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First, the court reasoned that McGuire had not satisfied the exclusive control requirement of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine because she sued multiple defendants, each of whom had a right or an ability to control. However, the law is to the contrary. Res ipsa loquitur has been applied in situations where multiple defendants have jointly exercised control of the instrumentality or agency that caused the plaintiffs injuries. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "res ipsa loquitur applicable to alleged negligence of hospital, oral surgeon, and nurse anesthetist",
"sentence": "See also Swierczek v. Lynch, 466 N.W.2d 512 (Neb. 1991) (res ipsa loquitur applicable to alleged negligence of hospital, oral surgeon, and nurse anesthetist); Stalter v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 669 S.W.2d 460 (Ark. 1984) (grocery store and bottling company properly joined as defendants in res ipsa case involving falling bottle); Jackson v. H.H. Robertson Co., 574 P.2d 822 (Ariz. 1978) (en banc) (negligence action based on construction site accident properly maintainable against two subcontractors under res ipsa loquitur)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "62 Wis. 2d 698, 708",
"parenthetical": "application of the doctrine permissible where evidence establishes that exclusive control was exercised collectively by the defendants",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Samson v. Riesing, 62 Wis. 2d 698, 708, 215 N.W.2d 662, 667-68 (1974) (application of the doctrine permissible where evidence establishes that exclusive control was exercised collectively by the defendants)."
} | 8,666,271 | b |
First, the court reasoned that McGuire had not satisfied the exclusive control requirement of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine because she sued multiple defendants, each of whom had a right or an ability to control. However, the law is to the contrary. Res ipsa loquitur has been applied in situations where multiple defendants have jointly exercised control of the instrumentality or agency that caused the plaintiffs injuries. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "grocery store and bottling company properly joined as defendants in res ipsa case involving falling bottle",
"sentence": "See also Swierczek v. Lynch, 466 N.W.2d 512 (Neb. 1991) (res ipsa loquitur applicable to alleged negligence of hospital, oral surgeon, and nurse anesthetist); Stalter v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 669 S.W.2d 460 (Ark. 1984) (grocery store and bottling company properly joined as defendants in res ipsa case involving falling bottle); Jackson v. H.H. Robertson Co., 574 P.2d 822 (Ariz. 1978) (en banc) (negligence action based on construction site accident properly maintainable against two subcontractors under res ipsa loquitur)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "62 Wis. 2d 698, 708",
"parenthetical": "application of the doctrine permissible where evidence establishes that exclusive control was exercised collectively by the defendants",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Samson v. Riesing, 62 Wis. 2d 698, 708, 215 N.W.2d 662, 667-68 (1974) (application of the doctrine permissible where evidence establishes that exclusive control was exercised collectively by the defendants)."
} | 8,666,271 | b |
First, the court reasoned that McGuire had not satisfied the exclusive control requirement of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine because she sued multiple defendants, each of whom had a right or an ability to control. However, the law is to the contrary. Res ipsa loquitur has been applied in situations where multiple defendants have jointly exercised control of the instrumentality or agency that caused the plaintiffs injuries. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 N.W.2d 662, 667-68",
"parenthetical": "application of the doctrine permissible where evidence establishes that exclusive control was exercised collectively by the defendants",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Samson v. Riesing, 62 Wis. 2d 698, 708, 215 N.W.2d 662, 667-68 (1974) (application of the doctrine permissible where evidence establishes that exclusive control was exercised collectively by the defendants)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "res ipsa loquitur applicable to alleged negligence of hospital, oral surgeon, and nurse anesthetist",
"sentence": "See also Swierczek v. Lynch, 466 N.W.2d 512 (Neb. 1991) (res ipsa loquitur applicable to alleged negligence of hospital, oral surgeon, and nurse anesthetist); Stalter v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 669 S.W.2d 460 (Ark. 1984) (grocery store and bottling company properly joined as defendants in res ipsa case involving falling bottle); Jackson v. H.H. Robertson Co., 574 P.2d 822 (Ariz. 1978) (en banc) (negligence action based on construction site accident properly maintainable against two subcontractors under res ipsa loquitur)."
} | 8,666,271 | a |
First, the court reasoned that McGuire had not satisfied the exclusive control requirement of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine because she sued multiple defendants, each of whom had a right or an ability to control. However, the law is to the contrary. Res ipsa loquitur has been applied in situations where multiple defendants have jointly exercised control of the instrumentality or agency that caused the plaintiffs injuries. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "grocery store and bottling company properly joined as defendants in res ipsa case involving falling bottle",
"sentence": "See also Swierczek v. Lynch, 466 N.W.2d 512 (Neb. 1991) (res ipsa loquitur applicable to alleged negligence of hospital, oral surgeon, and nurse anesthetist); Stalter v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 669 S.W.2d 460 (Ark. 1984) (grocery store and bottling company properly joined as defendants in res ipsa case involving falling bottle); Jackson v. H.H. Robertson Co., 574 P.2d 822 (Ariz. 1978) (en banc) (negligence action based on construction site accident properly maintainable against two subcontractors under res ipsa loquitur)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 N.W.2d 662, 667-68",
"parenthetical": "application of the doctrine permissible where evidence establishes that exclusive control was exercised collectively by the defendants",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Samson v. Riesing, 62 Wis. 2d 698, 708, 215 N.W.2d 662, 667-68 (1974) (application of the doctrine permissible where evidence establishes that exclusive control was exercised collectively by the defendants)."
} | 8,666,271 | b |
The plaintiff makes no argument in his brief before us, as he did in the court below, that the defendants' easements "to the Annisquam River" do not extend as set out in the judgment. (See n.6.) | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "22 Pick. 85, 94",
"parenthetical": "presumption in grant is that it extends to low water mark",
"sentence": "See also Valentine v. Piper, 22 Pick. 85, 94 (1839) (presumption in grant is that it extends to low water mark); Frankel, Law of Seashore Waters and Water Courses: Maine and Massachusetts 50-51 (1969)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "342 Mass. 251, 260-261",
"parenthetical": "\"words of similar import . . . convey title to the low water mark\"",
"sentence": "See Old Colony St. Ry. v. Phillips, 207 Mass. 174, 179-181 (1911); Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Assn., 342 Mass. 251, 260-261 (1961) (“words of similar import . . . convey title to the low water mark”)."
} | 3,965,316 | b |
Marsh chose to rely upon assistance from the prison legal access attorney and an inmate law clerk despite the fact that he was raising in the state courts only the unexhausted claims he already had raised in federal court." R. doc. 11, at 5-6. The fact that an inmate law clerk was assisting in drafting the state petition does not relieve Mr. Marsh from the personal responsibility of complying with the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1 F.Supp.2d 650, 655",
"parenthetical": "noting that although inmate had received assistance from fellow inmate, he could have filed the petition himself at any time",
"sentence": "See Henderson v. John son, 1 F.Supp.2d 650, 655 (N.D.Tex.1998) (noting that although inmate had received assistance from fellow inmate, he could have filed the petition himself at any time); see also Steed, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (holding that attorney miscalculation of AEDPA time period did not justify equitable tolling)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "219 F.3d 1298, 1300",
"parenthetical": "holding that attorney miscalculation of AEDPA time period did not justify equitable tolling",
"sentence": "See Henderson v. John son, 1 F.Supp.2d 650, 655 (N.D.Tex.1998) (noting that although inmate had received assistance from fellow inmate, he could have filed the petition himself at any time); see also Steed, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (holding that attorney miscalculation of AEDPA time period did not justify equitable tolling)."
} | 11,243,547 | a |
The requirement that a district court transfer an action within the jurisdiction of the circuit court is jurisdictional. SS 12-11-9. However, for a district-court order transferring an action to the circuit court to be effective, the circuit court must have exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "438 So.2d 766, 767-68",
"parenthetical": "holding that, when the district court dismissed, rather than transferred, a case not within its jurisdiction and a party appealed that dismissal, the circuit court could consider only the propriety of the dismissal on appeal, and determining that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction on appeal to consider the merits of the action",
"sentence": "Alexander v. Hawk, 189 So.3d 824, 827 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) (holding that, when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment, which was void, and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment); Darby v. Schley, 8 So.3d 1011, 1014 (Ala.Civ.App. 2008) (holding that, because the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the unlawful-detainer action, the district court’s “unauthorized transfer” of the action “could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the” circuit court); cf. Ex parte Smith, 438 So.2d 766, 767-68 (Ala.1983) (holding that, when the district court dismissed, rather than transferred, a case not within its jurisdiction and a party appealed that dismissal, the circuit court could consider only the propriety of the dismissal on appeal, and determining that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction on appeal to consider the merits of the action)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "189 So.3d 824, 827",
"parenthetical": "holding that, when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment, which was void, and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment",
"sentence": "Alexander v. Hawk, 189 So.3d 824, 827 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) (holding that, when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment, which was void, and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment); Darby v. Schley, 8 So.3d 1011, 1014 (Ala.Civ.App. 2008) (holding that, because the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the unlawful-detainer action, the district court’s “unauthorized transfer” of the action “could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the” circuit court); cf. Ex parte Smith, 438 So.2d 766, 767-68 (Ala.1983) (holding that, when the district court dismissed, rather than transferred, a case not within its jurisdiction and a party appealed that dismissal, the circuit court could consider only the propriety of the dismissal on appeal, and determining that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction on appeal to consider the merits of the action)."
} | 6,931,647 | b |
The requirement that a district court transfer an action within the jurisdiction of the circuit court is jurisdictional. SS 12-11-9. However, for a district-court order transferring an action to the circuit court to be effective, the circuit court must have exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "438 So.2d 766, 767-68",
"parenthetical": "holding that, when the district court dismissed, rather than transferred, a case not within its jurisdiction and a party appealed that dismissal, the circuit court could consider only the propriety of the dismissal on appeal, and determining that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction on appeal to consider the merits of the action",
"sentence": "Alexander v. Hawk, 189 So.3d 824, 827 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) (holding that, when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment, which was void, and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment); Darby v. Schley, 8 So.3d 1011, 1014 (Ala.Civ.App. 2008) (holding that, because the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the unlawful-detainer action, the district court’s “unauthorized transfer” of the action “could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the” circuit court); cf. Ex parte Smith, 438 So.2d 766, 767-68 (Ala.1983) (holding that, when the district court dismissed, rather than transferred, a case not within its jurisdiction and a party appealed that dismissal, the circuit court could consider only the propriety of the dismissal on appeal, and determining that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction on appeal to consider the merits of the action)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "8 So.3d 1011, 1014",
"parenthetical": "holding that, because the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the unlawful-detainer action, the district court's \"unauthorized transfer\" of the action \"could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the\" circuit court",
"sentence": "Alexander v. Hawk, 189 So.3d 824, 827 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) (holding that, when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment, which was void, and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment); Darby v. Schley, 8 So.3d 1011, 1014 (Ala.Civ.App. 2008) (holding that, because the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the unlawful-detainer action, the district court’s “unauthorized transfer” of the action “could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the” circuit court); cf. Ex parte Smith, 438 So.2d 766, 767-68 (Ala.1983) (holding that, when the district court dismissed, rather than transferred, a case not within its jurisdiction and a party appealed that dismissal, the circuit court could consider only the propriety of the dismissal on appeal, and determining that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction on appeal to consider the merits of the action)."
} | 6,931,647 | b |
Finally, under the last prong of the test, employer failed to prove a causal relationship between the injury and the false representation. There is simply no evidence in the record that Lopez's alien status was in any way related to the consequent injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "12 Va. App. 667, 667-68",
"parenthetical": "finding no causal connection between claimant's lumbo-sacral back injury and misrepresentation as to existence of prior \"backaches\" where prior back pain was caused by medical problems unrelated to the back",
"sentence": "See Grimes, 12 Va. App. at 667-68, 406 S.E.2d at 409 (finding no causal connection between claimant’s lumbo-sacral back injury and misrepresentation as to existence of prior “backaches” where prior back pain was caused by medical problems unrelated to the back); cf. McDaniel, 3 Va. App. at 413-14, 350 S.E.2d at 228-29 (finding a causal relationship between the injury involving back pain radiating into hip and leg and the misrepresentation where claimant, who had been unable to work at prior jobs because of back pain radiating into both legs, stated in job application that he had no specific problems which would prevent him from working)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "3 Va. App. 413, 413-14",
"parenthetical": "finding a causal relationship between the injury involving back pain radiating into hip and leg and the misrepresentation where claimant, who had been unable to work at prior jobs because of back pain radiating into both legs, stated in job application that he had no specific problems which would prevent him from working",
"sentence": "See Grimes, 12 Va. App. at 667-68, 406 S.E.2d at 409 (finding no causal connection between claimant’s lumbo-sacral back injury and misrepresentation as to existence of prior “backaches” where prior back pain was caused by medical problems unrelated to the back); cf. McDaniel, 3 Va. App. at 413-14, 350 S.E.2d at 228-29 (finding a causal relationship between the injury involving back pain radiating into hip and leg and the misrepresentation where claimant, who had been unable to work at prior jobs because of back pain radiating into both legs, stated in job application that he had no specific problems which would prevent him from working)."
