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Pls.' Mot. to Remand at 6 (stating that "Plaintiffs have filed essentially the same cause of action in both the DC Superior Court as well as the DC Federal Court"); see also Defs.' Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. to Remand, Ex. B. Thus, on at least two prior occasions, the plaintiffs have affirmatively invoked federal jurisdiction over the claims raised in the Superior Court complaint. See Pls.' Mot. to Remand at 3, 6. In so doing, they have waived any right to remand they may have otherwise had based on procedural defects in the removal of this action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "665 F.Supp.2d 515, 517",
"parenthetical": "holding that the plaintiffs waived any right to seek remand by filing a second amended complaint in federal court",
"sentence": "See Koehnen, 89 F.3d at 528 (concluding that the plaintiff waived any procedural defect in connection with removal by moving to file a supplemental complaint in the federal court and participating in oral argument on the motion); Moffit v. Balt. Am. Mortgage, 665 F.Supp.2d 515, 517 (D.Md.2009) (holding that the plaintiffs waived any right to seek remand by filing a second amended complaint in federal court); see also Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1036 (10th Cir.1998) (noting that “plaintiffs cannot voluntarily invoke, and then disavow, federal jurisdiction”) Accordingly, the court denies the plaintiffs’ motion to remand."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "156 F.3d 1030, 1036",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"plaintiffs cannot voluntarily invoke, and then disavow, federal jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See Koehnen, 89 F.3d at 528 (concluding that the plaintiff waived any procedural defect in connection with removal by moving to file a supplemental complaint in the federal court and participating in oral argument on the motion); Moffit v. Balt. Am. Mortgage, 665 F.Supp.2d 515, 517 (D.Md.2009) (holding that the plaintiffs waived any right to seek remand by filing a second amended complaint in federal court); see also Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1036 (10th Cir.1998) (noting that “plaintiffs cannot voluntarily invoke, and then disavow, federal jurisdiction”) Accordingly, the court denies the plaintiffs’ motion to remand."
} | 4,026,691 | a |
Hurn also maintains that the 1995 conviction was too remote to be relevant and that its unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value. We have held that a district court does not abuse its discretion by admitting thirteen-year-old evidence of prior bad acts where the prior conduct is very similar to the conduct charged. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "406 F.3d 793, 793",
"parenthetical": "holding that the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence is proper in a drug case where nine years elapse between the prior conduct and the conduct charged",
"sentence": "See United States v. Wimberly, 60 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir.1995); see also Macedo, 406 F.3d at 793 (holding that the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence is proper in a drug case where nine years elapse between the prior conduct and the conduct charged)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "291 F.3d 127, 138-39",
"parenthetical": "holding that a district court errs by admitting a twelve-year-old drug conviction to prove intent in a subsequent drug prosecution",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127, 138-39 (2d Cir.2002) (holding that a district court errs by admitting a twelve-year-old drug conviction to prove intent in a subsequent drug prosecution)."
} | 5,703,438 | a |
The Supreme Court found that the false imprisonment ends for either tort when the victim is released, or when the victim's imprisonment becomes "pursuant to [legal] process -- when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges." Id. Moreover, several states have found that claims for false arrest and false imprisonment accrue when the false imprisonment ends or when imprisonment becomes pursuant to legal process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "41 F.Supp.2d 216, 216",
"parenthetical": "\"Under New York law, false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue on the date of the release from confinement.\"",
"sentence": "See Hoffman v. County of Delaware, 41 F.Supp.2d at 216 (“Under New York law, false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue on the date of the release from confinement.”), aff'd 205 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir.2000); Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d at 154 (“We hold that false imprisonment is a continuing tort and that the cause of action for the entire period of imprisonment accrues when the detention ends.”); Belflower v. Blackshere, 281 P.2d at 425 (holding that a cause of action for illegal arrest and false imprisonment accrued at the time plaintiff was released from his alleged illegal restraint and not when the proceedings by which his arrest occurred terminated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "885 N.E.2d 25, 31",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"Johnson's cause of action for false imprisonment/false arrest accrued when he was bound over for trial in March 2003\"",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Blackwell, 885 N.E.2d 25, 31 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)(holding that “Johnson’s cause of action for false imprisonment/false arrest accrued when he was bound over for trial in March 2003”); Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Ky.2007)(holding that the false imprisonment ended when the plaintiff began being held pursuant to legal process — the date when he was arraigned on the charges)."
} | 4,119,033 | a |
The Supreme Court found that the false imprisonment ends for either tort when the victim is released, or when the victim's imprisonment becomes "pursuant to [legal] process -- when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges." Id. Moreover, several states have found that claims for false arrest and false imprisonment accrue when the false imprisonment ends or when imprisonment becomes pursuant to legal process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "41 F.Supp.2d 216, 216",
"parenthetical": "\"Under New York law, false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue on the date of the release from confinement.\"",
"sentence": "See Hoffman v. County of Delaware, 41 F.Supp.2d at 216 (“Under New York law, false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue on the date of the release from confinement.”), aff'd 205 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir.2000); Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d at 154 (“We hold that false imprisonment is a continuing tort and that the cause of action for the entire period of imprisonment accrues when the detention ends.”); Belflower v. Blackshere, 281 P.2d at 425 (holding that a cause of action for illegal arrest and false imprisonment accrued at the time plaintiff was released from his alleged illegal restraint and not when the proceedings by which his arrest occurred terminated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "226 S.W.3d 68, 72",
"parenthetical": "holding that the false imprisonment ended when the plaintiff began being held pursuant to legal process -- the date when he was arraigned on the charges",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Blackwell, 885 N.E.2d 25, 31 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)(holding that “Johnson’s cause of action for false imprisonment/false arrest accrued when he was bound over for trial in March 2003”); Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Ky.2007)(holding that the false imprisonment ended when the plaintiff began being held pursuant to legal process — the date when he was arraigned on the charges)."
} | 4,119,033 | a |
The Supreme Court found that the false imprisonment ends for either tort when the victim is released, or when the victim's imprisonment becomes "pursuant to [legal] process -- when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges." Id. Moreover, several states have found that claims for false arrest and false imprisonment accrue when the false imprisonment ends or when imprisonment becomes pursuant to legal process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Under New York law, false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue on the date of the release from confinement.\"",
"sentence": "See Hoffman v. County of Delaware, 41 F.Supp.2d at 216 (“Under New York law, false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue on the date of the release from confinement.”), aff'd 205 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir.2000); Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d at 154 (“We hold that false imprisonment is a continuing tort and that the cause of action for the entire period of imprisonment accrues when the detention ends.”); Belflower v. Blackshere, 281 P.2d at 425 (holding that a cause of action for illegal arrest and false imprisonment accrued at the time plaintiff was released from his alleged illegal restraint and not when the proceedings by which his arrest occurred terminated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "885 N.E.2d 25, 31",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"Johnson's cause of action for false imprisonment/false arrest accrued when he was bound over for trial in March 2003\"",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Blackwell, 885 N.E.2d 25, 31 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)(holding that “Johnson’s cause of action for false imprisonment/false arrest accrued when he was bound over for trial in March 2003”); Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Ky.2007)(holding that the false imprisonment ended when the plaintiff began being held pursuant to legal process — the date when he was arraigned on the charges)."
} | 4,119,033 | a |
The Supreme Court found that the false imprisonment ends for either tort when the victim is released, or when the victim's imprisonment becomes "pursuant to [legal] process -- when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges." Id. Moreover, several states have found that claims for false arrest and false imprisonment accrue when the false imprisonment ends or when imprisonment becomes pursuant to legal process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "226 S.W.3d 68, 72",
"parenthetical": "holding that the false imprisonment ended when the plaintiff began being held pursuant to legal process -- the date when he was arraigned on the charges",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Blackwell, 885 N.E.2d 25, 31 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)(holding that “Johnson’s cause of action for false imprisonment/false arrest accrued when he was bound over for trial in March 2003”); Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Ky.2007)(holding that the false imprisonment ended when the plaintiff began being held pursuant to legal process — the date when he was arraigned on the charges)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Under New York law, false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue on the date of the release from confinement.\"",
"sentence": "See Hoffman v. County of Delaware, 41 F.Supp.2d at 216 (“Under New York law, false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue on the date of the release from confinement.”), aff'd 205 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir.2000); Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d at 154 (“We hold that false imprisonment is a continuing tort and that the cause of action for the entire period of imprisonment accrues when the detention ends.”); Belflower v. Blackshere, 281 P.2d at 425 (holding that a cause of action for illegal arrest and false imprisonment accrued at the time plaintiff was released from his alleged illegal restraint and not when the proceedings by which his arrest occurred terminated)."
} | 4,119,033 | b |
The Supreme Court found that the false imprisonment ends for either tort when the victim is released, or when the victim's imprisonment becomes "pursuant to [legal] process -- when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges." Id. Moreover, several states have found that claims for false arrest and false imprisonment accrue when the false imprisonment ends or when imprisonment becomes pursuant to legal process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "885 N.E.2d 25, 31",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"Johnson's cause of action for false imprisonment/false arrest accrued when he was bound over for trial in March 2003\"",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Blackwell, 885 N.E.2d 25, 31 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)(holding that “Johnson’s cause of action for false imprisonment/false arrest accrued when he was bound over for trial in March 2003”); Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Ky.2007)(holding that the false imprisonment ended when the plaintiff began being held pursuant to legal process — the date when he was arraigned on the charges)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "594 S.W.2d 154, 154",
"parenthetical": "\"We hold that false imprisonment is a continuing tort and that the cause of action for the entire period of imprisonment accrues when the detention ends.\"",
"sentence": "See Hoffman v. County of Delaware, 41 F.Supp.2d at 216 (“Under New York law, false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue on the date of the release from confinement.”), aff'd 205 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir.2000); Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d at 154 (“We hold that false imprisonment is a continuing tort and that the cause of action for the entire period of imprisonment accrues when the detention ends.”); Belflower v. Blackshere, 281 P.2d at 425 (holding that a cause of action for illegal arrest and false imprisonment accrued at the time plaintiff was released from his alleged illegal restraint and not when the proceedings by which his arrest occurred terminated)."
} | 4,119,033 | b |
The Supreme Court found that the false imprisonment ends for either tort when the victim is released, or when the victim's imprisonment becomes "pursuant to [legal] process -- when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges." Id. Moreover, several states have found that claims for false arrest and false imprisonment accrue when the false imprisonment ends or when imprisonment becomes pursuant to legal process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "226 S.W.3d 68, 72",
"parenthetical": "holding that the false imprisonment ended when the plaintiff began being held pursuant to legal process -- the date when he was arraigned on the charges",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Blackwell, 885 N.E.2d 25, 31 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)(holding that “Johnson’s cause of action for false imprisonment/false arrest accrued when he was bound over for trial in March 2003”); Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Ky.2007)(holding that the false imprisonment ended when the plaintiff began being held pursuant to legal process — the date when he was arraigned on the charges)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "594 S.W.2d 154, 154",
"parenthetical": "\"We hold that false imprisonment is a continuing tort and that the cause of action for the entire period of imprisonment accrues when the detention ends.\"",
"sentence": "See Hoffman v. County of Delaware, 41 F.Supp.2d at 216 (“Under New York law, false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue on the date of the release from confinement.”), aff'd 205 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir.2000); Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d at 154 (“We hold that false imprisonment is a continuing tort and that the cause of action for the entire period of imprisonment accrues when the detention ends.”); Belflower v. Blackshere, 281 P.2d at 425 (holding that a cause of action for illegal arrest and false imprisonment accrued at the time plaintiff was released from his alleged illegal restraint and not when the proceedings by which his arrest occurred terminated)."
} | 4,119,033 | b |
The Supreme Court found that the false imprisonment ends for either tort when the victim is released, or when the victim's imprisonment becomes "pursuant to [legal] process -- when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges." Id. Moreover, several states have found that claims for false arrest and false imprisonment accrue when the false imprisonment ends or when imprisonment becomes pursuant to legal process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "885 N.E.2d 25, 31",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"Johnson's cause of action for false imprisonment/false arrest accrued when he was bound over for trial in March 2003\"",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Blackwell, 885 N.E.2d 25, 31 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)(holding that “Johnson’s cause of action for false imprisonment/false arrest accrued when he was bound over for trial in March 2003”); Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Ky.2007)(holding that the false imprisonment ended when the plaintiff began being held pursuant to legal process — the date when he was arraigned on the charges)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "281 P.2d 425, 425",
"parenthetical": "holding that a cause of action for illegal arrest and false imprisonment accrued at the time plaintiff was released from his alleged illegal restraint and not when the proceedings by which his arrest occurred terminated",
"sentence": "See Hoffman v. County of Delaware, 41 F.Supp.2d at 216 (“Under New York law, false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue on the date of the release from confinement.”), aff'd 205 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir.2000); Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d at 154 (“We hold that false imprisonment is a continuing tort and that the cause of action for the entire period of imprisonment accrues when the detention ends.”); Belflower v. Blackshere, 281 P.2d at 425 (holding that a cause of action for illegal arrest and false imprisonment accrued at the time plaintiff was released from his alleged illegal restraint and not when the proceedings by which his arrest occurred terminated)."
