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If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying the same rule in the context of a car search: \"[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | 7,961,218 | b |
Accordingly, the feasibility exception has not been applied where a defendant merely suggests that an original design is acceptable, or argues about tradeoffs involved in taking precautionary measures. Where, however, a defendant's evidence and arguments are framed in categorical terms, are presented in the form of superlatives, or, more generally, upset the balance of fairness that Rule 407 seeks to maintain, courts have found the exceptions applicable. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "774 F.2d 1309, 1313-14",
"parenthetical": "allowing admission of evidence of modifications to a rifle's safety mechanism for impeachment, where the manufacturer's representative repeatedly characterized the original mechanism as the safest possible",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wood, 70 F.3d at 1208 (holding that, where the defendant’s expert described the product design using superlatives, namely, the “safest [design] you could possibly put on the machine,” the plaintiff should have been permitted to impeach the expert by inquiring why the safest design possible was modified following the plaintiff’s accident); cf. Muzyka v. Remington Arms Co., 774 F.2d 1309, 1313-14 (5th Cir.1985) (allowing admission of evidence of modifications to a rifle’s safety mechanism for impeachment, where the manufacturer’s representative repeatedly characterized the original mechanism as the safest possible)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 1208, 1208",
"parenthetical": "holding that, where the defendant's expert described the product design using superlatives, namely, the \"safest [design] you could possibly put on the machine,\" the plaintiff should have been permitted to impeach the expert by inquiring why the safest design possible was modified following the plaintiff's accident",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wood, 70 F.3d at 1208 (holding that, where the defendant’s expert described the product design using superlatives, namely, the “safest [design] you could possibly put on the machine,” the plaintiff should have been permitted to impeach the expert by inquiring why the safest design possible was modified following the plaintiff’s accident); cf. Muzyka v. Remington Arms Co., 774 F.2d 1309, 1313-14 (5th Cir.1985) (allowing admission of evidence of modifications to a rifle’s safety mechanism for impeachment, where the manufacturer’s representative repeatedly characterized the original mechanism as the safest possible)."
} | 11,114,252 | b |
Faber avers -- and Menard does not dispute -- that he was plainly told that he was in no position to bargain: he could either sign the contract as it stood, or be replaced by a younger employee who would cost Menard less, with the added stinger that he was told that Menard would not, or that Larry Menard could not, negotiate terms of individual contracts. Moreover, Me-nard is a large national company, and Fa-ber was but one employee of that company, and even if he was a "managerial" employee, he was in the relatively low position of store manager for a multi-store, multi-state chain, so that Faber was not only at a distinct disadvantage in bargaining power, but was also subject to very different financial pressures than Menard. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "279 F.3d 893, 893",
"parenthetical": "noting that the employment agreement for all new employees with a national chain store was \"a prerequisite for employment\" that the applicants were not permitted to modify",
"sentence": "See Gentile, 479 N.W.2d at 609 (considering whether the parties were under any particular financial pressures); see also Circuit City, 279 F.3d at 893 (noting that the employment agreement for all new employees with a national chain store was “a prerequisite for employment” that the applicants were not permitted to modify)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "479 N.W.2d 609, 609",
"parenthetical": "considering whether the parties were under any particular financial pressures",
"sentence": "See Gentile, 479 N.W.2d at 609 (considering whether the parties were under any particular financial pressures); see also Circuit City, 279 F.3d at 893 (noting that the employment agreement for all new employees with a national chain store was “a prerequisite for employment” that the applicants were not permitted to modify)"
} | 9,108,303 | b |
As one example of such a sufficiently distant event, the Court cited a "collapse of the collective-bargaining relationship, as evidenced by decertification of the union." Id.) | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "857 F.Supp. 1069, 1078",
"parenthetical": "pre dieting the players can avoid the labor injunction if they disclaim the union as their collective bargaining agent",
"sentence": "Brown, 50 F.3d at 1057 (“If employees wish to seek the protections of the Sherman Act, they may forego unionization or even decertify their unions.”); see also NBA v. Williams, 857 F.Supp. 1069, 1078 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (pre dieting the players can avoid the labor injunction if they disclaim the union as their collective bargaining agent); Powell v. NFL, 764 F.Supp. 1351, 1356-57 (D.Minn.1991) (holding that the ongoing collective bargaining relationship ends, and the nonstatutory labor exemption no longer applies, when the players vote to repudiate the union)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "50 F.3d 1057, 1057",
"parenthetical": "\"If employees wish to seek the protections of the Sherman Act, they may forego unionization or even decertify their unions.\"",
"sentence": "Brown, 50 F.3d at 1057 (“If employees wish to seek the protections of the Sherman Act, they may forego unionization or even decertify their unions.”); see also NBA v. Williams, 857 F.Supp. 1069, 1078 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (pre dieting the players can avoid the labor injunction if they disclaim the union as their collective bargaining agent); Powell v. NFL, 764 F.Supp. 1351, 1356-57 (D.Minn.1991) (holding that the ongoing collective bargaining relationship ends, and the nonstatutory labor exemption no longer applies, when the players vote to repudiate the union)."
} | 4,203,564 | b |
As one example of such a sufficiently distant event, the Court cited a "collapse of the collective-bargaining relationship, as evidenced by decertification of the union." Id.) | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "50 F.3d 1057, 1057",
"parenthetical": "\"If employees wish to seek the protections of the Sherman Act, they may forego unionization or even decertify their unions.\"",
"sentence": "Brown, 50 F.3d at 1057 (“If employees wish to seek the protections of the Sherman Act, they may forego unionization or even decertify their unions.”); see also NBA v. Williams, 857 F.Supp. 1069, 1078 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (pre dieting the players can avoid the labor injunction if they disclaim the union as their collective bargaining agent); Powell v. NFL, 764 F.Supp. 1351, 1356-57 (D.Minn.1991) (holding that the ongoing collective bargaining relationship ends, and the nonstatutory labor exemption no longer applies, when the players vote to repudiate the union)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "764 F.Supp. 1351, 1356-57",
"parenthetical": "holding that the ongoing collective bargaining relationship ends, and the nonstatutory labor exemption no longer applies, when the players vote to repudiate the union",
"sentence": "Brown, 50 F.3d at 1057 (“If employees wish to seek the protections of the Sherman Act, they may forego unionization or even decertify their unions.”); see also NBA v. Williams, 857 F.Supp. 1069, 1078 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (pre dieting the players can avoid the labor injunction if they disclaim the union as their collective bargaining agent); Powell v. NFL, 764 F.Supp. 1351, 1356-57 (D.Minn.1991) (holding that the ongoing collective bargaining relationship ends, and the nonstatutory labor exemption no longer applies, when the players vote to repudiate the union)."
} | 4,203,564 | a |
Granting Mr. Reimer the benefit of all favorable inferences from the record, a jury could reasonably conclude that based on the information he possessed at the time and given the task he was performing, the risk of being burned while examining the School District's boiler on March 10, 1998, was neither a reasonably apparent danger nor a reasonably foreseeable incidental risk. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "180 F.3d 937, 940",
"parenthetical": "applying Minnesota law and affirming summary judgment where \"it is undisputed that Walk placed his hand in the trough knowing that the auger was engaged and knowing that the moving blades posed a substantial risk to him.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Walk v. Starkey Mach., Inc., 180 F.3d 937, 940 (8th Cir.1999) (applying Minnesota law and affirming summary judgment where “it is undisputed that Walk placed his hand in the trough knowing that the auger was engaged and knowing that the moving blades posed a substantial risk to him.”); Andren, 465 N.W.2d at 105-06 (affirming summary judgment where evidence conclusively demonstrated that plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger of lighting a cigarette in the presence of liquid propane gas and knew and appreciated that there was a liquid propane gas leak in the basement); Armstrong, 284 N.W.2d at 353 (“[A]ny improper operation of the release valve merely increased the risk of a BLEVE; it did not remove the occurrence of a BLEVE from the risks reasonably anticipated by the ... firemen.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "289 N.W.2d 170, 170",
"parenthetical": "\"In order to assume the risk of a particular act or condition one must know and appreciate the danger itself and not just the facts which constitute it.\"",
"sentence": "See Wegscheider, 289 N.W.2d at 170 (“In order to assume the risk of a particular act or condition one must know and appreciate the danger itself and not just the facts which constitute it.”)."
} | 9,317,034 | b |
Granting Mr. Reimer the benefit of all favorable inferences from the record, a jury could reasonably conclude that based on the information he possessed at the time and given the task he was performing, the risk of being burned while examining the School District's boiler on March 10, 1998, was neither a reasonably apparent danger nor a reasonably foreseeable incidental risk. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "465 N.W.2d 105, 105-06",
"parenthetical": "affirming summary judgment where evidence conclusively demonstrated that plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger of lighting a cigarette in the presence of liquid propane gas and knew and appreciated that there was a liquid propane gas leak in the basement",
"sentence": "Cf. Walk v. Starkey Mach., Inc., 180 F.3d 937, 940 (8th Cir.1999) (applying Minnesota law and affirming summary judgment where “it is undisputed that Walk placed his hand in the trough knowing that the auger was engaged and knowing that the moving blades posed a substantial risk to him.”); Andren, 465 N.W.2d at 105-06 (affirming summary judgment where evidence conclusively demonstrated that plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger of lighting a cigarette in the presence of liquid propane gas and knew and appreciated that there was a liquid propane gas leak in the basement); Armstrong, 284 N.W.2d at 353 (“[A]ny improper operation of the release valve merely increased the risk of a BLEVE; it did not remove the occurrence of a BLEVE from the risks reasonably anticipated by the ... firemen.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "289 N.W.2d 170, 170",
"parenthetical": "\"In order to assume the risk of a particular act or condition one must know and appreciate the danger itself and not just the facts which constitute it.\"",
"sentence": "See Wegscheider, 289 N.W.2d at 170 (“In order to assume the risk of a particular act or condition one must know and appreciate the danger itself and not just the facts which constitute it.”)."
} | 9,317,034 | b |
In cases challenging state criminal jury instructions in general, the United States Supreme Court has consistently deferred to the states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 396, 401",
"parenthetical": "\" '[R]eview by this Court of state action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction.' \"",
"sentence": "See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 149, 94 S.Ct. 396, 401, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) (“ ‘[R]eview by this Court of state action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction.’ ”) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340, 63 S.Ct. 608, 613, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "328 U.S. 463, 476",
"parenthetical": "\"The administration of criminal law in matters not affected by constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a matter peculiarly of local concern.\"",
"sentence": "See also Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476, 66 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25, 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946) (“The administration of criminal law in matters not affected by constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a matter peculiarly of local concern.”)."
} | 3,733,383 | a |
In cases challenging state criminal jury instructions in general, the United States Supreme Court has consistently deferred to the states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 396, 401",
"parenthetical": "\" '[R]eview by this Court of state action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction.' \"",
"sentence": "See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 149, 94 S.Ct. 396, 401, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) (“ ‘[R]eview by this Court of state action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction.’ ”) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340, 63 S.Ct. 608, 613, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "66 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25",
"parenthetical": "\"The administration of criminal law in matters not affected by constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a matter peculiarly of local concern.\"",
"sentence": "See also Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476, 66 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25, 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946) (“The administration of criminal law in matters not affected by constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a matter peculiarly of local concern.”)."
} | 3,733,383 | a |
In cases challenging state criminal jury instructions in general, the United States Supreme Court has consistently deferred to the states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 396, 401",
"parenthetical": "\" '[R]eview by this Court of state action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction.' \"",
"sentence": "See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 149, 94 S.Ct. 396, 401, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) (“ ‘[R]eview by this Court of state action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction.’ ”) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340, 63 S.Ct. 608, 613, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The administration of criminal law in matters not affected by constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a matter peculiarly of local concern.\"",
"sentence": "See also Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476, 66 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25, 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946) (“The administration of criminal law in matters not affected by constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a matter peculiarly of local concern.”)."
} | 3,733,383 | a |
In cases challenging state criminal jury instructions in general, the United States Supreme Court has consistently deferred to the states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" '[R]eview by this Court of state action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction.' \"",
"sentence": "See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 149, 94 S.Ct. 396, 401, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) (“ ‘[R]eview by this Court of state action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction.’ ”) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340, 63 S.Ct. 608, 613, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "328 U.S. 463, 476",
"parenthetical": "\"The administration of criminal law in matters not affected by constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a matter peculiarly of local concern.\"",
"sentence": "See also Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476, 66 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25, 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946) (“The administration of criminal law in matters not affected by constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a matter peculiarly of local concern.”)."
} | 3,733,383 | a |
In cases challenging state criminal jury instructions in general, the United States Supreme Court has consistently deferred to the states. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "66 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25",
"parenthetical": "\"The administration of criminal law in matters not affected by constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a matter peculiarly of local concern.\"",
"sentence": "See also Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476, 66 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25, 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946) (“The administration of criminal law in matters not affected by constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a matter peculiarly of local concern.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" '[R]eview by this Court of state action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction.' \"",
"sentence": "See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 149, 94 S.Ct. 396, 401, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) (“ ‘[R]eview by this Court of state action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction.’ ”) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340, 63 S.Ct. 608, 613, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943))."
} | 3,733,383 | b |
In cases challenging state criminal jury instructions in general, the United States Supreme Court has consistently deferred to the states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" '[R]eview by this Court of state action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction.' \"",
"sentence": "See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 149, 94 S.Ct. 396, 401, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) (“ ‘[R]eview by this Court of state action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction.’ ”) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340, 63 S.Ct. 608, 613, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The administration of criminal law in matters not affected by constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a matter peculiarly of local concern.\"",
"sentence": "See also Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476, 66 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25, 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946) (“The administration of criminal law in matters not affected by constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a matter peculiarly of local concern.”)."
} | 3,733,383 | a |
The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that a general creditor lacks the property interest required by Section 853(n)(2) in order to confer standing to pursue a claim in an ancillary proceeding. See, e.g., DSI Assocs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "496 F.3d 184, 184",
"parenthetical": "holding that a claimant without an interest in a \"particular, specific asset\" lacks standing to initiate ancillary proceeding",
"sentence": "LLC, 496 F.3d at 184 (holding that a claimant without an interest in a “particular, specific asset” lacks standing to initiate ancillary proceeding); Ribadeneira, 105 F.3d at 836-37 (holding that general creditor lacked standing to petition to modify an order of forfeiture); Coluccio, 51 F.3d at 339 (holding that general creditors do not have standing to contest forfeitures); Schwimmer, 968 F.2d at 1581; see also Agnello, 344 F.Supp.2d at 372 (holding that party that did not establish ownership in specific funds was a general creditor that only had a right to payment). Accordingly, the court agrees with the government that Griffin lacks standing to pursue a claim to the funds subject to the preliminary orders of forfeiture. (Gov."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "344 F.Supp.2d 372, 372",
"parenthetical": "holding that party that did not establish ownership in specific funds was a general creditor that only had a right to payment",
"sentence": "LLC, 496 F.3d at 184 (holding that a claimant without an interest in a “particular, specific asset” lacks standing to initiate ancillary proceeding); Ribadeneira, 105 F.3d at 836-37 (holding that general creditor lacked standing to petition to modify an order of forfeiture); Coluccio, 51 F.3d at 339 (holding that general creditors do not have standing to contest forfeitures); Schwimmer, 968 F.2d at 1581; see also Agnello, 344 F.Supp.2d at 372 (holding that party that did not establish ownership in specific funds was a general creditor that only had a right to payment). Accordingly, the court agrees with the government that Griffin lacks standing to pursue a claim to the funds subject to the preliminary orders of forfeiture. (Gov."
} | 4,306,460 | a |
The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that a general creditor lacks the property interest required by Section 853(n)(2) in order to confer standing to pursue a claim in an ancillary proceeding. See, e.g., DSI Assocs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "344 F.Supp.2d 372, 372",
"parenthetical": "holding that party that did not establish ownership in specific funds was a general creditor that only had a right to payment",
"sentence": "LLC, 496 F.3d at 184 (holding that a claimant without an interest in a “particular, specific asset” lacks standing to initiate ancillary proceeding); Ribadeneira, 105 F.3d at 836-37 (holding that general creditor lacked standing to petition to modify an order of forfeiture); Coluccio, 51 F.3d at 339 (holding that general creditors do not have standing to contest forfeitures); Schwimmer, 968 F.2d at 1581; see also Agnello, 344 F.Supp.2d at 372 (holding that party that did not establish ownership in specific funds was a general creditor that only had a right to payment). Accordingly, the court agrees with the government that Griffin lacks standing to pursue a claim to the funds subject to the preliminary orders of forfeiture. (Gov."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "105 F.3d 836, 836-37",
"parenthetical": "holding that general creditor lacked standing to petition to modify an order of forfeiture",
"sentence": "LLC, 496 F.3d at 184 (holding that a claimant without an interest in a “particular, specific asset” lacks standing to initiate ancillary proceeding); Ribadeneira, 105 F.3d at 836-37 (holding that general creditor lacked standing to petition to modify an order of forfeiture); Coluccio, 51 F.3d at 339 (holding that general creditors do not have standing to contest forfeitures); Schwimmer, 968 F.2d at 1581; see also Agnello, 344 F.Supp.2d at 372 (holding that party that did not establish ownership in specific funds was a general creditor that only had a right to payment). Accordingly, the court agrees with the government that Griffin lacks standing to pursue a claim to the funds subject to the preliminary orders of forfeiture. (Gov."
