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Courts in other states have repeatedly found that in the absence of actual control, a property owner owes no duty to a contractor or a contractor's employee who suffers injury from being electrocuted on the property owner's premises. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "875 F.2d 603, 605-07",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the claim of a contractor's employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | 7,068,160 | a |
Courts in other states have repeatedly found that in the absence of actual control, a property owner owes no duty to a contractor or a contractor's employee who suffers injury from being electrocuted on the property owner's premises. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386",
"parenthetical": "holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "875 F.2d 603, 605-07",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the claim of a contractor's employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | 7,068,160 | b |
Courts in other states have repeatedly found that in the absence of actual control, a property owner owes no duty to a contractor or a contractor's employee who suffers injury from being electrocuted on the property owner's premises. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211",
"parenthetical": "finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor's employee in the absence of \"latent or concealed dangers\" or \"actual physical control over the work area\"",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362",
"parenthetical": "holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | 7,068,160 | a |
Courts in other states have repeatedly found that in the absence of actual control, a property owner owes no duty to a contractor or a contractor's employee who suffers injury from being electrocuted on the property owner's premises. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211",
"parenthetical": "finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor's employee in the absence of \"latent or concealed dangers\" or \"actual physical control over the work area\"",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | 7,068,160 | a |
Courts in other states have repeatedly found that in the absence of actual control, a property owner owes no duty to a contractor or a contractor's employee who suffers injury from being electrocuted on the property owner's premises. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386",
"parenthetical": "holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211",
"parenthetical": "finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor's employee in the absence of \"latent or concealed dangers\" or \"actual physical control over the work area\"",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | 7,068,160 | b |
Courts in other states have repeatedly found that in the absence of actual control, a property owner owes no duty to a contractor or a contractor's employee who suffers injury from being electrocuted on the property owner's premises. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362",
"parenthetical": "holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of \"obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform\"",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | 7,068,160 | b |
Courts in other states have repeatedly found that in the absence of actual control, a property owner owes no duty to a contractor or a contractor's employee who suffers injury from being electrocuted on the property owner's premises. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of \"obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform\"",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | 7,068,160 | b |
Courts in other states have repeatedly found that in the absence of actual control, a property owner owes no duty to a contractor or a contractor's employee who suffers injury from being electrocuted on the property owner's premises. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386",
"parenthetical": "holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of \"obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform\"",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | 7,068,160 | b |
Courts in other states have repeatedly found that in the absence of actual control, a property owner owes no duty to a contractor or a contractor's employee who suffers injury from being electrocuted on the property owner's premises. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362",
"parenthetical": "holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "606 S.W.2d 66, 68",
"parenthetical": "finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of \"obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform\"",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | 7,068,160 | b |
Courts in other states have repeatedly found that in the absence of actual control, a property owner owes no duty to a contractor or a contractor's employee who suffers injury from being electrocuted on the property owner's premises. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "606 S.W.2d 66, 68",
"parenthetical": "finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of \"obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform\"",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | 7,068,160 | b |
Courts in other states have repeatedly found that in the absence of actual control, a property owner owes no duty to a contractor or a contractor's employee who suffers injury from being electrocuted on the property owner's premises. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386",
"parenthetical": "holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "606 S.W.2d 66, 68",
"parenthetical": "finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of \"obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform\"",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | 7,068,160 | b |
Courts in other states have repeatedly found that in the absence of actual control, a property owner owes no duty to a contractor or a contractor's employee who suffers injury from being electrocuted on the property owner's premises. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362",
"parenthetical": "holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61",
"parenthetical": "finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor's argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | 7,068,160 | b |
Courts in other states have repeatedly found that in the absence of actual control, a property owner owes no duty to a contractor or a contractor's employee who suffers injury from being electrocuted on the property owner's premises. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61",
"parenthetical": "finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor's argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | 7,068,160 | a |
Courts in other states have repeatedly found that in the absence of actual control, a property owner owes no duty to a contractor or a contractor's employee who suffers injury from being electrocuted on the property owner's premises. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61",
"parenthetical": "finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor's argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386",
"parenthetical": "holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker",
"sentence": "Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605-07 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting the claim of a contractor’s employee that the premises owner had a duty to deenergize the lines where the contractor worked); Wells v. Gen. Elec. Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.Md.1992) (finding an employer owed no duty to a contractor’s employee in the absence of “latent or concealed dangers” or “actual physical control over the work area”); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1980) (finding a utility had no duty to deenergize its lines or warn an electrical contractor of “obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform”); Durbin v. Culberson Cnty., 132 S.W.3d 650, 660-61 (Tex.Ct.App.2004) (finding that the defendant owed no duty to a contractor who was electrocuted while changing out light bulbs on an energized pole, despite the contractor’s argument that the defendant should have provided locked down switches); cf. Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 358, 362 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution); Edick v. Paul de Lima Co., Inc., 6 A.D.3d 864, 775 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2004) (holding a company that serviced a coffee maker owed no duty to an employee who received an electric shock while attempting to clean the coffee maker)."
} | 7,068,160 | a |
Defendants' liter-alist approach to this definition, an apparent source of much discourse among the courts in this circuit and others, has been explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit. In Zeller, the Second Circuit held that "the mere fact that a note has a maturity of less than nine months does not take the case out of Rule 10b-5, unless the note fits the general notion of 'commercial paper' ...." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "544 F.2d 1126, 1138",
"parenthetical": "enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a \"security\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "494 U.S. 56, 70-71",
"parenthetical": "declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in SS 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | 9,431,318 | b |
Defendants' liter-alist approach to this definition, an apparent source of much discourse among the courts in this circuit and others, has been explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit. In Zeller, the Second Circuit held that "the mere fact that a note has a maturity of less than nine months does not take the case out of Rule 10b-5, unless the note fits the general notion of 'commercial paper' ...." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "494 U.S. 56, 70-71",
"parenthetical": "declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in SS 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "726 F.2d 930, 939",
"parenthetical": "enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a \"security\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | 9,431,318 | a |
Defendants' liter-alist approach to this definition, an apparent source of much discourse among the courts in this circuit and others, has been explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit. In Zeller, the Second Circuit held that "the mere fact that a note has a maturity of less than nine months does not take the case out of Rule 10b-5, unless the note fits the general notion of 'commercial paper' ...." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in SS 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "544 F.2d 1126, 1138",
"parenthetical": "enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a \"security\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | 9,431,318 | a |
Defendants' liter-alist approach to this definition, an apparent source of much discourse among the courts in this circuit and others, has been explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit. In Zeller, the Second Circuit held that "the mere fact that a note has a maturity of less than nine months does not take the case out of Rule 10b-5, unless the note fits the general notion of 'commercial paper' ...." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in SS 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "726 F.2d 930, 939",
"parenthetical": "enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a \"security\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | 9,431,318 | a |
Defendants' liter-alist approach to this definition, an apparent source of much discourse among the courts in this circuit and others, has been explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit. In Zeller, the Second Circuit held that "the mere fact that a note has a maturity of less than nine months does not take the case out of Rule 10b-5, unless the note fits the general notion of 'commercial paper' ...." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in SS 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "544 F.2d 1126, 1138",
"parenthetical": "enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a \"security\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | 9,431,318 | a |
Defendants' liter-alist approach to this definition, an apparent source of much discourse among the courts in this circuit and others, has been explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit. In Zeller, the Second Circuit held that "the mere fact that a note has a maturity of less than nine months does not take the case out of Rule 10b-5, unless the note fits the general notion of 'commercial paper' ...." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in SS 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "726 F.2d 930, 939",
"parenthetical": "enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a \"security\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | 9,431,318 | a |
Defendants' liter-alist approach to this definition, an apparent source of much discourse among the courts in this circuit and others, has been explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit. In Zeller, the Second Circuit held that "the mere fact that a note has a maturity of less than nine months does not take the case out of Rule 10b-5, unless the note fits the general notion of 'commercial paper' ...." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "544 F.2d 1126, 1138",
"parenthetical": "enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a \"security\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "751 F.2d 529, 538",
"parenthetical": "noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of SS 3(a",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | 9,431,318 | b |
Defendants' liter-alist approach to this definition, an apparent source of much discourse among the courts in this circuit and others, has been explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit. In Zeller, the Second Circuit held that "the mere fact that a note has a maturity of less than nine months does not take the case out of Rule 10b-5, unless the note fits the general notion of 'commercial paper' ...." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "751 F.2d 529, 538",
"parenthetical": "noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of SS 3(a",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "726 F.2d 930, 939",
"parenthetical": "enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a \"security\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 800. See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70-71, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990) (declining to determine whether exclusion of short-term notes in § 3(a)(10) should be given literal effect); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 538 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that decisional law bars a literal reading of § 3(a)(10) and that a note with maturity less than nine months may be a “security”); cf. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.1976) (enumerating categories in which notes with a maturity exceeding nine months may not constitute a “security”) and Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (same)."
