructive eviction has been accomplished”); see also Ruotal Corp., N.W., Inc. v. Ottati, 391 So.2d 308, 309 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (finding a jury could reasonably infer that lessee’s compliance with notice was coerced and that triable issue existed regarding whether lessor had rental and security deposit available to it to cover past due rents)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "391 So.2d 308, 309",
"parenthetical": "finding a jury could reasonably infer that lessee's compliance with notice was coerced and that triable issue existed regarding whether lessor had rental and security deposit available to it to cover past due rents",
"sentence": "See Dobbins v. Paul, 71 N.C.App. 113, 321 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1984) (holding that \"[wjhen a wrongful demand or notice to quit or vacate leased premises is made by a lessor, or landlord, and is followed by immediate surrender of possession by the lessee, or tenant, a constructive eviction has been accomplished”); see also Ruotal Corp., N.W., Inc. v. Ottati, 391 So.2d 308, 309 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (finding a jury could reasonably infer that lessee’s compliance with notice was coerced and that triable issue existed regarding whether lessor had rental and security deposit available to it to cover past due rents)."
} | 10,347,626 | a |
. Barton contends that other courts have held a constructive eviction occurs when a lessor wrongfully serves a notice to quit upon a tenant who thereafter vacates. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "391 So.2d 308, 309",
"parenthetical": "finding a jury could reasonably infer that lessee's compliance with notice was coerced and that triable issue existed regarding whether lessor had rental and security deposit available to it to cover past due rents",
"sentence": "See Dobbins v. Paul, 71 N.C.App. 113, 321 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1984) (holding that \"[wjhen a wrongful demand or notice to quit or vacate leased premises is made by a lessor, or landlord, and is followed by immediate surrender of possession by the lessee, or tenant, a constructive eviction has been accomplished”); see also Ruotal Corp., N.W., Inc. v. Ottati, 391 So.2d 308, 309 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (finding a jury could reasonably infer that lessee’s compliance with notice was coerced and that triable issue existed regarding whether lessor had rental and security deposit available to it to cover past due rents)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "321 S.E.2d 537, 540",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[wjhen a wrongful demand or notice to quit or vacate leased premises is made by a lessor, or landlord, and is followed by immediate surrender of possession by the lessee, or tenant, a constructive eviction has been accomplished\"",
"sentence": "See Dobbins v. Paul, 71 N.C.App. 113, 321 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1984) (holding that \"[wjhen a wrongful demand or notice to quit or vacate leased premises is made by a lessor, or landlord, and is followed by immediate surrender of possession by the lessee, or tenant, a constructive eviction has been accomplished”); see also Ruotal Corp., N.W., Inc. v. Ottati, 391 So.2d 308, 309 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (finding a jury could reasonably infer that lessee’s compliance with notice was coerced and that triable issue existed regarding whether lessor had rental and security deposit available to it to cover past due rents)."
} | 10,347,626 | b |
In analyzing the Cort factors we will focus on the second factor ("whether Congress intended to provide the plaintiff with a private right of action") as "the key inquiry in this calculus." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 526, 534",
"parenthetical": "\"The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text....\"",
"sentence": "Alexander, 532 U.S. at 288, 121 S.Ct. 1511; see also Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) (“The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text....”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "376 F.3d 835, 835",
"parenthetical": "\"Indeed, the three Cort questions that are not explicitly focused on legislative intent are actually indicia of legislative intent, such that the Cort test itself is focused entirely on intent.\"",
"sentence": "Opera Plaza, 376 F.3d at 835. See also Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir.2007) (“Indeed, the three Cort questions that are not explicitly focused on legislative intent are actually indicia of legislative intent, such that the Cort test itself is focused entirely on intent.”). Here, congressional intent weighs decisively against finding a private right of action. “We ... begin ... our search for Congress’s intent with the text and structure of [the statute].”"
} | 5,735,424 | b |
In analyzing the Cort factors we will focus on the second factor ("whether Congress intended to provide the plaintiff with a private right of action") as "the key inquiry in this calculus." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "376 F.3d 835, 835",
"parenthetical": "\"Indeed, the three Cort questions that are not explicitly focused on legislative intent are actually indicia of legislative intent, such that the Cort test itself is focused entirely on intent.\"",
"sentence": "Opera Plaza, 376 F.3d at 835. See also Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir.2007) (“Indeed, the three Cort questions that are not explicitly focused on legislative intent are actually indicia of legislative intent, such that the Cort test itself is focused entirely on intent.”). Here, congressional intent weighs decisively against finding a private right of action. “We ... begin ... our search for Congress’s intent with the text and structure of [the statute].”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text....\"",
"sentence": "Alexander, 532 U.S. at 288, 121 S.Ct. 1511; see also Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) (“The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text....”)."
