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Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that police's \"flagrant[ ] violation]\" of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant's statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that police's \"flagrant[ ] violation]\" of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant's statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that police's \"flagrant[ ] violation]\" of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant's statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that police's \"flagrant[ ] violation]\" of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant's statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that police's \"flagrant[ ] violation]\" of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant's statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that police's \"flagrant[ ] violation]\" of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant's statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that police's \"flagrant[ ] violation]\" of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant's statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that police's \"flagrant[ ] violation]\" of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant's statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that police's \"flagrant[ ] violation]\" of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant's statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that police's \"flagrant[ ] violation]\" of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant's statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that juvenile's request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that juvenile's request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that juvenile's request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that juvenile's request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that juvenile's request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that juvenile's request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that juvenile's request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that juvenile's request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles' statements to be admissible",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where \"all reasonable efforts\" were made by police to contact defendant's mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was \"no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting\" defendant's mother",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles' statements to be admissible",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles' statements to be admissible",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | 105,855 | b |
Eight other states statutorily require police to notify a minor's guardian or custodian immediately if a minor is taken into custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles' statements to be admissible",
"sentence": "See People v. Gardner, 257 A.D.2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1999) (observing that police are statutorily required to notify immediately guardian or parent of juvenile upon her arrest or statements made are inadmissible); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000) (suppressing statements by juvenile -because parental notification statute violated); Palmer v. State, 626 A.2d 1358 (Del.1993) (reversing seventeen-year-old juvenile’s conviction because of police’s failure to timely notify custodian violated mandate of statute and constituted deprivation of defendant’s right to due process and self-incrimination rights); In re D.B., 303 Ill.App.3d 412, 237 Ill.Dec. 3, 708 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1999) (noting that purpose of law requiring immediate notification of parents when juvenile taken into custody “is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer with and counsel the juvenile before interrogation and confession”); Brown, supra, 182 Ill.App.3d 1046, 131 Ill.Dec. 534, 538 N.E.2d 909 (holding that police’s “flagrant[ ] violation]” of statute requiring officers to make reasonable attempts to notify parents among factors causing court to determine that defendant’s statement was involuntary and therefore should be suppressed); A Minor Boy v. State, 89 Nev. 564, 517 P.2d 183 (1973) (holding that consequence of deliberate violation of parental notification statute is suppression of statements made by defendant); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (holding that juvenile’s request for parent is invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); Sublette, supra, 365 No.2d 775 (observing that police officers’ failure to comply with statute requiring that parents be immediately notified upon arrest of child renders any statements made by juvenile inadmissible); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1992) (noting that law enforcement officials must comply with parental notification statute for juveniles’ statements to be admissible); MAC. v. Harrison County Family Court, supra, 566 No.2d 472 (finding that police’s blatant violation of juvenile’s statutory right to have parent present during interrogation required exclusion of any statements made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute",
"sentence": "Cf. A Minor Boy v. State, 91 Nev. 456, 537 P.2d 477 (1975) (finding that mandates of notification statute were satisfied where “all reasonable efforts” were made by police to contact defendant’s mother and not more than one hour could have elapsed before she was contacted and there was “no evidence of any intentional delay in contacting” defendant’s mother); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975) (holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute)."
} | 105,855 | a |
The State urges us to apply this "prosecution team" concept within the single agency of the Travis County District Attorney, suggesting that it was required to disclose only the Brady materials known to the office employees personally involved in the Hall prosecution. We find no support for the State's position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "70 S.W.3d 865, 871-73",
"parenthetical": "duty under Brady applied despite prosecutor's lack of personal knowledge of favorable information in office files",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Richardson, 70 S.W.3d 865, 871-73 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (duty under Brady applied despite prosecutor’s lack of personal knowledge of favorable information in office files); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (recognizing that a prosecutor’s office is an “entity” and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office “must be attributed” to the office as a whole) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 (1958)); Moore, 240 S.W.3d at 328 (“The duty to disclose under Brady arose only if the prosecutors or other members of the ‘prosecuting team’ knew of the investigation or had access to the information”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 U.S. 150, 154",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a prosecutor's office is an \"entity\" and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office \"must be attributed\" to the office as a whole",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Richardson, 70 S.W.3d 865, 871-73 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (duty under Brady applied despite prosecutor’s lack of personal knowledge of favorable information in office files); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (recognizing that a prosecutor’s office is an “entity” and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office “must be attributed” to the office as a whole) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 (1958)); Moore, 240 S.W.3d at 328 (“The duty to disclose under Brady arose only if the prosecutors or other members of the ‘prosecuting team’ knew of the investigation or had access to the information”)."
} | 7,301,162 | a |
The State urges us to apply this "prosecution team" concept within the single agency of the Travis County District Attorney, suggesting that it was required to disclose only the Brady materials known to the office employees personally involved in the Hall prosecution. We find no support for the State's position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "70 S.W.3d 865, 871-73",
"parenthetical": "duty under Brady applied despite prosecutor's lack of personal knowledge of favorable information in office files",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Richardson, 70 S.W.3d 865, 871-73 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (duty under Brady applied despite prosecutor’s lack of personal knowledge of favorable information in office files); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (recognizing that a prosecutor’s office is an “entity” and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office “must be attributed” to the office as a whole) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 (1958)); Moore, 240 S.W.3d at 328 (“The duty to disclose under Brady arose only if the prosecutors or other members of the ‘prosecuting team’ knew of the investigation or had access to the information”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a prosecutor's office is an \"entity\" and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office \"must be attributed\" to the office as a whole",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Richardson, 70 S.W.3d 865, 871-73 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (duty under Brady applied despite prosecutor’s lack of personal knowledge of favorable information in office files); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (recognizing that a prosecutor’s office is an “entity” and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office “must be attributed” to the office as a whole) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 (1958)); Moore, 240 S.W.3d at 328 (“The duty to disclose under Brady arose only if the prosecutors or other members of the ‘prosecuting team’ knew of the investigation or had access to the information”)."
} | 7,301,162 | a |
The State urges us to apply this "prosecution team" concept within the single agency of the Travis County District Attorney, suggesting that it was required to disclose only the Brady materials known to the office employees personally involved in the Hall prosecution. We find no support for the State's position. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a prosecutor's office is an \"entity\" and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office \"must be attributed\" to the office as a whole",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Richardson, 70 S.W.3d 865, 871-73 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (duty under Brady applied despite prosecutor’s lack of personal knowledge of favorable information in office files); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (recognizing that a prosecutor’s office is an “entity” and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office “must be attributed” to the office as a whole) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 (1958)); Moore, 240 S.W.3d at 328 (“The duty to disclose under Brady arose only if the prosecutors or other members of the ‘prosecuting team’ knew of the investigation or had access to the information”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "70 S.W.3d 865, 871-73",
"parenthetical": "duty under Brady applied despite prosecutor's lack of personal knowledge of favorable information in office files",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Richardson, 70 S.W.3d 865, 871-73 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (duty under Brady applied despite prosecutor’s lack of personal knowledge of favorable information in office files); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (recognizing that a prosecutor’s office is an “entity” and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office “must be attributed” to the office as a whole) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 (1958)); Moore, 240 S.W.3d at 328 (“The duty to disclose under Brady arose only if the prosecutors or other members of the ‘prosecuting team’ knew of the investigation or had access to the information”)."
} | 7,301,162 | b |
The State urges us to apply this "prosecution team" concept within the single agency of the Travis County District Attorney, suggesting that it was required to disclose only the Brady materials known to the office employees personally involved in the Hall prosecution. We find no support for the State's position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "70 S.W.3d 865, 871-73",
"parenthetical": "duty under Brady applied despite prosecutor's lack of personal knowledge of favorable information in office files",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Richardson, 70 S.W.3d 865, 871-73 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (duty under Brady applied despite prosecutor’s lack of personal knowledge of favorable information in office files); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (recognizing that a prosecutor’s office is an “entity” and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office “must be attributed” to the office as a whole) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 (1958)); Moore, 240 S.W.3d at 328 (“The duty to disclose under Brady arose only if the prosecutors or other members of the ‘prosecuting team’ knew of the investigation or had access to the information”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "240 S.W.3d 328, 328",
"parenthetical": "\"The duty to disclose under Brady arose only if the prosecutors or other members of the 'prosecuting team' knew of the investigation or had access to the information\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Richardson, 70 S.W.3d 865, 871-73 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (duty under Brady applied despite prosecutor’s lack of personal knowledge of favorable information in office files); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (recognizing that a prosecutor’s office is an “entity” and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office “must be attributed” to the office as a whole) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 (1958)); Moore, 240 S.W.3d at 328 (“The duty to disclose under Brady arose only if the prosecutors or other members of the ‘prosecuting team’ knew of the investigation or had access to the information”)."
