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Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "109 N.J. 187, 187",
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | a |
Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "109 N.J. 187, 187",
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "242 N.J.Super. 148, 159",
"parenthetical": "probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | a |
Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "109 N.J. 187, 187",
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | b |
Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "305 N.J.Super. 365, 373",
"parenthetical": "corrections officers' arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | a |
Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "corrections officers' arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | b |
Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "284 N.J.Super. 639, 651",
"parenthetical": "obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | b |
Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | a |
Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | a |
Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | b |
Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "242 N.J.Super. 148, 159",
"parenthetical": "probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | b |
Our Supreme Court adopted the federal "objective reasonableness" standard when determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend's child",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable",
"sentence": "Kirk v. City of Newark, supra, 109 N.J. at 187, 536 A.2d 229 (a reasonable officer could have believed that defendant police detective had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for scalding his girlfriend’s child); see also Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305 N.J.Super. 365, 373, 702 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1997) (corrections officers’ arrest of plaintiff, a former inmate, seen on or near state prison grounds, was objectively reasonable); McKinney v. East Orange Mun. Corp., 284 N.J.Super. 639, 651, 666 A.2d 191 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519, 673 A.2d 277 (1996) (obtaining search warrant and manner of its execution were both objectively unreasonable); Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 159, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990) (probable cause existed for warrant for search of plaintiffs home but manner in which search was conducted was objectively unreasonable)."
} | 340,338 | a |
At that time, preference eligible veterans, including preference eligible FBI employees, already had the right to appeal their removal to the Civil Service Commission under Section 14 the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 390, as amended 61 Stat. 723 ("[A] preference eligible ... shall have the right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission from, an adverse decision of the administrative officer."). Preference eligible FBI agents could exercise this right just as well as preference eligible employees of other agencies. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Because of the exemption of the FBI from the civil service laws, the Bureau is generally free to discharge its employees for any reasons it chooses,\" but \"like any other employer, the FBI is subject to the provisions of SS 9(c",
"sentence": "Cf. Carter v. United States, 407 F.2d 1238, 1242 & n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1968) (“Because of the exemption of the FBI from the civil service laws, the Bureau is generally free to discharge its employees for any reasons it chooses,” but “like any other employer, the FBI is subject to the provisions of § 9(c) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act by which Congress granted special rights and protections to the returning veteran,” though that agent could not appeal to the Civil Service Commission because he was not preference eligible)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "510 F.2d 1232, 1236",
"parenthetical": "discussing preference eligible FBI agent's rights under the Veterans Preference Act",
"sentence": "See id. (granting appeal rights to preference eligible employees “in any establishment, agency, bureau, administration, project, or department” without qualification on agency); Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1232, 1236 (D.C.Cir.1975) (discussing preference eligible FBI agent’s rights under the Veterans Preference Act)."
} | 4,146,655 | b |
The facts here are markedly different: the plaintiffs have alleged that Wojcik and Savage violated Pauluk's constitutional rights by moving him into a municipal building where he was exposed to toxic mold over the course of several years -- along with countless other employees, including the defendants. Wojcik and Savage's decision to reassign Pauluk more closely resembles the cases in which this court has declined to find a cognizable due process violation due to the unforeseeable nature of the' plaintiffs' injuries and the fact that the danger facing the plaintiff existed independent of state action. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "340 F.3d 952, 957",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n each of the cases in which we have applied the danger-creation exception, ultimate injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Patel, 648 F.3d at 976 (holding no rational fact finder could conclude that a teacher acted with deliberate indifference to her student’s well-being because the teacher “did not know there was any immediate danger in allowing [the plaintiff] to briefly use the next-door bathroom alone”); Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir.1998) (finding no liability where an individual was shot during a barroom brawl' by an off-duty deputy on the grounds that the injury was an unforeseeable consequence of a county policy requiring off-duty officers to carry a firearm); see also Lawrence v. United States, 340 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir.2003) (“[I]n each of the cases in which we have applied the danger-creation exception, ultimate injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "648 F.3d 976, 976",
"parenthetical": "holding no rational fact finder could conclude that a teacher acted with deliberate indifference to her student's well-being because the teacher \"did not know there was any immediate danger in allowing [the plaintiff] to briefly use the next-door bathroom alone\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Patel, 648 F.3d at 976 (holding no rational fact finder could conclude that a teacher acted with deliberate indifference to her student’s well-being because the teacher “did not know there was any immediate danger in allowing [the plaintiff] to briefly use the next-door bathroom alone”); Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir.1998) (finding no liability where an individual was shot during a barroom brawl' by an off-duty deputy on the grounds that the injury was an unforeseeable consequence of a county policy requiring off-duty officers to carry a firearm); see also Lawrence v. United States, 340 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir.2003) (“[I]n each of the cases in which we have applied the danger-creation exception, ultimate injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable.”)."
} | 4,353,975 | b |
The facts here are markedly different: the plaintiffs have alleged that Wojcik and Savage violated Pauluk's constitutional rights by moving him into a municipal building where he was exposed to toxic mold over the course of several years -- along with countless other employees, including the defendants. Wojcik and Savage's decision to reassign Pauluk more closely resembles the cases in which this court has declined to find a cognizable due process violation due to the unforeseeable nature of the' plaintiffs' injuries and the fact that the danger facing the plaintiff existed independent of state action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "147 F.3d 1054, 1061",
"parenthetical": "finding no liability where an individual was shot during a barroom brawl' by an off-duty deputy on the grounds that the injury was an unforeseeable consequence of a county policy requiring off-duty officers to carry a firearm",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Patel, 648 F.3d at 976 (holding no rational fact finder could conclude that a teacher acted with deliberate indifference to her student’s well-being because the teacher “did not know there was any immediate danger in allowing [the plaintiff] to briefly use the next-door bathroom alone”); Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir.1998) (finding no liability where an individual was shot during a barroom brawl' by an off-duty deputy on the grounds that the injury was an unforeseeable consequence of a county policy requiring off-duty officers to carry a firearm); see also Lawrence v. United States, 340 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir.2003) (“[I]n each of the cases in which we have applied the danger-creation exception, ultimate injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "340 F.3d 952, 957",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n each of the cases in which we have applied the danger-creation exception, ultimate injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Patel, 648 F.3d at 976 (holding no rational fact finder could conclude that a teacher acted with deliberate indifference to her student’s well-being because the teacher “did not know there was any immediate danger in allowing [the plaintiff] to briefly use the next-door bathroom alone”); Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir.1998) (finding no liability where an individual was shot during a barroom brawl' by an off-duty deputy on the grounds that the injury was an unforeseeable consequence of a county policy requiring off-duty officers to carry a firearm); see also Lawrence v. United States, 340 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir.2003) (“[I]n each of the cases in which we have applied the danger-creation exception, ultimate injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable.”)."
} | 4,353,975 | a |
Safety of the community is implicated not only by violence, but also by narcotics trafficking. In cases involving the instant drug offenses, the danger to the community is the likelihood that the defendant will, if released, traffic in illicit drugs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "788 F.2d 100, 111",
"parenthetical": "danger to community arises from the likelihood that the defendant will, if released, commit one of the proscribed federal offenses",
"sentence": "See United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 111 (3d Cir.1986)(danger to community arises from the likelihood that the defendant will, if released, commit one of the proscribed federal offenses)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "775 F.2d 504, 507",
"parenthetical": "statutory language unequivocably establishes that Congress intended to equate traffic in drugs with a danger to the community",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Strong, 775 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir.1985)(statutory language unequivocably establishes that Congress intended to equate traffic in drugs with a danger to the community)."
} | 3,992,370 | a |
Martin does not dispute that had he been in attendance, he would have been permitted to have his attorney present, confront the witnesses who testified, and call witnesses to speak on his behalf. While he alludes to possible problems with notice for the May 3 hearing, the Court finds that Defendants' repeated attempts to provide Martin with the necessary information constitute constructive service. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "375 F.3d 480, 480-81",
"parenthetical": "post-termination proceedings require, at a minimum \" 'that the discharged employee be permitted to attend the hearing, to have the assistance of counsel, to call witnesses and produce evidence on his own behalf, and to know and have an opportunity to challenge the evidence against him/ \" (quoting Carter, 767 F.2d at 273",
"sentence": "Cf. Mitchell, 375 F.3d at 480-81 (post-termination proceedings require, at a minimum “ ‘that the discharged employee be permitted to attend the hearing, to have the assistance of counsel, to call witnesses and produce evidence on his own behalf, and to know and have an opportunity to challenge the evidence against him/ ” (quoting Carter, 767 F.2d at 273))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "409 F.3d 279, 285",
"parenthetical": "Constitution only requires notice that is \"reasonably calculated\" to apprise party of action",
"sentence": "See Karkoukli’s, Inc. v. Dohany, 409 F.3d 279, 285 (6th Cir.2005) (Constitution only requires notice that is “reasonably calculated” to apprise party of action). In all, Martin raises no legitimate objections to the method by which Defendants carried out the May 3 hearing and its sufficiency under the Fourteenth Amendment."
} | 4,311,280 | b |
Martin does not dispute that had he been in attendance, he would have been permitted to have his attorney present, confront the witnesses who testified, and call witnesses to speak on his behalf. While he alludes to possible problems with notice for the May 3 hearing, the Court finds that Defendants' repeated attempts to provide Martin with the necessary information constitute constructive service. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "767 F.2d 273, 273",
"parenthetical": "post-termination proceedings require, at a minimum \" 'that the discharged employee be permitted to attend the hearing, to have the assistance of counsel, to call witnesses and produce evidence on his own behalf, and to know and have an opportunity to challenge the evidence against him/ \" (quoting Carter, 767 F.2d at 273",
"sentence": "Cf. Mitchell, 375 F.3d at 480-81 (post-termination proceedings require, at a minimum “ ‘that the discharged employee be permitted to attend the hearing, to have the assistance of counsel, to call witnesses and produce evidence on his own behalf, and to know and have an opportunity to challenge the evidence against him/ ” (quoting Carter, 767 F.2d at 273))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "409 F.3d 279, 285",
"parenthetical": "Constitution only requires notice that is \"reasonably calculated\" to apprise party of action",
"sentence": "See Karkoukli’s, Inc. v. Dohany, 409 F.3d 279, 285 (6th Cir.2005) (Constitution only requires notice that is “reasonably calculated” to apprise party of action). In all, Martin raises no legitimate objections to the method by which Defendants carried out the May 3 hearing and its sufficiency under the Fourteenth Amendment."
} | 4,311,280 | b |
First, McDonough has not pointed us to any evidence to establish that she was substantially limited in the major life activity of working. "Working can be considered a major life activity." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "301 F.3d 866, 869",
"parenthetical": "\"The number of Americans restricted by back problems to light work is legion. They are not disabled.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Whitlock v. Mac-Gray, Inc., 345 F.3d 44, 46 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment); see also Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir.2002) (“The number of Americans restricted by back problems to light work is legion. They are not disabled.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "345 F.3d 44, 46",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Whitlock v. Mac-Gray, Inc., 345 F.3d 44, 46 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment); see also Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir.2002) (“The number of Americans restricted by back problems to light work is legion. They are not disabled.”)."
} | 3,740,477 | b |
Defendant also states incompletely the law on. publication of opinions ac companied by full disclosure of the facts on which they are based. Defendant is correct that "when an author outlines the facts available to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally protected by the First Amendment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 1067, 1067",
"parenthetical": "noting that opinions based on disclosed facts are not actionable \"where the underlying facts are not actionable because they are nondefa-matory\" and \"where [the underlying facts] are not actionable because there is an absence of actual malice\"",
"sentence": "Partington, 56 F.3d at 1157. This principle “assumes, however, that the factual basis itself is true.” Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1129; Standing Committee v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1440 (9th Cir.1995) (“Where a publication sets forth the facts underlying its statement of opinion and those facts' are true, the Constitution protects that opinion from liability for defamation.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted)); Dodds, 145 F.3d at 1067 (noting that opinions based on disclosed facts are not actionable “where the underlying facts are not actionable because they are nondefa-matory” and “where [the underlying facts] are not actionable because there is an absence of actual malice”); Franklin, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at 438. A speaker, therefore, properly finds protection in the First Amendment when he publishes opinions based either upon fully disclosed, true facts, see, e.g., Partington, 56 F.3d at 1154 (“Where, as here, an author writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and offers his own personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should generally be protected by the First Amendment.”), or upon facts otherwise commonly known to the audience, such as facts that are a matter of public knowledge."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1122",
"parenthetical": "dismissing Johnnie Cochran, Esq.'s suit against the New York Post, because the statement \"history reveals that [Cochran] will say or do just about anything to win, typically at the expense of truth\" was based upon disclosed facts, and not \"on any additional, undisclosed facts not known to the public\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Cochran, 58 F.Supp.2d at 1122 (dismissing Johnnie Cochran, Esq.’s suit against the New York Post, because the statement “history reveals that [Cochran] will say or do just about anything to win, typically at the expense of truth” was based upon disclosed facts, and not “on any additional, undisclosed facts not known to the public”); Goetz v. Kunstler, 164 Misc.2d 557, 563, 625 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1995) (dismissing complaint of Bernhard Goetz against William Kunstler, Esq., in part because Mr. Kunstler’s “description of Goetz as a ‘murderous vigilante’ would be understood as an opinion, a mere hypothesis based upon facts both widely known and fully set forth”)."