} | 9,431,318 | a |
The ISTIL forgery findings were relevant under OEC 401 because they tended to show that plaintiff did have the skill and sophistication to create forged documents-- which, in the ISTIL case, included the creation of several letters and documents (both typewritten and on word processing equipment), faxes from different places, and forged signatures. That relevancy goes to the impeachment of plaintiffs factual assertions, not whether he had a propensity to forge documents. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "high degree of similarity of circumstances between uncharged conduct and current charges not required when evidence is used for purpose other than to prove identity",
"sentence": "See also State v. Momeni, 234 Or App 193, 227 P3d 1230, rev den, 348 Or 523 (2010) (high degree of similarity of circumstances between uncharged conduct and current charges not required when evidence is used for purpose other than to prove identity)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "271 Or 201, 213",
"parenthetical": "uncharged misconduct evidence admissible to impeach credibility of defendant's testimony",
"sentence": "See State v. Manrique, 271 Or 201, 213, 531 P2d 239 (1975) (uncharged misconduct evidence admissible to impeach credibility of defendant’s testimony); State v. Smith, 86 Or App 239, 244, 739 P2d 577 (1987) (evidence of “other crimes” of the defendant that contradicts a statement of fact made by a witness may be used to impeach that witness’s credibility)."
} | 6,793,051 | b |
The ISTIL forgery findings were relevant under OEC 401 because they tended to show that plaintiff did have the skill and sophistication to create forged documents-- which, in the ISTIL case, included the creation of several letters and documents (both typewritten and on word processing equipment), faxes from different places, and forged signatures. That relevancy goes to the impeachment of plaintiffs factual assertions, not whether he had a propensity to forge documents. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "271 Or 201, 213",
"parenthetical": "uncharged misconduct evidence admissible to impeach credibility of defendant's testimony",
"sentence": "See State v. Manrique, 271 Or 201, 213, 531 P2d 239 (1975) (uncharged misconduct evidence admissible to impeach credibility of defendant’s testimony); State v. Smith, 86 Or App 239, 244, 739 P2d 577 (1987) (evidence of “other crimes” of the defendant that contradicts a statement of fact made by a witness may be used to impeach that witness’s credibility)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "high degree of similarity of circumstances between uncharged conduct and current charges not required when evidence is used for purpose other than to prove identity",
"sentence": "See also State v. Momeni, 234 Or App 193, 227 P3d 1230, rev den, 348 Or 523 (2010) (high degree of similarity of circumstances between uncharged conduct and current charges not required when evidence is used for purpose other than to prove identity)."
} | 6,793,051 | a |
The ISTIL forgery findings were relevant under OEC 401 because they tended to show that plaintiff did have the skill and sophistication to create forged documents-- which, in the ISTIL case, included the creation of several letters and documents (both typewritten and on word processing equipment), faxes from different places, and forged signatures. That relevancy goes to the impeachment of plaintiffs factual assertions, not whether he had a propensity to forge documents. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "86 Or App 239, 244",
"parenthetical": "evidence of \"other crimes\" of the defendant that contradicts a statement of fact made by a witness may be used to impeach that witness's credibility",
"sentence": "See State v. Manrique, 271 Or 201, 213, 531 P2d 239 (1975) (uncharged misconduct evidence admissible to impeach credibility of defendant’s testimony); State v. Smith, 86 Or App 239, 244, 739 P2d 577 (1987) (evidence of “other crimes” of the defendant that contradicts a statement of fact made by a witness may be used to impeach that witness’s credibility)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "high degree of similarity of circumstances between uncharged conduct and current charges not required when evidence is used for purpose other than to prove identity",
"sentence": "See also State v. Momeni, 234 Or App 193, 227 P3d 1230, rev den, 348 Or 523 (2010) (high degree of similarity of circumstances between uncharged conduct and current charges not required when evidence is used for purpose other than to prove identity)."
} | 6,793,051 | a |
The ISTIL forgery findings were relevant under OEC 401 because they tended to show that plaintiff did have the skill and sophistication to create forged documents-- which, in the ISTIL case, included the creation of several letters and documents (both typewritten and on word processing equipment), faxes from different places, and forged signatures. That relevancy goes to the impeachment of plaintiffs factual assertions, not whether he had a propensity to forge documents. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "high degree of similarity of circumstances between uncharged conduct and current charges not required when evidence is used for purpose other than to prove identity",
"sentence": "See also State v. Momeni, 234 Or App 193, 227 P3d 1230, rev den, 348 Or 523 (2010) (high degree of similarity of circumstances between uncharged conduct and current charges not required when evidence is used for purpose other than to prove identity)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "86 Or App 239, 244",
"parenthetical": "evidence of \"other crimes\" of the defendant that contradicts a statement of fact made by a witness may be used to impeach that witness's credibility",
"sentence": "See State v. Manrique, 271 Or 201, 213, 531 P2d 239 (1975) (uncharged misconduct evidence admissible to impeach credibility of defendant’s testimony); State v. Smith, 86 Or App 239, 244, 739 P2d 577 (1987) (evidence of “other crimes” of the defendant that contradicts a statement of fact made by a witness may be used to impeach that witness’s credibility)."
} | 6,793,051 | b |
The contrary view is also acknowledged in Mandelker, Land Use Law SS 5.37, p. 5-38. That treatise recognizes that a total ban can be appropriate: "Courts review the total exclusion of one type of commercial use from a community on a case-by-case basis to decide whether the exclusion advances legitimate zoning purposes." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "212 Conn. 570, 583",
"parenthetical": "\"Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities' public safety, health and general welfare.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "392 So. 2d 993, 994",
"parenthetical": "\"The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | 3,674,393 | a |
The contrary view is also acknowledged in Mandelker, Land Use Law SS 5.37, p. 5-38. That treatise recognizes that a total ban can be appropriate: "Courts review the total exclusion of one type of commercial use from a community on a case-by-case basis to decide whether the exclusion advances legitimate zoning purposes." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "212 Conn. 570, 583",
"parenthetical": "\"Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities' public safety, health and general welfare.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | 3,674,393 | b |
The contrary view is also acknowledged in Mandelker, Land Use Law SS 5.37, p. 5-38. That treatise recognizes that a total ban can be appropriate: "Courts review the total exclusion of one type of commercial use from a community on a case-by-case basis to decide whether the exclusion advances legitimate zoning purposes." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "212 Conn. 570, 583",
"parenthetical": "\"Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities' public safety, health and general welfare.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | 3,674,393 | a |
The contrary view is also acknowledged in Mandelker, Land Use Law SS 5.37, p. 5-38. That treatise recognizes that a total ban can be appropriate: "Courts review the total exclusion of one type of commercial use from a community on a case-by-case basis to decide whether the exclusion advances legitimate zoning purposes." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "212 Conn. 570, 583",
"parenthetical": "\"Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities' public safety, health and general welfare.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | 3,674,393 | b |
The contrary view is also acknowledged in Mandelker, Land Use Law SS 5.37, p. 5-38. That treatise recognizes that a total ban can be appropriate: "Courts review the total exclusion of one type of commercial use from a community on a case-by-case basis to decide whether the exclusion advances legitimate zoning purposes." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "392 So. 2d 993, 994",
"parenthetical": "\"The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities' public safety, health and general welfare.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | 3,674,393 | b |
The contrary view is also acknowledged in Mandelker, Land Use Law SS 5.37, p. 5-38. That treatise recognizes that a total ban can be appropriate: "Courts review the total exclusion of one type of commercial use from a community on a case-by-case basis to decide whether the exclusion advances legitimate zoning purposes." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities' public safety, health and general welfare.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | 3,674,393 | b |
The contrary view is also acknowledged in Mandelker, Land Use Law SS 5.37, p. 5-38. That treatise recognizes that a total ban can be appropriate: "Courts review the total exclusion of one type of commercial use from a community on a case-by-case basis to decide whether the exclusion advances legitimate zoning purposes." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities' public safety, health and general welfare.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | 3,674,393 | a |
The contrary view is also acknowledged in Mandelker, Land Use Law SS 5.37, p. 5-38. That treatise recognizes that a total ban can be appropriate: "Courts review the total exclusion of one type of commercial use from a community on a case-by-case basis to decide whether the exclusion advances legitimate zoning purposes." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities' public safety, health and general welfare.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Fosick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (“Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities’ public safety, health and general welfare.”); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1981) (“The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.”). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people."