} | 4,306,460 | b |
The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that a general creditor lacks the property interest required by Section 853(n)(2) in order to confer standing to pursue a claim in an ancillary proceeding. See, e.g., DSI Assocs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "51 F.3d 339, 339",
"parenthetical": "holding that general creditors do not have standing to contest forfeitures",
"sentence": "LLC, 496 F.3d at 184 (holding that a claimant without an interest in a “particular, specific asset” lacks standing to initiate ancillary proceeding); Ribadeneira, 105 F.3d at 836-37 (holding that general creditor lacked standing to petition to modify an order of forfeiture); Coluccio, 51 F.3d at 339 (holding that general creditors do not have standing to contest forfeitures); Schwimmer, 968 F.2d at 1581; see also Agnello, 344 F.Supp.2d at 372 (holding that party that did not establish ownership in specific funds was a general creditor that only had a right to payment). Accordingly, the court agrees with the government that Griffin lacks standing to pursue a claim to the funds subject to the preliminary orders of forfeiture. (Gov."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "344 F.Supp.2d 372, 372",
"parenthetical": "holding that party that did not establish ownership in specific funds was a general creditor that only had a right to payment",
"sentence": "LLC, 496 F.3d at 184 (holding that a claimant without an interest in a “particular, specific asset” lacks standing to initiate ancillary proceeding); Ribadeneira, 105 F.3d at 836-37 (holding that general creditor lacked standing to petition to modify an order of forfeiture); Coluccio, 51 F.3d at 339 (holding that general creditors do not have standing to contest forfeitures); Schwimmer, 968 F.2d at 1581; see also Agnello, 344 F.Supp.2d at 372 (holding that party that did not establish ownership in specific funds was a general creditor that only had a right to payment). Accordingly, the court agrees with the government that Griffin lacks standing to pursue a claim to the funds subject to the preliminary orders of forfeiture. (Gov."
} | 4,306,460 | a |
Although an unnamed class member, Kaufmann has standing to appeal, without first intervening. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "536 U.S. 1, 14",
"parenthetical": "holding that unnamed class members who object in a timely manner to approval of a settlement at a fairness hearing may appeal without first intervening",
"sentence": "See Devlin v. Scardelletti 536 U.S. 1, 14, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (holding that unnamed class members who object in a timely manner to approval of a settlement at a fairness hearing may appeal without first intervening); See also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1307 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that an unnamed plaintiff that did not intervene nonetheless had standing to appeal a class action settlement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 F.3d 1304, 1307",
"parenthetical": "holding that an unnamed plaintiff that did not intervene nonetheless had standing to appeal a class action settlement",
"sentence": "See Devlin v. Scardelletti 536 U.S. 1, 14, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (holding that unnamed class members who object in a timely manner to approval of a settlement at a fairness hearing may appeal without first intervening); See also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1307 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that an unnamed plaintiff that did not intervene nonetheless had standing to appeal a class action settlement)."
} | 9,034,218 | a |
Although an unnamed class member, Kaufmann has standing to appeal, without first intervening. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 F.3d 1304, 1307",
"parenthetical": "holding that an unnamed plaintiff that did not intervene nonetheless had standing to appeal a class action settlement",
"sentence": "See Devlin v. Scardelletti 536 U.S. 1, 14, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (holding that unnamed class members who object in a timely manner to approval of a settlement at a fairness hearing may appeal without first intervening); See also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1307 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that an unnamed plaintiff that did not intervene nonetheless had standing to appeal a class action settlement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that unnamed class members who object in a timely manner to approval of a settlement at a fairness hearing may appeal without first intervening",
"sentence": "See Devlin v. Scardelletti 536 U.S. 1, 14, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (holding that unnamed class members who object in a timely manner to approval of a settlement at a fairness hearing may appeal without first intervening); See also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1307 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that an unnamed plaintiff that did not intervene nonetheless had standing to appeal a class action settlement)."
} | 9,034,218 | b |
Although an unnamed class member, Kaufmann has standing to appeal, without first intervening. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that unnamed class members who object in a timely manner to approval of a settlement at a fairness hearing may appeal without first intervening",
"sentence": "See Devlin v. Scardelletti 536 U.S. 1, 14, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (holding that unnamed class members who object in a timely manner to approval of a settlement at a fairness hearing may appeal without first intervening); See also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1307 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that an unnamed plaintiff that did not intervene nonetheless had standing to appeal a class action settlement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 F.3d 1304, 1307",
"parenthetical": "holding that an unnamed plaintiff that did not intervene nonetheless had standing to appeal a class action settlement",
"sentence": "See Devlin v. Scardelletti 536 U.S. 1, 14, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (holding that unnamed class members who object in a timely manner to approval of a settlement at a fairness hearing may appeal without first intervening); See also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1307 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that an unnamed plaintiff that did not intervene nonetheless had standing to appeal a class action settlement)."
} | 9,034,218 | a |
The evidence was clearly sufficient to show that Boyd was a drug dealer and that he distributed crack as charged in the indictment, but it 'did not show that he was engaged in a conspiratorial agreement to violate the drug laws. None of the three women who testified against Boyd indicated that she worked for Boyd or solicited drug sales on his behalf, or otherwise acted in concert with Boyd to achieve a common purpose beyond their desire to purchase drugs from him. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "9 F.3d 1139, 1157",
"parenthetical": "\"An agreement to violate narcotics laws may be inferred from 'concert of action.' \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1157 (5th Cir.1993) (“An agreement to violate narcotics laws may be inferred from ‘concert of action.’ ”); see also United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 769 (5th Cir.2007) (holding that co-conspirators’ concert of action allowed jury to infer an agreement where defendants agreed to purchase crack cocaine together for distribution, agreed to travel together, and agreed to have another co-conspirator conduct the transaction on behalf of all of them). The only motive apparent from the testimony for the women helping Franklin was their hope that Franklin would either share the drugs with them or pay them for their assistance."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "484 F.3d 762, 769",
"parenthetical": "holding that co-conspirators' concert of action allowed jury to infer an agreement where defendants agreed to purchase crack cocaine together for distribution, agreed to travel together, and agreed to have another co-conspirator conduct the transaction on behalf of all of them",
"sentence": "See United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1157 (5th Cir.1993) (“An agreement to violate narcotics laws may be inferred from ‘concert of action.’ ”); see also United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 769 (5th Cir.2007) (holding that co-conspirators’ concert of action allowed jury to infer an agreement where defendants agreed to purchase crack cocaine together for distribution, agreed to travel together, and agreed to have another co-conspirator conduct the transaction on behalf of all of them). The only motive apparent from the testimony for the women helping Franklin was their hope that Franklin would either share the drugs with them or pay them for their assistance."
} | 3,988,578 | a |
Corroboration may be established in a variety of ways as illustrated by the cited cases. Thus, to be corroborative, the evidence must be separate and apart from that already given and tend to strengthen or confirm the matter corroborated. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "122 Ariz. 22, 26",
"parenthetical": "\"Corroborative evidence tends to corroborate or to confirm, whereas cumulative evidence merely augments or tends to establish a point already proved by other evidence.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Kennedy, 122 Ariz. 22, 26, 592 P.2d 1288, 1292 (App.1979) (“Corroborative evidence tends to corroborate or to confirm, whereas cumulative evidence merely augments or tends to establish a point already proved by other evidence.”); See also Huff, 609 F.2d at 292 (“The probability that the statement is true ... [is] shown by corroborative evidence.”)"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 292, 292",
"parenthetical": "\"The probability that the statement is true ... [is] shown by corroborative evidence.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Kennedy, 122 Ariz. 22, 26, 592 P.2d 1288, 1292 (App.1979) (“Corroborative evidence tends to corroborate or to confirm, whereas cumulative evidence merely augments or tends to establish a point already proved by other evidence.”); See also Huff, 609 F.2d at 292 (“The probability that the statement is true ... [is] shown by corroborative evidence.”)"
} | 1,522,396 | a |
Corroboration may be established in a variety of ways as illustrated by the cited cases. Thus, to be corroborative, the evidence must be separate and apart from that already given and tend to strengthen or confirm the matter corroborated. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "592 P.2d 1288, 1292",
"parenthetical": "\"Corroborative evidence tends to corroborate or to confirm, whereas cumulative evidence merely augments or tends to establish a point already proved by other evidence.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Kennedy, 122 Ariz. 22, 26, 592 P.2d 1288, 1292 (App.1979) (“Corroborative evidence tends to corroborate or to confirm, whereas cumulative evidence merely augments or tends to establish a point already proved by other evidence.”); See also Huff, 609 F.2d at 292 (“The probability that the statement is true ... [is] shown by corroborative evidence.”)"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 292, 292",
"parenthetical": "\"The probability that the statement is true ... [is] shown by corroborative evidence.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Kennedy, 122 Ariz. 22, 26, 592 P.2d 1288, 1292 (App.1979) (“Corroborative evidence tends to corroborate or to confirm, whereas cumulative evidence merely augments or tends to establish a point already proved by other evidence.”); See also Huff, 609 F.2d at 292 (“The probability that the statement is true ... [is] shown by corroborative evidence.”)"
} | 1,522,396 | a |
Houseboat has not shown that litigating the case in Florida would so inconvenience it as to deprive it of its day in court, nor has it demonstrated that litigating the case in Florida would harm this forum. Based on the foregoing and absent any evidence of fraud, we conclude that Houseboat knowingly signed the agreement and is thereby bound by the forum selection clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "220 Ga. App. 638, 639",
"parenthetical": "\"one who signs a contract is presumed to know its contents . . .\"",
"sentence": "See also Brinson v. Martin, 220 Ga. App. 638, 639 (1) (469 SE2d 537) (1996) (“one who signs a contract is presumed to know its contents . . .”) (citation and punctuation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "285 Ga. App. 815, 818-819",
"parenthetical": "waivers of personal jurisdiction are expressly permitted in Georgia and do not contravene public policy",
"sentence": "See OFC Capital v. Colonial Distrib., 285 Ga. App. 815, 818-819 (648 SE2d 140) (2007) (waivers of personal jurisdiction are expressly permitted in Georgia and do not contravene public policy)."
} | 12,168,597 | b |
As a result of the general rulemaking authority contained in the Interstate Commerce Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgates regulations which govern leasing by interstate motor carriers. Regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission governing leases of interstate motor carriers have the same effect as statutory federal law and, therefore, preempt conflicting state law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission preempt conflicting state law regarding vicarious liability",
"sentence": "See Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1973) (regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission preempt conflicting state law regarding vicarious liability)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgated pursuant to the Federal Safety Appliance Act have the same force as federal statutes",
"sentence": "Cf. A., T. & S. F. Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 57 S. Ct. 541, 81 L. Ed. 748 (1937) (regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgated pursuant to the Federal Safety Appliance Act have the same force as federal statutes)."
} | 8,594,517 | a |
As a result of the general rulemaking authority contained in the Interstate Commerce Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgates regulations which govern leasing by interstate motor carriers. Regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission governing leases of interstate motor carriers have the same effect as statutory federal law and, therefore, preempt conflicting state law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission preempt conflicting state law regarding vicarious liability",
"sentence": "See Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1973) (regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission preempt conflicting state law regarding vicarious liability)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgated pursuant to the Federal Safety Appliance Act have the same force as federal statutes",
"sentence": "Cf. A., T. & S. F. Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 57 S. Ct. 541, 81 L. Ed. 748 (1937) (regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgated pursuant to the Federal Safety Appliance Act have the same force as federal statutes)."
} | 8,594,517 | a |
As a result of the general rulemaking authority contained in the Interstate Commerce Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgates regulations which govern leasing by interstate motor carriers. Regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission governing leases of interstate motor carriers have the same effect as statutory federal law and, therefore, preempt conflicting state law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission preempt conflicting state law regarding vicarious liability",
"sentence": "See Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1973) (regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission preempt conflicting state law regarding vicarious liability)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgated pursuant to the Federal Safety Appliance Act have the same force as federal statutes",
"sentence": "Cf. A., T. & S. F. Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 57 S. Ct. 541, 81 L. Ed. 748 (1937) (regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgated pursuant to the Federal Safety Appliance Act have the same force as federal statutes)."
} | 8,594,517 | a |
As a result of the general rulemaking authority contained in the Interstate Commerce Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgates regulations which govern leasing by interstate motor carriers. Regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission governing leases of interstate motor carriers have the same effect as statutory federal law and, therefore, preempt conflicting state law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission preempt conflicting state law regarding vicarious liability",
"sentence": "See Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1973) (regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission preempt conflicting state law regarding vicarious liability)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "U.S. Treasury regulations specifying ownership of a savings bond are federal law which prevails over conflicting state law on ownership",
"sentence": "Cf., also, Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 82 S. Ct. 1089, 8 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1962) (U.S. Treasury regulations specifying ownership of a savings bond are federal law which prevails over conflicting state law on ownership)."
} | 8,594,517 | a |
As a result of the general rulemaking authority contained in the Interstate Commerce Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgates regulations which govern leasing by interstate motor carriers. Regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission governing leases of interstate motor carriers have the same effect as statutory federal law and, therefore, preempt conflicting state law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission preempt conflicting state law regarding vicarious liability",
"sentence": "See Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1973) (regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission preempt conflicting state law regarding vicarious liability)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "U.S. Treasury regulations specifying ownership of a savings bond are federal law which prevails over conflicting state law on ownership",
"sentence": "Cf., also, Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 82 S. Ct. 1089, 8 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1962) (U.S. Treasury regulations specifying ownership of a savings bond are federal law which prevails over conflicting state law on ownership)."
} | 8,594,517 | a |
As a result of the general rulemaking authority contained in the Interstate Commerce Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgates regulations which govern leasing by interstate motor carriers. Regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission governing leases of interstate motor carriers have the same effect as statutory federal law and, therefore, preempt conflicting state law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "U.S. Treasury regulations specifying ownership of a savings bond are federal law which prevails over conflicting state law on ownership",
"sentence": "Cf., also, Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 82 S. Ct. 1089, 8 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1962) (U.S. Treasury regulations specifying ownership of a savings bond are federal law which prevails over conflicting state law on ownership)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission preempt conflicting state law regarding vicarious liability",
"sentence": "See Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1973) (regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission preempt conflicting state law regarding vicarious liability)."
} | 8,594,517 | b |
It is questionable whether we need to consider the extent of the IRS's compliance -with identifying the taxpayer on its notice in this context. Our hesitation occurs because the Ninth Circuit analysis of IRS lien priority has focused on the reasonable inspection test even when the NFTL uses the taxpayer's correct legal name. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "243 B.R. 263, 267",
"parenthetical": "stating that first step in determining whether tax lien was valid was to evaluate whether the Form 668 notice substantially complied with the statutory requirement of identifying the taxpayer",
"sentence": "See Kivel, 878 F.2d at 302 (court determined that it need not decide whether the NFTL filed under the taxpayer’s full legal name was valid against a subsequent purchaser, but whether the way the notices were filed complied with 26 U.S.C. § 6323(f)(4), as that was the statute which governed the validity of liens in California); TKB Int’l, 995 F.2d 1460 (tax liens filed in exact name of taxpayer held invalid against subsequent purchaser who acquired property that was subject to fraudulent conveyance and fraudulent nature of transaction was not apparent on face of deed); cf. Walsh v. United States (In re Focht), 243 B.R. 263, 267 (W.D.Pa.1999)(stating that first step in determining whether tax lien was valid was to evaluate whether the Form 668 notice substantially complied with the statutory requirement of identifying the taxpayer)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "878 F.2d 302, 302",
"parenthetical": "court determined that it need not decide whether the NFTL filed under the taxpayer's full legal name was valid against a subsequent purchaser, but whether the way the notices were filed complied with 26 U.S.C. SS 6323(f",
"sentence": "See Kivel, 878 F.2d at 302 (court determined that it need not decide whether the NFTL filed under the taxpayer’s full legal name was valid against a subsequent purchaser, but whether the way the notices were filed complied with 26 U.S.C. § 6323(f)(4), as that was the statute which governed the validity of liens in California); TKB Int’l, 995 F.2d 1460 (tax liens filed in exact name of taxpayer held invalid against subsequent purchaser who acquired property that was subject to fraudulent conveyance and fraudulent nature of transaction was not apparent on face of deed); cf. Walsh v. United States (In re Focht), 243 B.R. 263, 267 (W.D.Pa.1999)(stating that first step in determining whether tax lien was valid was to evaluate whether the Form 668 notice substantially complied with the statutory requirement of identifying the taxpayer)."
} | 4,121,661 | b |
It is questionable whether we need to consider the extent of the IRS's compliance -with identifying the taxpayer on its notice in this context. Our hesitation occurs because the Ninth Circuit analysis of IRS lien priority has focused on the reasonable inspection test even when the NFTL uses the taxpayer's correct legal name. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "tax liens filed in exact name of taxpayer held invalid against subsequent purchaser who acquired property that was subject to fraudulent conveyance and fraudulent nature of transaction was not apparent on face of deed",
"sentence": "See Kivel, 878 F.2d at 302 (court determined that it need not decide whether the NFTL filed under the taxpayer’s full legal name was valid against a subsequent purchaser, but whether the way the notices were filed complied with 26 U.S.C. § 6323(f)(4), as that was the statute which governed the validity of liens in California); TKB Int’l, 995 F.2d 1460 (tax liens filed in exact name of taxpayer held invalid against subsequent purchaser who acquired property that was subject to fraudulent conveyance and fraudulent nature of transaction was not apparent on face of deed); cf. Walsh v. United States (In re Focht), 243 B.R. 263, 267 (W.D.Pa.1999)(stating that first step in determining whether tax lien was valid was to evaluate whether the Form 668 notice substantially complied with the statutory requirement of identifying the taxpayer)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "243 B.R. 263, 267",
"parenthetical": "stating that first step in determining whether tax lien was valid was to evaluate whether the Form 668 notice substantially complied with the statutory requirement of identifying the taxpayer",
"sentence": "See Kivel, 878 F.2d at 302 (court determined that it need not decide whether the NFTL filed under the taxpayer’s full legal name was valid against a subsequent purchaser, but whether the way the notices were filed complied with 26 U.S.C. § 6323(f)(4), as that was the statute which governed the validity of liens in California); TKB Int’l, 995 F.2d 1460 (tax liens filed in exact name of taxpayer held invalid against subsequent purchaser who acquired property that was subject to fraudulent conveyance and fraudulent nature of transaction was not apparent on face of deed); cf. Walsh v. United States (In re Focht), 243 B.R. 263, 267 (W.D.Pa.1999)(stating that first step in determining whether tax lien was valid was to evaluate whether the Form 668 notice substantially complied with the statutory requirement of identifying the taxpayer)."