} | 9,228,101 | a |
Defendant also states incompletely the law on. publication of opinions ac companied by full disclosure of the facts on which they are based. Defendant is correct that "when an author outlines the facts available to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally protected by the First Amendment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 1067, 1067",
"parenthetical": "noting that opinions based on disclosed facts are not actionable \"where the underlying facts are not actionable because they are nondefa-matory\" and \"where [the underlying facts] are not actionable because there is an absence of actual malice\"",
"sentence": "Partington, 56 F.3d at 1157. This principle “assumes, however, that the factual basis itself is true.” Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1129; Standing Committee v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1440 (9th Cir.1995) (“Where a publication sets forth the facts underlying its statement of opinion and those facts' are true, the Constitution protects that opinion from liability for defamation.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted)); Dodds, 145 F.3d at 1067 (noting that opinions based on disclosed facts are not actionable “where the underlying facts are not actionable because they are nondefa-matory” and “where [the underlying facts] are not actionable because there is an absence of actual malice”); Franklin, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at 438. A speaker, therefore, properly finds protection in the First Amendment when he publishes opinions based either upon fully disclosed, true facts, see, e.g., Partington, 56 F.3d at 1154 (“Where, as here, an author writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and offers his own personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should generally be protected by the First Amendment.”), or upon facts otherwise commonly known to the audience, such as facts that are a matter of public knowledge."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "164 Misc.2d 557, 563",
"parenthetical": "dismissing complaint of Bernhard Goetz against William Kunstler, Esq., in part because Mr. Kunstler's \"description of Goetz as a 'murderous vigilante' would be understood as an opinion, a mere hypothesis based upon facts both widely known and fully set forth\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Cochran, 58 F.Supp.2d at 1122 (dismissing Johnnie Cochran, Esq.’s suit against the New York Post, because the statement “history reveals that [Cochran] will say or do just about anything to win, typically at the expense of truth” was based upon disclosed facts, and not “on any additional, undisclosed facts not known to the public”); Goetz v. Kunstler, 164 Misc.2d 557, 563, 625 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1995) (dismissing complaint of Bernhard Goetz against William Kunstler, Esq., in part because Mr. Kunstler’s “description of Goetz as a ‘murderous vigilante’ would be understood as an opinion, a mere hypothesis based upon facts both widely known and fully set forth”)."
} | 9,228,101 | a |
Defendant also states incompletely the law on. publication of opinions ac companied by full disclosure of the facts on which they are based. Defendant is correct that "when an author outlines the facts available to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally protected by the First Amendment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 1067, 1067",
"parenthetical": "noting that opinions based on disclosed facts are not actionable \"where the underlying facts are not actionable because they are nondefa-matory\" and \"where [the underlying facts] are not actionable because there is an absence of actual malice\"",
"sentence": "Partington, 56 F.3d at 1157. This principle “assumes, however, that the factual basis itself is true.” Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1129; Standing Committee v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1440 (9th Cir.1995) (“Where a publication sets forth the facts underlying its statement of opinion and those facts' are true, the Constitution protects that opinion from liability for defamation.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted)); Dodds, 145 F.3d at 1067 (noting that opinions based on disclosed facts are not actionable “where the underlying facts are not actionable because they are nondefa-matory” and “where [the underlying facts] are not actionable because there is an absence of actual malice”); Franklin, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at 438. A speaker, therefore, properly finds protection in the First Amendment when he publishes opinions based either upon fully disclosed, true facts, see, e.g., Partington, 56 F.3d at 1154 (“Where, as here, an author writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and offers his own personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should generally be protected by the First Amendment.”), or upon facts otherwise commonly known to the audience, such as facts that are a matter of public knowledge."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing complaint of Bernhard Goetz against William Kunstler, Esq., in part because Mr. Kunstler's \"description of Goetz as a 'murderous vigilante' would be understood as an opinion, a mere hypothesis based upon facts both widely known and fully set forth\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Cochran, 58 F.Supp.2d at 1122 (dismissing Johnnie Cochran, Esq.’s suit against the New York Post, because the statement “history reveals that [Cochran] will say or do just about anything to win, typically at the expense of truth” was based upon disclosed facts, and not “on any additional, undisclosed facts not known to the public”); Goetz v. Kunstler, 164 Misc.2d 557, 563, 625 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1995) (dismissing complaint of Bernhard Goetz against William Kunstler, Esq., in part because Mr. Kunstler’s “description of Goetz as a ‘murderous vigilante’ would be understood as an opinion, a mere hypothesis based upon facts both widely known and fully set forth”)."
} | 9,228,101 | a |
Defendant also states incompletely the law on. publication of opinions ac companied by full disclosure of the facts on which they are based. Defendant is correct that "when an author outlines the facts available to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally protected by the First Amendment." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1122",
"parenthetical": "dismissing Johnnie Cochran, Esq.'s suit against the New York Post, because the statement \"history reveals that [Cochran] will say or do just about anything to win, typically at the expense of truth\" was based upon disclosed facts, and not \"on any additional, undisclosed facts not known to the public\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Cochran, 58 F.Supp.2d at 1122 (dismissing Johnnie Cochran, Esq.’s suit against the New York Post, because the statement “history reveals that [Cochran] will say or do just about anything to win, typically at the expense of truth” was based upon disclosed facts, and not “on any additional, undisclosed facts not known to the public”); Goetz v. Kunstler, 164 Misc.2d 557, 563, 625 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1995) (dismissing complaint of Bernhard Goetz against William Kunstler, Esq., in part because Mr. Kunstler’s “description of Goetz as a ‘murderous vigilante’ would be understood as an opinion, a mere hypothesis based upon facts both widely known and fully set forth”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "10 Cal.Rptr.3d 438, 438",
"parenthetical": "\"Where, as here, an author writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and offers his own personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should generally be protected by the First Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "Partington, 56 F.3d at 1157. This principle “assumes, however, that the factual basis itself is true.” Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1129; Standing Committee v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1440 (9th Cir.1995) (“Where a publication sets forth the facts underlying its statement of opinion and those facts' are true, the Constitution protects that opinion from liability for defamation.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted)); Dodds, 145 F.3d at 1067 (noting that opinions based on disclosed facts are not actionable “where the underlying facts are not actionable because they are nondefa-matory” and “where [the underlying facts] are not actionable because there is an absence of actual malice”); Franklin, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at 438. A speaker, therefore, properly finds protection in the First Amendment when he publishes opinions based either upon fully disclosed, true facts, see, e.g., Partington, 56 F.3d at 1154 (“Where, as here, an author writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and offers his own personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should generally be protected by the First Amendment.”), or upon facts otherwise commonly known to the audience, such as facts that are a matter of public knowledge."
} | 9,228,101 | b |
Defendant also states incompletely the law on. publication of opinions ac companied by full disclosure of the facts on which they are based. Defendant is correct that "when an author outlines the facts available to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally protected by the First Amendment." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "164 Misc.2d 557, 563",
"parenthetical": "dismissing complaint of Bernhard Goetz against William Kunstler, Esq., in part because Mr. Kunstler's \"description of Goetz as a 'murderous vigilante' would be understood as an opinion, a mere hypothesis based upon facts both widely known and fully set forth\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Cochran, 58 F.Supp.2d at 1122 (dismissing Johnnie Cochran, Esq.’s suit against the New York Post, because the statement “history reveals that [Cochran] will say or do just about anything to win, typically at the expense of truth” was based upon disclosed facts, and not “on any additional, undisclosed facts not known to the public”); Goetz v. Kunstler, 164 Misc.2d 557, 563, 625 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1995) (dismissing complaint of Bernhard Goetz against William Kunstler, Esq., in part because Mr. Kunstler’s “description of Goetz as a ‘murderous vigilante’ would be understood as an opinion, a mere hypothesis based upon facts both widely known and fully set forth”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "10 Cal.Rptr.3d 438, 438",
"parenthetical": "\"Where, as here, an author writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and offers his own personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should generally be protected by the First Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "Partington, 56 F.3d at 1157. This principle “assumes, however, that the factual basis itself is true.” Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1129; Standing Committee v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1440 (9th Cir.1995) (“Where a publication sets forth the facts underlying its statement of opinion and those facts' are true, the Constitution protects that opinion from liability for defamation.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted)); Dodds, 145 F.3d at 1067 (noting that opinions based on disclosed facts are not actionable “where the underlying facts are not actionable because they are nondefa-matory” and “where [the underlying facts] are not actionable because there is an absence of actual malice”); Franklin, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at 438. A speaker, therefore, properly finds protection in the First Amendment when he publishes opinions based either upon fully disclosed, true facts, see, e.g., Partington, 56 F.3d at 1154 (“Where, as here, an author writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and offers his own personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should generally be protected by the First Amendment.”), or upon facts otherwise commonly known to the audience, such as facts that are a matter of public knowledge."
} | 9,228,101 | b |
Defendant also states incompletely the law on. publication of opinions ac companied by full disclosure of the facts on which they are based. Defendant is correct that "when an author outlines the facts available to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally protected by the First Amendment." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing complaint of Bernhard Goetz against William Kunstler, Esq., in part because Mr. Kunstler's \"description of Goetz as a 'murderous vigilante' would be understood as an opinion, a mere hypothesis based upon facts both widely known and fully set forth\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Cochran, 58 F.Supp.2d at 1122 (dismissing Johnnie Cochran, Esq.’s suit against the New York Post, because the statement “history reveals that [Cochran] will say or do just about anything to win, typically at the expense of truth” was based upon disclosed facts, and not “on any additional, undisclosed facts not known to the public”); Goetz v. Kunstler, 164 Misc.2d 557, 563, 625 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1995) (dismissing complaint of Bernhard Goetz against William Kunstler, Esq., in part because Mr. Kunstler’s “description of Goetz as a ‘murderous vigilante’ would be understood as an opinion, a mere hypothesis based upon facts both widely known and fully set forth”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "10 Cal.Rptr.3d 438, 438",
"parenthetical": "\"Where, as here, an author writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and offers his own personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should generally be protected by the First Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "Partington, 56 F.3d at 1157. This principle “assumes, however, that the factual basis itself is true.” Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1129; Standing Committee v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1440 (9th Cir.1995) (“Where a publication sets forth the facts underlying its statement of opinion and those facts' are true, the Constitution protects that opinion from liability for defamation.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted)); Dodds, 145 F.3d at 1067 (noting that opinions based on disclosed facts are not actionable “where the underlying facts are not actionable because they are nondefa-matory” and “where [the underlying facts] are not actionable because there is an absence of actual malice”); Franklin, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at 438. A speaker, therefore, properly finds protection in the First Amendment when he publishes opinions based either upon fully disclosed, true facts, see, e.g., Partington, 56 F.3d at 1154 (“Where, as here, an author writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and offers his own personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should generally be protected by the First Amendment.”), or upon facts otherwise commonly known to the audience, such as facts that are a matter of public knowledge."
} | 9,228,101 | b |
Defendant also states incompletely the law on. publication of opinions ac companied by full disclosure of the facts on which they are based. Defendant is correct that "when an author outlines the facts available to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally protected by the First Amendment." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1122",
"parenthetical": "dismissing Johnnie Cochran, Esq.'s suit against the New York Post, because the statement \"history reveals that [Cochran] will say or do just about anything to win, typically at the expense of truth\" was based upon disclosed facts, and not \"on any additional, undisclosed facts not known to the public\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Cochran, 58 F.Supp.2d at 1122 (dismissing Johnnie Cochran, Esq.’s suit against the New York Post, because the statement “history reveals that [Cochran] will say or do just about anything to win, typically at the expense of truth” was based upon disclosed facts, and not “on any additional, undisclosed facts not known to the public”); Goetz v. Kunstler, 164 Misc.2d 557, 563, 625 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1995) (dismissing complaint of Bernhard Goetz against William Kunstler, Esq., in part because Mr. Kunstler’s “description of Goetz as a ‘murderous vigilante’ would be understood as an opinion, a mere hypothesis based upon facts both widely known and fully set forth”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "56 F.3d 1154, 1154",
"parenthetical": "\"Where, as here, an author writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and offers his own personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should generally be protected by the First Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "Partington, 56 F.3d at 1157. This principle “assumes, however, that the factual basis itself is true.” Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1129; Standing Committee v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1440 (9th Cir.1995) (“Where a publication sets forth the facts underlying its statement of opinion and those facts' are true, the Constitution protects that opinion from liability for defamation.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted)); Dodds, 145 F.3d at 1067 (noting that opinions based on disclosed facts are not actionable “where the underlying facts are not actionable because they are nondefa-matory” and “where [the underlying facts] are not actionable because there is an absence of actual malice”); Franklin, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at 438. A speaker, therefore, properly finds protection in the First Amendment when he publishes opinions based either upon fully disclosed, true facts, see, e.g., Partington, 56 F.3d at 1154 (“Where, as here, an author writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and offers his own personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should generally be protected by the First Amendment.”), or upon facts otherwise commonly known to the audience, such as facts that are a matter of public knowledge."