} | 2,319,292 | a |
Finally, under the last prong of the test, employer failed to prove a causal relationship between the injury and the false representation. There is simply no evidence in the record that Lopez's alien status was in any way related to the consequent injury. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "350 S.E.2d 228, 228-29",
"parenthetical": "finding a causal relationship between the injury involving back pain radiating into hip and leg and the misrepresentation where claimant, who had been unable to work at prior jobs because of back pain radiating into both legs, stated in job application that he had no specific problems which would prevent him from working",
"sentence": "See Grimes, 12 Va. App. at 667-68, 406 S.E.2d at 409 (finding no causal connection between claimant’s lumbo-sacral back injury and misrepresentation as to existence of prior “backaches” where prior back pain was caused by medical problems unrelated to the back); cf. McDaniel, 3 Va. App. at 413-14, 350 S.E.2d at 228-29 (finding a causal relationship between the injury involving back pain radiating into hip and leg and the misrepresentation where claimant, who had been unable to work at prior jobs because of back pain radiating into both legs, stated in job application that he had no specific problems which would prevent him from working)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "12 Va. App. 667, 667-68",
"parenthetical": "finding no causal connection between claimant's lumbo-sacral back injury and misrepresentation as to existence of prior \"backaches\" where prior back pain was caused by medical problems unrelated to the back",
"sentence": "See Grimes, 12 Va. App. at 667-68, 406 S.E.2d at 409 (finding no causal connection between claimant’s lumbo-sacral back injury and misrepresentation as to existence of prior “backaches” where prior back pain was caused by medical problems unrelated to the back); cf. McDaniel, 3 Va. App. at 413-14, 350 S.E.2d at 228-29 (finding a causal relationship between the injury involving back pain radiating into hip and leg and the misrepresentation where claimant, who had been unable to work at prior jobs because of back pain radiating into both legs, stated in job application that he had no specific problems which would prevent him from working)."
} | 2,319,292 | b |
Finally, under the last prong of the test, employer failed to prove a causal relationship between the injury and the false representation. There is simply no evidence in the record that Lopez's alien status was in any way related to the consequent injury. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "3 Va. App. 413, 413-14",
"parenthetical": "finding a causal relationship between the injury involving back pain radiating into hip and leg and the misrepresentation where claimant, who had been unable to work at prior jobs because of back pain radiating into both legs, stated in job application that he had no specific problems which would prevent him from working",
"sentence": "See Grimes, 12 Va. App. at 667-68, 406 S.E.2d at 409 (finding no causal connection between claimant’s lumbo-sacral back injury and misrepresentation as to existence of prior “backaches” where prior back pain was caused by medical problems unrelated to the back); cf. McDaniel, 3 Va. App. at 413-14, 350 S.E.2d at 228-29 (finding a causal relationship between the injury involving back pain radiating into hip and leg and the misrepresentation where claimant, who had been unable to work at prior jobs because of back pain radiating into both legs, stated in job application that he had no specific problems which would prevent him from working)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "406 S.E.2d 409, 409",
"parenthetical": "finding no causal connection between claimant's lumbo-sacral back injury and misrepresentation as to existence of prior \"backaches\" where prior back pain was caused by medical problems unrelated to the back",
"sentence": "See Grimes, 12 Va. App. at 667-68, 406 S.E.2d at 409 (finding no causal connection between claimant’s lumbo-sacral back injury and misrepresentation as to existence of prior “backaches” where prior back pain was caused by medical problems unrelated to the back); cf. McDaniel, 3 Va. App. at 413-14, 350 S.E.2d at 228-29 (finding a causal relationship between the injury involving back pain radiating into hip and leg and the misrepresentation where claimant, who had been unable to work at prior jobs because of back pain radiating into both legs, stated in job application that he had no specific problems which would prevent him from working)."
} | 2,319,292 | b |
Finally, under the last prong of the test, employer failed to prove a causal relationship between the injury and the false representation. There is simply no evidence in the record that Lopez's alien status was in any way related to the consequent injury. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "350 S.E.2d 228, 228-29",
"parenthetical": "finding a causal relationship between the injury involving back pain radiating into hip and leg and the misrepresentation where claimant, who had been unable to work at prior jobs because of back pain radiating into both legs, stated in job application that he had no specific problems which would prevent him from working",
"sentence": "See Grimes, 12 Va. App. at 667-68, 406 S.E.2d at 409 (finding no causal connection between claimant’s lumbo-sacral back injury and misrepresentation as to existence of prior “backaches” where prior back pain was caused by medical problems unrelated to the back); cf. McDaniel, 3 Va. App. at 413-14, 350 S.E.2d at 228-29 (finding a causal relationship between the injury involving back pain radiating into hip and leg and the misrepresentation where claimant, who had been unable to work at prior jobs because of back pain radiating into both legs, stated in job application that he had no specific problems which would prevent him from working)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "406 S.E.2d 409, 409",
"parenthetical": "finding no causal connection between claimant's lumbo-sacral back injury and misrepresentation as to existence of prior \"backaches\" where prior back pain was caused by medical problems unrelated to the back",
"sentence": "See Grimes, 12 Va. App. at 667-68, 406 S.E.2d at 409 (finding no causal connection between claimant’s lumbo-sacral back injury and misrepresentation as to existence of prior “backaches” where prior back pain was caused by medical problems unrelated to the back); cf. McDaniel, 3 Va. App. at 413-14, 350 S.E.2d at 228-29 (finding a causal relationship between the injury involving back pain radiating into hip and leg and the misrepresentation where claimant, who had been unable to work at prior jobs because of back pain radiating into both legs, stated in job application that he had no specific problems which would prevent him from working)."
} | 2,319,292 | b |
We lack jurisdiction to consider Celis-Arambula's contention that the IJ was partial and violated his right to due process because he did not raise that issue before the BIA, and thereby failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "554 F.3d 1203, 1208",
"parenthetical": "issues not argued in a petitioner's BIA appeal brief have not been exhausted, and the court lacks jurisdiction to consider them",
"sentence": "See Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc) (issues not argued in a petitioner’s BIA appeal brief have not been exhausted, and the court lacks jurisdiction to consider them); see also Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir.2002) (this court may not entertain due process claims based on correctable procedural errors unless an alien first gives the BIA an opportunity to address them)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "296 F.3d 871, 877",
"parenthetical": "this court may not entertain due process claims based on correctable procedural errors unless an alien first gives the BIA an opportunity to address them",
"sentence": "See Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc) (issues not argued in a petitioner’s BIA appeal brief have not been exhausted, and the court lacks jurisdiction to consider them); see also Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir.2002) (this court may not entertain due process claims based on correctable procedural errors unless an alien first gives the BIA an opportunity to address them)."
} | 4,148,964 | a |
The reasons for the changes given by the deponents were to clarify, to correct a misstatement, or to correct a response because the deponent did not. understand the question. In addition, the errata sheets were delivered to defendants prior to their filing their motion for summary judgment, and defendants have not alleged that plaintiffs failed to follow the proper procedures set forth in rule 30(e) to make the changes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "926 F.Supp. 799, 804",
"parenthetical": "failure to provide explanation for changes to deposition testimony resulted in court striking the evidence and disregarding same, in summary judgment analysis",
"sentence": "See Rios v. Welch, 856 F.Supp. 1499, 1502 (D.Kan.1994) (responding to plea for reconsideration of weight to be given to corrected deposition testimony the court responded that it was its belief that a plaintiff is not permitted to “virtually rewrite portions of a deposition, particularly after the defendant has filed a summary judgment motion, simply by invoking the benefits of Rule 30(e)”); see also Duff v. Lobdell-Emery Mfg. Co., 926 F.Supp. 799, 804 (N.D.Ind.1996) (failure to provide explanation for changes to deposition testimony resulted in court striking the evidence and disregarding same, in summary judgment analysis)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "856 F.Supp. 1499, 1502",
"parenthetical": "responding to plea for reconsideration of weight to be given to corrected deposition testimony the court responded that it was its belief that a plaintiff is not permitted to \"virtually rewrite portions of a deposition, particularly after the defendant has filed a summary judgment motion, simply by invoking the benefits of Rule 30(e",
"sentence": "See Rios v. Welch, 856 F.Supp. 1499, 1502 (D.Kan.1994) (responding to plea for reconsideration of weight to be given to corrected deposition testimony the court responded that it was its belief that a plaintiff is not permitted to “virtually rewrite portions of a deposition, particularly after the defendant has filed a summary judgment motion, simply by invoking the benefits of Rule 30(e)”); see also Duff v. Lobdell-Emery Mfg. Co., 926 F.Supp. 799, 804 (N.D.Ind.1996) (failure to provide explanation for changes to deposition testimony resulted in court striking the evidence and disregarding same, in summary judgment analysis)."
} | 331,251 | b |
The orders are void because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying action. Because the orders are void, appellants argue, appellants should be restored to the position they would have been in had the orders never been entered. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "683 F.2d 832, 834",
"parenthetical": "explaining that a garnishee is entitled to restitution of payment made on a void judgment",
"sentence": "Watts, 752 F.2d at 410 (finding that defendant was entitled to restitution under Rule 60(b)(4) because the judgment against him was void); see also Vander Zee v. Karabatsos, 683 F.2d 832, 834 (4th Cir.1982) (explaining that a garnishee is entitled to restitution of payment made on a void judgment)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "752 F.2d 410, 410",
"parenthetical": "finding that defendant was entitled to restitution under Rule 60(b)(4) because the judgment against him was void",
"sentence": "Watts, 752 F.2d at 410 (finding that defendant was entitled to restitution under Rule 60(b)(4) because the judgment against him was void); see also Vander Zee v. Karabatsos, 683 F.2d 832, 834 (4th Cir.1982) (explaining that a garnishee is entitled to restitution of payment made on a void judgment)."
} | 10,513,752 | b |
Because we have determined from the outset that the carjacking statute is directed at regulating economic activity, we do not need to address the separate question of whether the statute's jurisdictional element also renders it constitutional as another species of Category Three regulation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "86 F.3d 564, 568-69",
"parenthetical": "focusing on sufficiency of firearm statute's jurisdictional element as basis for valid exercise of commerce power",
"sentence": "See United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1450 (6th Cir.1996) (absence of jurisdictional element not fatal to federal gambling statute); United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1141 (6th Cir.1996) (“Lopez did not proclaim a general rule that all federal criminal statutes must include a jurisdictional element.”); cf. United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 568-69 (6th Cir.1996) (focusing on sufficiency of firearm statute’s jurisdictional element as basis for valid exercise of commerce power)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "92 F.3d 1444, 1450",
"parenthetical": "absence of jurisdictional element not fatal to federal gambling statute",
"sentence": "See United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1450 (6th Cir.1996) (absence of jurisdictional element not fatal to federal gambling statute); United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1141 (6th Cir.1996) (“Lopez did not proclaim a general rule that all federal criminal statutes must include a jurisdictional element.”); cf. United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 568-69 (6th Cir.1996) (focusing on sufficiency of firearm statute’s jurisdictional element as basis for valid exercise of commerce power)."
} | 7,649,419 | b |
Because we have determined from the outset that the carjacking statute is directed at regulating economic activity, we do not need to address the separate question of whether the statute's jurisdictional element also renders it constitutional as another species of Category Three regulation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "90 F.3d 1135, 1141",
"parenthetical": "\"Lopez did not proclaim a general rule that all federal criminal statutes must include a jurisdictional element.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1450 (6th Cir.1996) (absence of jurisdictional element not fatal to federal gambling statute); United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1141 (6th Cir.1996) (“Lopez did not proclaim a general rule that all federal criminal statutes must include a jurisdictional element.”); cf. United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 568-69 (6th Cir.1996) (focusing on sufficiency of firearm statute’s jurisdictional element as basis for valid exercise of commerce power)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "86 F.3d 564, 568-69",
"parenthetical": "focusing on sufficiency of firearm statute's jurisdictional element as basis for valid exercise of commerce power",
"sentence": "See United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1450 (6th Cir.1996) (absence of jurisdictional element not fatal to federal gambling statute); United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1141 (6th Cir.1996) (“Lopez did not proclaim a general rule that all federal criminal statutes must include a jurisdictional element.”); cf. United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 568-69 (6th Cir.1996) (focusing on sufficiency of firearm statute’s jurisdictional element as basis for valid exercise of commerce power)."
} | 7,649,419 | a |
In order to invoke the "double jeopardy bar," a defendant need not demonstrate that the declaration of a mistrial prejudiced him in any way other than infringement on the "valued right" to have the empaneled tribunal decide his cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "400 U.S. 490, 490",
"parenthetical": "majority holds declaration of mistrial was not supported by manifest necessity, although, in words of the dissent, \"the mistrial was not requested by the prosecutor, and there is not the slightest indication that he desired it to occur.\"",
"sentence": "See Jorn, 400 U.S. at 490, 91 S.Ct. at 559 (majority holds declaration of mistrial was not supported by manifest necessity, although, in words of the dissent, “the mistrial was not requested by the prosecutor, and there is not the slightest indication that he desired it to occur.”) (Stewart, J., dissenting)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "973 F.2d 255, 255",
"parenthetical": "mistrial improper even when not requested or desired by government and only declared because of \"the interest of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Council, 973 F.2d at 255 (mistrial improper even when not requested or desired by government and only declared because of “the interest of the defendant”); Sartori 730 F.2d at 977 (mistrial improper although not requested or desired by government and declared solely because of court’s possible conflict with defense position)."
