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A finding of sanity does not preclude consideration of the statutory mitigating factors concerning a defendant's mental condition. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "407 So.2d 894, 902",
"parenthetical": "declining to follow Huckaby where the trial court considered mental mitigation, but found that the testimony did not compel application of mental mitigators",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 639 So.2d 6, 13 (Fla.1994) (finding error in trial court’s rejection of mental mitigators on the basis that the defendant was sane); Knowles v. State, 632 So.2d 62, 67 (Fla.1993) (remanding for resen-tencing where trial court failed to find statutory mental mitigation because the defendant was sane even though evidence indicated that defendant suffered from organic brain damage and that he was in an acute psychotic state at the time of the murder); Huckaby v. State, 343 So.2d 29, 33-34 (Fla.1977) (vacating death sentence where trial court completely ignored evidence of mental mitigation partially on the basis that the defendant understood the difference between right and wrong); cf. Smith v. State, 407 So.2d 894, 902 (Fla,1981) (declining to follow Huckáby where the trial court considered mental mitigation, but found that the testimony did not compel application of mental mitigators)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "343 So.2d 29, 33-34",
"parenthetical": "vacating death sentence where trial court completely ignored evidence of mental mitigation partially on the basis that the defendant understood the difference between right and wrong",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 639 So.2d 6, 13 (Fla.1994) (finding error in trial court’s rejection of mental mitigators on the basis that the defendant was sane); Knowles v. State, 632 So.2d 62, 67 (Fla.1993) (remanding for resen-tencing where trial court failed to find statutory mental mitigation because the defendant was sane even though evidence indicated that defendant suffered from organic brain damage and that he was in an acute psychotic state at the time of the murder); Huckaby v. State, 343 So.2d 29, 33-34 (Fla.1977) (vacating death sentence where trial court completely ignored evidence of mental mitigation partially on the basis that the defendant understood the difference between right and wrong); cf. Smith v. State, 407 So.2d 894, 902 (Fla,1981) (declining to follow Huckáby where the trial court considered mental mitigation, but found that the testimony did not compel application of mental mitigators)."
} | 9,202,890 | b |
"This broadbased power includes the power to supervise, administrate, discipline, and serve the needs of the public in all facets of the courts." It further includes "the authority to exercise necessary means to regulate and control the practice of law by promulgating and enforcing rules to discipline attorneys." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "472 U.S. 634, 643",
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers. * * * This inherent power derives from the lawyer's role as an officer of the court which granted admission.\"",
"sentence": "Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 206 (5th Cir.1988); see In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643, 105 S.Ct. 2874, 86 L.Ed.2d 504 (1985) (“Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers. * * * This inherent power derives from the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court which granted admission.”); see also In re Petition of Almond, 603 A.2d 1087, 1087 (R.I.1992) (“This court is responsible for promulgating rules regulating the practice of law and ethical standards for the conduct of attorneys admitted to the Rhode Island Bar.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 A.2d 1087, 1087",
"parenthetical": "\"This court is responsible for promulgating rules regulating the practice of law and ethical standards for the conduct of attorneys admitted to the Rhode Island Bar.\"",
"sentence": "Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 206 (5th Cir.1988); see In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643, 105 S.Ct. 2874, 86 L.Ed.2d 504 (1985) (“Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers. * * * This inherent power derives from the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court which granted admission.”); see also In re Petition of Almond, 603 A.2d 1087, 1087 (R.I.1992) (“This court is responsible for promulgating rules regulating the practice of law and ethical standards for the conduct of attorneys admitted to the Rhode Island Bar.”)."
} | 6,890,379 | a |
"This broadbased power includes the power to supervise, administrate, discipline, and serve the needs of the public in all facets of the courts." It further includes "the authority to exercise necessary means to regulate and control the practice of law by promulgating and enforcing rules to discipline attorneys." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers. * * * This inherent power derives from the lawyer's role as an officer of the court which granted admission.\"",
"sentence": "Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 206 (5th Cir.1988); see In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643, 105 S.Ct. 2874, 86 L.Ed.2d 504 (1985) (“Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers. * * * This inherent power derives from the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court which granted admission.”); see also In re Petition of Almond, 603 A.2d 1087, 1087 (R.I.1992) (“This court is responsible for promulgating rules regulating the practice of law and ethical standards for the conduct of attorneys admitted to the Rhode Island Bar.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 A.2d 1087, 1087",
"parenthetical": "\"This court is responsible for promulgating rules regulating the practice of law and ethical standards for the conduct of attorneys admitted to the Rhode Island Bar.\"",
"sentence": "Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 206 (5th Cir.1988); see In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643, 105 S.Ct. 2874, 86 L.Ed.2d 504 (1985) (“Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers. * * * This inherent power derives from the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court which granted admission.”); see also In re Petition of Almond, 603 A.2d 1087, 1087 (R.I.1992) (“This court is responsible for promulgating rules regulating the practice of law and ethical standards for the conduct of attorneys admitted to the Rhode Island Bar.”)."