} | 9,228,101 | b |
Defendant also states incompletely the law on. publication of opinions ac companied by full disclosure of the facts on which they are based. Defendant is correct that "when an author outlines the facts available to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally protected by the First Amendment." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "164 Misc.2d 557, 563",
"parenthetical": "dismissing complaint of Bernhard Goetz against William Kunstler, Esq., in part because Mr. Kunstler's \"description of Goetz as a 'murderous vigilante' would be understood as an opinion, a mere hypothesis based upon facts both widely known and fully set forth\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Cochran, 58 F.Supp.2d at 1122 (dismissing Johnnie Cochran, Esq.’s suit against the New York Post, because the statement “history reveals that [Cochran] will say or do just about anything to win, typically at the expense of truth” was based upon disclosed facts, and not “on any additional, undisclosed facts not known to the public”); Goetz v. Kunstler, 164 Misc.2d 557, 563, 625 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1995) (dismissing complaint of Bernhard Goetz against William Kunstler, Esq., in part because Mr. Kunstler’s “description of Goetz as a ‘murderous vigilante’ would be understood as an opinion, a mere hypothesis based upon facts both widely known and fully set forth”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "56 F.3d 1154, 1154",
"parenthetical": "\"Where, as here, an author writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and offers his own personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should generally be protected by the First Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "Partington, 56 F.3d at 1157. This principle “assumes, however, that the factual basis itself is true.” Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1129; Standing Committee v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1440 (9th Cir.1995) (“Where a publication sets forth the facts underlying its statement of opinion and those facts' are true, the Constitution protects that opinion from liability for defamation.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted)); Dodds, 145 F.3d at 1067 (noting that opinions based on disclosed facts are not actionable “where the underlying facts are not actionable because they are nondefa-matory” and “where [the underlying facts] are not actionable because there is an absence of actual malice”); Franklin, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at 438. A speaker, therefore, properly finds protection in the First Amendment when he publishes opinions based either upon fully disclosed, true facts, see, e.g., Partington, 56 F.3d at 1154 (“Where, as here, an author writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and offers his own personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should generally be protected by the First Amendment.”), or upon facts otherwise commonly known to the audience, such as facts that are a matter of public knowledge."
} | 9,228,101 | b |
Defendant also states incompletely the law on. publication of opinions ac companied by full disclosure of the facts on which they are based. Defendant is correct that "when an author outlines the facts available to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally protected by the First Amendment." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing complaint of Bernhard Goetz against William Kunstler, Esq., in part because Mr. Kunstler's \"description of Goetz as a 'murderous vigilante' would be understood as an opinion, a mere hypothesis based upon facts both widely known and fully set forth\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Cochran, 58 F.Supp.2d at 1122 (dismissing Johnnie Cochran, Esq.’s suit against the New York Post, because the statement “history reveals that [Cochran] will say or do just about anything to win, typically at the expense of truth” was based upon disclosed facts, and not “on any additional, undisclosed facts not known to the public”); Goetz v. Kunstler, 164 Misc.2d 557, 563, 625 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1995) (dismissing complaint of Bernhard Goetz against William Kunstler, Esq., in part because Mr. Kunstler’s “description of Goetz as a ‘murderous vigilante’ would be understood as an opinion, a mere hypothesis based upon facts both widely known and fully set forth”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "56 F.3d 1154, 1154",
"parenthetical": "\"Where, as here, an author writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and offers his own personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should generally be protected by the First Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "Partington, 56 F.3d at 1157. This principle “assumes, however, that the factual basis itself is true.” Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1129; Standing Committee v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1440 (9th Cir.1995) (“Where a publication sets forth the facts underlying its statement of opinion and those facts' are true, the Constitution protects that opinion from liability for defamation.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted)); Dodds, 145 F.3d at 1067 (noting that opinions based on disclosed facts are not actionable “where the underlying facts are not actionable because they are nondefa-matory” and “where [the underlying facts] are not actionable because there is an absence of actual malice”); Franklin, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at 438. A speaker, therefore, properly finds protection in the First Amendment when he publishes opinions based either upon fully disclosed, true facts, see, e.g., Partington, 56 F.3d at 1154 (“Where, as here, an author writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and offers his own personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should generally be protected by the First Amendment.”), or upon facts otherwise commonly known to the audience, such as facts that are a matter of public knowledge."
} | 9,228,101 | b |
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Anaya Morales' motion to remand because he failed to show he was prejudiced by his counsels' performance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "339 F.3d 814, 826-28",
"parenthetical": "no prejudice where motion failed to present plausible grounds for relief",
"sentence": "See Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 826-28 (9th Cir.2003) (no prejudice where motion failed to present plausible grounds for relief); see also Zetino, 622 F.3d at 1016 (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”); Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151-52 (9th Cir.2010)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "622 F.3d 1016, 1016",
"parenthetical": "\"An alien's desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.\"",
"sentence": "See Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 826-28 (9th Cir.2003) (no prejudice where motion failed to present plausible grounds for relief); see also Zetino, 622 F.3d at 1016 (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”); Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151-52 (9th Cir.2010)."
} | 4,113,782 | a |
Having determined that Ries was seized, we turn to whether the pat search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. The district court concluded that the search fell within the emergency-aid exception. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "726 N.W.2d 783, 788-90",
"parenthetical": "holding warrantless entry of residence was justified by need to search for intruders or injured occupants",
"sentence": "See State v. Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d 783, 788-90 (Minn. 2007) (holding warrantless entry of residence was justified by need to search for intruders or injured occupants); see also Lopez, 698 N.W.2d at 23 (concluding war-rantless seizure of unconscious driver was justified by emergency-aid exception)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "698 N.W.2d 23, 23",
"parenthetical": "concluding war-rantless seizure of unconscious driver was justified by emergency-aid exception",
"sentence": "See State v. Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d 783, 788-90 (Minn. 2007) (holding warrantless entry of residence was justified by need to search for intruders or injured occupants); see also Lopez, 698 N.W.2d at 23 (concluding war-rantless seizure of unconscious driver was justified by emergency-aid exception)."
} | 12,188,704 | a |
13. In seeking to satisfy legitimate tax debts, the government may levy on property held by a corporation or other business entity, when the corporation or other business entity is determined to be the alter ego or nominee of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "church was the alter ego of the taxpayer and could be levied on to satisfy taxpayer's delinquent taxes",
"sentence": "Valley Fin., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162, 171 (D.C.Cir.1980) (corporation was not considered to be a separate entity for tax purposes since it was the alter ego of the taxpayer); see also Loving Saviour Church v. United States, 728 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir.1984) (church was the alter ego of the taxpayer and could be levied on to satisfy taxpayer’s delinquent taxes); United States v. Williams, 581 F.Supp. 756 (N.D.Ga.1982) (although legal title was in the name of Helen Williams, she held title as the nominee of her son); Simpson v. United States, 63 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) para. 89-514 (M.D.Fla.1989) (title holder held title as nominee of taxpayer)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "629 F.2d 162, 171",
"parenthetical": "corporation was not considered to be a separate entity for tax purposes since it was the alter ego of the taxpayer",
"sentence": "Valley Fin., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162, 171 (D.C.Cir.1980) (corporation was not considered to be a separate entity for tax purposes since it was the alter ego of the taxpayer); see also Loving Saviour Church v. United States, 728 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir.1984) (church was the alter ego of the taxpayer and could be levied on to satisfy taxpayer’s delinquent taxes); United States v. Williams, 581 F.Supp. 756 (N.D.Ga.1982) (although legal title was in the name of Helen Williams, she held title as the nominee of her son); Simpson v. United States, 63 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) para. 89-514 (M.D.Fla.1989) (title holder held title as nominee of taxpayer)."
} | 7,413,155 | b |
13. In seeking to satisfy legitimate tax debts, the government may levy on property held by a corporation or other business entity, when the corporation or other business entity is determined to be the alter ego or nominee of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "629 F.2d 162, 171",
"parenthetical": "corporation was not considered to be a separate entity for tax purposes since it was the alter ego of the taxpayer",
"sentence": "Valley Fin., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162, 171 (D.C.Cir.1980) (corporation was not considered to be a separate entity for tax purposes since it was the alter ego of the taxpayer); see also Loving Saviour Church v. United States, 728 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir.1984) (church was the alter ego of the taxpayer and could be levied on to satisfy taxpayer’s delinquent taxes); United States v. Williams, 581 F.Supp. 756 (N.D.Ga.1982) (although legal title was in the name of Helen Williams, she held title as the nominee of her son); Simpson v. United States, 63 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) para. 89-514 (M.D.Fla.1989) (title holder held title as nominee of taxpayer)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although legal title was in the name of Helen Williams, she held title as the nominee of her son",
"sentence": "Valley Fin., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162, 171 (D.C.Cir.1980) (corporation was not considered to be a separate entity for tax purposes since it was the alter ego of the taxpayer); see also Loving Saviour Church v. United States, 728 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir.1984) (church was the alter ego of the taxpayer and could be levied on to satisfy taxpayer’s delinquent taxes); United States v. Williams, 581 F.Supp. 756 (N.D.Ga.1982) (although legal title was in the name of Helen Williams, she held title as the nominee of her son); Simpson v. United States, 63 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) para. 89-514 (M.D.Fla.1989) (title holder held title as nominee of taxpayer)."
} | 7,413,155 | a |
The question of prejudice is one for the trier of fact, with each case resting upon its own merits. However, a reasonable factfinder, believing that promises conditioned upon timely performance should be kept when made, could have determined that the loss was not enough to warrant granting Ocean Atlantic's motion for specific performance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "129 N.E. 891, 891",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that eccentric homeowner who insists on using Reading pipe should not be forced to accept Cohoes pipe that general contractor believes is \"just as good\"",
"sentence": "See Kansas Bankers, 963 F.2d at 294 (parties “who have bargained for strict compliance with specific time requirements ... inherently are prejudiced by noncompliance” with those deadlines); Dove v. Rose Acre Farms Inc., 434 N.E.2d 931 (Ind. App.Ct.1982); see also Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891 (suggesting that eccentric homeowner who insists on using Reading pipe should not be forced to accept Cohoes pipe that general contractor believes is “just as good”). We refuse to hold that the trial judge committed clear error."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "963 F.2d 294, 294",
"parenthetical": "parties \"who have bargained for strict compliance with specific time requirements ... inherently are prejudiced by noncompliance\" with those deadlines",
"sentence": "See Kansas Bankers, 963 F.2d at 294 (parties “who have bargained for strict compliance with specific time requirements ... inherently are prejudiced by noncompliance” with those deadlines); Dove v. Rose Acre Farms Inc., 434 N.E.2d 931 (Ind. App.Ct.1982); see also Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891 (suggesting that eccentric homeowner who insists on using Reading pipe should not be forced to accept Cohoes pipe that general contractor believes is “just as good”). We refuse to hold that the trial judge committed clear error."
} | 9,507,422 | b |
In further contrast to Dubria, any curative statement made by the judge was not sufficient to avoid the injurious !effect on the verdict. Given the highly inflammatory content of the tape suggesting that the medical evidence was far more conclusive than it actually was, even with a curative instruction, the injurious effect on the jury's verdict could not have been mitigated. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "224 F.3d 1002, 1002",
"parenthetical": "\"This is not a case in which the statements at issue are so clearly prejudicial that a curative instruction could not mitigate their effect.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 479 (9th Cir.1988) (finding under the circumstances that “the trial court’s curative instruction to the jury was not sufficient to obviate the prejudice”); cf. Dubria, 224 F.3d at 1002 (“This is not a case in which the statements at issue are so clearly prejudicial that a curative instruction could not mitigate their effect.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "852 F.2d 475, 479",
"parenthetical": "finding under the circumstances that \"the trial court's curative instruction to the jury was not sufficient to obviate the prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 479 (9th Cir.1988) (finding under the circumstances that “the trial court’s curative instruction to the jury was not sufficient to obviate the prejudice”); cf. Dubria, 224 F.3d at 1002 (“This is not a case in which the statements at issue are so clearly prejudicial that a curative instruction could not mitigate their effect.”)."
