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"Rules authorizing discovery ... are a matter of legislative grace." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "429 U.S. 545, 559",
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"[tjhere is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case\"",
"sentence": "Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d at 788 (Seattle Times “focused on the fact that discovery is ‘a matter of legislative grace’ ”); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (recognizing “[tjhere is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "858 F.2d 788, 788",
"parenthetical": "Seattle Times \"focused on the fact that discovery is 'a matter of legislative grace' \"",
"sentence": "Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d at 788 (Seattle Times “focused on the fact that discovery is ‘a matter of legislative grace’ ”); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (recognizing “[tjhere is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case”)."
} | 4,282,956 | b |
"Rules authorizing discovery ... are a matter of legislative grace." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"[tjhere is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case\"",
"sentence": "Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d at 788 (Seattle Times “focused on the fact that discovery is ‘a matter of legislative grace’ ”); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (recognizing “[tjhere is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "858 F.2d 788, 788",
"parenthetical": "Seattle Times \"focused on the fact that discovery is 'a matter of legislative grace' \"",
"sentence": "Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d at 788 (Seattle Times “focused on the fact that discovery is ‘a matter of legislative grace’ ”); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (recognizing “[tjhere is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case”)."
} | 4,282,956 | b |
"Rules authorizing discovery ... are a matter of legislative grace." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"[tjhere is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case\"",
"sentence": "Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d at 788 (Seattle Times “focused on the fact that discovery is ‘a matter of legislative grace’ ”); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (recognizing “[tjhere is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "858 F.2d 788, 788",
"parenthetical": "Seattle Times \"focused on the fact that discovery is 'a matter of legislative grace' \"",
"sentence": "Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d at 788 (Seattle Times “focused on the fact that discovery is ‘a matter of legislative grace’ ”); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (recognizing “[tjhere is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case”)."
} | 4,282,956 | b |
Nor does the Remand Redetermination mention that Commerce asked for and received source data for the data in ques tion. In this circumstance, the failure to address the considerable amount of evidence contrary to the Department's finding that the data were not from publicly available sources casts doubt upon the validity of the finding itself. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "340 U.S. 474, 488",
"parenthetical": "\"The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.\"",
"sentence": "See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (“The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.”); see also Cleo Inc. v. United States, 501 F.3d 1291, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Although a reviewing court must take into account contradictory evidence or any evidence in the record that undermines the agency’s finding, the substantial evidence test does not require that there be an absence of evidence detracting from the agency’s conclusion.”) (citing Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 487-88)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "501 F.3d 1291, 1296",
"parenthetical": "\"Although a reviewing court must take into account contradictory evidence or any evidence in the record that undermines the agency's finding, the substantial evidence test does not require that there be an absence of evidence detracting from the agency's conclusion.\"",
"sentence": "See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (“The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.”); see also Cleo Inc. v. United States, 501 F.3d 1291, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Although a reviewing court must take into account contradictory evidence or any evidence in the record that undermines the agency’s finding, the substantial evidence test does not require that there be an absence of evidence detracting from the agency’s conclusion.”) (citing Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 487-88)."
} | 3,695,971 | a |
. Only four published opinions have read section 1447(c) to authorize an award of fees or costs against plaintiffs. Three involved a removal that was, at the outset, improper, and thus they are not inconsistent with the conclusion we reach today. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "removal based on diversity improper because plaintiff mispled residency in complaint",
"sentence": "See Vaughan, 227 F. 364 (removal based on diversity improper because plaintiff mispled residency in complaint); Duarte v. Donnelley, 266 F.Supp. 380, 384 (D.Haw.1967) (removal improper because amount in controversy was below jurisdictional limit); Barraclough v. ADP Automotive Claims Servs., Inc., 818 F.Supp. 1310 (N.D.Cal.1993) (removal improper because plaintiff's only federal claim was, by her own admission, frivolous)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "remand forced by plaintiff's subsequent amendment of complaint to join a local defendant",
"sentence": "But see Clark v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 117 F.Supp. 583 (W.D.Mo.1953) (remand forced by plaintiff's subsequent amendment of complaint to join a local defendant)."
} | 7,413,867 | a |
. Only four published opinions have read section 1447(c) to authorize an award of fees or costs against plaintiffs. Three involved a removal that was, at the outset, improper, and thus they are not inconsistent with the conclusion we reach today. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "remand forced by plaintiff's subsequent amendment of complaint to join a local defendant",
"sentence": "But see Clark v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 117 F.Supp. 583 (W.D.Mo.1953) (remand forced by plaintiff's subsequent amendment of complaint to join a local defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "266 F.Supp. 380, 384",
"parenthetical": "removal improper because amount in controversy was below jurisdictional limit",
"sentence": "See Vaughan, 227 F. 364 (removal based on diversity improper because plaintiff mispled residency in complaint); Duarte v. Donnelley, 266 F.Supp. 380, 384 (D.Haw.1967) (removal improper because amount in controversy was below jurisdictional limit); Barraclough v. ADP Automotive Claims Servs., Inc., 818 F.Supp. 1310 (N.D.Cal.1993) (removal improper because plaintiff's only federal claim was, by her own admission, frivolous)."
} | 7,413,867 | b |
. Only four published opinions have read section 1447(c) to authorize an award of fees or costs against plaintiffs. Three involved a removal that was, at the outset, improper, and thus they are not inconsistent with the conclusion we reach today. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "removal improper because plaintiff's only federal claim was, by her own admission, frivolous",
"sentence": "See Vaughan, 227 F. 364 (removal based on diversity improper because plaintiff mispled residency in complaint); Duarte v. Donnelley, 266 F.Supp. 380, 384 (D.Haw.1967) (removal improper because amount in controversy was below jurisdictional limit); Barraclough v. ADP Automotive Claims Servs., Inc., 818 F.Supp. 1310 (N.D.Cal.1993) (removal improper because plaintiff's only federal claim was, by her own admission, frivolous)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "remand forced by plaintiff's subsequent amendment of complaint to join a local defendant",
"sentence": "But see Clark v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 117 F.Supp. 583 (W.D.Mo.1953) (remand forced by plaintiff's subsequent amendment of complaint to join a local defendant)."
} | 7,413,867 | a |
Since kk Liquormart, the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that the Court's citation to American Mini Theatres and Barnes requires that alcohol regulations of SOBs be analyzed in light of the First Amendment tests contained therein. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "316 F.3d 702, 712",
"parenthetical": "concluding that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes",
"sentence": "See Ben’s Bar v. Vill. of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir.2003) (concluding that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes); see also 181 South Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228, 233 (3d Cir.2006) (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes); Odie v. Decatur County, 421 F.3d 386, 399 (6th Cir.2005) (agreeing with the circuit courts that have interpreted kk Liquor- mart’s “reaffirmation of LaRue’s holding to mean that the LaRue regulations would have survived intermediate scrutiny' — -and ... that they would have had to survive such scrutiny to comport with the First Amendment”); Giovani Carandola Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 513 n. 2 & 519 (4th Cir.2002) (noting the 44 Liquormart Court’s reliance on First Amendment cases and holding that “the result reached in LaRue remains sound not because a state enjoys any special authority when it burdens speech by restricting the sale of alcohol, but rather because the regulation in LaRue complied with the First Amendment”); Sammy’s of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993, 996 (11th Cir.1998) (reaffirming that the Barnes intermediate level of scrutiny, derived from United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), applies to adult entertainment liquor regulations)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "454 F.3d 228, 233",
"parenthetical": "agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes",
"sentence": "See Ben’s Bar v. Vill. of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir.2003) (concluding that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes); see also 181 South Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228, 233 (3d Cir.2006) (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes); Odie v. Decatur County, 421 F.3d 386, 399 (6th Cir.2005) (agreeing with the circuit courts that have interpreted kk Liquor- mart’s “reaffirmation of LaRue’s holding to mean that the LaRue regulations would have survived intermediate scrutiny' — -and ... that they would have had to survive such scrutiny to comport with the First Amendment”); Giovani Carandola Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 513 n. 2 & 519 (4th Cir.2002) (noting the 44 Liquormart Court’s reliance on First Amendment cases and holding that “the result reached in LaRue remains sound not because a state enjoys any special authority when it burdens speech by restricting the sale of alcohol, but rather because the regulation in LaRue complied with the First Amendment”); Sammy’s of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993, 996 (11th Cir.1998) (reaffirming that the Barnes intermediate level of scrutiny, derived from United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), applies to adult entertainment liquor regulations)."
} | 3,866,689 | a |
Since kk Liquormart, the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that the Court's citation to American Mini Theatres and Barnes requires that alcohol regulations of SOBs be analyzed in light of the First Amendment tests contained therein. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "316 F.3d 702, 712",
"parenthetical": "concluding that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes",
"sentence": "See Ben’s Bar v. Vill. of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir.2003) (concluding that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes); see also 181 South Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228, 233 (3d Cir.2006) (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes); Odie v. Decatur County, 421 F.3d 386, 399 (6th Cir.2005) (agreeing with the circuit courts that have interpreted kk Liquor- mart’s “reaffirmation of LaRue’s holding to mean that the LaRue regulations would have survived intermediate scrutiny' — -and ... that they would have had to survive such scrutiny to comport with the First Amendment”); Giovani Carandola Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 513 n. 2 & 519 (4th Cir.2002) (noting the 44 Liquormart Court’s reliance on First Amendment cases and holding that “the result reached in LaRue remains sound not because a state enjoys any special authority when it burdens speech by restricting the sale of alcohol, but rather because the regulation in LaRue complied with the First Amendment”); Sammy’s of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993, 996 (11th Cir.1998) (reaffirming that the Barnes intermediate level of scrutiny, derived from United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), applies to adult entertainment liquor regulations)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "421 F.3d 386, 399",
"parenthetical": "agreeing with the circuit courts that have interpreted kk Liquor- mart's \"reaffirmation of LaRue's holding to mean that the LaRue regulations would have survived intermediate scrutiny' -- -and ... that they would have had to survive such scrutiny to comport with the First Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See Ben’s Bar v. Vill. of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir.2003) (concluding that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes); see also 181 South Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228, 233 (3d Cir.2006) (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes); Odie v. Decatur County, 421 F.3d 386, 399 (6th Cir.2005) (agreeing with the circuit courts that have interpreted kk Liquor- mart’s “reaffirmation of LaRue’s holding to mean that the LaRue regulations would have survived intermediate scrutiny' — -and ... that they would have had to survive such scrutiny to comport with the First Amendment”); Giovani Carandola Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 513 n. 2 & 519 (4th Cir.2002) (noting the 44 Liquormart Court’s reliance on First Amendment cases and holding that “the result reached in LaRue remains sound not because a state enjoys any special authority when it burdens speech by restricting the sale of alcohol, but rather because the regulation in LaRue complied with the First Amendment”); Sammy’s of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993, 996 (11th Cir.1998) (reaffirming that the Barnes intermediate level of scrutiny, derived from United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), applies to adult entertainment liquor regulations)."