} | 4,121,661 | a |
However, where the litigated issues involve not basic contract enforcement questions, but issues peculiar to federal bankruptcy law, attorney's fees will not be awarded absent bad faith or harassment by the losing party. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "744 F.2d 693, 693",
"parenthetical": "refusing to award fees where creditor brought a nondischargeability action",
"sentence": "Coast Trading, 744 F.2d at 693 (refusing to award fees where creditor brought a nondischargeability action); Grove v. Fulwiler (In re Fulwiler), 624 F.2d 908, 910 (9th Cir.1980) (refusing to award fees for creditor’s action under Section 546); see also Johnson v. Righetti (In re Johnson), 756 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir.1985) (because creditor’s request for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to Section 362(d) was not an “action on the contract,” debtor was not entitled to attorneys’ fees for defense against the request)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "756 F.2d 738, 741-42",
"parenthetical": "because creditor's request for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to Section 362(d",
"sentence": "Coast Trading, 744 F.2d at 693 (refusing to award fees where creditor brought a nondischargeability action); Grove v. Fulwiler (In re Fulwiler), 624 F.2d 908, 910 (9th Cir.1980) (refusing to award fees for creditor’s action under Section 546); see also Johnson v. Righetti (In re Johnson), 756 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir.1985) (because creditor’s request for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to Section 362(d) was not an “action on the contract,” debtor was not entitled to attorneys’ fees for defense against the request)."
} | 6,513,228 | a |
However, where the litigated issues involve not basic contract enforcement questions, but issues peculiar to federal bankruptcy law, attorney's fees will not be awarded absent bad faith or harassment by the losing party. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "624 F.2d 908, 910",
"parenthetical": "refusing to award fees for creditor's action under Section 546",
"sentence": "Coast Trading, 744 F.2d at 693 (refusing to award fees where creditor brought a nondischargeability action); Grove v. Fulwiler (In re Fulwiler), 624 F.2d 908, 910 (9th Cir.1980) (refusing to award fees for creditor’s action under Section 546); see also Johnson v. Righetti (In re Johnson), 756 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir.1985) (because creditor’s request for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to Section 362(d) was not an “action on the contract,” debtor was not entitled to attorneys’ fees for defense against the request)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "756 F.2d 738, 741-42",
"parenthetical": "because creditor's request for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to Section 362(d",
"sentence": "Coast Trading, 744 F.2d at 693 (refusing to award fees where creditor brought a nondischargeability action); Grove v. Fulwiler (In re Fulwiler), 624 F.2d 908, 910 (9th Cir.1980) (refusing to award fees for creditor’s action under Section 546); see also Johnson v. Righetti (In re Johnson), 756 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir.1985) (because creditor’s request for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to Section 362(d) was not an “action on the contract,” debtor was not entitled to attorneys’ fees for defense against the request)."
} | 6,513,228 | a |
At common law, an office holder who accepts a second office incompatible with the first automatically vacates the first office. E.g. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acceptance of office of chairman and executive officer of Maui Board of Supervisors vacated the office of supervisor",
"sentence": "Pombo v. Fleming, 32 Haw. 818 (1933) (acceptance of office of chairman and executive officer of Maui Board of Supervisors vacated the office of supervisor); Hollinger v. Kumalae, 25 Haw. 669, 689 (1920) (acceptances of office of supervisor of the City & County of Honolulu automatically vacated the offices of state senator and state representative); accord, Township of Belleville v. Fomarotto, 228 N.J.Super. 412, 549 A.2d 1267 (1988); Hover v. Wolven, 175 Ohio St. 114, 191 N.E.2d 723 (1963); Howard v. Harrington, 114 Me. 443, 96 A. 769 (1916); State v. Goff, 15 R.I. 505, 9 A. 226 (1887)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "judge who announced intention to seek office of governor forfeited his office where state constitution then specifically provided \"[a]ny justice or judge who shall become a candidate for an elective office shall thereby forfeit his office\"",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Pioneer Mill Co., Ltd., 53 Haw. 496, 497 P.2d 549 (1972) (judge who announced intention to seek office of governor forfeited his office where state constitution then specifically provided “[a]ny justice or judge who shall become a candidate for an elective office shall thereby forfeit his office”)."
} | 12,266,874 | a |
At common law, an office holder who accepts a second office incompatible with the first automatically vacates the first office. E.g. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acceptance of office of chairman and executive officer of Maui Board of Supervisors vacated the office of supervisor",
"sentence": "Pombo v. Fleming, 32 Haw. 818 (1933) (acceptance of office of chairman and executive officer of Maui Board of Supervisors vacated the office of supervisor); Hollinger v. Kumalae, 25 Haw. 669, 689 (1920) (acceptances of office of supervisor of the City & County of Honolulu automatically vacated the offices of state senator and state representative); accord, Township of Belleville v. Fomarotto, 228 N.J.Super. 412, 549 A.2d 1267 (1988); Hover v. Wolven, 175 Ohio St. 114, 191 N.E.2d 723 (1963); Howard v. Harrington, 114 Me. 443, 96 A. 769 (1916); State v. Goff, 15 R.I. 505, 9 A. 226 (1887)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "judge who announced intention to seek office of governor forfeited his office where state constitution then specifically provided \"[a]ny justice or judge who shall become a candidate for an elective office shall thereby forfeit his office\"",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Pioneer Mill Co., Ltd., 53 Haw. 496, 497 P.2d 549 (1972) (judge who announced intention to seek office of governor forfeited his office where state constitution then specifically provided “[a]ny justice or judge who shall become a candidate for an elective office shall thereby forfeit his office”)."
} | 12,266,874 | a |
At common law, an office holder who accepts a second office incompatible with the first automatically vacates the first office. E.g. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "25 Haw. 669, 689",
"parenthetical": "acceptances of office of supervisor of the City & County of Honolulu automatically vacated the offices of state senator and state representative",
"sentence": "Pombo v. Fleming, 32 Haw. 818 (1933) (acceptance of office of chairman and executive officer of Maui Board of Supervisors vacated the office of supervisor); Hollinger v. Kumalae, 25 Haw. 669, 689 (1920) (acceptances of office of supervisor of the City & County of Honolulu automatically vacated the offices of state senator and state representative); accord, Township of Belleville v. Fomarotto, 228 N.J.Super. 412, 549 A.2d 1267 (1988); Hover v. Wolven, 175 Ohio St. 114, 191 N.E.2d 723 (1963); Howard v. Harrington, 114 Me. 443, 96 A. 769 (1916); State v. Goff, 15 R.I. 505, 9 A. 226 (1887)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "judge who announced intention to seek office of governor forfeited his office where state constitution then specifically provided \"[a]ny justice or judge who shall become a candidate for an elective office shall thereby forfeit his office\"",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Pioneer Mill Co., Ltd., 53 Haw. 496, 497 P.2d 549 (1972) (judge who announced intention to seek office of governor forfeited his office where state constitution then specifically provided “[a]ny justice or judge who shall become a candidate for an elective office shall thereby forfeit his office”)."
} | 12,266,874 | a |
At common law, an office holder who accepts a second office incompatible with the first automatically vacates the first office. E.g. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "25 Haw. 669, 689",
"parenthetical": "acceptances of office of supervisor of the City & County of Honolulu automatically vacated the offices of state senator and state representative",
"sentence": "Pombo v. Fleming, 32 Haw. 818 (1933) (acceptance of office of chairman and executive officer of Maui Board of Supervisors vacated the office of supervisor); Hollinger v. Kumalae, 25 Haw. 669, 689 (1920) (acceptances of office of supervisor of the City & County of Honolulu automatically vacated the offices of state senator and state representative); accord, Township of Belleville v. Fomarotto, 228 N.J.Super. 412, 549 A.2d 1267 (1988); Hover v. Wolven, 175 Ohio St. 114, 191 N.E.2d 723 (1963); Howard v. Harrington, 114 Me. 443, 96 A. 769 (1916); State v. Goff, 15 R.I. 505, 9 A. 226 (1887)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "judge who announced intention to seek office of governor forfeited his office where state constitution then specifically provided \"[a]ny justice or judge who shall become a candidate for an elective office shall thereby forfeit his office\"",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Pioneer Mill Co., Ltd., 53 Haw. 496, 497 P.2d 549 (1972) (judge who announced intention to seek office of governor forfeited his office where state constitution then specifically provided “[a]ny justice or judge who shall become a candidate for an elective office shall thereby forfeit his office”)."
} | 12,266,874 | a |
For the reasons discussed in connection with Count 2, when these incidents are viewed in the context of the entire record, they are insufficient to support a reasonable inference that Plaintiffs' termination was motivated by his gender. There is simply no record evidence supporting an inference that similarly-situated others were treated more favorably based on their gender. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1 F.Supp.3d 443, 451",
"parenthetical": "noting that the fourth prima facie element of a Title VII claim requires the plaintiff to show that similarly situated persons outside of the plaintiffs protected class were treated more favorably or that other circumstances in the case give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination",
"sentence": "See Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 366 (3d Cir.2008), order clarified, 543 F.3d 178 (3d Cir.2008) (noting that, for purposes of demonstrating the fourth element of a pri-ma facie employment discrimination case, “[t]he evidence most often used to establish this nexus [between the plaintiffs protected status and the adverse employment action] is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class”) (citing cases); see also McClung v. Songer Steel Servs., Inc., 1 F.Supp.3d 443, 451 (W.D.Pa.2014) (noting that the fourth prima facie element of a Title VII claim requires the plaintiff to show that similarly situated persons outside of the plaintiffs protected class were treated more favorably or that other circumstances in the case give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination) (citing authority), Because Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII or the PHRA, his claims at Counts 7 and 9 are subject to summary judgment on that basis alone."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "527 F.3d 358, 366",
"parenthetical": "noting that, for purposes of demonstrating the fourth element of a pri-ma facie employment discrimination case, \"[t]he evidence most often used to establish this nexus [between the plaintiffs protected status and the adverse employment action] is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class\"",
"sentence": "See Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 366 (3d Cir.2008), order clarified, 543 F.3d 178 (3d Cir.2008) (noting that, for purposes of demonstrating the fourth element of a pri-ma facie employment discrimination case, “[t]he evidence most often used to establish this nexus [between the plaintiffs protected status and the adverse employment action] is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class”) (citing cases); see also McClung v. Songer Steel Servs., Inc., 1 F.Supp.3d 443, 451 (W.D.Pa.2014) (noting that the fourth prima facie element of a Title VII claim requires the plaintiff to show that similarly situated persons outside of the plaintiffs protected class were treated more favorably or that other circumstances in the case give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination) (citing authority), Because Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII or the PHRA, his claims at Counts 7 and 9 are subject to summary judgment on that basis alone."
} | 4,346,259 | b |
For the reasons discussed in connection with Count 2, when these incidents are viewed in the context of the entire record, they are insufficient to support a reasonable inference that Plaintiffs' termination was motivated by his gender. There is simply no record evidence supporting an inference that similarly-situated others were treated more favorably based on their gender. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1 F.Supp.3d 443, 451",
"parenthetical": "noting that the fourth prima facie element of a Title VII claim requires the plaintiff to show that similarly situated persons outside of the plaintiffs protected class were treated more favorably or that other circumstances in the case give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination",
"sentence": "See Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 366 (3d Cir.2008), order clarified, 543 F.3d 178 (3d Cir.2008) (noting that, for purposes of demonstrating the fourth element of a pri-ma facie employment discrimination case, “[t]he evidence most often used to establish this nexus [between the plaintiffs protected status and the adverse employment action] is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class”) (citing cases); see also McClung v. Songer Steel Servs., Inc., 1 F.Supp.3d 443, 451 (W.D.Pa.2014) (noting that the fourth prima facie element of a Title VII claim requires the plaintiff to show that similarly situated persons outside of the plaintiffs protected class were treated more favorably or that other circumstances in the case give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination) (citing authority), Because Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII or the PHRA, his claims at Counts 7 and 9 are subject to summary judgment on that basis alone."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that, for purposes of demonstrating the fourth element of a pri-ma facie employment discrimination case, \"[t]he evidence most often used to establish this nexus [between the plaintiffs protected status and the adverse employment action] is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class\"",
"sentence": "See Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 366 (3d Cir.2008), order clarified, 543 F.3d 178 (3d Cir.2008) (noting that, for purposes of demonstrating the fourth element of a pri-ma facie employment discrimination case, “[t]he evidence most often used to establish this nexus [between the plaintiffs protected status and the adverse employment action] is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class”) (citing cases); see also McClung v. Songer Steel Servs., Inc., 1 F.Supp.3d 443, 451 (W.D.Pa.2014) (noting that the fourth prima facie element of a Title VII claim requires the plaintiff to show that similarly situated persons outside of the plaintiffs protected class were treated more favorably or that other circumstances in the case give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination) (citing authority), Because Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII or the PHRA, his claims at Counts 7 and 9 are subject to summary judgment on that basis alone."
} | 4,346,259 | b |
Utilizing that standard, this Court has recognized instances in which injured plaintiffs failed to satisfy the burden of proving a business owner's negligence because of a lack of evidence demonstrating how long a dangerous condition existed, or whether the owner knew or should have known of its existence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "708 A.2d 187, 189",
"parenthetical": "Court affirmed judgment in favor of toy store because of lack of evidence showing that employees knew of fallen basketball hoop in aisle before girl was injured",
"sentence": "See Massart v. Toys R Us, Inc., 708 A.2d 187, 189 (R.I.1998) (per curiam) (Court affirmed judgment in favor of toy store because of lack of evidence showing that employees knew of fallen basketball hoop in aisle before girl was injured); see also Barone, 767 A.2d at 68 (retail store properly granted judgment in slip- and-fall case in which the plaintiff presented no evidence of the nature and extent of the alleged puddle of water at the site of her fall and no proof concerning length of time alleged condition was present); Gleason v. Almac’s, Inc., 103 R.I. 40, 42, 234 A.2d 350, 351 (1967) (trial justice improperly denied judgment in defendant’s favor because there was insufficient evidence that store had notice of roll of film on floor and no testimony about store policy on maintaining a safe condition for customers)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "767 A.2d 68, 68",
"parenthetical": "retail store properly granted judgment in slip- and-fall case in which the plaintiff presented no evidence of the nature and extent of the alleged puddle of water at the site of her fall and no proof concerning length of time alleged condition was present",
"sentence": "See Massart v. Toys R Us, Inc., 708 A.2d 187, 189 (R.I.1998) (per curiam) (Court affirmed judgment in favor of toy store because of lack of evidence showing that employees knew of fallen basketball hoop in aisle before girl was injured); see also Barone, 767 A.2d at 68 (retail store properly granted judgment in slip- and-fall case in which the plaintiff presented no evidence of the nature and extent of the alleged puddle of water at the site of her fall and no proof concerning length of time alleged condition was present); Gleason v. Almac’s, Inc., 103 R.I. 40, 42, 234 A.2d 350, 351 (1967) (trial justice improperly denied judgment in defendant’s favor because there was insufficient evidence that store had notice of roll of film on floor and no testimony about store policy on maintaining a safe condition for customers)."
} | 9,295,930 | a |
Utilizing that standard, this Court has recognized instances in which injured plaintiffs failed to satisfy the burden of proving a business owner's negligence because of a lack of evidence demonstrating how long a dangerous condition existed, or whether the owner knew or should have known of its existence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "103 R.I. 40, 42",
"parenthetical": "trial justice improperly denied judgment in defendant's favor because there was insufficient evidence that store had notice of roll of film on floor and no testimony about store policy on maintaining a safe condition for customers",
"sentence": "See Massart v. Toys R Us, Inc., 708 A.2d 187, 189 (R.I.1998) (per curiam) (Court affirmed judgment in favor of toy store because of lack of evidence showing that employees knew of fallen basketball hoop in aisle before girl was injured); see also Barone, 767 A.2d at 68 (retail store properly granted judgment in slip- and-fall case in which the plaintiff presented no evidence of the nature and extent of the alleged puddle of water at the site of her fall and no proof concerning length of time alleged condition was present); Gleason v. Almac’s, Inc., 103 R.I. 40, 42, 234 A.2d 350, 351 (1967) (trial justice improperly denied judgment in defendant’s favor because there was insufficient evidence that store had notice of roll of film on floor and no testimony about store policy on maintaining a safe condition for customers)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "708 A.2d 187, 189",
"parenthetical": "Court affirmed judgment in favor of toy store because of lack of evidence showing that employees knew of fallen basketball hoop in aisle before girl was injured",
"sentence": "See Massart v. Toys R Us, Inc., 708 A.2d 187, 189 (R.I.1998) (per curiam) (Court affirmed judgment in favor of toy store because of lack of evidence showing that employees knew of fallen basketball hoop in aisle before girl was injured); see also Barone, 767 A.2d at 68 (retail store properly granted judgment in slip- and-fall case in which the plaintiff presented no evidence of the nature and extent of the alleged puddle of water at the site of her fall and no proof concerning length of time alleged condition was present); Gleason v. Almac’s, Inc., 103 R.I. 40, 42, 234 A.2d 350, 351 (1967) (trial justice improperly denied judgment in defendant’s favor because there was insufficient evidence that store had notice of roll of film on floor and no testimony about store policy on maintaining a safe condition for customers)."