} | 10,523,909 | a |
In order to invoke the "double jeopardy bar," a defendant need not demonstrate that the declaration of a mistrial prejudiced him in any way other than infringement on the "valued right" to have the empaneled tribunal decide his cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "400 U.S. 490, 490",
"parenthetical": "majority holds declaration of mistrial was not supported by manifest necessity, although, in words of the dissent, \"the mistrial was not requested by the prosecutor, and there is not the slightest indication that he desired it to occur.\"",
"sentence": "See Jorn, 400 U.S. at 490, 91 S.Ct. at 559 (majority holds declaration of mistrial was not supported by manifest necessity, although, in words of the dissent, “the mistrial was not requested by the prosecutor, and there is not the slightest indication that he desired it to occur.”) (Stewart, J., dissenting)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "730 F.2d 977, 977",
"parenthetical": "mistrial improper although not requested or desired by government and declared solely because of court's possible conflict with defense position",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Council, 973 F.2d at 255 (mistrial improper even when not requested or desired by government and only declared because of “the interest of the defendant”); Sartori 730 F.2d at 977 (mistrial improper although not requested or desired by government and declared solely because of court’s possible conflict with defense position)."
} | 10,523,909 | a |
In order to invoke the "double jeopardy bar," a defendant need not demonstrate that the declaration of a mistrial prejudiced him in any way other than infringement on the "valued right" to have the empaneled tribunal decide his cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "973 F.2d 255, 255",
"parenthetical": "mistrial improper even when not requested or desired by government and only declared because of \"the interest of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Council, 973 F.2d at 255 (mistrial improper even when not requested or desired by government and only declared because of “the interest of the defendant”); Sartori 730 F.2d at 977 (mistrial improper although not requested or desired by government and declared solely because of court’s possible conflict with defense position)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "91 S.Ct. 559, 559",
"parenthetical": "majority holds declaration of mistrial was not supported by manifest necessity, although, in words of the dissent, \"the mistrial was not requested by the prosecutor, and there is not the slightest indication that he desired it to occur.\"",
"sentence": "See Jorn, 400 U.S. at 490, 91 S.Ct. at 559 (majority holds declaration of mistrial was not supported by manifest necessity, although, in words of the dissent, “the mistrial was not requested by the prosecutor, and there is not the slightest indication that he desired it to occur.”) (Stewart, J., dissenting)."
} | 10,523,909 | b |
In order to invoke the "double jeopardy bar," a defendant need not demonstrate that the declaration of a mistrial prejudiced him in any way other than infringement on the "valued right" to have the empaneled tribunal decide his cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "730 F.2d 977, 977",
"parenthetical": "mistrial improper although not requested or desired by government and declared solely because of court's possible conflict with defense position",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Council, 973 F.2d at 255 (mistrial improper even when not requested or desired by government and only declared because of “the interest of the defendant”); Sartori 730 F.2d at 977 (mistrial improper although not requested or desired by government and declared solely because of court’s possible conflict with defense position)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "91 S.Ct. 559, 559",
"parenthetical": "majority holds declaration of mistrial was not supported by manifest necessity, although, in words of the dissent, \"the mistrial was not requested by the prosecutor, and there is not the slightest indication that he desired it to occur.\"",
"sentence": "See Jorn, 400 U.S. at 490, 91 S.Ct. at 559 (majority holds declaration of mistrial was not supported by manifest necessity, although, in words of the dissent, “the mistrial was not requested by the prosecutor, and there is not the slightest indication that he desired it to occur.”) (Stewart, J., dissenting)."
} | 10,523,909 | b |
The Bank admitted discharging Hollingsworth for misconduct uncovered in the course of discovery. This, however, does not constitute an admission that the Bank discharged Hollingsworth in retaliation for participation in protected activity. If the Bank had in fact admitted that a retaliatory motive was the reason or one of several reasons for discharging Hollingsworth, then a directed verdict for Hollingsworth would have been appropriate. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "23 Wn. App. 88, 91",
"parenthetical": "discharge based to any degree on retaliatory motive violates RCW 49.60-.210",
"sentence": "Kinney v. Bauch, 23 Wn. App. 88, 91, 596 P.2d 1074 (1979) (discharge based to any degree on retaliatory motive violates RCW 49.60-.210); cf. Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1982) (must be established that engaging in the protected activity was one of the reasons for discharge and that the discharge would not have occurred but for the activity)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "695 F.2d 343, 345",
"parenthetical": "must be established that engaging in the protected activity was one of the reasons for discharge and that the discharge would not have occurred but for the activity",
"sentence": "Kinney v. Bauch, 23 Wn. App. 88, 91, 596 P.2d 1074 (1979) (discharge based to any degree on retaliatory motive violates RCW 49.60-.210); cf. Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1982) (must be established that engaging in the protected activity was one of the reasons for discharge and that the discharge would not have occurred but for the activity)."
} | 1,784,914 | a |
The Bank admitted discharging Hollingsworth for misconduct uncovered in the course of discovery. This, however, does not constitute an admission that the Bank discharged Hollingsworth in retaliation for participation in protected activity. If the Bank had in fact admitted that a retaliatory motive was the reason or one of several reasons for discharging Hollingsworth, then a directed verdict for Hollingsworth would have been appropriate. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discharge based to any degree on retaliatory motive violates RCW 49.60-.210",
"sentence": "Kinney v. Bauch, 23 Wn. App. 88, 91, 596 P.2d 1074 (1979) (discharge based to any degree on retaliatory motive violates RCW 49.60-.210); cf. Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1982) (must be established that engaging in the protected activity was one of the reasons for discharge and that the discharge would not have occurred but for the activity)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "695 F.2d 343, 345",
"parenthetical": "must be established that engaging in the protected activity was one of the reasons for discharge and that the discharge would not have occurred but for the activity",
"sentence": "Kinney v. Bauch, 23 Wn. App. 88, 91, 596 P.2d 1074 (1979) (discharge based to any degree on retaliatory motive violates RCW 49.60-.210); cf. Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1982) (must be established that engaging in the protected activity was one of the reasons for discharge and that the discharge would not have occurred but for the activity)."
} | 1,784,914 | a |
The failure to object to those rulings when the district court still had an opportunity to correct any irregularity constitutes acquiescence. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "486 U.S. 847, 868",
"parenthetical": "stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making \"a timely request for rehef'",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 868, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making “a timely request for rehef’); see also Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that failure to raise issues or raising issues too late constitutes waiver); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 (9th Cir.1992) (“To hold otherwise would encourage parties to withhold recusal motions, pending a resolution of their dispute on the merits, and then if necessary invoke [recusal] in order to get a second bite at the apple.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "259 F.3d 1101, 1108-09",
"parenthetical": "stating that failure to raise issues or raising issues too late constitutes waiver",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 868, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making “a timely request for rehef’); see also Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that failure to raise issues or raising issues too late constitutes waiver); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 (9th Cir.1992) (“To hold otherwise would encourage parties to withhold recusal motions, pending a resolution of their dispute on the merits, and then if necessary invoke [recusal] in order to get a second bite at the apple.”)."
} | 1,003,108 | a |
The failure to object to those rulings when the district court still had an opportunity to correct any irregularity constitutes acquiescence. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "486 U.S. 847, 868",
"parenthetical": "stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making \"a timely request for rehef'",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 868, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making “a timely request for rehef’); see also Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that failure to raise issues or raising issues too late constitutes waiver); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 (9th Cir.1992) (“To hold otherwise would encourage parties to withhold recusal motions, pending a resolution of their dispute on the merits, and then if necessary invoke [recusal] in order to get a second bite at the apple.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "967 F.2d 1280, 1295",
"parenthetical": "\"To hold otherwise would encourage parties to withhold recusal motions, pending a resolution of their dispute on the merits, and then if necessary invoke [recusal] in order to get a second bite at the apple.\"",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 868, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making “a timely request for rehef’); see also Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that failure to raise issues or raising issues too late constitutes waiver); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 (9th Cir.1992) (“To hold otherwise would encourage parties to withhold recusal motions, pending a resolution of their dispute on the merits, and then if necessary invoke [recusal] in order to get a second bite at the apple.”)."
} | 1,003,108 | a |
The failure to object to those rulings when the district court still had an opportunity to correct any irregularity constitutes acquiescence. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "259 F.3d 1101, 1108-09",
"parenthetical": "stating that failure to raise issues or raising issues too late constitutes waiver",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 868, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making “a timely request for rehef’); see also Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that failure to raise issues or raising issues too late constitutes waiver); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 (9th Cir.1992) (“To hold otherwise would encourage parties to withhold recusal motions, pending a resolution of their dispute on the merits, and then if necessary invoke [recusal] in order to get a second bite at the apple.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making \"a timely request for rehef'",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 868, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making “a timely request for rehef’); see also Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that failure to raise issues or raising issues too late constitutes waiver); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 (9th Cir.1992) (“To hold otherwise would encourage parties to withhold recusal motions, pending a resolution of their dispute on the merits, and then if necessary invoke [recusal] in order to get a second bite at the apple.”)."
} | 1,003,108 | b |
The failure to object to those rulings when the district court still had an opportunity to correct any irregularity constitutes acquiescence. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "967 F.2d 1280, 1295",
"parenthetical": "\"To hold otherwise would encourage parties to withhold recusal motions, pending a resolution of their dispute on the merits, and then if necessary invoke [recusal] in order to get a second bite at the apple.\"",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 868, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making “a timely request for rehef’); see also Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that failure to raise issues or raising issues too late constitutes waiver); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 (9th Cir.1992) (“To hold otherwise would encourage parties to withhold recusal motions, pending a resolution of their dispute on the merits, and then if necessary invoke [recusal] in order to get a second bite at the apple.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making \"a timely request for rehef'",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 868, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making “a timely request for rehef’); see also Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that failure to raise issues or raising issues too late constitutes waiver); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 (9th Cir.1992) (“To hold otherwise would encourage parties to withhold recusal motions, pending a resolution of their dispute on the merits, and then if necessary invoke [recusal] in order to get a second bite at the apple.”)."
} | 1,003,108 | b |
The failure to object to those rulings when the district court still had an opportunity to correct any irregularity constitutes acquiescence. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "259 F.3d 1101, 1108-09",
"parenthetical": "stating that failure to raise issues or raising issues too late constitutes waiver",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 868, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making “a timely request for rehef’); see also Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that failure to raise issues or raising issues too late constitutes waiver); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 (9th Cir.1992) (“To hold otherwise would encourage parties to withhold recusal motions, pending a resolution of their dispute on the merits, and then if necessary invoke [recusal] in order to get a second bite at the apple.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making \"a timely request for rehef'",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 868, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making “a timely request for rehef’); see also Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that failure to raise issues or raising issues too late constitutes waiver); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 (9th Cir.1992) (“To hold otherwise would encourage parties to withhold recusal motions, pending a resolution of their dispute on the merits, and then if necessary invoke [recusal] in order to get a second bite at the apple.”)."
} | 1,003,108 | b |
The failure to object to those rulings when the district court still had an opportunity to correct any irregularity constitutes acquiescence. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "967 F.2d 1280, 1295",
"parenthetical": "\"To hold otherwise would encourage parties to withhold recusal motions, pending a resolution of their dispute on the merits, and then if necessary invoke [recusal] in order to get a second bite at the apple.\"",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 868, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making “a timely request for rehef’); see also Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that failure to raise issues or raising issues too late constitutes waiver); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 (9th Cir.1992) (“To hold otherwise would encourage parties to withhold recusal motions, pending a resolution of their dispute on the merits, and then if necessary invoke [recusal] in order to get a second bite at the apple.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making \"a timely request for rehef'",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 868, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (stating that remedies for violations of the recusal statute depend on making “a timely request for rehef’); see also Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that failure to raise issues or raising issues too late constitutes waiver); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 (9th Cir.1992) (“To hold otherwise would encourage parties to withhold recusal motions, pending a resolution of their dispute on the merits, and then if necessary invoke [recusal] in order to get a second bite at the apple.”)."
} | 1,003,108 | b |
At trial, the Levy defendants offered no evidence that the plaintiffs acted in a manner which justified a belief on the part of defendants that their copyright was free from challenge. Although in some instances, silence and inaction may induce justifiable reliance on the part of the defendant, those circumstances are not present when the defendant is in a position to ascertain the extent of the competing claim. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "279 F.2d 105, 105",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that such acts of omission rarely satisfy elements of estoppel.",
"sentence": "Hampton, 279 F.2d at 105. See also 3 Nimmer, § 13.07 (acknowledging that such acts of omission rarely satisfy elements of estoppel.) In the instant case, not only did Goldner and Levy know of the plaintiffs’ claim to ownership of the Fools copyright and attempt to conceal the accrual of royalties from them, but Levy also, in part, caused the plaintiffs’ silence and inaction."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "891 F.2d 401, 404",
"parenthetical": "\"one who seeks Equity's assistance must stand before the court with clean hands\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Stone II, 891 F.2d 401, 404, (“one who seeks Equity’s assistance must stand before the court with clean hands”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,826,832 | a |
(Id. 31 at 10-11.) The standard for determining whether this particular type of regulatory taking has occurred, however, "is not whether the landowner has been denied those uses to which he wants to put his land; it is whether the landowner has been denied all or substantially all economically viable use of his land." Plaintiffs have made no showing that the "mere enactment" of the Ordinance will deprive landowners of all or substantially all economically viable use of their land; thus, Plaintiffs have not yet demonstrated a facial taking of constitutional proportions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "480 U.S. 498, 498",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner's right to make profitable use of some segments of his property\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 498, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (noting that “[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner’s right to make profitable use of some segments of his property”); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 296, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did “not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put”). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiffs assert a facial takings claim under federal law."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "452 U.S. 264, 296",
"parenthetical": "rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did \"not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 498, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (noting that “[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner’s right to make profitable use of some segments of his property”); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 296, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did “not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put”). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiffs assert a facial takings claim under federal law."