} | 3,866,689 | a |
Since kk Liquormart, the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that the Court's citation to American Mini Theatres and Barnes requires that alcohol regulations of SOBs be analyzed in light of the First Amendment tests contained therein. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting the 44 Liquormart Court's reliance on First Amendment cases and holding that \"the result reached in LaRue remains sound not because a state enjoys any special authority when it burdens speech by restricting the sale of alcohol, but rather because the regulation in LaRue complied with the First Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See Ben’s Bar v. Vill. of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir.2003) (concluding that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes); see also 181 South Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228, 233 (3d Cir.2006) (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes); Odie v. Decatur County, 421 F.3d 386, 399 (6th Cir.2005) (agreeing with the circuit courts that have interpreted kk Liquor- mart’s “reaffirmation of LaRue’s holding to mean that the LaRue regulations would have survived intermediate scrutiny' — -and ... that they would have had to survive such scrutiny to comport with the First Amendment”); Giovani Carandola Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 513 n. 2 & 519 (4th Cir.2002) (noting the 44 Liquormart Court’s reliance on First Amendment cases and holding that “the result reached in LaRue remains sound not because a state enjoys any special authority when it burdens speech by restricting the sale of alcohol, but rather because the regulation in LaRue complied with the First Amendment”); Sammy’s of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993, 996 (11th Cir.1998) (reaffirming that the Barnes intermediate level of scrutiny, derived from United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), applies to adult entertainment liquor regulations)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "316 F.3d 702, 712",
"parenthetical": "concluding that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes",
"sentence": "See Ben’s Bar v. Vill. of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir.2003) (concluding that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes); see also 181 South Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228, 233 (3d Cir.2006) (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that prohibitions on the sale of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments must be analyzed in light of American Mini Theatres and Barnes); Odie v. Decatur County, 421 F.3d 386, 399 (6th Cir.2005) (agreeing with the circuit courts that have interpreted kk Liquor- mart’s “reaffirmation of LaRue’s holding to mean that the LaRue regulations would have survived intermediate scrutiny' — -and ... that they would have had to survive such scrutiny to comport with the First Amendment”); Giovani Carandola Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 513 n. 2 & 519 (4th Cir.2002) (noting the 44 Liquormart Court’s reliance on First Amendment cases and holding that “the result reached in LaRue remains sound not because a state enjoys any special authority when it burdens speech by restricting the sale of alcohol, but rather because the regulation in LaRue complied with the First Amendment”); Sammy’s of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993, 996 (11th Cir.1998) (reaffirming that the Barnes intermediate level of scrutiny, derived from United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), applies to adult entertainment liquor regulations)."
} | 3,866,689 | b |
The Supreme Court has also commented on language and the Constitution in other contexts. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that "the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those bom with English on the tongue." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "273 U.S. 284, 298",
"parenthetical": "stating that the Constitution protects \"those who speak another tongue\"",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "262 U.S. 390, 401",
"parenthetical": "holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | 9,113,463 | b |
The Supreme Court has also commented on language and the Constitution in other contexts. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that "the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those bom with English on the tongue." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the Constitution protects \"those who speak another tongue\"",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "262 U.S. 390, 401",
"parenthetical": "holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | 9,113,463 | b |
The Supreme Court has also commented on language and the Constitution in other contexts. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that "the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those bom with English on the tongue." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "262 U.S. 390, 401",
"parenthetical": "holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the Constitution protects \"those who speak another tongue\"",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | 9,113,463 | a |
The Supreme Court has also commented on language and the Constitution in other contexts. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that "the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those bom with English on the tongue." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "273 U.S. 284, 298",
"parenthetical": "stating that the Constitution protects \"those who speak another tongue\"",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | 9,113,463 | a |
The Supreme Court has also commented on language and the Constitution in other contexts. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that "the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those bom with English on the tongue." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the Constitution protects \"those who speak another tongue\"",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | 9,113,463 | b |
The Supreme Court has also commented on language and the Constitution in other contexts. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that "the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those bom with English on the tongue." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the Constitution protects \"those who speak another tongue\"",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | 9,113,463 | b |
The Supreme Court has also commented on language and the Constitution in other contexts. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that "the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those bom with English on the tongue." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "273 U.S. 284, 298",
"parenthetical": "stating that the Constitution protects \"those who speak another tongue\"",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | 9,113,463 | b |
The Supreme Court has also commented on language and the Constitution in other contexts. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that "the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those bom with English on the tongue." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the Constitution protects \"those who speak another tongue\"",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | 9,113,463 | b |
The Supreme Court has also commented on language and the Constitution in other contexts. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that "the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those bom with English on the tongue." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the Constitution protects \"those who speak another tongue\"",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages",
"sentence": "Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law which restricted the teaching of foreign languages); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (stating that the Constitution protects “those who speak another tongue”)."
} | 9,113,463 | b |
To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the City ordinances on the ground that they impermissibly distinguish between MFUs and free-standing restaurants, Plaintiffs' challenge fails. First, the City's decision to distinguish MFUs from freestanding restaurants is fully acceptable under the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "199 U.S. 552, 563",
"parenthetical": "\"It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "427 U.S. 303, 303",
"parenthetical": "\"States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | 3,671,070 | a |
To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the City ordinances on the ground that they impermissibly distinguish between MFUs and free-standing restaurants, Plaintiffs' challenge fails. First, the City's decision to distinguish MFUs from freestanding restaurants is fully acceptable under the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "199 U.S. 552, 563",
"parenthetical": "\"It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | 3,671,070 | b |
To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the City ordinances on the ground that they impermissibly distinguish between MFUs and free-standing restaurants, Plaintiffs' challenge fails. First, the City's decision to distinguish MFUs from freestanding restaurants is fully acceptable under the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "260 U.S. 174, 176",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "199 U.S. 552, 563",
"parenthetical": "\"It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | 3,671,070 | b |
To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the City ordinances on the ground that they impermissibly distinguish between MFUs and free-standing restaurants, Plaintiffs' challenge fails. First, the City's decision to distinguish MFUs from freestanding restaurants is fully acceptable under the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "199 U.S. 552, 563",
"parenthetical": "\"It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | 3,671,070 | a |
To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the City ordinances on the ground that they impermissibly distinguish between MFUs and free-standing restaurants, Plaintiffs' challenge fails. First, the City's decision to distinguish MFUs from freestanding restaurants is fully acceptable under the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "199 U.S. 552, 563",
"parenthetical": "\"It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | 3,671,070 | b |
To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the City ordinances on the ground that they impermissibly distinguish between MFUs and free-standing restaurants, Plaintiffs' challenge fails. First, the City's decision to distinguish MFUs from freestanding restaurants is fully acceptable under the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "427 U.S. 303, 303",
"parenthetical": "\"States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | 3,671,070 | a |
To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the City ordinances on the ground that they impermissibly distinguish between MFUs and free-standing restaurants, Plaintiffs' challenge fails. First, the City's decision to distinguish MFUs from freestanding restaurants is fully acceptable under the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | 3,671,070 | b |
To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the City ordinances on the ground that they impermissibly distinguish between MFUs and free-standing restaurants, Plaintiffs' challenge fails. First, the City's decision to distinguish MFUs from freestanding restaurants is fully acceptable under the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "260 U.S. 174, 176",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | 3,671,070 | a |
To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the City ordinances on the ground that they impermissibly distinguish between MFUs and free-standing restaurants, Plaintiffs' challenge fails. First, the City's decision to distinguish MFUs from freestanding restaurants is fully acceptable under the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | 3,671,070 | a |
To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the City ordinances on the ground that they impermissibly distinguish between MFUs and free-standing restaurants, Plaintiffs' challenge fails. First, the City's decision to distinguish MFUs from freestanding restaurants is fully acceptable under the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | 3,671,070 | b |
To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the City ordinances on the ground that they impermissibly distinguish between MFUs and free-standing restaurants, Plaintiffs' challenge fails. First, the City's decision to distinguish MFUs from freestanding restaurants is fully acceptable under the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "427 U.S. 303, 303",
"parenthetical": "\"States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | 3,671,070 | b |
To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the City ordinances on the ground that they impermissibly distinguish between MFUs and free-standing restaurants, Plaintiffs' challenge fails. First, the City's decision to distinguish MFUs from freestanding restaurants is fully acceptable under the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | 3,671,070 | a |
To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the City ordinances on the ground that they impermissibly distinguish between MFUs and free-standing restaurants, Plaintiffs' challenge fails. First, the City's decision to distinguish MFUs from freestanding restaurants is fully acceptable under the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "260 U.S. 174, 176",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | 3,671,070 | a |
To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the City ordinances on the ground that they impermissibly distinguish between MFUs and free-standing restaurants, Plaintiffs' challenge fails. First, the City's decision to distinguish MFUs from freestanding restaurants is fully acceptable under the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | 3,671,070 | b |
To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the City ordinances on the ground that they impermissibly distinguish between MFUs and free-standing restaurants, Plaintiffs' challenge fails. First, the City's decision to distinguish MFUs from freestanding restaurants is fully acceptable under the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 563, 26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905) (“It is primarily for the State to select the kinds of businesses which shall be the subjects of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind.”); see also New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513 (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922) (“[I]n the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely applied and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing.”)."
} | 3,671,070 | a |
The seizure by the arresting officer of the pack of cigarettes, which was in plain view, was a reasonable confiscation of property that was illegal for Thomas to possess at that time and place. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "455 U.S. 1, 5-6",
"parenthetical": "the \"plain view\" doctrine \"permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be\"",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6, 102 S.Ct. 812, 815-16, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982) (the “plain view” doctrine “permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be”); State v. Culbreath, 300 S.C. 232, 237, 387 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1990) (“The ‘plain view’ doctrine is applicable where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.”); cf. Johnson v. Multiple Misc. Items 1-424, 523 N.W.2d 238 (Minn.Ct.App.1994) (defining contraband as property that is illegal for a particular offender to possess, even if possession of such property by another would not be illegal). Thus, the subsequent discovery and seizure of the marijuana was lawful as well."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defining contraband as property that is illegal for a particular offender to possess, even if possession of such property by another would not be illegal",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6, 102 S.Ct. 812, 815-16, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982) (the “plain view” doctrine “permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be”); State v. Culbreath, 300 S.C. 232, 237, 387 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1990) (“The ‘plain view’ doctrine is applicable where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.”); cf. Johnson v. Multiple Misc. Items 1-424, 523 N.W.2d 238 (Minn.Ct.App.1994) (defining contraband as property that is illegal for a particular offender to possess, even if possession of such property by another would not be illegal). Thus, the subsequent discovery and seizure of the marijuana was lawful as well."