} | 4,119,033 | b |
The Supreme Court found that the false imprisonment ends for either tort when the victim is released, or when the victim's imprisonment becomes "pursuant to [legal] process -- when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges." Id. Moreover, several states have found that claims for false arrest and false imprisonment accrue when the false imprisonment ends or when imprisonment becomes pursuant to legal process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "281 P.2d 425, 425",
"parenthetical": "holding that a cause of action for illegal arrest and false imprisonment accrued at the time plaintiff was released from his alleged illegal restraint and not when the proceedings by which his arrest occurred terminated",
"sentence": "See Hoffman v. County of Delaware, 41 F.Supp.2d at 216 (“Under New York law, false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue on the date of the release from confinement.”), aff'd 205 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir.2000); Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d at 154 (“We hold that false imprisonment is a continuing tort and that the cause of action for the entire period of imprisonment accrues when the detention ends.”); Belflower v. Blackshere, 281 P.2d at 425 (holding that a cause of action for illegal arrest and false imprisonment accrued at the time plaintiff was released from his alleged illegal restraint and not when the proceedings by which his arrest occurred terminated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "226 S.W.3d 68, 72",
"parenthetical": "holding that the false imprisonment ended when the plaintiff began being held pursuant to legal process -- the date when he was arraigned on the charges",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Blackwell, 885 N.E.2d 25, 31 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)(holding that “Johnson’s cause of action for false imprisonment/false arrest accrued when he was bound over for trial in March 2003”); Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Ky.2007)(holding that the false imprisonment ended when the plaintiff began being held pursuant to legal process — the date when he was arraigned on the charges)."
} | 4,119,033 | a |
(Emphases added.) Because HRCP 12(b) is identical to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), the federal courts' interpretation of this rule is highly persuasive. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "50 Haw. 528, 532",
"parenthetical": "federal courts' interpretations of the FRCP are deemed \"highly persuasive in, the reasoning of this court\" since the HRCP were patterned after the federal rules",
"sentence": "See Harada v. Burns, 50 Haw. 528, 532, 445 P.2d 376, 380 (1968) (federal courts’ interpretations of the FRCP are deemed “highly persuasive in, the reasoning of this court” since the HRCP were patterned after the federal rules); see also Compass Dev., Inc. v. Blevins, 10 Haw.App. 388, 394, 876 P.2d 1335, 1338 (1994) (because HRCP Rule 41(b) is identical to FRCP Rule 41(b), the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal rule is persuasive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "10 Haw.App. 388, 394",
"parenthetical": "because HRCP Rule 41(b) is identical to FRCP Rule 41(b), the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal rule is persuasive",
"sentence": "See Harada v. Burns, 50 Haw. 528, 532, 445 P.2d 376, 380 (1968) (federal courts’ interpretations of the FRCP are deemed “highly persuasive in, the reasoning of this court” since the HRCP were patterned after the federal rules); see also Compass Dev., Inc. v. Blevins, 10 Haw.App. 388, 394, 876 P.2d 1335, 1338 (1994) (because HRCP Rule 41(b) is identical to FRCP Rule 41(b), the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal rule is persuasive)."
} | 12,261,193 | a |
(Emphases added.) Because HRCP 12(b) is identical to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), the federal courts' interpretation of this rule is highly persuasive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "876 P.2d 1335, 1338",
"parenthetical": "because HRCP Rule 41(b) is identical to FRCP Rule 41(b), the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal rule is persuasive",
"sentence": "See Harada v. Burns, 50 Haw. 528, 532, 445 P.2d 376, 380 (1968) (federal courts’ interpretations of the FRCP are deemed “highly persuasive in, the reasoning of this court” since the HRCP were patterned after the federal rules); see also Compass Dev., Inc. v. Blevins, 10 Haw.App. 388, 394, 876 P.2d 1335, 1338 (1994) (because HRCP Rule 41(b) is identical to FRCP Rule 41(b), the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal rule is persuasive)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "50 Haw. 528, 532",
"parenthetical": "federal courts' interpretations of the FRCP are deemed \"highly persuasive in, the reasoning of this court\" since the HRCP were patterned after the federal rules",
"sentence": "See Harada v. Burns, 50 Haw. 528, 532, 445 P.2d 376, 380 (1968) (federal courts’ interpretations of the FRCP are deemed “highly persuasive in, the reasoning of this court” since the HRCP were patterned after the federal rules); see also Compass Dev., Inc. v. Blevins, 10 Haw.App. 388, 394, 876 P.2d 1335, 1338 (1994) (because HRCP Rule 41(b) is identical to FRCP Rule 41(b), the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal rule is persuasive)."
} | 12,261,193 | b |
(Emphases added.) Because HRCP 12(b) is identical to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), the federal courts' interpretation of this rule is highly persuasive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "10 Haw.App. 388, 394",
"parenthetical": "because HRCP Rule 41(b) is identical to FRCP Rule 41(b), the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal rule is persuasive",
"sentence": "See Harada v. Burns, 50 Haw. 528, 532, 445 P.2d 376, 380 (1968) (federal courts’ interpretations of the FRCP are deemed “highly persuasive in, the reasoning of this court” since the HRCP were patterned after the federal rules); see also Compass Dev., Inc. v. Blevins, 10 Haw.App. 388, 394, 876 P.2d 1335, 1338 (1994) (because HRCP Rule 41(b) is identical to FRCP Rule 41(b), the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal rule is persuasive)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "445 P.2d 376, 380",
"parenthetical": "federal courts' interpretations of the FRCP are deemed \"highly persuasive in, the reasoning of this court\" since the HRCP were patterned after the federal rules",
"sentence": "See Harada v. Burns, 50 Haw. 528, 532, 445 P.2d 376, 380 (1968) (federal courts’ interpretations of the FRCP are deemed “highly persuasive in, the reasoning of this court” since the HRCP were patterned after the federal rules); see also Compass Dev., Inc. v. Blevins, 10 Haw.App. 388, 394, 876 P.2d 1335, 1338 (1994) (because HRCP Rule 41(b) is identical to FRCP Rule 41(b), the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal rule is persuasive)."
} | 12,261,193 | b |
(Emphases added.) Because HRCP 12(b) is identical to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), the federal courts' interpretation of this rule is highly persuasive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "876 P.2d 1335, 1338",
"parenthetical": "because HRCP Rule 41(b) is identical to FRCP Rule 41(b), the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal rule is persuasive",
"sentence": "See Harada v. Burns, 50 Haw. 528, 532, 445 P.2d 376, 380 (1968) (federal courts’ interpretations of the FRCP are deemed “highly persuasive in, the reasoning of this court” since the HRCP were patterned after the federal rules); see also Compass Dev., Inc. v. Blevins, 10 Haw.App. 388, 394, 876 P.2d 1335, 1338 (1994) (because HRCP Rule 41(b) is identical to FRCP Rule 41(b), the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal rule is persuasive)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "445 P.2d 376, 380",
"parenthetical": "federal courts' interpretations of the FRCP are deemed \"highly persuasive in, the reasoning of this court\" since the HRCP were patterned after the federal rules",
"sentence": "See Harada v. Burns, 50 Haw. 528, 532, 445 P.2d 376, 380 (1968) (federal courts’ interpretations of the FRCP are deemed “highly persuasive in, the reasoning of this court” since the HRCP were patterned after the federal rules); see also Compass Dev., Inc. v. Blevins, 10 Haw.App. 388, 394, 876 P.2d 1335, 1338 (1994) (because HRCP Rule 41(b) is identical to FRCP Rule 41(b), the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal rule is persuasive)."
} | 12,261,193 | b |
Accordingly, we have no reason to conclude that Villanova's relationship with HSOA was anything other than an ordinary, arm's-length, lender-borrower relationship. In that type of relationship, the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not arise. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "660 S.W.2d 521, 522",
"parenthetical": "rejecting contention that an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing exists in every contract",
"sentence": "See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA, 960 S.W.2d at 52 (the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not arise in ordinary commercial transactions); see also English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex.1983) (rejecting contention that an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing exists in every contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "960 S.W.2d 52, 52",
"parenthetical": "the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not arise in ordinary commercial transactions",
"sentence": "See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA, 960 S.W.2d at 52 (the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not arise in ordinary commercial transactions); see also English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex.1983) (rejecting contention that an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing exists in every contract)."
} | 12,371,346 | b |
We have also recognized that dangers that are obvious to adults may not be fully appreciated by children of Shawn's age. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "297 N.W.2d 727, 743",
"parenthetical": "stating that a 4-year-old child was \"incapable of appreciating the risk\" that her pajamas could ignite from an electric burner",
"sentence": "See Heitman v. Lake City, 225 Minn. 117, 30 N.W.2d 18, 23 (1947) (stating, “[c]hil-dren, through childish inattention, may fail to observe conditions which an adult might reasonably be expected to discover,” in a case involving a 7-year-old child who drowned); see also Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 743 (Minn. 1980) (stating that a 4-year-old child was “incapable of appreciating the risk” that her pajamas could ignite from an electric burner); Doren v. Nw. Baptist Hasp."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating, \"[c]hil-dren, through childish inattention, may fail to observe conditions which an adult might reasonably be expected to discover,\" in a case involving a 7-year-old child who drowned",
"sentence": "See Heitman v. Lake City, 225 Minn. 117, 30 N.W.2d 18, 23 (1947) (stating, “[c]hil-dren, through childish inattention, may fail to observe conditions which an adult might reasonably be expected to discover,” in a case involving a 7-year-old child who drowned); see also Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 743 (Minn. 1980) (stating that a 4-year-old child was “incapable of appreciating the risk” that her pajamas could ignite from an electric burner); Doren v. Nw. Baptist Hasp."
} | 12,334,770 | b |
We have also recognized that dangers that are obvious to adults may not be fully appreciated by children of Shawn's age. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "297 N.W.2d 727, 743",
"parenthetical": "stating that a 4-year-old child was \"incapable of appreciating the risk\" that her pajamas could ignite from an electric burner",
"sentence": "See Heitman v. Lake City, 225 Minn. 117, 30 N.W.2d 18, 23 (1947) (stating, “[c]hil-dren, through childish inattention, may fail to observe conditions which an adult might reasonably be expected to discover,” in a case involving a 7-year-old child who drowned); see also Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 743 (Minn. 1980) (stating that a 4-year-old child was “incapable of appreciating the risk” that her pajamas could ignite from an electric burner); Doren v. Nw. Baptist Hasp."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "30 N.W.2d 18, 23",
"parenthetical": "stating, \"[c]hil-dren, through childish inattention, may fail to observe conditions which an adult might reasonably be expected to discover,\" in a case involving a 7-year-old child who drowned",
"sentence": "See Heitman v. Lake City, 225 Minn. 117, 30 N.W.2d 18, 23 (1947) (stating, “[c]hil-dren, through childish inattention, may fail to observe conditions which an adult might reasonably be expected to discover,” in a case involving a 7-year-old child who drowned); see also Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 743 (Minn. 1980) (stating that a 4-year-old child was “incapable of appreciating the risk” that her pajamas could ignite from an electric burner); Doren v. Nw. Baptist Hasp."
} | 12,334,770 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Dennison's access-to-court claim against Ulibarri concerning her alleged refusal to approve his two notices of claims as legal mail because Denni-son failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether his underlying claims were non-frivolous. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 319, 325",
"parenthetical": "a complaint is frivolous where \"it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact\"",
"sentence": "See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (the complaint must describe the underlying.claim “well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous test’” and “to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (a complaint is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "536 U.S. 416, 416",
"parenthetical": "the complaint must describe the underlying.claim \"well enough to apply the 'nonfrivolous test'\" and \"to show that the 'arguable' nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope\"",
"sentence": "See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (the complaint must describe the underlying.claim “well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous test’” and “to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (a complaint is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”)."
} | 4,297,356 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Dennison's access-to-court claim against Ulibarri concerning her alleged refusal to approve his two notices of claims as legal mail because Denni-son failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether his underlying claims were non-frivolous. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a complaint is frivolous where \"it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact\"",
"sentence": "See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (the complaint must describe the underlying.claim “well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous test’” and “to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (a complaint is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "536 U.S. 416, 416",
"parenthetical": "the complaint must describe the underlying.claim \"well enough to apply the 'nonfrivolous test'\" and \"to show that the 'arguable' nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope\"",
"sentence": "See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (the complaint must describe the underlying.claim “well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous test’” and “to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (a complaint is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”)."
} | 4,297,356 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Dennison's access-to-court claim against Ulibarri concerning her alleged refusal to approve his two notices of claims as legal mail because Denni-son failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether his underlying claims were non-frivolous. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "536 U.S. 416, 416",
"parenthetical": "the complaint must describe the underlying.claim \"well enough to apply the 'nonfrivolous test'\" and \"to show that the 'arguable' nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope\"",
"sentence": "See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (the complaint must describe the underlying.claim “well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous test’” and “to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (a complaint is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a complaint is frivolous where \"it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact\"",
"sentence": "See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (the complaint must describe the underlying.claim “well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous test’” and “to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (a complaint is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”)."
} | 4,297,356 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Dennison's access-to-court claim against Ulibarri concerning her alleged refusal to approve his two notices of claims as legal mail because Denni-son failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether his underlying claims were non-frivolous. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the complaint must describe the underlying.claim \"well enough to apply the 'nonfrivolous test'\" and \"to show that the 'arguable' nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope\"",
"sentence": "See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (the complaint must describe the underlying.claim “well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous test’” and “to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (a complaint is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 319, 325",
"parenthetical": "a complaint is frivolous where \"it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact\"",
"sentence": "See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (the complaint must describe the underlying.claim “well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous test’” and “to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (a complaint is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”)."
} | 4,297,356 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Dennison's access-to-court claim against Ulibarri concerning her alleged refusal to approve his two notices of claims as legal mail because Denni-son failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether his underlying claims were non-frivolous. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the complaint must describe the underlying.claim \"well enough to apply the 'nonfrivolous test'\" and \"to show that the 'arguable' nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope\"",
"sentence": "See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (the complaint must describe the underlying.claim “well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous test’” and “to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (a complaint is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a complaint is frivolous where \"it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact\"",
"sentence": "See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (the complaint must describe the underlying.claim “well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous test’” and “to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (a complaint is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”)."