} | 3,756,280 | a |
(Id. 31 at 10-11.) The standard for determining whether this particular type of regulatory taking has occurred, however, "is not whether the landowner has been denied those uses to which he wants to put his land; it is whether the landowner has been denied all or substantially all economically viable use of his land." Plaintiffs have made no showing that the "mere enactment" of the Ordinance will deprive landowners of all or substantially all economically viable use of their land; thus, Plaintiffs have not yet demonstrated a facial taking of constitutional proportions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "480 U.S. 498, 498",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner's right to make profitable use of some segments of his property\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 498, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (noting that “[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner’s right to make profitable use of some segments of his property”); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 296, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did “not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put”). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiffs assert a facial takings claim under federal law."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did \"not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 498, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (noting that “[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner’s right to make profitable use of some segments of his property”); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 296, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did “not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put”). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiffs assert a facial takings claim under federal law."
} | 3,756,280 | a |
(Id. 31 at 10-11.) The standard for determining whether this particular type of regulatory taking has occurred, however, "is not whether the landowner has been denied those uses to which he wants to put his land; it is whether the landowner has been denied all or substantially all economically viable use of his land." Plaintiffs have made no showing that the "mere enactment" of the Ordinance will deprive landowners of all or substantially all economically viable use of their land; thus, Plaintiffs have not yet demonstrated a facial taking of constitutional proportions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "480 U.S. 498, 498",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner's right to make profitable use of some segments of his property\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 498, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (noting that “[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner’s right to make profitable use of some segments of his property”); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 296, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did “not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put”). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiffs assert a facial takings claim under federal law."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did \"not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 498, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (noting that “[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner’s right to make profitable use of some segments of his property”); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 296, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did “not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put”). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiffs assert a facial takings claim under federal law."
} | 3,756,280 | a |
(Id. 31 at 10-11.) The standard for determining whether this particular type of regulatory taking has occurred, however, "is not whether the landowner has been denied those uses to which he wants to put his land; it is whether the landowner has been denied all or substantially all economically viable use of his land." Plaintiffs have made no showing that the "mere enactment" of the Ordinance will deprive landowners of all or substantially all economically viable use of their land; thus, Plaintiffs have not yet demonstrated a facial taking of constitutional proportions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner's right to make profitable use of some segments of his property\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 498, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (noting that “[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner’s right to make profitable use of some segments of his property”); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 296, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did “not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put”). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiffs assert a facial takings claim under federal law."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "452 U.S. 264, 296",
"parenthetical": "rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did \"not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 498, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (noting that “[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner’s right to make profitable use of some segments of his property”); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 296, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did “not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put”). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiffs assert a facial takings claim under federal law."
} | 3,756,280 | a |
(Id. 31 at 10-11.) The standard for determining whether this particular type of regulatory taking has occurred, however, "is not whether the landowner has been denied those uses to which he wants to put his land; it is whether the landowner has been denied all or substantially all economically viable use of his land." Plaintiffs have made no showing that the "mere enactment" of the Ordinance will deprive landowners of all or substantially all economically viable use of their land; thus, Plaintiffs have not yet demonstrated a facial taking of constitutional proportions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner's right to make profitable use of some segments of his property\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 498, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (noting that “[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner’s right to make profitable use of some segments of his property”); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 296, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did “not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put”). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiffs assert a facial takings claim under federal law."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did \"not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 498, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (noting that “[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner’s right to make profitable use of some segments of his property”); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 296, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did “not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put”). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiffs assert a facial takings claim under federal law."
} | 3,756,280 | a |
(Id. 31 at 10-11.) The standard for determining whether this particular type of regulatory taking has occurred, however, "is not whether the landowner has been denied those uses to which he wants to put his land; it is whether the landowner has been denied all or substantially all economically viable use of his land." Plaintiffs have made no showing that the "mere enactment" of the Ordinance will deprive landowners of all or substantially all economically viable use of their land; thus, Plaintiffs have not yet demonstrated a facial taking of constitutional proportions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did \"not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 498, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (noting that “[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner’s right to make profitable use of some segments of his property”); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 296, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did “not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put”). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiffs assert a facial takings claim under federal law."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner's right to make profitable use of some segments of his property\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 498, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (noting that “[m]any zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner’s right to make profitable use of some segments of his property”); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 296, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (rejecting facial takings claim in part because statute did “not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [property in question] may be put”). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiffs assert a facial takings claim under federal law."
} | 3,756,280 | b |
Without standing, the court has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. Because standing is a necessary component of the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, it cannot be waived, and its absence can be raised at any time. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 VT 87, ¶ 2",
"parenthetical": "equating Court's review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 490, 517-18",
"parenthetical": "\"The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.\"",
"sentence": "See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”)."
} | 3,691,553 | a |
Without standing, the court has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. Because standing is a necessary component of the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, it cannot be waived, and its absence can be raised at any time. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 490, 517-18",
"parenthetical": "\"The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.\"",
"sentence": "See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "158 Vt. 354, 357-58",
"parenthetical": "subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time",
"sentence": "See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”)."
} | 3,691,553 | b |
Without standing, the court has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. Because standing is a necessary component of the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, it cannot be waived, and its absence can be raised at any time. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 490, 517-18",
"parenthetical": "\"The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.\"",
"sentence": "See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "609 A.2d 638, 640",
"parenthetical": "subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time",
"sentence": "See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”)."
} | 3,691,553 | b |
Without standing, the court has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. Because standing is a necessary component of the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, it cannot be waived, and its absence can be raised at any time. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation",
"sentence": "See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 490, 517-18",
"parenthetical": "\"The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.\"",
"sentence": "See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”)."
} | 3,691,553 | a |
Without standing, the court has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. Because standing is a necessary component of the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, it cannot be waived, and its absence can be raised at any time. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 490, 517-18",
"parenthetical": "\"The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.\"",
"sentence": "See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2006 MT 29, ¶ 16",
"parenthetical": "stating that standing is \"threshold requirement of every case\" and may be raised at any time",
"sentence": "See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”)."
} | 3,691,553 | b |
Without standing, the court has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. Because standing is a necessary component of the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, it cannot be waived, and its absence can be raised at any time. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 490, 517-18",
"parenthetical": "\"The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.\"",
"sentence": "See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that standing is \"threshold requirement of every case\" and may be raised at any time",
"sentence": "See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”)."
} | 3,691,553 | b |
Without standing, the court has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. Because standing is a necessary component of the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, it cannot be waived, and its absence can be raised at any time. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 490, 517-18",
"parenthetical": "\"The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.\"",
"sentence": "See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that standing is \"threshold requirement of every case\" and may be raised at any time",
"sentence": "See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”)."
} | 3,691,553 | b |
Even assuming that New York does not require written notification under section 9-504(3), the district court determined that Metlife did not provide adequate oral notification. This determination of a mixed question of law and fact is subject to our review under a deferential standard. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "841 F.2d 166, 170",
"parenthetical": "trial court's determination that defendant had actual notice of prior interest in goods was not clearly erroneous",
"sentence": "See Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 841 F.2d 166, 170 (7th Cir.1988) (trial court’s determination that defendant had actual notice of prior interest in goods was not clearly erroneous); see also Yockey v. Horn, 880 F.2d 945, 949 n. 6 (7th Cir.1989) (clearly erroneous standard of review is employed for mixed questions of law and fact)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clearly erroneous standard of review is employed for mixed questions of law and fact",
"sentence": "See Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 841 F.2d 166, 170 (7th Cir.1988) (trial court’s determination that defendant had actual notice of prior interest in goods was not clearly erroneous); see also Yockey v. Horn, 880 F.2d 945, 949 n. 6 (7th Cir.1989) (clearly erroneous standard of review is employed for mixed questions of law and fact)."
} | 12,032,817 | a |
Finally, although Wright's dicta relating to pledges obviously should be followed because pledges are addressed by the text of Application Note 7(b),-Wright's dicta relating to "immediate recovery from the actual debtor" should be limited to cover the Chichy-iike situation where a criminal defendant in a fraudulent loan case procured the loan for a third party. If this latter piece of dicta were read broadly to apply to any situation where repayment was made immediately, then it contradicts other more tightly and cautiously reasoned circuit precedent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the relevant point in time for determining the amount of loss in a fraud case is at the time the crime was detected, rather than at sentencing\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Flowers, 55 F.3d 218 (6th Cir.) (“the relevant point in time for determining the amount of loss in a fraud case is at the time the crime was detected, rather than at sentencing”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 261, 133 L.Ed.2d 185 (1995), a check kiting case."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "74 F.3d 107, 111",
"parenthetical": "refusing to permit a bank loan officer to deduct repayments made within about one month after discovery of the fraud by the bank",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scott, 74 F.3d 107, 111 (6th Cir.1996) (refusing to permit a bank loan officer to deduct repayments made within about one month after discovery of the fraud by the bank)."
} | 7,653,450 | b |
Finally, although Wright's dicta relating to pledges obviously should be followed because pledges are addressed by the text of Application Note 7(b),-Wright's dicta relating to "immediate recovery from the actual debtor" should be limited to cover the Chichy-iike situation where a criminal defendant in a fraudulent loan case procured the loan for a third party. If this latter piece of dicta were read broadly to apply to any situation where repayment was made immediately, then it contradicts other more tightly and cautiously reasoned circuit precedent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the relevant point in time for determining the amount of loss in a fraud case is at the time the crime was detected, rather than at sentencing\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Flowers, 55 F.3d 218 (6th Cir.) (“the relevant point in time for determining the amount of loss in a fraud case is at the time the crime was detected, rather than at sentencing”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 261, 133 L.Ed.2d 185 (1995), a check kiting case."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "74 F.3d 107, 111",
"parenthetical": "refusing to permit a bank loan officer to deduct repayments made within about one month after discovery of the fraud by the bank",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scott, 74 F.3d 107, 111 (6th Cir.1996) (refusing to permit a bank loan officer to deduct repayments made within about one month after discovery of the fraud by the bank)."
} | 7,653,450 | b |
Finally, although Wright's dicta relating to pledges obviously should be followed because pledges are addressed by the text of Application Note 7(b),-Wright's dicta relating to "immediate recovery from the actual debtor" should be limited to cover the Chichy-iike situation where a criminal defendant in a fraudulent loan case procured the loan for a third party. If this latter piece of dicta were read broadly to apply to any situation where repayment was made immediately, then it contradicts other more tightly and cautiously reasoned circuit precedent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the relevant point in time for determining the amount of loss in a fraud case is at the time the crime was detected, rather than at sentencing\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Flowers, 55 F.3d 218 (6th Cir.) (“the relevant point in time for determining the amount of loss in a fraud case is at the time the crime was detected, rather than at sentencing”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 261, 133 L.Ed.2d 185 (1995), a check kiting case."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "74 F.3d 107, 111",
"parenthetical": "refusing to permit a bank loan officer to deduct repayments made within about one month after discovery of the fraud by the bank",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scott, 74 F.3d 107, 111 (6th Cir.1996) (refusing to permit a bank loan officer to deduct repayments made within about one month after discovery of the fraud by the bank)."
} | 7,653,450 | b |
We are also concerned about the application of the permit requirement to groups of ten or more persons. We entertain doubt whether applying the permit requirement to such a small group is sufficiently tied to the City's interest in protecting the safety and convenience of citizens who use the public sidewalks and streets. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "312 U.S. 576, 576",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that permit requirement, applied to a \"parade or procession\" of five groups of fifteen to twenty persons, serves the government interest of public convenience",
"sentence": "See Cox, 312 U.S. at 576, 61 S.Ct. at 765-66 (recognizing that permit requirement, applied to a “parade or procession” of five groups of fifteen to twenty persons, serves the government interest of public convenience)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "comparing the Portland ordinance to the participant requirements of other cities, and concluding that the other cities' ordinances which, in general, had participant requirements of at least 50 persons, \"appear much more narrowly tailored\"",
"sentence": "See also Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1207 n. 13 (comparing the Portland ordinance to the participant requirements of other cities, and concluding that the other cities’ ordinances which, in general, had participant requirements of at least 50 persons, “appear much more narrowly tailored”); Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1248 n. 8 (9th Cir.1981) (stating that even if 24-hour notice requirement were justified for large groups, it sweeps too broadly in regu-lating small groups.)"