} | 1,546,990 | b |
A claim of unconstitutional shackling is subject to a harmless error analysis. In order to succeed on such claim, a defendant must show prejudice, that is, "a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "135 Wn.2d 888, 888",
"parenthetical": "defendant's mere appearance in handcuffs during jury selection does not indicate the incident \"inflamed or prejudiced\" the jurors against him",
"sentence": "Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d at 888. Accord State v. Early, 70 Wn. App. 452, 462, 853 P.2d 964 (1993) (defendant’s mere appearance in handcuffs during jury selection does not indicate the incident “inflamed or prejudiced” the jurors against him), review denied, 123 Wn.2d 1004, 868 P.2d 872 (1994)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "33 Wn. App. 435, 435",
"parenthetical": "it is not reversible error simply because jurors see a defendant wearing shackles",
"sentence": "See also Gosser, 33 Wn. App. at 435 (it is not reversible error simply because jurors see a defendant wearing shackles)."
} | 99,086 | a |
A claim of unconstitutional shackling is subject to a harmless error analysis. In order to succeed on such claim, a defendant must show prejudice, that is, "a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "70 Wn. App. 452, 462",
"parenthetical": "defendant's mere appearance in handcuffs during jury selection does not indicate the incident \"inflamed or prejudiced\" the jurors against him",
"sentence": "Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d at 888. Accord State v. Early, 70 Wn. App. 452, 462, 853 P.2d 964 (1993) (defendant’s mere appearance in handcuffs during jury selection does not indicate the incident “inflamed or prejudiced” the jurors against him), review denied, 123 Wn.2d 1004, 868 P.2d 872 (1994)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "33 Wn. App. 435, 435",
"parenthetical": "it is not reversible error simply because jurors see a defendant wearing shackles",
"sentence": "See also Gosser, 33 Wn. App. at 435 (it is not reversible error simply because jurors see a defendant wearing shackles)."
} | 99,086 | a |
A claim of unconstitutional shackling is subject to a harmless error analysis. In order to succeed on such claim, a defendant must show prejudice, that is, "a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's mere appearance in handcuffs during jury selection does not indicate the incident \"inflamed or prejudiced\" the jurors against him",
"sentence": "Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d at 888. Accord State v. Early, 70 Wn. App. 452, 462, 853 P.2d 964 (1993) (defendant’s mere appearance in handcuffs during jury selection does not indicate the incident “inflamed or prejudiced” the jurors against him), review denied, 123 Wn.2d 1004, 868 P.2d 872 (1994)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "33 Wn. App. 435, 435",
"parenthetical": "it is not reversible error simply because jurors see a defendant wearing shackles",
"sentence": "See also Gosser, 33 Wn. App. at 435 (it is not reversible error simply because jurors see a defendant wearing shackles)."
} | 99,086 | a |
A claim of unconstitutional shackling is subject to a harmless error analysis. In order to succeed on such claim, a defendant must show prejudice, that is, "a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "33 Wn. App. 435, 435",
"parenthetical": "it is not reversible error simply because jurors see a defendant wearing shackles",
"sentence": "See also Gosser, 33 Wn. App. at 435 (it is not reversible error simply because jurors see a defendant wearing shackles)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's mere appearance in handcuffs during jury selection does not indicate the incident \"inflamed or prejudiced\" the jurors against him",
"sentence": "Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d at 888. Accord State v. Early, 70 Wn. App. 452, 462, 853 P.2d 964 (1993) (defendant’s mere appearance in handcuffs during jury selection does not indicate the incident “inflamed or prejudiced” the jurors against him), review denied, 123 Wn.2d 1004, 868 P.2d 872 (1994)."
} | 99,086 | b |
A claim of unconstitutional shackling is subject to a harmless error analysis. In order to succeed on such claim, a defendant must show prejudice, that is, "a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "33 Wn. App. 435, 435",
"parenthetical": "it is not reversible error simply because jurors see a defendant wearing shackles",
"sentence": "See also Gosser, 33 Wn. App. at 435 (it is not reversible error simply because jurors see a defendant wearing shackles)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's mere appearance in handcuffs during jury selection does not indicate the incident \"inflamed or prejudiced\" the jurors against him",
"sentence": "Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d at 888. Accord State v. Early, 70 Wn. App. 452, 462, 853 P.2d 964 (1993) (defendant’s mere appearance in handcuffs during jury selection does not indicate the incident “inflamed or prejudiced” the jurors against him), review denied, 123 Wn.2d 1004, 868 P.2d 872 (1994)."
} | 99,086 | b |
On the other hand, such canons are routinely discarded when they do not further a statute's remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "140 Vt. 501, 511",
"parenthetical": "\"Rules of construction are not laws, hard and inflexible, which must be applied in a given situation simply because it is possible to do so.\"",
"sentence": "See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.23 (1983); see also Hardesty v. Andró Corp., 555 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Okla. 1976) (expressio unius maxim is “to be applied with great caution, is not of universal application, and is not conclusive as to the meaning of a statute”); cf. State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 511, 438 A.2d 1135,1140 (1981) (“Rules of construction are not laws, hard and inflexible, which must be applied in a given situation simply because it is possible to do so.”). As noted, the Legislature passed the 1976 amendment, not to limit the damages available to the relatives of adult decedents, but rather to further the remedial purposes of the WDA by developing the definition of pecuniary injuries."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "555 P.2d 1030, 1036",
"parenthetical": "expressio unius maxim is \"to be applied with great caution, is not of universal application, and is not conclusive as to the meaning of a statute\"",
"sentence": "See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.23 (1983); see also Hardesty v. Andró Corp., 555 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Okla. 1976) (expressio unius maxim is “to be applied with great caution, is not of universal application, and is not conclusive as to the meaning of a statute”); cf. State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 511, 438 A.2d 1135,1140 (1981) (“Rules of construction are not laws, hard and inflexible, which must be applied in a given situation simply because it is possible to do so.”). As noted, the Legislature passed the 1976 amendment, not to limit the damages available to the relatives of adult decedents, but rather to further the remedial purposes of the WDA by developing the definition of pecuniary injuries."
} | 4,815,396 | b |
On the other hand, such canons are routinely discarded when they do not further a statute's remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "555 P.2d 1030, 1036",
"parenthetical": "expressio unius maxim is \"to be applied with great caution, is not of universal application, and is not conclusive as to the meaning of a statute\"",
"sentence": "See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.23 (1983); see also Hardesty v. Andró Corp., 555 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Okla. 1976) (expressio unius maxim is “to be applied with great caution, is not of universal application, and is not conclusive as to the meaning of a statute”); cf. State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 511, 438 A.2d 1135,1140 (1981) (“Rules of construction are not laws, hard and inflexible, which must be applied in a given situation simply because it is possible to do so.”). As noted, the Legislature passed the 1976 amendment, not to limit the damages available to the relatives of adult decedents, but rather to further the remedial purposes of the WDA by developing the definition of pecuniary injuries."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "438 A.2d 1135, 1140",
"parenthetical": "\"Rules of construction are not laws, hard and inflexible, which must be applied in a given situation simply because it is possible to do so.\"",
"sentence": "See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.23 (1983); see also Hardesty v. Andró Corp., 555 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Okla. 1976) (expressio unius maxim is “to be applied with great caution, is not of universal application, and is not conclusive as to the meaning of a statute”); cf. State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 511, 438 A.2d 1135,1140 (1981) (“Rules of construction are not laws, hard and inflexible, which must be applied in a given situation simply because it is possible to do so.”). As noted, the Legislature passed the 1976 amendment, not to limit the damages available to the relatives of adult decedents, but rather to further the remedial purposes of the WDA by developing the definition of pecuniary injuries."
} | 4,815,396 | a |
FOIA is designed, however, to benefit the public, not specific litigants. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a requester's \"rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 214, 242",
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | 4,283,204 | a |
FOIA is designed, however, to benefit the public, not specific litigants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a requester's \"rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | 4,283,204 | b |
FOIA is designed, however, to benefit the public, not specific litigants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a requester's \"rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | 4,283,204 | b |
FOIA is designed, however, to benefit the public, not specific litigants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 214, 242",
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a requester's \"rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | 4,283,204 | b |
FOIA is designed, however, to benefit the public, not specific litigants. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a requester's \"rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | 4,283,204 | a |
FOIA is designed, however, to benefit the public, not specific litigants. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a requester's \"rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | 4,283,204 | a |
FOIA is designed, however, to benefit the public, not specific litigants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 214, 242",
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a requester's \"rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | 4,283,204 | b |
FOIA is designed, however, to benefit the public, not specific litigants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a requester's \"rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | 4,283,204 | b |
FOIA is designed, however, to benefit the public, not specific litigants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a requester's \"rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (recognizing that a requester’s “rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [he or she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average members of the public”); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company, 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (noting that the “FOIA was not intended to function as a private discovery tool”)."
} | 4,283,204 | b |
It asks to be declared representative of the few (five or six), not the many, whether the comparison group is all TRAC members or all Allnet subscribers June-December 1984. Even in an equitable relief context, TRAC's plea for standing would stray from the core concept of associational representation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "400 F.Supp. 1208, 1213",
"parenthetical": "court grants standing to association to seek injunctive relief to benefit 6 of its 3,500 members, while noting that \"we might feel more confident of [the association's] taking a vigorous, adversarial stance had plaintiff been able to identify more members adversely affected by the Act\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (association has standing to assert members’ rights “because it and its members are in every practical sense identical [and it] is but the medium through which individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views”); Robinson v. Conslisk, 385 F.Supp. 529, 538 (N.D.Ill.1974) (“Since the League is the collective embodiment of its members, the League has standing to protect its members’ rights against encroachment by third parties.”); cf. Action Alliance for Senior Citizens v. Shapp, 400 F.Supp. 1208, 1213 (E.D.Pa.1975) (court grants standing to association to seek injunctive relief to benefit 6 of its 3,500 members, while noting that “we might feel more confident of [the association’s] taking a vigorous, adversarial stance had plaintiff been able to identify more members adversely affected by the Act”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "357 U.S. 449, 459",
"parenthetical": "association has standing to assert members' rights \"because it and its members are in every practical sense identical [and it] is but the medium through which individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (association has standing to assert members’ rights “because it and its members are in every practical sense identical [and it] is but the medium through which individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views”); Robinson v. Conslisk, 385 F.Supp. 529, 538 (N.D.Ill.1974) (“Since the League is the collective embodiment of its members, the League has standing to protect its members’ rights against encroachment by third parties.”); cf. Action Alliance for Senior Citizens v. Shapp, 400 F.Supp. 1208, 1213 (E.D.Pa.1975) (court grants standing to association to seek injunctive relief to benefit 6 of its 3,500 members, while noting that “we might feel more confident of [the association’s] taking a vigorous, adversarial stance had plaintiff been able to identify more members adversely affected by the Act”)."
} | 1,655,977 | b |
It asks to be declared representative of the few (five or six), not the many, whether the comparison group is all TRAC members or all Allnet subscribers June-December 1984. Even in an equitable relief context, TRAC's plea for standing would stray from the core concept of associational representation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170",
"parenthetical": "association has standing to assert members' rights \"because it and its members are in every practical sense identical [and it] is but the medium through which individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (association has standing to assert members’ rights “because it and its members are in every practical sense identical [and it] is but the medium through which individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views”); Robinson v. Conslisk, 385 F.Supp. 529, 538 (N.D.Ill.1974) (“Since the League is the collective embodiment of its members, the League has standing to protect its members’ rights against encroachment by third parties.”); cf. Action Alliance for Senior Citizens v. Shapp, 400 F.Supp. 1208, 1213 (E.D.Pa.1975) (court grants standing to association to seek injunctive relief to benefit 6 of its 3,500 members, while noting that “we might feel more confident of [the association’s] taking a vigorous, adversarial stance had plaintiff been able to identify more members adversely affected by the Act”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "400 F.Supp. 1208, 1213",
"parenthetical": "court grants standing to association to seek injunctive relief to benefit 6 of its 3,500 members, while noting that \"we might feel more confident of [the association's] taking a vigorous, adversarial stance had plaintiff been able to identify more members adversely affected by the Act\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (association has standing to assert members’ rights “because it and its members are in every practical sense identical [and it] is but the medium through which individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views”); Robinson v. Conslisk, 385 F.Supp. 529, 538 (N.D.Ill.1974) (“Since the League is the collective embodiment of its members, the League has standing to protect its members’ rights against encroachment by third parties.”); cf. Action Alliance for Senior Citizens v. Shapp, 400 F.Supp. 1208, 1213 (E.D.Pa.1975) (court grants standing to association to seek injunctive relief to benefit 6 of its 3,500 members, while noting that “we might feel more confident of [the association’s] taking a vigorous, adversarial stance had plaintiff been able to identify more members adversely affected by the Act”)."