} | 6,890,379 | a |
"This broadbased power includes the power to supervise, administrate, discipline, and serve the needs of the public in all facets of the courts." It further includes "the authority to exercise necessary means to regulate and control the practice of law by promulgating and enforcing rules to discipline attorneys." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers. * * * This inherent power derives from the lawyer's role as an officer of the court which granted admission.\"",
"sentence": "Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 206 (5th Cir.1988); see In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643, 105 S.Ct. 2874, 86 L.Ed.2d 504 (1985) (“Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers. * * * This inherent power derives from the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court which granted admission.”); see also In re Petition of Almond, 603 A.2d 1087, 1087 (R.I.1992) (“This court is responsible for promulgating rules regulating the practice of law and ethical standards for the conduct of attorneys admitted to the Rhode Island Bar.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 A.2d 1087, 1087",
"parenthetical": "\"This court is responsible for promulgating rules regulating the practice of law and ethical standards for the conduct of attorneys admitted to the Rhode Island Bar.\"",
"sentence": "Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 206 (5th Cir.1988); see In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643, 105 S.Ct. 2874, 86 L.Ed.2d 504 (1985) (“Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers. * * * This inherent power derives from the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court which granted admission.”); see also In re Petition of Almond, 603 A.2d 1087, 1087 (R.I.1992) (“This court is responsible for promulgating rules regulating the practice of law and ethical standards for the conduct of attorneys admitted to the Rhode Island Bar.”)."
} | 6,890,379 | a |
Courts have held entire meal breaks to be compensable under the FLSA when employees continue to have job responsibilities during their breaks. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "915 F.2d 1473, 1477",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he essential consideration in determining whether a meal period is a bona fide meal period or a compensable rest period is whether the employees are in fact relieved from work for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal.\"",
"sentence": "See Kohlheim v. Glynn County, 915 F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir.1990) (“[T]he essential consideration in determining whether a meal period is a bona fide meal period or a compensable rest period is whether the employees are in fact relieved from work for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal.”); see also Reich v. S. New England Telecomm. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 64-65 (2d Cir.1997) (holding meal periods compensable “work” under FLSA if employees perform duties predominantly for the benefit of the employer); Henson v. Pulaski County Sheriff Dep’t, 6 F.3d 531, 534-35 (8th Cir.1993) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 F.3d 58, 64-65",
"parenthetical": "holding meal periods compensable \"work\" under FLSA if employees perform duties predominantly for the benefit of the employer",
"sentence": "See Kohlheim v. Glynn County, 915 F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir.1990) (“[T]he essential consideration in determining whether a meal period is a bona fide meal period or a compensable rest period is whether the employees are in fact relieved from work for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal.”); see also Reich v. S. New England Telecomm. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 64-65 (2d Cir.1997) (holding meal periods compensable “work” under FLSA if employees perform duties predominantly for the benefit of the employer); Henson v. Pulaski County Sheriff Dep’t, 6 F.3d 531, 534-35 (8th Cir.1993) (same)."