} | 9,051,301 | a |
We are also concerned about the application of the permit requirement to groups of ten or more persons. We entertain doubt whether applying the permit requirement to such a small group is sufficiently tied to the City's interest in protecting the safety and convenience of citizens who use the public sidewalks and streets. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "312 U.S. 576, 576",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that permit requirement, applied to a \"parade or procession\" of five groups of fifteen to twenty persons, serves the government interest of public convenience",
"sentence": "See Cox, 312 U.S. at 576, 61 S.Ct. at 765-66 (recognizing that permit requirement, applied to a “parade or procession” of five groups of fifteen to twenty persons, serves the government interest of public convenience)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that even if 24-hour notice requirement were justified for large groups, it sweeps too broadly in regu-lating small groups.",
"sentence": "See also Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1207 n. 13 (comparing the Portland ordinance to the participant requirements of other cities, and concluding that the other cities’ ordinances which, in general, had participant requirements of at least 50 persons, “appear much more narrowly tailored”); Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1248 n. 8 (9th Cir.1981) (stating that even if 24-hour notice requirement were justified for large groups, it sweeps too broadly in regu-lating small groups.)"
} | 9,051,301 | a |
We are also concerned about the application of the permit requirement to groups of ten or more persons. We entertain doubt whether applying the permit requirement to such a small group is sufficiently tied to the City's interest in protecting the safety and convenience of citizens who use the public sidewalks and streets. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "comparing the Portland ordinance to the participant requirements of other cities, and concluding that the other cities' ordinances which, in general, had participant requirements of at least 50 persons, \"appear much more narrowly tailored\"",
"sentence": "See also Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1207 n. 13 (comparing the Portland ordinance to the participant requirements of other cities, and concluding that the other cities’ ordinances which, in general, had participant requirements of at least 50 persons, “appear much more narrowly tailored”); Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1248 n. 8 (9th Cir.1981) (stating that even if 24-hour notice requirement were justified for large groups, it sweeps too broadly in regu-lating small groups.)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "61 S.Ct. 765, 765-66",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that permit requirement, applied to a \"parade or procession\" of five groups of fifteen to twenty persons, serves the government interest of public convenience",
"sentence": "See Cox, 312 U.S. at 576, 61 S.Ct. at 765-66 (recognizing that permit requirement, applied to a “parade or procession” of five groups of fifteen to twenty persons, serves the government interest of public convenience)."
} | 9,051,301 | b |
We are also concerned about the application of the permit requirement to groups of ten or more persons. We entertain doubt whether applying the permit requirement to such a small group is sufficiently tied to the City's interest in protecting the safety and convenience of citizens who use the public sidewalks and streets. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that even if 24-hour notice requirement were justified for large groups, it sweeps too broadly in regu-lating small groups.",
"sentence": "See also Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1207 n. 13 (comparing the Portland ordinance to the participant requirements of other cities, and concluding that the other cities’ ordinances which, in general, had participant requirements of at least 50 persons, “appear much more narrowly tailored”); Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1248 n. 8 (9th Cir.1981) (stating that even if 24-hour notice requirement were justified for large groups, it sweeps too broadly in regu-lating small groups.)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "61 S.Ct. 765, 765-66",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that permit requirement, applied to a \"parade or procession\" of five groups of fifteen to twenty persons, serves the government interest of public convenience",
"sentence": "See Cox, 312 U.S. at 576, 61 S.Ct. at 765-66 (recognizing that permit requirement, applied to a “parade or procession” of five groups of fifteen to twenty persons, serves the government interest of public convenience)."
} | 9,051,301 | b |
An unlawful denial of access can occur in many different ways, including delay. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "458 So.2d 1075, 1079",
"parenthetical": "\"The only delay permitted by the Act is the limited reasonable time allowed the custodian to retrieve the record and delete those portions of the record the custodian asserts are exempt.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So.2d 1075, 1079 (Fla.1984) (“The only delay permitted by the Act is the limited reasonable time allowed the custodian to retrieve the record and delete those portions of the record the custodian asserts are exempt.”); see also Barfield v. Town of Eatonville, 675 So.2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“An unjustified delay in complying with a public record request amounts to an unlawful refusal under section 119.12(1), Florida Statutes.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An unjustified delay in complying with a public record request amounts to an unlawful refusal under section 119.12(1), Florida Statutes.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So.2d 1075, 1079 (Fla.1984) (“The only delay permitted by the Act is the limited reasonable time allowed the custodian to retrieve the record and delete those portions of the record the custodian asserts are exempt.”); see also Barfield v. Town of Eatonville, 675 So.2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“An unjustified delay in complying with a public record request amounts to an unlawful refusal under section 119.12(1), Florida Statutes.”)."
} | 6,896,011 | a |
BJVSD has made no showing that it had an individual legal right relative to the underlying judgment and the complained-of post-judgment orders. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "533 S.W.2d 923, 927",
"parenthetical": "\"Without breach of a legal right belonging to the plaintiff no cause of action can accrue to his benefit.\"",
"sentence": "See Nauslar, 170 S.W.3d at 249 (holding that only one whose primary legal right has been breached may seek redress for injury); see also Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex.1976) (“Without breach of a legal right belonging to the plaintiff no cause of action can accrue to his benefit.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 S.W.3d 249, 249",
"parenthetical": "holding that only one whose primary legal right has been breached may seek redress for injury",
"sentence": "See Nauslar, 170 S.W.3d at 249 (holding that only one whose primary legal right has been breached may seek redress for injury); see also Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex.1976) (“Without breach of a legal right belonging to the plaintiff no cause of action can accrue to his benefit.”)."
} | 7,091,684 | b |
Admittedly, this interest did increase due to the 1987 settlement. However, the real issues here are not over the royalty interest itself but rather whether there was a breach of duty to market or, alternatively, whether a take-or-pay settlement should be subject to such royalties at all, both questions of Texas law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 B.R. 361, 366",
"parenthetical": "\"While it is true that this court approved the agreement, that alone would not confer jurisdiction to resolve all subsequent disputes regardless of their connection to the bankruptcy case\"",
"sentence": "In re Gerken Trucking, Inc., 10 B.R. 203, 205 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1981) (“Adoption of the [collective bargaining] agreement in the plan does not result in the Court’s retaining jurisdiction over post confirmation controversies relating to that agreement”); see also, In re Greenley Energy Holdings of Pa., 110 B.R. 173, 180-81 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1990) (and authorities cited therein); In re Almarc Corp., 94 B.R. 361, 366 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988) (“While it is true that this court approved the agreement, that alone would not confer jurisdiction to resolve all subsequent disputes regardless of their connection to the bankruptcy case”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "10 B.R. 203, 205",
"parenthetical": "\"Adoption of the [collective bargaining] agreement in the plan does not result in the Court's retaining jurisdiction over post confirmation controversies relating to that agreement\"",
"sentence": "In re Gerken Trucking, Inc., 10 B.R. 203, 205 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1981) (“Adoption of the [collective bargaining] agreement in the plan does not result in the Court’s retaining jurisdiction over post confirmation controversies relating to that agreement”); see also, In re Greenley Energy Holdings of Pa., 110 B.R. 173, 180-81 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1990) (and authorities cited therein); In re Almarc Corp., 94 B.R. 361, 366 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988) (“While it is true that this court approved the agreement, that alone would not confer jurisdiction to resolve all subsequent disputes regardless of their connection to the bankruptcy case”)."
} | 6,503,186 | b |
The appellant left the bag in the motel room with his girlfriend, who was alone in the room when law enforcement arrived. The police believed that she had control of the room, and the evidence showed that the appellant intended to reunite with her after the drug transaction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "936 F.2d 1561, 1570-71",
"parenthetical": "observing that leaving an item in the care of another may refute an intent to abandon it",
"sentence": "See United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1570-71 (10th Cir.1991) (observing that leaving an item in the care of another may refute an intent to abandon it); cf. Knight, 61 VaApp. at 309 n. 5, 734 S.E.2d at 722 n. 5 (noting in dicta that an owner generally retains a reasonable expectation of privacy even in lost property, subject to the finder’s examining it to identify its owner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that an owner generally retains a reasonable expectation of privacy even in lost property, subject to the finder's examining it to identify its owner",
"sentence": "See United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1570-71 (10th Cir.1991) (observing that leaving an item in the care of another may refute an intent to abandon it); cf. Knight, 61 VaApp. at 309 n. 5, 734 S.E.2d at 722 n. 5 (noting in dicta that an owner generally retains a reasonable expectation of privacy even in lost property, subject to the finder’s examining it to identify its owner)."
} | 12,173,510 | a |
A losing bidder seeking to interfere with a government procurement must meet a high burden. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "78 F.3d 1556, 1562",
"parenthetical": "ruling that a \"protester must show not only a significant error in the procurement process, but also that the error prejudiced it.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Banknote Corp., 365 F.3d at 1351; Advanced Data Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed.Cir.2000) (noting that the “arbitrary and capricious standard ... is highly differential ... [and] requires a reviewing court to sustain an agency action evincing rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.”); see also Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1562 (Fed.Cir.1996) (ruling that a “protester must show not only a significant error in the procurement process, but also that the error prejudiced it.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "216 F.3d 1054, 1058",
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"arbitrary and capricious standard ... is highly differential ... [and] requires a reviewing court to sustain an agency action evincing rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Banknote Corp., 365 F.3d at 1351; Advanced Data Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed.Cir.2000) (noting that the “arbitrary and capricious standard ... is highly differential ... [and] requires a reviewing court to sustain an agency action evincing rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.”); see also Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1562 (Fed.Cir.1996) (ruling that a “protester must show not only a significant error in the procurement process, but also that the error prejudiced it.”)."
} | 1,614,857 | b |
For purposes of the Corrupt Organizations Act, it is unnecessary to consider whether these acts are sufficient for conviction of the predicate drug offenses. Indeed, our case law emphasizes that conviction of the predicate offenses is neither required nor necessary in the determination of a violation of the corrupt organizations statute. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding a defendant's conviction for violation of the corrupt organizations statute even though he had been acquitted of the predicate criminal acts",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 423 Pa.Super. 1, 620 A.2d 9 (1993), appeal denied, 536 Pa. 619, 637 A.2d 279 (1993) (upholding a defendant’s conviction for violation of the corrupt organizations statute even though he had been acquitted of the predicate criminal acts)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "806 A.2d 1280, 1287",
"parenthetical": "\"Under the Corrupt Organization Act, an offense could be established by proving, inter alia, that a person received income 'from a pattern of racketeering activity in which he participated as a principal.' 18 Pa.C.S. SS 911(b",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 806 A.2d 1280, 1287 (Pa.Super.2002) (“Under the Corrupt Organization Act, an offense could be established by proving, inter alia, that a person received income ‘from a pattern of racketeering activity in which he participated as a principal.’ 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(b)(1). The statute defined the element of ‘racketeering’ as ‘any act which is indictable’ under a prescribed number of Crimes Code chapters. 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(h)(l)(i). Significantly, this language does not require any criminal conviction, but merely a pattern of ‘indictable’ acts”)."
} | 9,090,974 | b |
For purposes of the Corrupt Organizations Act, it is unnecessary to consider whether these acts are sufficient for conviction of the predicate drug offenses. Indeed, our case law emphasizes that conviction of the predicate offenses is neither required nor necessary in the determination of a violation of the corrupt organizations statute. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding a defendant's conviction for violation of the corrupt organizations statute even though he had been acquitted of the predicate criminal acts",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 423 Pa.Super. 1, 620 A.2d 9 (1993), appeal denied, 536 Pa. 619, 637 A.2d 279 (1993) (upholding a defendant’s conviction for violation of the corrupt organizations statute even though he had been acquitted of the predicate criminal acts)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "806 A.2d 1280, 1287",
"parenthetical": "\"Under the Corrupt Organization Act, an offense could be established by proving, inter alia, that a person received income 'from a pattern of racketeering activity in which he participated as a principal.' 18 Pa.C.S. SS 911(b",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 806 A.2d 1280, 1287 (Pa.Super.2002) (“Under the Corrupt Organization Act, an offense could be established by proving, inter alia, that a person received income ‘from a pattern of racketeering activity in which he participated as a principal.’ 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(b)(1). The statute defined the element of ‘racketeering’ as ‘any act which is indictable’ under a prescribed number of Crimes Code chapters. 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(h)(l)(i). Significantly, this language does not require any criminal conviction, but merely a pattern of ‘indictable’ acts”)."
} | 9,090,974 | b |
For purposes of the Corrupt Organizations Act, it is unnecessary to consider whether these acts are sufficient for conviction of the predicate drug offenses. Indeed, our case law emphasizes that conviction of the predicate offenses is neither required nor necessary in the determination of a violation of the corrupt organizations statute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "806 A.2d 1280, 1287",
"parenthetical": "\"Under the Corrupt Organization Act, an offense could be established by proving, inter alia, that a person received income 'from a pattern of racketeering activity in which he participated as a principal.' 18 Pa.C.S. SS 911(b",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 806 A.2d 1280, 1287 (Pa.Super.2002) (“Under the Corrupt Organization Act, an offense could be established by proving, inter alia, that a person received income ‘from a pattern of racketeering activity in which he participated as a principal.’ 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(b)(1). The statute defined the element of ‘racketeering’ as ‘any act which is indictable’ under a prescribed number of Crimes Code chapters. 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(h)(l)(i). Significantly, this language does not require any criminal conviction, but merely a pattern of ‘indictable’ acts”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding a defendant's conviction for violation of the corrupt organizations statute even though he had been acquitted of the predicate criminal acts",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 423 Pa.Super. 1, 620 A.2d 9 (1993), appeal denied, 536 Pa. 619, 637 A.2d 279 (1993) (upholding a defendant’s conviction for violation of the corrupt organizations statute even though he had been acquitted of the predicate criminal acts)."