} | 9,295,930 | b |
Utilizing that standard, this Court has recognized instances in which injured plaintiffs failed to satisfy the burden of proving a business owner's negligence because of a lack of evidence demonstrating how long a dangerous condition existed, or whether the owner knew or should have known of its existence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "708 A.2d 187, 189",
"parenthetical": "Court affirmed judgment in favor of toy store because of lack of evidence showing that employees knew of fallen basketball hoop in aisle before girl was injured",
"sentence": "See Massart v. Toys R Us, Inc., 708 A.2d 187, 189 (R.I.1998) (per curiam) (Court affirmed judgment in favor of toy store because of lack of evidence showing that employees knew of fallen basketball hoop in aisle before girl was injured); see also Barone, 767 A.2d at 68 (retail store properly granted judgment in slip- and-fall case in which the plaintiff presented no evidence of the nature and extent of the alleged puddle of water at the site of her fall and no proof concerning length of time alleged condition was present); Gleason v. Almac’s, Inc., 103 R.I. 40, 42, 234 A.2d 350, 351 (1967) (trial justice improperly denied judgment in defendant’s favor because there was insufficient evidence that store had notice of roll of film on floor and no testimony about store policy on maintaining a safe condition for customers)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "234 A.2d 350, 351",
"parenthetical": "trial justice improperly denied judgment in defendant's favor because there was insufficient evidence that store had notice of roll of film on floor and no testimony about store policy on maintaining a safe condition for customers",
"sentence": "See Massart v. Toys R Us, Inc., 708 A.2d 187, 189 (R.I.1998) (per curiam) (Court affirmed judgment in favor of toy store because of lack of evidence showing that employees knew of fallen basketball hoop in aisle before girl was injured); see also Barone, 767 A.2d at 68 (retail store properly granted judgment in slip- and-fall case in which the plaintiff presented no evidence of the nature and extent of the alleged puddle of water at the site of her fall and no proof concerning length of time alleged condition was present); Gleason v. Almac’s, Inc., 103 R.I. 40, 42, 234 A.2d 350, 351 (1967) (trial justice improperly denied judgment in defendant’s favor because there was insufficient evidence that store had notice of roll of film on floor and no testimony about store policy on maintaining a safe condition for customers)."
} | 9,295,930 | a |
We recognize that GMD opposes this result. GMD argues on appeal that certain improper remarks by Anthony's counsel during closing argument necessitate a new trial on damages because the remarks infected the jury's verdict with passion and prejudice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "948 F.2d 1546, 1561",
"parenthetical": "\"It is well settled that mere excessiveness in the amount of an award may be cured by a remittitur, whereas excessiveness which results from jury passion and prejudice may not be so cured. In that case, a new trial is required.\"",
"sentence": "See Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1561 (10th Cir.1991) (“It is well settled that mere excessiveness in the amount of an award may be cured by a remittitur, whereas excessiveness which results from jury passion and prejudice may not be so cured. In that case, a new trial is required.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1941, 118 L.Ed.2d 547 (1992); see also De León López v. Corporación Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 125 (1st Cir.1991); Seidman, 923 F.2d at 1140. GMD makes no claim of error, however, and does not assert that the alleged remarks contaminated the jury’s liability findings."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "931 F.2d 125, 125",
"parenthetical": "noting that the rule against remittitur in cases of tainted jury verdicts \"protects against the potential contamination of a jury's liability findings\"",
"sentence": "Cf. De León López, 931 F.2d at 125 (noting that the rule against remittitur in cases of tainted jury verdicts “protects against the potential contamination of a jury’s liability findings”) (emphasis added); 11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2815 (1973) (same); J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, 6A ¶ 59.08[7] (1993) (same)."
} | 1,830,340 | a |
We recognize that GMD opposes this result. GMD argues on appeal that certain improper remarks by Anthony's counsel during closing argument necessitate a new trial on damages because the remarks infected the jury's verdict with passion and prejudice. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "931 F.2d 125, 125",
"parenthetical": "noting that the rule against remittitur in cases of tainted jury verdicts \"protects against the potential contamination of a jury's liability findings\"",
"sentence": "Cf. De León López, 931 F.2d at 125 (noting that the rule against remittitur in cases of tainted jury verdicts “protects against the potential contamination of a jury’s liability findings”) (emphasis added); 11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2815 (1973) (same); J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, 6A ¶ 59.08[7] (1993) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is well settled that mere excessiveness in the amount of an award may be cured by a remittitur, whereas excessiveness which results from jury passion and prejudice may not be so cured. In that case, a new trial is required.\"",
"sentence": "See Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1561 (10th Cir.1991) (“It is well settled that mere excessiveness in the amount of an award may be cured by a remittitur, whereas excessiveness which results from jury passion and prejudice may not be so cured. In that case, a new trial is required.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1941, 118 L.Ed.2d 547 (1992); see also De León López v. Corporación Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 125 (1st Cir.1991); Seidman, 923 F.2d at 1140. GMD makes no claim of error, however, and does not assert that the alleged remarks contaminated the jury’s liability findings."
} | 1,830,340 | b |
We recognize that GMD opposes this result. GMD argues on appeal that certain improper remarks by Anthony's counsel during closing argument necessitate a new trial on damages because the remarks infected the jury's verdict with passion and prejudice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is well settled that mere excessiveness in the amount of an award may be cured by a remittitur, whereas excessiveness which results from jury passion and prejudice may not be so cured. In that case, a new trial is required.\"",
"sentence": "See Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1561 (10th Cir.1991) (“It is well settled that mere excessiveness in the amount of an award may be cured by a remittitur, whereas excessiveness which results from jury passion and prejudice may not be so cured. In that case, a new trial is required.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1941, 118 L.Ed.2d 547 (1992); see also De León López v. Corporación Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 125 (1st Cir.1991); Seidman, 923 F.2d at 1140. GMD makes no claim of error, however, and does not assert that the alleged remarks contaminated the jury’s liability findings."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "931 F.2d 125, 125",
"parenthetical": "noting that the rule against remittitur in cases of tainted jury verdicts \"protects against the potential contamination of a jury's liability findings\"",
"sentence": "Cf. De León López, 931 F.2d at 125 (noting that the rule against remittitur in cases of tainted jury verdicts “protects against the potential contamination of a jury’s liability findings”) (emphasis added); 11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2815 (1973) (same); J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, 6A ¶ 59.08[7] (1993) (same)."
} | 1,830,340 | a |
# Indeed, our precedent makes it crystal clear that conviction of aiding and abetting is tantamount to conviction of the underlying offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "542 F.3d 653, 659",
"parenthetical": "\"[Because] there is no material distinction between an aider and abettor and principals in any jurisdiction of the United States ... aiding and abetting an [offense] is the functional equivalent of personally committing that offense [and] that offense ,... constitutes an aggravated felony.\"",
"sentence": "See Salazar-Luviano v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 857, 860 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Salazar’s aiding and abetting conviction is technically a violation of 18 U.S.C. § -2. That Salazar was convicted of aiding and abetting, however, makes him liable as a principal of the underlying offense.”); see also Ortiz-Magana v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[Because] there is no material distinction between an aider and abettor and principals in any jurisdiction of the United States ... aiding and abetting an [offense] is the functional equivalent of personally committing that offense [and] that offense ,... constitutes an aggravated felony.”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Salazar's aiding and abetting conviction is technically a violation of 18 U.S.C. SS -2. That Salazar was convicted of aiding and abetting, however, makes him liable as a principal of the underlying offense.\"",
"sentence": "See Salazar-Luviano v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 857, 860 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Salazar’s aiding and abetting conviction is technically a violation of 18 U.S.C. § -2. That Salazar was convicted of aiding and abetting, however, makes him liable as a principal of the underlying offense.”); see also Ortiz-Magana v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[Because] there is no material distinction between an aider and abettor and principals in any jurisdiction of the United States ... aiding and abetting an [offense] is the functional equivalent of personally committing that offense [and] that offense ,... constitutes an aggravated felony.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 12,266,948 | b |
We believe that these errors require resentencing. We concede that where, as here, the district court departs from the sentencing guidelines, an error in applying the guidelines may sometimes prove harmless; for example, the district court might clearly indicate that the applicable guideline sentencing range had nothing to do with the sentence actually imposed. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when a court departs from the guidelines, \"[i]t is ... arguable that any computational error in assigning a total offense level [is] harmless\"",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 48 n. 4 (1st Cir.1989) (when a court departs from the guidelines, “[i]t is ... arguable that any computational error in assigning a total offense level [is] harmless”) (dicta)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "872 F.2d 597, 608",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hether the court incorrectly determined the recommended range is relevant to our review of a [departure for a] ... sentence that exceeds the Guidelines may look reasonable when compared to one recommended range, but unreasonable when compared to another\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 608 (5th Cir.1989) (“[W]hether the court incorrectly determined the recommended range is relevant to our review of a [departure for a] ... sentence that exceeds the Guidelines may look reasonable when compared to one recommended range, but unreasonable when compared to another”). We cannot say the error is harmless here, however, because the court’s decision to impose a 97-month “departure” sentence may well have been influenced by the PSI’s sentencing recommendation, which itself may well have reflected either or both of the mistakes we have just described."
} | 10,534,387 | a |
Precedents do not supply a clear answer. The Supreme Court has held that the use of unreasonable force by a public school teacher against a student does not constitute a deprivation of liberty "without due process of law" where the state has provided the student with a post-deprivation tort remedy. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "451 U.S. 543, 543-44",
"parenthetical": "negligently caused deprivation of property not without due process of law where post-deprivation remedy available",
"sentence": "Cf. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 543-44,101 S.Ct. at 1916-17 (negligently caused deprivation of property not without due process of law where post-deprivation remedy available)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "430 U.S. 673, 673-83",
"parenthetical": "noting the state's long-recognized interest in permitting the use of corporal punishment in public schools as a means for maintaining discipline",
"sentence": "Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 673-83, 97 S.Ct. at 1413-19 (noting the state’s long-recognized interest in permitting the use of corporal punishment in public schools as a means for maintaining discipline)."
} | 3,467,622 | b |
Precedents do not supply a clear answer. The Supreme Court has held that the use of unreasonable force by a public school teacher against a student does not constitute a deprivation of liberty "without due process of law" where the state has provided the student with a post-deprivation tort remedy. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "101 S.Ct. 1916, 1916-17",
"parenthetical": "negligently caused deprivation of property not without due process of law where post-deprivation remedy available",
"sentence": "Cf. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 543-44,101 S.Ct. at 1916-17 (negligently caused deprivation of property not without due process of law where post-deprivation remedy available)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "430 U.S. 673, 673-83",
"parenthetical": "noting the state's long-recognized interest in permitting the use of corporal punishment in public schools as a means for maintaining discipline",
"sentence": "Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 673-83, 97 S.Ct. at 1413-19 (noting the state’s long-recognized interest in permitting the use of corporal punishment in public schools as a means for maintaining discipline)."
} | 3,467,622 | b |
Precedents do not supply a clear answer. The Supreme Court has held that the use of unreasonable force by a public school teacher against a student does not constitute a deprivation of liberty "without due process of law" where the state has provided the student with a post-deprivation tort remedy. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "451 U.S. 543, 543-44",
"parenthetical": "negligently caused deprivation of property not without due process of law where post-deprivation remedy available",
"sentence": "Cf. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 543-44,101 S.Ct. at 1916-17 (negligently caused deprivation of property not without due process of law where post-deprivation remedy available)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "97 S.Ct. 1413, 1413-19",
"parenthetical": "noting the state's long-recognized interest in permitting the use of corporal punishment in public schools as a means for maintaining discipline",
"sentence": "Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 673-83, 97 S.Ct. at 1413-19 (noting the state’s long-recognized interest in permitting the use of corporal punishment in public schools as a means for maintaining discipline)."
} | 3,467,622 | b |
Precedents do not supply a clear answer. The Supreme Court has held that the use of unreasonable force by a public school teacher against a student does not constitute a deprivation of liberty "without due process of law" where the state has provided the student with a post-deprivation tort remedy. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "101 S.Ct. 1916, 1916-17",
"parenthetical": "negligently caused deprivation of property not without due process of law where post-deprivation remedy available",
"sentence": "Cf. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 543-44,101 S.Ct. at 1916-17 (negligently caused deprivation of property not without due process of law where post-deprivation remedy available)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "97 S.Ct. 1413, 1413-19",
"parenthetical": "noting the state's long-recognized interest in permitting the use of corporal punishment in public schools as a means for maintaining discipline",
"sentence": "Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 673-83, 97 S.Ct. at 1413-19 (noting the state’s long-recognized interest in permitting the use of corporal punishment in public schools as a means for maintaining discipline)."
} | 3,467,622 | b |
Trial Tr. 10:5-10. Second, the language under 523(a)(2)(A) "other than a statement respecting the debtor's ... financial condition," should be interpreted narrowly to include formal written accounting documents, and not broad oral or written statements concerning financial wealth. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "2014 WL 1492717, at *7",
"parenthetical": "finding statements made regarding overall health of insider's financial condition could not be excepted from discharge under 523(a)(2)(A",
"sentence": "But see In re Urban, 2014 WL 1492717, at *7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. April 16, 2014) (finding statements made regarding overall health of insider’s financial condition could not be excepted from discharge under 523(a)(2)(A))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "461 B.R. 564, 577-78",
"parenthetical": "holding \"that the phrase 'statement respecting the debtor's ... financial condition' should be narrowly interpreted\"",
"sentence": "See In re Belice, 461 B.R. 564, 577-78 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.2011) (holding “that the phrase ‘statement respecting the debtor’s ... financial condition’ should be narrowly interpreted”); In re Joelson, 427 F.3d 700, 714 (10th Cir.2005) (adopting a strict interpretation of statements of financial condition)."
} | 4,222,126 | b |
Counts grouped together pursuant to the sentencing guidelines are interdependent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "749 F.3d 1014, 1014-15",
"parenthetical": "\"The notion is that, especially in the guidelines era, sentencing on multiple counts is an inherently interrelated, interconnected, and holistic process which requires a court to craft an overall sentence .... \"",
"sentence": "U.S. v. Rozier, 485 Fed.Appx. 352, 356 (11th Cir.2012) (holding that counts were interdependent where they were grouped together); U.S. v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 181-82 (3d Cir.2010) (“[Cjounts that were grouped pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines at the original sentencing are interdependent.... ”); U.S. v. Bass, 104 Fed.Appx. 997, 999-1000 (5th Cir.2004) (applying the sentencing package doctrine where counts were grouped under the sentencing guidelines); see also Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1014-15 (“The notion is that, especially in the guidelines era, sentencing on multiple counts is an inherently interrelated, interconnected, and holistic process which requires a court to craft an overall sentence .... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "485 Fed.Appx. 352, 356",
"parenthetical": "holding that counts were interdependent where they were grouped together",
"sentence": "U.S. v. Rozier, 485 Fed.Appx. 352, 356 (11th Cir.2012) (holding that counts were interdependent where they were grouped together); U.S. v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 181-82 (3d Cir.2010) (“[Cjounts that were grouped pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines at the original sentencing are interdependent.... ”); U.S. v. Bass, 104 Fed.Appx. 997, 999-1000 (5th Cir.2004) (applying the sentencing package doctrine where counts were grouped under the sentencing guidelines); see also Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1014-15 (“The notion is that, especially in the guidelines era, sentencing on multiple counts is an inherently interrelated, interconnected, and holistic process which requires a court to craft an overall sentence .... ”)."
} | 12,136,928 | b |
Counts grouped together pursuant to the sentencing guidelines are interdependent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "749 F.3d 1014, 1014-15",
"parenthetical": "\"The notion is that, especially in the guidelines era, sentencing on multiple counts is an inherently interrelated, interconnected, and holistic process which requires a court to craft an overall sentence .... \"",
"sentence": "U.S. v. Rozier, 485 Fed.Appx. 352, 356 (11th Cir.2012) (holding that counts were interdependent where they were grouped together); U.S. v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 181-82 (3d Cir.2010) (“[Cjounts that were grouped pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines at the original sentencing are interdependent.... ”); U.S. v. Bass, 104 Fed.Appx. 997, 999-1000 (5th Cir.2004) (applying the sentencing package doctrine where counts were grouped under the sentencing guidelines); see also Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1014-15 (“The notion is that, especially in the guidelines era, sentencing on multiple counts is an inherently interrelated, interconnected, and holistic process which requires a court to craft an overall sentence .... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "594 F.3d 172, 181-82",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjounts that were grouped pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines at the original sentencing are interdependent.... \"",
"sentence": "U.S. v. Rozier, 485 Fed.Appx. 352, 356 (11th Cir.2012) (holding that counts were interdependent where they were grouped together); U.S. v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 181-82 (3d Cir.2010) (“[Cjounts that were grouped pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines at the original sentencing are interdependent.... ”); U.S. v. Bass, 104 Fed.Appx. 997, 999-1000 (5th Cir.2004) (applying the sentencing package doctrine where counts were grouped under the sentencing guidelines); see also Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1014-15 (“The notion is that, especially in the guidelines era, sentencing on multiple counts is an inherently interrelated, interconnected, and holistic process which requires a court to craft an overall sentence .... ”)."
} | 12,136,928 | b |
Counts grouped together pursuant to the sentencing guidelines are interdependent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "749 F.3d 1014, 1014-15",
"parenthetical": "\"The notion is that, especially in the guidelines era, sentencing on multiple counts is an inherently interrelated, interconnected, and holistic process which requires a court to craft an overall sentence .... \"",
"sentence": "U.S. v. Rozier, 485 Fed.Appx. 352, 356 (11th Cir.2012) (holding that counts were interdependent where they were grouped together); U.S. v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 181-82 (3d Cir.2010) (“[Cjounts that were grouped pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines at the original sentencing are interdependent.... ”); U.S. v. Bass, 104 Fed.Appx. 997, 999-1000 (5th Cir.2004) (applying the sentencing package doctrine where counts were grouped under the sentencing guidelines); see also Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1014-15 (“The notion is that, especially in the guidelines era, sentencing on multiple counts is an inherently interrelated, interconnected, and holistic process which requires a court to craft an overall sentence .... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "104 Fed.Appx. 997, 999-1000",
"parenthetical": "applying the sentencing package doctrine where counts were grouped under the sentencing guidelines",
"sentence": "U.S. v. Rozier, 485 Fed.Appx. 352, 356 (11th Cir.2012) (holding that counts were interdependent where they were grouped together); U.S. v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 181-82 (3d Cir.2010) (“[Cjounts that were grouped pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines at the original sentencing are interdependent.... ”); U.S. v. Bass, 104 Fed.Appx. 997, 999-1000 (5th Cir.2004) (applying the sentencing package doctrine where counts were grouped under the sentencing guidelines); see also Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1014-15 (“The notion is that, especially in the guidelines era, sentencing on multiple counts is an inherently interrelated, interconnected, and holistic process which requires a court to craft an overall sentence .... ”)."