} | 5,714,988 | a |
The government's case against Hands contained weaknesses similar to those identified in Marshall: the direct evidence consisted entirely of the testimony of wit nesses of highly questionable credibility, and the circumstantial evidence was far less convincing than the Marshall circumstantial evidence. Hands's case turned entirely upon which biased witnesses the jury chose to believe. Evidence that tended to erode Hands's credibility and to prejudice the jury against him, therefore, could have had a substantial -- perhaps overpowering -- impact on the jury's deliberations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "23 F.3d 570, 575",
"parenthetical": "finding error not harmless and vacating conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct that \"significantly interfered with the jury's ability to make an essential and liminal credibility determination\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Crutchfield, 26 F.3d 1098, 1103 (11th Cir.1994) (reversing conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct where “[t]he prejudicial effect of [the] misconduct cannot be disputed, as this case turned largely on the jury’s credibility determinations of the several witnesses who testified”); see also United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that the cumulative effect of several incidents of prosecutorial misconduct that undercut defendant’s credibility was not harmless error; noting that defendant, to go free, needed to persuade jury that he was credible and that the prosecution witnesses, who testified in exchange for leniency, were not); United States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695, 700-01 (D.C.Cir.1999) (no harmless error where “credibility was key”); United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 575 (1st Cir.1994) (finding error not harmless and vacating conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct that “significantly interfered with the jury’s ability to make an essential and liminal credibility determination”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "26 F.3d 1098, 1103",
"parenthetical": "reversing conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct where \"[t]he prejudicial effect of [the] misconduct cannot be disputed, as this case turned largely on the jury's credibility determinations of the several witnesses who testified\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Crutchfield, 26 F.3d 1098, 1103 (11th Cir.1994) (reversing conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct where “[t]he prejudicial effect of [the] misconduct cannot be disputed, as this case turned largely on the jury’s credibility determinations of the several witnesses who testified”); see also United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that the cumulative effect of several incidents of prosecutorial misconduct that undercut defendant’s credibility was not harmless error; noting that defendant, to go free, needed to persuade jury that he was credible and that the prosecution witnesses, who testified in exchange for leniency, were not); United States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695, 700-01 (D.C.Cir.1999) (no harmless error where “credibility was key”); United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 575 (1st Cir.1994) (finding error not harmless and vacating conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct that “significantly interfered with the jury’s ability to make an essential and liminal credibility determination”)."
} | 11,549,672 | b |
But, as we have noted, Ms. Escobedo has not alleged that it was a vehicle to effect any discriminatory animus harbored by the nurses, let alone provide evidence of such intent or effect; to the contrary, Ms. Escobedo testified that she got along well with the nurses and they supported her in disputes with her supervisors. This evidence before us thus simply does not permit an inference of "overt" discrimination as required by our precedent' and we cannot say that the combination of the two incidents could reasonably be found to have created a hostile atmosphere. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "185 F.3d 1098, 1098, 1102",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"obviously sex and gender-motivated conduct\" by a supervisor -- including, inter alia, his stated belief \"that women in general were incompetent, stupid and scatterbrained\" -- \"so poisoned the entire body of conduct toward Plaintiff that a jury reasonably could view all of the allegedly harassing conduct ... as the product of sex and gender hostility\"",
"sentence": "See Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that plaintiff failed to present a triable issue as to a hostile work environment where the “derisive environment in the workshop was universal” — he was not “singled out” for abuse — and he failed to show the derisive atmosphere “stemmed from racial animus”); cf. O’Shea, 185 F.3d at 1098, 1102 (holding that the “obviously sex and gender-motivated conduct” by a supervisor — including, inter alia, his stated belief “that women in general were incompetent, stupid and scatterbrained” — “so poisoned the entire body of conduct toward Plaintiff that a jury reasonably could view all of the allegedly harassing conduct ... as the product of sex and gender hostility”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 545, 551",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff failed to present a triable issue as to a hostile work environment where the \"derisive environment in the workshop was universal\" -- he was not \"singled out\" for abuse -- and he failed to show the derisive atmosphere \"stemmed from racial animus\"",
"sentence": "See Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that plaintiff failed to present a triable issue as to a hostile work environment where the “derisive environment in the workshop was universal” — he was not “singled out” for abuse — and he failed to show the derisive atmosphere “stemmed from racial animus”); cf. O’Shea, 185 F.3d at 1098, 1102 (holding that the “obviously sex and gender-motivated conduct” by a supervisor — including, inter alia, his stated belief “that women in general were incompetent, stupid and scatterbrained” — “so poisoned the entire body of conduct toward Plaintiff that a jury reasonably could view all of the allegedly harassing conduct ... as the product of sex and gender hostility”)."