} | 4,297,356 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Dennison's access-to-court claim against Ulibarri concerning her alleged refusal to approve his two notices of claims as legal mail because Denni-son failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether his underlying claims were non-frivolous. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a complaint is frivolous where \"it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact\"",
"sentence": "See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (the complaint must describe the underlying.claim “well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous test’” and “to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (a complaint is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the complaint must describe the underlying.claim \"well enough to apply the 'nonfrivolous test'\" and \"to show that the 'arguable' nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope\"",
"sentence": "See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (the complaint must describe the underlying.claim “well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous test’” and “to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than a hope”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (a complaint is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”)."
} | 4,297,356 | b |
Learning the contents of the purse was crucial to a proper police response. These facts must be viewed objectively. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948",
"parenthetical": "\"The officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant,\" as a court need not \"discem[] what is in the mind of the individual officer conducting the search.\"",
"sentence": "See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“[T] he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); see also Brigham City, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948 (2006) (“The officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant,” as a court need not “discem[] what is in the mind of the individual officer conducting the search.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "436 U.S. 128, 138",
"parenthetical": "\"[T] he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.\"",
"sentence": "See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“[T] he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); see also Brigham City, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948 (2006) (“The officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant,” as a court need not “discem[] what is in the mind of the individual officer conducting the search.”)."
} | 5,714,662 | b |
Learning the contents of the purse was crucial to a proper police response. These facts must be viewed objectively. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T] he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.\"",
"sentence": "See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“[T] he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); see also Brigham City, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948 (2006) (“The officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant,” as a court need not “discem[] what is in the mind of the individual officer conducting the search.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948",
"parenthetical": "\"The officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant,\" as a court need not \"discem[] what is in the mind of the individual officer conducting the search.\"",
"sentence": "See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“[T] he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); see also Brigham City, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948 (2006) (“The officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant,” as a court need not “discem[] what is in the mind of the individual officer conducting the search.”)."
} | 5,714,662 | a |
Learning the contents of the purse was crucial to a proper police response. These facts must be viewed objectively. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T] he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.\"",
"sentence": "See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“[T] he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); see also Brigham City, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948 (2006) (“The officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant,” as a court need not “discem[] what is in the mind of the individual officer conducting the search.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948",
"parenthetical": "\"The officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant,\" as a court need not \"discem[] what is in the mind of the individual officer conducting the search.\"",
"sentence": "See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“[T] he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); see also Brigham City, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948 (2006) (“The officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant,” as a court need not “discem[] what is in the mind of the individual officer conducting the search.”)."
} | 5,714,662 | a |
There was no evidence that the defendant shared payment of the rent. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "630 P.2d 1070, 1073",
"parenthetical": "defendant who was one of four people living in the trailer, paid an equal share of the rent, and used the living area along with the others had a reasonable expectation of privacy",
"sentence": "People v. Savage, 630 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Colo.1981) (defendant who was one of four people living in the trailer, paid an equal share of the rent, and used the living area along with the others had a reasonable expectation of privacy). David Juarez was not present in the house when the evidence was seized."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "176 Colo. 391, 394",
"parenthetical": "defendant was legitimately in the house and therefore had standing to challenge the search of the house",
"sentence": "Cf. People v. Godinas, 176 Colo. 391, 394, 490 P.2d 945, 947 (1971) (defendant was legitimately in the house and therefore had standing to challenge the search of the house); Adargo v. People, 173 Colo. 323, 325, 478 P.2d 308, 308 (1970) (defendant had standing because he was in his sister’s home with her permission when the search of her house was conducted)."
} | 10,397,823 | a |
There was no evidence that the defendant shared payment of the rent. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "630 P.2d 1070, 1073",
"parenthetical": "defendant who was one of four people living in the trailer, paid an equal share of the rent, and used the living area along with the others had a reasonable expectation of privacy",
"sentence": "People v. Savage, 630 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Colo.1981) (defendant who was one of four people living in the trailer, paid an equal share of the rent, and used the living area along with the others had a reasonable expectation of privacy). David Juarez was not present in the house when the evidence was seized."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "490 P.2d 945, 947",
"parenthetical": "defendant was legitimately in the house and therefore had standing to challenge the search of the house",
"sentence": "Cf. People v. Godinas, 176 Colo. 391, 394, 490 P.2d 945, 947 (1971) (defendant was legitimately in the house and therefore had standing to challenge the search of the house); Adargo v. People, 173 Colo. 323, 325, 478 P.2d 308, 308 (1970) (defendant had standing because he was in his sister’s home with her permission when the search of her house was conducted)."
} | 10,397,823 | a |
There was no evidence that the defendant shared payment of the rent. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "630 P.2d 1070, 1073",
"parenthetical": "defendant who was one of four people living in the trailer, paid an equal share of the rent, and used the living area along with the others had a reasonable expectation of privacy",
"sentence": "People v. Savage, 630 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Colo.1981) (defendant who was one of four people living in the trailer, paid an equal share of the rent, and used the living area along with the others had a reasonable expectation of privacy). David Juarez was not present in the house when the evidence was seized."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "173 Colo. 323, 325",
"parenthetical": "defendant had standing because he was in his sister's home with her permission when the search of her house was conducted",
"sentence": "Cf. People v. Godinas, 176 Colo. 391, 394, 490 P.2d 945, 947 (1971) (defendant was legitimately in the house and therefore had standing to challenge the search of the house); Adargo v. People, 173 Colo. 323, 325, 478 P.2d 308, 308 (1970) (defendant had standing because he was in his sister’s home with her permission when the search of her house was conducted)."
} | 10,397,823 | a |
There was no evidence that the defendant shared payment of the rent. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "630 P.2d 1070, 1073",
"parenthetical": "defendant who was one of four people living in the trailer, paid an equal share of the rent, and used the living area along with the others had a reasonable expectation of privacy",
"sentence": "People v. Savage, 630 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Colo.1981) (defendant who was one of four people living in the trailer, paid an equal share of the rent, and used the living area along with the others had a reasonable expectation of privacy). David Juarez was not present in the house when the evidence was seized."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "478 P.2d 308, 308",
"parenthetical": "defendant had standing because he was in his sister's home with her permission when the search of her house was conducted",
"sentence": "Cf. People v. Godinas, 176 Colo. 391, 394, 490 P.2d 945, 947 (1971) (defendant was legitimately in the house and therefore had standing to challenge the search of the house); Adargo v. People, 173 Colo. 323, 325, 478 P.2d 308, 308 (1970) (defendant had standing because he was in his sister’s home with her permission when the search of her house was conducted)."
} | 10,397,823 | a |
While private contracting parties would ordinarily be equally chargeable -- so far as enforceability and interpretation are concerned -- -with their respective counsels' derelictions in negotiating commercial contracts, different concerns apply to bargained plea agreements. Unlike the private contract situation, the validity of a bargained guilty plea depends finally upon the voluntariness and intelligence with which the defendant -- and not his counsel -- enters the bargained plea. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "624 F.2d 461, 473",
"parenthetical": "in interpreting disputed immunity agreement, court \"not primarily concerned with the gauge of [defense counsel's] professional caution or responsibility\"",
"sentence": "Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509, 104 S.Ct. at 2547. This necessary condition to effective waiver of constitutional rights can be found wanting not only because of the Government’s derelictions in discharging its duty of fair bargaining, see Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-62, 92 S.Ct. at 498, but also because of any independent (as well as Government-induced) dereliction of defense counsel amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d at 949 (Coffin, C.J.) (that defense counsel’s possible dereliction may constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel invalidating guilty plea, not a “relevant legal concern” in direct proceeding in criminal case to vacate plea because of broken plea agreement); cf. United States v. Society of Independent Gasoline Manufacturers, 624 F.2d 461, 473 (4th Cir.1979) (in interpreting disputed immunity agreement, court “not primarily concerned with the gauge of [defense counsel’s] professional caution or responsibility”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "467 U.S. 509, 509",
"parenthetical": "that defense counsel's possible dereliction may constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel invalidating guilty plea, not a \"relevant legal concern\" in direct proceeding in criminal case to vacate plea because of broken plea agreement",
"sentence": "Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509, 104 S.Ct. at 2547. This necessary condition to effective waiver of constitutional rights can be found wanting not only because of the Government’s derelictions in discharging its duty of fair bargaining, see Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-62, 92 S.Ct. at 498, but also because of any independent (as well as Government-induced) dereliction of defense counsel amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d at 949 (Coffin, C.J.) (that defense counsel’s possible dereliction may constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel invalidating guilty plea, not a “relevant legal concern” in direct proceeding in criminal case to vacate plea because of broken plea agreement); cf. United States v. Society of Independent Gasoline Manufacturers, 624 F.2d 461, 473 (4th Cir.1979) (in interpreting disputed immunity agreement, court “not primarily concerned with the gauge of [defense counsel’s] professional caution or responsibility”)."
} | 10,546,535 | b |
While private contracting parties would ordinarily be equally chargeable -- so far as enforceability and interpretation are concerned -- -with their respective counsels' derelictions in negotiating commercial contracts, different concerns apply to bargained plea agreements. Unlike the private contract situation, the validity of a bargained guilty plea depends finally upon the voluntariness and intelligence with which the defendant -- and not his counsel -- enters the bargained plea. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "624 F.2d 461, 473",
"parenthetical": "in interpreting disputed immunity agreement, court \"not primarily concerned with the gauge of [defense counsel's] professional caution or responsibility\"",
"sentence": "Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509, 104 S.Ct. at 2547. This necessary condition to effective waiver of constitutional rights can be found wanting not only because of the Government’s derelictions in discharging its duty of fair bargaining, see Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-62, 92 S.Ct. at 498, but also because of any independent (as well as Government-induced) dereliction of defense counsel amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d at 949 (Coffin, C.J.) (that defense counsel’s possible dereliction may constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel invalidating guilty plea, not a “relevant legal concern” in direct proceeding in criminal case to vacate plea because of broken plea agreement); cf. United States v. Society of Independent Gasoline Manufacturers, 624 F.2d 461, 473 (4th Cir.1979) (in interpreting disputed immunity agreement, court “not primarily concerned with the gauge of [defense counsel’s] professional caution or responsibility”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 2547, 2547",
"parenthetical": "that defense counsel's possible dereliction may constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel invalidating guilty plea, not a \"relevant legal concern\" in direct proceeding in criminal case to vacate plea because of broken plea agreement",
"sentence": "Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509, 104 S.Ct. at 2547. This necessary condition to effective waiver of constitutional rights can be found wanting not only because of the Government’s derelictions in discharging its duty of fair bargaining, see Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-62, 92 S.Ct. at 498, but also because of any independent (as well as Government-induced) dereliction of defense counsel amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d at 949 (Coffin, C.J.) (that defense counsel’s possible dereliction may constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel invalidating guilty plea, not a “relevant legal concern” in direct proceeding in criminal case to vacate plea because of broken plea agreement); cf. United States v. Society of Independent Gasoline Manufacturers, 624 F.2d 461, 473 (4th Cir.1979) (in interpreting disputed immunity agreement, court “not primarily concerned with the gauge of [defense counsel’s] professional caution or responsibility”)."
} | 10,546,535 | b |
While private contracting parties would ordinarily be equally chargeable -- so far as enforceability and interpretation are concerned -- -with their respective counsels' derelictions in negotiating commercial contracts, different concerns apply to bargained plea agreements. Unlike the private contract situation, the validity of a bargained guilty plea depends finally upon the voluntariness and intelligence with which the defendant -- and not his counsel -- enters the bargained plea. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "624 F.2d 461, 473",
"parenthetical": "in interpreting disputed immunity agreement, court \"not primarily concerned with the gauge of [defense counsel's] professional caution or responsibility\"",
"sentence": "Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509, 104 S.Ct. at 2547. This necessary condition to effective waiver of constitutional rights can be found wanting not only because of the Government’s derelictions in discharging its duty of fair bargaining, see Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-62, 92 S.Ct. at 498, but also because of any independent (as well as Government-induced) dereliction of defense counsel amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d at 949 (Coffin, C.J.) (that defense counsel’s possible dereliction may constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel invalidating guilty plea, not a “relevant legal concern” in direct proceeding in criminal case to vacate plea because of broken plea agreement); cf. United States v. Society of Independent Gasoline Manufacturers, 624 F.2d 461, 473 (4th Cir.1979) (in interpreting disputed immunity agreement, court “not primarily concerned with the gauge of [defense counsel’s] professional caution or responsibility”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "404 U.S. 261, 261-62",
"parenthetical": "that defense counsel's possible dereliction may constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel invalidating guilty plea, not a \"relevant legal concern\" in direct proceeding in criminal case to vacate plea because of broken plea agreement",
"sentence": "Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509, 104 S.Ct. at 2547. This necessary condition to effective waiver of constitutional rights can be found wanting not only because of the Government’s derelictions in discharging its duty of fair bargaining, see Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-62, 92 S.Ct. at 498, but also because of any independent (as well as Government-induced) dereliction of defense counsel amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d at 949 (Coffin, C.J.) (that defense counsel’s possible dereliction may constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel invalidating guilty plea, not a “relevant legal concern” in direct proceeding in criminal case to vacate plea because of broken plea agreement); cf. United States v. Society of Independent Gasoline Manufacturers, 624 F.2d 461, 473 (4th Cir.1979) (in interpreting disputed immunity agreement, court “not primarily concerned with the gauge of [defense counsel’s] professional caution or responsibility”)."