} | 12,136,928 | b |
However, we agree with Nofoa that in relation to the third factor, he was denied the opportunity for meaningful cross-examination because he did not have access to relevant discovery materials that would have assisted in the cross-examination of CW. We have recognized that access to witness statements may be relevant to determine whether the opportunity for cross-examination at a preliminary hearing was sufficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "67 Haw. 22, 22",
"parenthetical": "\"Normally, a cross-examination cannot be full and thorough unless counsel is permitted access to the witness' [sic] previous statements on the matters on which the witness is testifying ....\"",
"sentence": "See Toledo, 67 Haw. at 22, 675 P.2d at 775 (“Normally, a cross-examination cannot be full and thorough unless counsel is permitted access to the witness’ [sic] previous statements on the matters on which the witness is testifying ....”); see also Torres, 357 Ill.Dec. 18, 962 N.E.2d at 933 (noting defense counsel at the preliminary hearing was “not privy” to certain statements given by the witness to support holding that preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible at trial). Here, at the preliminary hearing, the only materials in Nofoa’s counsel’s possession were the JDPC and the complaint."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting defense counsel at the preliminary hearing was \"not privy\" to certain statements given by the witness to support holding that preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible at trial",
"sentence": "See Toledo, 67 Haw. at 22, 675 P.2d at 775 (“Normally, a cross-examination cannot be full and thorough unless counsel is permitted access to the witness’ [sic] previous statements on the matters on which the witness is testifying ....”); see also Torres, 357 Ill.Dec. 18, 962 N.E.2d at 933 (noting defense counsel at the preliminary hearing was “not privy” to certain statements given by the witness to support holding that preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible at trial). Here, at the preliminary hearing, the only materials in Nofoa’s counsel’s possession were the JDPC and the complaint."
} | 12,311,293 | a |
However, we agree with Nofoa that in relation to the third factor, he was denied the opportunity for meaningful cross-examination because he did not have access to relevant discovery materials that would have assisted in the cross-examination of CW. We have recognized that access to witness statements may be relevant to determine whether the opportunity for cross-examination at a preliminary hearing was sufficient. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "962 N.E.2d 933, 933",
"parenthetical": "noting defense counsel at the preliminary hearing was \"not privy\" to certain statements given by the witness to support holding that preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible at trial",
"sentence": "See Toledo, 67 Haw. at 22, 675 P.2d at 775 (“Normally, a cross-examination cannot be full and thorough unless counsel is permitted access to the witness’ [sic] previous statements on the matters on which the witness is testifying ....”); see also Torres, 357 Ill.Dec. 18, 962 N.E.2d at 933 (noting defense counsel at the preliminary hearing was “not privy” to certain statements given by the witness to support holding that preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible at trial). Here, at the preliminary hearing, the only materials in Nofoa’s counsel’s possession were the JDPC and the complaint."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "67 Haw. 22, 22",
"parenthetical": "\"Normally, a cross-examination cannot be full and thorough unless counsel is permitted access to the witness' [sic] previous statements on the matters on which the witness is testifying ....\"",
"sentence": "See Toledo, 67 Haw. at 22, 675 P.2d at 775 (“Normally, a cross-examination cannot be full and thorough unless counsel is permitted access to the witness’ [sic] previous statements on the matters on which the witness is testifying ....”); see also Torres, 357 Ill.Dec. 18, 962 N.E.2d at 933 (noting defense counsel at the preliminary hearing was “not privy” to certain statements given by the witness to support holding that preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible at trial). Here, at the preliminary hearing, the only materials in Nofoa’s counsel’s possession were the JDPC and the complaint."
} | 12,311,293 | b |
However, we agree with Nofoa that in relation to the third factor, he was denied the opportunity for meaningful cross-examination because he did not have access to relevant discovery materials that would have assisted in the cross-examination of CW. We have recognized that access to witness statements may be relevant to determine whether the opportunity for cross-examination at a preliminary hearing was sufficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "675 P.2d 775, 775",
"parenthetical": "\"Normally, a cross-examination cannot be full and thorough unless counsel is permitted access to the witness' [sic] previous statements on the matters on which the witness is testifying ....\"",
"sentence": "See Toledo, 67 Haw. at 22, 675 P.2d at 775 (“Normally, a cross-examination cannot be full and thorough unless counsel is permitted access to the witness’ [sic] previous statements on the matters on which the witness is testifying ....”); see also Torres, 357 Ill.Dec. 18, 962 N.E.2d at 933 (noting defense counsel at the preliminary hearing was “not privy” to certain statements given by the witness to support holding that preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible at trial). Here, at the preliminary hearing, the only materials in Nofoa’s counsel’s possession were the JDPC and the complaint."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting defense counsel at the preliminary hearing was \"not privy\" to certain statements given by the witness to support holding that preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible at trial",
"sentence": "See Toledo, 67 Haw. at 22, 675 P.2d at 775 (“Normally, a cross-examination cannot be full and thorough unless counsel is permitted access to the witness’ [sic] previous statements on the matters on which the witness is testifying ....”); see also Torres, 357 Ill.Dec. 18, 962 N.E.2d at 933 (noting defense counsel at the preliminary hearing was “not privy” to certain statements given by the witness to support holding that preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible at trial). Here, at the preliminary hearing, the only materials in Nofoa’s counsel’s possession were the JDPC and the complaint."
} | 12,311,293 | a |
However, we agree with Nofoa that in relation to the third factor, he was denied the opportunity for meaningful cross-examination because he did not have access to relevant discovery materials that would have assisted in the cross-examination of CW. We have recognized that access to witness statements may be relevant to determine whether the opportunity for cross-examination at a preliminary hearing was sufficient. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "962 N.E.2d 933, 933",
"parenthetical": "noting defense counsel at the preliminary hearing was \"not privy\" to certain statements given by the witness to support holding that preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible at trial",
"sentence": "See Toledo, 67 Haw. at 22, 675 P.2d at 775 (“Normally, a cross-examination cannot be full and thorough unless counsel is permitted access to the witness’ [sic] previous statements on the matters on which the witness is testifying ....”); see also Torres, 357 Ill.Dec. 18, 962 N.E.2d at 933 (noting defense counsel at the preliminary hearing was “not privy” to certain statements given by the witness to support holding that preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible at trial). Here, at the preliminary hearing, the only materials in Nofoa’s counsel’s possession were the JDPC and the complaint."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "675 P.2d 775, 775",
"parenthetical": "\"Normally, a cross-examination cannot be full and thorough unless counsel is permitted access to the witness' [sic] previous statements on the matters on which the witness is testifying ....\"",
"sentence": "See Toledo, 67 Haw. at 22, 675 P.2d at 775 (“Normally, a cross-examination cannot be full and thorough unless counsel is permitted access to the witness’ [sic] previous statements on the matters on which the witness is testifying ....”); see also Torres, 357 Ill.Dec. 18, 962 N.E.2d at 933 (noting defense counsel at the preliminary hearing was “not privy” to certain statements given by the witness to support holding that preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible at trial). Here, at the preliminary hearing, the only materials in Nofoa’s counsel’s possession were the JDPC and the complaint."
} | 12,311,293 | b |
The defendant is correct that, in the employment context, liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress can arise only for conduct in the "termination process," not for behavior that is "part of an ongoing employment relationship." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying Perodeau to dismiss negligent infliction claim against corporate defendant",
"sentence": "See Perodeau, 792 A.2d at 762; see Parsons, 243 Conn. at 88, 700 A.2d 655 (“Negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context arises only where it is based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process.”); Absher v. Flexi Int’l Software, Inc., No. 3:02CV171, 2003 WL 2002778, *3, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6089, *9 (D.Conn. March 31, 2003) (dismissing negligent infliction claim due to plaintiffs failure to “allege any conduct pertaining to the termination of her employment”); cf. Brunson v. Bayer Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 192, 208 & n. 19 (D.Conn.2002) (applying Perodeau to dismiss negligent infliction claim against corporate defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "243 Conn. 88, 88",
"parenthetical": "\"Negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context arises only where it is based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process.\"",
"sentence": "See Perodeau, 792 A.2d at 762; see Parsons, 243 Conn. at 88, 700 A.2d 655 (“Negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context arises only where it is based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process.”); Absher v. Flexi Int’l Software, Inc., No. 3:02CV171, 2003 WL 2002778, *3, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6089, *9 (D.Conn. March 31, 2003) (dismissing negligent infliction claim due to plaintiffs failure to “allege any conduct pertaining to the termination of her employment”); cf. Brunson v. Bayer Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 192, 208 & n. 19 (D.Conn.2002) (applying Perodeau to dismiss negligent infliction claim against corporate defendant)."
} | 9,074,073 | b |
The defendant is correct that, in the employment context, liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress can arise only for conduct in the "termination process," not for behavior that is "part of an ongoing employment relationship." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying Perodeau to dismiss negligent infliction claim against corporate defendant",
"sentence": "See Perodeau, 792 A.2d at 762; see Parsons, 243 Conn. at 88, 700 A.2d 655 (“Negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context arises only where it is based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process.”); Absher v. Flexi Int’l Software, Inc., No. 3:02CV171, 2003 WL 2002778, *3, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6089, *9 (D.Conn. March 31, 2003) (dismissing negligent infliction claim due to plaintiffs failure to “allege any conduct pertaining to the termination of her employment”); cf. Brunson v. Bayer Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 192, 208 & n. 19 (D.Conn.2002) (applying Perodeau to dismiss negligent infliction claim against corporate defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context arises only where it is based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process.\"",
"sentence": "See Perodeau, 792 A.2d at 762; see Parsons, 243 Conn. at 88, 700 A.2d 655 (“Negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context arises only where it is based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process.”); Absher v. Flexi Int’l Software, Inc., No. 3:02CV171, 2003 WL 2002778, *3, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6089, *9 (D.Conn. March 31, 2003) (dismissing negligent infliction claim due to plaintiffs failure to “allege any conduct pertaining to the termination of her employment”); cf. Brunson v. Bayer Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 192, 208 & n. 19 (D.Conn.2002) (applying Perodeau to dismiss negligent infliction claim against corporate defendant)."
} | 9,074,073 | b |
The defendant is correct that, in the employment context, liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress can arise only for conduct in the "termination process," not for behavior that is "part of an ongoing employment relationship." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying Perodeau to dismiss negligent infliction claim against corporate defendant",
"sentence": "See Perodeau, 792 A.2d at 762; see Parsons, 243 Conn. at 88, 700 A.2d 655 (“Negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context arises only where it is based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process.”); Absher v. Flexi Int’l Software, Inc., No. 3:02CV171, 2003 WL 2002778, *3, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6089, *9 (D.Conn. March 31, 2003) (dismissing negligent infliction claim due to plaintiffs failure to “allege any conduct pertaining to the termination of her employment”); cf. Brunson v. Bayer Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 192, 208 & n. 19 (D.Conn.2002) (applying Perodeau to dismiss negligent infliction claim against corporate defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2003 WL 2002778, *3",
"parenthetical": "dismissing negligent infliction claim due to plaintiffs failure to \"allege any conduct pertaining to the termination of her employment\"",
"sentence": "See Perodeau, 792 A.2d at 762; see Parsons, 243 Conn. at 88, 700 A.2d 655 (“Negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context arises only where it is based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process.”); Absher v. Flexi Int’l Software, Inc., No. 3:02CV171, 2003 WL 2002778, *3, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6089, *9 (D.Conn. March 31, 2003) (dismissing negligent infliction claim due to plaintiffs failure to “allege any conduct pertaining to the termination of her employment”); cf. Brunson v. Bayer Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 192, 208 & n. 19 (D.Conn.2002) (applying Perodeau to dismiss negligent infliction claim against corporate defendant)."
} | 9,074,073 | b |
The defendant is correct that, in the employment context, liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress can arise only for conduct in the "termination process," not for behavior that is "part of an ongoing employment relationship." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying Perodeau to dismiss negligent infliction claim against corporate defendant",
"sentence": "See Perodeau, 792 A.2d at 762; see Parsons, 243 Conn. at 88, 700 A.2d 655 (“Negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context arises only where it is based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process.”); Absher v. Flexi Int’l Software, Inc., No. 3:02CV171, 2003 WL 2002778, *3, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6089, *9 (D.Conn. March 31, 2003) (dismissing negligent infliction claim due to plaintiffs failure to “allege any conduct pertaining to the termination of her employment”); cf. Brunson v. Bayer Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 192, 208 & n. 19 (D.Conn.2002) (applying Perodeau to dismiss negligent infliction claim against corporate defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6089, *9",
"parenthetical": "dismissing negligent infliction claim due to plaintiffs failure to \"allege any conduct pertaining to the termination of her employment\"",
"sentence": "See Perodeau, 792 A.2d at 762; see Parsons, 243 Conn. at 88, 700 A.2d 655 (“Negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context arises only where it is based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process.”); Absher v. Flexi Int’l Software, Inc., No. 3:02CV171, 2003 WL 2002778, *3, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6089, *9 (D.Conn. March 31, 2003) (dismissing negligent infliction claim due to plaintiffs failure to “allege any conduct pertaining to the termination of her employment”); cf. Brunson v. Bayer Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 192, 208 & n. 19 (D.Conn.2002) (applying Perodeau to dismiss negligent infliction claim against corporate defendant)."
} | 9,074,073 | b |
The district court imputed knowledge to Tapia-Ortiz based on the statement of Cede-no, his alleged co-conspirator, that Tapia-Ortiz would serve as the buyer in both transactions. Yet even if we assume arguendo that Tapia-Ortiz was involved in an uncharged conspiracy with Cedeno, the Government must show that the actions of Cedeno were in furtherance of the conspiracy and were reasonably foreseeable to Tapia-Ortiz before Tapia-Ortiz can be held responsible for them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "926 F.2d 172, 177-78",
"parenthetical": "co-conspirator cannot be sentenced for certain conspiratorial acts unless there is proof that he knew or should have known about the details of those acts or could reasonably foresee that they would occur",
"sentence": "See United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 177-78 (2d Cir.) (co-conspirator cannot be sentenced for certain conspiratorial acts unless there is proof that he knew or should have known about the details of those acts or could reasonably foresee that they would occur), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 112 S.Ct. 347, 116 L.Ed.2d 287 (1991); see also United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir.1993) (conspirator’s reasonable knowledge of relevant conduct is required by statute imposing mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug offenses)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "987 F.2d 920, 926",
"parenthetical": "conspirator's reasonable knowledge of relevant conduct is required by statute imposing mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug offenses",
"sentence": "See United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 177-78 (2d Cir.) (co-conspirator cannot be sentenced for certain conspiratorial acts unless there is proof that he knew or should have known about the details of those acts or could reasonably foresee that they would occur), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 112 S.Ct. 347, 116 L.Ed.2d 287 (1991); see also United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir.1993) (conspirator’s reasonable knowledge of relevant conduct is required by statute imposing mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug offenses)."
} | 10,511,365 | a |
The district court imputed knowledge to Tapia-Ortiz based on the statement of Cede-no, his alleged co-conspirator, that Tapia-Ortiz would serve as the buyer in both transactions. Yet even if we assume arguendo that Tapia-Ortiz was involved in an uncharged conspiracy with Cedeno, the Government must show that the actions of Cedeno were in furtherance of the conspiracy and were reasonably foreseeable to Tapia-Ortiz before Tapia-Ortiz can be held responsible for them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "co-conspirator cannot be sentenced for certain conspiratorial acts unless there is proof that he knew or should have known about the details of those acts or could reasonably foresee that they would occur",
"sentence": "See United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 177-78 (2d Cir.) (co-conspirator cannot be sentenced for certain conspiratorial acts unless there is proof that he knew or should have known about the details of those acts or could reasonably foresee that they would occur), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 112 S.Ct. 347, 116 L.Ed.2d 287 (1991); see also United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir.1993) (conspirator’s reasonable knowledge of relevant conduct is required by statute imposing mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug offenses)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "987 F.2d 920, 926",
"parenthetical": "conspirator's reasonable knowledge of relevant conduct is required by statute imposing mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug offenses",
"sentence": "See United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 177-78 (2d Cir.) (co-conspirator cannot be sentenced for certain conspiratorial acts unless there is proof that he knew or should have known about the details of those acts or could reasonably foresee that they would occur), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 112 S.Ct. 347, 116 L.Ed.2d 287 (1991); see also United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir.1993) (conspirator’s reasonable knowledge of relevant conduct is required by statute imposing mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug offenses)."