} | 9,090,974 | a |
For purposes of the Corrupt Organizations Act, it is unnecessary to consider whether these acts are sufficient for conviction of the predicate drug offenses. Indeed, our case law emphasizes that conviction of the predicate offenses is neither required nor necessary in the determination of a violation of the corrupt organizations statute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "806 A.2d 1280, 1287",
"parenthetical": "\"Under the Corrupt Organization Act, an offense could be established by proving, inter alia, that a person received income 'from a pattern of racketeering activity in which he participated as a principal.' 18 Pa.C.S. SS 911(b",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 806 A.2d 1280, 1287 (Pa.Super.2002) (“Under the Corrupt Organization Act, an offense could be established by proving, inter alia, that a person received income ‘from a pattern of racketeering activity in which he participated as a principal.’ 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(b)(1). The statute defined the element of ‘racketeering’ as ‘any act which is indictable’ under a prescribed number of Crimes Code chapters. 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(h)(l)(i). Significantly, this language does not require any criminal conviction, but merely a pattern of ‘indictable’ acts”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding a defendant's conviction for violation of the corrupt organizations statute even though he had been acquitted of the predicate criminal acts",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 423 Pa.Super. 1, 620 A.2d 9 (1993), appeal denied, 536 Pa. 619, 637 A.2d 279 (1993) (upholding a defendant’s conviction for violation of the corrupt organizations statute even though he had been acquitted of the predicate criminal acts)."
} | 9,090,974 | a |
Rather, the ALJ detailed at substantial length why he found it lacking compared with the other evidence. This is all that we require when reviewing an administrative law judge's decision for compliance with 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1527(d)(2)'s reasons-giving requirement. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "486 F.3d 234, at 245-46",
"parenthetical": "remanding where ALJ did not explain weight given to treating physician's opinion",
"sentence": "See Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir.2007) (approving ALJ’s decision declining to give treating sources controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated that sources’ reports were “inconsistent with the overall evidence of record” and sources formed their opinion solely from claimant’s subjective symptoms); Anderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 Fed.Appx. 366, 370 (6th Cir.2006) (approving ALJ decision declining to give treating physician controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated “that the doctor’s overall treatment notes did not support and were not consistent with his conclusory assertion that [the claimant] was disabled”); cf. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, at 245-46 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ did not explain weight given to treating physician’s opinion); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 749-50 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ “entirely failed to address the primary treating source’s presumptively supportable opinion”); Wilson, 378 F.3d at 545 (remanding where ALJ summarily dismissed treating physician’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "482 F.3d 873, 877",
"parenthetical": "approving ALJ's decision declining to give treating sources controlling weight where ALJ's decision stated that sources' reports were \"inconsistent with the overall evidence of record\" and sources formed their opinion solely from claimant's subjective symptoms",
"sentence": "See Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir.2007) (approving ALJ’s decision declining to give treating sources controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated that sources’ reports were “inconsistent with the overall evidence of record” and sources formed their opinion solely from claimant’s subjective symptoms); Anderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 Fed.Appx. 366, 370 (6th Cir.2006) (approving ALJ decision declining to give treating physician controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated “that the doctor’s overall treatment notes did not support and were not consistent with his conclusory assertion that [the claimant] was disabled”); cf. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, at 245-46 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ did not explain weight given to treating physician’s opinion); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 749-50 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ “entirely failed to address the primary treating source’s presumptively supportable opinion”); Wilson, 378 F.3d at 545 (remanding where ALJ summarily dismissed treating physician’s opinion)."
} | 5,389,118 | b |
Rather, the ALJ detailed at substantial length why he found it lacking compared with the other evidence. This is all that we require when reviewing an administrative law judge's decision for compliance with 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1527(d)(2)'s reasons-giving requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "482 F.3d 873, 877",
"parenthetical": "approving ALJ's decision declining to give treating sources controlling weight where ALJ's decision stated that sources' reports were \"inconsistent with the overall evidence of record\" and sources formed their opinion solely from claimant's subjective symptoms",
"sentence": "See Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir.2007) (approving ALJ’s decision declining to give treating sources controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated that sources’ reports were “inconsistent with the overall evidence of record” and sources formed their opinion solely from claimant’s subjective symptoms); Anderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 Fed.Appx. 366, 370 (6th Cir.2006) (approving ALJ decision declining to give treating physician controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated “that the doctor’s overall treatment notes did not support and were not consistent with his conclusory assertion that [the claimant] was disabled”); cf. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, at 245-46 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ did not explain weight given to treating physician’s opinion); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 749-50 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ “entirely failed to address the primary treating source’s presumptively supportable opinion”); Wilson, 378 F.3d at 545 (remanding where ALJ summarily dismissed treating physician’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "478 F.3d 742, 749-50",
"parenthetical": "remanding where ALJ \"entirely failed to address the primary treating source's presumptively supportable opinion\"",
"sentence": "See Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir.2007) (approving ALJ’s decision declining to give treating sources controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated that sources’ reports were “inconsistent with the overall evidence of record” and sources formed their opinion solely from claimant’s subjective symptoms); Anderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 Fed.Appx. 366, 370 (6th Cir.2006) (approving ALJ decision declining to give treating physician controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated “that the doctor’s overall treatment notes did not support and were not consistent with his conclusory assertion that [the claimant] was disabled”); cf. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, at 245-46 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ did not explain weight given to treating physician’s opinion); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 749-50 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ “entirely failed to address the primary treating source’s presumptively supportable opinion”); Wilson, 378 F.3d at 545 (remanding where ALJ summarily dismissed treating physician’s opinion)."
} | 5,389,118 | a |
Rather, the ALJ detailed at substantial length why he found it lacking compared with the other evidence. This is all that we require when reviewing an administrative law judge's decision for compliance with 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1527(d)(2)'s reasons-giving requirement. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "486 F.3d 234, at 245-46",
"parenthetical": "remanding where ALJ did not explain weight given to treating physician's opinion",
"sentence": "See Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir.2007) (approving ALJ’s decision declining to give treating sources controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated that sources’ reports were “inconsistent with the overall evidence of record” and sources formed their opinion solely from claimant’s subjective symptoms); Anderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 Fed.Appx. 366, 370 (6th Cir.2006) (approving ALJ decision declining to give treating physician controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated “that the doctor’s overall treatment notes did not support and were not consistent with his conclusory assertion that [the claimant] was disabled”); cf. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, at 245-46 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ did not explain weight given to treating physician’s opinion); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 749-50 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ “entirely failed to address the primary treating source’s presumptively supportable opinion”); Wilson, 378 F.3d at 545 (remanding where ALJ summarily dismissed treating physician’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 Fed.Appx. 366, 370",
"parenthetical": "approving ALJ decision declining to give treating physician controlling weight where ALJ's decision stated \"that the doctor's overall treatment notes did not support and were not consistent with his conclusory assertion that [the claimant] was disabled\"",
"sentence": "See Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir.2007) (approving ALJ’s decision declining to give treating sources controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated that sources’ reports were “inconsistent with the overall evidence of record” and sources formed their opinion solely from claimant’s subjective symptoms); Anderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 Fed.Appx. 366, 370 (6th Cir.2006) (approving ALJ decision declining to give treating physician controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated “that the doctor’s overall treatment notes did not support and were not consistent with his conclusory assertion that [the claimant] was disabled”); cf. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, at 245-46 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ did not explain weight given to treating physician’s opinion); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 749-50 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ “entirely failed to address the primary treating source’s presumptively supportable opinion”); Wilson, 378 F.3d at 545 (remanding where ALJ summarily dismissed treating physician’s opinion)."
} | 5,389,118 | b |
Rather, the ALJ detailed at substantial length why he found it lacking compared with the other evidence. This is all that we require when reviewing an administrative law judge's decision for compliance with 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1527(d)(2)'s reasons-giving requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 Fed.Appx. 366, 370",
"parenthetical": "approving ALJ decision declining to give treating physician controlling weight where ALJ's decision stated \"that the doctor's overall treatment notes did not support and were not consistent with his conclusory assertion that [the claimant] was disabled\"",
"sentence": "See Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir.2007) (approving ALJ’s decision declining to give treating sources controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated that sources’ reports were “inconsistent with the overall evidence of record” and sources formed their opinion solely from claimant’s subjective symptoms); Anderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 Fed.Appx. 366, 370 (6th Cir.2006) (approving ALJ decision declining to give treating physician controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated “that the doctor’s overall treatment notes did not support and were not consistent with his conclusory assertion that [the claimant] was disabled”); cf. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, at 245-46 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ did not explain weight given to treating physician’s opinion); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 749-50 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ “entirely failed to address the primary treating source’s presumptively supportable opinion”); Wilson, 378 F.3d at 545 (remanding where ALJ summarily dismissed treating physician’s opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "478 F.3d 742, 749-50",
"parenthetical": "remanding where ALJ \"entirely failed to address the primary treating source's presumptively supportable opinion\"",
"sentence": "See Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir.2007) (approving ALJ’s decision declining to give treating sources controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated that sources’ reports were “inconsistent with the overall evidence of record” and sources formed their opinion solely from claimant’s subjective symptoms); Anderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 Fed.Appx. 366, 370 (6th Cir.2006) (approving ALJ decision declining to give treating physician controlling weight where ALJ’s decision stated “that the doctor’s overall treatment notes did not support and were not consistent with his conclusory assertion that [the claimant] was disabled”); cf. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, at 245-46 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ did not explain weight given to treating physician’s opinion); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 749-50 (6th Cir.2007) (remanding where ALJ “entirely failed to address the primary treating source’s presumptively supportable opinion”); Wilson, 378 F.3d at 545 (remanding where ALJ summarily dismissed treating physician’s opinion)."
} | 5,389,118 | a |
Although the definition of cohabitation as set forth in the dissolution judgment is not controlled by SS 46b-86 (b), statutes are a useful source of policy for common-law adjudication, particularly when there is a close relationship between the statutory and common-law subject matters. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54",
"parenthetical": "statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "227 Conn. 270, 281-82",
"parenthetical": "Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | 247,062 | b |
Although the definition of cohabitation as set forth in the dissolution judgment is not controlled by SS 46b-86 (b), statutes are a useful source of policy for common-law adjudication, particularly when there is a close relationship between the statutory and common-law subject matters. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "227 Conn. 270, 281-82",
"parenthetical": "Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | 247,062 | b |
Although the definition of cohabitation as set forth in the dissolution judgment is not controlled by SS 46b-86 (b), statutes are a useful source of policy for common-law adjudication, particularly when there is a close relationship between the statutory and common-law subject matters. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "227 Conn. 270, 281-82",
"parenthetical": "Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | 247,062 | a |
Although the definition of cohabitation as set forth in the dissolution judgment is not controlled by SS 46b-86 (b), statutes are a useful source of policy for common-law adjudication, particularly when there is a close relationship between the statutory and common-law subject matters. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "227 Conn. 270, 281-82",
"parenthetical": "Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | 247,062 | a |
Although the definition of cohabitation as set forth in the dissolution judgment is not controlled by SS 46b-86 (b), statutes are a useful source of policy for common-law adjudication, particularly when there is a close relationship between the statutory and common-law subject matters. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54",
"parenthetical": "statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | 247,062 | b |
Although the definition of cohabitation as set forth in the dissolution judgment is not controlled by SS 46b-86 (b), statutes are a useful source of policy for common-law adjudication, particularly when there is a close relationship between the statutory and common-law subject matters. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | 247,062 | a |
Although the definition of cohabitation as set forth in the dissolution judgment is not controlled by SS 46b-86 (b), statutes are a useful source of policy for common-law adjudication, particularly when there is a close relationship between the statutory and common-law subject matters. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | 247,062 | a |
Although the definition of cohabitation as set forth in the dissolution judgment is not controlled by SS 46b-86 (b), statutes are a useful source of policy for common-law adjudication, particularly when there is a close relationship between the statutory and common-law subject matters. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property",
"sentence": "Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-15, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993) (use of Public Acts 1990, No. 90-213, § 46, which amended General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 46b-86 [a], to conclude, as matter of common law, that elimination of contemplation requirement applies to alimony as well as child support orders); see New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281-82, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993) (Uniform Commercial Code used as statutory source for transactions involving real property); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) (same); Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 225, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) (same); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946 (1980) (same); see also Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 453-54, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986) (statute governing rights of successor corporation following merger used as precedent for determining rights of partnership as successor entity following merger)."
} | 247,062 | b |
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Konarskis' motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)(1) because the Konarskis failed to demonstrate excusable neglect or any other ground for relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "5 F.3d 1263, 1263",
"parenthetical": "setting forth grounds for reconsideration under Rules 59(e) and 60(b",
"sentence": "See ACandS, 5 F.3d at 1263 (setting forth grounds for reconsideration under Rules 59(e) and 60(b)); see also Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth four-factor equitable test for determining whether a party’s failure to meet a déadline constitutes “excusable neglect”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "624 F.3d 1253, 1261",
"parenthetical": "setting forth four-factor equitable test for determining whether a party's failure to meet a deadline constitutes \"excusable neglect\"",
"sentence": "See ACandS, 5 F.3d at 1263 (setting forth grounds for reconsideration under Rules 59(e) and 60(b)); see also Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth four-factor equitable test for determining whether a party’s failure to meet a déadline constitutes “excusable neglect”)."