} | 10,546,535 | b |
While private contracting parties would ordinarily be equally chargeable -- so far as enforceability and interpretation are concerned -- -with their respective counsels' derelictions in negotiating commercial contracts, different concerns apply to bargained plea agreements. Unlike the private contract situation, the validity of a bargained guilty plea depends finally upon the voluntariness and intelligence with which the defendant -- and not his counsel -- enters the bargained plea. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "92 S.Ct. 498, 498",
"parenthetical": "that defense counsel's possible dereliction may constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel invalidating guilty plea, not a \"relevant legal concern\" in direct proceeding in criminal case to vacate plea because of broken plea agreement",
"sentence": "Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509, 104 S.Ct. at 2547. This necessary condition to effective waiver of constitutional rights can be found wanting not only because of the Government’s derelictions in discharging its duty of fair bargaining, see Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-62, 92 S.Ct. at 498, but also because of any independent (as well as Government-induced) dereliction of defense counsel amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d at 949 (Coffin, C.J.) (that defense counsel’s possible dereliction may constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel invalidating guilty plea, not a “relevant legal concern” in direct proceeding in criminal case to vacate plea because of broken plea agreement); cf. United States v. Society of Independent Gasoline Manufacturers, 624 F.2d 461, 473 (4th Cir.1979) (in interpreting disputed immunity agreement, court “not primarily concerned with the gauge of [defense counsel’s] professional caution or responsibility”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "624 F.2d 461, 473",
"parenthetical": "in interpreting disputed immunity agreement, court \"not primarily concerned with the gauge of [defense counsel's] professional caution or responsibility\"",
"sentence": "Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509, 104 S.Ct. at 2547. This necessary condition to effective waiver of constitutional rights can be found wanting not only because of the Government’s derelictions in discharging its duty of fair bargaining, see Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-62, 92 S.Ct. at 498, but also because of any independent (as well as Government-induced) dereliction of defense counsel amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d at 949 (Coffin, C.J.) (that defense counsel’s possible dereliction may constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel invalidating guilty plea, not a “relevant legal concern” in direct proceeding in criminal case to vacate plea because of broken plea agreement); cf. United States v. Society of Independent Gasoline Manufacturers, 624 F.2d 461, 473 (4th Cir.1979) (in interpreting disputed immunity agreement, court “not primarily concerned with the gauge of [defense counsel’s] professional caution or responsibility”)."
} | 10,546,535 | a |
We do not agree. Since the law governing the classification of aggravated identity theft was unsettled at the time of the appellant's removal, we cannot fairly conclude that the appellant was misled at all. A waiver of rights based on a reasonable interpretation of existing law is not rendered faulty by later jurisprudential developments. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "577 F.3d 288, 299",
"parenthetical": "finding no due process violation in BIA's refusal to entertain a motion to reopen removal proceedings even though offense underlying removal was later determined not to be an aggravated felony",
"sentence": "See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); see also Baptist, 759 F.3d at 698 (explaining that “the law in effect at the time of [the defendant’s] challenged removal is what matters to [the court’s] analysis”); cf. Ovalles v. Holder, 577 F.3d 288, 299 (5th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (finding no due process violation in BIA’s refusal to entertain a motion to reopen removal proceedings even though offense underlying removal was later determined not to be an aggravated felony)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "759 F.3d 698, 698",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"the law in effect at the time of [the defendant's] challenged removal is what matters to [the court's] analysis\"",
"sentence": "See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); see also Baptist, 759 F.3d at 698 (explaining that “the law in effect at the time of [the defendant’s] challenged removal is what matters to [the court’s] analysis”); cf. Ovalles v. Holder, 577 F.3d 288, 299 (5th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (finding no due process violation in BIA’s refusal to entertain a motion to reopen removal proceedings even though offense underlying removal was later determined not to be an aggravated felony)."
} | 4,339,853 | b |
The court held that since notice was mandatory, substantial compliance along the lines suggested by the state was insufficient and that suppression was required even if the defendant could show no prejudice resulting from the violation. The court correctly noted that in these respects the Connecticut statute was stricter than the federal wiretapping statute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unnotified defendant entitled to suppression only upon a showing of prejudice",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982); id. § 2518(8)(d) (the authorizing judge has discretion to determine whether notice should be sent to a person not named in wiretap authorization); United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 438-39 & n. 26, 97 S.Ct. 658, 673 & n. 26, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (unnotified defendant entitled to suppression only upon a showing of prejudice); United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 528-29 (2d Cir.1977) (same), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 931, 98 S.Ct. 2831, 56 L.Ed.2d 776 (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "176 Conn. 17, 25",
"parenthetical": "\"Connecticut scheme is ... in many respects more stringent than the equivalent federal act\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Grant, 176 Conn. 17, 25, 404 A.2d 873, 878 (1978) (“Connecticut scheme is ... in many respects more stringent than the equivalent federal act”)."
} | 1,600,095 | a |
The court held that since notice was mandatory, substantial compliance along the lines suggested by the state was insufficient and that suppression was required even if the defendant could show no prejudice resulting from the violation. The court correctly noted that in these respects the Connecticut statute was stricter than the federal wiretapping statute. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "404 A.2d 873, 878",
"parenthetical": "\"Connecticut scheme is ... in many respects more stringent than the equivalent federal act\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Grant, 176 Conn. 17, 25, 404 A.2d 873, 878 (1978) (“Connecticut scheme is ... in many respects more stringent than the equivalent federal act”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unnotified defendant entitled to suppression only upon a showing of prejudice",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982); id. § 2518(8)(d) (the authorizing judge has discretion to determine whether notice should be sent to a person not named in wiretap authorization); United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 438-39 & n. 26, 97 S.Ct. 658, 673 & n. 26, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (unnotified defendant entitled to suppression only upon a showing of prejudice); United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 528-29 (2d Cir.1977) (same), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 931, 98 S.Ct. 2831, 56 L.Ed.2d 776 (1978)."
} | 1,600,095 | b |
The court held that since notice was mandatory, substantial compliance along the lines suggested by the state was insufficient and that suppression was required even if the defendant could show no prejudice resulting from the violation. The court correctly noted that in these respects the Connecticut statute was stricter than the federal wiretapping statute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unnotified defendant entitled to suppression only upon a showing of prejudice",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982); id. § 2518(8)(d) (the authorizing judge has discretion to determine whether notice should be sent to a person not named in wiretap authorization); United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 438-39 & n. 26, 97 S.Ct. 658, 673 & n. 26, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (unnotified defendant entitled to suppression only upon a showing of prejudice); United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 528-29 (2d Cir.1977) (same), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 931, 98 S.Ct. 2831, 56 L.Ed.2d 776 (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "176 Conn. 17, 25",
"parenthetical": "\"Connecticut scheme is ... in many respects more stringent than the equivalent federal act\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Grant, 176 Conn. 17, 25, 404 A.2d 873, 878 (1978) (“Connecticut scheme is ... in many respects more stringent than the equivalent federal act”)."
} | 1,600,095 | a |
The court held that since notice was mandatory, substantial compliance along the lines suggested by the state was insufficient and that suppression was required even if the defendant could show no prejudice resulting from the violation. The court correctly noted that in these respects the Connecticut statute was stricter than the federal wiretapping statute. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "404 A.2d 873, 878",
"parenthetical": "\"Connecticut scheme is ... in many respects more stringent than the equivalent federal act\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Grant, 176 Conn. 17, 25, 404 A.2d 873, 878 (1978) (“Connecticut scheme is ... in many respects more stringent than the equivalent federal act”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unnotified defendant entitled to suppression only upon a showing of prejudice",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982); id. § 2518(8)(d) (the authorizing judge has discretion to determine whether notice should be sent to a person not named in wiretap authorization); United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 438-39 & n. 26, 97 S.Ct. 658, 673 & n. 26, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (unnotified defendant entitled to suppression only upon a showing of prejudice); United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 528-29 (2d Cir.1977) (same), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 931, 98 S.Ct. 2831, 56 L.Ed.2d 776 (1978)."
} | 1,600,095 | b |
The court held that since notice was mandatory, substantial compliance along the lines suggested by the state was insufficient and that suppression was required even if the defendant could show no prejudice resulting from the violation. The court correctly noted that in these respects the Connecticut statute was stricter than the federal wiretapping statute. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "176 Conn. 17, 25",
"parenthetical": "\"Connecticut scheme is ... in many respects more stringent than the equivalent federal act\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Grant, 176 Conn. 17, 25, 404 A.2d 873, 878 (1978) (“Connecticut scheme is ... in many respects more stringent than the equivalent federal act”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unnotified defendant entitled to suppression only upon a showing of prejudice",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982); id. § 2518(8)(d) (the authorizing judge has discretion to determine whether notice should be sent to a person not named in wiretap authorization); United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 438-39 & n. 26, 97 S.Ct. 658, 673 & n. 26, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (unnotified defendant entitled to suppression only upon a showing of prejudice); United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 528-29 (2d Cir.1977) (same), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 931, 98 S.Ct. 2831, 56 L.Ed.2d 776 (1978)."
} | 1,600,095 | b |
The court held that since notice was mandatory, substantial compliance along the lines suggested by the state was insufficient and that suppression was required even if the defendant could show no prejudice resulting from the violation. The court correctly noted that in these respects the Connecticut statute was stricter than the federal wiretapping statute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unnotified defendant entitled to suppression only upon a showing of prejudice",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982); id. § 2518(8)(d) (the authorizing judge has discretion to determine whether notice should be sent to a person not named in wiretap authorization); United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 438-39 & n. 26, 97 S.Ct. 658, 673 & n. 26, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (unnotified defendant entitled to suppression only upon a showing of prejudice); United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 528-29 (2d Cir.1977) (same), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 931, 98 S.Ct. 2831, 56 L.Ed.2d 776 (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "404 A.2d 873, 878",
"parenthetical": "\"Connecticut scheme is ... in many respects more stringent than the equivalent federal act\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Grant, 176 Conn. 17, 25, 404 A.2d 873, 878 (1978) (“Connecticut scheme is ... in many respects more stringent than the equivalent federal act”)."
} | 1,600,095 | a |
Determining whether Rodriguez-Correa was eligible for the program, and thus would have received a reduction in his sentence through a plea bargain or a government's motion for downward departure, is a matter of prosecutorial discretion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "178 F.3d 1168, 1174",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"entering into plea bargains is within the United States Attorney's prosecutorial discretion\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pickering, 178 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir.1999) (stating that “entering into plea bargains is within the United States Attorney’s prosecutorial discretion”) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds as stated in United States v. Orrega, 363 F.3d 1093, 1098 n. 8 (11th Cir.2004); see also, United States v. Rankin, 572 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir.1978) (stating that “there is no constitutional right to plea bargain.”) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)); see also United States v. Orozco, 160 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir.1998) (stating that “[determining whether a motion for reduction of sentence will be filed is reserved to the government.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "160 F.3d 1309, 1316",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[determining whether a motion for reduction of sentence will be filed is reserved to the government.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pickering, 178 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir.1999) (stating that “entering into plea bargains is within the United States Attorney’s prosecutorial discretion”) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds as stated in United States v. Orrega, 363 F.3d 1093, 1098 n. 8 (11th Cir.2004); see also, United States v. Rankin, 572 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir.1978) (stating that “there is no constitutional right to plea bargain.”) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)); see also United States v. Orozco, 160 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir.1998) (stating that “[determining whether a motion for reduction of sentence will be filed is reserved to the government.”)."
} | 3,167,173 | a |
Determining whether Rodriguez-Correa was eligible for the program, and thus would have received a reduction in his sentence through a plea bargain or a government's motion for downward departure, is a matter of prosecutorial discretion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "160 F.3d 1309, 1316",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[determining whether a motion for reduction of sentence will be filed is reserved to the government.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pickering, 178 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir.1999) (stating that “entering into plea bargains is within the United States Attorney’s prosecutorial discretion”) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds as stated in United States v. Orrega, 363 F.3d 1093, 1098 n. 8 (11th Cir.2004); see also, United States v. Rankin, 572 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir.1978) (stating that “there is no constitutional right to plea bargain.”) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)); see also United States v. Orozco, 160 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir.1998) (stating that “[determining whether a motion for reduction of sentence will be filed is reserved to the government.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"entering into plea bargains is within the United States Attorney's prosecutorial discretion\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pickering, 178 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir.1999) (stating that “entering into plea bargains is within the United States Attorney’s prosecutorial discretion”) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds as stated in United States v. Orrega, 363 F.3d 1093, 1098 n. 8 (11th Cir.2004); see also, United States v. Rankin, 572 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir.1978) (stating that “there is no constitutional right to plea bargain.”) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)); see also United States v. Orozco, 160 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir.1998) (stating that “[determining whether a motion for reduction of sentence will be filed is reserved to the government.”)."
} | 3,167,173 | b |
On appeal, Ms. Plasai argues that the settlement agreement should be voided as involuntary. Because Ms. Plasai first questioned the voluntariness of the settlement agreement in a petition for review by the full board, not during the dismissal proceeding with the AJ, she has waived this argument before us. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "229 F.3d 1088, 1091",
"parenthetical": "holding that the issue of the voluntariness of a settlement agreement is waived on appeal if not raised before the Board",
"sentence": "See Bosley v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 162 F.3d 665, 668 (Fed.Cir.1998) (“if the party ... raises an issue for the first time in a petition for review by the full Board, this court will not consider the issue.”); see also Sargent v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 229 F.3d 1088, 1091 (Fed.Cir.2000) (holding that the issue of the voluntariness of a settlement agreement is waived on appeal if not raised before the Board)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "162 F.3d 665, 668",
"parenthetical": "\"if the party ... raises an issue for the first time in a petition for review by the full Board, this court will not consider the issue.\"",
"sentence": "See Bosley v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 162 F.3d 665, 668 (Fed.Cir.1998) (“if the party ... raises an issue for the first time in a petition for review by the full Board, this court will not consider the issue.”); see also Sargent v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 229 F.3d 1088, 1091 (Fed.Cir.2000) (holding that the issue of the voluntariness of a settlement agreement is waived on appeal if not raised before the Board)."