} | 3,616,821 | b |
This is particularly so as to plaintiffs' claims for blacklisting which I previously found derive from a "common nucleus" of facts since the blacklisting allegedly occurred in retaliation for the action to recover wages. Judicial economy, deference to plaintiffs' choice of forum and the avoidance of unnecessary, duplicative and expensive litigation all support retention of jurisdiction in a single forum. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 F.2d 1261, 1261",
"parenthetical": "because plaintiff asserted valid wage claim court should retain jurisdiction over personal injury claim",
"sentence": "See Pereira, 764 F.2d at 690 (deference to plaintiff’s choice of forum); Dutta, 528 F.2d at 1261 (because plaintiff asserted valid wage claim court should retain jurisdiction over personal injury claim); Cf. Kanagaratnam v. Vialogro Compania Naviera, S.A., 1985 AMC 865, 871, 1984 WL 735 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (court retained wage claims but dismissed personal injury claim based upon absence of American contacts)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "1985 AMC 865, 871",
"parenthetical": "court retained wage claims but dismissed personal injury claim based upon absence of American contacts",
"sentence": "See Pereira, 764 F.2d at 690 (deference to plaintiff’s choice of forum); Dutta, 528 F.2d at 1261 (because plaintiff asserted valid wage claim court should retain jurisdiction over personal injury claim); Cf. Kanagaratnam v. Vialogro Compania Naviera, S.A., 1985 AMC 865, 871, 1984 WL 735 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (court retained wage claims but dismissed personal injury claim based upon absence of American contacts)."
} | 7,390,380 | a |
This is particularly so as to plaintiffs' claims for blacklisting which I previously found derive from a "common nucleus" of facts since the blacklisting allegedly occurred in retaliation for the action to recover wages. Judicial economy, deference to plaintiffs' choice of forum and the avoidance of unnecessary, duplicative and expensive litigation all support retention of jurisdiction in a single forum. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court retained wage claims but dismissed personal injury claim based upon absence of American contacts",
"sentence": "See Pereira, 764 F.2d at 690 (deference to plaintiff’s choice of forum); Dutta, 528 F.2d at 1261 (because plaintiff asserted valid wage claim court should retain jurisdiction over personal injury claim); Cf. Kanagaratnam v. Vialogro Compania Naviera, S.A., 1985 AMC 865, 871, 1984 WL 735 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (court retained wage claims but dismissed personal injury claim based upon absence of American contacts)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 F.2d 1261, 1261",
"parenthetical": "because plaintiff asserted valid wage claim court should retain jurisdiction over personal injury claim",
"sentence": "See Pereira, 764 F.2d at 690 (deference to plaintiff’s choice of forum); Dutta, 528 F.2d at 1261 (because plaintiff asserted valid wage claim court should retain jurisdiction over personal injury claim); Cf. Kanagaratnam v. Vialogro Compania Naviera, S.A., 1985 AMC 865, 871, 1984 WL 735 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (court retained wage claims but dismissed personal injury claim based upon absence of American contacts)."
} | 7,390,380 | b |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "392 U.S. 40, 53",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "372 U.S. 391, 424",
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | 9,057,532 | a |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "392 U.S. 40, 53",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | 9,057,532 | b |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "392 U.S. 40, 53",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | 9,057,532 | a |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "372 U.S. 391, 424",
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | 9,057,532 | a |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | 9,057,532 | a |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | 9,057,532 | a |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "372 U.S. 391, 424",
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | 9,057,532 | b |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | 9,057,532 | a |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.”); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (“[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”)."
} | 9,057,532 | a |
Nor does the later introduction of the tape in evidence at the hearing transform the preparation of the tape into a prosecu-torial activity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "55 F.3d 26, 29",
"parenthetical": "\"The prosecutorial nature of an act does not spread backwards like an inkblot, immunizing everything it touches.\"",
"sentence": "See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 55 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir.1995) (“The prosecutorial nature of an act does not spread backwards like an inkblot, immunizing everything it touches.”); see also Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275-76, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (“That the prosecutors later called a grand jury to consider the evidence this work produced does not retroactively transform that work from administrative into the prosecutorial.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "509 U.S. 275, 275-76",
"parenthetical": "\"That the prosecutors later called a grand jury to consider the evidence this work produced does not retroactively transform that work from administrative into the prosecutorial.\"",
"sentence": "See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 55 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir.1995) (“The prosecutorial nature of an act does not spread backwards like an inkblot, immunizing everything it touches.”); see also Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275-76, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (“That the prosecutors later called a grand jury to consider the evidence this work produced does not retroactively transform that work from administrative into the prosecutorial.”)."