} | 3,674,393 | a |
Texas law supplies several limitations periods, applicable to different types of claims. Of the state law claims governed by the Texas statutes of limitations, we find that personal injury claims are most nearly analogous to the discrimination claims authorized by the Rehabilitation Act. As the Supreme Court has recognized, claims for discrimination are essentially claims for personal injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 661, 661",
"parenthetical": "Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. SS 1981, alleging racial discrimination, \"are in essence claims for personal injury.\"",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "846 F.2d 1026, 1028",
"parenthetical": "holding that Texas' two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. SS 1981",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | 11,291,462 | a |
Texas law supplies several limitations periods, applicable to different types of claims. Of the state law claims governed by the Texas statutes of limitations, we find that personal injury claims are most nearly analogous to the discrimination claims authorized by the Rehabilitation Act. As the Supreme Court has recognized, claims for discrimination are essentially claims for personal injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 661, 661",
"parenthetical": "Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. SS 1981, alleging racial discrimination, \"are in essence claims for personal injury.\"",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "724 F.2d 511, 514",
"parenthetical": "holding that Texas' two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | 11,291,462 | a |
Texas law supplies several limitations periods, applicable to different types of claims. Of the state law claims governed by the Texas statutes of limitations, we find that personal injury claims are most nearly analogous to the discrimination claims authorized by the Rehabilitation Act. As the Supreme Court has recognized, claims for discrimination are essentially claims for personal injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 2621, 2621",
"parenthetical": "Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. SS 1981, alleging racial discrimination, \"are in essence claims for personal injury.\"",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "846 F.2d 1026, 1028",
"parenthetical": "holding that Texas' two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. SS 1981",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | 11,291,462 | a |
Texas law supplies several limitations periods, applicable to different types of claims. Of the state law claims governed by the Texas statutes of limitations, we find that personal injury claims are most nearly analogous to the discrimination claims authorized by the Rehabilitation Act. As the Supreme Court has recognized, claims for discrimination are essentially claims for personal injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 2621, 2621",
"parenthetical": "Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. SS 1981, alleging racial discrimination, \"are in essence claims for personal injury.\"",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "724 F.2d 511, 514",
"parenthetical": "holding that Texas' two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | 11,291,462 | a |
Texas law supplies several limitations periods, applicable to different types of claims. Of the state law claims governed by the Texas statutes of limitations, we find that personal injury claims are most nearly analogous to the discrimination claims authorized by the Rehabilitation Act. As the Supreme Court has recognized, claims for discrimination are essentially claims for personal injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "471 U.S. 280, 280",
"parenthetical": "Claims under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983, including those which allege discrimination, \"are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_\"",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "846 F.2d 1026, 1028",
"parenthetical": "holding that Texas' two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. SS 1981",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | 11,291,462 | a |
Texas law supplies several limitations periods, applicable to different types of claims. Of the state law claims governed by the Texas statutes of limitations, we find that personal injury claims are most nearly analogous to the discrimination claims authorized by the Rehabilitation Act. As the Supreme Court has recognized, claims for discrimination are essentially claims for personal injury. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "724 F.2d 511, 514",
"parenthetical": "holding that Texas' two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "471 U.S. 280, 280",
"parenthetical": "Claims under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983, including those which allege discrimination, \"are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_\"",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | 11,291,462 | b |
Texas law supplies several limitations periods, applicable to different types of claims. Of the state law claims governed by the Texas statutes of limitations, we find that personal injury claims are most nearly analogous to the discrimination claims authorized by the Rehabilitation Act. As the Supreme Court has recognized, claims for discrimination are essentially claims for personal injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 1949, 1949",
"parenthetical": "Claims under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983, including those which allege discrimination, \"are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_\"",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "846 F.2d 1026, 1028",
"parenthetical": "holding that Texas' two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. SS 1981",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | 11,291,462 | a |
Texas law supplies several limitations periods, applicable to different types of claims. Of the state law claims governed by the Texas statutes of limitations, we find that personal injury claims are most nearly analogous to the discrimination claims authorized by the Rehabilitation Act. As the Supreme Court has recognized, claims for discrimination are essentially claims for personal injury. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "724 F.2d 511, 514",
"parenthetical": "holding that Texas' two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 1949, 1949",
"parenthetical": "Claims under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983, including those which allege discrimination, \"are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_\"",
"sentence": "See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661, 107 S.Ct. at 2621 (Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, “are in essence claims for personal injury.”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including those which allege discrimination, “are best characterized as personal injury ac-tions_”); see also Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Cervantes v. IMCO, Halliburton Services, 724 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that Texas’ two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin)."
} | 11,291,462 | b |
Ultimately, I concluded that the e-mail evidence was sufficiently reliable to show that defendant conspired to smuggle women for purposes of prostitution. Defendant presented no contrary evidence. Therefore, a departure was appropriate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 F.3d 509, 514",
"parenthetical": "affirming upward departure based on evidence of defendant's past, uncharged criminal conduct, including violence to prostitutes he pimped",
"sentence": "See United States v. Carter, 111 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming upward departure based on evidence of defendant’s past, uncharged criminal conduct, including violence to prostitutes he pimped); see also United States v. Delmarle, 99 F.3d 80, 85-86 (2d Cir.1996) (affirming upward departure based on foreign criminal conduct, even though foreign conviction was constitutionally infirm, because investigative records were sufficiently reliable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 F.3d 80, 85-86",
"parenthetical": "affirming upward departure based on foreign criminal conduct, even though foreign conviction was constitutionally infirm, because investigative records were sufficiently reliable",
"sentence": "See United States v. Carter, 111 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming upward departure based on evidence of defendant’s past, uncharged criminal conduct, including violence to prostitutes he pimped); see also United States v. Delmarle, 99 F.3d 80, 85-86 (2d Cir.1996) (affirming upward departure based on foreign criminal conduct, even though foreign conviction was constitutionally infirm, because investigative records were sufficiently reliable)."