} | 5,687,511 | b |
Yet, the Board injected ambiguity into K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f) when it determined that the statute did not define the phrase "recreational or social event." When deciding whether a statute is ambiguous, a basic principle of statutory construction provides that where words in a statute are not defined, they must be given their ordinary meaning. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 U.S. 37, 42",
"parenthetical": "words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning",
"sentence": "See Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, Syl. ¶ 3, 407 P.2d 471 (1965) (words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199, 100 S. Ct. 311 (1979) (words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning",
"sentence": "See Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, Syl. ¶ 3, 407 P.2d 471 (1965) (words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199, 100 S. Ct. 311 (1979) (words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning)."
} | 3,688,909 | b |
Yet, the Board injected ambiguity into K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f) when it determined that the statute did not define the phrase "recreational or social event." When deciding whether a statute is ambiguous, a basic principle of statutory construction provides that where words in a statute are not defined, they must be given their ordinary meaning. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning",
"sentence": "See Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, Syl. ¶ 3, 407 P.2d 471 (1965) (words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199, 100 S. Ct. 311 (1979) (words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning",
"sentence": "See Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, Syl. ¶ 3, 407 P.2d 471 (1965) (words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199, 100 S. Ct. 311 (1979) (words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning)."
} | 3,688,909 | a |
Yet, the Board injected ambiguity into K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f) when it determined that the statute did not define the phrase "recreational or social event." When deciding whether a statute is ambiguous, a basic principle of statutory construction provides that where words in a statute are not defined, they must be given their ordinary meaning. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning",
"sentence": "See Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, Syl. ¶ 3, 407 P.2d 471 (1965) (words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199, 100 S. Ct. 311 (1979) (words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning",
"sentence": "See Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, Syl. ¶ 3, 407 P.2d 471 (1965) (words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199, 100 S. Ct. 311 (1979) (words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning)."
} | 3,688,909 | b |
Yet, the Board injected ambiguity into K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f) when it determined that the statute did not define the phrase "recreational or social event." When deciding whether a statute is ambiguous, a basic principle of statutory construction provides that where words in a statute are not defined, they must be given their ordinary meaning. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning",
"sentence": "See Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, Syl. ¶ 3, 407 P.2d 471 (1965) (words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199, 100 S. Ct. 311 (1979) (words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 U.S. 37, 42",
"parenthetical": "words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning",
"sentence": "See Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, Syl. ¶ 3, 407 P.2d 471 (1965) (words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199, 100 S. Ct. 311 (1979) (words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning)."
} | 3,688,909 | a |
Yet, the Board injected ambiguity into K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f) when it determined that the statute did not define the phrase "recreational or social event." When deciding whether a statute is ambiguous, a basic principle of statutory construction provides that where words in a statute are not defined, they must be given their ordinary meaning. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning",
"sentence": "See Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, Syl. ¶ 3, 407 P.2d 471 (1965) (words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199, 100 S. Ct. 311 (1979) (words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning",
"sentence": "See Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, Syl. ¶ 3, 407 P.2d 471 (1965) (words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199, 100 S. Ct. 311 (1979) (words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning)."
} | 3,688,909 | a |
Yet, the Board injected ambiguity into K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f) when it determined that the statute did not define the phrase "recreational or social event." When deciding whether a statute is ambiguous, a basic principle of statutory construction provides that where words in a statute are not defined, they must be given their ordinary meaning. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning",
"sentence": "See Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, Syl. ¶ 3, 407 P.2d 471 (1965) (words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199, 100 S. Ct. 311 (1979) (words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning",
"sentence": "See Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, Syl. ¶ 3, 407 P.2d 471 (1965) (words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199, 100 S. Ct. 311 (1979) (words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning)."
} | 3,688,909 | a |
Commentators have suggested that one of the reasons for the absence of a clear framework for determining when the indefinite reach of laws invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement may be that the Supreme Court framed vagueness as a procedural doctrine, but used it to invalidate statutes on implicit substantive grounds. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying \"rogues and vagabonds\" and others as subject to punishment",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "striking down ordinance making it a crime for \"three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,\" and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that \"alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | 9,109,812 | a |
Commentators have suggested that one of the reasons for the absence of a clear framework for determining when the indefinite reach of laws invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement may be that the Supreme Court framed vagueness as a procedural doctrine, but used it to invalidate statutes on implicit substantive grounds. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "striking down ordinance making it a crime for \"three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,\" and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that \"alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying \"rogues and vagabonds\" and others as subject to punishment",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | 9,109,812 | b |
Commentators have suggested that one of the reasons for the absence of a clear framework for determining when the indefinite reach of laws invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement may be that the Supreme Court framed vagueness as a procedural doctrine, but used it to invalidate statutes on implicit substantive grounds. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "striking down ordinance making it a crime for \"three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,\" and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that \"alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying \"rogues and vagabonds\" and others as subject to punishment",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | 9,109,812 | b |
Commentators have suggested that one of the reasons for the absence of a clear framework for determining when the indefinite reach of laws invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement may be that the Supreme Court framed vagueness as a procedural doctrine, but used it to invalidate statutes on implicit substantive grounds. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying \"rogues and vagabonds\" and others as subject to punishment",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "striking down ordinance making it a crime for \"three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,\" and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that \"alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | 9,109,812 | a |
Commentators have suggested that one of the reasons for the absence of a clear framework for determining when the indefinite reach of laws invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement may be that the Supreme Court framed vagueness as a procedural doctrine, but used it to invalidate statutes on implicit substantive grounds. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "striking down ordinance making it a crime for \"three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,\" and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that \"alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying \"rogues and vagabonds\" and others as subject to punishment",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | 9,109,812 | b |
Commentators have suggested that one of the reasons for the absence of a clear framework for determining when the indefinite reach of laws invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement may be that the Supreme Court framed vagueness as a procedural doctrine, but used it to invalidate statutes on implicit substantive grounds. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying \"rogues and vagabonds\" and others as subject to punishment",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "striking down ordinance making it a crime for \"three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,\" and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that \"alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | 9,109,812 | a |
Commentators have suggested that one of the reasons for the absence of a clear framework for determining when the indefinite reach of laws invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement may be that the Supreme Court framed vagueness as a procedural doctrine, but used it to invalidate statutes on implicit substantive grounds. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying \"rogues and vagabonds\" and others as subject to punishment",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "striking down ordinance making it a crime for \"three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,\" and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that \"alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | 9,109,812 | a |
Commentators have suggested that one of the reasons for the absence of a clear framework for determining when the indefinite reach of laws invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement may be that the Supreme Court framed vagueness as a procedural doctrine, but used it to invalidate statutes on implicit substantive grounds. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying \"rogues and vagabonds\" and others as subject to punishment",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "striking down ordinance making it a crime for \"three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,\" and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that \"alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | 9,109,812 | a |
Commentators have suggested that one of the reasons for the absence of a clear framework for determining when the indefinite reach of laws invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement may be that the Supreme Court framed vagueness as a procedural doctrine, but used it to invalidate statutes on implicit substantive grounds. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "striking down ordinance making it a crime for \"three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,\" and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that \"alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying \"rogues and vagabonds\" and others as subject to punishment",
"sentence": "Id. at 604-05; see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 Cal. L.Rev. 491 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court used the vagueness doctrine to prevent the police from imposing certain kinds of middle class norms on citizens and citing as an example Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy ordinance classifying “rogues and vagabonds” and others as subject to punishment)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down ordinance making it a crime for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,” and citing Kemer Commission Report for proposition that “alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967”)."
} | 9,109,812 | b |
. Mangum does not argue, and we do not find, that the pertinent statutes are unclear or reasonably susceptible to different interpretations. Therefore, the rule of lenity does not apply here, nor does Mangum argue otherwise. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying rule of lenity to prohibited possessor statute that could \"be interpreted in two alternative ways\"",
"sentence": "But see State v. Gore, 101 Wash.2d 481, 681 P.2d 227, 230 (1984) (applying rule of lenity to prohibited possessor statute that could \"be interpreted in two alternative ways”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "445 U.S. 65, 65",
"parenthetical": "lenity principle's \"touchstone ... is statutory ambiguity\" and does not apply when \"statute could not be more plain\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Sanchez, 209 Ariz. 66, ¶ 6, 97 P.3d 891, 893 (App.2004); State v. Fell, 203 Ariz. 186, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 218, 221 (App.2002); see also Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 920-21 (lenity principle’s \"touchstone ... is statutory ambiguity” and does not apply when \"statute could not be more plain”)."
} | 3,998,359 | b |
. Mangum does not argue, and we do not find, that the pertinent statutes are unclear or reasonably susceptible to different interpretations. Therefore, the rule of lenity does not apply here, nor does Mangum argue otherwise. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "445 U.S. 65, 65",
"parenthetical": "lenity principle's \"touchstone ... is statutory ambiguity\" and does not apply when \"statute could not be more plain\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Sanchez, 209 Ariz. 66, ¶ 6, 97 P.3d 891, 893 (App.2004); State v. Fell, 203 Ariz. 186, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 218, 221 (App.2002); see also Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 920-21 (lenity principle’s \"touchstone ... is statutory ambiguity” and does not apply when \"statute could not be more plain”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "681 P.2d 227, 230",
"parenthetical": "applying rule of lenity to prohibited possessor statute that could \"be interpreted in two alternative ways\"",
"sentence": "But see State v. Gore, 101 Wash.2d 481, 681 P.2d 227, 230 (1984) (applying rule of lenity to prohibited possessor statute that could \"be interpreted in two alternative ways”)."
} | 3,998,359 | a |
. Mangum does not argue, and we do not find, that the pertinent statutes are unclear or reasonably susceptible to different interpretations. Therefore, the rule of lenity does not apply here, nor does Mangum argue otherwise. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "100 S.Ct. 920, 920-21",
"parenthetical": "lenity principle's \"touchstone ... is statutory ambiguity\" and does not apply when \"statute could not be more plain\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Sanchez, 209 Ariz. 66, ¶ 6, 97 P.3d 891, 893 (App.2004); State v. Fell, 203 Ariz. 186, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 218, 221 (App.2002); see also Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 920-21 (lenity principle’s \"touchstone ... is statutory ambiguity” and does not apply when \"statute could not be more plain”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying rule of lenity to prohibited possessor statute that could \"be interpreted in two alternative ways\"",
"sentence": "But see State v. Gore, 101 Wash.2d 481, 681 P.2d 227, 230 (1984) (applying rule of lenity to prohibited possessor statute that could \"be interpreted in two alternative ways”)."
} | 3,998,359 | a |
. Mangum does not argue, and we do not find, that the pertinent statutes are unclear or reasonably susceptible to different interpretations. Therefore, the rule of lenity does not apply here, nor does Mangum argue otherwise. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "681 P.2d 227, 230",
"parenthetical": "applying rule of lenity to prohibited possessor statute that could \"be interpreted in two alternative ways\"",
"sentence": "But see State v. Gore, 101 Wash.2d 481, 681 P.2d 227, 230 (1984) (applying rule of lenity to prohibited possessor statute that could \"be interpreted in two alternative ways”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "100 S.Ct. 920, 920-21",
"parenthetical": "lenity principle's \"touchstone ... is statutory ambiguity\" and does not apply when \"statute could not be more plain\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Sanchez, 209 Ariz. 66, ¶ 6, 97 P.3d 891, 893 (App.2004); State v. Fell, 203 Ariz. 186, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 218, 221 (App.2002); see also Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 920-21 (lenity principle’s \"touchstone ... is statutory ambiguity” and does not apply when \"statute could not be more plain”)."
} | 3,998,359 | b |
Although the police in this case, unlike Edwards, were unaware of the petitioner's prior request for counsel, I do not consider that fact to be significant. Once a defendant invokes his right to counsel, that knowledge is imputed to all law enforcement officials. Therefore, the fact that subsequent interrogating officers are unaware of such invocation is irrelevant to the question of whether a constitutional right has been violated. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "454 U.S. 924, 924",
"parenthetical": "knowledge of petitioner's request for counsel at arraignment imputed to police",
"sentence": "Johnson v. Virginia, 454 U.S. at 924, 102 S.Ct. at 424 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (knowledge of petitioner’s request for counsel at arraignment imputed to police); United States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir.1983); White III, 687 F.2d at 887-88 n. 9; United States ex rel. Karr v. Wolff, 556 F.Supp. at 765; United States v. Renda, 567 F.Supp. at 487; See also United States ex rel. Kimes v. Greer, 527 F.Supp. at 310 (good faith of officer who questioned suspect after request for counsel is irrelevant)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "527 F.Supp. 310, 310",
"parenthetical": "good faith of officer who questioned suspect after request for counsel is irrelevant",
"sentence": "Johnson v. Virginia, 454 U.S. at 924, 102 S.Ct. at 424 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (knowledge of petitioner’s request for counsel at arraignment imputed to police); United States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir.1983); White III, 687 F.2d at 887-88 n. 9; United States ex rel. Karr v. Wolff, 556 F.Supp. at 765; United States v. Renda, 567 F.Supp. at 487; See also United States ex rel. Kimes v. Greer, 527 F.Supp. at 310 (good faith of officer who questioned suspect after request for counsel is irrelevant)."