} | 517,349 | a |
The seizure by the arresting officer of the pack of cigarettes, which was in plain view, was a reasonable confiscation of property that was illegal for Thomas to possess at that time and place. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defining contraband as property that is illegal for a particular offender to possess, even if possession of such property by another would not be illegal",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6, 102 S.Ct. 812, 815-16, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982) (the “plain view” doctrine “permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be”); State v. Culbreath, 300 S.C. 232, 237, 387 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1990) (“The ‘plain view’ doctrine is applicable where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.”); cf. Johnson v. Multiple Misc. Items 1-424, 523 N.W.2d 238 (Minn.Ct.App.1994) (defining contraband as property that is illegal for a particular offender to possess, even if possession of such property by another would not be illegal). Thus, the subsequent discovery and seizure of the marijuana was lawful as well."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 812, 815-16",
"parenthetical": "the \"plain view\" doctrine \"permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be\"",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6, 102 S.Ct. 812, 815-16, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982) (the “plain view” doctrine “permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be”); State v. Culbreath, 300 S.C. 232, 237, 387 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1990) (“The ‘plain view’ doctrine is applicable where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.”); cf. Johnson v. Multiple Misc. Items 1-424, 523 N.W.2d 238 (Minn.Ct.App.1994) (defining contraband as property that is illegal for a particular offender to possess, even if possession of such property by another would not be illegal). Thus, the subsequent discovery and seizure of the marijuana was lawful as well."
} | 517,349 | b |
The seizure by the arresting officer of the pack of cigarettes, which was in plain view, was a reasonable confiscation of property that was illegal for Thomas to possess at that time and place. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the \"plain view\" doctrine \"permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be\"",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6, 102 S.Ct. 812, 815-16, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982) (the “plain view” doctrine “permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be”); State v. Culbreath, 300 S.C. 232, 237, 387 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1990) (“The ‘plain view’ doctrine is applicable where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.”); cf. Johnson v. Multiple Misc. Items 1-424, 523 N.W.2d 238 (Minn.Ct.App.1994) (defining contraband as property that is illegal for a particular offender to possess, even if possession of such property by another would not be illegal). Thus, the subsequent discovery and seizure of the marijuana was lawful as well."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defining contraband as property that is illegal for a particular offender to possess, even if possession of such property by another would not be illegal",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6, 102 S.Ct. 812, 815-16, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982) (the “plain view” doctrine “permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be”); State v. Culbreath, 300 S.C. 232, 237, 387 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1990) (“The ‘plain view’ doctrine is applicable where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.”); cf. Johnson v. Multiple Misc. Items 1-424, 523 N.W.2d 238 (Minn.Ct.App.1994) (defining contraband as property that is illegal for a particular offender to possess, even if possession of such property by another would not be illegal). Thus, the subsequent discovery and seizure of the marijuana was lawful as well."
} | 517,349 | a |
The seizure by the arresting officer of the pack of cigarettes, which was in plain view, was a reasonable confiscation of property that was illegal for Thomas to possess at that time and place. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "300 S.C. 232, 237",
"parenthetical": "\"The 'plain view' doctrine is applicable where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.\"",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6, 102 S.Ct. 812, 815-16, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982) (the “plain view” doctrine “permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be”); State v. Culbreath, 300 S.C. 232, 237, 387 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1990) (“The ‘plain view’ doctrine is applicable where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.”); cf. Johnson v. Multiple Misc. Items 1-424, 523 N.W.2d 238 (Minn.Ct.App.1994) (defining contraband as property that is illegal for a particular offender to possess, even if possession of such property by another would not be illegal). Thus, the subsequent discovery and seizure of the marijuana was lawful as well."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defining contraband as property that is illegal for a particular offender to possess, even if possession of such property by another would not be illegal",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6, 102 S.Ct. 812, 815-16, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982) (the “plain view” doctrine “permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be”); State v. Culbreath, 300 S.C. 232, 237, 387 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1990) (“The ‘plain view’ doctrine is applicable where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.”); cf. Johnson v. Multiple Misc. Items 1-424, 523 N.W.2d 238 (Minn.Ct.App.1994) (defining contraband as property that is illegal for a particular offender to possess, even if possession of such property by another would not be illegal). Thus, the subsequent discovery and seizure of the marijuana was lawful as well."
} | 517,349 | a |
The seizure by the arresting officer of the pack of cigarettes, which was in plain view, was a reasonable confiscation of property that was illegal for Thomas to possess at that time and place. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defining contraband as property that is illegal for a particular offender to possess, even if possession of such property by another would not be illegal",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6, 102 S.Ct. 812, 815-16, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982) (the “plain view” doctrine “permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be”); State v. Culbreath, 300 S.C. 232, 237, 387 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1990) (“The ‘plain view’ doctrine is applicable where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.”); cf. Johnson v. Multiple Misc. Items 1-424, 523 N.W.2d 238 (Minn.Ct.App.1994) (defining contraband as property that is illegal for a particular offender to possess, even if possession of such property by another would not be illegal). Thus, the subsequent discovery and seizure of the marijuana was lawful as well."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "387 S.E.2d 255, 257",
"parenthetical": "\"The 'plain view' doctrine is applicable where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.\"",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6, 102 S.Ct. 812, 815-16, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982) (the “plain view” doctrine “permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be”); State v. Culbreath, 300 S.C. 232, 237, 387 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1990) (“The ‘plain view’ doctrine is applicable where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.”); cf. Johnson v. Multiple Misc. Items 1-424, 523 N.W.2d 238 (Minn.Ct.App.1994) (defining contraband as property that is illegal for a particular offender to possess, even if possession of such property by another would not be illegal). Thus, the subsequent discovery and seizure of the marijuana was lawful as well."
} | 517,349 | b |
This evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Davis did not justifiably use deadly force to protect himself -- after Cameron already had been shot in the head -- from Cameron's assault. Or the jury simply could have disbelieved Davis's claim of self-defense, given the number of gunshots fired. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction for voluntary manslaughter when appellant hit the victim on the back of the head with a vodka bottle after the victim made a homosexual advance to him, causing appellant to fear a sexual assault",
"sentence": "See also Thomas v. State, 174 Ga. App. 560 (330 SE2d 777) (1985) (upholding conviction for voluntary manslaughter when appellant hit the victim on the back of the head with a vodka bottle after the victim made a homosexual advance to him, causing appellant to fear a sexual assault)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence of multiple gunshots authorized jury to reject defendant's claim of self-defense",
"sentence": "See Stanley v. State, 254 Ga. 376 (329 SE2d 500) (1985) (evidence of multiple gunshots authorized jury to reject defendant’s claim of self-defense). The evidence was also sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Davis was guilty of voluntary manslaughter in that he shot and killed Cameron out of “a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.”"
} | 12,167,820 | b |
Because there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for claims brought under Minn.Stat. SS 176.82, subd. 1, the next task is to determine whether the statute itself provides a jury trial right. Minnesota courts have recognized that the Legislature has chosen to withhold the right to a jury trial in Minn.Stat. SS 176.82, subd. 1. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "227 Minn. 434, 434",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a remedy provided by the WCA did not include the right a jury trial",
"sentence": "See Minn.Stat. § 176.301 (2012) (“When a workers’ compensation issue is present in the district court action, the court may try the action itself without a jury, or refer the matter to the chief administrative law judge for assignment to a compensation judge.” (emphasis added)); see also Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 434, 35 N.W.2d at 734 (concluding that a remedy provided by the WCA did not include the right a jury trial)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 N.W.2d 423, 427",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a jury trial was not required because \"section 176.82 has no element of a common law claim which could otherwise support the right to a jury trial\"",
"sentence": "Snesrud v. Instant Web, Inc., 484 N.W.2d 423, 427 (Minn.App.1992) (concluding that a jury trial was not required because “section 176.82 has no element of a common law claim which could otherwise support the right to a jury trial”), rev. denied (Minn. June 17, 1992)."
} | 6,927,089 | b |
Because there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for claims brought under Minn.Stat. SS 176.82, subd. 1, the next task is to determine whether the statute itself provides a jury trial right. Minnesota courts have recognized that the Legislature has chosen to withhold the right to a jury trial in Minn.Stat. SS 176.82, subd. 1. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 N.W.2d 423, 427",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a jury trial was not required because \"section 176.82 has no element of a common law claim which could otherwise support the right to a jury trial\"",
"sentence": "Snesrud v. Instant Web, Inc., 484 N.W.2d 423, 427 (Minn.App.1992) (concluding that a jury trial was not required because “section 176.82 has no element of a common law claim which could otherwise support the right to a jury trial”), rev. denied (Minn. June 17, 1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "35 N.W.2d 734, 734",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a remedy provided by the WCA did not include the right a jury trial",
"sentence": "See Minn.Stat. § 176.301 (2012) (“When a workers’ compensation issue is present in the district court action, the court may try the action itself without a jury, or refer the matter to the chief administrative law judge for assignment to a compensation judge.” (emphasis added)); see also Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 434, 35 N.W.2d at 734 (concluding that a remedy provided by the WCA did not include the right a jury trial)."
} | 6,927,089 | a |
Finally, even if this court were to find that the effective date of INA SS 242(a)(2)(B) renders it inapplicable to the instant case, this court still lacks the authority to review the District Director's decision to deny an extension of voluntary departure. Prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA, the District Director had the sole authority to grant voluntary departures under the former 8 U.S.C.A. SSSS 1252(b), 1254(e). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "933 F.2d 598, 598",
"parenthetical": "recognizing limited jurisdiction of judiciary to review such decisions under 8 C.F.R. SS 244.2 and holding that court lacked authority to review INS's discretionary grant of voluntary departure",
"sentence": "See Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 598 (recognizing limited jurisdiction of judiciary to review such decisions under 8 C.F.R. § 244.2 and holding that court lacked authority to review INS’s discretionary grant of voluntary departure); see also Nocon v. INS, 789 F.2d 1028, 1034 (3rd Cir.1986) (Board of Immigration Appeals has no authority to grant extension because sole authority rests with District Director); Lalani, 105 F.3d at 338 (noting that there is no meaningful standard for reviewing decisions made under 8 C.F.R. § 244.2). But see Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1579 (10th Cir.1994) (noting that some courts have recognized that District Director’s refusal to extend voluntary departure is reviewable in District Court pursuant to the general jurisdictional grant set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1329.) (citing Williams v. INS, 795 F.2d 738, 745 (9th Cir.1986))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "789 F.2d 1028, 1034",
"parenthetical": "Board of Immigration Appeals has no authority to grant extension because sole authority rests with District Director",
"sentence": "See Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 598 (recognizing limited jurisdiction of judiciary to review such decisions under 8 C.F.R. § 244.2 and holding that court lacked authority to review INS’s discretionary grant of voluntary departure); see also Nocon v. INS, 789 F.2d 1028, 1034 (3rd Cir.1986) (Board of Immigration Appeals has no authority to grant extension because sole authority rests with District Director); Lalani, 105 F.3d at 338 (noting that there is no meaningful standard for reviewing decisions made under 8 C.F.R. § 244.2). But see Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1579 (10th Cir.1994) (noting that some courts have recognized that District Director’s refusal to extend voluntary departure is reviewable in District Court pursuant to the general jurisdictional grant set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1329.) (citing Williams v. INS, 795 F.2d 738, 745 (9th Cir.1986))."