} | 7,301,162 | a |
ACE argues that the categorical exclusion, by its own terms, does not apply to this case because helicopter permits are beyond the intended scope of the exclusion. When reviewing an agency's application of its own regulation, the agency's interpretation of its regulation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly ' erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "142 F.3d 1170, 1173",
"parenthetical": "Fish and Wildlife Service's interpretation of its own regulations entitled to deference",
"sentence": "Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 510-12, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994); United States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir.1998) (Fish and Wildlife Service’s interpretation of its own regulations entitled to deference). Although this Circuit has not applied this standard specifically to categorical exclusions under NEPA, several other circuits have."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "784 F.2d 702, 705",
"parenthetical": "holding that deference is owed to an agency's interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations, so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation",
"sentence": "See West Houston Air Comm. v. FAA, 784 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir.1986) (holding that deference is owed to an agency’s interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations, so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation); City of Alexandria v. Federal Highway Admin., 756 F.2d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir.985)."
} | 1,733,551 | a |
The agency also reasonably determined that Lin did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution based on his baptism and practice of Christianity in the United States because Lin testified that he was a relatively new practitioner and evidence in the record indicated that officials primarily targeted spiritual leaders. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "12 F.3d 1233, 1240",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]ersecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.\"",
"sentence": "See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir.2007) (“[wjhere there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”); Ivan-ishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 483 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that harm must be sufficiently severe and rise above “mere harassment”); see also Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.1993) (“[P]ersecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 F.3d 135, 143",
"parenthetical": "\"Put simply, to establish a well-founded fear of persecution in the absence of any evidence of past persecution, an alien must make some showing that authorities in his country of nationality are either aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities.\"",
"sentence": "See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.2008) (“Put simply, to establish a well-founded fear of persecution in the absence of any evidence of past persecution, an alien must make some showing that authorities in his country of nationality are either aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities.”); see also Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d 125 at 128-29. The agency also reasonably determined that Lin had not established a pattern or practice of persecution against Christians in China because the country conditions evidence in the record indicated that enforcement against underground churches varied throughout China and the Chinese government’s treatment of members of underground churches constituted harassment rather than persecution."
} | 5,753,901 | b |
The agency also reasonably determined that Lin did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution based on his baptism and practice of Christianity in the United States because Lin testified that he was a relatively new practitioner and evidence in the record indicated that officials primarily targeted spiritual leaders. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "12 F.3d 1233, 1240",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]ersecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.\"",
"sentence": "See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir.2007) (“[wjhere there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”); Ivan-ishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 483 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that harm must be sufficiently severe and rise above “mere harassment”); see also Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.1993) (“[P]ersecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "480 F.3d 160, 167",
"parenthetical": "\"[wjhere there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\"",
"sentence": "See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir.2007) (“[wjhere there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”); Ivan-ishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 483 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that harm must be sufficiently severe and rise above “mere harassment”); see also Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.1993) (“[P]ersecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”)."
} | 5,753,901 | b |
The agency also reasonably determined that Lin did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution based on his baptism and practice of Christianity in the United States because Lin testified that he was a relatively new practitioner and evidence in the record indicated that officials primarily targeted spiritual leaders. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "483 F.3d 332, 341",
"parenthetical": "holding that harm must be sufficiently severe and rise above \"mere harassment\"",
"sentence": "See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir.2007) (“[wjhere there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”); Ivan-ishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 483 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that harm must be sufficiently severe and rise above “mere harassment”); see also Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.1993) (“[P]ersecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "12 F.3d 1233, 1240",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]ersecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.\"",
"sentence": "See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir.2007) (“[wjhere there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”); Ivan-ishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 483 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that harm must be sufficiently severe and rise above “mere harassment”); see also Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.1993) (“[P]ersecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”)."
} | 5,753,901 | a |
Although we are free to review de novo the application of law to undisputed facts, the existence of an employment relationship constitutes the "ultimate fact issue," which cannot be decided as a matter of law simply because the predicate facts are uncontested. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "262 N.W.2d 152, 154",
"parenthetical": "treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker's submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "239 Minn. 55, 62",
"parenthetical": "stating the determination of an employment relationship is an \"ultimate fact issue\"",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | 10,694,928 | b |
Although we are free to review de novo the application of law to undisputed facts, the existence of an employment relationship constitutes the "ultimate fact issue," which cannot be decided as a matter of law simply because the predicate facts are uncontested. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "239 Minn. 55, 62",
"parenthetical": "stating the determination of an employment relationship is an \"ultimate fact issue\"",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | 10,694,928 | a |
Although we are free to review de novo the application of law to undisputed facts, the existence of an employment relationship constitutes the "ultimate fact issue," which cannot be decided as a matter of law simply because the predicate facts are uncontested. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "794 P.2d 138, 141",
"parenthetical": "analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "239 Minn. 55, 62",
"parenthetical": "stating the determination of an employment relationship is an \"ultimate fact issue\"",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | 10,694,928 | b |
Although we are free to review de novo the application of law to undisputed facts, the existence of an employment relationship constitutes the "ultimate fact issue," which cannot be decided as a matter of law simply because the predicate facts are uncontested. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "57 N.W.2d 831, 835",
"parenthetical": "stating the determination of an employment relationship is an \"ultimate fact issue\"",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "262 N.W.2d 152, 154",
"parenthetical": "treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker's submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | 10,694,928 | a |
Although we are free to review de novo the application of law to undisputed facts, the existence of an employment relationship constitutes the "ultimate fact issue," which cannot be decided as a matter of law simply because the predicate facts are uncontested. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "57 N.W.2d 831, 835",
"parenthetical": "stating the determination of an employment relationship is an \"ultimate fact issue\"",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | 10,694,928 | b |
Although we are free to review de novo the application of law to undisputed facts, the existence of an employment relationship constitutes the "ultimate fact issue," which cannot be decided as a matter of law simply because the predicate facts are uncontested. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "794 P.2d 138, 141",
"parenthetical": "analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "57 N.W.2d 831, 835",
"parenthetical": "stating the determination of an employment relationship is an \"ultimate fact issue\"",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | 10,694,928 | b |
Although we are free to review de novo the application of law to undisputed facts, the existence of an employment relationship constitutes the "ultimate fact issue," which cannot be decided as a matter of law simply because the predicate facts are uncontested. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "262 N.W.2d 152, 154",
"parenthetical": "treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker's submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | 10,694,928 | b |
Although we are free to review de novo the application of law to undisputed facts, the existence of an employment relationship constitutes the "ultimate fact issue," which cannot be decided as a matter of law simply because the predicate facts are uncontested. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "262 N.W.2d 152, 154",
"parenthetical": "treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker's submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "794 P.2d 138, 141",
"parenthetical": "analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences",
"sentence": "See Darvell v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 239 Minn. 55, 62, 57 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1953) (stating the determination of an employment relationship is an “ultimate fact issue”); see also State by Spannaus v. Mecca Enters., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn.1977) (treating the issue as a question of fact, which turns chiefly on the worker’s submission to control over the means of achieving a particular goal); Holzemer v. Minnesota Milk Co., 259 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn.1977) (same); Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (same); Edelston v. Builders & Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 550-51, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25 (1975) (same); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 279 Minn. 396, 403-04, 157 N.W.2d 33, 39 (1968) (same); Tretter v. Dart Transit Co., 271 Minn. 131, 134-36, 135 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (1965); Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49-51, 47 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (1951) (same); Turner v. Schumacher Motor Express, Inc., 230 Minn. 172, 175-76, 41 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1950) (same); Carter v. W.J. Dyer & Bro., 186 Minn. 413, 414-17, 243 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1932) (same); cf. Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990) (analyzing the employment-status determination as an ultimate fact issue, which may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the undisputed predicate facts would support multiple inferences); Fleming v. Foothill-Montrose Ledger, 71 Cal.App.3d 681, 139 Cal.Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct.App.1977) (same); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same)."
} | 10,694,928 | a |
Our decision in Kim, as well as cases from other states, reveals that when courts have allowed a prior bad act to be introduced to prove motive, the prosecution actually presented sufficient alternate evidence to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "153 N.H. 325, 325, 328",
"parenthetical": "holding evidence of defendant's gambling losses and extramarital affair admissible to show motive to kill when he admitted to police that he drugged and robbed murder victims, but claimed he did not kill them",
"sentence": "Kim, 153 N.H. at 325, 328 (holding evidence of defendant’s gambling losses and extramarital affair admissible to show motive to kill when he admitted to police that he drugged and robbed murder victims, but claimed he did not kill them); see State v. Carapezza, 191 P.3d 256, 261, 263 (Kan. 2008) (holding crack cocaine addiction admissible to prove motive to kill and rob when accomplice identified defendant and defendant’s cell mates testified she had admitted her actions); Adkins v. Com., 96 S.W.3d 779, 783-85, 793 (Ky. 2003) (affirming introduction of drug addiction to prove motive for robbery and murder when defendant admitted to being at victim’s house and substantial physical evidence linked him to the murder); Henness, 679 N.E.2d at 694 (holding drug addiction admissible to show motive to rob and kill when defendant had the victim’s car, check book, and credit cards, told his wife and a friend that he had killed the victim in self-defense, sold the car to a drug dealer, and used all the money from forged checks, credit card cash advances and car sale to purchase and use drugs), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 971 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "191 P.3d 256, 261, 263",
"parenthetical": "holding crack cocaine addiction admissible to prove motive to kill and rob when accomplice identified defendant and defendant's cell mates testified she had admitted her actions",
"sentence": "Kim, 153 N.H. at 325, 328 (holding evidence of defendant’s gambling losses and extramarital affair admissible to show motive to kill when he admitted to police that he drugged and robbed murder victims, but claimed he did not kill them); see State v. Carapezza, 191 P.3d 256, 261, 263 (Kan. 2008) (holding crack cocaine addiction admissible to prove motive to kill and rob when accomplice identified defendant and defendant’s cell mates testified she had admitted her actions); Adkins v. Com., 96 S.W.3d 779, 783-85, 793 (Ky. 2003) (affirming introduction of drug addiction to prove motive for robbery and murder when defendant admitted to being at victim’s house and substantial physical evidence linked him to the murder); Henness, 679 N.E.2d at 694 (holding drug addiction admissible to show motive to rob and kill when defendant had the victim’s car, check book, and credit cards, told his wife and a friend that he had killed the victim in self-defense, sold the car to a drug dealer, and used all the money from forged checks, credit card cash advances and car sale to purchase and use drugs), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 971 (1997)."