} | 1,678,029 | a |
For more than half of this time, Mr. Cluff was in closed quarters with his assailants. They even warned him not to seek help from the guards, warnings that he followed because he was "afraid" and "couldn't handle another beating." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "443 F.3d 712, 712",
"parenthetical": "admitting a statement as an excited utterance over a hearsay objection when there was a thirty-five minute period between assault and statement to police upon arriving on scene",
"sentence": "See Ledford, 443 F.3d at 712 (admitting a statement as an excited utterance over a hearsay objection when there was a thirty-five minute period between assault and statement to police upon arriving on scene); see also United States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir.1998) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a four-hour delay between spousal beating and statements made by victim at battered women’s shelter); United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir.1998) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a three-hour delay between discovery that people were in burning building and declarant’s statement admitting part in arson); Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 395 (7th Cir.1991) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a two-hour delay between shooting and victim’s statement identifying perpetrator of shooting)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "156 F.3d 22, 30",
"parenthetical": "admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a four-hour delay between spousal beating and statements made by victim at battered women's shelter",
"sentence": "See Ledford, 443 F.3d at 712 (admitting a statement as an excited utterance over a hearsay objection when there was a thirty-five minute period between assault and statement to police upon arriving on scene); see also United States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir.1998) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a four-hour delay between spousal beating and statements made by victim at battered women’s shelter); United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir.1998) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a three-hour delay between discovery that people were in burning building and declarant’s statement admitting part in arson); Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 395 (7th Cir.1991) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a two-hour delay between shooting and victim’s statement identifying perpetrator of shooting)."
} | 4,042,664 | a |
For more than half of this time, Mr. Cluff was in closed quarters with his assailants. They even warned him not to seek help from the guards, warnings that he followed because he was "afraid" and "couldn't handle another beating." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "135 F.3d 116, 128",
"parenthetical": "admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a three-hour delay between discovery that people were in burning building and declarant's statement admitting part in arson",
"sentence": "See Ledford, 443 F.3d at 712 (admitting a statement as an excited utterance over a hearsay objection when there was a thirty-five minute period between assault and statement to police upon arriving on scene); see also United States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir.1998) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a four-hour delay between spousal beating and statements made by victim at battered women’s shelter); United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir.1998) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a three-hour delay between discovery that people were in burning building and declarant’s statement admitting part in arson); Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 395 (7th Cir.1991) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a two-hour delay between shooting and victim’s statement identifying perpetrator of shooting)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "443 F.3d 712, 712",
"parenthetical": "admitting a statement as an excited utterance over a hearsay objection when there was a thirty-five minute period between assault and statement to police upon arriving on scene",
"sentence": "See Ledford, 443 F.3d at 712 (admitting a statement as an excited utterance over a hearsay objection when there was a thirty-five minute period between assault and statement to police upon arriving on scene); see also United States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir.1998) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a four-hour delay between spousal beating and statements made by victim at battered women’s shelter); United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir.1998) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a three-hour delay between discovery that people were in burning building and declarant’s statement admitting part in arson); Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 395 (7th Cir.1991) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a two-hour delay between shooting and victim’s statement identifying perpetrator of shooting)."
} | 4,042,664 | b |
For more than half of this time, Mr. Cluff was in closed quarters with his assailants. They even warned him not to seek help from the guards, warnings that he followed because he was "afraid" and "couldn't handle another beating." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "922 F.2d 390, 395",
"parenthetical": "admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a two-hour delay between shooting and victim's statement identifying perpetrator of shooting",
"sentence": "See Ledford, 443 F.3d at 712 (admitting a statement as an excited utterance over a hearsay objection when there was a thirty-five minute period between assault and statement to police upon arriving on scene); see also United States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir.1998) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a four-hour delay between spousal beating and statements made by victim at battered women’s shelter); United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir.1998) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a three-hour delay between discovery that people were in burning building and declarant’s statement admitting part in arson); Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 395 (7th Cir.1991) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a two-hour delay between shooting and victim’s statement identifying perpetrator of shooting)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "443 F.3d 712, 712",
"parenthetical": "admitting a statement as an excited utterance over a hearsay objection when there was a thirty-five minute period between assault and statement to police upon arriving on scene",
"sentence": "See Ledford, 443 F.3d at 712 (admitting a statement as an excited utterance over a hearsay objection when there was a thirty-five minute period between assault and statement to police upon arriving on scene); see also United States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir.1998) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a four-hour delay between spousal beating and statements made by victim at battered women’s shelter); United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir.1998) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a three-hour delay between discovery that people were in burning building and declarant’s statement admitting part in arson); Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 395 (7th Cir.1991) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a two-hour delay between shooting and victim’s statement identifying perpetrator of shooting)."
} | 4,042,664 | b |
If Voisinet is indigent, the trial court shall take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation of counsel, which may include the appointment of new counsel. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | 11,490,764 | b |
If Voisinet is indigent, the trial court shall take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation of counsel, which may include the appointment of new counsel. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | 11,490,764 | b |
If Voisinet is indigent, the trial court shall take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation of counsel, which may include the appointment of new counsel. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | 11,490,764 | b |
If Voisinet is indigent, the trial court shall take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation of counsel, which may include the appointment of new counsel. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160",
"parenthetical": "consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | 11,490,764 | a |
If Voisinet is indigent, the trial court shall take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation of counsel, which may include the appointment of new counsel. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160",
"parenthetical": "consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | 11,490,764 | b |
If Voisinet is indigent, the trial court shall take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation of counsel, which may include the appointment of new counsel. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160",
"parenthetical": "consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | 11,490,764 | a |
If Voisinet is indigent, the trial court shall take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation of counsel, which may include the appointment of new counsel. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | 11,490,764 | a |
If Voisinet is indigent, the trial court shall take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation of counsel, which may include the appointment of new counsel. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | 11,490,764 | b |
If Voisinet is indigent, the trial court shall take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation of counsel, which may include the appointment of new counsel. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated",
"sentence": "See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (equal protection requires the state to provide transcript in appeal of right to indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated)."
} | 11,490,764 | a |
J.A. 41-42. Given the facts of this case, we cannot conclude that the district court clearly erred when reaching this conclusion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "77 F.3d 74, 74",
"parenthetical": "\"The district court's decision whether to grant a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a factual determination that we review for clear error.\"",
"sentence": "See Miller, 77 F.3d at 74 (“The district court’s decision whether to grant a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a factual determination that we review for clear error.”); see also United States v. Hawley, 93 F.3d 682, 689-90 (10th Cir.1996) (affirming denial of acceptance of responsibility to defendant who received an obstruction of justice enhancement for pre-guiltyplea violation of appearance bond: “Conduct amounting to escape or violation of an appearance bond is certainly evidence of failure to accept responsibility, and this fact alone provides adequate foundation for the district court’s decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "93 F.3d 682, 689-90",
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of acceptance of responsibility to defendant who received an obstruction of justice enhancement for pre-guiltyplea violation of appearance bond: \"Conduct amounting to escape or violation of an appearance bond is certainly evidence of failure to accept responsibility, and this fact alone provides adequate foundation for the district court's decision.\"",
"sentence": "See Miller, 77 F.3d at 74 (“The district court’s decision whether to grant a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a factual determination that we review for clear error.”); see also United States v. Hawley, 93 F.3d 682, 689-90 (10th Cir.1996) (affirming denial of acceptance of responsibility to defendant who received an obstruction of justice enhancement for pre-guiltyplea violation of appearance bond: “Conduct amounting to escape or violation of an appearance bond is certainly evidence of failure to accept responsibility, and this fact alone provides adequate foundation for the district court’s decision.”)."
} | 3,680,227 | a |
While the second set of notes do not indicate that Brochu was present, this Court finds that National Grid has not met its burden of proving that the interview notes are subject to the attorney-client privilege because they have not proven that Jim Sullivan and Michael Knott were interviewing Caproni, Coyle, and Sullivan in their capacity as Sciumeca's Team members instead of IA Team members. In addition, any IA Team investigation would necessarily be conducted in the ordinary course of business as there are 1500 incident analysis investigations a year; therefore, National Grid has not met its burden of proving that the interview notes are subject to the protection of the work product doctrine. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "26 Mass.App.Ct. 1016, 1016",
"parenthetical": "indicating that when the work product is prepared in \"the ordinary line of business and duty,\" it is not protected by the work product doctrine",
"sentence": "See Shotwell, 26 Mass.App.Ct. at 1016 (indicating that when the work product is prepared in “the ordinary line of business and duty,” it is not protected by the work product doctrine); see also Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202 (holding that documents that are created in the ordinary course of business or would have been created irrespective of litigation are not protected by the work product doctrine)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "134 F.3d 1202, 1202",
"parenthetical": "holding that documents that are created in the ordinary course of business or would have been created irrespective of litigation are not protected by the work product doctrine",
"sentence": "See Shotwell, 26 Mass.App.Ct. at 1016 (indicating that when the work product is prepared in “the ordinary line of business and duty,” it is not protected by the work product doctrine); see also Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202 (holding that documents that are created in the ordinary course of business or would have been created irrespective of litigation are not protected by the work product doctrine)."
} | 11,075,102 | a |
The alleged basis for the plaintiffs' non-disclosure claim is that the American Express SEC filings were incorporated by reference in the SPD and those filings failed to disclose material adverse financial information about American Express. Even if the disclosure requirements of ERISA go beyond the specific requirements of sections 1021-31, the requirement is no more than a duty to refrain from making affirmative misrepresentations to plan participants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "690 F.Supp.2d 271, 271",
"parenthetical": "\"Defendants have no affirmative duty under ERISA to disclose information about the company's financial condition to plan participants.\"",
"sentence": "See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 506, 116 S.Ct. 1065 (finding affirmative deception to be a violation of ERISA section 404(a) fiduciary duties, but not reaching “the question whether ERISA fiduciaries have any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information on their own initiative, or in response to employee inquiries”); Devlin, 274 F.3d at 88 (finding affirmative misrepresentations to plan participants violate ERISA fiduciary duties); see also Gearren, 690 F.Supp.2d at 271 (“Defendants have no affirmative duty under ERISA to disclose information about the company’s financial condition to plan participants.”); In re Citigroup, 2009 WL 2762708, at *21 (citing Bd. of Trs. of CWAJITU Negotiated Pension Plan v. Weinstein, 107 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir.1997))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "516 U.S. 506, 506",
"parenthetical": "finding affirmative deception to be a violation of ERISA section 404(a",
"sentence": "See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 506, 116 S.Ct. 1065 (finding affirmative deception to be a violation of ERISA section 404(a) fiduciary duties, but not reaching “the question whether ERISA fiduciaries have any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information on their own initiative, or in response to employee inquiries”); Devlin, 274 F.3d at 88 (finding affirmative misrepresentations to plan participants violate ERISA fiduciary duties); see also Gearren, 690 F.Supp.2d at 271 (“Defendants have no affirmative duty under ERISA to disclose information about the company’s financial condition to plan participants.”); In re Citigroup, 2009 WL 2762708, at *21 (citing Bd. of Trs. of CWAJITU Negotiated Pension Plan v. Weinstein, 107 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir.1997))."
} | 4,184,103 | b |
The alleged basis for the plaintiffs' non-disclosure claim is that the American Express SEC filings were incorporated by reference in the SPD and those filings failed to disclose material adverse financial information about American Express. Even if the disclosure requirements of ERISA go beyond the specific requirements of sections 1021-31, the requirement is no more than a duty to refrain from making affirmative misrepresentations to plan participants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "690 F.Supp.2d 271, 271",
"parenthetical": "\"Defendants have no affirmative duty under ERISA to disclose information about the company's financial condition to plan participants.\"",
"sentence": "See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 506, 116 S.Ct. 1065 (finding affirmative deception to be a violation of ERISA section 404(a) fiduciary duties, but not reaching “the question whether ERISA fiduciaries have any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information on their own initiative, or in response to employee inquiries”); Devlin, 274 F.3d at 88 (finding affirmative misrepresentations to plan participants violate ERISA fiduciary duties); see also Gearren, 690 F.Supp.2d at 271 (“Defendants have no affirmative duty under ERISA to disclose information about the company’s financial condition to plan participants.”); In re Citigroup, 2009 WL 2762708, at *21 (citing Bd. of Trs. of CWAJITU Negotiated Pension Plan v. Weinstein, 107 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir.1997))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding affirmative deception to be a violation of ERISA section 404(a",
"sentence": "See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 506, 116 S.Ct. 1065 (finding affirmative deception to be a violation of ERISA section 404(a) fiduciary duties, but not reaching “the question whether ERISA fiduciaries have any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information on their own initiative, or in response to employee inquiries”); Devlin, 274 F.3d at 88 (finding affirmative misrepresentations to plan participants violate ERISA fiduciary duties); see also Gearren, 690 F.Supp.2d at 271 (“Defendants have no affirmative duty under ERISA to disclose information about the company’s financial condition to plan participants.”); In re Citigroup, 2009 WL 2762708, at *21 (citing Bd. of Trs. of CWAJITU Negotiated Pension Plan v. Weinstein, 107 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir.1997))."
} | 4,184,103 | b |
The alleged basis for the plaintiffs' non-disclosure claim is that the American Express SEC filings were incorporated by reference in the SPD and those filings failed to disclose material adverse financial information about American Express. Even if the disclosure requirements of ERISA go beyond the specific requirements of sections 1021-31, the requirement is no more than a duty to refrain from making affirmative misrepresentations to plan participants. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "274 F.3d 88, 88",
"parenthetical": "finding affirmative misrepresentations to plan participants violate ERISA fiduciary duties",
"sentence": "See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 506, 116 S.Ct. 1065 (finding affirmative deception to be a violation of ERISA section 404(a) fiduciary duties, but not reaching “the question whether ERISA fiduciaries have any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information on their own initiative, or in response to employee inquiries”); Devlin, 274 F.3d at 88 (finding affirmative misrepresentations to plan participants violate ERISA fiduciary duties); see also Gearren, 690 F.Supp.2d at 271 (“Defendants have no affirmative duty under ERISA to disclose information about the company’s financial condition to plan participants.”); In re Citigroup, 2009 WL 2762708, at *21 (citing Bd. of Trs. of CWAJITU Negotiated Pension Plan v. Weinstein, 107 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir.1997))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "690 F.Supp.2d 271, 271",
"parenthetical": "\"Defendants have no affirmative duty under ERISA to disclose information about the company's financial condition to plan participants.\"",
"sentence": "See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 506, 116 S.Ct. 1065 (finding affirmative deception to be a violation of ERISA section 404(a) fiduciary duties, but not reaching “the question whether ERISA fiduciaries have any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information on their own initiative, or in response to employee inquiries”); Devlin, 274 F.3d at 88 (finding affirmative misrepresentations to plan participants violate ERISA fiduciary duties); see also Gearren, 690 F.Supp.2d at 271 (“Defendants have no affirmative duty under ERISA to disclose information about the company’s financial condition to plan participants.”); In re Citigroup, 2009 WL 2762708, at *21 (citing Bd. of Trs. of CWAJITU Negotiated Pension Plan v. Weinstein, 107 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir.1997))."