} | 531,333 | a |
Although there is room for reasonable disagreement as to the force of some of these factors in the instant case, the important point, which the majority fails to recognize, is that whatever the impact of the first four factors, retroactive application is appropriate only if the court finds that the first four factors are counterbalanced by the fifth factor -- the statutory interest in applying a new rule. "Unless the burden of imposing the new standard is de minimis, or the newly discovered statutory design compels its retroactive application, the principles which underlie the very notion of an ordered society, in which authoritatively established rules of conduct may fairly be relied upon, must preclude its retroactive effect." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "719 F.2d 436, 468",
"parenthetical": "\"The statutory interest in applying the new rule despite individual reliance is, of course, the crucial consideration in the context of requiring an agency to apply one of its rules retroactively.\"",
"sentence": "Retail, Wholesale, 366 F.2d at 392. See id. at 390 (“courts have not infrequently declined to enforce administrative orders when in their view the inequity of retroactive application has not been counterbalanced by sufficiently significant statutory interests.”); see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 468 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204, 104 S.Ct. 3571, 82 L.Ed.2d 870 (1984) (“The statutory interest in applying the new rule despite individual reliance is, of course, the crucial consideration in the context of requiring an agency to apply one of its rules retroactively.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "366 F.2d 392, 392",
"parenthetical": "\"courts have not infrequently declined to enforce administrative orders when in their view the inequity of retroactive application has not been counterbalanced by sufficiently significant statutory interests.\"",
"sentence": "Retail, Wholesale, 366 F.2d at 392. See id. at 390 (“courts have not infrequently declined to enforce administrative orders when in their view the inequity of retroactive application has not been counterbalanced by sufficiently significant statutory interests.”); see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 468 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204, 104 S.Ct. 3571, 82 L.Ed.2d 870 (1984) (“The statutory interest in applying the new rule despite individual reliance is, of course, the crucial consideration in the context of requiring an agency to apply one of its rules retroactively.”)."
} | 1,741,493 | b |
Although there is room for reasonable disagreement as to the force of some of these factors in the instant case, the important point, which the majority fails to recognize, is that whatever the impact of the first four factors, retroactive application is appropriate only if the court finds that the first four factors are counterbalanced by the fifth factor -- the statutory interest in applying a new rule. "Unless the burden of imposing the new standard is de minimis, or the newly discovered statutory design compels its retroactive application, the principles which underlie the very notion of an ordered society, in which authoritatively established rules of conduct may fairly be relied upon, must preclude its retroactive effect." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "366 F.2d 392, 392",
"parenthetical": "\"courts have not infrequently declined to enforce administrative orders when in their view the inequity of retroactive application has not been counterbalanced by sufficiently significant statutory interests.\"",
"sentence": "Retail, Wholesale, 366 F.2d at 392. See id. at 390 (“courts have not infrequently declined to enforce administrative orders when in their view the inequity of retroactive application has not been counterbalanced by sufficiently significant statutory interests.”); see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 468 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204, 104 S.Ct. 3571, 82 L.Ed.2d 870 (1984) (“The statutory interest in applying the new rule despite individual reliance is, of course, the crucial consideration in the context of requiring an agency to apply one of its rules retroactively.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The statutory interest in applying the new rule despite individual reliance is, of course, the crucial consideration in the context of requiring an agency to apply one of its rules retroactively.\"",
"sentence": "Retail, Wholesale, 366 F.2d at 392. See id. at 390 (“courts have not infrequently declined to enforce administrative orders when in their view the inequity of retroactive application has not been counterbalanced by sufficiently significant statutory interests.”); see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 468 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204, 104 S.Ct. 3571, 82 L.Ed.2d 870 (1984) (“The statutory interest in applying the new rule despite individual reliance is, of course, the crucial consideration in the context of requiring an agency to apply one of its rules retroactively.”)."
} | 1,741,493 | a |
Although there is room for reasonable disagreement as to the force of some of these factors in the instant case, the important point, which the majority fails to recognize, is that whatever the impact of the first four factors, retroactive application is appropriate only if the court finds that the first four factors are counterbalanced by the fifth factor -- the statutory interest in applying a new rule. "Unless the burden of imposing the new standard is de minimis, or the newly discovered statutory design compels its retroactive application, the principles which underlie the very notion of an ordered society, in which authoritatively established rules of conduct may fairly be relied upon, must preclude its retroactive effect." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "366 F.2d 392, 392",
"parenthetical": "\"courts have not infrequently declined to enforce administrative orders when in their view the inequity of retroactive application has not been counterbalanced by sufficiently significant statutory interests.\"",
"sentence": "Retail, Wholesale, 366 F.2d at 392. See id. at 390 (“courts have not infrequently declined to enforce administrative orders when in their view the inequity of retroactive application has not been counterbalanced by sufficiently significant statutory interests.”); see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 468 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204, 104 S.Ct. 3571, 82 L.Ed.2d 870 (1984) (“The statutory interest in applying the new rule despite individual reliance is, of course, the crucial consideration in the context of requiring an agency to apply one of its rules retroactively.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The statutory interest in applying the new rule despite individual reliance is, of course, the crucial consideration in the context of requiring an agency to apply one of its rules retroactively.\"",
"sentence": "Retail, Wholesale, 366 F.2d at 392. See id. at 390 (“courts have not infrequently declined to enforce administrative orders when in their view the inequity of retroactive application has not been counterbalanced by sufficiently significant statutory interests.”); see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 468 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204, 104 S.Ct. 3571, 82 L.Ed.2d 870 (1984) (“The statutory interest in applying the new rule despite individual reliance is, of course, the crucial consideration in the context of requiring an agency to apply one of its rules retroactively.”)."
} | 1,741,493 | a |
Although there is room for reasonable disagreement as to the force of some of these factors in the instant case, the important point, which the majority fails to recognize, is that whatever the impact of the first four factors, retroactive application is appropriate only if the court finds that the first four factors are counterbalanced by the fifth factor -- the statutory interest in applying a new rule. "Unless the burden of imposing the new standard is de minimis, or the newly discovered statutory design compels its retroactive application, the principles which underlie the very notion of an ordered society, in which authoritatively established rules of conduct may fairly be relied upon, must preclude its retroactive effect." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The statutory interest in applying the new rule despite individual reliance is, of course, the crucial consideration in the context of requiring an agency to apply one of its rules retroactively.\"",
"sentence": "Retail, Wholesale, 366 F.2d at 392. See id. at 390 (“courts have not infrequently declined to enforce administrative orders when in their view the inequity of retroactive application has not been counterbalanced by sufficiently significant statutory interests.”); see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 468 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204, 104 S.Ct. 3571, 82 L.Ed.2d 870 (1984) (“The statutory interest in applying the new rule despite individual reliance is, of course, the crucial consideration in the context of requiring an agency to apply one of its rules retroactively.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "366 F.2d 392, 392",
"parenthetical": "\"courts have not infrequently declined to enforce administrative orders when in their view the inequity of retroactive application has not been counterbalanced by sufficiently significant statutory interests.\"",
"sentence": "Retail, Wholesale, 366 F.2d at 392. See id. at 390 (“courts have not infrequently declined to enforce administrative orders when in their view the inequity of retroactive application has not been counterbalanced by sufficiently significant statutory interests.”); see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 468 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204, 104 S.Ct. 3571, 82 L.Ed.2d 870 (1984) (“The statutory interest in applying the new rule despite individual reliance is, of course, the crucial consideration in the context of requiring an agency to apply one of its rules retroactively.”)."
} | 1,741,493 | b |
In the present case, appellant argued at trial that the State was required to produce the cocaine she distributed to Trooper Elzey in order to establish that she had committed the offenses charged. This was not a correct statement of law. The nature of the substance distributed to the trooper could have been proved by other, sufficient evidence. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "68 Md.App. 467, 471-2",
"parenthetical": "admission by owner of vehicle that substances found in the vehicle were marijuana and cocaine was sufficient evidence upon which to base forfeiture of the vehicle",
"sentence": "One 1979 Cadillac Seville v. State, 68 Md.App. 467, 471-2, 513 A.2d 927 (1986) (admission by owner of vehicle that substances found in the vehicle were marijuana and cocaine was sufficient evidence upon which to base forfeiture of the vehicle)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "79 Md.App. 241, 255",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence",
"sentence": "See also Best v. State, 79 Md.App. 241, 255, 556 A.2d 701 (1989) (recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence)."
} | 1,021,704 | a |
In the present case, appellant argued at trial that the State was required to produce the cocaine she distributed to Trooper Elzey in order to establish that she had committed the offenses charged. This was not a correct statement of law. The nature of the substance distributed to the trooper could have been proved by other, sufficient evidence. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "68 Md.App. 467, 471-2",
"parenthetical": "admission by owner of vehicle that substances found in the vehicle were marijuana and cocaine was sufficient evidence upon which to base forfeiture of the vehicle",
"sentence": "One 1979 Cadillac Seville v. State, 68 Md.App. 467, 471-2, 513 A.2d 927 (1986) (admission by owner of vehicle that substances found in the vehicle were marijuana and cocaine was sufficient evidence upon which to base forfeiture of the vehicle)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence",
"sentence": "See also Best v. State, 79 Md.App. 241, 255, 556 A.2d 701 (1989) (recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence)."
} | 1,021,704 | a |
In the present case, appellant argued at trial that the State was required to produce the cocaine she distributed to Trooper Elzey in order to establish that she had committed the offenses charged. This was not a correct statement of law. The nature of the substance distributed to the trooper could have been proved by other, sufficient evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "79 Md.App. 241, 255",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence",
"sentence": "See also Best v. State, 79 Md.App. 241, 255, 556 A.2d 701 (1989) (recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "admission by owner of vehicle that substances found in the vehicle were marijuana and cocaine was sufficient evidence upon which to base forfeiture of the vehicle",
"sentence": "One 1979 Cadillac Seville v. State, 68 Md.App. 467, 471-2, 513 A.2d 927 (1986) (admission by owner of vehicle that substances found in the vehicle were marijuana and cocaine was sufficient evidence upon which to base forfeiture of the vehicle)."
} | 1,021,704 | b |
In the present case, appellant argued at trial that the State was required to produce the cocaine she distributed to Trooper Elzey in order to establish that she had committed the offenses charged. This was not a correct statement of law. The nature of the substance distributed to the trooper could have been proved by other, sufficient evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence",
"sentence": "See also Best v. State, 79 Md.App. 241, 255, 556 A.2d 701 (1989) (recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "admission by owner of vehicle that substances found in the vehicle were marijuana and cocaine was sufficient evidence upon which to base forfeiture of the vehicle",
"sentence": "One 1979 Cadillac Seville v. State, 68 Md.App. 467, 471-2, 513 A.2d 927 (1986) (admission by owner of vehicle that substances found in the vehicle were marijuana and cocaine was sufficient evidence upon which to base forfeiture of the vehicle)."