} | 5,735,424 | a |
In analyzing the Cort factors we will focus on the second factor ("whether Congress intended to provide the plaintiff with a private right of action") as "the key inquiry in this calculus." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text....\"",
"sentence": "Alexander, 532 U.S. at 288, 121 S.Ct. 1511; see also Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) (“The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text....”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "376 F.3d 835, 835",
"parenthetical": "\"Indeed, the three Cort questions that are not explicitly focused on legislative intent are actually indicia of legislative intent, such that the Cort test itself is focused entirely on intent.\"",
"sentence": "Opera Plaza, 376 F.3d at 835. See also Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir.2007) (“Indeed, the three Cort questions that are not explicitly focused on legislative intent are actually indicia of legislative intent, such that the Cort test itself is focused entirely on intent.”). Here, congressional intent weighs decisively against finding a private right of action. “We ... begin ... our search for Congress’s intent with the text and structure of [the statute].”"
} | 5,735,424 | b |
In analyzing the Cort factors we will focus on the second factor ("whether Congress intended to provide the plaintiff with a private right of action") as "the key inquiry in this calculus." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 526, 534",
"parenthetical": "\"The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text....\"",
"sentence": "Alexander, 532 U.S. at 288, 121 S.Ct. 1511; see also Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) (“The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text....”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "487 F.3d 734, 739",
"parenthetical": "\"Indeed, the three Cort questions that are not explicitly focused on legislative intent are actually indicia of legislative intent, such that the Cort test itself is focused entirely on intent.\"",
"sentence": "Opera Plaza, 376 F.3d at 835. See also Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir.2007) (“Indeed, the three Cort questions that are not explicitly focused on legislative intent are actually indicia of legislative intent, such that the Cort test itself is focused entirely on intent.”). Here, congressional intent weighs decisively against finding a private right of action. “We ... begin ... our search for Congress’s intent with the text and structure of [the statute].”"
} | 5,735,424 | b |
In analyzing the Cort factors we will focus on the second factor ("whether Congress intended to provide the plaintiff with a private right of action") as "the key inquiry in this calculus." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "487 F.3d 734, 739",
"parenthetical": "\"Indeed, the three Cort questions that are not explicitly focused on legislative intent are actually indicia of legislative intent, such that the Cort test itself is focused entirely on intent.\"",
"sentence": "Opera Plaza, 376 F.3d at 835. See also Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir.2007) (“Indeed, the three Cort questions that are not explicitly focused on legislative intent are actually indicia of legislative intent, such that the Cort test itself is focused entirely on intent.”). Here, congressional intent weighs decisively against finding a private right of action. “We ... begin ... our search for Congress’s intent with the text and structure of [the statute].”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text....\"",
"sentence": "Alexander, 532 U.S. at 288, 121 S.Ct. 1511; see also Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) (“The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text....”)."
} | 5,735,424 | a |
In analyzing the Cort factors we will focus on the second factor ("whether Congress intended to provide the plaintiff with a private right of action") as "the key inquiry in this calculus." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "487 F.3d 734, 739",
"parenthetical": "\"Indeed, the three Cort questions that are not explicitly focused on legislative intent are actually indicia of legislative intent, such that the Cort test itself is focused entirely on intent.\"",
"sentence": "Opera Plaza, 376 F.3d at 835. See also Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir.2007) (“Indeed, the three Cort questions that are not explicitly focused on legislative intent are actually indicia of legislative intent, such that the Cort test itself is focused entirely on intent.”). Here, congressional intent weighs decisively against finding a private right of action. “We ... begin ... our search for Congress’s intent with the text and structure of [the statute].”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text....\"",
"sentence": "Alexander, 532 U.S. at 288, 121 S.Ct. 1511; see also Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) (“The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text....”)."