} | 11,529,769 | a |
Nor does the later introduction of the tape in evidence at the hearing transform the preparation of the tape into a prosecu-torial activity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "55 F.3d 26, 29",
"parenthetical": "\"The prosecutorial nature of an act does not spread backwards like an inkblot, immunizing everything it touches.\"",
"sentence": "See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 55 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir.1995) (“The prosecutorial nature of an act does not spread backwards like an inkblot, immunizing everything it touches.”); see also Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275-76, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (“That the prosecutors later called a grand jury to consider the evidence this work produced does not retroactively transform that work from administrative into the prosecutorial.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"That the prosecutors later called a grand jury to consider the evidence this work produced does not retroactively transform that work from administrative into the prosecutorial.\"",
"sentence": "See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 55 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir.1995) (“The prosecutorial nature of an act does not spread backwards like an inkblot, immunizing everything it touches.”); see also Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275-76, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (“That the prosecutors later called a grand jury to consider the evidence this work produced does not retroactively transform that work from administrative into the prosecutorial.”)."
} | 11,529,769 | a |
Mocek argues that forum analysis and time, place; and man ner analysis do not apply in determining whether his conduct was "protected speech" for purposes of a retaliation claim, such that any government conduct intended to stop activity that is sometimes protected by the First Amendment is unconstitutional retaliation. But most other circuits have applied forum and time, place, and manner analyses to retaliation claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "753 F.3d 7, 7-8",
"parenthetical": "holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, \"[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them,\" including \"[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops\"",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them,” including “[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops”); Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir.2004) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[b]ecause Michigan has not passed an applicable time, place, or manner restriction, Dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of Byerley’s residence” (emphasis added)); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.2002) (rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.2004); Blomquist v. Town of Marana, 501 Fed.Appx. 657, 659 (9th Cir.2012) (holding plaintiffs could not maintain a retaliation claim where they “lacked a First Amendment right to picket or otherwise occupy” a nonpublic forum); Olasz v. Welsh, 301 Fed.Appx. 142, 146 (3d Cir.2008) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “restricting ... disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time, place, and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum”); cf. Carreon v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 395 F.3d 786, 796-97 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 786, 796-97",
"parenthetical": "rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them,” including “[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops”); Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir.2004) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[b]ecause Michigan has not passed an applicable time, place, or manner restriction, Dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of Byerley’s residence” (emphasis added)); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.2002) (rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.2004); Blomquist v. Town of Marana, 501 Fed.Appx. 657, 659 (9th Cir.2012) (holding plaintiffs could not maintain a retaliation claim where they “lacked a First Amendment right to picket or otherwise occupy” a nonpublic forum); Olasz v. Welsh, 301 Fed.Appx. 142, 146 (3d Cir.2008) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “restricting ... disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time, place, and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum”); cf. Carreon v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 395 F.3d 786, 796-97 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum)."
} | 4,087,411 | a |
Mocek argues that forum analysis and time, place; and man ner analysis do not apply in determining whether his conduct was "protected speech" for purposes of a retaliation claim, such that any government conduct intended to stop activity that is sometimes protected by the First Amendment is unconstitutional retaliation. But most other circuits have applied forum and time, place, and manner analyses to retaliation claims. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 786, 796-97",
"parenthetical": "rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them,” including “[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops”); Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir.2004) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[b]ecause Michigan has not passed an applicable time, place, or manner restriction, Dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of Byerley’s residence” (emphasis added)); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.2002) (rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.2004); Blomquist v. Town of Marana, 501 Fed.Appx. 657, 659 (9th Cir.2012) (holding plaintiffs could not maintain a retaliation claim where they “lacked a First Amendment right to picket or otherwise occupy” a nonpublic forum); Olasz v. Welsh, 301 Fed.Appx. 142, 146 (3d Cir.2008) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “restricting ... disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time, place, and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum”); cf. Carreon v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 395 F.3d 786, 796-97 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "354 F.3d 540, 552",
"parenthetical": "holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, \"[b]ecause Michigan has not passed an applicable time, place, or manner restriction, Dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of Byerley's residence\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them,” including “[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops”); Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir.2004) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[b]ecause Michigan has not passed an applicable time, place, or manner restriction, Dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of Byerley’s residence” (emphasis added)); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.2002) (rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.2004); Blomquist v. Town of Marana, 501 Fed.Appx. 657, 659 (9th Cir.2012) (holding plaintiffs could not maintain a retaliation claim where they “lacked a First Amendment right to picket or otherwise occupy” a nonpublic forum); Olasz v. Welsh, 301 Fed.Appx. 142, 146 (3d Cir.2008) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “restricting ... disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time, place, and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum”); cf. Carreon v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 395 F.3d 786, 796-97 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum)."