} | 10,511,365 | a |
The district court imputed knowledge to Tapia-Ortiz based on the statement of Cede-no, his alleged co-conspirator, that Tapia-Ortiz would serve as the buyer in both transactions. Yet even if we assume arguendo that Tapia-Ortiz was involved in an uncharged conspiracy with Cedeno, the Government must show that the actions of Cedeno were in furtherance of the conspiracy and were reasonably foreseeable to Tapia-Ortiz before Tapia-Ortiz can be held responsible for them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "co-conspirator cannot be sentenced for certain conspiratorial acts unless there is proof that he knew or should have known about the details of those acts or could reasonably foresee that they would occur",
"sentence": "See United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 177-78 (2d Cir.) (co-conspirator cannot be sentenced for certain conspiratorial acts unless there is proof that he knew or should have known about the details of those acts or could reasonably foresee that they would occur), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 112 S.Ct. 347, 116 L.Ed.2d 287 (1991); see also United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir.1993) (conspirator’s reasonable knowledge of relevant conduct is required by statute imposing mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug offenses)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "987 F.2d 920, 926",
"parenthetical": "conspirator's reasonable knowledge of relevant conduct is required by statute imposing mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug offenses",
"sentence": "See United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 177-78 (2d Cir.) (co-conspirator cannot be sentenced for certain conspiratorial acts unless there is proof that he knew or should have known about the details of those acts or could reasonably foresee that they would occur), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 112 S.Ct. 347, 116 L.Ed.2d 287 (1991); see also United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir.1993) (conspirator’s reasonable knowledge of relevant conduct is required by statute imposing mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug offenses)."
} | 10,511,365 | a |
Although this change occurred well before Doe submitted his form, Duchesne's first affidavit indicates that at least as late as the EEO investigation of Doe's complaint, FMLA forms were still shared with managers and supervisors such as Tahir. These two statements do not necessarily contradict one another, for it seems perfectly possible that medical leave information continued to be shared with relevant managers and supervisors even after Paul Neff assumed responsibility for tracking and processing the requests. In any event, whatever conflict may exist must be resolved at trial, where Doe will have an opportunity to question Duchesne about his two statements. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "526 U.S. 795, 806-07",
"parenthetical": "a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement",
"sentence": "See Rogers Corp. v. EPA, 275 F.3d 1096, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“Summary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.”); cf. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603-04, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999) (a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "275 F.3d 1096, 1103",
"parenthetical": "\"Summary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers Corp. v. EPA, 275 F.3d 1096, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“Summary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.”); cf. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603-04, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999) (a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement)."
} | 3,700,896 | b |
Although this change occurred well before Doe submitted his form, Duchesne's first affidavit indicates that at least as late as the EEO investigation of Doe's complaint, FMLA forms were still shared with managers and supervisors such as Tahir. These two statements do not necessarily contradict one another, for it seems perfectly possible that medical leave information continued to be shared with relevant managers and supervisors even after Paul Neff assumed responsibility for tracking and processing the requests. In any event, whatever conflict may exist must be resolved at trial, where Doe will have an opportunity to question Duchesne about his two statements. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "275 F.3d 1096, 1103",
"parenthetical": "\"Summary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers Corp. v. EPA, 275 F.3d 1096, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“Summary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.”); cf. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603-04, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999) (a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603-04",
"parenthetical": "a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement",
"sentence": "See Rogers Corp. v. EPA, 275 F.3d 1096, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“Summary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.”); cf. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603-04, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999) (a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement)."
} | 3,700,896 | a |
Although this change occurred well before Doe submitted his form, Duchesne's first affidavit indicates that at least as late as the EEO investigation of Doe's complaint, FMLA forms were still shared with managers and supervisors such as Tahir. These two statements do not necessarily contradict one another, for it seems perfectly possible that medical leave information continued to be shared with relevant managers and supervisors even after Paul Neff assumed responsibility for tracking and processing the requests. In any event, whatever conflict may exist must be resolved at trial, where Doe will have an opportunity to question Duchesne about his two statements. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "275 F.3d 1096, 1103",
"parenthetical": "\"Summary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers Corp. v. EPA, 275 F.3d 1096, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“Summary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.”); cf. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603-04, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999) (a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement",
"sentence": "See Rogers Corp. v. EPA, 275 F.3d 1096, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“Summary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.”); cf. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603-04, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999) (a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement)."
} | 3,700,896 | a |
The two issues are simply not the same as they involve different principles of law which are subject to the application of different relevant facts. Under the federal maritime choice-of-law test, applicable to Jones Act seafarers in federal district court, a case should not be dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens if federal maritime law applies to the case, which is determined in part by whether the defendant ship-owner is found to have a base of operations in the United States. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "711 So.2d 1298, 1298",
"parenthetical": "\"Even if ... the action is properly maintainable under the Jones Act on the principle adopted in [Rhoditis], the trial court correctly concluded that forum non conveniens is applicable to such an action in the Florida state courts ....\"",
"sentence": "See Guerra v. Selsdon Mar. Corp., 711 So.2d 1298, 1298 (Fla.Ct.App.1998) (“Even if ... the action is properly maintainable under the Jones Act on the principle adopted in [Rhoditis], the trial court correctly concluded that forum non conveniens is applicable to such an action in the Florida state courts ....”) (internal citations omitted); see also Valdivia v. Prestige Cruises, N.V., 898 So.2d 271, 272 (Fla.Ct.App.2005) (affirming dismissal based on forum non conveniens without consideration of federal maritime choice-of-law standards); Tananta v. Cruise Ships Catering & Servs. Int'l, N.V., 909 So.2d 874, 881-84 (Fla.Ct.App.2004) (en banc) (contrasting federal maritime choice-of-law analysis with Florida’s forum non conveniens doctrine)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "898 So.2d 271, 272",
"parenthetical": "affirming dismissal based on forum non conveniens without consideration of federal maritime choice-of-law standards",
"sentence": "See Guerra v. Selsdon Mar. Corp., 711 So.2d 1298, 1298 (Fla.Ct.App.1998) (“Even if ... the action is properly maintainable under the Jones Act on the principle adopted in [Rhoditis], the trial court correctly concluded that forum non conveniens is applicable to such an action in the Florida state courts ....”) (internal citations omitted); see also Valdivia v. Prestige Cruises, N.V., 898 So.2d 271, 272 (Fla.Ct.App.2005) (affirming dismissal based on forum non conveniens without consideration of federal maritime choice-of-law standards); Tananta v. Cruise Ships Catering & Servs. Int'l, N.V., 909 So.2d 874, 881-84 (Fla.Ct.App.2004) (en banc) (contrasting federal maritime choice-of-law analysis with Florida’s forum non conveniens doctrine)."
} | 3,514,604 | a |
The two issues are simply not the same as they involve different principles of law which are subject to the application of different relevant facts. Under the federal maritime choice-of-law test, applicable to Jones Act seafarers in federal district court, a case should not be dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens if federal maritime law applies to the case, which is determined in part by whether the defendant ship-owner is found to have a base of operations in the United States. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "711 So.2d 1298, 1298",
"parenthetical": "\"Even if ... the action is properly maintainable under the Jones Act on the principle adopted in [Rhoditis], the trial court correctly concluded that forum non conveniens is applicable to such an action in the Florida state courts ....\"",
"sentence": "See Guerra v. Selsdon Mar. Corp., 711 So.2d 1298, 1298 (Fla.Ct.App.1998) (“Even if ... the action is properly maintainable under the Jones Act on the principle adopted in [Rhoditis], the trial court correctly concluded that forum non conveniens is applicable to such an action in the Florida state courts ....”) (internal citations omitted); see also Valdivia v. Prestige Cruises, N.V., 898 So.2d 271, 272 (Fla.Ct.App.2005) (affirming dismissal based on forum non conveniens without consideration of federal maritime choice-of-law standards); Tananta v. Cruise Ships Catering & Servs. Int'l, N.V., 909 So.2d 874, 881-84 (Fla.Ct.App.2004) (en banc) (contrasting federal maritime choice-of-law analysis with Florida’s forum non conveniens doctrine)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "909 So.2d 874, 881-84",
"parenthetical": "contrasting federal maritime choice-of-law analysis with Florida's forum non conveniens doctrine",
"sentence": "See Guerra v. Selsdon Mar. Corp., 711 So.2d 1298, 1298 (Fla.Ct.App.1998) (“Even if ... the action is properly maintainable under the Jones Act on the principle adopted in [Rhoditis], the trial court correctly concluded that forum non conveniens is applicable to such an action in the Florida state courts ....”) (internal citations omitted); see also Valdivia v. Prestige Cruises, N.V., 898 So.2d 271, 272 (Fla.Ct.App.2005) (affirming dismissal based on forum non conveniens without consideration of federal maritime choice-of-law standards); Tananta v. Cruise Ships Catering & Servs. Int'l, N.V., 909 So.2d 874, 881-84 (Fla.Ct.App.2004) (en banc) (contrasting federal maritime choice-of-law analysis with Florida’s forum non conveniens doctrine)."
} | 3,514,604 | a |
[29] Based upon the record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Zamani did not demonstrate good cause as to why his late notice should be accepted and thus in denying his belated, verbal motion to assert an insanity defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "524 N.E.2d 11, 11",
"parenthetical": "holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's belated motion to assert an insanity defense where the defendant did not make showing of good cause as required by statute",
"sentence": "See Ankney, 825 N.E.2d at 970 (holding that the defendant did not demonstrate and our review of the record did not reveal that the defendant made a showing of good cause as to why his late notice should be accepted, and as such the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant’s belated, oral motion to assert an insanity defense) (citing Eveler, 524 N.E.2d at 11 (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s belated motion to assert an insanity defense where the defendant did not make showing of good cause as required by statute)); see also Dudley v. State, 480 N.E.2d 881, 895 (Ind.1985) (holding that, since trial had begun and the defendant failed to offer evidence rising to the level of good cause showing why the defense was not previously raised, the trial court properly denied the appellant’s motion for psychiatric examination, and noting the trial court had observed that the information learned by the defendant’s counsel was previously available and could not be considered newly discovered)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "480 N.E.2d 881, 895",
"parenthetical": "holding that, since trial had begun and the defendant failed to offer evidence rising to the level of good cause showing why the defense was not previously raised, the trial court properly denied the appellant's motion for psychiatric examination, and noting the trial court had observed that the information learned by the defendant's counsel was previously available and could not be considered newly discovered",
"sentence": "See Ankney, 825 N.E.2d at 970 (holding that the defendant did not demonstrate and our review of the record did not reveal that the defendant made a showing of good cause as to why his late notice should be accepted, and as such the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant’s belated, oral motion to assert an insanity defense) (citing Eveler, 524 N.E.2d at 11 (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s belated motion to assert an insanity defense where the defendant did not make showing of good cause as required by statute)); see also Dudley v. State, 480 N.E.2d 881, 895 (Ind.1985) (holding that, since trial had begun and the defendant failed to offer evidence rising to the level of good cause showing why the defense was not previously raised, the trial court properly denied the appellant’s motion for psychiatric examination, and noting the trial court had observed that the information learned by the defendant’s counsel was previously available and could not be considered newly discovered)."
} | 6,869,055 | a |
These arguments are without merit; petitioner's criminal record satisfies the three tests of Ozkok. First, a finding of guilt was made. Striking the guilty finding did not mean the facts supporting the finding no longer existed; it merely rewarded petitioner for good behavior during probation by technically erasing his conviction for reasons unrelated to its validity on the merits. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Court defined new standard for final \"conviction\" because old standard placed form over substance, \"and aliens who [were] clearly guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended to be considered \"convicted\" [were] permitted to escape the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a conviction.\"",
"sentence": "Garcia-Gonzales v. INS, 344 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir.) (a court’s entering of “probation without judgment” does not void a conviction on the merits but merely “rewards the [alien] for good behavior during probation by releasing certain penalties and disabilities”), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840, 86 S.Ct. 88, 15 L.Ed.2d 81 (1965); cf. Ozkok, 1988 WL 235459,1988 BIA LEXIS at 12 (Court defined new standard for final “conviction” because old standard placed form over substance, “and aliens who [were] clearly guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended to be considered “convicted” [were] permitted to escape the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a conviction.”). Second, just because petitioner’s probation was terminated does not mean some form of punishment was never imposed on him. Regardless of his subsequent termination of probation, it is undisputed that the circuit court did order a “punishment, penalty, or restraint,” e.g. the probation and fine."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "344 F.2d 804, 808",
"parenthetical": "a court's entering of \"probation without judgment\" does not void a conviction on the merits but merely \"rewards the [alien] for good behavior during probation by releasing certain penalties and disabilities\"",
"sentence": "Garcia-Gonzales v. INS, 344 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir.) (a court’s entering of “probation without judgment” does not void a conviction on the merits but merely “rewards the [alien] for good behavior during probation by releasing certain penalties and disabilities”), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840, 86 S.Ct. 88, 15 L.Ed.2d 81 (1965); cf. Ozkok, 1988 WL 235459,1988 BIA LEXIS at 12 (Court defined new standard for final “conviction” because old standard placed form over substance, “and aliens who [were] clearly guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended to be considered “convicted” [were] permitted to escape the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a conviction.”). Second, just because petitioner’s probation was terminated does not mean some form of punishment was never imposed on him. Regardless of his subsequent termination of probation, it is undisputed that the circuit court did order a “punishment, penalty, or restraint,” e.g. the probation and fine."
} | 10,509,637 | b |
These arguments are without merit; petitioner's criminal record satisfies the three tests of Ozkok. First, a finding of guilt was made. Striking the guilty finding did not mean the facts supporting the finding no longer existed; it merely rewarded petitioner for good behavior during probation by technically erasing his conviction for reasons unrelated to its validity on the merits. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Court defined new standard for final \"conviction\" because old standard placed form over substance, \"and aliens who [were] clearly guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended to be considered \"convicted\" [were] permitted to escape the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a conviction.\"",
"sentence": "Garcia-Gonzales v. INS, 344 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir.) (a court’s entering of “probation without judgment” does not void a conviction on the merits but merely “rewards the [alien] for good behavior during probation by releasing certain penalties and disabilities”), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840, 86 S.Ct. 88, 15 L.Ed.2d 81 (1965); cf. Ozkok, 1988 WL 235459,1988 BIA LEXIS at 12 (Court defined new standard for final “conviction” because old standard placed form over substance, “and aliens who [were] clearly guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended to be considered “convicted” [were] permitted to escape the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a conviction.”). Second, just because petitioner’s probation was terminated does not mean some form of punishment was never imposed on him. Regardless of his subsequent termination of probation, it is undisputed that the circuit court did order a “punishment, penalty, or restraint,” e.g. the probation and fine."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a court's entering of \"probation without judgment\" does not void a conviction on the merits but merely \"rewards the [alien] for good behavior during probation by releasing certain penalties and disabilities\"",
"sentence": "Garcia-Gonzales v. INS, 344 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir.) (a court’s entering of “probation without judgment” does not void a conviction on the merits but merely “rewards the [alien] for good behavior during probation by releasing certain penalties and disabilities”), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840, 86 S.Ct. 88, 15 L.Ed.2d 81 (1965); cf. Ozkok, 1988 WL 235459,1988 BIA LEXIS at 12 (Court defined new standard for final “conviction” because old standard placed form over substance, “and aliens who [were] clearly guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended to be considered “convicted” [were] permitted to escape the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a conviction.”). Second, just because petitioner’s probation was terminated does not mean some form of punishment was never imposed on him. Regardless of his subsequent termination of probation, it is undisputed that the circuit court did order a “punishment, penalty, or restraint,” e.g. the probation and fine."
} | 10,509,637 | b |
These arguments are without merit; petitioner's criminal record satisfies the three tests of Ozkok. First, a finding of guilt was made. Striking the guilty finding did not mean the facts supporting the finding no longer existed; it merely rewarded petitioner for good behavior during probation by technically erasing his conviction for reasons unrelated to its validity on the merits. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Court defined new standard for final \"conviction\" because old standard placed form over substance, \"and aliens who [were] clearly guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended to be considered \"convicted\" [were] permitted to escape the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a conviction.\"",
"sentence": "Garcia-Gonzales v. INS, 344 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir.) (a court’s entering of “probation without judgment” does not void a conviction on the merits but merely “rewards the [alien] for good behavior during probation by releasing certain penalties and disabilities”), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840, 86 S.Ct. 88, 15 L.Ed.2d 81 (1965); cf. Ozkok, 1988 WL 235459,1988 BIA LEXIS at 12 (Court defined new standard for final “conviction” because old standard placed form over substance, “and aliens who [were] clearly guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended to be considered “convicted” [were] permitted to escape the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a conviction.”). Second, just because petitioner’s probation was terminated does not mean some form of punishment was never imposed on him. Regardless of his subsequent termination of probation, it is undisputed that the circuit court did order a “punishment, penalty, or restraint,” e.g. the probation and fine."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a court's entering of \"probation without judgment\" does not void a conviction on the merits but merely \"rewards the [alien] for good behavior during probation by releasing certain penalties and disabilities\"",
"sentence": "Garcia-Gonzales v. INS, 344 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir.) (a court’s entering of “probation without judgment” does not void a conviction on the merits but merely “rewards the [alien] for good behavior during probation by releasing certain penalties and disabilities”), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840, 86 S.Ct. 88, 15 L.Ed.2d 81 (1965); cf. Ozkok, 1988 WL 235459,1988 BIA LEXIS at 12 (Court defined new standard for final “conviction” because old standard placed form over substance, “and aliens who [were] clearly guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended to be considered “convicted” [were] permitted to escape the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a conviction.”). Second, just because petitioner’s probation was terminated does not mean some form of punishment was never imposed on him. Regardless of his subsequent termination of probation, it is undisputed that the circuit court did order a “punishment, penalty, or restraint,” e.g. the probation and fine."