} | 9,276,520 | a |
Nevertheless, a handgun with an obliterated serial number seems distinct from a weapon like a short-barreled shotgun. While a short-barreled shotgun is dangerous and unusual in that its conceal-ability fosters its use in illicit activity, it is also dangerous and unusual because of its heightened capability to cause damage. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 F.3d 524, 532",
"parenthetical": "\"With its shorter barrel, a sawed-off shotgun can be concealed under a large shirt or coat. It is the combination of low, somewhat indiscriminate accuracy, large destructive power, and the ability to conceal that makes a sawed-off shotgun useful for only violence against another person .... \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Amos, 501 F.3d 524, 532 (6th Cir.2007) (McKeague, J., dissenting) (“With its shorter barrel, a sawed-off shotgun can be concealed under a large shirt or coat. It is the combination of low, somewhat indiscriminate accuracy, large destructive power, and the ability to conceal that makes a sawed-off shotgun useful for only violence against another person .... ”); see also United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 404 (7th Cir.2008) (likening sawed-off shotguns to “other dangerous weapons like bazookas, mortars, pipe bombs, and machine guns”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "512 F.3d 394, 404",
"parenthetical": "likening sawed-off shotguns to \"other dangerous weapons like bazookas, mortars, pipe bombs, and machine guns\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Amos, 501 F.3d 524, 532 (6th Cir.2007) (McKeague, J., dissenting) (“With its shorter barrel, a sawed-off shotgun can be concealed under a large shirt or coat. It is the combination of low, somewhat indiscriminate accuracy, large destructive power, and the ability to conceal that makes a sawed-off shotgun useful for only violence against another person .... ”); see also United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 404 (7th Cir.2008) (likening sawed-off shotguns to “other dangerous weapons like bazookas, mortars, pipe bombs, and machine guns”)."
} | 3,707,189 | a |
. This principle is not at all alien to the federal system, as federal tax obligations have been interpreted in an identical manner. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "541 U.S. 123, 123",
"parenthetical": "holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.\"",
"sentence": "See Gallet-ti, 541 U.S. at 123, 124 S.Ct. 1548 (holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.”); United States v. Holmes, 727 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.2013) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]\" may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.\"",
"sentence": "See also Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 544 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]” may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.”)."
} | 3,898,679 | a |
. This principle is not at all alien to the federal system, as federal tax obligations have been interpreted in an identical manner. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "541 U.S. 123, 123",
"parenthetical": "holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.\"",
"sentence": "See Gallet-ti, 541 U.S. at 123, 124 S.Ct. 1548 (holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.”); United States v. Holmes, 727 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.2013) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]\" may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.\"",
"sentence": "See also Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 544 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]” may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.”)."
} | 3,898,679 | a |
. This principle is not at all alien to the federal system, as federal tax obligations have been interpreted in an identical manner. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "541 U.S. 123, 123",
"parenthetical": "holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.\"",
"sentence": "See Gallet-ti, 541 U.S. at 123, 124 S.Ct. 1548 (holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.”); United States v. Holmes, 727 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.2013) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]\" may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.\"",
"sentence": "See also Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 544 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]” may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.”)."
} | 3,898,679 | a |
. This principle is not at all alien to the federal system, as federal tax obligations have been interpreted in an identical manner. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]\" may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.\"",
"sentence": "See also Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 544 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]” may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.\"",
"sentence": "See Gallet-ti, 541 U.S. at 123, 124 S.Ct. 1548 (holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.”); United States v. Holmes, 727 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.2013) (same)."
} | 3,898,679 | b |
. This principle is not at all alien to the federal system, as federal tax obligations have been interpreted in an identical manner. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]\" may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.\"",
"sentence": "See also Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 544 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]” may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.\"",
"sentence": "See Gallet-ti, 541 U.S. at 123, 124 S.Ct. 1548 (holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.”); United States v. Holmes, 727 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.2013) (same)."
} | 3,898,679 | b |
. This principle is not at all alien to the federal system, as federal tax obligations have been interpreted in an identical manner. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.\"",
"sentence": "See Gallet-ti, 541 U.S. at 123, 124 S.Ct. 1548 (holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.”); United States v. Holmes, 727 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.2013) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]\" may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.\"",
"sentence": "See also Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 544 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]” may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.”)."
} | 3,898,679 | a |
. This principle is not at all alien to the federal system, as federal tax obligations have been interpreted in an identical manner. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "541 U.S. 123, 123",
"parenthetical": "holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.\"",
"sentence": "See Galletti, 541 U.S. at 123, 124 S.Ct. 1548 (holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.”); United States v. Holmes, 727 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.2013) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]\" may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.\"",
"sentence": "See also Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 544 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (observing that state “taxing scheme[s]” may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.”)."
} | 3,824,586 | a |
. This principle is not at all alien to the federal system, as federal tax obligations have been interpreted in an identical manner. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]\" may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.\"",
"sentence": "See also Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 544 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (observing that state “taxing scheme[s]” may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "541 U.S. 123, 123",
"parenthetical": "holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.\"",
"sentence": "See Galletti, 541 U.S. at 123, 124 S.Ct. 1548 (holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.”); United States v. Holmes, 727 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.2013) (same)."
} | 3,824,586 | b |
. This principle is not at all alien to the federal system, as federal tax obligations have been interpreted in an identical manner. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "541 U.S. 123, 123",
"parenthetical": "holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.\"",
"sentence": "See Galletti, 541 U.S. at 123, 124 S.Ct. 1548 (holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.”); United States v. Holmes, 727 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.2013) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]\" may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.\"",
"sentence": "See also Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 544 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (observing that state “taxing scheme[s]” may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.”)."
} | 3,824,586 | a |
. This principle is not at all alien to the federal system, as federal tax obligations have been interpreted in an identical manner. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]\" may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.\"",
"sentence": "See also Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 544 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (observing that state “taxing scheme[s]” may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.\"",
"sentence": "See Galletti, 541 U.S. at 123, 124 S.Ct. 1548 (holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.”); United States v. Holmes, 727 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.2013) (same)."
} | 3,824,586 | b |
. This principle is not at all alien to the federal system, as federal tax obligations have been interpreted in an identical manner. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]\" may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.\"",
"sentence": "See also Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 544 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (observing that state “taxing scheme[s]” may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.\"",
"sentence": "See Galletti, 541 U.S. at 123, 124 S.Ct. 1548 (holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.”); United States v. Holmes, 727 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.2013) (same)."
} | 3,824,586 | b |
. This principle is not at all alien to the federal system, as federal tax obligations have been interpreted in an identical manner. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that state \"taxing scheme[s]\" may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.\"",
"sentence": "See also Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 544 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (observing that state “taxing scheme[s]” may \"switch[] the incidence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.\"",
"sentence": "See Galletti, 541 U.S. at 123, 124 S.Ct. 1548 (holding that a derivatively liable corporate officer need not be separately assessed because \"[t]he consequences of the assessment ... attach to the tax debt without reference to the special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.”); United States v. Holmes, 727 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.2013) (same)."
} | 3,824,586 | b |
. The only detail of the evaluation duty that Section 321(a) provides is that the duty includes "investigating threatened plant closures or reductions in employment allegedly resulting from [CAA] administration or enforcement." 42 U.S.C. SS 7621(a). However, Section 321(a) explicitly notes that these investigations need only be conducted "where appropriate," id., and thereby renders them a matter of agency discretion unreviewable under Section 304(a)(2). See Guilford Cty. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "348 F.Supp.2d 548, 556",
"parenthetical": "holding that a statute providing that a state \"shall\" offer training and assistance \"if appropriate\" leaves the state with \"discretion in providing training and assistance\"",
"sentence": "Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. Wilson, 348 F.Supp.2d 548, 556 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (holding that a statute providing that a state \"shall” offer training and assistance \"if appropriate” leaves the state with \"discretion in providing training and assistance”); cf. Michigan v. EPA, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2699, 2707, 192 L.Ed.2d 674 (2015) (explaining that \" 'appropriate' is the classic broad and all-encompassing term” — one that \"leaves agencies with flexibility”) (internal quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "135 S.Ct. 2699, 2707",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \" 'appropriate' is the classic broad and all-encompassing term\" -- one that \"leaves agencies with flexibility\"",
"sentence": "Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. Wilson, 348 F.Supp.2d 548, 556 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (holding that a statute providing that a state \"shall” offer training and assistance \"if appropriate” leaves the state with \"discretion in providing training and assistance”); cf. Michigan v. EPA, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2699, 2707, 192 L.Ed.2d 674 (2015) (explaining that \" 'appropriate' is the classic broad and all-encompassing term” — one that \"leaves agencies with flexibility”) (internal quotation marks omitted)."