} | 12,408,006 | a |
However, when this same evidence is viewed collectively it supports the trial court's determination that Barry constructively possessed the marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt. The trier-of-fact is "permitted to consider the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the drugs." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "356 F.3d 831, 837",
"parenthetical": "holding evidence establishing the intent of the defendants to distribute drugs also permits the inference they intended to exercise dominion over them to demonstrate constructive possession",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Lee, 356 F.3d 831, 837 (8th Cir.2003) (holding evidence establishing the intent of the defendants to distribute drugs also permits the inference they intended to exercise dominion over them to demonstrate constructive possession)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding drug convictions based on constructive possession of methamphetamine found in the spare tire of a vehicle in light of evidence of a close relationship and drug conspiracy between driver and passenger of the vehicle",
"sentence": "United States v. Flores, 362 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir.2004)(upholding drug convictions based on constructive possession of methamphetamine found in the spare tire of a vehicle in light of evidence of a close relationship and drug conspiracy between driver and passenger of the vehicle)."
} | 9,225,748 | b |
In Zazueta-Carrillo, Vasquez-Lopez and Barragan-Sanchez, we relied on the aliens' previous voluntary departure agreements in rejecting their arguments for relief. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "322 F.3d 1173, 1173-74",
"parenthetical": "rejecting alien's argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the \"specific policy\" of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure",
"sentence": "Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1173-74 (rejecting alien’s argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the “specific policy” of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure); Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 974 (“While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing ‘presence’ so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.”); Barragan-Sanchez, 471 F.2d at 760-61 (holding that because alien’s two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not, therefore, strictly voluntary, they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years’ continuous presence in the United States under a rule that excused absences that were brief, casual and innocent); cf. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 324,112 S.Ct. 719 (holding that “the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "502 U.S. 324, 324",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims\"",
"sentence": "Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1173-74 (rejecting alien’s argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the “specific policy” of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure); Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 974 (“While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing ‘presence’ so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.”); Barragan-Sanchez, 471 F.2d at 760-61 (holding that because alien’s two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not, therefore, strictly voluntary, they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years’ continuous presence in the United States under a rule that excused absences that were brief, casual and innocent); cf. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 324,112 S.Ct. 719 (holding that “the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims”)."
} | 9,228,798 | a |
In Zazueta-Carrillo, Vasquez-Lopez and Barragan-Sanchez, we relied on the aliens' previous voluntary departure agreements in rejecting their arguments for relief. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "322 F.3d 1173, 1173-74",
"parenthetical": "rejecting alien's argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the \"specific policy\" of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure",
"sentence": "Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1173-74 (rejecting alien’s argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the “specific policy” of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure); Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 974 (“While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing ‘presence’ so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.”); Barragan-Sanchez, 471 F.2d at 760-61 (holding that because alien’s two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not, therefore, strictly voluntary, they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years’ continuous presence in the United States under a rule that excused absences that were brief, casual and innocent); cf. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 324,112 S.Ct. 719 (holding that “the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims\"",
"sentence": "Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1173-74 (rejecting alien’s argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the “specific policy” of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure); Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 974 (“While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing ‘presence’ so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.”); Barragan-Sanchez, 471 F.2d at 760-61 (holding that because alien’s two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not, therefore, strictly voluntary, they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years’ continuous presence in the United States under a rule that excused absences that were brief, casual and innocent); cf. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 324,112 S.Ct. 719 (holding that “the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims”)."
} | 9,228,798 | a |
In Zazueta-Carrillo, Vasquez-Lopez and Barragan-Sanchez, we relied on the aliens' previous voluntary departure agreements in rejecting their arguments for relief. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "343 F.3d 974, 974",
"parenthetical": "\"While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing 'presence' so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.\"",
"sentence": "Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1173-74 (rejecting alien’s argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the “specific policy” of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure); Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 974 (“While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing ‘presence’ so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.”); Barragan-Sanchez, 471 F.2d at 760-61 (holding that because alien’s two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not, therefore, strictly voluntary, they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years’ continuous presence in the United States under a rule that excused absences that were brief, casual and innocent); cf. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 324,112 S.Ct. 719 (holding that “the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "502 U.S. 324, 324",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims\"",
"sentence": "Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1173-74 (rejecting alien’s argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the “specific policy” of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure); Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 974 (“While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing ‘presence’ so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.”); Barragan-Sanchez, 471 F.2d at 760-61 (holding that because alien’s two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not, therefore, strictly voluntary, they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years’ continuous presence in the United States under a rule that excused absences that were brief, casual and innocent); cf. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 324,112 S.Ct. 719 (holding that “the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims”)."
} | 9,228,798 | a |
In Zazueta-Carrillo, Vasquez-Lopez and Barragan-Sanchez, we relied on the aliens' previous voluntary departure agreements in rejecting their arguments for relief. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "343 F.3d 974, 974",
"parenthetical": "\"While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing 'presence' so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.\"",
"sentence": "Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1173-74 (rejecting alien’s argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the “specific policy” of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure); Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 974 (“While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing ‘presence’ so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.”); Barragan-Sanchez, 471 F.2d at 760-61 (holding that because alien’s two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not, therefore, strictly voluntary, they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years’ continuous presence in the United States under a rule that excused absences that were brief, casual and innocent); cf. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 324,112 S.Ct. 719 (holding that “the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims\"",
"sentence": "Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1173-74 (rejecting alien’s argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the “specific policy” of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure); Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 974 (“While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing ‘presence’ so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.”); Barragan-Sanchez, 471 F.2d at 760-61 (holding that because alien’s two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not, therefore, strictly voluntary, they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years’ continuous presence in the United States under a rule that excused absences that were brief, casual and innocent); cf. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 324,112 S.Ct. 719 (holding that “the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims”)."
} | 9,228,798 | a |
In Zazueta-Carrillo, Vasquez-Lopez and Barragan-Sanchez, we relied on the aliens' previous voluntary departure agreements in rejecting their arguments for relief. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "471 F.2d 760, 760-61",
"parenthetical": "holding that because alien's two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not, therefore, strictly voluntary, they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years' continuous presence in the United States under a rule that excused absences that were brief, casual and innocent",
"sentence": "Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1173-74 (rejecting alien’s argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the “specific policy” of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure); Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 974 (“While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing ‘presence’ so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.”); Barragan-Sanchez, 471 F.2d at 760-61 (holding that because alien’s two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not, therefore, strictly voluntary, they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years’ continuous presence in the United States under a rule that excused absences that were brief, casual and innocent); cf. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 324,112 S.Ct. 719 (holding that “the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "502 U.S. 324, 324",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims\"",
"sentence": "Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1173-74 (rejecting alien’s argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the “specific policy” of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure); Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 974 (“While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing ‘presence’ so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.”); Barragan-Sanchez, 471 F.2d at 760-61 (holding that because alien’s two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not, therefore, strictly voluntary, they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years’ continuous presence in the United States under a rule that excused absences that were brief, casual and innocent); cf. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 324,112 S.Ct. 719 (holding that “the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims”)."
} | 9,228,798 | a |
In Zazueta-Carrillo, Vasquez-Lopez and Barragan-Sanchez, we relied on the aliens' previous voluntary departure agreements in rejecting their arguments for relief. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "471 F.2d 760, 760-61",
"parenthetical": "holding that because alien's two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not, therefore, strictly voluntary, they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years' continuous presence in the United States under a rule that excused absences that were brief, casual and innocent",
"sentence": "Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1173-74 (rejecting alien’s argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the “specific policy” of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure); Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 974 (“While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing ‘presence’ so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.”); Barragan-Sanchez, 471 F.2d at 760-61 (holding that because alien’s two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not, therefore, strictly voluntary, they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years’ continuous presence in the United States under a rule that excused absences that were brief, casual and innocent); cf. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 324,112 S.Ct. 719 (holding that “the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims\"",
"sentence": "Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1173-74 (rejecting alien’s argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the “specific policy” of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure); Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 974 (“While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing ‘presence’ so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.”); Barragan-Sanchez, 471 F.2d at 760-61 (holding that because alien’s two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not, therefore, strictly voluntary, they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years’ continuous presence in the United States under a rule that excused absences that were brief, casual and innocent); cf. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 324,112 S.Ct. 719 (holding that “the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening ... on the basis that respondent failed to satisfactorily explain his previous withdrawal of these claims”)."
} | 9,228,798 | a |
Substantial evidence supports the BIA's denial of withholding of removal because Gorbitz Espinoza failed to establish that the Shining Path persecuted him on account of an imputed political opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "293 F.3d 1089, 1094-95",
"parenthetical": "no imputed political opinion where petitioner offered no evidence that his father had a political opinion that could be imputed to petitioner",
"sentence": "See Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1094-95 (9th Cir.2002) (no imputed political opinion where petitioner offered no evidence that his father had a political opinion that could be imputed to petitioner); see also Cruz-Navarro, 232 F.3d at 1030 (no imputed political opinion where there was no evidence to show that guerillas imputed a political opinion to petitioner). Moreover, the record does not support Gorbitz Espinoza’s contention that he was persecuted on account of an actual political opinion."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "232 F.3d 1030, 1030",
"parenthetical": "no imputed political opinion where there was no evidence to show that guerillas imputed a political opinion to petitioner",
"sentence": "See Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1094-95 (9th Cir.2002) (no imputed political opinion where petitioner offered no evidence that his father had a political opinion that could be imputed to petitioner); see also Cruz-Navarro, 232 F.3d at 1030 (no imputed political opinion where there was no evidence to show that guerillas imputed a political opinion to petitioner). Moreover, the record does not support Gorbitz Espinoza’s contention that he was persecuted on account of an actual political opinion."
} | 3,814,449 | a |
Although this sweeping language is arguably applicable here, the Fifth Circuit, and numerous other courts, have rejected a broad interpretation of Freeporb-McMoRan and have limited its application to cases involving the addition of parties under Rule 25. The case literature supports a finding that a nondiverse intervenor, having intervened as of right, will defeat jurisdiction if considered indispensable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "462 F.3d 393, 393",
"parenthetical": "\"If a person cannot be made a party under Rule 19(a) because ... joinder would destroy subject-matter jurisdiction, then a federal court must determine whether that person is 'indispensable.' \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Olympic Mills, 477 F.3d at 7 (“If [the intervenor] is entitled to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) and is an indispensable party under Rule 19(b), the litigation must be dismissed because there would not be complete diversity.” (quoting B. Fernandez & Hnos., Inc. v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 440 F.3d 541, 544 (1st Cir.2006))); Lawyers Title, 2009 WL 2032406, at *6 (“Since1 the Court is of the opinion that Intervenors are qualified to intervene as of right under Rule 24, and because their presence would destroy complete diversity, the Court must next determine whether Intervenors are indispensable to this action .... ”); see also Brown, 462 F.3d at 393 (“If a person cannot be made a party under Rule 19(a) because ... joinder would destroy subject-matter jurisdiction, then a federal court must determine whether that person is ‘indispensable.’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "477 F.3d 7, 7",
"parenthetical": "\"If [the intervenor] is entitled to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) and is an indispensable party under Rule 19(b",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Olympic Mills, 477 F.3d at 7 (“If [the intervenor] is entitled to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) and is an indispensable party under Rule 19(b), the litigation must be dismissed because there would not be complete diversity.” (quoting B. Fernandez & Hnos., Inc. v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 440 F.3d 541, 544 (1st Cir.2006))); Lawyers Title, 2009 WL 2032406, at *6 (“Since1 the Court is of the opinion that Intervenors are qualified to intervene as of right under Rule 24, and because their presence would destroy complete diversity, the Court must next determine whether Intervenors are indispensable to this action .... ”); see also Brown, 462 F.3d at 393 (“If a person cannot be made a party under Rule 19(a) because ... joinder would destroy subject-matter jurisdiction, then a federal court must determine whether that person is ‘indispensable.’ ”)."
} | 3,936,001 | b |
Although this sweeping language is arguably applicable here, the Fifth Circuit, and numerous other courts, have rejected a broad interpretation of Freeporb-McMoRan and have limited its application to cases involving the addition of parties under Rule 25. The case literature supports a finding that a nondiverse intervenor, having intervened as of right, will defeat jurisdiction if considered indispensable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "462 F.3d 393, 393",
"parenthetical": "\"If a person cannot be made a party under Rule 19(a) because ... joinder would destroy subject-matter jurisdiction, then a federal court must determine whether that person is 'indispensable.' \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Olympic Mills, 477 F.3d at 7 (“If [the intervenor] is entitled to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) and is an indispensable party under Rule 19(b), the litigation must be dismissed because there would not be complete diversity.” (quoting B. Fernandez & Hnos., Inc. v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 440 F.3d 541, 544 (1st Cir.2006))); Lawyers Title, 2009 WL 2032406, at *6 (“Since1 the Court is of the opinion that Intervenors are qualified to intervene as of right under Rule 24, and because their presence would destroy complete diversity, the Court must next determine whether Intervenors are indispensable to this action .... ”); see also Brown, 462 F.3d at 393 (“If a person cannot be made a party under Rule 19(a) because ... joinder would destroy subject-matter jurisdiction, then a federal court must determine whether that person is ‘indispensable.’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2009 WL 2032406, at *6",
"parenthetical": "\"Since1 the Court is of the opinion that Intervenors are qualified to intervene as of right under Rule 24, and because their presence would destroy complete diversity, the Court must next determine whether Intervenors are indispensable to this action .... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Olympic Mills, 477 F.3d at 7 (“If [the intervenor] is entitled to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) and is an indispensable party under Rule 19(b), the litigation must be dismissed because there would not be complete diversity.” (quoting B. Fernandez & Hnos., Inc. v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 440 F.3d 541, 544 (1st Cir.2006))); Lawyers Title, 2009 WL 2032406, at *6 (“Since1 the Court is of the opinion that Intervenors are qualified to intervene as of right under Rule 24, and because their presence would destroy complete diversity, the Court must next determine whether Intervenors are indispensable to this action .... ”); see also Brown, 462 F.3d at 393 (“If a person cannot be made a party under Rule 19(a) because ... joinder would destroy subject-matter jurisdiction, then a federal court must determine whether that person is ‘indispensable.’ ”)."