} | 10,509,637 | b |
These arguments are without merit; petitioner's criminal record satisfies the three tests of Ozkok. First, a finding of guilt was made. Striking the guilty finding did not mean the facts supporting the finding no longer existed; it merely rewarded petitioner for good behavior during probation by technically erasing his conviction for reasons unrelated to its validity on the merits. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Court defined new standard for final \"conviction\" because old standard placed form over substance, \"and aliens who [were] clearly guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended to be considered \"convicted\" [were] permitted to escape the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a conviction.\"",
"sentence": "Garcia-Gonzales v. INS, 344 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir.) (a court’s entering of “probation without judgment” does not void a conviction on the merits but merely “rewards the [alien] for good behavior during probation by releasing certain penalties and disabilities”), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840, 86 S.Ct. 88, 15 L.Ed.2d 81 (1965); cf. Ozkok, 1988 WL 235459,1988 BIA LEXIS at 12 (Court defined new standard for final “conviction” because old standard placed form over substance, “and aliens who [were] clearly guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended to be considered “convicted” [were] permitted to escape the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a conviction.”). Second, just because petitioner’s probation was terminated does not mean some form of punishment was never imposed on him. Regardless of his subsequent termination of probation, it is undisputed that the circuit court did order a “punishment, penalty, or restraint,” e.g. the probation and fine."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a court's entering of \"probation without judgment\" does not void a conviction on the merits but merely \"rewards the [alien] for good behavior during probation by releasing certain penalties and disabilities\"",
"sentence": "Garcia-Gonzales v. INS, 344 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir.) (a court’s entering of “probation without judgment” does not void a conviction on the merits but merely “rewards the [alien] for good behavior during probation by releasing certain penalties and disabilities”), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840, 86 S.Ct. 88, 15 L.Ed.2d 81 (1965); cf. Ozkok, 1988 WL 235459,1988 BIA LEXIS at 12 (Court defined new standard for final “conviction” because old standard placed form over substance, “and aliens who [were] clearly guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended to be considered “convicted” [were] permitted to escape the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a conviction.”). Second, just because petitioner’s probation was terminated does not mean some form of punishment was never imposed on him. Regardless of his subsequent termination of probation, it is undisputed that the circuit court did order a “punishment, penalty, or restraint,” e.g. the probation and fine."
} | 10,509,637 | b |
Some of the cases have 'also indicated that a medical monitoring cause of action may be subject to normal tort defenses such as assumption of risk and contributory negligence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[a] plaintiff[ smoker]'s claim would, of course, remain subject to all available affirmative defenses, such ' as contributory negligence\"",
"sentence": "See Donovan, 455 Mass, at 226 n. 11, 914 N.E.2d at 901 n. 11 (“[a] plaintiff[ smoker]’s claim would, of course, remain subject to all available affirmative defenses, such ' as contributory negligence”); Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 974, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d at 801 (“when a defendant in a [toxic landfill] negligence action demonstrates that a plaintiffs smoking is negligent and that a portion of the plaintiffs fear of cancer is attributable to the smoking, comparative fault principles may be applied to reduce the amount of recovery for emotional distress damages based on such fear”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "241 A.D.2d 294, 294",
"parenthetical": "in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs' \"voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking\"",
"sentence": "See also Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 191 (in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs’ “voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking”)."
} | 6,047,705 | a |
Some of the cases have 'also indicated that a medical monitoring cause of action may be subject to normal tort defenses such as assumption of risk and contributory negligence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "672 N.Y.S.2d 191, 191",
"parenthetical": "in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs' \"voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking\"",
"sentence": "See also Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 191 (in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs’ “voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[a] plaintiff[ smoker]'s claim would, of course, remain subject to all available affirmative defenses, such ' as contributory negligence\"",
"sentence": "See Donovan, 455 Mass, at 226 n. 11, 914 N.E.2d at 901 n. 11 (“[a] plaintiff[ smoker]’s claim would, of course, remain subject to all available affirmative defenses, such ' as contributory negligence”); Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 974, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d at 801 (“when a defendant in a [toxic landfill] negligence action demonstrates that a plaintiffs smoking is negligent and that a portion of the plaintiffs fear of cancer is attributable to the smoking, comparative fault principles may be applied to reduce the amount of recovery for emotional distress damages based on such fear”)."
} | 6,047,705 | b |
Some of the cases have 'also indicated that a medical monitoring cause of action may be subject to normal tort defenses such as assumption of risk and contributory negligence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "6 Cal.4th 974, 974",
"parenthetical": "\"when a defendant in a [toxic landfill] negligence action demonstrates that a plaintiffs smoking is negligent and that a portion of the plaintiffs fear of cancer is attributable to the smoking, comparative fault principles may be applied to reduce the amount of recovery for emotional distress damages based on such fear\"",
"sentence": "See Donovan, 455 Mass, at 226 n. 11, 914 N.E.2d at 901 n. 11 (“[a] plaintiff[ smoker]’s claim would, of course, remain subject to all available affirmative defenses, such ' as contributory negligence”); Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 974, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d at 801 (“when a defendant in a [toxic landfill] negligence action demonstrates that a plaintiffs smoking is negligent and that a portion of the plaintiffs fear of cancer is attributable to the smoking, comparative fault principles may be applied to reduce the amount of recovery for emotional distress damages based on such fear”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "241 A.D.2d 294, 294",
"parenthetical": "in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs' \"voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking\"",
"sentence": "See also Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 191 (in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs’ “voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking”)."
} | 6,047,705 | a |
Some of the cases have 'also indicated that a medical monitoring cause of action may be subject to normal tort defenses such as assumption of risk and contributory negligence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "6 Cal.4th 974, 974",
"parenthetical": "\"when a defendant in a [toxic landfill] negligence action demonstrates that a plaintiffs smoking is negligent and that a portion of the plaintiffs fear of cancer is attributable to the smoking, comparative fault principles may be applied to reduce the amount of recovery for emotional distress damages based on such fear\"",
"sentence": "See Donovan, 455 Mass, at 226 n. 11, 914 N.E.2d at 901 n. 11 (“[a] plaintiff[ smoker]’s claim would, of course, remain subject to all available affirmative defenses, such ' as contributory negligence”); Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 974, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d at 801 (“when a defendant in a [toxic landfill] negligence action demonstrates that a plaintiffs smoking is negligent and that a portion of the plaintiffs fear of cancer is attributable to the smoking, comparative fault principles may be applied to reduce the amount of recovery for emotional distress damages based on such fear”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "672 N.Y.S.2d 191, 191",
"parenthetical": "in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs' \"voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking\"",
"sentence": "See also Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 191 (in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs’ “voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking”)."
} | 6,047,705 | a |
Some of the cases have 'also indicated that a medical monitoring cause of action may be subject to normal tort defenses such as assumption of risk and contributory negligence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "241 A.D.2d 294, 294",
"parenthetical": "in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs' \"voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking\"",
"sentence": "See also Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 191 (in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs’ “voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"when a defendant in a [toxic landfill] negligence action demonstrates that a plaintiffs smoking is negligent and that a portion of the plaintiffs fear of cancer is attributable to the smoking, comparative fault principles may be applied to reduce the amount of recovery for emotional distress damages based on such fear\"",
"sentence": "See Donovan, 455 Mass, at 226 n. 11, 914 N.E.2d at 901 n. 11 (“[a] plaintiff[ smoker]’s claim would, of course, remain subject to all available affirmative defenses, such ' as contributory negligence”); Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 974, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d at 801 (“when a defendant in a [toxic landfill] negligence action demonstrates that a plaintiffs smoking is negligent and that a portion of the plaintiffs fear of cancer is attributable to the smoking, comparative fault principles may be applied to reduce the amount of recovery for emotional distress damages based on such fear”)."
} | 6,047,705 | b |
Some of the cases have 'also indicated that a medical monitoring cause of action may be subject to normal tort defenses such as assumption of risk and contributory negligence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "672 N.Y.S.2d 191, 191",
"parenthetical": "in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs' \"voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking\"",
"sentence": "See also Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 191 (in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs’ “voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"when a defendant in a [toxic landfill] negligence action demonstrates that a plaintiffs smoking is negligent and that a portion of the plaintiffs fear of cancer is attributable to the smoking, comparative fault principles may be applied to reduce the amount of recovery for emotional distress damages based on such fear\"",
"sentence": "See Donovan, 455 Mass, at 226 n. 11, 914 N.E.2d at 901 n. 11 (“[a] plaintiff[ smoker]’s claim would, of course, remain subject to all available affirmative defenses, such ' as contributory negligence”); Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 974, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d at 801 (“when a defendant in a [toxic landfill] negligence action demonstrates that a plaintiffs smoking is negligent and that a portion of the plaintiffs fear of cancer is attributable to the smoking, comparative fault principles may be applied to reduce the amount of recovery for emotional distress damages based on such fear”)."
} | 6,047,705 | b |
Some of the cases have 'also indicated that a medical monitoring cause of action may be subject to normal tort defenses such as assumption of risk and contributory negligence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "863 P.2d 801, 801",
"parenthetical": "\"when a defendant in a [toxic landfill] negligence action demonstrates that a plaintiffs smoking is negligent and that a portion of the plaintiffs fear of cancer is attributable to the smoking, comparative fault principles may be applied to reduce the amount of recovery for emotional distress damages based on such fear\"",
"sentence": "See Donovan, 455 Mass, at 226 n. 11, 914 N.E.2d at 901 n. 11 (“[a] plaintiff[ smoker]’s claim would, of course, remain subject to all available affirmative defenses, such ' as contributory negligence”); Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 974, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d at 801 (“when a defendant in a [toxic landfill] negligence action demonstrates that a plaintiffs smoking is negligent and that a portion of the plaintiffs fear of cancer is attributable to the smoking, comparative fault principles may be applied to reduce the amount of recovery for emotional distress damages based on such fear”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "241 A.D.2d 294, 294",
"parenthetical": "in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs' \"voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking\"",
"sentence": "See also Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 191 (in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs’ “voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking”)."
} | 6,047,705 | a |
Some of the cases have 'also indicated that a medical monitoring cause of action may be subject to normal tort defenses such as assumption of risk and contributory negligence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "863 P.2d 801, 801",
"parenthetical": "\"when a defendant in a [toxic landfill] negligence action demonstrates that a plaintiffs smoking is negligent and that a portion of the plaintiffs fear of cancer is attributable to the smoking, comparative fault principles may be applied to reduce the amount of recovery for emotional distress damages based on such fear\"",
"sentence": "See Donovan, 455 Mass, at 226 n. 11, 914 N.E.2d at 901 n. 11 (“[a] plaintiff[ smoker]’s claim would, of course, remain subject to all available affirmative defenses, such ' as contributory negligence”); Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 974, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d at 801 (“when a defendant in a [toxic landfill] negligence action demonstrates that a plaintiffs smoking is negligent and that a portion of the plaintiffs fear of cancer is attributable to the smoking, comparative fault principles may be applied to reduce the amount of recovery for emotional distress damages based on such fear”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "672 N.Y.S.2d 191, 191",
"parenthetical": "in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs' \"voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking\"",
"sentence": "See also Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 191 (in a cancerphobia case involving a toxic landfill, a jury may properly consider the plain tiffs’ “voluntary exposure to carcinogens, for example, by smoking”)."
} | 6,047,705 | a |
. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint also alleges violations of the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the constitution. However, plaintiff does not press these alleged constitutional violations as independent grounds for relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "588 F.2d 319, 327-28",
"parenthetical": "violation of federal constitutional right not a separate ground for relief under Federal Tort Claims Act",
"sentence": "See Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 327-28 (2d Cir.1978) (violation of federal constitutional right not a separate ground for relief under Federal Tort Claims Act); cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20, 23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1472, 1474, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (victim of intentional misconduct by federal officials may bring Federal Tort Claims Act action against United States, as well as Bivens action against officials alleged to have infringed constitutional rights, but only if state in which the misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "446 U.S. 14, 20, 23",
"parenthetical": "victim of intentional misconduct by federal officials may bring Federal Tort Claims Act action against United States, as well as Bivens action against officials alleged to have infringed constitutional rights, but only if state in which the misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct",
"sentence": "See Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 327-28 (2d Cir.1978) (violation of federal constitutional right not a separate ground for relief under Federal Tort Claims Act); cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20, 23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1472, 1474, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (victim of intentional misconduct by federal officials may bring Federal Tort Claims Act action against United States, as well as Bivens action against officials alleged to have infringed constitutional rights, but only if state in which the misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct)."
} | 4,065,769 | a |
. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint also alleges violations of the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the constitution. However, plaintiff does not press these alleged constitutional violations as independent grounds for relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "588 F.2d 319, 327-28",
"parenthetical": "violation of federal constitutional right not a separate ground for relief under Federal Tort Claims Act",
"sentence": "See Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 327-28 (2d Cir.1978) (violation of federal constitutional right not a separate ground for relief under Federal Tort Claims Act); cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20, 23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1472, 1474, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (victim of intentional misconduct by federal officials may bring Federal Tort Claims Act action against United States, as well as Bivens action against officials alleged to have infringed constitutional rights, but only if state in which the misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "100 S.Ct. 1468, 1472, 1474",
"parenthetical": "victim of intentional misconduct by federal officials may bring Federal Tort Claims Act action against United States, as well as Bivens action against officials alleged to have infringed constitutional rights, but only if state in which the misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct",
"sentence": "See Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 327-28 (2d Cir.1978) (violation of federal constitutional right not a separate ground for relief under Federal Tort Claims Act); cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20, 23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1472, 1474, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (victim of intentional misconduct by federal officials may bring Federal Tort Claims Act action against United States, as well as Bivens action against officials alleged to have infringed constitutional rights, but only if state in which the misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct)."
} | 4,065,769 | a |
. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint also alleges violations of the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the constitution. However, plaintiff does not press these alleged constitutional violations as independent grounds for relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "588 F.2d 319, 327-28",
"parenthetical": "violation of federal constitutional right not a separate ground for relief under Federal Tort Claims Act",
"sentence": "See Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 327-28 (2d Cir.1978) (violation of federal constitutional right not a separate ground for relief under Federal Tort Claims Act); cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20, 23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1472, 1474, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (victim of intentional misconduct by federal officials may bring Federal Tort Claims Act action against United States, as well as Bivens action against officials alleged to have infringed constitutional rights, but only if state in which the misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "victim of intentional misconduct by federal officials may bring Federal Tort Claims Act action against United States, as well as Bivens action against officials alleged to have infringed constitutional rights, but only if state in which the misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct",
"sentence": "See Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 327-28 (2d Cir.1978) (violation of federal constitutional right not a separate ground for relief under Federal Tort Claims Act); cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20, 23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1472, 1474, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (victim of intentional misconduct by federal officials may bring Federal Tort Claims Act action against United States, as well as Bivens action against officials alleged to have infringed constitutional rights, but only if state in which the misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct)."
} | 4,065,769 | a |
Finally, Matthys also asserts a claim for retaliatory discharge on account of her filing of an workers' compensation claim. In general, Indiana adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine, whereby an employment contract is terminable at the will of either party. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "412 F.3d 785, 785",
"parenthetical": "noting that such claims are called \"Frampton\" claims in Indiana courts",
"sentence": "See also Hudson, 412 F.3d at 785 (noting that such claims are called “Frampton” claims in Indiana courts); Crye, 2008 WL 5111349 at *7."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2008 WL 5111349, at *7",
"parenthetical": "\"employers can generally terminate an employment at any time, for a good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all\"",
"sentence": "Hudson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 412 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir.2005); Crye v. Caterpillar, Inc., 2008 WL 5111349 at *7 (N.D.Ind.2008) (“employers can generally terminate an employment at any time, for a good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all”); Settele v. Walgreens Co., 2007 WL 1970954 at *3 (N.D.Ind.2007). However, the Indiana Supreme Court has carved out an exception to this rule, acknowledging a cause of action for employees discharged in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim."
} | 4,257,538 | b |
Otherwise, there would be no reason to apply them. Courts in Utah and other states that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code have supplemented it in several outcome-determinative ways. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2009 UT 87, ¶ 10",
"parenthetical": "allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code",
"sentence": "See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d 1128 (allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code); Morgan v. Zions First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Pepper), 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that final closing orders in a probate proceeding can be vacated through a rule 60(b) motion, despite the fact that section 75-3-1001 of the probate code \"discharges a personal representative from further claim or demand after a final closing order has been entered\"); In re Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (estopping the first wife of decedent from asserting her inheritance rights as against the decedent's second wife); In re Estate of Peter C., 488 A2d 468, 470 (Me.1985) (holding that the common law rule that a guardian is in a fiduciary relationship to his ward was not abrogated by the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code even though the code does not shoulder guardians with fiduciary responsibilities); In re Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1988) (holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "760 P.2d 316, 319-20",
"parenthetical": "holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\"",
"sentence": "See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d 1128 (allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code); Morgan v. Zions First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Pepper), 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that final closing orders in a probate proceeding can be vacated through a rule 60(b) motion, despite the fact that section 75-3-1001 of the probate code \"discharges a personal representative from further claim or demand after a final closing order has been entered\"); In re Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (estopping the first wife of decedent from asserting her inheritance rights as against the decedent's second wife); In re Estate of Peter C., 488 A2d 468, 470 (Me.1985) (holding that the common law rule that a guardian is in a fiduciary relationship to his ward was not abrogated by the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code even though the code does not shoulder guardians with fiduciary responsibilities); In re Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1988) (holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\")."
} | 6,971,161 | a |
Otherwise, there would be no reason to apply them. Courts in Utah and other states that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code have supplemented it in several outcome-determinative ways. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code",
"sentence": "See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d 1128 (allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code); Morgan v. Zions First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Pepper), 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that final closing orders in a probate proceeding can be vacated through a rule 60(b) motion, despite the fact that section 75-3-1001 of the probate code \"discharges a personal representative from further claim or demand after a final closing order has been entered\"); In re Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (estopping the first wife of decedent from asserting her inheritance rights as against the decedent's second wife); In re Estate of Peter C., 488 A2d 468, 470 (Me.1985) (holding that the common law rule that a guardian is in a fiduciary relationship to his ward was not abrogated by the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code even though the code does not shoulder guardians with fiduciary responsibilities); In re Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1988) (holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "760 P.2d 316, 319-20",
"parenthetical": "holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\"",
"sentence": "See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d 1128 (allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code); Morgan v. Zions First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Pepper), 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that final closing orders in a probate proceeding can be vacated through a rule 60(b) motion, despite the fact that section 75-3-1001 of the probate code \"discharges a personal representative from further claim or demand after a final closing order has been entered\"); In re Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (estopping the first wife of decedent from asserting her inheritance rights as against the decedent's second wife); In re Estate of Peter C., 488 A2d 468, 470 (Me.1985) (holding that the common law rule that a guardian is in a fiduciary relationship to his ward was not abrogated by the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code even though the code does not shoulder guardians with fiduciary responsibilities); In re Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1988) (holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\")."