} | 12,276,180 | a |
. The only detail of the evaluation duty that Section 321(a) provides is that the duty includes "investigating threatened plant closures or reductions in employment allegedly resulting from [CAA] administration or enforcement." 42 U.S.C. SS 7621(a). However, Section 321(a) explicitly notes that these investigations need only be conducted "where appropriate," id., and thereby renders them a matter of agency discretion unreviewable under Section 304(a)(2). See Guilford Cty. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that \" 'appropriate' is the classic broad and all-encompassing term\" -- one that \"leaves agencies with flexibility\"",
"sentence": "Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. Wilson, 348 F.Supp.2d 548, 556 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (holding that a statute providing that a state \"shall” offer training and assistance \"if appropriate” leaves the state with \"discretion in providing training and assistance”); cf. Michigan v. EPA, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2699, 2707, 192 L.Ed.2d 674 (2015) (explaining that \" 'appropriate' is the classic broad and all-encompassing term” — one that \"leaves agencies with flexibility”) (internal quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "348 F.Supp.2d 548, 556",
"parenthetical": "holding that a statute providing that a state \"shall\" offer training and assistance \"if appropriate\" leaves the state with \"discretion in providing training and assistance\"",
"sentence": "Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. Wilson, 348 F.Supp.2d 548, 556 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (holding that a statute providing that a state \"shall” offer training and assistance \"if appropriate” leaves the state with \"discretion in providing training and assistance”); cf. Michigan v. EPA, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2699, 2707, 192 L.Ed.2d 674 (2015) (explaining that \" 'appropriate' is the classic broad and all-encompassing term” — one that \"leaves agencies with flexibility”) (internal quotation marks omitted)."
} | 12,276,180 | b |
In determining whether there is significant federal involvement, our cases focus not only on the efforts to obtain a warrant, but also on the execution of the warrant. However, since no federal officers were involved in the criminal investigation, or in obtaining or executing the warrant, federal rules did not apply to the search. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "273 U.S. 28, 33",
"parenthetical": "before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search \"in substance and effect ... a joint operation\" of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply",
"sentence": "Cf. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33, 47 S.Ct. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927) (before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search “in substance and effect ... a joint operation” of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949) (“The decisive factor in determining the applicability of the Byars case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "956 F.2d 847, 847",
"parenthetical": "section 3109 not applicable where state officers acted totally without federal involvement in seizing evidence",
"sentence": "Id. at 662-63. See also Moore, 956 F.2d at 847 (section 3109 not applicable where state officers acted totally without federal involvement in seizing evidence); United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237, 242 (8th Cir.1995) (no “significant federal involvement” where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives). In United States v. Schroeder, 129 F.3d 439, 443 (8th Cir.1997), we held that even the presence of federal officers at the search would not have constituted significant federal involvement, at least where state officers obtained and executed a warrant issued by a state judge as part of an investigation based on state law."
} | 11,242,494 | b |
In determining whether there is significant federal involvement, our cases focus not only on the efforts to obtain a warrant, but also on the execution of the warrant. However, since no federal officers were involved in the criminal investigation, or in obtaining or executing the warrant, federal rules did not apply to the search. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search \"in substance and effect ... a joint operation\" of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply",
"sentence": "Cf. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33, 47 S.Ct. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927) (before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search “in substance and effect ... a joint operation” of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949) (“The decisive factor in determining the applicability of the Byars case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "956 F.2d 847, 847",
"parenthetical": "section 3109 not applicable where state officers acted totally without federal involvement in seizing evidence",
"sentence": "Id. at 662-63. See also Moore, 956 F.2d at 847 (section 3109 not applicable where state officers acted totally without federal involvement in seizing evidence); United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237, 242 (8th Cir.1995) (no “significant federal involvement” where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives). In United States v. Schroeder, 129 F.3d 439, 443 (8th Cir.1997), we held that even the presence of federal officers at the search would not have constituted significant federal involvement, at least where state officers obtained and executed a warrant issued by a state judge as part of an investigation based on state law."
} | 11,242,494 | b |
In determining whether there is significant federal involvement, our cases focus not only on the efforts to obtain a warrant, but also on the execution of the warrant. However, since no federal officers were involved in the criminal investigation, or in obtaining or executing the warrant, federal rules did not apply to the search. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "956 F.2d 847, 847",
"parenthetical": "section 3109 not applicable where state officers acted totally without federal involvement in seizing evidence",
"sentence": "Id. at 662-63. See also Moore, 956 F.2d at 847 (section 3109 not applicable where state officers acted totally without federal involvement in seizing evidence); United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237, 242 (8th Cir.1995) (no “significant federal involvement” where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives). In United States v. Schroeder, 129 F.3d 439, 443 (8th Cir.1997), we held that even the presence of federal officers at the search would not have constituted significant federal involvement, at least where state officers obtained and executed a warrant issued by a state judge as part of an investigation based on state law."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search \"in substance and effect ... a joint operation\" of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply",
"sentence": "Cf. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33, 47 S.Ct. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927) (before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search “in substance and effect ... a joint operation” of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949) (“The decisive factor in determining the applicability of the Byars case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means."
} | 11,242,494 | a |
In determining whether there is significant federal involvement, our cases focus not only on the efforts to obtain a warrant, but also on the execution of the warrant. However, since no federal officers were involved in the criminal investigation, or in obtaining or executing the warrant, federal rules did not apply to the search. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "69 F.3d 237, 242",
"parenthetical": "no \"significant federal involvement\" where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives",
"sentence": "Id. at 662-63. See also Moore, 956 F.2d at 847 (section 3109 not applicable where state officers acted totally without federal involvement in seizing evidence); United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237, 242 (8th Cir.1995) (no “significant federal involvement” where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives). In United States v. Schroeder, 129 F.3d 439, 443 (8th Cir.1997), we held that even the presence of federal officers at the search would not have constituted significant federal involvement, at least where state officers obtained and executed a warrant issued by a state judge as part of an investigation based on state law."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "273 U.S. 28, 33",
"parenthetical": "before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search \"in substance and effect ... a joint operation\" of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply",
"sentence": "Cf. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33, 47 S.Ct. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927) (before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search “in substance and effect ... a joint operation” of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949) (“The decisive factor in determining the applicability of the Byars case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means."
} | 11,242,494 | a |
In determining whether there is significant federal involvement, our cases focus not only on the efforts to obtain a warrant, but also on the execution of the warrant. However, since no federal officers were involved in the criminal investigation, or in obtaining or executing the warrant, federal rules did not apply to the search. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "69 F.3d 237, 242",
"parenthetical": "no \"significant federal involvement\" where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives",
"sentence": "Id. at 662-63. See also Moore, 956 F.2d at 847 (section 3109 not applicable where state officers acted totally without federal involvement in seizing evidence); United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237, 242 (8th Cir.1995) (no “significant federal involvement” where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives). In United States v. Schroeder, 129 F.3d 439, 443 (8th Cir.1997), we held that even the presence of federal officers at the search would not have constituted significant federal involvement, at least where state officers obtained and executed a warrant issued by a state judge as part of an investigation based on state law."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search \"in substance and effect ... a joint operation\" of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply",
"sentence": "Cf. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33, 47 S.Ct. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927) (before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search “in substance and effect ... a joint operation” of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949) (“The decisive factor in determining the applicability of the Byars case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means."