} | 1,655,977 | a |
It asks to be declared representative of the few (five or six), not the many, whether the comparison group is all TRAC members or all Allnet subscribers June-December 1984. Even in an equitable relief context, TRAC's plea for standing would stray from the core concept of associational representation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "association has standing to assert members' rights \"because it and its members are in every practical sense identical [and it] is but the medium through which individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (association has standing to assert members’ rights “because it and its members are in every practical sense identical [and it] is but the medium through which individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views”); Robinson v. Conslisk, 385 F.Supp. 529, 538 (N.D.Ill.1974) (“Since the League is the collective embodiment of its members, the League has standing to protect its members’ rights against encroachment by third parties.”); cf. Action Alliance for Senior Citizens v. Shapp, 400 F.Supp. 1208, 1213 (E.D.Pa.1975) (court grants standing to association to seek injunctive relief to benefit 6 of its 3,500 members, while noting that “we might feel more confident of [the association’s] taking a vigorous, adversarial stance had plaintiff been able to identify more members adversely affected by the Act”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "400 F.Supp. 1208, 1213",
"parenthetical": "court grants standing to association to seek injunctive relief to benefit 6 of its 3,500 members, while noting that \"we might feel more confident of [the association's] taking a vigorous, adversarial stance had plaintiff been able to identify more members adversely affected by the Act\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (association has standing to assert members’ rights “because it and its members are in every practical sense identical [and it] is but the medium through which individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views”); Robinson v. Conslisk, 385 F.Supp. 529, 538 (N.D.Ill.1974) (“Since the League is the collective embodiment of its members, the League has standing to protect its members’ rights against encroachment by third parties.”); cf. Action Alliance for Senior Citizens v. Shapp, 400 F.Supp. 1208, 1213 (E.D.Pa.1975) (court grants standing to association to seek injunctive relief to benefit 6 of its 3,500 members, while noting that “we might feel more confident of [the association’s] taking a vigorous, adversarial stance had plaintiff been able to identify more members adversely affected by the Act”)."
} | 1,655,977 | a |
It asks to be declared representative of the few (five or six), not the many, whether the comparison group is all TRAC members or all Allnet subscribers June-December 1984. Even in an equitable relief context, TRAC's plea for standing would stray from the core concept of associational representation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "385 F.Supp. 529, 538",
"parenthetical": "\"Since the League is the collective embodiment of its members, the League has standing to protect its members' rights against encroachment by third parties.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (association has standing to assert members’ rights “because it and its members are in every practical sense identical [and it] is but the medium through which individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views”); Robinson v. Conslisk, 385 F.Supp. 529, 538 (N.D.Ill.1974) (“Since the League is the collective embodiment of its members, the League has standing to protect its members’ rights against encroachment by third parties.”); cf. Action Alliance for Senior Citizens v. Shapp, 400 F.Supp. 1208, 1213 (E.D.Pa.1975) (court grants standing to association to seek injunctive relief to benefit 6 of its 3,500 members, while noting that “we might feel more confident of [the association’s] taking a vigorous, adversarial stance had plaintiff been able to identify more members adversely affected by the Act”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "400 F.Supp. 1208, 1213",
"parenthetical": "court grants standing to association to seek injunctive relief to benefit 6 of its 3,500 members, while noting that \"we might feel more confident of [the association's] taking a vigorous, adversarial stance had plaintiff been able to identify more members adversely affected by the Act\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (association has standing to assert members’ rights “because it and its members are in every practical sense identical [and it] is but the medium through which individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views”); Robinson v. Conslisk, 385 F.Supp. 529, 538 (N.D.Ill.1974) (“Since the League is the collective embodiment of its members, the League has standing to protect its members’ rights against encroachment by third parties.”); cf. Action Alliance for Senior Citizens v. Shapp, 400 F.Supp. 1208, 1213 (E.D.Pa.1975) (court grants standing to association to seek injunctive relief to benefit 6 of its 3,500 members, while noting that “we might feel more confident of [the association’s] taking a vigorous, adversarial stance had plaintiff been able to identify more members adversely affected by the Act”)."
} | 1,655,977 | a |
In part because courts are reluctant to discourage cooperation between agencies, the mere fact of federal participation in an investigation does not suffice to establish an improper "working arrangement." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "281 F.2d 344, 344",
"parenthetical": "explaining that FBI agents properly interrogated defendants who were in state custody because they had a \"duty to endeavor to ascertain all the available facts about the federal crimes which they were investigating\"",
"sentence": "See Coppola, 281 F.2d at 344 (explaining that FBI agents properly interrogated defendants who were in state custody because they had a “duty to endeavor to ascertain all the available facts about the federal crimes which they were investigating”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "362 U.S. 217, 229",
"parenthetical": "finding FBI's participation (including conducting search) during execution of INS warrant did not \"taint the administrative arrest\"",
"sentence": "See also Barnett v. U.S., 384 F.2d 848, 857 (5th Cir.1967); Gaines, 555 F.2d at 624. Cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 229, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960) (finding FBI’s participation (including conducting search) during execution of INS warrant did not “taint the administrative arrest”)."
} | 11,117,275 | a |
In part because courts are reluctant to discourage cooperation between agencies, the mere fact of federal participation in an investigation does not suffice to establish an improper "working arrangement." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "281 F.2d 344, 344",
"parenthetical": "explaining that FBI agents properly interrogated defendants who were in state custody because they had a \"duty to endeavor to ascertain all the available facts about the federal crimes which they were investigating\"",
"sentence": "See Coppola, 281 F.2d at 344 (explaining that FBI agents properly interrogated defendants who were in state custody because they had a “duty to endeavor to ascertain all the available facts about the federal crimes which they were investigating”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding FBI's participation (including conducting search) during execution of INS warrant did not \"taint the administrative arrest\"",
"sentence": "See also Barnett v. U.S., 384 F.2d 848, 857 (5th Cir.1967); Gaines, 555 F.2d at 624. Cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 229, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960) (finding FBI’s participation (including conducting search) during execution of INS warrant did not “taint the administrative arrest”)."
} | 11,117,275 | a |
In part because courts are reluctant to discourage cooperation between agencies, the mere fact of federal participation in an investigation does not suffice to establish an improper "working arrangement." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "281 F.2d 344, 344",
"parenthetical": "explaining that FBI agents properly interrogated defendants who were in state custody because they had a \"duty to endeavor to ascertain all the available facts about the federal crimes which they were investigating\"",
"sentence": "See Coppola, 281 F.2d at 344 (explaining that FBI agents properly interrogated defendants who were in state custody because they had a “duty to endeavor to ascertain all the available facts about the federal crimes which they were investigating”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding FBI's participation (including conducting search) during execution of INS warrant did not \"taint the administrative arrest\"",
"sentence": "See also Barnett v. U.S., 384 F.2d 848, 857 (5th Cir.1967); Gaines, 555 F.2d at 624. Cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 229, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960) (finding FBI’s participation (including conducting search) during execution of INS warrant did not “taint the administrative arrest”)."
} | 11,117,275 | a |
. While the FDCPA explicitly provides for money damages, it does not provide for injunctive relief in private actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that several courts have held that the FDCPA does not authorize equitable relief",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir.2004) (\"[Ijnjunctive and declaratory relief are not available to litigants acting in an individual capacity under the FDCPA.’'); Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2000) (noting that \"all private actions under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act are for damages\"); Sibley v. Fulton DeKalb Collection Serv., 677 F.2d 830, 834 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the FDCPA); Sparkman v. Zwicker & Assocs., P.C., 374 F.Supp.2d 293, 299 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (holding that \"neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the FDCPA\"); see also Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 977 n. 39 (5th Cir.2000) (noting that several courts have held that the FDCPA does not authorize equitable relief); but see, e.g., Schwarm v. Craighead, 233 F.R.D. 655, 663 (E.D.Cal.2006) (certifying injunctive class action in FDCPA suit); Hansen v. Ticket Track, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 412, 416 (W.D.Wash.2003) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "385 F.3d 337, 342",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ijnjunctive and declaratory relief are not available to litigants acting in an individual capacity under the FDCPA.''",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir.2004) (\"[Ijnjunctive and declaratory relief are not available to litigants acting in an individual capacity under the FDCPA.’'); Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2000) (noting that \"all private actions under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act are for damages\"); Sibley v. Fulton DeKalb Collection Serv., 677 F.2d 830, 834 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the FDCPA); Sparkman v. Zwicker & Assocs., P.C., 374 F.Supp.2d 293, 299 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (holding that \"neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the FDCPA\"); see also Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 977 n. 39 (5th Cir.2000) (noting that several courts have held that the FDCPA does not authorize equitable relief); but see, e.g., Schwarm v. Craighead, 233 F.R.D. 655, 663 (E.D.Cal.2006) (certifying injunctive class action in FDCPA suit); Hansen v. Ticket Track, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 412, 416 (W.D.Wash.2003) (same)."
} | 3,510,124 | b |
. While the FDCPA explicitly provides for money damages, it does not provide for injunctive relief in private actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "201 F.3d 877, 882",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"all private actions under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act are for damages\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir.2004) (\"[Ijnjunctive and declaratory relief are not available to litigants acting in an individual capacity under the FDCPA.’'); Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2000) (noting that \"all private actions under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act are for damages\"); Sibley v. Fulton DeKalb Collection Serv., 677 F.2d 830, 834 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the FDCPA); Sparkman v. Zwicker & Assocs., P.C., 374 F.Supp.2d 293, 299 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (holding that \"neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the FDCPA\"); see also Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 977 n. 39 (5th Cir.2000) (noting that several courts have held that the FDCPA does not authorize equitable relief); but see, e.g., Schwarm v. Craighead, 233 F.R.D. 655, 663 (E.D.Cal.2006) (certifying injunctive class action in FDCPA suit); Hansen v. Ticket Track, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 412, 416 (W.D.Wash.2003) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that several courts have held that the FDCPA does not authorize equitable relief",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir.2004) (\"[Ijnjunctive and declaratory relief are not available to litigants acting in an individual capacity under the FDCPA.’'); Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2000) (noting that \"all private actions under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act are for damages\"); Sibley v. Fulton DeKalb Collection Serv., 677 F.2d 830, 834 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the FDCPA); Sparkman v. Zwicker & Assocs., P.C., 374 F.Supp.2d 293, 299 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (holding that \"neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the FDCPA\"); see also Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 977 n. 39 (5th Cir.2000) (noting that several courts have held that the FDCPA does not authorize equitable relief); but see, e.g., Schwarm v. Craighead, 233 F.R.D. 655, 663 (E.D.Cal.2006) (certifying injunctive class action in FDCPA suit); Hansen v. Ticket Track, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 412, 416 (W.D.Wash.2003) (same)."
} | 3,510,124 | a |
. While the FDCPA explicitly provides for money damages, it does not provide for injunctive relief in private actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that several courts have held that the FDCPA does not authorize equitable relief",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir.2004) (\"[Ijnjunctive and declaratory relief are not available to litigants acting in an individual capacity under the FDCPA.’'); Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2000) (noting that \"all private actions under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act are for damages\"); Sibley v. Fulton DeKalb Collection Serv., 677 F.2d 830, 834 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the FDCPA); Sparkman v. Zwicker & Assocs., P.C., 374 F.Supp.2d 293, 299 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (holding that \"neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the FDCPA\"); see also Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 977 n. 39 (5th Cir.2000) (noting that several courts have held that the FDCPA does not authorize equitable relief); but see, e.g., Schwarm v. Craighead, 233 F.R.D. 655, 663 (E.D.Cal.2006) (certifying injunctive class action in FDCPA suit); Hansen v. Ticket Track, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 412, 416 (W.D.Wash.2003) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "677 F.2d 830, 834",
"parenthetical": "holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the FDCPA",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir.2004) (\"[Ijnjunctive and declaratory relief are not available to litigants acting in an individual capacity under the FDCPA.’'); Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2000) (noting that \"all private actions under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act are for damages\"); Sibley v. Fulton DeKalb Collection Serv., 677 F.2d 830, 834 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the FDCPA); Sparkman v. Zwicker & Assocs., P.C., 374 F.Supp.2d 293, 299 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (holding that \"neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the FDCPA\"); see also Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 977 n. 39 (5th Cir.2000) (noting that several courts have held that the FDCPA does not authorize equitable relief); but see, e.g., Schwarm v. Craighead, 233 F.R.D. 655, 663 (E.D.Cal.2006) (certifying injunctive class action in FDCPA suit); Hansen v. Ticket Track, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 412, 416 (W.D.Wash.2003) (same)."