} | 1,021,704 | b |
Turning to Defendant's challenge to her plea, we first address her undisputed claim that she was not informed that as a result of her plea, she would have a felony conviction, she would have difficulty in obtaining credit, securing employment, obtaining Section 8 housing and federal financial aid, and that her conviction would preclude her from owning a firearm and would subject her future testimony to impeachment. In our view, these consequences of her plea are collateral consequences that' she need not know to enter a valid plea. Defendant cites no case where a court found that knowledge of any of these consequences was necessary for a plea to be knowing. And courts have ruled that defendants do not need to be aware of collateral consequences similar or identical to several of those she names. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "687 F.3d 56, 61",
"parenthetical": "possibility of civil commitment after serving criminal sentence is collateral consequence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir.2012) (loss of federal benefits); Kratt v. Garvey, 342 F.3d 475, 485 (6th Cir.2003) (revocation of pilot’s license); United States v. Campusano, 947 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1991) (use in evidence in federal trial of defendant’s guilty plea in state prosecution); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3rd Cir.1976) (defendant would lose civil-service job and conviction was for a felony); see also United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2nd Cir.2012) (possibility of civil commitment after serving criminal sentence is collateral consequence); Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir.2004) (possible life commitment as a sexually dangerous person is collateral consequence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "947 F.2d 1, 4-5",
"parenthetical": "use in evidence in federal trial of defendant's guilty plea in state prosecution",
"sentence": "See United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir.2012) (loss of federal benefits); Kratt v. Garvey, 342 F.3d 475, 485 (6th Cir.2003) (revocation of pilot’s license); United States v. Campusano, 947 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1991) (use in evidence in federal trial of defendant’s guilty plea in state prosecution); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3rd Cir.1976) (defendant would lose civil-service job and conviction was for a felony); see also United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2nd Cir.2012) (possibility of civil commitment after serving criminal sentence is collateral consequence); Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir.2004) (possible life commitment as a sexually dangerous person is collateral consequence)."
} | 4,180,551 | b |
Turning to Defendant's challenge to her plea, we first address her undisputed claim that she was not informed that as a result of her plea, she would have a felony conviction, she would have difficulty in obtaining credit, securing employment, obtaining Section 8 housing and federal financial aid, and that her conviction would preclude her from owning a firearm and would subject her future testimony to impeachment. In our view, these consequences of her plea are collateral consequences that' she need not know to enter a valid plea. Defendant cites no case where a court found that knowledge of any of these consequences was necessary for a plea to be knowing. And courts have ruled that defendants do not need to be aware of collateral consequences similar or identical to several of those she names. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "365 F.3d 14, 18",
"parenthetical": "possible life commitment as a sexually dangerous person is collateral consequence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir.2012) (loss of federal benefits); Kratt v. Garvey, 342 F.3d 475, 485 (6th Cir.2003) (revocation of pilot’s license); United States v. Campusano, 947 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1991) (use in evidence in federal trial of defendant’s guilty plea in state prosecution); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3rd Cir.1976) (defendant would lose civil-service job and conviction was for a felony); see also United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2nd Cir.2012) (possibility of civil commitment after serving criminal sentence is collateral consequence); Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir.2004) (possible life commitment as a sexually dangerous person is collateral consequence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "947 F.2d 1, 4-5",
"parenthetical": "use in evidence in federal trial of defendant's guilty plea in state prosecution",
"sentence": "See United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir.2012) (loss of federal benefits); Kratt v. Garvey, 342 F.3d 475, 485 (6th Cir.2003) (revocation of pilot’s license); United States v. Campusano, 947 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1991) (use in evidence in federal trial of defendant’s guilty plea in state prosecution); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3rd Cir.1976) (defendant would lose civil-service job and conviction was for a felony); see also United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2nd Cir.2012) (possibility of civil commitment after serving criminal sentence is collateral consequence); Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir.2004) (possible life commitment as a sexually dangerous person is collateral consequence)."
} | 4,180,551 | b |
Turning to Defendant's challenge to her plea, we first address her undisputed claim that she was not informed that as a result of her plea, she would have a felony conviction, she would have difficulty in obtaining credit, securing employment, obtaining Section 8 housing and federal financial aid, and that her conviction would preclude her from owning a firearm and would subject her future testimony to impeachment. In our view, these consequences of her plea are collateral consequences that' she need not know to enter a valid plea. Defendant cites no case where a court found that knowledge of any of these consequences was necessary for a plea to be knowing. And courts have ruled that defendants do not need to be aware of collateral consequences similar or identical to several of those she names. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "687 F.3d 56, 61",
"parenthetical": "possibility of civil commitment after serving criminal sentence is collateral consequence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir.2012) (loss of federal benefits); Kratt v. Garvey, 342 F.3d 475, 485 (6th Cir.2003) (revocation of pilot’s license); United States v. Campusano, 947 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1991) (use in evidence in federal trial of defendant’s guilty plea in state prosecution); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3rd Cir.1976) (defendant would lose civil-service job and conviction was for a felony); see also United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2nd Cir.2012) (possibility of civil commitment after serving criminal sentence is collateral consequence); Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir.2004) (possible life commitment as a sexually dangerous person is collateral consequence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "529 F.2d 1066, 1072",
"parenthetical": "defendant would lose civil-service job and conviction was for a felony",
"sentence": "See United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir.2012) (loss of federal benefits); Kratt v. Garvey, 342 F.3d 475, 485 (6th Cir.2003) (revocation of pilot’s license); United States v. Campusano, 947 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1991) (use in evidence in federal trial of defendant’s guilty plea in state prosecution); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3rd Cir.1976) (defendant would lose civil-service job and conviction was for a felony); see also United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2nd Cir.2012) (possibility of civil commitment after serving criminal sentence is collateral consequence); Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir.2004) (possible life commitment as a sexually dangerous person is collateral consequence)."
} | 4,180,551 | b |
Turning to Defendant's challenge to her plea, we first address her undisputed claim that she was not informed that as a result of her plea, she would have a felony conviction, she would have difficulty in obtaining credit, securing employment, obtaining Section 8 housing and federal financial aid, and that her conviction would preclude her from owning a firearm and would subject her future testimony to impeachment. In our view, these consequences of her plea are collateral consequences that' she need not know to enter a valid plea. Defendant cites no case where a court found that knowledge of any of these consequences was necessary for a plea to be knowing. And courts have ruled that defendants do not need to be aware of collateral consequences similar or identical to several of those she names. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "365 F.3d 14, 18",
"parenthetical": "possible life commitment as a sexually dangerous person is collateral consequence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir.2012) (loss of federal benefits); Kratt v. Garvey, 342 F.3d 475, 485 (6th Cir.2003) (revocation of pilot’s license); United States v. Campusano, 947 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1991) (use in evidence in federal trial of defendant’s guilty plea in state prosecution); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3rd Cir.1976) (defendant would lose civil-service job and conviction was for a felony); see also United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2nd Cir.2012) (possibility of civil commitment after serving criminal sentence is collateral consequence); Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir.2004) (possible life commitment as a sexually dangerous person is collateral consequence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "529 F.2d 1066, 1072",
"parenthetical": "defendant would lose civil-service job and conviction was for a felony",
"sentence": "See United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir.2012) (loss of federal benefits); Kratt v. Garvey, 342 F.3d 475, 485 (6th Cir.2003) (revocation of pilot’s license); United States v. Campusano, 947 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1991) (use in evidence in federal trial of defendant’s guilty plea in state prosecution); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3rd Cir.1976) (defendant would lose civil-service job and conviction was for a felony); see also United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2nd Cir.2012) (possibility of civil commitment after serving criminal sentence is collateral consequence); Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir.2004) (possible life commitment as a sexually dangerous person is collateral consequence)."
} | 4,180,551 | b |
Given the highly deferential AEDPA standard, it is even possible that if Pennsylvania merely had a generic burglary statute that did not differentiate between burglarizing an occupied or unoccupied building, a reasonable application of the "fact of a prior conviction" exception might have permitted the judge to look at facts underlying the prior burglary conviction to determine whether Garrus was convicted of burglarizing an occupied building. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "268 F.3d 151, 153, 157",
"parenthetical": "finding that Apprendi allows a sentencing judge to find \"not only the mere fact of previous convictions but [certain] other related issues as well\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 153, 157 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that Apprendi allows a sentencing judge to find “not only the mere fact of previous convictions but [certain] other related issues as well”); cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (holding that under a federal “three strikes” law, the sentencing judge may only find facts that were necessary to the prior conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "495 U.S. 575, 602",
"parenthetical": "holding that under a federal \"three strikes\" law, the sentencing judge may only find facts that were necessary to the prior conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 153, 157 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that Apprendi allows a sentencing judge to find “not only the mere fact of previous convictions but [certain] other related issues as well”); cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (holding that under a federal “three strikes” law, the sentencing judge may only find facts that were necessary to the prior conviction)."
} | 3,522,839 | a |
Given the highly deferential AEDPA standard, it is even possible that if Pennsylvania merely had a generic burglary statute that did not differentiate between burglarizing an occupied or unoccupied building, a reasonable application of the "fact of a prior conviction" exception might have permitted the judge to look at facts underlying the prior burglary conviction to determine whether Garrus was convicted of burglarizing an occupied building. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that under a federal \"three strikes\" law, the sentencing judge may only find facts that were necessary to the prior conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 153, 157 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that Apprendi allows a sentencing judge to find “not only the mere fact of previous convictions but [certain] other related issues as well”); cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (holding that under a federal “three strikes” law, the sentencing judge may only find facts that were necessary to the prior conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "268 F.3d 151, 153, 157",
"parenthetical": "finding that Apprendi allows a sentencing judge to find \"not only the mere fact of previous convictions but [certain] other related issues as well\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 153, 157 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that Apprendi allows a sentencing judge to find “not only the mere fact of previous convictions but [certain] other related issues as well”); cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (holding that under a federal “three strikes” law, the sentencing judge may only find facts that were necessary to the prior conviction)."
} | 3,522,839 | b |
Given the highly deferential AEDPA standard, it is even possible that if Pennsylvania merely had a generic burglary statute that did not differentiate between burglarizing an occupied or unoccupied building, a reasonable application of the "fact of a prior conviction" exception might have permitted the judge to look at facts underlying the prior burglary conviction to determine whether Garrus was convicted of burglarizing an occupied building. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "268 F.3d 151, 153, 157",
"parenthetical": "finding that Apprendi allows a sentencing judge to find \"not only the mere fact of previous convictions but [certain] other related issues as well\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 153, 157 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that Apprendi allows a sentencing judge to find “not only the mere fact of previous convictions but [certain] other related issues as well”); cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (holding that under a federal “three strikes” law, the sentencing judge may only find facts that were necessary to the prior conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that under a federal \"three strikes\" law, the sentencing judge may only find facts that were necessary to the prior conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 153, 157 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that Apprendi allows a sentencing judge to find “not only the mere fact of previous convictions but [certain] other related issues as well”); cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (holding that under a federal “three strikes” law, the sentencing judge may only find facts that were necessary to the prior conviction)."