} | 5,735,424 | a |
"[A] party's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "418 F.3d 1116, 1122",
"parenthetical": "firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review",
"sentence": "But see, Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir.2005) (firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 F.3d 573, 579-80",
"parenthetical": "district court's decision to review a magistrate's recommendation de novo despite the lack of an objection does not preclude application of the \"firm waiver rule\"",
"sentence": "See Vega v. Suthers, 195 F.3d 573, 579-80 (10th Cir.1999) (district court’s decision to review a magistrate’s recommendation de novo despite the lack of an objection does not preclude application of the “firm waiver rule”); One Parcel of Real Property, 73 F.3d at 1059-60 (a party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review); International Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Wyoming Coal Refining Systems, Inc., 52 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir.1995) (by failing to object to certain portions of the magistrate’s order, cross-claimant had waived its right to appeal those portions of the ruling); Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342, 1352 (10th Cir.1992) (by then-failure to file objections, plaintiffs waived their right to appeal the magistrate’s ruling)."
} | 3,650,466 | b |
"[A] party's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "73 F.3d 1059, 1059-60",
"parenthetical": "a party's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review",
"sentence": "See Vega v. Suthers, 195 F.3d 573, 579-80 (10th Cir.1999) (district court’s decision to review a magistrate’s recommendation de novo despite the lack of an objection does not preclude application of the “firm waiver rule”); One Parcel of Real Property, 73 F.3d at 1059-60 (a party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review); International Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Wyoming Coal Refining Systems, Inc., 52 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir.1995) (by failing to object to certain portions of the magistrate’s order, cross-claimant had waived its right to appeal those portions of the ruling); Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342, 1352 (10th Cir.1992) (by then-failure to file objections, plaintiffs waived their right to appeal the magistrate’s ruling)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "418 F.3d 1116, 1122",
"parenthetical": "firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review",
"sentence": "But see, Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir.2005) (firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review)."
} | 3,650,466 | a |
"[A] party's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "418 F.3d 1116, 1122",
"parenthetical": "firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review",
"sentence": "But see, Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir.2005) (firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "52 F.3d 901, 904",
"parenthetical": "by failing to object to certain portions of the magistrate's order, cross-claimant had waived its right to appeal those portions of the ruling",
"sentence": "See Vega v. Suthers, 195 F.3d 573, 579-80 (10th Cir.1999) (district court’s decision to review a magistrate’s recommendation de novo despite the lack of an objection does not preclude application of the “firm waiver rule”); One Parcel of Real Property, 73 F.3d at 1059-60 (a party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review); International Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Wyoming Coal Refining Systems, Inc., 52 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir.1995) (by failing to object to certain portions of the magistrate’s order, cross-claimant had waived its right to appeal those portions of the ruling); Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342, 1352 (10th Cir.1992) (by then-failure to file objections, plaintiffs waived their right to appeal the magistrate’s ruling)."
} | 3,650,466 | b |
"[A] party's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "980 F.2d 1342, 1352",
"parenthetical": "by then-failure to file objections, plaintiffs waived their right to appeal the magistrate's ruling",
"sentence": "See Vega v. Suthers, 195 F.3d 573, 579-80 (10th Cir.1999) (district court’s decision to review a magistrate’s recommendation de novo despite the lack of an objection does not preclude application of the “firm waiver rule”); One Parcel of Real Property, 73 F.3d at 1059-60 (a party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review); International Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Wyoming Coal Refining Systems, Inc., 52 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir.1995) (by failing to object to certain portions of the magistrate’s order, cross-claimant had waived its right to appeal those portions of the ruling); Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342, 1352 (10th Cir.1992) (by then-failure to file objections, plaintiffs waived their right to appeal the magistrate’s ruling)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "418 F.3d 1116, 1122",
"parenthetical": "firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review",
"sentence": "But see, Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir.2005) (firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review)."
} | 3,650,466 | a |
. The issue of whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief has divided the circuits. The majority hold that such use is not constitutionally permissible. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "774 F.2d 530, 538",
"parenthetical": "testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "637 F.2d 869, 876",
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government's direct case\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | 3,752,988 | a |
. The issue of whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief has divided the circuits. The majority hold that such use is not constitutionally permissible. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "408 F.3d 1102, 1111",
"parenthetical": "comment on defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir.1985) (testimony of defendants' pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence properly admitted; no fundamental unfairness in admitting evidence of non-Miranda-induced silence); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir.2005) (comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1991) (dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "774 F.2d 530, 538",
"parenthetical": "testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) (\"use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\"custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta \"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”)."
} | 3,752,988 | b |
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