} | 11,242,494 | a |
In determining whether there is significant federal involvement, our cases focus not only on the efforts to obtain a warrant, but also on the execution of the warrant. However, since no federal officers were involved in the criminal investigation, or in obtaining or executing the warrant, federal rules did not apply to the search. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "69 F.3d 237, 242",
"parenthetical": "no \"significant federal involvement\" where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives",
"sentence": "Id. at 662-63. See also Moore, 956 F.2d at 847 (section 3109 not applicable where state officers acted totally without federal involvement in seizing evidence); United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237, 242 (8th Cir.1995) (no “significant federal involvement” where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives). In United States v. Schroeder, 129 F.3d 439, 443 (8th Cir.1997), we held that even the presence of federal officers at the search would not have constituted significant federal involvement, at least where state officers obtained and executed a warrant issued by a state judge as part of an investigation based on state law."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search \"in substance and effect ... a joint operation\" of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply",
"sentence": "Cf. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33, 47 S.Ct. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927) (before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search “in substance and effect ... a joint operation” of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949) (“The decisive factor in determining the applicability of the Byars case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means."
} | 11,242,494 | a |
In determining whether there is significant federal involvement, our cases focus not only on the efforts to obtain a warrant, but also on the execution of the warrant. However, since no federal officers were involved in the criminal investigation, or in obtaining or executing the warrant, federal rules did not apply to the search. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "273 U.S. 28, 33",
"parenthetical": "before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search \"in substance and effect ... a joint operation\" of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply",
"sentence": "Cf. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33, 47 S.Ct. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927) (before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search “in substance and effect ... a joint operation” of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949) (“The decisive factor in determining the applicability of the Byars case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "129 F.3d 439, 443",
"parenthetical": "no \"significant federal involvement\" where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives",
"sentence": "Id. at 662-63. See also Moore, 956 F.2d at 847 (section 3109 not applicable where state officers acted totally without federal involvement in seizing evidence); United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237, 242 (8th Cir.1995) (no “significant federal involvement” where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives). In United States v. Schroeder, 129 F.3d 439, 443 (8th Cir.1997), we held that even the presence of federal officers at the search would not have constituted significant federal involvement, at least where state officers obtained and executed a warrant issued by a state judge as part of an investigation based on state law."
} | 11,242,494 | b |
In determining whether there is significant federal involvement, our cases focus not only on the efforts to obtain a warrant, but also on the execution of the warrant. However, since no federal officers were involved in the criminal investigation, or in obtaining or executing the warrant, federal rules did not apply to the search. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search \"in substance and effect ... a joint operation\" of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply",
"sentence": "Cf. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33, 47 S.Ct. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927) (before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search “in substance and effect ... a joint operation” of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949) (“The decisive factor in determining the applicability of the Byars case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "129 F.3d 439, 443",
"parenthetical": "no \"significant federal involvement\" where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives",
"sentence": "Id. at 662-63. See also Moore, 956 F.2d at 847 (section 3109 not applicable where state officers acted totally without federal involvement in seizing evidence); United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237, 242 (8th Cir.1995) (no “significant federal involvement” where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives). In United States v. Schroeder, 129 F.3d 439, 443 (8th Cir.1997), we held that even the presence of federal officers at the search would not have constituted significant federal involvement, at least where state officers obtained and executed a warrant issued by a state judge as part of an investigation based on state law."
} | 11,242,494 | b |
In determining whether there is significant federal involvement, our cases focus not only on the efforts to obtain a warrant, but also on the execution of the warrant. However, since no federal officers were involved in the criminal investigation, or in obtaining or executing the warrant, federal rules did not apply to the search. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "129 F.3d 439, 443",
"parenthetical": "no \"significant federal involvement\" where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives",
"sentence": "Id. at 662-63. See also Moore, 956 F.2d at 847 (section 3109 not applicable where state officers acted totally without federal involvement in seizing evidence); United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237, 242 (8th Cir.1995) (no “significant federal involvement” where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives). In United States v. Schroeder, 129 F.3d 439, 443 (8th Cir.1997), we held that even the presence of federal officers at the search would not have constituted significant federal involvement, at least where state officers obtained and executed a warrant issued by a state judge as part of an investigation based on state law."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search \"in substance and effect ... a joint operation\" of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply",
"sentence": "Cf. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33, 47 S.Ct. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927) (before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search “in substance and effect ... a joint operation” of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949) (“The decisive factor in determining the applicability of the Byars case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means."
} | 11,242,494 | a |
Although this evidence clearly and convincingly supports the finding that rather than separating from his spouse, Father "has chosen, instead, to remain with his wife," App. at 17 (Order at 8, P 2), Father's unwillingness to live separately from a mentally ill spouse, without more, is an insufficient basis upon which to terminate his parental rights. As our courts have long held: "Mental [disability] of the parents, standing alone, is not a proper ground for terminating parental rights." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "892 N.E.2d 239, 249, 248",
"parenthetical": "affirming termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights not only due to \"Mother's refusal to take readily available steps to bridge the communication gap caused [by her disability, which] seriously hindered Mother's ability to effectively care for her children\" but concluding that \"[i]n addition to not being able to appropri ately supervise the children, [both parents] fail[ed] to complete home-based services, and fail[ed] to improve their ability to effectively communicate with each other, ... [and] the parents had also not achieved the dispositional goal of securing and maintaining a safe and stable home\"",
"sentence": "Egly, 592 N.E.2d at 1234 (citing Ind.Code § 31-6-5-4(c) (1990); Matter of Dull, 521 N.E.2d 972, 976 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (“finding] that retardation of a parent by itself is not a ground for termination of parental rights” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted))); but see R.W., Sr., v. Marion Cnty. Dep’t of Child. Servs., 892 N.E.2d 239, 249, 248 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (affirming termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights not only due to “Mother’s refusal to take readily available steps to bridge the communication gap caused [by her disability, which] seriously hindered Mother’s ability to effectively care for her children” but concluding that “[i]n addition to not being able to appropri ately supervise the children, [both parents] fail[ed] to complete home-based services, and fail[ed] to improve their ability to effectively communicate with each other, ... [and] the parents had also not achieved the dispositional goal of securing and maintaining a safe and stable home”); R.G. v. Marion Cty."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "521 N.E.2d 972, 976",
"parenthetical": "\"finding] that retardation of a parent by itself is not a ground for termination of parental rights\" (emphasis in original",
"sentence": "Egly, 592 N.E.2d at 1234 (citing Ind.Code § 31-6-5-4(c) (1990); Matter of Dull, 521 N.E.2d 972, 976 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (“finding] that retardation of a parent by itself is not a ground for termination of parental rights” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted))); but see R.W., Sr., v. Marion Cnty. Dep’t of Child. Servs., 892 N.E.2d 239, 249, 248 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (affirming termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights not only due to “Mother’s refusal to take readily available steps to bridge the communication gap caused [by her disability, which] seriously hindered Mother’s ability to effectively care for her children” but concluding that “[i]n addition to not being able to appropri ately supervise the children, [both parents] fail[ed] to complete home-based services, and fail[ed] to improve their ability to effectively communicate with each other, ... [and] the parents had also not achieved the dispositional goal of securing and maintaining a safe and stable home”); R.G. v. Marion Cty."
} | 6,800,277 | b |
. Defendants also premise their motion to dismiss on Rule 9(b), but the PSLRA "super-cedes and embodies the standards of Rule 9(b)." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "299 F.3d 735, 742",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he investors technically do not need to meet the requirements of both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir.2002) (\"[T]he investors technically do not need to meet the requirements of both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the PSLRA, as the PSLRA supersedes reliance on 9(b) in securities fraud cases and embodies the standards of 9(b).”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The PSLRA requirements are more rigorous than those under Rule 9(b",
"sentence": "In re Nash Finch Co. Sec. Litig., 502 F.Supp.2d 861, 871 n. 5 (D.Minn.2007). Accord Lustgraaf v. Behrens, 619 F.3d 867, 874 n. 2 (8th Cir.2010) (“The PSLRA requirements are more rigorous than those under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”)."