} | 6,949,780 | a |
Our decision in Kim, as well as cases from other states, reveals that when courts have allowed a prior bad act to be introduced to prove motive, the prosecution actually presented sufficient alternate evidence to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "153 N.H. 325, 325, 328",
"parenthetical": "holding evidence of defendant's gambling losses and extramarital affair admissible to show motive to kill when he admitted to police that he drugged and robbed murder victims, but claimed he did not kill them",
"sentence": "Kim, 153 N.H. at 325, 328 (holding evidence of defendant’s gambling losses and extramarital affair admissible to show motive to kill when he admitted to police that he drugged and robbed murder victims, but claimed he did not kill them); see State v. Carapezza, 191 P.3d 256, 261, 263 (Kan. 2008) (holding crack cocaine addiction admissible to prove motive to kill and rob when accomplice identified defendant and defendant’s cell mates testified she had admitted her actions); Adkins v. Com., 96 S.W.3d 779, 783-85, 793 (Ky. 2003) (affirming introduction of drug addiction to prove motive for robbery and murder when defendant admitted to being at victim’s house and substantial physical evidence linked him to the murder); Henness, 679 N.E.2d at 694 (holding drug addiction admissible to show motive to rob and kill when defendant had the victim’s car, check book, and credit cards, told his wife and a friend that he had killed the victim in self-defense, sold the car to a drug dealer, and used all the money from forged checks, credit card cash advances and car sale to purchase and use drugs), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 971 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "96 S.W.3d 779, 783-85, 793",
"parenthetical": "affirming introduction of drug addiction to prove motive for robbery and murder when defendant admitted to being at victim's house and substantial physical evidence linked him to the murder",
"sentence": "Kim, 153 N.H. at 325, 328 (holding evidence of defendant’s gambling losses and extramarital affair admissible to show motive to kill when he admitted to police that he drugged and robbed murder victims, but claimed he did not kill them); see State v. Carapezza, 191 P.3d 256, 261, 263 (Kan. 2008) (holding crack cocaine addiction admissible to prove motive to kill and rob when accomplice identified defendant and defendant’s cell mates testified she had admitted her actions); Adkins v. Com., 96 S.W.3d 779, 783-85, 793 (Ky. 2003) (affirming introduction of drug addiction to prove motive for robbery and murder when defendant admitted to being at victim’s house and substantial physical evidence linked him to the murder); Henness, 679 N.E.2d at 694 (holding drug addiction admissible to show motive to rob and kill when defendant had the victim’s car, check book, and credit cards, told his wife and a friend that he had killed the victim in self-defense, sold the car to a drug dealer, and used all the money from forged checks, credit card cash advances and car sale to purchase and use drugs), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 971 (1997)."
} | 6,949,780 | a |
Our decision in Kim, as well as cases from other states, reveals that when courts have allowed a prior bad act to be introduced to prove motive, the prosecution actually presented sufficient alternate evidence to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "153 N.H. 325, 325, 328",
"parenthetical": "holding evidence of defendant's gambling losses and extramarital affair admissible to show motive to kill when he admitted to police that he drugged and robbed murder victims, but claimed he did not kill them",
"sentence": "Kim, 153 N.H. at 325, 328 (holding evidence of defendant’s gambling losses and extramarital affair admissible to show motive to kill when he admitted to police that he drugged and robbed murder victims, but claimed he did not kill them); see State v. Carapezza, 191 P.3d 256, 261, 263 (Kan. 2008) (holding crack cocaine addiction admissible to prove motive to kill and rob when accomplice identified defendant and defendant’s cell mates testified she had admitted her actions); Adkins v. Com., 96 S.W.3d 779, 783-85, 793 (Ky. 2003) (affirming introduction of drug addiction to prove motive for robbery and murder when defendant admitted to being at victim’s house and substantial physical evidence linked him to the murder); Henness, 679 N.E.2d at 694 (holding drug addiction admissible to show motive to rob and kill when defendant had the victim’s car, check book, and credit cards, told his wife and a friend that he had killed the victim in self-defense, sold the car to a drug dealer, and used all the money from forged checks, credit card cash advances and car sale to purchase and use drugs), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 971 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "679 N.E.2d 694, 694",
"parenthetical": "holding drug addiction admissible to show motive to rob and kill when defendant had the victim's car, check book, and credit cards, told his wife and a friend that he had killed the victim in self-defense, sold the car to a drug dealer, and used all the money from forged checks, credit card cash advances and car sale to purchase and use drugs",
"sentence": "Kim, 153 N.H. at 325, 328 (holding evidence of defendant’s gambling losses and extramarital affair admissible to show motive to kill when he admitted to police that he drugged and robbed murder victims, but claimed he did not kill them); see State v. Carapezza, 191 P.3d 256, 261, 263 (Kan. 2008) (holding crack cocaine addiction admissible to prove motive to kill and rob when accomplice identified defendant and defendant’s cell mates testified she had admitted her actions); Adkins v. Com., 96 S.W.3d 779, 783-85, 793 (Ky. 2003) (affirming introduction of drug addiction to prove motive for robbery and murder when defendant admitted to being at victim’s house and substantial physical evidence linked him to the murder); Henness, 679 N.E.2d at 694 (holding drug addiction admissible to show motive to rob and kill when defendant had the victim’s car, check book, and credit cards, told his wife and a friend that he had killed the victim in self-defense, sold the car to a drug dealer, and used all the money from forged checks, credit card cash advances and car sale to purchase and use drugs), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 971 (1997)."
} | 6,949,780 | a |
Our decision in Kim, as well as cases from other states, reveals that when courts have allowed a prior bad act to be introduced to prove motive, the prosecution actually presented sufficient alternate evidence to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "153 N.H. 325, 325, 328",
"parenthetical": "holding evidence of defendant's gambling losses and extramarital affair admissible to show motive to kill when he admitted to police that he drugged and robbed murder victims, but claimed he did not kill them",
"sentence": "Kim, 153 N.H. at 325, 328 (holding evidence of defendant’s gambling losses and extramarital affair admissible to show motive to kill when he admitted to police that he drugged and robbed murder victims, but claimed he did not kill them); see State v. Carapezza, 191 P.3d 256, 261, 263 (Kan. 2008) (holding crack cocaine addiction admissible to prove motive to kill and rob when accomplice identified defendant and defendant’s cell mates testified she had admitted her actions); Adkins v. Com., 96 S.W.3d 779, 783-85, 793 (Ky. 2003) (affirming introduction of drug addiction to prove motive for robbery and murder when defendant admitted to being at victim’s house and substantial physical evidence linked him to the murder); Henness, 679 N.E.2d at 694 (holding drug addiction admissible to show motive to rob and kill when defendant had the victim’s car, check book, and credit cards, told his wife and a friend that he had killed the victim in self-defense, sold the car to a drug dealer, and used all the money from forged checks, credit card cash advances and car sale to purchase and use drugs), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 971 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding drug addiction admissible to show motive to rob and kill when defendant had the victim's car, check book, and credit cards, told his wife and a friend that he had killed the victim in self-defense, sold the car to a drug dealer, and used all the money from forged checks, credit card cash advances and car sale to purchase and use drugs",
"sentence": "Kim, 153 N.H. at 325, 328 (holding evidence of defendant’s gambling losses and extramarital affair admissible to show motive to kill when he admitted to police that he drugged and robbed murder victims, but claimed he did not kill them); see State v. Carapezza, 191 P.3d 256, 261, 263 (Kan. 2008) (holding crack cocaine addiction admissible to prove motive to kill and rob when accomplice identified defendant and defendant’s cell mates testified she had admitted her actions); Adkins v. Com., 96 S.W.3d 779, 783-85, 793 (Ky. 2003) (affirming introduction of drug addiction to prove motive for robbery and murder when defendant admitted to being at victim’s house and substantial physical evidence linked him to the murder); Henness, 679 N.E.2d at 694 (holding drug addiction admissible to show motive to rob and kill when defendant had the victim’s car, check book, and credit cards, told his wife and a friend that he had killed the victim in self-defense, sold the car to a drug dealer, and used all the money from forged checks, credit card cash advances and car sale to purchase and use drugs), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 971 (1997)."