} | 3,936,001 | b |
Because the Court has found no triable issues regarding the alleged violations of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 194, 201",
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,171,790 | a |
Because the Court has found no triable issues regarding the alleged violations of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,171,790 | a |
Because the Court has found no triable issues regarding the alleged violations of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,171,790 | a |
Because the Court has found no triable issues regarding the alleged violations of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 194, 201",
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,171,790 | b |
Because the Court has found no triable issues regarding the alleged violations of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,171,790 | b |
Because the Court has found no triable issues regarding the alleged violations of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,171,790 | b |
Because the Court has found no triable issues regarding the alleged violations of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 194, 201",
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,171,790 | a |
Because the Court has found no triable issues regarding the alleged violations of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,171,790 | a |
Because the Court has found no triable issues regarding the alleged violations of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,171,790 | b |
The fact that we have taken judicial notice of the reliability of the technique of DNA profiling does not mean that expert testimony concerning DNA profiling is automatically admissible under Daubert. A number of courts have required that the trial court further inquire into whether the expert properly performed the techniques involved in creating the DNA profiles. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that admissibility conditioned on a finding that the expert properly performed the protocols underlying DNA profiling",
"sentence": "See People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup.Ct.1989) (holding that admissibility conditioned on a finding that the expert properly performed the protocols underlying DNA profiling); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir.1990) (same), vacated and dismissed as moot, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir.1991); but see Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 800 (court should inquire as to whether the protocols were properly performed, but this issue should generally go to the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "955 F.2d 800, 800",
"parenthetical": "court should inquire as to whether the protocols were properly performed, but this issue should generally go to the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence",
"sentence": "See People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup.Ct.1989) (holding that admissibility conditioned on a finding that the expert properly performed the protocols underlying DNA profiling); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir.1990) (same), vacated and dismissed as moot, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir.1991); but see Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 800 (court should inquire as to whether the protocols were properly performed, but this issue should generally go to the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence)."
} | 10,516,691 | a |
The fact that we have taken judicial notice of the reliability of the technique of DNA profiling does not mean that expert testimony concerning DNA profiling is automatically admissible under Daubert. A number of courts have required that the trial court further inquire into whether the expert properly performed the techniques involved in creating the DNA profiles. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "955 F.2d 800, 800",
"parenthetical": "court should inquire as to whether the protocols were properly performed, but this issue should generally go to the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence",
"sentence": "See People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup.Ct.1989) (holding that admissibility conditioned on a finding that the expert properly performed the protocols underlying DNA profiling); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir.1990) (same), vacated and dismissed as moot, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir.1991); but see Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 800 (court should inquire as to whether the protocols were properly performed, but this issue should generally go to the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that admissibility conditioned on a finding that the expert properly performed the protocols underlying DNA profiling",
"sentence": "See People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup.Ct.1989) (holding that admissibility conditioned on a finding that the expert properly performed the protocols underlying DNA profiling); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir.1990) (same), vacated and dismissed as moot, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir.1991); but see Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 800 (court should inquire as to whether the protocols were properly performed, but this issue should generally go to the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence)."
} | 10,516,691 | b |
The absence of the word "knowingly" in subsection (4)(b) does not, however, mean that the subsection does not have a knowledge requirement. Florida courts will ordinarily presume that the Legislature intends statutes defining a criminal violation to contain a knowledge requirement absent an express indication of a contrary intent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "criminal statutes, such as computer pornography statutes, are presumed to include broadly applicable scienter requirements in absence of express contrary intent",
"sentence": "Wegner v. State, 928 So.2d 436, 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (statute imposing criminal liability on person who receives computer transmissions of descriptive or identifying information about minor for purpose of facilitating sexual conduct with minor would be construed as requiring knowledge by accused that person from whom or about whom he received computer transmission was minor); see also Cash-att v. State, 873 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (criminal statutes, such as computer pornography statutes, are presumed to include broadly applicable scienter requirements in absence of express contrary intent)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "928 So.2d 436, 439",
"parenthetical": "statute imposing criminal liability on person who receives computer transmissions of descriptive or identifying information about minor for purpose of facilitating sexual conduct with minor would be construed as requiring knowledge by accused that person from whom or about whom he received computer transmission was minor",
"sentence": "Wegner v. State, 928 So.2d 436, 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (statute imposing criminal liability on person who receives computer transmissions of descriptive or identifying information about minor for purpose of facilitating sexual conduct with minor would be construed as requiring knowledge by accused that person from whom or about whom he received computer transmission was minor); see also Cash-att v. State, 873 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (criminal statutes, such as computer pornography statutes, are presumed to include broadly applicable scienter requirements in absence of express contrary intent)."
} | 7,333,596 | b |
See Rule 403, SCRE (stating that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice). This evidence was highly prejudicial and not harmless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "379 S.C. 26, 26",
"parenthetical": "noting the admission of prior bad act evidence when the offender was unsubstantiated was not harmless error because the identity of the perpetrator was the essential issue at trial",
"sentence": "See Fletcher, 379 S.C. at 26, 664 S.E.2d at 484 (noting the admission of prior bad act evidence when the offender was unsubstantiated was not harmless error because the identity of the perpetrator was the essential issue at trial); see also Northcutt, 372 S.C. at 218-19, 641 S.E.2d at 879 (reversing a death penalty conviction due to unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403, SCRE, when the trial court admitted evidence of the victim’s spiral leg fracture at age ten-weeks despite the fact that the prior injury was, by all accounts, an accident)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "372 S.C. 218, 218-19",
"parenthetical": "reversing a death penalty conviction due to unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403, SCRE, when the trial court admitted evidence of the victim's spiral leg fracture at age ten-weeks despite the fact that the prior injury was, by all accounts, an accident",
"sentence": "See Fletcher, 379 S.C. at 26, 664 S.E.2d at 484 (noting the admission of prior bad act evidence when the offender was unsubstantiated was not harmless error because the identity of the perpetrator was the essential issue at trial); see also Northcutt, 372 S.C. at 218-19, 641 S.E.2d at 879 (reversing a death penalty conviction due to unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403, SCRE, when the trial court admitted evidence of the victim’s spiral leg fracture at age ten-weeks despite the fact that the prior injury was, by all accounts, an accident)."
} | 3,870,997 | a |
See Rule 403, SCRE (stating that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice). This evidence was highly prejudicial and not harmless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "379 S.C. 26, 26",
"parenthetical": "noting the admission of prior bad act evidence when the offender was unsubstantiated was not harmless error because the identity of the perpetrator was the essential issue at trial",
"sentence": "See Fletcher, 379 S.C. at 26, 664 S.E.2d at 484 (noting the admission of prior bad act evidence when the offender was unsubstantiated was not harmless error because the identity of the perpetrator was the essential issue at trial); see also Northcutt, 372 S.C. at 218-19, 641 S.E.2d at 879 (reversing a death penalty conviction due to unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403, SCRE, when the trial court admitted evidence of the victim’s spiral leg fracture at age ten-weeks despite the fact that the prior injury was, by all accounts, an accident)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "641 S.E.2d 879, 879",
"parenthetical": "reversing a death penalty conviction due to unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403, SCRE, when the trial court admitted evidence of the victim's spiral leg fracture at age ten-weeks despite the fact that the prior injury was, by all accounts, an accident",
"sentence": "See Fletcher, 379 S.C. at 26, 664 S.E.2d at 484 (noting the admission of prior bad act evidence when the offender was unsubstantiated was not harmless error because the identity of the perpetrator was the essential issue at trial); see also Northcutt, 372 S.C. at 218-19, 641 S.E.2d at 879 (reversing a death penalty conviction due to unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403, SCRE, when the trial court admitted evidence of the victim’s spiral leg fracture at age ten-weeks despite the fact that the prior injury was, by all accounts, an accident)."
} | 3,870,997 | a |
See Rule 403, SCRE (stating that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice). This evidence was highly prejudicial and not harmless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "664 S.E.2d 484, 484",
"parenthetical": "noting the admission of prior bad act evidence when the offender was unsubstantiated was not harmless error because the identity of the perpetrator was the essential issue at trial",
"sentence": "See Fletcher, 379 S.C. at 26, 664 S.E.2d at 484 (noting the admission of prior bad act evidence when the offender was unsubstantiated was not harmless error because the identity of the perpetrator was the essential issue at trial); see also Northcutt, 372 S.C. at 218-19, 641 S.E.2d at 879 (reversing a death penalty conviction due to unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403, SCRE, when the trial court admitted evidence of the victim’s spiral leg fracture at age ten-weeks despite the fact that the prior injury was, by all accounts, an accident)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "372 S.C. 218, 218-19",
"parenthetical": "reversing a death penalty conviction due to unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403, SCRE, when the trial court admitted evidence of the victim's spiral leg fracture at age ten-weeks despite the fact that the prior injury was, by all accounts, an accident",
"sentence": "See Fletcher, 379 S.C. at 26, 664 S.E.2d at 484 (noting the admission of prior bad act evidence when the offender was unsubstantiated was not harmless error because the identity of the perpetrator was the essential issue at trial); see also Northcutt, 372 S.C. at 218-19, 641 S.E.2d at 879 (reversing a death penalty conviction due to unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403, SCRE, when the trial court admitted evidence of the victim’s spiral leg fracture at age ten-weeks despite the fact that the prior injury was, by all accounts, an accident)."
} | 3,870,997 | a |
See Rule 403, SCRE (stating that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice). This evidence was highly prejudicial and not harmless. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "641 S.E.2d 879, 879",
"parenthetical": "reversing a death penalty conviction due to unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403, SCRE, when the trial court admitted evidence of the victim's spiral leg fracture at age ten-weeks despite the fact that the prior injury was, by all accounts, an accident",
"sentence": "See Fletcher, 379 S.C. at 26, 664 S.E.2d at 484 (noting the admission of prior bad act evidence when the offender was unsubstantiated was not harmless error because the identity of the perpetrator was the essential issue at trial); see also Northcutt, 372 S.C. at 218-19, 641 S.E.2d at 879 (reversing a death penalty conviction due to unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403, SCRE, when the trial court admitted evidence of the victim’s spiral leg fracture at age ten-weeks despite the fact that the prior injury was, by all accounts, an accident)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "664 S.E.2d 484, 484",
"parenthetical": "noting the admission of prior bad act evidence when the offender was unsubstantiated was not harmless error because the identity of the perpetrator was the essential issue at trial",
"sentence": "See Fletcher, 379 S.C. at 26, 664 S.E.2d at 484 (noting the admission of prior bad act evidence when the offender was unsubstantiated was not harmless error because the identity of the perpetrator was the essential issue at trial); see also Northcutt, 372 S.C. at 218-19, 641 S.E.2d at 879 (reversing a death penalty conviction due to unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403, SCRE, when the trial court admitted evidence of the victim’s spiral leg fracture at age ten-weeks despite the fact that the prior injury was, by all accounts, an accident)."
} | 3,870,997 | b |
Such language is inflammatory, particularly to the extent that it attributes improper motives to Appellants. Thus, we admonish counsel to refrain from needlessly inflaming the passions of the jury. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "11 A.3d 939, 939",
"parenthetical": "recognizing a \"central premise that negligence concepts have no place in Pennsylvania's strict liability law\"",
"sentence": "See Young, 761 A.2d at 563 (noting that “an appeal to passion or prejudice is improper and will not be countenanced” and equating a verdict obtained by such arguments to “one obtained by false testimony”); see also Schmidt, 11 A.3d at 939 (recognizing a “central premise that negligence concepts have no place in Pennsylvania’s strict liability law”); Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1007 (“Strict liability focuses solely on the product ... and is divorced from the conduct of the manufacturer.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "761 A.2d 563, 563",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"an appeal to passion or prejudice is improper and will not be countenanced\" and equating a verdict obtained by such arguments to \"one obtained by false testimony\"",
"sentence": "See Young, 761 A.2d at 563 (noting that “an appeal to passion or prejudice is improper and will not be countenanced” and equating a verdict obtained by such arguments to “one obtained by false testimony”); see also Schmidt, 11 A.3d at 939 (recognizing a “central premise that negligence concepts have no place in Pennsylvania’s strict liability law”); Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1007 (“Strict liability focuses solely on the product ... and is divorced from the conduct of the manufacturer.”)."
} | 6,891,264 | b |
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