} | 3,510,124 | b |
. While the FDCPA explicitly provides for money damages, it does not provide for injunctive relief in private actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that several courts have held that the FDCPA does not authorize equitable relief",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir.2004) (\"[Ijnjunctive and declaratory relief are not available to litigants acting in an individual capacity under the FDCPA.’'); Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2000) (noting that \"all private actions under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act are for damages\"); Sibley v. Fulton DeKalb Collection Serv., 677 F.2d 830, 834 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the FDCPA); Sparkman v. Zwicker & Assocs., P.C., 374 F.Supp.2d 293, 299 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (holding that \"neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the FDCPA\"); see also Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 977 n. 39 (5th Cir.2000) (noting that several courts have held that the FDCPA does not authorize equitable relief); but see, e.g., Schwarm v. Craighead, 233 F.R.D. 655, 663 (E.D.Cal.2006) (certifying injunctive class action in FDCPA suit); Hansen v. Ticket Track, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 412, 416 (W.D.Wash.2003) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "374 F.Supp.2d 293, 299",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the FDCPA\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir.2004) (\"[Ijnjunctive and declaratory relief are not available to litigants acting in an individual capacity under the FDCPA.’'); Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2000) (noting that \"all private actions under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act are for damages\"); Sibley v. Fulton DeKalb Collection Serv., 677 F.2d 830, 834 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the FDCPA); Sparkman v. Zwicker & Assocs., P.C., 374 F.Supp.2d 293, 299 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (holding that \"neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the FDCPA\"); see also Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 977 n. 39 (5th Cir.2000) (noting that several courts have held that the FDCPA does not authorize equitable relief); but see, e.g., Schwarm v. Craighead, 233 F.R.D. 655, 663 (E.D.Cal.2006) (certifying injunctive class action in FDCPA suit); Hansen v. Ticket Track, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 412, 416 (W.D.Wash.2003) (same)."
} | 3,510,124 | b |
The ex post facto clause prohibits the enactment of statutes that punish as a crime an act previously committed which was innocent when done. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "897 F.2d 1099, 1124",
"parenthetical": "\"Since conspiracy is a continuous crime, a statute increasing the penalty for a conspiracy beginning before the date of enactment but continuing after-wards does not violate the ex post facto clause.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1124 (11th Cir.1990) (“Since conspiracy is a continuous crime, a statute increasing the penalty for a conspiracy beginning before the date of enactment but continuing after-wards does not violate the ex post facto clause.”); see also United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1284 (11th Cir.1996) (“There was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have found that Jackson’s fraudulent scheme began in 1985 but continued until the end of his tenure as a councilman (1990) ..."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "98 F.3d 1266, 1284",
"parenthetical": "\"There was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have found that Jackson's fraudulent scheme began in 1985 but continued until the end of his tenure as a councilman (1990",
"sentence": "See United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1124 (11th Cir.1990) (“Since conspiracy is a continuous crime, a statute increasing the penalty for a conspiracy beginning before the date of enactment but continuing after-wards does not violate the ex post facto clause.”); see also United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1284 (11th Cir.1996) (“There was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have found that Jackson’s fraudulent scheme began in 1985 but continued until the end of his tenure as a councilman (1990) ..."
} | 11,453,470 | a |
Under the objective standard, a plaintiff must allege a deprivation "sufficiently serious" to constitute a constitutional violation. A plaintiff may satisfy the objective prong by alleging that his prison work duties created a serious risk of seri ous injury. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "999 F.Supp. 394, 399",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment to defendants when prisoner's medical records did not show \"his back problem was serious enough to prevent him from performing the tasks required of [his position as] a mess hall worker\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1246 (5th Cir.1989) (prisoner properly alleged an Eighth Amendment claim when he claimed that his work detail assignment seriously aggravated his serious physical condition); Baumann v. Walsh, 36 F.Supp.2d 508, 513 (N.D.N.Y.1999) (prisoner alleged Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that he had been required to climb along top shelf of storage room); Thomas v. Coombe, 95-CV-10342, 1998 WL 20000, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1998) (prisoner set forth Eighth Amendment claim when she alleged that she had been required to perform heavy kitchen work in contravention of doctor’s orders); but see Wilson v. Johnson, 999 F.Supp. 394, 399 (W.D.N.Y.1998) (granting summary judgment to defendants when prisoner’s medical records did not show “his back problem was serious enough to prevent him from performing the tasks required of [his position as] a mess hall worker”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "864 F.2d 1235, 1246",
"parenthetical": "prisoner properly alleged an Eighth Amendment claim when he claimed that his work detail assignment seriously aggravated his serious physical condition",
"sentence": "Cf. Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1246 (5th Cir.1989) (prisoner properly alleged an Eighth Amendment claim when he claimed that his work detail assignment seriously aggravated his serious physical condition); Baumann v. Walsh, 36 F.Supp.2d 508, 513 (N.D.N.Y.1999) (prisoner alleged Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that he had been required to climb along top shelf of storage room); Thomas v. Coombe, 95-CV-10342, 1998 WL 20000, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1998) (prisoner set forth Eighth Amendment claim when she alleged that she had been required to perform heavy kitchen work in contravention of doctor’s orders); but see Wilson v. Johnson, 999 F.Supp. 394, 399 (W.D.N.Y.1998) (granting summary judgment to defendants when prisoner’s medical records did not show “his back problem was serious enough to prevent him from performing the tasks required of [his position as] a mess hall worker”)."
} | 629,450 | b |
Under the objective standard, a plaintiff must allege a deprivation "sufficiently serious" to constitute a constitutional violation. A plaintiff may satisfy the objective prong by alleging that his prison work duties created a serious risk of seri ous injury. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "999 F.Supp. 394, 399",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment to defendants when prisoner's medical records did not show \"his back problem was serious enough to prevent him from performing the tasks required of [his position as] a mess hall worker\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1246 (5th Cir.1989) (prisoner properly alleged an Eighth Amendment claim when he claimed that his work detail assignment seriously aggravated his serious physical condition); Baumann v. Walsh, 36 F.Supp.2d 508, 513 (N.D.N.Y.1999) (prisoner alleged Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that he had been required to climb along top shelf of storage room); Thomas v. Coombe, 95-CV-10342, 1998 WL 20000, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1998) (prisoner set forth Eighth Amendment claim when she alleged that she had been required to perform heavy kitchen work in contravention of doctor’s orders); but see Wilson v. Johnson, 999 F.Supp. 394, 399 (W.D.N.Y.1998) (granting summary judgment to defendants when prisoner’s medical records did not show “his back problem was serious enough to prevent him from performing the tasks required of [his position as] a mess hall worker”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "36 F.Supp.2d 508, 513",
"parenthetical": "prisoner alleged Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that he had been required to climb along top shelf of storage room",
"sentence": "Cf. Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1246 (5th Cir.1989) (prisoner properly alleged an Eighth Amendment claim when he claimed that his work detail assignment seriously aggravated his serious physical condition); Baumann v. Walsh, 36 F.Supp.2d 508, 513 (N.D.N.Y.1999) (prisoner alleged Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that he had been required to climb along top shelf of storage room); Thomas v. Coombe, 95-CV-10342, 1998 WL 20000, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1998) (prisoner set forth Eighth Amendment claim when she alleged that she had been required to perform heavy kitchen work in contravention of doctor’s orders); but see Wilson v. Johnson, 999 F.Supp. 394, 399 (W.D.N.Y.1998) (granting summary judgment to defendants when prisoner’s medical records did not show “his back problem was serious enough to prevent him from performing the tasks required of [his position as] a mess hall worker”)."
} | 629,450 | b |
Under the objective standard, a plaintiff must allege a deprivation "sufficiently serious" to constitute a constitutional violation. A plaintiff may satisfy the objective prong by alleging that his prison work duties created a serious risk of seri ous injury. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "1998 WL 20000, at *2",
"parenthetical": "prisoner set forth Eighth Amendment claim when she alleged that she had been required to perform heavy kitchen work in contravention of doctor's orders",
"sentence": "Cf. Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1246 (5th Cir.1989) (prisoner properly alleged an Eighth Amendment claim when he claimed that his work detail assignment seriously aggravated his serious physical condition); Baumann v. Walsh, 36 F.Supp.2d 508, 513 (N.D.N.Y.1999) (prisoner alleged Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that he had been required to climb along top shelf of storage room); Thomas v. Coombe, 95-CV-10342, 1998 WL 20000, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1998) (prisoner set forth Eighth Amendment claim when she alleged that she had been required to perform heavy kitchen work in contravention of doctor’s orders); but see Wilson v. Johnson, 999 F.Supp. 394, 399 (W.D.N.Y.1998) (granting summary judgment to defendants when prisoner’s medical records did not show “his back problem was serious enough to prevent him from performing the tasks required of [his position as] a mess hall worker”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "999 F.Supp. 394, 399",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment to defendants when prisoner's medical records did not show \"his back problem was serious enough to prevent him from performing the tasks required of [his position as] a mess hall worker\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1246 (5th Cir.1989) (prisoner properly alleged an Eighth Amendment claim when he claimed that his work detail assignment seriously aggravated his serious physical condition); Baumann v. Walsh, 36 F.Supp.2d 508, 513 (N.D.N.Y.1999) (prisoner alleged Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that he had been required to climb along top shelf of storage room); Thomas v. Coombe, 95-CV-10342, 1998 WL 20000, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1998) (prisoner set forth Eighth Amendment claim when she alleged that she had been required to perform heavy kitchen work in contravention of doctor’s orders); but see Wilson v. Johnson, 999 F.Supp. 394, 399 (W.D.N.Y.1998) (granting summary judgment to defendants when prisoner’s medical records did not show “his back problem was serious enough to prevent him from performing the tasks required of [his position as] a mess hall worker”)."
} | 629,450 | a |
. If the government were correct that X-Citement Video announced a new rule, this would provide an additional ground for our conclusion that the cause and prejudice requirement does not apply. We have consistently permitted defendants to challenge their convictions in SS 2255 motions, where there has been an intervening change in the law after the time for direct appeal has run. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "468 U.S. 1, 16",
"parenthetical": "holding that the novelty of a petitioner's claim can constitute cause for a procedural default",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sood, 969 F.2d at 775 (defendants pled guilty and did not challenge their convictions until post-conviction collateral proceedings); see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 2910, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (holding that the novelty of a petitioner’s claim can constitute cause for a procedural default)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "969 F.2d 775, 775",
"parenthetical": "defendants pled guilty and did not challenge their convictions until post-conviction collateral proceedings",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sood, 969 F.2d at 775 (defendants pled guilty and did not challenge their convictions until post-conviction collateral proceedings); see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 2910, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (holding that the novelty of a petitioner’s claim can constitute cause for a procedural default)."
} | 10,513,249 | b |
. If the government were correct that X-Citement Video announced a new rule, this would provide an additional ground for our conclusion that the cause and prejudice requirement does not apply. We have consistently permitted defendants to challenge their convictions in SS 2255 motions, where there has been an intervening change in the law after the time for direct appeal has run. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 2901, 2910",
"parenthetical": "holding that the novelty of a petitioner's claim can constitute cause for a procedural default",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sood, 969 F.2d at 775 (defendants pled guilty and did not challenge their convictions until post-conviction collateral proceedings); see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 2910, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (holding that the novelty of a petitioner’s claim can constitute cause for a procedural default)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "969 F.2d 775, 775",
"parenthetical": "defendants pled guilty and did not challenge their convictions until post-conviction collateral proceedings",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sood, 969 F.2d at 775 (defendants pled guilty and did not challenge their convictions until post-conviction collateral proceedings); see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 2910, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (holding that the novelty of a petitioner’s claim can constitute cause for a procedural default)."
} | 10,513,249 | b |
. If the government were correct that X-Citement Video announced a new rule, this would provide an additional ground for our conclusion that the cause and prejudice requirement does not apply. We have consistently permitted defendants to challenge their convictions in SS 2255 motions, where there has been an intervening change in the law after the time for direct appeal has run. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "969 F.2d 775, 775",
"parenthetical": "defendants pled guilty and did not challenge their convictions until post-conviction collateral proceedings",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sood, 969 F.2d at 775 (defendants pled guilty and did not challenge their convictions until post-conviction collateral proceedings); see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 2910, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (holding that the novelty of a petitioner’s claim can constitute cause for a procedural default)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the novelty of a petitioner's claim can constitute cause for a procedural default",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sood, 969 F.2d at 775 (defendants pled guilty and did not challenge their convictions until post-conviction collateral proceedings); see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 2910, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (holding that the novelty of a petitioner’s claim can constitute cause for a procedural default)."