} | 6,949,780 | a |
The court has noted that, although ITC generally focuses on annual time periods for the purpose of data analysis, it is not required by statute to use any particular time frame. In light of ITC's broad discretion in setting time periods for the collection of data, the court has held that, under certain circumstances, ITC cannot be compelled to analyze data on a quarterly basis. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "8 CIT 26, 26",
"parenthetical": "ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends",
"sentence": "American Spring Wire Corp., 8 CIT at 26, 590 F. Supp. at 1279 (ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "8 CIT 94, 94",
"parenthetical": "an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis",
"sentence": "See also, British Steel Corp., 8 CIT at 94, 593 F. Supp. at 411 (an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis)."
} | 6,097,302 | a |
The court has noted that, although ITC generally focuses on annual time periods for the purpose of data analysis, it is not required by statute to use any particular time frame. In light of ITC's broad discretion in setting time periods for the collection of data, the court has held that, under certain circumstances, ITC cannot be compelled to analyze data on a quarterly basis. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "8 CIT 26, 26",
"parenthetical": "ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends",
"sentence": "American Spring Wire Corp., 8 CIT at 26, 590 F. Supp. at 1279 (ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "593 F. Supp. 411, 411",
"parenthetical": "an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis",
"sentence": "See also, British Steel Corp., 8 CIT at 94, 593 F. Supp. at 411 (an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis)."
} | 6,097,302 | a |
The court has noted that, although ITC generally focuses on annual time periods for the purpose of data analysis, it is not required by statute to use any particular time frame. In light of ITC's broad discretion in setting time periods for the collection of data, the court has held that, under certain circumstances, ITC cannot be compelled to analyze data on a quarterly basis. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "590 F. Supp. 1279, 1279",
"parenthetical": "ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends",
"sentence": "American Spring Wire Corp., 8 CIT at 26, 590 F. Supp. at 1279 (ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "8 CIT 94, 94",
"parenthetical": "an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis",
"sentence": "See also, British Steel Corp., 8 CIT at 94, 593 F. Supp. at 411 (an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis)."
} | 6,097,302 | a |
The court has noted that, although ITC generally focuses on annual time periods for the purpose of data analysis, it is not required by statute to use any particular time frame. In light of ITC's broad discretion in setting time periods for the collection of data, the court has held that, under certain circumstances, ITC cannot be compelled to analyze data on a quarterly basis. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "593 F. Supp. 411, 411",
"parenthetical": "an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis",
"sentence": "See also, British Steel Corp., 8 CIT at 94, 593 F. Supp. at 411 (an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "590 F. Supp. 1279, 1279",
"parenthetical": "ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends",
"sentence": "American Spring Wire Corp., 8 CIT at 26, 590 F. Supp. at 1279 (ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends)."
} | 6,097,302 | b |
The court has noted that, although ITC generally focuses on annual time periods for the purpose of data analysis, it is not required by statute to use any particular time frame. In light of ITC's broad discretion in setting time periods for the collection of data, the court has held that, under certain circumstances, ITC cannot be compelled to analyze data on a quarterly basis. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "8 CIT 26, 26",
"parenthetical": "ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends",
"sentence": "American Spring Wire Corp., 8 CIT at 26, 590 F.Supp. at 1279 (ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "8 CIT 94, 94",
"parenthetical": "an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis",
"sentence": "See also, British Steel Corp., 8 CIT at 94, 593 F.Supp. at 411 (an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis)."
} | 586,388 | a |
The court has noted that, although ITC generally focuses on annual time periods for the purpose of data analysis, it is not required by statute to use any particular time frame. In light of ITC's broad discretion in setting time periods for the collection of data, the court has held that, under certain circumstances, ITC cannot be compelled to analyze data on a quarterly basis. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "593 F.Supp. 411, 411",
"parenthetical": "an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis",
"sentence": "See also, British Steel Corp., 8 CIT at 94, 593 F.Supp. at 411 (an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "8 CIT 26, 26",
"parenthetical": "ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends",
"sentence": "American Spring Wire Corp., 8 CIT at 26, 590 F.Supp. at 1279 (ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends)."
} | 586,388 | b |
The court has noted that, although ITC generally focuses on annual time periods for the purpose of data analysis, it is not required by statute to use any particular time frame. In light of ITC's broad discretion in setting time periods for the collection of data, the court has held that, under certain circumstances, ITC cannot be compelled to analyze data on a quarterly basis. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "8 CIT 94, 94",
"parenthetical": "an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis",
"sentence": "See also, British Steel Corp., 8 CIT at 94, 593 F.Supp. at 411 (an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "590 F.Supp. 1279, 1279",
"parenthetical": "ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends",
"sentence": "American Spring Wire Corp., 8 CIT at 26, 590 F.Supp. at 1279 (ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends)."
} | 586,388 | b |
The court has noted that, although ITC generally focuses on annual time periods for the purpose of data analysis, it is not required by statute to use any particular time frame. In light of ITC's broad discretion in setting time periods for the collection of data, the court has held that, under certain circumstances, ITC cannot be compelled to analyze data on a quarterly basis. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "593 F.Supp. 411, 411",
"parenthetical": "an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis",
"sentence": "See also, British Steel Corp., 8 CIT at 94, 593 F.Supp. at 411 (an analysis of recent quarterly data would not have negated the significance of the increasing absolute volume of imports on a long term basis)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "590 F.Supp. 1279, 1279",
"parenthetical": "ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends",
"sentence": "American Spring Wire Corp., 8 CIT at 26, 590 F.Supp. at 1279 (ITC was not required to base its findings on a quarterly analysis of the most recent data available, since analysis of quarter-by-quarter data would distort significant long term trends)."
} | 586,388 | b |
One of the acts of expression for which Plaintiff was disciplined was his distribution of the sexual harassment Complaint lodged against him. Regarding the content of the Complaint, it is well-settled that allegations of sexual harassment, like allegations of racial harassment, are matters of public concern. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "973 F.2d 1263, 1269",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"reports of sexual harassment perpetrated on [the plaintiff] and other women at [the University of Texas Health Center]--is of great public concern\"",
"sentence": "See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (noting that “it is clear that ... statements concerning the school district’s allegedly racially discriminatory policies involved a matter of public concern”) (citing Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979)); Wilson v. UT Health Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263, 1269 (5th Cir.1992) (finding that “reports of sexual harassment perpetrated on [the plaintiff] and other women at [the University of Texas Health Center]—is of great public concern”); see also Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 608 (6th Cir.2000) (finding that because the plaintiffs complaint was for race discrimination, it inherently involved a matter of public concern)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "209 F.3d 597, 608",
"parenthetical": "finding that because the plaintiffs complaint was for race discrimination, it inherently involved a matter of public concern",
"sentence": "See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (noting that “it is clear that ... statements concerning the school district’s allegedly racially discriminatory policies involved a matter of public concern”) (citing Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979)); Wilson v. UT Health Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263, 1269 (5th Cir.1992) (finding that “reports of sexual harassment perpetrated on [the plaintiff] and other women at [the University of Texas Health Center]—is of great public concern”); see also Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 608 (6th Cir.2000) (finding that because the plaintiffs complaint was for race discrimination, it inherently involved a matter of public concern)."
} | 11,139,082 | a |
Courts generally defer to the Executive Branch in matters of national security, particularly where the matter in question is "a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call [and] is committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 518, 527",
"parenthetical": "deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman",
"sentence": "Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the Army's decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable",
"sentence": "See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953) (stating that the Army’s decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable)."
} | 4,062,161 | a |
Courts generally defer to the Executive Branch in matters of national security, particularly where the matter in question is "a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call [and] is committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the Army's decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable",
"sentence": "See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953) (stating that the Army’s decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 518, 527",
"parenthetical": "deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman",
"sentence": "Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman)."
} | 4,062,161 | b |
Courts generally defer to the Executive Branch in matters of national security, particularly where the matter in question is "a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call [and] is committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the Army's decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable",
"sentence": "See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953) (stating that the Army’s decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 518, 527",
"parenthetical": "deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman",
"sentence": "Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman)."
} | 4,062,161 | b |
Courts generally defer to the Executive Branch in matters of national security, particularly where the matter in question is "a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call [and] is committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman",
"sentence": "Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the Army's decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable",
"sentence": "See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953) (stating that the Army’s decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable)."
} | 4,062,161 | a |
Courts generally defer to the Executive Branch in matters of national security, particularly where the matter in question is "a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call [and] is committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the Army's decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable",
"sentence": "See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953) (stating that the Army’s decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman",
"sentence": "Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman)."
} | 4,062,161 | b |
Courts generally defer to the Executive Branch in matters of national security, particularly where the matter in question is "a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call [and] is committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the Army's decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable",
"sentence": "See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953) (stating that the Army’s decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman",
"sentence": "Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman)."
} | 4,062,161 | b |
Courts generally defer to the Executive Branch in matters of national security, particularly where the matter in question is "a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call [and] is committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the Army's decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable",
"sentence": "See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953) (stating that the Army’s decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman",
"sentence": "Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman)."