} | 4,184,103 | a |
Turning to the circumstances of this case, we are easily convinced that the Unions' concerns have more than a "marginal" relationship to the purposes implicit in the PES. The district court erred in focusing too narrowly on the functions of the PES in isolation from the entire Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 ("PRA"), of which the PES are a part. When attempting to discern the scope of interests embraced by a particular legislative provision, courts may look to the purposes animating the entire statutory framework. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "479 U.S. 401, 401",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress' overall purposes in the National Bank Act.\"",
"sentence": "See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 401, 107 S.Ct. at 757 (“[W]e are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress’ overall purposes in the National Bank Act.”); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 & n. 2, 90 S.Ct. 827, 831-32 & n. 2, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); see also National Coal Association v. Hodel, 825 F.2d 523, 529 (D.C.Cir.1987) (looking beyond the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) to other legislation aimed at the coal industry in order to “flesh out the meaning of the term ‘public interest’ ” in the FLPMA); Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 18 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“Thus, plaintiffs ... appear to fall within the zone of interests of the statutory scheme represented by three complementary enactments.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "825 F.2d 523, 529",
"parenthetical": "looking beyond the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA",
"sentence": "See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 401, 107 S.Ct. at 757 (“[W]e are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress’ overall purposes in the National Bank Act.”); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 & n. 2, 90 S.Ct. 827, 831-32 & n. 2, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); see also National Coal Association v. Hodel, 825 F.2d 523, 529 (D.C.Cir.1987) (looking beyond the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) to other legislation aimed at the coal industry in order to “flesh out the meaning of the term ‘public interest’ ” in the FLPMA); Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 18 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“Thus, plaintiffs ... appear to fall within the zone of interests of the statutory scheme represented by three complementary enactments.”)."
} | 10,529,052 | a |
Turning to the circumstances of this case, we are easily convinced that the Unions' concerns have more than a "marginal" relationship to the purposes implicit in the PES. The district court erred in focusing too narrowly on the functions of the PES in isolation from the entire Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 ("PRA"), of which the PES are a part. When attempting to discern the scope of interests embraced by a particular legislative provision, courts may look to the purposes animating the entire statutory framework. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Thus, plaintiffs ... appear to fall within the zone of interests of the statutory scheme represented by three complementary enactments.\"",
"sentence": "See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 401, 107 S.Ct. at 757 (“[W]e are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress’ overall purposes in the National Bank Act.”); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 & n. 2, 90 S.Ct. 827, 831-32 & n. 2, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); see also National Coal Association v. Hodel, 825 F.2d 523, 529 (D.C.Cir.1987) (looking beyond the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) to other legislation aimed at the coal industry in order to “flesh out the meaning of the term ‘public interest’ ” in the FLPMA); Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 18 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“Thus, plaintiffs ... appear to fall within the zone of interests of the statutory scheme represented by three complementary enactments.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "479 U.S. 401, 401",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress' overall purposes in the National Bank Act.\"",
"sentence": "See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 401, 107 S.Ct. at 757 (“[W]e are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress’ overall purposes in the National Bank Act.”); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 & n. 2, 90 S.Ct. 827, 831-32 & n. 2, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); see also National Coal Association v. Hodel, 825 F.2d 523, 529 (D.C.Cir.1987) (looking beyond the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) to other legislation aimed at the coal industry in order to “flesh out the meaning of the term ‘public interest’ ” in the FLPMA); Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 18 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“Thus, plaintiffs ... appear to fall within the zone of interests of the statutory scheme represented by three complementary enactments.”)."
} | 10,529,052 | b |
Turning to the circumstances of this case, we are easily convinced that the Unions' concerns have more than a "marginal" relationship to the purposes implicit in the PES. The district court erred in focusing too narrowly on the functions of the PES in isolation from the entire Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 ("PRA"), of which the PES are a part. When attempting to discern the scope of interests embraced by a particular legislative provision, courts may look to the purposes animating the entire statutory framework. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 757, 757",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress' overall purposes in the National Bank Act.\"",
"sentence": "See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 401, 107 S.Ct. at 757 (“[W]e are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress’ overall purposes in the National Bank Act.”); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 & n. 2, 90 S.Ct. 827, 831-32 & n. 2, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); see also National Coal Association v. Hodel, 825 F.2d 523, 529 (D.C.Cir.1987) (looking beyond the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) to other legislation aimed at the coal industry in order to “flesh out the meaning of the term ‘public interest’ ” in the FLPMA); Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 18 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“Thus, plaintiffs ... appear to fall within the zone of interests of the statutory scheme represented by three complementary enactments.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "825 F.2d 523, 529",
"parenthetical": "looking beyond the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA",
"sentence": "See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 401, 107 S.Ct. at 757 (“[W]e are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress’ overall purposes in the National Bank Act.”); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 & n. 2, 90 S.Ct. 827, 831-32 & n. 2, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); see also National Coal Association v. Hodel, 825 F.2d 523, 529 (D.C.Cir.1987) (looking beyond the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) to other legislation aimed at the coal industry in order to “flesh out the meaning of the term ‘public interest’ ” in the FLPMA); Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 18 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“Thus, plaintiffs ... appear to fall within the zone of interests of the statutory scheme represented by three complementary enactments.”)."
} | 10,529,052 | a |
Turning to the circumstances of this case, we are easily convinced that the Unions' concerns have more than a "marginal" relationship to the purposes implicit in the PES. The district court erred in focusing too narrowly on the functions of the PES in isolation from the entire Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 ("PRA"), of which the PES are a part. When attempting to discern the scope of interests embraced by a particular legislative provision, courts may look to the purposes animating the entire statutory framework. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 757, 757",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress' overall purposes in the National Bank Act.\"",
"sentence": "See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 401, 107 S.Ct. at 757 (“[W]e are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress’ overall purposes in the National Bank Act.”); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 & n. 2, 90 S.Ct. 827, 831-32 & n. 2, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); see also National Coal Association v. Hodel, 825 F.2d 523, 529 (D.C.Cir.1987) (looking beyond the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) to other legislation aimed at the coal industry in order to “flesh out the meaning of the term ‘public interest’ ” in the FLPMA); Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 18 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“Thus, plaintiffs ... appear to fall within the zone of interests of the statutory scheme represented by three complementary enactments.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Thus, plaintiffs ... appear to fall within the zone of interests of the statutory scheme represented by three complementary enactments.\"",
"sentence": "See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 401, 107 S.Ct. at 757 (“[W]e are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress’ overall purposes in the National Bank Act.”); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 & n. 2, 90 S.Ct. 827, 831-32 & n. 2, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); see also National Coal Association v. Hodel, 825 F.2d 523, 529 (D.C.Cir.1987) (looking beyond the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) to other legislation aimed at the coal industry in order to “flesh out the meaning of the term ‘public interest’ ” in the FLPMA); Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 18 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“Thus, plaintiffs ... appear to fall within the zone of interests of the statutory scheme represented by three complementary enactments.”)."
} | 10,529,052 | a |
In addition, the vast majority of the prosecutor's argument focused on the evidence. Fernandez's lawyer thoroughly responded to the improper remarks in his own closing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "partial acquittal \"reinforces our conclusion that the prosecutor's remarks did not undermine the jury's ability to view the evidence independently and fairly\"",
"sentence": "See Young, 470 U.S. at 18 n.15, 105 S.Ct. 1038 (partial acquittal “reinforces our conclusion that the prosecutor’s remarks did not undermine the jury’s ability to view the evidence independently and fairly”); Wright, 625 F.3d at 613 (same); de Cruz, 82 F.3d at 863 (same); Koon, 34 F.3d at 1446 (same)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "659 F.3d 1261, 1261",
"parenthetical": "improper comment was \"the last argument the jury heard before going to the jury room to deliberate\"",
"sentence": "Compare Wright, 625 F.3d at 613 (improper comment “was mitigated by defense counsel’s excellent rebuttal”), with Sanchez, 659 F.3d at 1261 (improper comment was “the last argument the jury heard before going to the jury room to deliberate”). And the jury acquitted Fernandez of one of the two charges against him, indicating that they reviewed the evidence objectively."
} | 12,265,495 | b |
In addition, the vast majority of the prosecutor's argument focused on the evidence. Fernandez's lawyer thoroughly responded to the improper remarks in his own closing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "partial acquittal \"reinforces our conclusion that the prosecutor's remarks did not undermine the jury's ability to view the evidence independently and fairly\"",
"sentence": "See Young, 470 U.S. at 18 n.15, 105 S.Ct. 1038 (partial acquittal “reinforces our conclusion that the prosecutor’s remarks did not undermine the jury’s ability to view the evidence independently and fairly”); Wright, 625 F.3d at 613 (same); de Cruz, 82 F.3d at 863 (same); Koon, 34 F.3d at 1446 (same)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "659 F.3d 1261, 1261",
"parenthetical": "improper comment was \"the last argument the jury heard before going to the jury room to deliberate\"",
"sentence": "Compare Wright, 625 F.3d at 613 (improper comment “was mitigated by defense counsel’s excellent rebuttal”), with Sanchez, 659 F.3d at 1261 (improper comment was “the last argument the jury heard before going to the jury room to deliberate”). And the jury acquitted Fernandez of one of the two charges against him, indicating that they reviewed the evidence objectively."
} | 12,265,495 | b |
Indeed, the fact that the Board's decision is almost entirely unexplained strongly suggests that the Board simply applied subsection (i)(B), which -- post-amendment--plainly forecloses UPMC's interest claim. Thus, the Court must vacate and remand. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "52 F.3d 363, 365",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen a court reviewing agency action determines that an agency made an error of law, the court's inquiry is at an end: the case must be remanded tq the agency for further action consistent with the corrected legal standards.\"",
"sentence": "See PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 52 F.3d 363, 365 (D.C.Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a court reviewing agency action determines that an agency made an error of law, the court’s inquiry is at an end: the case must be remanded tq the agency for further action consistent with the corrected legal standards.”); cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943) (“[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "318 U.S. 80, 95",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.\"",
"sentence": "See PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 52 F.3d 363, 365 (D.C.Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a court reviewing agency action determines that an agency made an error of law, the court’s inquiry is at an end: the case must be remanded tq the agency for further action consistent with the corrected legal standards.”); cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943) (“[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.”)."
} | 4,189,630 | a |
Indeed, the fact that the Board's decision is almost entirely unexplained strongly suggests that the Board simply applied subsection (i)(B), which -- post-amendment--plainly forecloses UPMC's interest claim. Thus, the Court must vacate and remand. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.\"",
"sentence": "See PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 52 F.3d 363, 365 (D.C.Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a court reviewing agency action determines that an agency made an error of law, the court’s inquiry is at an end: the case must be remanded tq the agency for further action consistent with the corrected legal standards.”); cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943) (“[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "52 F.3d 363, 365",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen a court reviewing agency action determines that an agency made an error of law, the court's inquiry is at an end: the case must be remanded tq the agency for further action consistent with the corrected legal standards.\"",
"sentence": "See PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 52 F.3d 363, 365 (D.C.Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a court reviewing agency action determines that an agency made an error of law, the court’s inquiry is at an end: the case must be remanded tq the agency for further action consistent with the corrected legal standards.”); cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943) (“[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.”)."
} | 4,189,630 | b |
Indeed, the fact that the Board's decision is almost entirely unexplained strongly suggests that the Board simply applied subsection (i)(B), which -- post-amendment--plainly forecloses UPMC's interest claim. Thus, the Court must vacate and remand. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "52 F.3d 363, 365",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen a court reviewing agency action determines that an agency made an error of law, the court's inquiry is at an end: the case must be remanded tq the agency for further action consistent with the corrected legal standards.\"",
"sentence": "See PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 52 F.3d 363, 365 (D.C.Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a court reviewing agency action determines that an agency made an error of law, the court’s inquiry is at an end: the case must be remanded tq the agency for further action consistent with the corrected legal standards.”); cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943) (“[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.\"",
"sentence": "See PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 52 F.3d 363, 365 (D.C.Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a court reviewing agency action determines that an agency made an error of law, the court’s inquiry is at an end: the case must be remanded tq the agency for further action consistent with the corrected legal standards.”); cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943) (“[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.”)."