} | 10,513,249 | a |
Contrary to what we said in Major, which was dicta and did not directly control the outcome of the case, this court, and other districts, have consistently ruled that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon is a second degree felony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon is a second degree felony",
"sentence": "See Whidden v. State, 374 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (discussing the robbery statute and concluding that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon is a second degree felony as provided in the attempt statute, section 777.04); see also Williams v. State, 850 So.2d 656 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Whidden and recognizing that attempted armed robbery is a second degree felony); Lopez v. State, 781 So.2d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (recognizing that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon is a second degree felony); Westbrook v. State, 617 So.2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (directing the trial court to correct the judgment, which erroneously stated that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon was a first degree felony, when it is a second degree felony); Arthur v. State, 391 So.2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (citing Whidden and agreeing that attempted robbery with a firearm is a second degree felony)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "374 So.2d 543, 545",
"parenthetical": "discussing the robbery statute and concluding that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon is a second degree felony as provided in the attempt statute, section 777.04",
"sentence": "See Whidden v. State, 374 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (discussing the robbery statute and concluding that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon is a second degree felony as provided in the attempt statute, section 777.04); see also Williams v. State, 850 So.2d 656 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Whidden and recognizing that attempted armed robbery is a second degree felony); Lopez v. State, 781 So.2d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (recognizing that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon is a second degree felony); Westbrook v. State, 617 So.2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (directing the trial court to correct the judgment, which erroneously stated that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon was a first degree felony, when it is a second degree felony); Arthur v. State, 391 So.2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (citing Whidden and agreeing that attempted robbery with a firearm is a second degree felony)."
} | 8,160,833 | b |
Contrary to what we said in Major, which was dicta and did not directly control the outcome of the case, this court, and other districts, have consistently ruled that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon is a second degree felony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "374 So.2d 543, 545",
"parenthetical": "discussing the robbery statute and concluding that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon is a second degree felony as provided in the attempt statute, section 777.04",
"sentence": "See Whidden v. State, 374 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (discussing the robbery statute and concluding that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon is a second degree felony as provided in the attempt statute, section 777.04); see also Williams v. State, 850 So.2d 656 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Whidden and recognizing that attempted armed robbery is a second degree felony); Lopez v. State, 781 So.2d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (recognizing that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon is a second degree felony); Westbrook v. State, 617 So.2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (directing the trial court to correct the judgment, which erroneously stated that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon was a first degree felony, when it is a second degree felony); Arthur v. State, 391 So.2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (citing Whidden and agreeing that attempted robbery with a firearm is a second degree felony)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "directing the trial court to correct the judgment, which erroneously stated that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon was a first degree felony, when it is a second degree felony",
"sentence": "See Whidden v. State, 374 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (discussing the robbery statute and concluding that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon is a second degree felony as provided in the attempt statute, section 777.04); see also Williams v. State, 850 So.2d 656 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Whidden and recognizing that attempted armed robbery is a second degree felony); Lopez v. State, 781 So.2d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (recognizing that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon is a second degree felony); Westbrook v. State, 617 So.2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (directing the trial court to correct the judgment, which erroneously stated that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon was a first degree felony, when it is a second degree felony); Arthur v. State, 391 So.2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (citing Whidden and agreeing that attempted robbery with a firearm is a second degree felony)."
} | 8,160,833 | a |
Second, as previously mentioned in this opinion, Matheny's prior convictions support the reasonableness of the district court's sentence. Because Matheny cannot demonstrate prejudice from the district court's consideration of one prior arrest, his substantial rights have not been affected. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "507 U.S. 735, 735",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[njormally, although perhaps not in every case, the defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the 'affecting substantial rights' prong of Rule 52(b",
"sentence": "See Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d at 629 (“[W]e conclude that the district court had adequate grounds to depart upward despite its error in considering the prior arrests for which the PSR did not set forth the factual details.”); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (stating that “[njormally, although perhaps not in every case, the defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the ‘affecting substantial rights’ prong of Rule 52(b)”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "433 F.3d 629, 629",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e conclude that the district court had adequate grounds to depart upward despite its error in considering the prior arrests for which the PSR did not set forth the factual details.\"",
"sentence": "See Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d at 629 (“[W]e conclude that the district court had adequate grounds to depart upward despite its error in considering the prior arrests for which the PSR did not set forth the factual details.”); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (stating that “[njormally, although perhaps not in every case, the defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the ‘affecting substantial rights’ prong of Rule 52(b)”)."
} | 3,087,694 | b |
Second, as previously mentioned in this opinion, Matheny's prior convictions support the reasonableness of the district court's sentence. Because Matheny cannot demonstrate prejudice from the district court's consideration of one prior arrest, his substantial rights have not been affected. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[njormally, although perhaps not in every case, the defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the 'affecting substantial rights' prong of Rule 52(b",
"sentence": "See Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d at 629 (“[W]e conclude that the district court had adequate grounds to depart upward despite its error in considering the prior arrests for which the PSR did not set forth the factual details.”); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (stating that “[njormally, although perhaps not in every case, the defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the ‘affecting substantial rights’ prong of Rule 52(b)”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "433 F.3d 629, 629",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e conclude that the district court had adequate grounds to depart upward despite its error in considering the prior arrests for which the PSR did not set forth the factual details.\"",
"sentence": "See Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d at 629 (“[W]e conclude that the district court had adequate grounds to depart upward despite its error in considering the prior arrests for which the PSR did not set forth the factual details.”); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (stating that “[njormally, although perhaps not in every case, the defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the ‘affecting substantial rights’ prong of Rule 52(b)”)."
} | 3,087,694 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Stringer's claim against defendant Koehn because Stringer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Koehn consciously disregarded a serious risk to Stringer's health in addressing his abdominal pain. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 242, 249-50",
"parenthetical": "party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "511 U.S. 825, 845, 847",
"parenthetical": "a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if \"he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it\"",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | 4,288,987 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Stringer's claim against defendant Koehn because Stringer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Koehn consciously disregarded a serious risk to Stringer's health in addressing his abdominal pain. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "511 U.S. 825, 845, 847",
"parenthetical": "a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if \"he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it\"",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | 4,288,987 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Stringer's claim against defendant Koehn because Stringer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Koehn consciously disregarded a serious risk to Stringer's health in addressing his abdominal pain. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "511 U.S. 825, 845, 847",
"parenthetical": "a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if \"he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it\"",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | 4,288,987 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Stringer's claim against defendant Koehn because Stringer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Koehn consciously disregarded a serious risk to Stringer's health in addressing his abdominal pain. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 242, 249-50",
"parenthetical": "party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if \"he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it\"",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | 4,288,987 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Stringer's claim against defendant Koehn because Stringer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Koehn consciously disregarded a serious risk to Stringer's health in addressing his abdominal pain. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if \"he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it\"",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | 4,288,987 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Stringer's claim against defendant Koehn because Stringer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Koehn consciously disregarded a serious risk to Stringer's health in addressing his abdominal pain. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if \"he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it\"",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | 4,288,987 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Stringer's claim against defendant Koehn because Stringer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Koehn consciously disregarded a serious risk to Stringer's health in addressing his abdominal pain. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if \"he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it\"",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 242, 249-50",
"parenthetical": "party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | 4,288,987 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Stringer's claim against defendant Koehn because Stringer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Koehn consciously disregarded a serious risk to Stringer's health in addressing his abdominal pain. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if \"he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it\"",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | 4,288,987 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Stringer's claim against defendant Koehn because Stringer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Koehn consciously disregarded a serious risk to Stringer's health in addressing his abdominal pain. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if \"he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it\"",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to show deliberate indifference, prisoner must establish that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment may not rest on con-clusory assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence)."
} | 4,288,987 | a |
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed ERISA's preemptive effects on state exemption statutes like Virginia's, several other circuits have. The majority of those circuits have held that ERISA's savings clause precluded preemption of state exemption statutes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "275 F.3d 604, 605",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that exemption statutes dealing with IRAs are outside ERISA's scope and therefore not preempted",
"sentence": "See also In re Weinhoeft, 275 F.3d 604, 605 (7th Cir.2001) (acknowledging that exemption statutes dealing with IRAs are outside ERISA’s scope and therefore not preempted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding Florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause",
"sentence": "See In re Schlein, 8 F.3d 745 (11th Cir.1993) (holding Florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause); In re Vickers, 954 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir.1992) (holding Missouri statute that exempted pension plan benefits from bankruptcy estate was not preempted due to savings clause); In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir.1991) (holding Texas exemption law was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause)."
} | 9,358,407 | b |
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed ERISA's preemptive effects on state exemption statutes like Virginia's, several other circuits have. The majority of those circuits have held that ERISA's savings clause precluded preemption of state exemption statutes. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that ERISA's savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption",
"sentence": "But cf. Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.1991), withdrawn, 992 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.1993) (finding that ERISA’s savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding Florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause",
"sentence": "See In re Schlein, 8 F.3d 745 (11th Cir.1993) (holding Florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause); In re Vickers, 954 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir.1992) (holding Missouri statute that exempted pension plan benefits from bankruptcy estate was not preempted due to savings clause); In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir.1991) (holding Texas exemption law was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause)."
} | 9,358,407 | b |
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed ERISA's preemptive effects on state exemption statutes like Virginia's, several other circuits have. The majority of those circuits have held that ERISA's savings clause precluded preemption of state exemption statutes. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that ERISA's savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption",
"sentence": "But cf. Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.1991), withdrawn, 992 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.1993) (finding that ERISA’s savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding Florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause",
"sentence": "See In re Schlein, 8 F.3d 745 (11th Cir.1993) (holding Florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause); In re Vickers, 954 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir.1992) (holding Missouri statute that exempted pension plan benefits from bankruptcy estate was not preempted due to savings clause); In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir.1991) (holding Texas exemption law was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause)."
} | 9,358,407 | b |
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed ERISA's preemptive effects on state exemption statutes like Virginia's, several other circuits have. The majority of those circuits have held that ERISA's savings clause precluded preemption of state exemption statutes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding Missouri statute that exempted pension plan benefits from bankruptcy estate was not preempted due to savings clause",
"sentence": "See In re Schlein, 8 F.3d 745 (11th Cir.1993) (holding Florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause); In re Vickers, 954 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir.1992) (holding Missouri statute that exempted pension plan benefits from bankruptcy estate was not preempted due to savings clause); In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir.1991) (holding Texas exemption law was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "275 F.3d 604, 605",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that exemption statutes dealing with IRAs are outside ERISA's scope and therefore not preempted",
"sentence": "See also In re Weinhoeft, 275 F.3d 604, 605 (7th Cir.2001) (acknowledging that exemption statutes dealing with IRAs are outside ERISA’s scope and therefore not preempted)."
} | 9,358,407 | a |
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed ERISA's preemptive effects on state exemption statutes like Virginia's, several other circuits have. The majority of those circuits have held that ERISA's savings clause precluded preemption of state exemption statutes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding Missouri statute that exempted pension plan benefits from bankruptcy estate was not preempted due to savings clause",
"sentence": "See In re Schlein, 8 F.3d 745 (11th Cir.1993) (holding Florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause); In re Vickers, 954 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir.1992) (holding Missouri statute that exempted pension plan benefits from bankruptcy estate was not preempted due to savings clause); In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir.1991) (holding Texas exemption law was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that ERISA's savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption",
"sentence": "But cf. Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.1991), withdrawn, 992 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.1993) (finding that ERISA’s savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption)."
} | 9,358,407 | a |
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed ERISA's preemptive effects on state exemption statutes like Virginia's, several other circuits have. The majority of those circuits have held that ERISA's savings clause precluded preemption of state exemption statutes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding Missouri statute that exempted pension plan benefits from bankruptcy estate was not preempted due to savings clause",
"sentence": "See In re Schlein, 8 F.3d 745 (11th Cir.1993) (holding Florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause); In re Vickers, 954 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir.1992) (holding Missouri statute that exempted pension plan benefits from bankruptcy estate was not preempted due to savings clause); In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir.1991) (holding Texas exemption law was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that ERISA's savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption",
"sentence": "But cf. Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.1991), withdrawn, 992 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.1993) (finding that ERISA’s savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption)."
} | 9,358,407 | a |
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed ERISA's preemptive effects on state exemption statutes like Virginia's, several other circuits have. The majority of those circuits have held that ERISA's savings clause precluded preemption of state exemption statutes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "275 F.3d 604, 605",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that exemption statutes dealing with IRAs are outside ERISA's scope and therefore not preempted",
"sentence": "See also In re Weinhoeft, 275 F.3d 604, 605 (7th Cir.2001) (acknowledging that exemption statutes dealing with IRAs are outside ERISA’s scope and therefore not preempted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding Texas exemption law was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause",
"sentence": "See In re Schlein, 8 F.3d 745 (11th Cir.1993) (holding Florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause); In re Vickers, 954 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir.1992) (holding Missouri statute that exempted pension plan benefits from bankruptcy estate was not preempted due to savings clause); In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir.1991) (holding Texas exemption law was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause)."
} | 9,358,407 | b |
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed ERISA's preemptive effects on state exemption statutes like Virginia's, several other circuits have. The majority of those circuits have held that ERISA's savings clause precluded preemption of state exemption statutes. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that ERISA's savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption",
"sentence": "But cf. Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.1991), withdrawn, 992 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.1993) (finding that ERISA’s savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding Texas exemption law was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause",
"sentence": "See In re Schlein, 8 F.3d 745 (11th Cir.1993) (holding Florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause); In re Vickers, 954 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir.1992) (holding Missouri statute that exempted pension plan benefits from bankruptcy estate was not preempted due to savings clause); In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir.1991) (holding Texas exemption law was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause)."