} | 4,062,161 | b |
Courts generally defer to the Executive Branch in matters of national security, particularly where the matter in question is "a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call [and] is committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman",
"sentence": "Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the Army's decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable",
"sentence": "See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953) (stating that the Army’s decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable)."
} | 4,062,161 | a |
Courts generally defer to the Executive Branch in matters of national security, particularly where the matter in question is "a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call [and] is committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the Army's decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable",
"sentence": "See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953) (stating that the Army’s decision not to award commission to, or alternatively to discharge, a medical specialist is not renewable)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman",
"sentence": "Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (deferring to mili-tar/s decision not to grant security clearance to openly gay woman)."
} | 4,062,161 | b |
. Although briefly addressed by the Maryland Defendants, see Appellee's Br. at 16-17, our case law appears to consider these as two separate and independent inquiries for which a Second Amendment challenger must plead factual circumstances that remove the challenger's circumstances from the "realm of ordinary challenges." We have rejected challenges as being in the realm of ordinary challenges with respect to "in defense of hearth and home" on the basis that a "fear of being robbed ... is far too vague and unsubstantiated to remove [a] case from the typical felon in possession case." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "703 F.3d 246, 246",
"parenthetical": "rejecting desire to possess ammunition primarily for hunting purposes on the same basis",
"sentence": "Moore, 666 F.3d at 320; see Smoot, 690 F.3d at 222 (rejecting a desire to possess a weapon premised on a tip that \"other people were looking for [the defendant]\" on the same basis); see also Pruess, 703 F.3d at 246 (rejecting desire to possess ammunition primarily for hunting purposes on the same basis)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "690 F.3d 222, 222",
"parenthetical": "rejecting a desire to possess a weapon premised on a tip that \"other people were looking for [the defendant]\" on the same basis",
"sentence": "Moore, 666 F.3d at 320; see Smoot, 690 F.3d at 222 (rejecting a desire to possess a weapon premised on a tip that \"other people were looking for [the defendant]\" on the same basis); see also Pruess, 703 F.3d at 246 (rejecting desire to possess ammunition primarily for hunting purposes on the same basis)."
} | 12,277,595 | b |
Once again we emphasize the obvious simply because it is so consistently elided by Gilday, both below and on appeal: The Gil-day injunction grants Gilday no right or privilege to place any telephone call, nor has Gilday cited any authoritative decision indicating that conditioning prison-telephone utilization on informed prisoner consent to reasonable prison-security safeguards violates a federal or state right. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "35 F.3d 1100, 1100",
"parenthetical": "prison may impose rational limits on inmate telephone access, including subjecting inmates to MITS-type system",
"sentence": "See Langton, 71 F.3d at 936 (stating: “at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute” about whether DOC “defendants are authorized by law” to require prisoner consent to MITS regime) (citing Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that “implied consent” is inferred from circumstances indicating that party knowingly agreed to surveillance)); see also Washington, 35 F.3d at 1100 (prison may impose rational limits on inmate telephone access, including subjecting inmates to MITS-type system); Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 747 (prisoner’s right to telephone access subject to reasonable restrictions); Feeley, 570 F.2d at 374 (right of’ pretrial detainees to place telephone calls is subject to reasonable restrictions); Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at 90 (upholding MITS as reasonable security measure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "71 F.3d 936, 936",
"parenthetical": "stating: \"at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute\" about whether DOC \"defendants are authorized by law\" to require prisoner consent to MITS regime",
"sentence": "See Langton, 71 F.3d at 936 (stating: “at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute” about whether DOC “defendants are authorized by law” to require prisoner consent to MITS regime) (citing Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that “implied consent” is inferred from circumstances indicating that party knowingly agreed to surveillance)); see also Washington, 35 F.3d at 1100 (prison may impose rational limits on inmate telephone access, including subjecting inmates to MITS-type system); Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 747 (prisoner’s right to telephone access subject to reasonable restrictions); Feeley, 570 F.2d at 374 (right of’ pretrial detainees to place telephone calls is subject to reasonable restrictions); Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at 90 (upholding MITS as reasonable security measure)."
} | 11,902,545 | b |
Once again we emphasize the obvious simply because it is so consistently elided by Gilday, both below and on appeal: The Gil-day injunction grants Gilday no right or privilege to place any telephone call, nor has Gilday cited any authoritative decision indicating that conditioning prison-telephone utilization on informed prisoner consent to reasonable prison-security safeguards violates a federal or state right. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "71 F.3d 936, 936",
"parenthetical": "stating: \"at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute\" about whether DOC \"defendants are authorized by law\" to require prisoner consent to MITS regime",
"sentence": "See Langton, 71 F.3d at 936 (stating: “at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute” about whether DOC “defendants are authorized by law” to require prisoner consent to MITS regime) (citing Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that “implied consent” is inferred from circumstances indicating that party knowingly agreed to surveillance)); see also Washington, 35 F.3d at 1100 (prison may impose rational limits on inmate telephone access, including subjecting inmates to MITS-type system); Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 747 (prisoner’s right to telephone access subject to reasonable restrictions); Feeley, 570 F.2d at 374 (right of’ pretrial detainees to place telephone calls is subject to reasonable restrictions); Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at 90 (upholding MITS as reasonable security measure)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 F.2d 374, 374",
"parenthetical": "right of' pretrial detainees to place telephone calls is subject to reasonable restrictions",
"sentence": "See Langton, 71 F.3d at 936 (stating: “at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute” about whether DOC “defendants are authorized by law” to require prisoner consent to MITS regime) (citing Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that “implied consent” is inferred from circumstances indicating that party knowingly agreed to surveillance)); see also Washington, 35 F.3d at 1100 (prison may impose rational limits on inmate telephone access, including subjecting inmates to MITS-type system); Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 747 (prisoner’s right to telephone access subject to reasonable restrictions); Feeley, 570 F.2d at 374 (right of’ pretrial detainees to place telephone calls is subject to reasonable restrictions); Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at 90 (upholding MITS as reasonable security measure)."
} | 11,902,545 | a |
Once again we emphasize the obvious simply because it is so consistently elided by Gilday, both below and on appeal: The Gil-day injunction grants Gilday no right or privilege to place any telephone call, nor has Gilday cited any authoritative decision indicating that conditioning prison-telephone utilization on informed prisoner consent to reasonable prison-security safeguards violates a federal or state right. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "71 F.3d 936, 936",
"parenthetical": "stating: \"at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute\" about whether DOC \"defendants are authorized by law\" to require prisoner consent to MITS regime",
"sentence": "See Langton, 71 F.3d at 936 (stating: “at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute” about whether DOC “defendants are authorized by law” to require prisoner consent to MITS regime) (citing Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that “implied consent” is inferred from circumstances indicating that party knowingly agreed to surveillance)); see also Washington, 35 F.3d at 1100 (prison may impose rational limits on inmate telephone access, including subjecting inmates to MITS-type system); Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 747 (prisoner’s right to telephone access subject to reasonable restrictions); Feeley, 570 F.2d at 374 (right of’ pretrial detainees to place telephone calls is subject to reasonable restrictions); Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at 90 (upholding MITS as reasonable security measure)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "814 F.Supp. 1430, 1443-44",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that prison may deem consent implied in situations where inmate must consent to terms in order to place calls, but finding surveillance of prison phones \"a necessary price for prison security\"",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Cheely, 814 F.Supp. 1430, 1443-44 (D.Alaska 1992) (rejecting argument that prison may deem consent implied in situations where inmate must consent to terms in order to place calls, but finding surveillance of prison phones “a necessary price for prison security”), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir.1994)."
} | 11,902,545 | a |
Once again we emphasize the obvious simply because it is so consistently elided by Gilday, both below and on appeal: The Gil-day injunction grants Gilday no right or privilege to place any telephone call, nor has Gilday cited any authoritative decision indicating that conditioning prison-telephone utilization on informed prisoner consent to reasonable prison-security safeguards violates a federal or state right. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that prison may deem consent implied in situations where inmate must consent to terms in order to place calls, but finding surveillance of prison phones \"a necessary price for prison security\"",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Cheely, 814 F.Supp. 1430, 1443-44 (D.Alaska 1992) (rejecting argument that prison may deem consent implied in situations where inmate must consent to terms in order to place calls, but finding surveillance of prison phones “a necessary price for prison security”), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir.1994)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "71 F.3d 936, 936",
"parenthetical": "stating: \"at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute\" about whether DOC \"defendants are authorized by law\" to require prisoner consent to MITS regime",
"sentence": "See Langton, 71 F.3d at 936 (stating: “at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute” about whether DOC “defendants are authorized by law” to require prisoner consent to MITS regime) (citing Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that “implied consent” is inferred from circumstances indicating that party knowingly agreed to surveillance)); see also Washington, 35 F.3d at 1100 (prison may impose rational limits on inmate telephone access, including subjecting inmates to MITS-type system); Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 747 (prisoner’s right to telephone access subject to reasonable restrictions); Feeley, 570 F.2d at 374 (right of’ pretrial detainees to place telephone calls is subject to reasonable restrictions); Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at 90 (upholding MITS as reasonable security measure)."