} | 4,141,131 | b |
. Defendants also premise their motion to dismiss on Rule 9(b), but the PSLRA "super-cedes and embodies the standards of Rule 9(b)." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "299 F.3d 735, 742",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he investors technically do not need to meet the requirements of both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir.2002) (\"[T]he investors technically do not need to meet the requirements of both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the PSLRA, as the PSLRA supersedes reliance on 9(b) in securities fraud cases and embodies the standards of 9(b).”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The PSLRA requirements are more rigorous than those under Rule 9(b",
"sentence": "In re Nash Finch Co. Sec. Litig., 502 F.Supp.2d 861, 871 n. 5 (D.Minn.2007). Accord Lustgraaf v. Behrens, 619 F.3d 867, 874 n. 2 (8th Cir.2010) (“The PSLRA requirements are more rigorous than those under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”)."
} | 4,141,131 | b |
Ebid claims that the IJ erred in making an adverse credibility determination on the basis of the submission of one fraudulent document that Ebid explained was the result of a friend's advice that he needed corroboration and the fact that he could not obtain one from his doctor in Egypt. We disagree. An asylum applicant's knowing use of a fraudulent document that goes to the heart of his or her asylum claim, without sufficient explanation, can be substantial evidence to support an IJ's decision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "21 I. & N. Dec. 1083, 1083",
"parenthetical": "holding that an asylum applicant's submission of false documents without an adequate explanation supported adverse credibility findings",
"sentence": "See In re O-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 1083 (holding that an asylum applicant’s submission of false documents without an adequate explanation supported adverse credibility findings); accord, Borovikova v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 435 F.3d 151, 157-58 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that, absent a satisfactory explanation, a report indicating that petitioner’s birth certificate was forged impeached her “general credibility” and observing that the IJ could have rested the adverse credibility determination on this fact alone); cf. Lin v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir.2006) (“An IJ may be justified in some circumstances in concluding that a falsified document that goes to the heart of an applicant’s claim for asylum, if submitted as evidence in an asylum proceeding, calls into question the authenticity of other documents submitted in support of that application.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "445 F.3d 127, 132",
"parenthetical": "\"An IJ may be justified in some circumstances in concluding that a falsified document that goes to the heart of an applicant's claim for asylum, if submitted as evidence in an asylum proceeding, calls into question the authenticity of other documents submitted in support of that application.\"",
"sentence": "See In re O-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 1083 (holding that an asylum applicant’s submission of false documents without an adequate explanation supported adverse credibility findings); accord, Borovikova v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 435 F.3d 151, 157-58 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that, absent a satisfactory explanation, a report indicating that petitioner’s birth certificate was forged impeached her “general credibility” and observing that the IJ could have rested the adverse credibility determination on this fact alone); cf. Lin v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir.2006) (“An IJ may be justified in some circumstances in concluding that a falsified document that goes to the heart of an applicant’s claim for asylum, if submitted as evidence in an asylum proceeding, calls into question the authenticity of other documents submitted in support of that application.”)."
} | 3,699,740 | a |
In support of its slander per se claim, Plaintiff alleges that Hall "has stated and continues to state to Agilysys's existing customers and prospective customers that Agilysys is no longer in the business of selling IBM hardware or IBM solutions for such hardware." Am. Compl. at P 198. Plaintiff also alleges that "Hall has made false statements to Agilysys's customers and prospective customers regarding Agi-lysys's capacity to meet customer needs with respect to iSeries and IBM hardware and- solutions." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 4103576, at *30",
"parenthetical": "statements that the plaintiff was out of business did not constitute slander per se because they did not imply any dishonest or discreditable conduct on the Plaintiffs part",
"sentence": "Bellemead, LLC, 280 Ga. at 639, 631 S.E.2d 693 (finding no slander per se where the defendant allegedly said that the plaintiff would not be selling lots much longer because the plaintiff was leaving the area and suggesting that the buyer should buy lots from the defendant instead); see B & F Sys., Inc. v. LeBlanc, No. 7:07-CV-192 HL, 2011 WL 4103576, at *30 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2011) (statements that the plaintiff was out of business did not constitute slander per se because they did not imply any dishonest or discreditable conduct on the Plaintiffs part)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "280 Ga. 639, 639",
"parenthetical": "finding no slander per se where the defendant allegedly said that the plaintiff would not be selling lots much longer because the plaintiff was leaving the area and suggesting that the buyer should buy lots from the defendant instead",
"sentence": "Bellemead, LLC, 280 Ga. at 639, 631 S.E.2d 693 (finding no slander per se where the defendant allegedly said that the plaintiff would not be selling lots much longer because the plaintiff was leaving the area and suggesting that the buyer should buy lots from the defendant instead); see B & F Sys., Inc. v. LeBlanc, No. 7:07-CV-192 HL, 2011 WL 4103576, at *30 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2011) (statements that the plaintiff was out of business did not constitute slander per se because they did not imply any dishonest or discreditable conduct on the Plaintiffs part)."
} | 12,273,880 | b |
In support of its slander per se claim, Plaintiff alleges that Hall "has stated and continues to state to Agilysys's existing customers and prospective customers that Agilysys is no longer in the business of selling IBM hardware or IBM solutions for such hardware." Am. Compl. at P 198. Plaintiff also alleges that "Hall has made false statements to Agilysys's customers and prospective customers regarding Agi-lysys's capacity to meet customer needs with respect to iSeries and IBM hardware and- solutions." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 4103576, at *30",
"parenthetical": "statements that the plaintiff was out of business did not constitute slander per se because they did not imply any dishonest or discreditable conduct on the Plaintiffs part",
"sentence": "Bellemead, LLC, 280 Ga. at 639, 631 S.E.2d 693 (finding no slander per se where the defendant allegedly said that the plaintiff would not be selling lots much longer because the plaintiff was leaving the area and suggesting that the buyer should buy lots from the defendant instead); see B & F Sys., Inc. v. LeBlanc, No. 7:07-CV-192 HL, 2011 WL 4103576, at *30 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2011) (statements that the plaintiff was out of business did not constitute slander per se because they did not imply any dishonest or discreditable conduct on the Plaintiffs part)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no slander per se where the defendant allegedly said that the plaintiff would not be selling lots much longer because the plaintiff was leaving the area and suggesting that the buyer should buy lots from the defendant instead",
"sentence": "Bellemead, LLC, 280 Ga. at 639, 631 S.E.2d 693 (finding no slander per se where the defendant allegedly said that the plaintiff would not be selling lots much longer because the plaintiff was leaving the area and suggesting that the buyer should buy lots from the defendant instead); see B & F Sys., Inc. v. LeBlanc, No. 7:07-CV-192 HL, 2011 WL 4103576, at *30 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2011) (statements that the plaintiff was out of business did not constitute slander per se because they did not imply any dishonest or discreditable conduct on the Plaintiffs part)."
} | 12,273,880 | b |
First, as we explain below, a fact question remains as to whether there was sufficient probable cause to arrest Blondin for obstruction. Even if he committed a crime, though, that crime--failing to immediately comply with an officer order to get back from the scene of an arrest, when he was already standing thirty-seven feet away--was far from severe. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "478 F.3d 1048, 1055",
"parenthetical": "trespassing and obstructing a police officer were not \"serious offenses\"",
"sentence": "See Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir.2007) (trespassing and obstructing a police officer were not “serious offenses”); see also Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 702 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc) (domestic violence suspect was not “particularly dangerous,” and his offense was not “especially egregious”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "394 F.3d 689, 702",
"parenthetical": "domestic violence suspect was not \"particularly dangerous,\" and his offense was not \"especially egregious\"",
"sentence": "See Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir.2007) (trespassing and obstructing a police officer were not “serious offenses”); see also Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 702 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc) (domestic violence suspect was not “particularly dangerous,” and his offense was not “especially egregious”)."