} | 3,522,839 | a |
Only twice prior to Strickland has a New Jersey court purported to apply a "reasonable competence" standard. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "155 N.J.Super. 567, 570",
"parenthetical": "trial counsel departed from \"the accepted standard of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 519; see also State v. Marrero, 155 N.J.Super. 567,570 (App.Div.1978) (trial counsel departed from “the accepted standard of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases”); cf. State v. Sugar, 84 N.J. 1, 17 (1980) (without applying standard, court notes that counsel must be “reasonably competent”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 N.J. 1, 17",
"parenthetical": "without applying standard, court notes that counsel must be \"reasonably competent\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 519; see also State v. Marrero, 155 N.J.Super. 567,570 (App.Div.1978) (trial counsel departed from “the accepted standard of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases”); cf. State v. Sugar, 84 N.J. 1, 17 (1980) (without applying standard, court notes that counsel must be “reasonably competent”)."
} | 1,353,423 | a |
We note that this court has not in past cases required the district court to make specific findings regarding every factor of section 3622. We have remanded for findings on section 3622 where the district court made no findings with respect to any of the factors. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "941 F.2d 60, 65",
"parenthetical": "interpreting 18 U.S.C. SS 3572, a section similar to section 3622, not to require specific factual findings",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Marquez, 941 F.2d 60, 65 (2nd Cir.1991) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3572, a section similar to section 3622, not to require specific factual findings)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "885 F.2d 181, 182-83",
"parenthetical": "interpreting the word \"shall\" in section 3622 to require specific factual findings to be made for each of the nine factors enumerated in the statute",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Harvey, 885 F.2d 181, 182-83 (4th Cir.1989) (interpreting the word “shall” in section 3622 to require specific factual findings to be made for each of the nine factors enumerated in the statute)."
} | 11,304,611 | a |
The Boyd Family challenges the relevancy of most of the evidence listed above, as Officer Paine did not know of its existence prior to shooting Cammerin, and the only issue in front of the jury was whether Officer Paine's actions were reasonable based on his perspective at the time. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "111 F.3d 1332, 1341",
"parenthetical": "upholding the magistrate judge's evidentiary ruling to exclude evidence that the victim of a police shooting wanted to be killed by the police, on the ground that the evidence was not relevant to the objective reasonableness test, as the events immediately prior to the use of force were undisputed",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”); see also Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1341 (7th Cir.1997) (upholding the magistrate judge’s evidentiary ruling to exclude evidence that the victim of a police shooting wanted to be killed by the police, on the ground that the evidence was not relevant to the objective reasonableness test, as the events immediately prior to the use of force were undisputed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 386, 396",
"parenthetical": "\"The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.\"",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”); see also Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1341 (7th Cir.1997) (upholding the magistrate judge’s evidentiary ruling to exclude evidence that the victim of a police shooting wanted to be killed by the police, on the ground that the evidence was not relevant to the objective reasonableness test, as the events immediately prior to the use of force were undisputed)."
} | 4,037,695 | b |
The Boyd Family challenges the relevancy of most of the evidence listed above, as Officer Paine did not know of its existence prior to shooting Cammerin, and the only issue in front of the jury was whether Officer Paine's actions were reasonable based on his perspective at the time. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.\"",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”); see also Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1341 (7th Cir.1997) (upholding the magistrate judge’s evidentiary ruling to exclude evidence that the victim of a police shooting wanted to be killed by the police, on the ground that the evidence was not relevant to the objective reasonableness test, as the events immediately prior to the use of force were undisputed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "111 F.3d 1332, 1341",
"parenthetical": "upholding the magistrate judge's evidentiary ruling to exclude evidence that the victim of a police shooting wanted to be killed by the police, on the ground that the evidence was not relevant to the objective reasonableness test, as the events immediately prior to the use of force were undisputed",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”); see also Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1341 (7th Cir.1997) (upholding the magistrate judge’s evidentiary ruling to exclude evidence that the victim of a police shooting wanted to be killed by the police, on the ground that the evidence was not relevant to the objective reasonableness test, as the events immediately prior to the use of force were undisputed)."
} | 4,037,695 | a |
The Boyd Family challenges the relevancy of most of the evidence listed above, as Officer Paine did not know of its existence prior to shooting Cammerin, and the only issue in front of the jury was whether Officer Paine's actions were reasonable based on his perspective at the time. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "111 F.3d 1332, 1341",
"parenthetical": "upholding the magistrate judge's evidentiary ruling to exclude evidence that the victim of a police shooting wanted to be killed by the police, on the ground that the evidence was not relevant to the objective reasonableness test, as the events immediately prior to the use of force were undisputed",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”); see also Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1341 (7th Cir.1997) (upholding the magistrate judge’s evidentiary ruling to exclude evidence that the victim of a police shooting wanted to be killed by the police, on the ground that the evidence was not relevant to the objective reasonableness test, as the events immediately prior to the use of force were undisputed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.\"",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”); see also Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1341 (7th Cir.1997) (upholding the magistrate judge’s evidentiary ruling to exclude evidence that the victim of a police shooting wanted to be killed by the police, on the ground that the evidence was not relevant to the objective reasonableness test, as the events immediately prior to the use of force were undisputed)."
} | 4,037,695 | b |
The government agreed. The court's finding is consistent with the growing list of courts that have reached the same conclusion following Johnson. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "802 F.3d 1185, 1195",
"parenthetical": "holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines, notwithstanding the government's position that the residual clause of SS 4B1.2(a",
"sentence": "No. 3:15-00021, 2015 WL 5895199, at *7 (S.D.W.Va. Oct. 8, 2015) (“This Court holds that enhancing a convicted individual’s sentence under the residual clause of the career offender enhancement, § 4B1.2(a)(2), denies due process of law because the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.”); and Petrillo v. United States, 147 F.Supp.3d 9, 21, No. 3:08-CV-1204 (JBA), 2015 WL 7574744, at *7 (D.Conn. Nov. 25, 2015) (“Because the Government acknowledges that the Guidelines may be unconstitutionally vague and because the Supreme Court recently held that language identical to § 4B1.2 is unconstitutionally vague, by the Government’s own admission, if [the defendant] were sentenced today, he would not be sentenced as a career offender.”); but see United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1195 (11th Cir.2015) (holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines, notwithstanding the government’s position that the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a) was unconstitutionally vague following Johnson)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "805 F.3d 1204, 1210",
"parenthetical": "\"The concerns about judicial inconsistency that motivated the Court in Johnson lead us to conclude that the residual clause of the Guidelines is also unconstitutionally vague.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir.2015) (“The concerns about judicial inconsistency that motivated the Court in Johnson lead us to conclude that the residual clause of the Guidelines is also unconstitutionally vague.”); United States v. Darden, 605 Fed.Appx. 545, 546 (6th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (holding a defendant could not receive an enhanced sentenced under the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) following Johnson); Cornejo-Lopez, 2015 WL 7274060, at *7 (“Just as the iteration of the [residual] clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) is unconstitutionally vague, so too is the residual clause of U.S.S.G. 4B1.2.”); United States v. Litzy, 137 F.Supp.3d 920, 930, CR."
} | 4,330,742 | b |
The government agreed. The court's finding is consistent with the growing list of courts that have reached the same conclusion following Johnson. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "802 F.3d 1185, 1195",
"parenthetical": "holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines, notwithstanding the government's position that the residual clause of SS 4B1.2(a",
"sentence": "No. 3:15-00021, 2015 WL 5895199, at *7 (S.D.W.Va. Oct. 8, 2015) (“This Court holds that enhancing a convicted individual’s sentence under the residual clause of the career offender enhancement, § 4B1.2(a)(2), denies due process of law because the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.”); and Petrillo v. United States, 147 F.Supp.3d 9, 21, No. 3:08-CV-1204 (JBA), 2015 WL 7574744, at *7 (D.Conn. Nov. 25, 2015) (“Because the Government acknowledges that the Guidelines may be unconstitutionally vague and because the Supreme Court recently held that language identical to § 4B1.2 is unconstitutionally vague, by the Government’s own admission, if [the defendant] were sentenced today, he would not be sentenced as a career offender.”); but see United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1195 (11th Cir.2015) (holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines, notwithstanding the government’s position that the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a) was unconstitutionally vague following Johnson)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2015 WL 7274060, at *7",
"parenthetical": "\"Just as the iteration of the [residual] clause in 18 U.S.C. SS 924(e",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir.2015) (“The concerns about judicial inconsistency that motivated the Court in Johnson lead us to conclude that the residual clause of the Guidelines is also unconstitutionally vague.”); United States v. Darden, 605 Fed.Appx. 545, 546 (6th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (holding a defendant could not receive an enhanced sentenced under the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) following Johnson); Cornejo-Lopez, 2015 WL 7274060, at *7 (“Just as the iteration of the [residual] clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) is unconstitutionally vague, so too is the residual clause of U.S.S.G. 4B1.2.”); United States v. Litzy, 137 F.Supp.3d 920, 930, CR."
} | 4,330,742 | b |
The government agreed. The court's finding is consistent with the growing list of courts that have reached the same conclusion following Johnson. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2015 WL 5895199, at *7",
"parenthetical": "\"This Court holds that enhancing a convicted individual's sentence under the residual clause of the career offender enhancement, SS 4B1.2(a)(2), denies due process of law because the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.\"",
"sentence": "No. 3:15-00021, 2015 WL 5895199, at *7 (S.D.W.Va. Oct. 8, 2015) (“This Court holds that enhancing a convicted individual’s sentence under the residual clause of the career offender enhancement, § 4B1.2(a)(2), denies due process of law because the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.”); and Petrillo v. United States, 147 F.Supp.3d 9, 21, No. 3:08-CV-1204 (JBA), 2015 WL 7574744, at *7 (D.Conn. Nov. 25, 2015) (“Because the Government acknowledges that the Guidelines may be unconstitutionally vague and because the Supreme Court recently held that language identical to § 4B1.2 is unconstitutionally vague, by the Government’s own admission, if [the defendant] were sentenced today, he would not be sentenced as a career offender.”); but see United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1195 (11th Cir.2015) (holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines, notwithstanding the government’s position that the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a) was unconstitutionally vague following Johnson)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "802 F.3d 1185, 1195",
"parenthetical": "holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines, notwithstanding the government's position that the residual clause of SS 4B1.2(a",
"sentence": "No. 3:15-00021, 2015 WL 5895199, at *7 (S.D.W.Va. Oct. 8, 2015) (“This Court holds that enhancing a convicted individual’s sentence under the residual clause of the career offender enhancement, § 4B1.2(a)(2), denies due process of law because the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.”); and Petrillo v. United States, 147 F.Supp.3d 9, 21, No. 3:08-CV-1204 (JBA), 2015 WL 7574744, at *7 (D.Conn. Nov. 25, 2015) (“Because the Government acknowledges that the Guidelines may be unconstitutionally vague and because the Supreme Court recently held that language identical to § 4B1.2 is unconstitutionally vague, by the Government’s own admission, if [the defendant] were sentenced today, he would not be sentenced as a career offender.”); but see United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1195 (11th Cir.2015) (holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines, notwithstanding the government’s position that the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a) was unconstitutionally vague following Johnson)."