} | 9,358,407 | b |
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed ERISA's preemptive effects on state exemption statutes like Virginia's, several other circuits have. The majority of those circuits have held that ERISA's savings clause precluded preemption of state exemption statutes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding Texas exemption law was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause",
"sentence": "See In re Schlein, 8 F.3d 745 (11th Cir.1993) (holding Florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause); In re Vickers, 954 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir.1992) (holding Missouri statute that exempted pension plan benefits from bankruptcy estate was not preempted due to savings clause); In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir.1991) (holding Texas exemption law was not preempted by ERISA due to savings clause)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that ERISA's savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption",
"sentence": "But cf. Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.1991), withdrawn, 992 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.1993) (finding that ERISA’s savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption)."
} | 9,358,407 | a |
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed ERISA's preemptive effects on state exemption statutes like Virginia's, several other circuits have. The majority of those circuits have held that ERISA's savings clause precluded preemption of state exemption statutes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "275 F.3d 604, 605",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that exemption statutes dealing with IRAs are outside ERISA's scope and therefore not preempted",
"sentence": "See also In re Weinhoeft, 275 F.3d 604, 605 (7th Cir.2001) (acknowledging that exemption statutes dealing with IRAs are outside ERISA’s scope and therefore not preempted)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that ERISA's savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption",
"sentence": "But cf. Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.1991), withdrawn, 992 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.1993) (finding that ERISA’s savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption)."
} | 9,358,407 | a |
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed ERISA's preemptive effects on state exemption statutes like Virginia's, several other circuits have. The majority of those circuits have held that ERISA's savings clause precluded preemption of state exemption statutes. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that ERISA's savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption",
"sentence": "But cf. Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.1991), withdrawn, 992 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.1993) (finding that ERISA’s savings clause did not save Arizona exemption statute from preemption)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "275 F.3d 604, 605",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that exemption statutes dealing with IRAs are outside ERISA's scope and therefore not preempted",
"sentence": "See also In re Weinhoeft, 275 F.3d 604, 605 (7th Cir.2001) (acknowledging that exemption statutes dealing with IRAs are outside ERISA’s scope and therefore not preempted)."
} | 9,358,407 | b |
However, evidence that plaintiff operated the boat in water too high and at a speed too great causing him too lose control and be ejected will be permitted on the issue of proximate cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2010 WL 2867899, at *4",
"parenthetical": "\"absent a comparative negligence defense, a plaintiffs conduct is also relevant to establishing proximate cause.\"",
"sentence": "See id., 128 N.J. at 98, 607 A.2d at 644 (determining that plaintiffs actions were relevant to the issue of proximate cause even though jury could not consider conduct as evidence of contributory negligence); see also Madden v. Cosco, 2010 WL 2867899, at *4 (N.J.Super.A.D. July 19, 2010) (“absent a comparative negligence defense, a plaintiffs conduct is also relevant to establishing proximate cause.”) (citing Johansen, 128 N.J. at 97-99, 607 A.2d at 644). Likewise, defendant will also be permitted to introduce evidence of plaintiffs actions after he was ejected from the boat before contact with the engine’s propeller."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "128 N.J. 98, 98",
"parenthetical": "determining that plaintiffs actions were relevant to the issue of proximate cause even though jury could not consider conduct as evidence of contributory negligence",
"sentence": "See id., 128 N.J. at 98, 607 A.2d at 644 (determining that plaintiffs actions were relevant to the issue of proximate cause even though jury could not consider conduct as evidence of contributory negligence); see also Madden v. Cosco, 2010 WL 2867899, at *4 (N.J.Super.A.D. July 19, 2010) (“absent a comparative negligence defense, a plaintiffs conduct is also relevant to establishing proximate cause.”) (citing Johansen, 128 N.J. at 97-99, 607 A.2d at 644). Likewise, defendant will also be permitted to introduce evidence of plaintiffs actions after he was ejected from the boat before contact with the engine’s propeller."
} | 4,146,521 | b |
However, evidence that plaintiff operated the boat in water too high and at a speed too great causing him too lose control and be ejected will be permitted on the issue of proximate cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2010 WL 2867899, at *4",
"parenthetical": "\"absent a comparative negligence defense, a plaintiffs conduct is also relevant to establishing proximate cause.\"",
"sentence": "See id., 128 N.J. at 98, 607 A.2d at 644 (determining that plaintiffs actions were relevant to the issue of proximate cause even though jury could not consider conduct as evidence of contributory negligence); see also Madden v. Cosco, 2010 WL 2867899, at *4 (N.J.Super.A.D. July 19, 2010) (“absent a comparative negligence defense, a plaintiffs conduct is also relevant to establishing proximate cause.”) (citing Johansen, 128 N.J. at 97-99, 607 A.2d at 644). Likewise, defendant will also be permitted to introduce evidence of plaintiffs actions after he was ejected from the boat before contact with the engine’s propeller."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "607 A.2d 644, 644",
"parenthetical": "determining that plaintiffs actions were relevant to the issue of proximate cause even though jury could not consider conduct as evidence of contributory negligence",
"sentence": "See id., 128 N.J. at 98, 607 A.2d at 644 (determining that plaintiffs actions were relevant to the issue of proximate cause even though jury could not consider conduct as evidence of contributory negligence); see also Madden v. Cosco, 2010 WL 2867899, at *4 (N.J.Super.A.D. July 19, 2010) (“absent a comparative negligence defense, a plaintiffs conduct is also relevant to establishing proximate cause.”) (citing Johansen, 128 N.J. at 97-99, 607 A.2d at 644). Likewise, defendant will also be permitted to introduce evidence of plaintiffs actions after he was ejected from the boat before contact with the engine’s propeller."
} | 4,146,521 | b |
Appellant's conduct, as indicated by the Commonwealth's evidence, exhibited an extreme indifference to the value of human life and created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to Jonathan and Gabe. Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict on these two charges. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "906 S.W.2d 327, 334",
"parenthetical": "holding that there was sufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where defendant pointed a gun and fired two shots while in a crowded restaurant, thereby creating dangerous atmosphere for other diners",
"sentence": "See Port v. Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d 327, 334 (Ky.1995) (holding that there was sufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where defendant pointed a gun and fired two shots while in a crowded restaurant, thereby creating dangerous atmosphere for other diners); Combs v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 859, 860-61 (Ky.1983) (holding that there was sufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where a bullet came within fifteen feet of a bystander); Hunt v. Commonwealth, 304 S.W.3d 15, 38 (Ky.2009) (“It is self-evident that bullets may ricochet.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "384 S.W.3d 77, 104",
"parenthetical": "holding that there was insufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where evidence established that the victim was in a back bedroom, behind a closed door, and hiding under a bed when three shots were fired in the front living room",
"sentence": "Cf. Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 104 (Ky.2012) (holding that there was insufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where evidence established that the victim was in a back bedroom, behind a closed door, and hiding under a bed when three shots were fired in the front living room)."
} | 7,086,895 | a |
Appellant's conduct, as indicated by the Commonwealth's evidence, exhibited an extreme indifference to the value of human life and created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to Jonathan and Gabe. Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict on these two charges. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "384 S.W.3d 77, 104",
"parenthetical": "holding that there was insufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where evidence established that the victim was in a back bedroom, behind a closed door, and hiding under a bed when three shots were fired in the front living room",
"sentence": "Cf. Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 104 (Ky.2012) (holding that there was insufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where evidence established that the victim was in a back bedroom, behind a closed door, and hiding under a bed when three shots were fired in the front living room)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "652 S.W.2d 859, 860-61",
"parenthetical": "holding that there was sufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where a bullet came within fifteen feet of a bystander",
"sentence": "See Port v. Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d 327, 334 (Ky.1995) (holding that there was sufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where defendant pointed a gun and fired two shots while in a crowded restaurant, thereby creating dangerous atmosphere for other diners); Combs v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 859, 860-61 (Ky.1983) (holding that there was sufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where a bullet came within fifteen feet of a bystander); Hunt v. Commonwealth, 304 S.W.3d 15, 38 (Ky.2009) (“It is self-evident that bullets may ricochet.”)."
} | 7,086,895 | b |
Further, the Court is mindful that the trial court failed to take appropriate action to minimize the prejudicial effect of the gang evidence on the jury, e.g., by clearly instructing the jury to limit their consideration of the gang affiliation testimony to a proper purpose, e.g., impeachment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "205 F.3d 1165, 1165",
"parenthetical": "district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting gang evidence where it took steps to minimize undue prejudice",
"sentence": "See Jobson, 102 F.3d at 222 (noting trial court’s error in failing to instruct the jury on proper purpose of gang evidence and finding that such error was not harmless); see also Takahashi, 205 F.3d at 1165 (district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting gang evidence where it took steps to minimize undue prejudice); Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1431 (9th Cir.1994) (finding that gang evidence and argument was harmless error upon habeas review given trial court’s “prompt and effective action” in instructing the jury on the evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "102 F.3d 222, 222",
"parenthetical": "noting trial court's error in failing to instruct the jury on proper purpose of gang evidence and finding that such error was not harmless",
"sentence": "See Jobson, 102 F.3d at 222 (noting trial court’s error in failing to instruct the jury on proper purpose of gang evidence and finding that such error was not harmless); see also Takahashi, 205 F.3d at 1165 (district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting gang evidence where it took steps to minimize undue prejudice); Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1431 (9th Cir.1994) (finding that gang evidence and argument was harmless error upon habeas review given trial court’s “prompt and effective action” in instructing the jury on the evidence)."
} | 9,277,795 | b |
Further, the Court is mindful that the trial court failed to take appropriate action to minimize the prejudicial effect of the gang evidence on the jury, e.g., by clearly instructing the jury to limit their consideration of the gang affiliation testimony to a proper purpose, e.g., impeachment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "102 F.3d 222, 222",
"parenthetical": "noting trial court's error in failing to instruct the jury on proper purpose of gang evidence and finding that such error was not harmless",
"sentence": "See Jobson, 102 F.3d at 222 (noting trial court’s error in failing to instruct the jury on proper purpose of gang evidence and finding that such error was not harmless); see also Takahashi, 205 F.3d at 1165 (district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting gang evidence where it took steps to minimize undue prejudice); Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1431 (9th Cir.1994) (finding that gang evidence and argument was harmless error upon habeas review given trial court’s “prompt and effective action” in instructing the jury on the evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "27 F.3d 1424, 1431",
"parenthetical": "finding that gang evidence and argument was harmless error upon habeas review given trial court's \"prompt and effective action\" in instructing the jury on the evidence",
"sentence": "See Jobson, 102 F.3d at 222 (noting trial court’s error in failing to instruct the jury on proper purpose of gang evidence and finding that such error was not harmless); see also Takahashi, 205 F.3d at 1165 (district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting gang evidence where it took steps to minimize undue prejudice); Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1431 (9th Cir.1994) (finding that gang evidence and argument was harmless error upon habeas review given trial court’s “prompt and effective action” in instructing the jury on the evidence)."
} | 9,277,795 | a |
The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by . . . [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful misconduct . . . .' [General Statutes] SS 52-557n (a) (2) (A) .... Under Connecticut law, the term 'wilfulness' is synonymous with 'intentional.' | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.’), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988) [“wilful misconduct has been defined as intentional conduct”]; see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (‘A wilful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one’s conduct.’)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "245 Conn. 385, 415",
"parenthetical": "legal concepts of wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.’), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988) [“wilful misconduct has been defined as intentional conduct”]; see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (‘A wilful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one’s conduct.’)."
} | 2,630,471 | a |
The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by . . . [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful misconduct . . . .' [General Statutes] SS 52-557n (a) (2) (A) .... Under Connecticut law, the term 'wilfulness' is synonymous with 'intentional.' | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legal concepts of wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.’), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988) [“wilful misconduct has been defined as intentional conduct”]; see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (‘A wilful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one’s conduct.’)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.’), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988) [“wilful misconduct has been defined as intentional conduct”]; see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (‘A wilful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one’s conduct.’)."
} | 2,630,471 | b |
The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by . . . [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful misconduct . . . .' [General Statutes] SS 52-557n (a) (2) (A) .... Under Connecticut law, the term 'wilfulness' is synonymous with 'intentional.' | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "239 Conn. 515, 527",
"parenthetical": "'A wilful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.’), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988) [“wilful misconduct has been defined as intentional conduct”]; see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (‘A wilful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one’s conduct.’)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.’), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988) [“wilful misconduct has been defined as intentional conduct”]; see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (‘A wilful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one’s conduct.’)."
} | 2,630,471 | b |
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