} | 4,189,630 | a |
J.A. 51. In such circumstances, the district court acted well within its discretion in not ordering a competency hearing on its own motion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "306 F.3d 1233, 1233-34",
"parenthetical": "identifying no abuse of discretion in failure sua sponte to order hearing because district court's observations and defense counsel's assurances as to defendant's competence \"overcome any reasonable doubt ... that may have been raised by his statement that he felt dizzy\" from taking wrong medication",
"sentence": "See United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1233-34 (identifying no abuse of discretion in failure sua sponte to order hearing because district court’s observations and defense counsel’s assurances as to defendant’s competence “overcome any reasonable doubt ... that may have been raised by his statement that he felt dizzy” from taking wrong medication); cf. United States v. Graves, 98 F.3d 258, 261-62 (7th Cir.1996) (concluding district court should have ordered sua sponte competency hearing where defendant suffered stroke that caused him “serious difficulty speaking and some paralysis, and ... some impairment of memory and understanding” when conversing with court)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "98 F.3d 258, 261-62",
"parenthetical": "concluding district court should have ordered sua sponte competency hearing where defendant suffered stroke that caused him \"serious difficulty speaking and some paralysis, and ... some impairment of memory and understanding\" when conversing with court",
"sentence": "See United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1233-34 (identifying no abuse of discretion in failure sua sponte to order hearing because district court’s observations and defense counsel’s assurances as to defendant’s competence “overcome any reasonable doubt ... that may have been raised by his statement that he felt dizzy” from taking wrong medication); cf. United States v. Graves, 98 F.3d 258, 261-62 (7th Cir.1996) (concluding district court should have ordered sua sponte competency hearing where defendant suffered stroke that caused him “serious difficulty speaking and some paralysis, and ... some impairment of memory and understanding” when conversing with court)."
} | 4,084,283 | a |
Thus, the complainant's testimony was circumstantial evidence of appellant's guilt as a party to aggravated robbery. However, under these circumstances, we conclude that unchallenged direct evidence provided by a criminal cohort is "clearly" more persuasive to a jury than challenged circumstantial evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "25 S.W.3d 808, 808",
"parenthetical": "although State offered documentary circumstantial evidence of defendant's participation in theft, only non-testifying cohort's statement implicated defendant through \"eye-witness evidence,\" causing unchallenged accusation to be more persuasive than records",
"sentence": "See Muttoni, 25 S.W.3d at 808 (although State offered documentary circumstantial evidence of defendant’s participation in theft, only non-testifying cohort’s statement implicated defendant through “eye-witness evidence,” causing unchallenged accusation to be more persuasive than records); see also Mendez, 56 S.W.3d at 893 (although “considerable circumstantial evidence” linked defendant to crime, non-testifying co-defendant’s direct allegation that defendant planned murders, provided weapons, entered victims’ house, and fired gun was more persuasive to jury). Accordingly, we conclude the admission of Hunter’s statement probably did contribute to his conviction."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "56 S.W.3d 893, 893",
"parenthetical": "although \"considerable circumstantial evidence\" linked defendant to crime, non-testifying co-defendant's direct allegation that defendant planned murders, provided weapons, entered victims' house, and fired gun was more persuasive to jury",
"sentence": "See Muttoni, 25 S.W.3d at 808 (although State offered documentary circumstantial evidence of defendant’s participation in theft, only non-testifying cohort’s statement implicated defendant through “eye-witness evidence,” causing unchallenged accusation to be more persuasive than records); see also Mendez, 56 S.W.3d at 893 (although “considerable circumstantial evidence” linked defendant to crime, non-testifying co-defendant’s direct allegation that defendant planned murders, provided weapons, entered victims’ house, and fired gun was more persuasive to jury). Accordingly, we conclude the admission of Hunter’s statement probably did contribute to his conviction."
} | 9,278,634 | a |
. Contrary to the concurrence's assertion, this rule does not risk encroaching on Fourth Amendment rights. Computer users can protect their files by using a password, just as one who shares a footlocker can protect his photographs by placing them in a locked container inside the footlocker. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 F.3d 947, 957",
"parenthetical": "explaining that consent to search an area does not include consent to search locked containers in that area",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718-20 (10th Cir.2007); United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 957 (3d Cir.1994) (explaining that consent to search an area does not include consent to search locked containers in that area); see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 135, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (\"To the extent a person wants to ensure that his possessions will be subject to a consent search only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in an area over which others do not share access and control, be it a private room or a locked suitcase under a bed.”). For example, in Trulock v. Freeh, the Fourth Circuit found that a defendant who protected his files with a password, had not \"assumed the risk” that his co-user \"would permit others to search his files.” 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir.2001)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "547 U.S. 135, 135",
"parenthetical": "\"To the extent a person wants to ensure that his possessions will be subject to a consent search only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in an area over which others do not share access and control, be it a private room or a locked suitcase under a bed.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718-20 (10th Cir.2007); United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 957 (3d Cir.1994) (explaining that consent to search an area does not include consent to search locked containers in that area); see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 135, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (\"To the extent a person wants to ensure that his possessions will be subject to a consent search only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in an area over which others do not share access and control, be it a private room or a locked suitcase under a bed.”). For example, in Trulock v. Freeh, the Fourth Circuit found that a defendant who protected his files with a password, had not \"assumed the risk” that his co-user \"would permit others to search his files.” 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir.2001)."
} | 4,228,246 | a |
. Contrary to the concurrence's assertion, this rule does not risk encroaching on Fourth Amendment rights. Computer users can protect their files by using a password, just as one who shares a footlocker can protect his photographs by placing them in a locked container inside the footlocker. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 F.3d 947, 957",
"parenthetical": "explaining that consent to search an area does not include consent to search locked containers in that area",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718-20 (10th Cir.2007); United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 957 (3d Cir.1994) (explaining that consent to search an area does not include consent to search locked containers in that area); see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 135, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (\"To the extent a person wants to ensure that his possessions will be subject to a consent search only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in an area over which others do not share access and control, be it a private room or a locked suitcase under a bed.”). For example, in Trulock v. Freeh, the Fourth Circuit found that a defendant who protected his files with a password, had not \"assumed the risk” that his co-user \"would permit others to search his files.” 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir.2001)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"To the extent a person wants to ensure that his possessions will be subject to a consent search only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in an area over which others do not share access and control, be it a private room or a locked suitcase under a bed.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718-20 (10th Cir.2007); United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 957 (3d Cir.1994) (explaining that consent to search an area does not include consent to search locked containers in that area); see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 135, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (\"To the extent a person wants to ensure that his possessions will be subject to a consent search only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in an area over which others do not share access and control, be it a private room or a locked suitcase under a bed.”). For example, in Trulock v. Freeh, the Fourth Circuit found that a defendant who protected his files with a password, had not \"assumed the risk” that his co-user \"would permit others to search his files.” 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir.2001)."
} | 4,228,246 | a |
. Contrary to the concurrence's assertion, this rule does not risk encroaching on Fourth Amendment rights. Computer users can protect their files by using a password, just as one who shares a footlocker can protect his photographs by placing them in a locked container inside the footlocker. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "275 F.3d 391, 403",
"parenthetical": "\"To the extent a person wants to ensure that his possessions will be subject to a consent search only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in an area over which others do not share access and control, be it a private room or a locked suitcase under a bed.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718-20 (10th Cir.2007); United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 957 (3d Cir.1994) (explaining that consent to search an area does not include consent to search locked containers in that area); see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 135, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (\"To the extent a person wants to ensure that his possessions will be subject to a consent search only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in an area over which others do not share access and control, be it a private room or a locked suitcase under a bed.”). For example, in Trulock v. Freeh, the Fourth Circuit found that a defendant who protected his files with a password, had not \"assumed the risk” that his co-user \"would permit others to search his files.” 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir.2001)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 F.3d 947, 957",
"parenthetical": "explaining that consent to search an area does not include consent to search locked containers in that area",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718-20 (10th Cir.2007); United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 957 (3d Cir.1994) (explaining that consent to search an area does not include consent to search locked containers in that area); see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 135, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (\"To the extent a person wants to ensure that his possessions will be subject to a consent search only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in an area over which others do not share access and control, be it a private room or a locked suitcase under a bed.”). For example, in Trulock v. Freeh, the Fourth Circuit found that a defendant who protected his files with a password, had not \"assumed the risk” that his co-user \"would permit others to search his files.” 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir.2001)."
} | 4,228,246 | b |
He also argues that his right to liberty protects him from being compelled to contract with an attorney. We are unaware of any U.S. Constitutional decision that declares citizens to have a right to self-representation in civil proceedings. Yet, arguing against such a right is nearly frivolous. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "404 U.S. 519, 520",
"parenthetical": "pleadings drafted by pro se litigants shall be held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys",
"sentence": "See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (pleadings drafted by pro se litigants shall be held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys); O’Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2nd Cir.1982) (self-representation in civil cases is a right of “high standing”); see also McBrearty v. Ken tucky Community and Technical College System, 262 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Ky.App.2008) (holding that pro se litigants must follow the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure); Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky.App.1987) (encouraging against the sua sponte dismissal of complaints, in part, because such a practice is “particularly prejudicial to pro se plaintiffs, who are generally unskilled in the art of pleading.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "262 S.W.3d 205, 210",
"parenthetical": "holding that pro se litigants must follow the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure",
"sentence": "See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (pleadings drafted by pro se litigants shall be held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys); O’Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2nd Cir.1982) (self-representation in civil cases is a right of “high standing”); see also McBrearty v. Ken tucky Community and Technical College System, 262 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Ky.App.2008) (holding that pro se litigants must follow the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure); Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky.App.1987) (encouraging against the sua sponte dismissal of complaints, in part, because such a practice is “particularly prejudicial to pro se plaintiffs, who are generally unskilled in the art of pleading.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted)."
} | 7,327,380 | a |
He also argues that his right to liberty protects him from being compelled to contract with an attorney. We are unaware of any U.S. Constitutional decision that declares citizens to have a right to self-representation in civil proceedings. Yet, arguing against such a right is nearly frivolous. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "92 S.Ct. 594, 596",
"parenthetical": "pleadings drafted by pro se litigants shall be held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys",
"sentence": "See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (pleadings drafted by pro se litigants shall be held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys); O’Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2nd Cir.1982) (self-representation in civil cases is a right of “high standing”); see also McBrearty v. Ken tucky Community and Technical College System, 262 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Ky.App.2008) (holding that pro se litigants must follow the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure); Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky.App.1987) (encouraging against the sua sponte dismissal of complaints, in part, because such a practice is “particularly prejudicial to pro se plaintiffs, who are generally unskilled in the art of pleading.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "262 S.W.3d 205, 210",
"parenthetical": "holding that pro se litigants must follow the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure",
"sentence": "See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (pleadings drafted by pro se litigants shall be held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys); O’Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2nd Cir.1982) (self-representation in civil cases is a right of “high standing”); see also McBrearty v. Ken tucky Community and Technical College System, 262 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Ky.App.2008) (holding that pro se litigants must follow the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure); Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky.App.1987) (encouraging against the sua sponte dismissal of complaints, in part, because such a practice is “particularly prejudicial to pro se plaintiffs, who are generally unskilled in the art of pleading.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted)."
} | 7,327,380 | a |
He also argues that his right to liberty protects him from being compelled to contract with an attorney. We are unaware of any U.S. Constitutional decision that declares citizens to have a right to self-representation in civil proceedings. Yet, arguing against such a right is nearly frivolous. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "262 S.W.3d 205, 210",
"parenthetical": "holding that pro se litigants must follow the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure",
"sentence": "See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (pleadings drafted by pro se litigants shall be held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys); O’Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2nd Cir.1982) (self-representation in civil cases is a right of “high standing”); see also McBrearty v. Ken tucky Community and Technical College System, 262 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Ky.App.2008) (holding that pro se litigants must follow the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure); Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky.App.1987) (encouraging against the sua sponte dismissal of complaints, in part, because such a practice is “particularly prejudicial to pro se plaintiffs, who are generally unskilled in the art of pleading.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pleadings drafted by pro se litigants shall be held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys",
"sentence": "See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (pleadings drafted by pro se litigants shall be held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys); O’Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2nd Cir.1982) (self-representation in civil cases is a right of “high standing”); see also McBrearty v. Ken tucky Community and Technical College System, 262 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Ky.App.2008) (holding that pro se litigants must follow the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure); Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky.App.1987) (encouraging against the sua sponte dismissal of complaints, in part, because such a practice is “particularly prejudicial to pro se plaintiffs, who are generally unskilled in the art of pleading.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted)."
} | 7,327,380 | b |
He also argues that his right to liberty protects him from being compelled to contract with an attorney. We are unaware of any U.S. Constitutional decision that declares citizens to have a right to self-representation in civil proceedings. Yet, arguing against such a right is nearly frivolous. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "692 F.2d 863, 867",
"parenthetical": "self-representation in civil cases is a right of \"high standing\"",
"sentence": "See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (pleadings drafted by pro se litigants shall be held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys); O’Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2nd Cir.1982) (self-representation in civil cases is a right of “high standing”); see also McBrearty v. Ken tucky Community and Technical College System, 262 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Ky.App.2008) (holding that pro se litigants must follow the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure); Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky.App.1987) (encouraging against the sua sponte dismissal of complaints, in part, because such a practice is “particularly prejudicial to pro se plaintiffs, who are generally unskilled in the art of pleading.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "262 S.W.3d 205, 210",
"parenthetical": "holding that pro se litigants must follow the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure",
"sentence": "See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (pleadings drafted by pro se litigants shall be held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys); O’Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2nd Cir.1982) (self-representation in civil cases is a right of “high standing”); see also McBrearty v. Ken tucky Community and Technical College System, 262 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Ky.App.2008) (holding that pro se litigants must follow the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure); Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky.App.1987) (encouraging against the sua sponte dismissal of complaints, in part, because such a practice is “particularly prejudicial to pro se plaintiffs, who are generally unskilled in the art of pleading.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted)."
} | 7,327,380 | a |
Courts in other states have repeatedly found that in the absence of actual control, a property owner owes no duty to a contractor or a contractor's employee who suffers injury from being electrocuted on the property owner's premises. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "875 F.2d 603, 605-07",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the claim of a contractor's employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362",
"parenthetical": "holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | 7,068,160 | a |
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