} | 4,330,742 | a |
The government agreed. The court's finding is consistent with the growing list of courts that have reached the same conclusion following Johnson. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "802 F.3d 1185, 1195",
"parenthetical": "holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines, notwithstanding the government's position that the residual clause of SS 4B1.2(a",
"sentence": "No. 3:15-00021, 2015 WL 5895199, at *7 (S.D.W.Va. Oct. 8, 2015) (“This Court holds that enhancing a convicted individual’s sentence under the residual clause of the career offender enhancement, § 4B1.2(a)(2), denies due process of law because the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.”); and Petrillo v. United States, 147 F.Supp.3d 9, 21, No. 3:08-CV-1204 (JBA), 2015 WL 7574744, at *7 (D.Conn. Nov. 25, 2015) (“Because the Government acknowledges that the Guidelines may be unconstitutionally vague and because the Supreme Court recently held that language identical to § 4B1.2 is unconstitutionally vague, by the Government’s own admission, if [the defendant] were sentenced today, he would not be sentenced as a career offender.”); but see United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1195 (11th Cir.2015) (holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines, notwithstanding the government’s position that the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a) was unconstitutionally vague following Johnson)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "147 F.Supp.3d 9, 21",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the Government acknowledges that the Guidelines may be unconstitutionally vague and because the Supreme Court recently held that language identical to SS 4B1.2 is unconstitutionally vague, by the Government's own admission, if [the defendant] were sentenced today, he would not be sentenced as a career offender.\"",
"sentence": "No. 3:15-00021, 2015 WL 5895199, at *7 (S.D.W.Va. Oct. 8, 2015) (“This Court holds that enhancing a convicted individual’s sentence under the residual clause of the career offender enhancement, § 4B1.2(a)(2), denies due process of law because the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.”); and Petrillo v. United States, 147 F.Supp.3d 9, 21, No. 3:08-CV-1204 (JBA), 2015 WL 7574744, at *7 (D.Conn. Nov. 25, 2015) (“Because the Government acknowledges that the Guidelines may be unconstitutionally vague and because the Supreme Court recently held that language identical to § 4B1.2 is unconstitutionally vague, by the Government’s own admission, if [the defendant] were sentenced today, he would not be sentenced as a career offender.”); but see United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1195 (11th Cir.2015) (holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines, notwithstanding the government’s position that the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a) was unconstitutionally vague following Johnson)."
} | 4,330,742 | b |
The government agreed. The court's finding is consistent with the growing list of courts that have reached the same conclusion following Johnson. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "802 F.3d 1185, 1195",
"parenthetical": "holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines, notwithstanding the government's position that the residual clause of SS 4B1.2(a",
"sentence": "No. 3:15-00021, 2015 WL 5895199, at *7 (S.D.W.Va. Oct. 8, 2015) (“This Court holds that enhancing a convicted individual’s sentence under the residual clause of the career offender enhancement, § 4B1.2(a)(2), denies due process of law because the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.”); and Petrillo v. United States, 147 F.Supp.3d 9, 21, No. 3:08-CV-1204 (JBA), 2015 WL 7574744, at *7 (D.Conn. Nov. 25, 2015) (“Because the Government acknowledges that the Guidelines may be unconstitutionally vague and because the Supreme Court recently held that language identical to § 4B1.2 is unconstitutionally vague, by the Government’s own admission, if [the defendant] were sentenced today, he would not be sentenced as a career offender.”); but see United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1195 (11th Cir.2015) (holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines, notwithstanding the government’s position that the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a) was unconstitutionally vague following Johnson)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2015 WL 7574744, at *7",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the Government acknowledges that the Guidelines may be unconstitutionally vague and because the Supreme Court recently held that language identical to SS 4B1.2 is unconstitutionally vague, by the Government's own admission, if [the defendant] were sentenced today, he would not be sentenced as a career offender.\"",
"sentence": "No. 3:15-00021, 2015 WL 5895199, at *7 (S.D.W.Va. Oct. 8, 2015) (“This Court holds that enhancing a convicted individual’s sentence under the residual clause of the career offender enhancement, § 4B1.2(a)(2), denies due process of law because the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.”); and Petrillo v. United States, 147 F.Supp.3d 9, 21, No. 3:08-CV-1204 (JBA), 2015 WL 7574744, at *7 (D.Conn. Nov. 25, 2015) (“Because the Government acknowledges that the Guidelines may be unconstitutionally vague and because the Supreme Court recently held that language identical to § 4B1.2 is unconstitutionally vague, by the Government’s own admission, if [the defendant] were sentenced today, he would not be sentenced as a career offender.”); but see United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1195 (11th Cir.2015) (holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines, notwithstanding the government’s position that the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a) was unconstitutionally vague following Johnson)."
} | 4,330,742 | b |
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has recently called into question the practice of reviewing state regulations under the guise of the due process clause. Nonetheless, neither the Seventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court has "completely extinguished" the doctrine of substantive due process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 607, 609",
"parenthetical": "\"A substantive due process claim can be brought in the context of property interests.\"",
"sentence": "See Schroeder, 927 F.2d at 961 (conceding that substantive due process has been “saved from total formlessness without being completely extinguished”); see also Swartz v. Scruton, 964 F.2d 607, 609 (7th Cir.1992) (“A substantive due process claim can be brought in the context of property interests.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "927 F.2d 961, 961",
"parenthetical": "conceding that substantive due process has been \"saved from total formlessness without being completely extinguished\"",
"sentence": "See Schroeder, 927 F.2d at 961 (conceding that substantive due process has been “saved from total formlessness without being completely extinguished”); see also Swartz v. Scruton, 964 F.2d 607, 609 (7th Cir.1992) (“A substantive due process claim can be brought in the context of property interests.”)."
} | 3,767,440 | b |
This conclusion un doubtedly applies to numerous other en- - forcement actions taken by the Bureau for the 18 months of its existence before Richard Cordray was properly confirmed by the Senate in July 2013. But while the Supreme Court understands the practical consequences of invalidating large numbers of agency actions, it has nevertheless done so when the law requires. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "705 F.3d 490, 493",
"parenthetical": "holding that because there was no quorum of validly appointed board members, the NLRB \"lacked authority\" to act,\" and the enforcement order was therefore \"void ab initio \"",
"sentence": "See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C.Cir.2013), aff'd 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014) (holding that because there was no quorum of validly appointed board members, the NLRB “lacked authority\" to act,” and the enforcement order was therefore “void ab initio ”); see also New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 687-88, 130 S.Ct. 2635, 177 L.Ed.2d 162 (2010); id. at 689, 130 S.Ct. 2635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Under the Court’s holding, the Board was unauthorized to resolve the more than 500 cases it addressed during those 26 months in the course of carrying out its responsibility....”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Under the Court's holding, the Board was unauthorized to resolve the more than 500 cases it addressed during those 26 months in the course of carrying out its responsibility....\"",
"sentence": "See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C.Cir.2013), aff'd 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014) (holding that because there was no quorum of validly appointed board members, the NLRB “lacked authority\" to act,” and the enforcement order was therefore “void ab initio ”); see also New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 687-88, 130 S.Ct. 2635, 177 L.Ed.2d 162 (2010); id. at 689, 130 S.Ct. 2635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Under the Court’s holding, the Board was unauthorized to resolve the more than 500 cases it addressed during those 26 months in the course of carrying out its responsibility....”)."
} | 4,253,194 | a |
This conclusion un doubtedly applies to numerous other en- - forcement actions taken by the Bureau for the 18 months of its existence before Richard Cordray was properly confirmed by the Senate in July 2013. But while the Supreme Court understands the practical consequences of invalidating large numbers of agency actions, it has nevertheless done so when the law requires. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that because there was no quorum of validly appointed board members, the NLRB \"lacked authority\" to act,\" and the enforcement order was therefore \"void ab initio \"",
"sentence": "See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C.Cir.2013), aff'd 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014) (holding that because there was no quorum of validly appointed board members, the NLRB “lacked authority\" to act,” and the enforcement order was therefore “void ab initio ”); see also New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 687-88, 130 S.Ct. 2635, 177 L.Ed.2d 162 (2010); id. at 689, 130 S.Ct. 2635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Under the Court’s holding, the Board was unauthorized to resolve the more than 500 cases it addressed during those 26 months in the course of carrying out its responsibility....”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Under the Court's holding, the Board was unauthorized to resolve the more than 500 cases it addressed during those 26 months in the course of carrying out its responsibility....\"",
"sentence": "See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C.Cir.2013), aff'd 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014) (holding that because there was no quorum of validly appointed board members, the NLRB “lacked authority\" to act,” and the enforcement order was therefore “void ab initio ”); see also New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 687-88, 130 S.Ct. 2635, 177 L.Ed.2d 162 (2010); id. at 689, 130 S.Ct. 2635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Under the Court’s holding, the Board was unauthorized to resolve the more than 500 cases it addressed during those 26 months in the course of carrying out its responsibility....”)."
} | 4,253,194 | a |
This statutory provision, together with the structurally inclusive nature of workers' compensation insurance, creates a relationship of trust and reliance between injured employees and workers' compensation insurers. I would hold, as have several other courts, that this relationship places a tort-based duty on insurers to deal in good faith with injured employees. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "706 P.2d 1272, 1272-74",
"parenthetical": "nature of workers' compensation insurance, combined with section of workers' compensation statute requiring that insurance policies contain clause making insurer primarily liable to employee, creates tort duty on part of insurer to deal in good faith with employee",
"sentence": "See Savio, 706 P.2d at 1272-74 (nature of workers’ compensation insurance, combined with section of workers’ compensation statute requiring that insurance policies contain clause making insurer primarily liable to employee, creates tort duty on part of insurer to deal in good faith with employee); see also Case v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir.1993) (recognizing duty to deal in good faith in workers’ compensation setting); Hollman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1259, 1262 (8th Cir.1983) (same); Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Holland, 469 So.2d 55, 58 (Miss. 1984) (same); Falline v. GNLV Corp., 107 Nev. 1004, 823 P.2d 888, 894 (1991) (same); Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 212-13 (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "7 F.3d 771, 773",
"parenthetical": "recognizing duty to deal in good faith in workers' compensation setting",
"sentence": "See Savio, 706 P.2d at 1272-74 (nature of workers’ compensation insurance, combined with section of workers’ compensation statute requiring that insurance policies contain clause making insurer primarily liable to employee, creates tort duty on part of insurer to deal in good faith with employee); see also Case v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir.1993) (recognizing duty to deal in good faith in workers’ compensation setting); Hollman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1259, 1262 (8th Cir.1983) (same); Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Holland, 469 So.2d 55, 58 (Miss. 1984) (same); Falline v. GNLV Corp., 107 Nev. 1004, 823 P.2d 888, 894 (1991) (same); Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 212-13 (same)."