} | 11,902,545 | b |
Once again we emphasize the obvious simply because it is so consistently elided by Gilday, both below and on appeal: The Gil-day injunction grants Gilday no right or privilege to place any telephone call, nor has Gilday cited any authoritative decision indicating that conditioning prison-telephone utilization on informed prisoner consent to reasonable prison-security safeguards violates a federal or state right. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "35 F.3d 1100, 1100",
"parenthetical": "prison may impose rational limits on inmate telephone access, including subjecting inmates to MITS-type system",
"sentence": "See Langton, 71 F.3d at 936 (stating: “at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute” about whether DOC “defendants are authorized by law” to require prisoner consent to MITS regime) (citing Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that “implied consent” is inferred from circumstances indicating that party knowingly agreed to surveillance)); see also Washington, 35 F.3d at 1100 (prison may impose rational limits on inmate telephone access, including subjecting inmates to MITS-type system); Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 747 (prisoner’s right to telephone access subject to reasonable restrictions); Feeley, 570 F.2d at 374 (right of’ pretrial detainees to place telephone calls is subject to reasonable restrictions); Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at 90 (upholding MITS as reasonable security measure)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "814 F.Supp. 1430, 1443-44",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that prison may deem consent implied in situations where inmate must consent to terms in order to place calls, but finding surveillance of prison phones \"a necessary price for prison security\"",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Cheely, 814 F.Supp. 1430, 1443-44 (D.Alaska 1992) (rejecting argument that prison may deem consent implied in situations where inmate must consent to terms in order to place calls, but finding surveillance of prison phones “a necessary price for prison security”), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir.1994)."
} | 11,902,545 | a |
Once again we emphasize the obvious simply because it is so consistently elided by Gilday, both below and on appeal: The Gil-day injunction grants Gilday no right or privilege to place any telephone call, nor has Gilday cited any authoritative decision indicating that conditioning prison-telephone utilization on informed prisoner consent to reasonable prison-security safeguards violates a federal or state right. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "35 F.3d 1100, 1100",
"parenthetical": "prison may impose rational limits on inmate telephone access, including subjecting inmates to MITS-type system",
"sentence": "See Langton, 71 F.3d at 936 (stating: “at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute” about whether DOC “defendants are authorized by law” to require prisoner consent to MITS regime) (citing Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that “implied consent” is inferred from circumstances indicating that party knowingly agreed to surveillance)); see also Washington, 35 F.3d at 1100 (prison may impose rational limits on inmate telephone access, including subjecting inmates to MITS-type system); Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 747 (prisoner’s right to telephone access subject to reasonable restrictions); Feeley, 570 F.2d at 374 (right of’ pretrial detainees to place telephone calls is subject to reasonable restrictions); Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at 90 (upholding MITS as reasonable security measure)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that prison may deem consent implied in situations where inmate must consent to terms in order to place calls, but finding surveillance of prison phones \"a necessary price for prison security\"",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Cheely, 814 F.Supp. 1430, 1443-44 (D.Alaska 1992) (rejecting argument that prison may deem consent implied in situations where inmate must consent to terms in order to place calls, but finding surveillance of prison phones “a necessary price for prison security”), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir.1994)."
} | 11,902,545 | a |
Once again we emphasize the obvious simply because it is so consistently elided by Gilday, both below and on appeal: The Gil-day injunction grants Gilday no right or privilege to place any telephone call, nor has Gilday cited any authoritative decision indicating that conditioning prison-telephone utilization on informed prisoner consent to reasonable prison-security safeguards violates a federal or state right. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "814 F.Supp. 1430, 1443-44",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that prison may deem consent implied in situations where inmate must consent to terms in order to place calls, but finding surveillance of prison phones \"a necessary price for prison security\"",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Cheely, 814 F.Supp. 1430, 1443-44 (D.Alaska 1992) (rejecting argument that prison may deem consent implied in situations where inmate must consent to terms in order to place calls, but finding surveillance of prison phones “a necessary price for prison security”), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir.1994)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 F.2d 374, 374",
"parenthetical": "right of' pretrial detainees to place telephone calls is subject to reasonable restrictions",
"sentence": "See Langton, 71 F.3d at 936 (stating: “at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute” about whether DOC “defendants are authorized by law” to require prisoner consent to MITS regime) (citing Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that “implied consent” is inferred from circumstances indicating that party knowingly agreed to surveillance)); see also Washington, 35 F.3d at 1100 (prison may impose rational limits on inmate telephone access, including subjecting inmates to MITS-type system); Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 747 (prisoner’s right to telephone access subject to reasonable restrictions); Feeley, 570 F.2d at 374 (right of’ pretrial detainees to place telephone calls is subject to reasonable restrictions); Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at 90 (upholding MITS as reasonable security measure)."
} | 11,902,545 | b |
Once again we emphasize the obvious simply because it is so consistently elided by Gilday, both below and on appeal: The Gil-day injunction grants Gilday no right or privilege to place any telephone call, nor has Gilday cited any authoritative decision indicating that conditioning prison-telephone utilization on informed prisoner consent to reasonable prison-security safeguards violates a federal or state right. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 F.2d 374, 374",
"parenthetical": "right of' pretrial detainees to place telephone calls is subject to reasonable restrictions",
"sentence": "See Langton, 71 F.3d at 936 (stating: “at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute” about whether DOC “defendants are authorized by law” to require prisoner consent to MITS regime) (citing Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that “implied consent” is inferred from circumstances indicating that party knowingly agreed to surveillance)); see also Washington, 35 F.3d at 1100 (prison may impose rational limits on inmate telephone access, including subjecting inmates to MITS-type system); Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 747 (prisoner’s right to telephone access subject to reasonable restrictions); Feeley, 570 F.2d at 374 (right of’ pretrial detainees to place telephone calls is subject to reasonable restrictions); Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at 90 (upholding MITS as reasonable security measure)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that prison may deem consent implied in situations where inmate must consent to terms in order to place calls, but finding surveillance of prison phones \"a necessary price for prison security\"",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Cheely, 814 F.Supp. 1430, 1443-44 (D.Alaska 1992) (rejecting argument that prison may deem consent implied in situations where inmate must consent to terms in order to place calls, but finding surveillance of prison phones “a necessary price for prison security”), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir.1994)."
} | 11,902,545 | a |
Moreover, the pork substitutes are provided from items already in the Prison kitchen, but the proposed hot kosher diet would require the Prison to undertake the extra effort to obtain frozen meals from a new vendor and specially heat them in a conventional or microwave oven. Under these circumstances, Muslim and Jewish inmates are not similarly situated, because the accommodation of Jewish inmates would require substantially greater effort than the accommodation of Muslim inmates. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "984 F.2d 979, 986",
"parenthetical": "patients with same disease not similarly situated unless they can be treated with the same procedure",
"sentence": "See Dexter v. Kirschner, 984 F.2d 979, 986 (9th Cir.1992) (patients with same disease not similarly situated unless they can be treated with the same procedure); cf. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 732-733 (8th Cir.1994) (men and women at different prisons with different administrative and security concerns not similarly situated)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "31 F.3d 727, 732-733",
"parenthetical": "men and women at different prisons with different administrative and security concerns not similarly situated",
"sentence": "See Dexter v. Kirschner, 984 F.2d 979, 986 (9th Cir.1992) (patients with same disease not similarly situated unless they can be treated with the same procedure); cf. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 732-733 (8th Cir.1994) (men and women at different prisons with different administrative and security concerns not similarly situated)."
} | 1,540,630 | a |
Cummings illustrates the problem: the separate categories of "support" and "equitable distribution of property" may well overlap. The need for on-going support may "depend on how much property the less well-off spouse is given outright." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding divorce court's award of lump sum of $135,000, in addition to \"support\" of $5,500 per month, was in the nature of alimony where state court had expressly observed that former wife would need a portion of the $135,000 for her support",
"sentence": "Werthen v. Werthen (In re Wertken), 329 F.3d 269, 273 (1st Cir.2003) (upholding bankruptcy court’s determination that an obligation labeled by divorce court as a property division, awarded in addition to child support payments, was intended to function as child and spousal support and therefore non-dischargeable); See also Wright v. Wright (In re Wright), 184 B.R. 318 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995) (finding divorce court’s award of lump sum of $135,000, in addition to “support” of $5,500 per month, was in the nature of alimony where state court had expressly observed that former wife would need a portion of the $135,000 for her support)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "329 F.3d 269, 273",
"parenthetical": "upholding bankruptcy court's determination that an obligation labeled by divorce court as a property division, awarded in addition to child support payments, was intended to function as child and spousal support and therefore non-dischargeable",
"sentence": "Werthen v. Werthen (In re Wertken), 329 F.3d 269, 273 (1st Cir.2003) (upholding bankruptcy court’s determination that an obligation labeled by divorce court as a property division, awarded in addition to child support payments, was intended to function as child and spousal support and therefore non-dischargeable); See also Wright v. Wright (In re Wright), 184 B.R. 318 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995) (finding divorce court’s award of lump sum of $135,000, in addition to “support” of $5,500 per month, was in the nature of alimony where state court had expressly observed that former wife would need a portion of the $135,000 for her support)."