} | 6,971,161 | a |
Otherwise, there would be no reason to apply them. Courts in Utah and other states that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code have supplemented it in several outcome-determinative ways. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "711 P.2d 261, 263",
"parenthetical": "holding that final closing orders in a probate proceeding can be vacated through a rule 60(b) motion, despite the fact that section 75-3-1001 of the probate code \"discharges a personal representative from further claim or demand after a final closing order has been entered\"",
"sentence": "See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d 1128 (allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code); Morgan v. Zions First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Pepper), 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that final closing orders in a probate proceeding can be vacated through a rule 60(b) motion, despite the fact that section 75-3-1001 of the probate code \"discharges a personal representative from further claim or demand after a final closing order has been entered\"); In re Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (estopping the first wife of decedent from asserting her inheritance rights as against the decedent's second wife); In re Estate of Peter C., 488 A2d 468, 470 (Me.1985) (holding that the common law rule that a guardian is in a fiduciary relationship to his ward was not abrogated by the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code even though the code does not shoulder guardians with fiduciary responsibilities); In re Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1988) (holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "760 P.2d 316, 319-20",
"parenthetical": "holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\"",
"sentence": "See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d 1128 (allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code); Morgan v. Zions First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Pepper), 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that final closing orders in a probate proceeding can be vacated through a rule 60(b) motion, despite the fact that section 75-3-1001 of the probate code \"discharges a personal representative from further claim or demand after a final closing order has been entered\"); In re Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (estopping the first wife of decedent from asserting her inheritance rights as against the decedent's second wife); In re Estate of Peter C., 488 A2d 468, 470 (Me.1985) (holding that the common law rule that a guardian is in a fiduciary relationship to his ward was not abrogated by the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code even though the code does not shoulder guardians with fiduciary responsibilities); In re Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1988) (holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\")."
} | 6,971,161 | a |
Otherwise, there would be no reason to apply them. Courts in Utah and other states that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code have supplemented it in several outcome-determinative ways. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "444 So.2d 477, 479",
"parenthetical": "estopping the first wife of decedent from asserting her inheritance rights as against the decedent's second wife",
"sentence": "See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d 1128 (allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code); Morgan v. Zions First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Pepper), 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that final closing orders in a probate proceeding can be vacated through a rule 60(b) motion, despite the fact that section 75-3-1001 of the probate code \"discharges a personal representative from further claim or demand after a final closing order has been entered\"); In re Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (estopping the first wife of decedent from asserting her inheritance rights as against the decedent's second wife); In re Estate of Peter C., 488 A2d 468, 470 (Me.1985) (holding that the common law rule that a guardian is in a fiduciary relationship to his ward was not abrogated by the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code even though the code does not shoulder guardians with fiduciary responsibilities); In re Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1988) (holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "760 P.2d 316, 319-20",
"parenthetical": "holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\"",
"sentence": "See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d 1128 (allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code); Morgan v. Zions First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Pepper), 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that final closing orders in a probate proceeding can be vacated through a rule 60(b) motion, despite the fact that section 75-3-1001 of the probate code \"discharges a personal representative from further claim or demand after a final closing order has been entered\"); In re Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (estopping the first wife of decedent from asserting her inheritance rights as against the decedent's second wife); In re Estate of Peter C., 488 A2d 468, 470 (Me.1985) (holding that the common law rule that a guardian is in a fiduciary relationship to his ward was not abrogated by the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code even though the code does not shoulder guardians with fiduciary responsibilities); In re Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1988) (holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\")."
} | 6,971,161 | a |
Otherwise, there would be no reason to apply them. Courts in Utah and other states that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code have supplemented it in several outcome-determinative ways. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"",
"sentence": "See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d 1128 (allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code); Morgan v. Zions First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Pepper), 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that final closing orders in a probate proceeding can be vacated through a rule 60(b) motion, despite the fact that section 75-3-1001 of the probate code \"discharges a personal representative from further claim or demand after a final closing order has been entered\"); In re Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (estopping the first wife of decedent from asserting her inheritance rights as against the decedent's second wife); In re Estate of Peter C., 488 A2d 468, 470 (Me.1985) (holding that the common law rule that a guardian is in a fiduciary relationship to his ward was not abrogated by the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code even though the code does not shoulder guardians with fiduciary responsibilities); In re Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1988) (holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "760 P.2d 316, 319-20",
"parenthetical": "holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\"",
"sentence": "See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d 1128 (allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code); Morgan v. Zions First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Pepper), 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that final closing orders in a probate proceeding can be vacated through a rule 60(b) motion, despite the fact that section 75-3-1001 of the probate code \"discharges a personal representative from further claim or demand after a final closing order has been entered\"); In re Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (estopping the first wife of decedent from asserting her inheritance rights as against the decedent's second wife); In re Estate of Peter C., 488 A2d 468, 470 (Me.1985) (holding that the common law rule that a guardian is in a fiduciary relationship to his ward was not abrogated by the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code even though the code does not shoulder guardians with fiduciary responsibilities); In re Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1988) (holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\")."
} | 6,971,161 | a |
Otherwise, there would be no reason to apply them. Courts in Utah and other states that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code have supplemented it in several outcome-determinative ways. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "760 P.2d 316, 319-20",
"parenthetical": "holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\"",
"sentence": "See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d 1128 (allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code); Morgan v. Zions First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Pepper), 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that final closing orders in a probate proceeding can be vacated through a rule 60(b) motion, despite the fact that section 75-3-1001 of the probate code \"discharges a personal representative from further claim or demand after a final closing order has been entered\"); In re Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (estopping the first wife of decedent from asserting her inheritance rights as against the decedent's second wife); In re Estate of Peter C., 488 A2d 468, 470 (Me.1985) (holding that the common law rule that a guardian is in a fiduciary relationship to his ward was not abrogated by the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code even though the code does not shoulder guardians with fiduciary responsibilities); In re Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1988) (holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "699 P.2d 638, 645",
"parenthetical": "applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"",
"sentence": "See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d 1128 (allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code); Morgan v. Zions First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Pepper), 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that final closing orders in a probate proceeding can be vacated through a rule 60(b) motion, despite the fact that section 75-3-1001 of the probate code \"discharges a personal representative from further claim or demand after a final closing order has been entered\"); In re Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (estopping the first wife of decedent from asserting her inheritance rights as against the decedent's second wife); In re Estate of Peter C., 488 A2d 468, 470 (Me.1985) (holding that the common law rule that a guardian is in a fiduciary relationship to his ward was not abrogated by the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code even though the code does not shoulder guardians with fiduciary responsibilities); In re Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1988) (holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\")."
} | 6,971,161 | b |
Otherwise, there would be no reason to apply them. Courts in Utah and other states that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code have supplemented it in several outcome-determinative ways. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "760 P.2d 316, 319-20",
"parenthetical": "holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\"",
"sentence": "See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d 1128 (allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code); Morgan v. Zions First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Pepper), 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that final closing orders in a probate proceeding can be vacated through a rule 60(b) motion, despite the fact that section 75-3-1001 of the probate code \"discharges a personal representative from further claim or demand after a final closing order has been entered\"); In re Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (estopping the first wife of decedent from asserting her inheritance rights as against the decedent's second wife); In re Estate of Peter C., 488 A2d 468, 470 (Me.1985) (holding that the common law rule that a guardian is in a fiduciary relationship to his ward was not abrogated by the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code even though the code does not shoulder guardians with fiduciary responsibilities); In re Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1988) (holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "583 N.W.2d 138, 140",
"parenthetical": "holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts",
"sentence": "See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d 1128 (allowing the equitable discovery rule to toll the three-year statute of limitations required in the Probate Code); Morgan v. Zions First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Pepper), 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that final closing orders in a probate proceeding can be vacated through a rule 60(b) motion, despite the fact that section 75-3-1001 of the probate code \"discharges a personal representative from further claim or demand after a final closing order has been entered\"); In re Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (estopping the first wife of decedent from asserting her inheritance rights as against the decedent's second wife); In re Estate of Peter C., 488 A2d 468, 470 (Me.1985) (holding that the common law rule that a guardian is in a fiduciary relationship to his ward was not abrogated by the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code even though the code does not shoulder guardians with fiduciary responsibilities); In re Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1988) (holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103, \"principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the [Utah Uniform Probate Code] unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code\")."
} | 6,971,161 | b |
This rationale justifies excluding the Haw-kinses' compensatory damages. It also justifies excluding damages awards which purport both to compensate and to punish--such as the liquidated damages awarded in age discrimination cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "914 F.2d 591, 591",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between punitive damages which serve no compensatory purpose and liquidated damages which serve both a deterrent and compensatory purpose",
"sentence": "See Miller, 914 F.2d at 591 (distinguishing between punitive damages which serve no compensatory purpose and liquidated damages which serve both a deterrent and compensatory purpose); Bennett v. United States, 30 Fed.Cl. 396, 401 (1994) (in contrast to exclusively noncompen-satory punitive damages, ADEA liquidated damages have a compensatory purpose and are therefore excludable); Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634, 1993 WL 231740 (1993) (ADEA liquidated damages, which serve both to compensate for intangible injuries and to punish, are excludable); cf. Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 84 (In a defamation suit alleging injury to reputation, “[a]ll income in compensation of that injury is excludable under § 104(a)(2)”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "848 F.2d 84, 84",
"parenthetical": "In a defamation suit alleging injury to reputation, \"[a]ll income in compensation of that injury is excludable under SS 104(a",
"sentence": "See Miller, 914 F.2d at 591 (distinguishing between punitive damages which serve no compensatory purpose and liquidated damages which serve both a deterrent and compensatory purpose); Bennett v. United States, 30 Fed.Cl. 396, 401 (1994) (in contrast to exclusively noncompen-satory punitive damages, ADEA liquidated damages have a compensatory purpose and are therefore excludable); Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634, 1993 WL 231740 (1993) (ADEA liquidated damages, which serve both to compensate for intangible injuries and to punish, are excludable); cf. Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 84 (In a defamation suit alleging injury to reputation, “[a]ll income in compensation of that injury is excludable under § 104(a)(2)”)."
} | 10,532,425 | a |
This rationale justifies excluding the Haw-kinses' compensatory damages. It also justifies excluding damages awards which purport both to compensate and to punish--such as the liquidated damages awarded in age discrimination cases. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "848 F.2d 84, 84",
"parenthetical": "In a defamation suit alleging injury to reputation, \"[a]ll income in compensation of that injury is excludable under SS 104(a",
"sentence": "See Miller, 914 F.2d at 591 (distinguishing between punitive damages which serve no compensatory purpose and liquidated damages which serve both a deterrent and compensatory purpose); Bennett v. United States, 30 Fed.Cl. 396, 401 (1994) (in contrast to exclusively noncompen-satory punitive damages, ADEA liquidated damages have a compensatory purpose and are therefore excludable); Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634, 1993 WL 231740 (1993) (ADEA liquidated damages, which serve both to compensate for intangible injuries and to punish, are excludable); cf. Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 84 (In a defamation suit alleging injury to reputation, “[a]ll income in compensation of that injury is excludable under § 104(a)(2)”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "30 Fed.Cl. 396, 401",
"parenthetical": "in contrast to exclusively noncompen-satory punitive damages, ADEA liquidated damages have a compensatory purpose and are therefore excludable",
"sentence": "See Miller, 914 F.2d at 591 (distinguishing between punitive damages which serve no compensatory purpose and liquidated damages which serve both a deterrent and compensatory purpose); Bennett v. United States, 30 Fed.Cl. 396, 401 (1994) (in contrast to exclusively noncompen-satory punitive damages, ADEA liquidated damages have a compensatory purpose and are therefore excludable); Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634, 1993 WL 231740 (1993) (ADEA liquidated damages, which serve both to compensate for intangible injuries and to punish, are excludable); cf. Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 84 (In a defamation suit alleging injury to reputation, “[a]ll income in compensation of that injury is excludable under § 104(a)(2)”)."
} | 10,532,425 | b |
This rationale justifies excluding the Haw-kinses' compensatory damages. It also justifies excluding damages awards which purport both to compensate and to punish--such as the liquidated damages awarded in age discrimination cases. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "848 F.2d 84, 84",
"parenthetical": "In a defamation suit alleging injury to reputation, \"[a]ll income in compensation of that injury is excludable under SS 104(a",
"sentence": "See Miller, 914 F.2d at 591 (distinguishing between punitive damages which serve no compensatory purpose and liquidated damages which serve both a deterrent and compensatory purpose); Bennett v. United States, 30 Fed.Cl. 396, 401 (1994) (in contrast to exclusively noncompen-satory punitive damages, ADEA liquidated damages have a compensatory purpose and are therefore excludable); Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634, 1993 WL 231740 (1993) (ADEA liquidated damages, which serve both to compensate for intangible injuries and to punish, are excludable); cf. Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 84 (In a defamation suit alleging injury to reputation, “[a]ll income in compensation of that injury is excludable under § 104(a)(2)”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ADEA liquidated damages, which serve both to compensate for intangible injuries and to punish, are excludable",
"sentence": "See Miller, 914 F.2d at 591 (distinguishing between punitive damages which serve no compensatory purpose and liquidated damages which serve both a deterrent and compensatory purpose); Bennett v. United States, 30 Fed.Cl. 396, 401 (1994) (in contrast to exclusively noncompen-satory punitive damages, ADEA liquidated damages have a compensatory purpose and are therefore excludable); Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634, 1993 WL 231740 (1993) (ADEA liquidated damages, which serve both to compensate for intangible injuries and to punish, are excludable); cf. Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 84 (In a defamation suit alleging injury to reputation, “[a]ll income in compensation of that injury is excludable under § 104(a)(2)”)."
} | 10,532,425 | b |
This rationale justifies excluding the Haw-kinses' compensatory damages. It also justifies excluding damages awards which purport both to compensate and to punish--such as the liquidated damages awarded in age discrimination cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ADEA liquidated damages, which serve both to compensate for intangible injuries and to punish, are excludable",
"sentence": "See Miller, 914 F.2d at 591 (distinguishing between punitive damages which serve no compensatory purpose and liquidated damages which serve both a deterrent and compensatory purpose); Bennett v. United States, 30 Fed.Cl. 396, 401 (1994) (in contrast to exclusively noncompen-satory punitive damages, ADEA liquidated damages have a compensatory purpose and are therefore excludable); Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634, 1993 WL 231740 (1993) (ADEA liquidated damages, which serve both to compensate for intangible injuries and to punish, are excludable); cf. Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 84 (In a defamation suit alleging injury to reputation, “[a]ll income in compensation of that injury is excludable under § 104(a)(2)”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "848 F.2d 84, 84",
"parenthetical": "In a defamation suit alleging injury to reputation, \"[a]ll income in compensation of that injury is excludable under SS 104(a",
"sentence": "See Miller, 914 F.2d at 591 (distinguishing between punitive damages which serve no compensatory purpose and liquidated damages which serve both a deterrent and compensatory purpose); Bennett v. United States, 30 Fed.Cl. 396, 401 (1994) (in contrast to exclusively noncompen-satory punitive damages, ADEA liquidated damages have a compensatory purpose and are therefore excludable); Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634, 1993 WL 231740 (1993) (ADEA liquidated damages, which serve both to compensate for intangible injuries and to punish, are excludable); cf. Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 84 (In a defamation suit alleging injury to reputation, “[a]ll income in compensation of that injury is excludable under § 104(a)(2)”)."
} | 10,532,425 | a |
Pls.' Mot. to Remand at 6 (stating that "Plaintiffs have filed essentially the same cause of action in both the DC Superior Court as well as the DC Federal Court"); see also Defs.' Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. to Remand, Ex. B. Thus, on at least two prior occasions, the plaintiffs have affirmatively invoked federal jurisdiction over the claims raised in the Superior Court complaint. See Pls.' Mot. to Remand at 3, 6. In so doing, they have waived any right to remand they may have otherwise had based on procedural defects in the removal of this action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 F.3d 528, 528",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the plaintiff waived any procedural defect in connection with removal by moving to file a supplemental complaint in the federal court and participating in oral argument on the motion",
"sentence": "See Koehnen, 89 F.3d at 528 (concluding that the plaintiff waived any procedural defect in connection with removal by moving to file a supplemental complaint in the federal court and participating in oral argument on the motion); Moffit v. Balt. Am. Mortgage, 665 F.Supp.2d 515, 517 (D.Md.2009) (holding that the plaintiffs waived any right to seek remand by filing a second amended complaint in federal court); see also Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1036 (10th Cir.1998) (noting that “plaintiffs cannot voluntarily invoke, and then disavow, federal jurisdiction”) Accordingly, the court denies the plaintiffs’ motion to remand."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "156 F.3d 1030, 1036",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"plaintiffs cannot voluntarily invoke, and then disavow, federal jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See Koehnen, 89 F.3d at 528 (concluding that the plaintiff waived any procedural defect in connection with removal by moving to file a supplemental complaint in the federal court and participating in oral argument on the motion); Moffit v. Balt. Am. Mortgage, 665 F.Supp.2d 515, 517 (D.Md.2009) (holding that the plaintiffs waived any right to seek remand by filing a second amended complaint in federal court); see also Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1036 (10th Cir.1998) (noting that “plaintiffs cannot voluntarily invoke, and then disavow, federal jurisdiction”) Accordingly, the court denies the plaintiffs’ motion to remand."
} | 4,026,691 | a |
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