} | 10,341,903 | a |
This is no less than the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "459 U.S. 248, 254-55",
"parenthetical": "\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "445 U.S. 115, 123, 126",
"parenthetical": "While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | 236,457 | a |
This is no less than the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "459 U.S. 248, 254-55",
"parenthetical": "\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | 236,457 | b |
This is no less than the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "459 U.S. 248, 254-55",
"parenthetical": "\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | 236,457 | b |
This is no less than the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "445 U.S. 115, 123, 126",
"parenthetical": "While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | 236,457 | a |
This is no less than the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | 236,457 | a |
This is no less than the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | 236,457 | b |
This is no less than the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "445 U.S. 115, 123, 126",
"parenthetical": "While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | 236,457 | b |
This is no less than the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | 236,457 | a |
This is no less than the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254-55, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (\"The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege.\"); see also U.S. v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123, 126, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980) (While use immunity must be confined to the scope required by the Fifth Amendment, \"perjury prosecutions are permissible for false answers to questions following the grant of immunity.\"). We accordingly hold that the Virgin Islands immunity statute affords protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment."
} | 236,457 | a |
In any event, "[i]n general, a jury may change or modify its verdict up to the point the verdict is accepted by the court and the jury is formally discharged." Thus, a trial court has the authority before accepting a verdict and before discharging a jury to send it back to correct a mistake or to clarify an ambiguity in its verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "938 S.W.2d 1, 21-22",
"parenthetical": "upon return of incomplete or inaccurate verdict, trial court may provide supplemental instruction and require that the jury retire to consider further its verdict",
"sentence": "See Burchett v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Ky.Ct.App.1987); see also State v. Jefferson, 938 S.W.2d 1, 21-22 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1996)(upon return of incomplete or inaccurate verdict, trial court may provide supplemental instruction and require that the jury retire to consider further its verdict); cf. Reifschneider v. City & County of Denver, 917 P.2d 315, 318 (Colo.App.1995)(“If inconsistencies in a jury’s verdict indicate confusion, it is appropriate for the court to resubmit the verdict to the jury for clarification and, if necessary, to submit supplemental instructions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "917 P.2d 315, 318",
"parenthetical": "\"If inconsistencies in a jury's verdict indicate confusion, it is appropriate for the court to resubmit the verdict to the jury for clarification and, if necessary, to submit supplemental instructions.\"",
"sentence": "See Burchett v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Ky.Ct.App.1987); see also State v. Jefferson, 938 S.W.2d 1, 21-22 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1996)(upon return of incomplete or inaccurate verdict, trial court may provide supplemental instruction and require that the jury retire to consider further its verdict); cf. Reifschneider v. City & County of Denver, 917 P.2d 315, 318 (Colo.App.1995)(“If inconsistencies in a jury’s verdict indicate confusion, it is appropriate for the court to resubmit the verdict to the jury for clarification and, if necessary, to submit supplemental instructions.”)."
} | 8,993,669 | a |
. Morgan styled one of her claims "negligence" rather than "medical malpractice" and argues that this distinction affects whether expert medical testimony is necessary to prove proximate cause. We do not believe it does. The relevant question is whether a lay juror could, without the assistance of expert medical testimony, sort out the evidence of causation, not whether the claim is styled "medical malpractice." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Whether a case is classified as ordinary negligence or medical malpractice is not determinative of whether expert testimony is required.\"",
"sentence": "See Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, ¶ 23, 176 P.3d 446 (requiring expert medical testimony to prove causation in an ordinary negligence case); see also Cunningham v. Riverside Health Sys., Inc., 33 Kan.App.2d 1, 99 P.3d 133, 136 (2004) (\"Whether a case is classified as ordinary negligence or medical malpractice is not determinative of whether expert testimony is required.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 UT App 406, ¶ 23",
"parenthetical": "requiring expert medical testimony to prove causation in an ordinary negligence case",
"sentence": "See Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, ¶ 23, 176 P.3d 446 (requiring expert medical testimony to prove causation in an ordinary negligence case); see also Cunningham v. Riverside Health Sys., Inc., 33 Kan.App.2d 1, 99 P.3d 133, 136 (2004) (\"Whether a case is classified as ordinary negligence or medical malpractice is not determinative of whether expert testimony is required.\")."
} | 6,985,839 | b |
. Morgan styled one of her claims "negligence" rather than "medical malpractice" and argues that this distinction affects whether expert medical testimony is necessary to prove proximate cause. We do not believe it does. The relevant question is whether a lay juror could, without the assistance of expert medical testimony, sort out the evidence of causation, not whether the claim is styled "medical malpractice." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 P.3d 133, 136",
"parenthetical": "\"Whether a case is classified as ordinary negligence or medical malpractice is not determinative of whether expert testimony is required.\"",
"sentence": "See Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, ¶ 23, 176 P.3d 446 (requiring expert medical testimony to prove causation in an ordinary negligence case); see also Cunningham v. Riverside Health Sys., Inc., 33 Kan.App.2d 1, 99 P.3d 133, 136 (2004) (\"Whether a case is classified as ordinary negligence or medical malpractice is not determinative of whether expert testimony is required.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 UT App 406, ¶ 23",
"parenthetical": "requiring expert medical testimony to prove causation in an ordinary negligence case",
"sentence": "See Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, ¶ 23, 176 P.3d 446 (requiring expert medical testimony to prove causation in an ordinary negligence case); see also Cunningham v. Riverside Health Sys., Inc., 33 Kan.App.2d 1, 99 P.3d 133, 136 (2004) (\"Whether a case is classified as ordinary negligence or medical malpractice is not determinative of whether expert testimony is required.\")."
} | 6,985,839 | b |
. Morgan styled one of her claims "negligence" rather than "medical malpractice" and argues that this distinction affects whether expert medical testimony is necessary to prove proximate cause. We do not believe it does. The relevant question is whether a lay juror could, without the assistance of expert medical testimony, sort out the evidence of causation, not whether the claim is styled "medical malpractice." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring expert medical testimony to prove causation in an ordinary negligence case",
"sentence": "See Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, ¶ 23, 176 P.3d 446 (requiring expert medical testimony to prove causation in an ordinary negligence case); see also Cunningham v. Riverside Health Sys., Inc., 33 Kan.App.2d 1, 99 P.3d 133, 136 (2004) (\"Whether a case is classified as ordinary negligence or medical malpractice is not determinative of whether expert testimony is required.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Whether a case is classified as ordinary negligence or medical malpractice is not determinative of whether expert testimony is required.\"",
"sentence": "See Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, ¶ 23, 176 P.3d 446 (requiring expert medical testimony to prove causation in an ordinary negligence case); see also Cunningham v. Riverside Health Sys., Inc., 33 Kan.App.2d 1, 99 P.3d 133, 136 (2004) (\"Whether a case is classified as ordinary negligence or medical malpractice is not determinative of whether expert testimony is required.\")."
} | 6,985,839 | a |
. Morgan styled one of her claims "negligence" rather than "medical malpractice" and argues that this distinction affects whether expert medical testimony is necessary to prove proximate cause. We do not believe it does. The relevant question is whether a lay juror could, without the assistance of expert medical testimony, sort out the evidence of causation, not whether the claim is styled "medical malpractice." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring expert medical testimony to prove causation in an ordinary negligence case",
"sentence": "See Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, ¶ 23, 176 P.3d 446 (requiring expert medical testimony to prove causation in an ordinary negligence case); see also Cunningham v. Riverside Health Sys., Inc., 33 Kan.App.2d 1, 99 P.3d 133, 136 (2004) (\"Whether a case is classified as ordinary negligence or medical malpractice is not determinative of whether expert testimony is required.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 P.3d 133, 136",
"parenthetical": "\"Whether a case is classified as ordinary negligence or medical malpractice is not determinative of whether expert testimony is required.\"",
"sentence": "See Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, ¶ 23, 176 P.3d 446 (requiring expert medical testimony to prove causation in an ordinary negligence case); see also Cunningham v. Riverside Health Sys., Inc., 33 Kan.App.2d 1, 99 P.3d 133, 136 (2004) (\"Whether a case is classified as ordinary negligence or medical malpractice is not determinative of whether expert testimony is required.\")."
} | 6,985,839 | a |
If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "417 U.S. 583, 595",
"parenthetical": "applying the same rule in the context of a car search: \"[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "506 F.2d 627, 630",
"parenthetical": "court evaluates claim of exigent circumstances from the time the police first \"had a right to obtain a warrant\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1974) (court evaluates claim of exigent circumstances from the time the police first “had a right to obtain a warrant”). Or, did the police use reasonable judgment in seeking more conclusive evidence than a lost wallet before deciding, at 4:30 a. m., to move against their prime suspect?"
} | 7,961,218 | b |
If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "506 F.2d 627, 630",
"parenthetical": "court evaluates claim of exigent circumstances from the time the police first \"had a right to obtain a warrant\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1974) (court evaluates claim of exigent circumstances from the time the police first “had a right to obtain a warrant”). Or, did the police use reasonable judgment in seeking more conclusive evidence than a lost wallet before deciding, at 4:30 a. m., to move against their prime suspect?"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471",
"parenthetical": "applying the same rule in the context of a car search: \"[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | 7,961,218 | a |
If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "506 F.2d 627, 630",
"parenthetical": "court evaluates claim of exigent circumstances from the time the police first \"had a right to obtain a warrant\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1974) (court evaluates claim of exigent circumstances from the time the police first “had a right to obtain a warrant”). Or, did the police use reasonable judgment in seeking more conclusive evidence than a lost wallet before deciding, at 4:30 a. m., to move against their prime suspect?"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying the same rule in the context of a car search: \"[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | 7,961,218 | a |
If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "417 U.S. 583, 595",
"parenthetical": "applying the same rule in the context of a car search: \"[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 946, 948",
"parenthetical": "\"the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | 7,961,218 | b |
If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471",
"parenthetical": "applying the same rule in the context of a car search: \"[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 946, 948",
"parenthetical": "\"the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | 7,961,218 | b |
If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 946, 948",
"parenthetical": "\"the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying the same rule in the context of a car search: \"[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | 7,961,218 | a |
If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "417 U.S. 583, 595",
"parenthetical": "applying the same rule in the context of a car search: \"[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | 7,961,218 | a |
If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471",
"parenthetical": "applying the same rule in the context of a car search: \"[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | 7,961,218 | b |
If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying the same rule in the context of a car search: \"[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | 7,961,218 | a |
If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "417 U.S. 583, 595",
"parenthetical": "applying the same rule in the context of a car search: \"[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | 7,961,218 | a |
If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471",
"parenthetical": "applying the same rule in the context of a car search: \"[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | 7,961,218 | a |
If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying the same rule in the context of a car search: \"[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | 7,961,218 | b |
If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "417 U.S. 583, 595",
"parenthetical": "applying the same rule in the context of a car search: \"[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | 7,961,218 | b |
If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471",
"parenthetical": "applying the same rule in the context of a car search: \"[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”)."
} | 7,961,218 | a |
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