} | 9,177,036 | b |
. Indeed, while it may have been the case, it cannot be conclusively determined from the record that the Magistrate Judge notified the parties prior to trial that he intended to convene an advisory jury under Rule 39(c). In this regard, we acknowledge the approach of other circuits which indicate that the failure to provide such notice is reversible error, as the parties may have engaged in a different trial strategy had they known of the jury's advisory capacity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "963 F.2d 885, 888",
"parenthetical": "examining the plain language of the rule and policy considerations of trial tactics and concluding \"the rule requires that the court's initiative in ordering a trial to an advisory jury must occur, and the parties be made aware of it, before the case is submitted\"",
"sentence": "See Thompson v. Parkes, 963 F.2d 885, 888 (6th Cir.1992) (examining the plain language of the rule and policy considerations of trial tactics and concluding \"the rule requires that the court’s initiative in ordering a trial to an advisory jury must occur, and the parties be made aware of it, before the case is submitted”); Bereda v. Picker ing Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir.1989) (requiring a district court to \"notify both sides of a jury's advisory status no later than the time at which the jury selection has begun”); Pradier v. Elespuru, 641 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir.1981) (recognizing that \"there are frequently significant tactical differences in presenting a case to a court, as opposed to a jury. The parties are entitled to know at the outset of the trial whether the decision will be made by the judge or the jury”); cf. Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 827 (2d Cir.1994) (recognizing \"that such notice is preferable,” rejecting a per se rule of notice, and requiring instead that the complaining party show \"demonstrable prejudice”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "29 F.3d 821, 827",
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"that such notice is preferable,\" rejecting a per se rule of notice, and requiring instead that the complaining party show \"demonstrable prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See Thompson v. Parkes, 963 F.2d 885, 888 (6th Cir.1992) (examining the plain language of the rule and policy considerations of trial tactics and concluding \"the rule requires that the court’s initiative in ordering a trial to an advisory jury must occur, and the parties be made aware of it, before the case is submitted”); Bereda v. Picker ing Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir.1989) (requiring a district court to \"notify both sides of a jury's advisory status no later than the time at which the jury selection has begun”); Pradier v. Elespuru, 641 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir.1981) (recognizing that \"there are frequently significant tactical differences in presenting a case to a court, as opposed to a jury. The parties are entitled to know at the outset of the trial whether the decision will be made by the judge or the jury”); cf. Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 827 (2d Cir.1994) (recognizing \"that such notice is preferable,” rejecting a per se rule of notice, and requiring instead that the complaining party show \"demonstrable prejudice”)."
} | 10,522,463 | a |
. Indeed, while it may have been the case, it cannot be conclusively determined from the record that the Magistrate Judge notified the parties prior to trial that he intended to convene an advisory jury under Rule 39(c). In this regard, we acknowledge the approach of other circuits which indicate that the failure to provide such notice is reversible error, as the parties may have engaged in a different trial strategy had they known of the jury's advisory capacity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "865 F.2d 49, 53",
"parenthetical": "requiring a district court to \"notify both sides of a jury's advisory status no later than the time at which the jury selection has begun\"",
"sentence": "See Thompson v. Parkes, 963 F.2d 885, 888 (6th Cir.1992) (examining the plain language of the rule and policy considerations of trial tactics and concluding \"the rule requires that the court’s initiative in ordering a trial to an advisory jury must occur, and the parties be made aware of it, before the case is submitted”); Bereda v. Picker ing Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir.1989) (requiring a district court to \"notify both sides of a jury's advisory status no later than the time at which the jury selection has begun”); Pradier v. Elespuru, 641 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir.1981) (recognizing that \"there are frequently significant tactical differences in presenting a case to a court, as opposed to a jury. The parties are entitled to know at the outset of the trial whether the decision will be made by the judge or the jury”); cf. Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 827 (2d Cir.1994) (recognizing \"that such notice is preferable,” rejecting a per se rule of notice, and requiring instead that the complaining party show \"demonstrable prejudice”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "29 F.3d 821, 827",
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"that such notice is preferable,\" rejecting a per se rule of notice, and requiring instead that the complaining party show \"demonstrable prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See Thompson v. Parkes, 963 F.2d 885, 888 (6th Cir.1992) (examining the plain language of the rule and policy considerations of trial tactics and concluding \"the rule requires that the court’s initiative in ordering a trial to an advisory jury must occur, and the parties be made aware of it, before the case is submitted”); Bereda v. Picker ing Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir.1989) (requiring a district court to \"notify both sides of a jury's advisory status no later than the time at which the jury selection has begun”); Pradier v. Elespuru, 641 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir.1981) (recognizing that \"there are frequently significant tactical differences in presenting a case to a court, as opposed to a jury. The parties are entitled to know at the outset of the trial whether the decision will be made by the judge or the jury”); cf. Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 827 (2d Cir.1994) (recognizing \"that such notice is preferable,” rejecting a per se rule of notice, and requiring instead that the complaining party show \"demonstrable prejudice”)."
} | 10,522,463 | a |
. Indeed, while it may have been the case, it cannot be conclusively determined from the record that the Magistrate Judge notified the parties prior to trial that he intended to convene an advisory jury under Rule 39(c). In this regard, we acknowledge the approach of other circuits which indicate that the failure to provide such notice is reversible error, as the parties may have engaged in a different trial strategy had they known of the jury's advisory capacity. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "29 F.3d 821, 827",
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"that such notice is preferable,\" rejecting a per se rule of notice, and requiring instead that the complaining party show \"demonstrable prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See Thompson v. Parkes, 963 F.2d 885, 888 (6th Cir.1992) (examining the plain language of the rule and policy considerations of trial tactics and concluding \"the rule requires that the court’s initiative in ordering a trial to an advisory jury must occur, and the parties be made aware of it, before the case is submitted”); Bereda v. Picker ing Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir.1989) (requiring a district court to \"notify both sides of a jury's advisory status no later than the time at which the jury selection has begun”); Pradier v. Elespuru, 641 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir.1981) (recognizing that \"there are frequently significant tactical differences in presenting a case to a court, as opposed to a jury. The parties are entitled to know at the outset of the trial whether the decision will be made by the judge or the jury”); cf. Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 827 (2d Cir.1994) (recognizing \"that such notice is preferable,” rejecting a per se rule of notice, and requiring instead that the complaining party show \"demonstrable prejudice”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "641 F.2d 808, 811",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"there are frequently significant tactical differences in presenting a case to a court, as opposed to a jury. The parties are entitled to know at the outset of the trial whether the decision will be made by the judge or the jury\"",
"sentence": "See Thompson v. Parkes, 963 F.2d 885, 888 (6th Cir.1992) (examining the plain language of the rule and policy considerations of trial tactics and concluding \"the rule requires that the court’s initiative in ordering a trial to an advisory jury must occur, and the parties be made aware of it, before the case is submitted”); Bereda v. Picker ing Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir.1989) (requiring a district court to \"notify both sides of a jury's advisory status no later than the time at which the jury selection has begun”); Pradier v. Elespuru, 641 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir.1981) (recognizing that \"there are frequently significant tactical differences in presenting a case to a court, as opposed to a jury. The parties are entitled to know at the outset of the trial whether the decision will be made by the judge or the jury”); cf. Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 827 (2d Cir.1994) (recognizing \"that such notice is preferable,” rejecting a per se rule of notice, and requiring instead that the complaining party show \"demonstrable prejudice”)."
} | 10,522,463 | b |
Some options were "sexually suggestive" and some were "innocuous." The Ninth Circuit held that the dating service was not an information content provider of the libelous profile. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "519 F.3d 671, 671",
"parenthetical": "Craigslist did not \"cause\" discriminatory housing advertisements within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 3604(c",
"sentence": "Id. at 1172; see Universal Commc’n Sys., 478 F.3d at 420 (messaging board immune with respect to posts it did not prompt); cf. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 671 (Craigslist did not “cause” discriminatory housing advertisements within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c), by hosting online marketplace where they were posted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "478 F.3d 420, 420",
"parenthetical": "messaging board immune with respect to posts it did not prompt",
"sentence": "Id. at 1172; see Universal Commc’n Sys., 478 F.3d at 420 (messaging board immune with respect to posts it did not prompt); cf. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 671 (Craigslist did not “cause” discriminatory housing advertisements within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c), by hosting online marketplace where they were posted)."
} | 3,663,642 | b |
Further, it is a cardinal principle that the Secretary's interpretation of the statute need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one which the court views as the most reasonable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "389 U.S. 299, 307",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f found to 'implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,' [regulation] must be upheld.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Cornell, 389 U.S. 299, 307, 88 S.Ct. 445, 450, 19 L.Ed.2d 537 (1967) (“[I]f found to ‘implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,’ [regulation] must be upheld.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 U.S. 528, 534-36",
"parenthetical": "regulation which had a \"reasonable basis\" in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer's challenge had \"logical force\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 534-36, 98 S.Ct. 841, 845-46, 55 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (regulation which had a “reasonable basis” in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer’s challenge had “logical force”)."