} | 3,697,736 | a |
Federal courts have also enforced the protection of SS 407 from post judgment garnishment procedures which allowed the garnishment of bank accounts containing Social Security funds where the procedures did not clearly distinguish these funds. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "595 F.Supp. 1535, 1555, n. 15",
"parenthetical": "notice to debtors must inform them of exemption of Social Security benefits from attachment",
"sentence": "See also, Reigh v. Schleigh, 595 F.Supp. 1535, 1555, n. 15 (D.Md.1984) (notice to debtors must inform them of exemption of Social Security benefits from attachment); Dionne v. Bouley, 583 F.Supp. 307, 319 (D.R.I.1984), aff'd 757 F.2d 1344 (1st Cir.1985); Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., Inc., 534 F.Supp. 1178, 1187-88 (S.D.N.Y.1982)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bank accounts may not be attached without regard to whether they contain Social Security funds",
"sentence": "See Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir.1980) (bank accounts may not be attached without regard to whether they contain Social Security funds)."
} | 12,024,995 | b |
However, the record also demonstrates that plaintiff was reassigned from a route suitable for "experienced couriers" to a route that did not require experience and was a "back buster." Moreover, plaintiff presented evidence that the reassignment required him to drive a truck, which plaintiff describes as the "the worst truck in the station" because of its poor transmission, lap-belt seat belts and lack of shelving. Dep. Grosso at 97. For these reasons, a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action when he was reassigned to route 202. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1999 WL 673062, at *6",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff suffered adverse employment action when her job responsibilities were reduced and her office location changed, even though plaintiff received the same salary and benefits",
"sentence": "See Burlington Northern, 126 S.Ct. at 2417 (reassignment of job duties was “materially adverse” for the purposes of Title VII retaliation claim where plaintiff was reassigned from a job that required “more qualifications” to a job that was “more arduous and dirtier.”); see also Voorhees, 1999 WL 673062 at *6 (plaintiff suffered adverse employment action when her job responsibilities were reduced and her office location changed, even though plaintiff received the same salary and benefits)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "126 S.Ct. 2417, 2417",
"parenthetical": "reassignment of job duties was \"materially adverse\" for the purposes of Title VII retaliation claim where plaintiff was reassigned from a job that required \"more qualifications\" to a job that was \"more arduous and dirtier.\"",
"sentence": "See Burlington Northern, 126 S.Ct. at 2417 (reassignment of job duties was “materially adverse” for the purposes of Title VII retaliation claim where plaintiff was reassigned from a job that required “more qualifications” to a job that was “more arduous and dirtier.”); see also Voorhees, 1999 WL 673062 at *6 (plaintiff suffered adverse employment action when her job responsibilities were reduced and her office location changed, even though plaintiff received the same salary and benefits)."
} | 3,776,295 | b |
Despite our recognition of the problem of homelessness among veterans, we are not bound by the Secretary's concession when considering whether Ms. Checo's homelessness is an extraordinary circumstance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "19 Vet.App. 332, 332",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Court will \"evaluate the evidence presented and determine whether equitable tolling is appropriate on a case-by-case basis\"",
"sentence": "See Bove, 25 Vet.App. at 140-41 (holding that the 120-day judicial appeal period is not subject to waiver or forfeiture by the Secretary); see also McCreary, 19 Vet.App. at 332 (holding that the Court will “evaluate the evidence presented and determine whether equitable tolling is appropriate on a case-by-case basis”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "25 Vet.App. 140, 140-41",
"parenthetical": "holding that the 120-day judicial appeal period is not subject to waiver or forfeiture by the Secretary",
"sentence": "See Bove, 25 Vet.App. at 140-41 (holding that the 120-day judicial appeal period is not subject to waiver or forfeiture by the Secretary); see also McCreary, 19 Vet.App. at 332 (holding that the Court will “evaluate the evidence presented and determine whether equitable tolling is appropriate on a case-by-case basis”)."
} | 4,074,020 | b |
Yet, appellant argues that because the decedent did not intend to injure Odegard, the intentional act exclusion is not applicable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "309 Minn. 169, 177-78",
"parenthetical": "inferring intent to injure when the acts were calculated and remorseless, such as intentional preparation to inflict serious injury by carrying loaded guns",
"sentence": "See German Mut Ins. Co. v. Yeager, 554 N.W.2d 116, 117 (Minn.App.1996), review denied (Minn. Dec. 23, 1996) (ruling that an intentional act exclusion to insurance coverage applies only when insured intends to cause harm, not when insured merely intends the act); see also Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Toal, 309 Minn. 169, 177-78, 244 N.W.2d 121, 126 (1976) (inferring intent to injure when the acts were calculated and remorseless, such as intentional preparation to inflict serious injury by carrying loaded guns)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "554 N.W.2d 116, 117",
"parenthetical": "ruling that an intentional act exclusion to insurance coverage applies only when insured intends to cause harm, not when insured merely intends the act",
"sentence": "See German Mut Ins. Co. v. Yeager, 554 N.W.2d 116, 117 (Minn.App.1996), review denied (Minn. Dec. 23, 1996) (ruling that an intentional act exclusion to insurance coverage applies only when insured intends to cause harm, not when insured merely intends the act); see also Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Toal, 309 Minn. 169, 177-78, 244 N.W.2d 121, 126 (1976) (inferring intent to injure when the acts were calculated and remorseless, such as intentional preparation to inflict serious injury by carrying loaded guns)."
} | 11,638,579 | b |
Yet, appellant argues that because the decedent did not intend to injure Odegard, the intentional act exclusion is not applicable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "554 N.W.2d 116, 117",
"parenthetical": "ruling that an intentional act exclusion to insurance coverage applies only when insured intends to cause harm, not when insured merely intends the act",
"sentence": "See German Mut Ins. Co. v. Yeager, 554 N.W.2d 116, 117 (Minn.App.1996), review denied (Minn. Dec. 23, 1996) (ruling that an intentional act exclusion to insurance coverage applies only when insured intends to cause harm, not when insured merely intends the act); see also Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Toal, 309 Minn. 169, 177-78, 244 N.W.2d 121, 126 (1976) (inferring intent to injure when the acts were calculated and remorseless, such as intentional preparation to inflict serious injury by carrying loaded guns)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "244 N.W.2d 121, 126",
"parenthetical": "inferring intent to injure when the acts were calculated and remorseless, such as intentional preparation to inflict serious injury by carrying loaded guns",
"sentence": "See German Mut Ins. Co. v. Yeager, 554 N.W.2d 116, 117 (Minn.App.1996), review denied (Minn. Dec. 23, 1996) (ruling that an intentional act exclusion to insurance coverage applies only when insured intends to cause harm, not when insured merely intends the act); see also Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Toal, 309 Minn. 169, 177-78, 244 N.W.2d 121, 126 (1976) (inferring intent to injure when the acts were calculated and remorseless, such as intentional preparation to inflict serious injury by carrying loaded guns)."
} | 11,638,579 | a |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "475 U.S. 412, 426",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "168 U.S. 532, 558",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | b |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "168 U.S. 532, 558",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | b |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "168 U.S. 532, 558",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | a |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "475 U.S. 412, 426",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | a |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | a |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | a |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "475 U.S. 412, 426",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | a |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | a |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | a |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "475 U.S. 412, 426",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "423 U.S. 411, 424",
"parenthetical": "identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the \"confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | b |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "423 U.S. 411, 424",
"parenthetical": "identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the \"confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | b |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "423 U.S. 411, 424",
"parenthetical": "identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the \"confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | b |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the \"confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "475 U.S. 412, 426",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | a |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the \"confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | b |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the \"confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | b |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "475 U.S. 412, 426",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the \"confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | b |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the \"confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | b |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the \"confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | b |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "475 U.S. 412, 426",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375",
"parenthetical": "identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | b |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375",
"parenthetical": "identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | a |
. The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375",
"parenthetical": "identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (\"[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station \" (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (\"[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied))."
} | 8,163,323 | b |
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