} | 292,649 | b |
Further, it is a cardinal principle that the Secretary's interpretation of the statute need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one which the court views as the most reasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 U.S. 528, 534-36",
"parenthetical": "regulation which had a \"reasonable basis\" in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer's challenge had \"logical force\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 534-36, 98 S.Ct. 841, 845-46, 55 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (regulation which had a “reasonable basis” in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer’s challenge had “logical force”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 S.Ct. 445, 450",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f found to 'implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,' [regulation] must be upheld.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Cornell, 389 U.S. 299, 307, 88 S.Ct. 445, 450, 19 L.Ed.2d 537 (1967) (“[I]f found to ‘implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,’ [regulation] must be upheld.”)."
} | 292,649 | a |
Further, it is a cardinal principle that the Secretary's interpretation of the statute need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one which the court views as the most reasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 U.S. 528, 534-36",
"parenthetical": "regulation which had a \"reasonable basis\" in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer's challenge had \"logical force\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 534-36, 98 S.Ct. 841, 845-46, 55 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (regulation which had a “reasonable basis” in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer’s challenge had “logical force”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f found to 'implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,' [regulation] must be upheld.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Cornell, 389 U.S. 299, 307, 88 S.Ct. 445, 450, 19 L.Ed.2d 537 (1967) (“[I]f found to ‘implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,’ [regulation] must be upheld.”)."
} | 292,649 | a |
Further, it is a cardinal principle that the Secretary's interpretation of the statute need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one which the court views as the most reasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 841, 845-46",
"parenthetical": "regulation which had a \"reasonable basis\" in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer's challenge had \"logical force\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 534-36, 98 S.Ct. 841, 845-46, 55 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (regulation which had a “reasonable basis” in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer’s challenge had “logical force”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "389 U.S. 299, 307",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f found to 'implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,' [regulation] must be upheld.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Cornell, 389 U.S. 299, 307, 88 S.Ct. 445, 450, 19 L.Ed.2d 537 (1967) (“[I]f found to ‘implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,’ [regulation] must be upheld.”)."
} | 292,649 | a |
Further, it is a cardinal principle that the Secretary's interpretation of the statute need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one which the court views as the most reasonable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 S.Ct. 445, 450",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f found to 'implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,' [regulation] must be upheld.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Cornell, 389 U.S. 299, 307, 88 S.Ct. 445, 450, 19 L.Ed.2d 537 (1967) (“[I]f found to ‘implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,’ [regulation] must be upheld.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 841, 845-46",
"parenthetical": "regulation which had a \"reasonable basis\" in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer's challenge had \"logical force\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 534-36, 98 S.Ct. 841, 845-46, 55 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (regulation which had a “reasonable basis” in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer’s challenge had “logical force”)."
} | 292,649 | b |
Further, it is a cardinal principle that the Secretary's interpretation of the statute need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one which the court views as the most reasonable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f found to 'implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,' [regulation] must be upheld.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Cornell, 389 U.S. 299, 307, 88 S.Ct. 445, 450, 19 L.Ed.2d 537 (1967) (“[I]f found to ‘implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,’ [regulation] must be upheld.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 841, 845-46",
"parenthetical": "regulation which had a \"reasonable basis\" in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer's challenge had \"logical force\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 534-36, 98 S.Ct. 841, 845-46, 55 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (regulation which had a “reasonable basis” in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer’s challenge had “logical force”)."
} | 292,649 | b |
Further, it is a cardinal principle that the Secretary's interpretation of the statute need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one which the court views as the most reasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulation which had a \"reasonable basis\" in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer's challenge had \"logical force\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 534-36, 98 S.Ct. 841, 845-46, 55 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (regulation which had a “reasonable basis” in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer’s challenge had “logical force”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "389 U.S. 299, 307",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f found to 'implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,' [regulation] must be upheld.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Cornell, 389 U.S. 299, 307, 88 S.Ct. 445, 450, 19 L.Ed.2d 537 (1967) (“[I]f found to ‘implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,’ [regulation] must be upheld.”)."
} | 292,649 | a |
Further, it is a cardinal principle that the Secretary's interpretation of the statute need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one which the court views as the most reasonable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 S.Ct. 445, 450",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f found to 'implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,' [regulation] must be upheld.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Cornell, 389 U.S. 299, 307, 88 S.Ct. 445, 450, 19 L.Ed.2d 537 (1967) (“[I]f found to ‘implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,’ [regulation] must be upheld.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulation which had a \"reasonable basis\" in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer's challenge had \"logical force\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 534-36, 98 S.Ct. 841, 845-46, 55 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (regulation which had a “reasonable basis” in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer’s challenge had “logical force”)."
} | 292,649 | b |
Further, it is a cardinal principle that the Secretary's interpretation of the statute need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one which the court views as the most reasonable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f found to 'implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,' [regulation] must be upheld.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Cornell, 389 U.S. 299, 307, 88 S.Ct. 445, 450, 19 L.Ed.2d 537 (1967) (“[I]f found to ‘implement the Congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,’ [regulation] must be upheld.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulation which had a \"reasonable basis\" in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer's challenge had \"logical force\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 534-36, 98 S.Ct. 841, 845-46, 55 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (regulation which had a “reasonable basis” in the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer’s challenge had “logical force”)."
} | 292,649 | b |
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gambill leave to proceed in forma pauperis because Gambill failed to allege a claim against any defendant under any cognizable legal theory. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "864 F.2d 635, 638",
"parenthetical": "court may sua sponte dismiss an action for failure to state a claim without notice or an opportunity to respond where plaintiff cannot possibly win relief",
"sentence": "See id. at 1370 (“A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.”); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir.1988) (court may sua sponte dismiss an action for failure to state a claim without notice or an opportunity to respond where plaintiff cannot possibly win relief); see also McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir.1996) (Rule 8 is an independent basis of dismissal and requires each averment of a pleading to be simple, concise, and direct, stating which defendant is liable to the plaintiff for which wrong)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1172, 1179",
"parenthetical": "Rule 8 is an independent basis of dismissal and requires each averment of a pleading to be simple, concise, and direct, stating which defendant is liable to the plaintiff for which wrong",
"sentence": "See id. at 1370 (“A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.”); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir.1988) (court may sua sponte dismiss an action for failure to state a claim without notice or an opportunity to respond where plaintiff cannot possibly win relief); see also McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir.1996) (Rule 8 is an independent basis of dismissal and requires each averment of a pleading to be simple, concise, and direct, stating which defendant is liable to the plaintiff for which wrong)."
} | 4,072,712 | a |
Turning to the case before us, we hold that the absence of a receipt from the appellant for a copy of the staff judge advocate's recommendation does not evidence a failure to comply with Rule for Courts-Martial 1106(f)(1), because such affirmative proof of service is not required. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presumption that acting commander assumed command in accordance with regulations",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Yates, 28 M.J. 60 (C.M.A.1989) (presumption that acting commander assumed command in accordance with regulations); United States v. Moschella, 43 C.M.R. 383 (C.M.A.1971) (presumption that amended convening order was properly promulgated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presumption that staff judge advocate had authority to excuse court members",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ponder, 29 M.J. 782 (A.C.M.R.1989) (presumption that staff judge advocate had authority to excuse court members)."
} | 5,866,416 | b |
In post-Troxel decisions, courts of last resort in Maryland and Illinois have likewise held their state visitation statutes unconstitutional where grandparents were required to prove only that visitation was in their grandchild's best interest without a preliminary finding that the parents opposing the visits were unfit to make that decision. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "28 S.W.3d 357, 365-66",
"parenthetical": "holding Troxel not controlling where state's supreme court previously held rational basis review sufficient based on minimal intrusion of grandparent visitation and other parental protections afforded by visitation statute",
"sentence": "But see In re G.P.C., 28 S.W.3d 357, 365-66 (Mo.Ct.App.2000) (holding Troxel not controlling where state’s supreme court previously held rational basis review sufficient based on minimal intrusion of grandparent visitation and other parental protections afforded by visitation statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "761 A.2d 291, 301-03",
"parenthetical": "holding grandparent visitation statute serves compelling state interest in maintaining grandparent-grandchild relationship where grandparents had raised child for period of time, but agreeing with trial court that something more than child's best interest must be established to serve compelling state interest",
"sentence": "Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill.2d 455, 250 Ill.Dec. 758, 739 N.E.2d 521, 534 (2000); Brice v. Brice, 133 Md.App. 302, 754 A.2d 1132, 1135-36 (2000); see also Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 301-03 (Me.2000) (holding grandparent visitation statute serves compelling state interest in maintaining grandparent-grandchild relationship where grandparents had raised child for period of time, but agreeing with trial court that something more than child’s best interest must be established to serve compelling state interest)."
} | 9,484,622 | b |
Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "109 N.J. 187, 187",
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "305 N.J.Super. 365, 373",
"parenthetical": "corrections officers' arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | a |
Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "corrections officers' arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "109 N.J. 187, 187",
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | b |
Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "284 N.J.Super. 639, 651",
"parenthetical": "obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "109 N.J. 187, 187",
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | b |
Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "109 N.J. 187, 187",
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | a |
Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "109 N.J. 187, 187",
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | a |
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