} | 4,087,411 | b |
Mocek argues that forum analysis and time, place; and man ner analysis do not apply in determining whether his conduct was "protected speech" for purposes of a retaliation claim, such that any government conduct intended to stop activity that is sometimes protected by the First Amendment is unconstitutional retaliation. But most other circuits have applied forum and time, place, and manner analyses to retaliation claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "307 F.3d 650, 654",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them,” including “[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops”); Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir.2004) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[b]ecause Michigan has not passed an applicable time, place, or manner restriction, Dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of Byerley’s residence” (emphasis added)); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.2002) (rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.2004); Blomquist v. Town of Marana, 501 Fed.Appx. 657, 659 (9th Cir.2012) (holding plaintiffs could not maintain a retaliation claim where they “lacked a First Amendment right to picket or otherwise occupy” a nonpublic forum); Olasz v. Welsh, 301 Fed.Appx. 142, 146 (3d Cir.2008) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “restricting ... disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time, place, and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum”); cf. Carreon v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 395 F.3d 786, 796-97 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 786, 796-97",
"parenthetical": "rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them,” including “[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops”); Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir.2004) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[b]ecause Michigan has not passed an applicable time, place, or manner restriction, Dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of Byerley’s residence” (emphasis added)); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.2002) (rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.2004); Blomquist v. Town of Marana, 501 Fed.Appx. 657, 659 (9th Cir.2012) (holding plaintiffs could not maintain a retaliation claim where they “lacked a First Amendment right to picket or otherwise occupy” a nonpublic forum); Olasz v. Welsh, 301 Fed.Appx. 142, 146 (3d Cir.2008) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “restricting ... disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time, place, and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum”); cf. Carreon v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 395 F.3d 786, 796-97 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum)."
} | 4,087,411 | a |
Mocek argues that forum analysis and time, place; and man ner analysis do not apply in determining whether his conduct was "protected speech" for purposes of a retaliation claim, such that any government conduct intended to stop activity that is sometimes protected by the First Amendment is unconstitutional retaliation. But most other circuits have applied forum and time, place, and manner analyses to retaliation claims. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 786, 796-97",
"parenthetical": "rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them,” including “[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops”); Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir.2004) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[b]ecause Michigan has not passed an applicable time, place, or manner restriction, Dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of Byerley’s residence” (emphasis added)); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.2002) (rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.2004); Blomquist v. Town of Marana, 501 Fed.Appx. 657, 659 (9th Cir.2012) (holding plaintiffs could not maintain a retaliation claim where they “lacked a First Amendment right to picket or otherwise occupy” a nonpublic forum); Olasz v. Welsh, 301 Fed.Appx. 142, 146 (3d Cir.2008) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “restricting ... disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time, place, and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum”); cf. Carreon v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 395 F.3d 786, 796-97 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them,” including “[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops”); Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir.2004) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[b]ecause Michigan has not passed an applicable time, place, or manner restriction, Dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of Byerley’s residence” (emphasis added)); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.2002) (rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.2004); Blomquist v. Town of Marana, 501 Fed.Appx. 657, 659 (9th Cir.2012) (holding plaintiffs could not maintain a retaliation claim where they “lacked a First Amendment right to picket or otherwise occupy” a nonpublic forum); Olasz v. Welsh, 301 Fed.Appx. 142, 146 (3d Cir.2008) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “restricting ... disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time, place, and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum”); cf. Carreon v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 395 F.3d 786, 796-97 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum)."
} | 4,087,411 | b |
Mocek argues that forum analysis and time, place; and man ner analysis do not apply in determining whether his conduct was "protected speech" for purposes of a retaliation claim, such that any government conduct intended to stop activity that is sometimes protected by the First Amendment is unconstitutional retaliation. But most other circuits have applied forum and time, place, and manner analyses to retaliation claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 Fed.Appx. 657, 659",
"parenthetical": "holding plaintiffs could not maintain a retaliation claim where they \"lacked a First Amendment right to picket or otherwise occupy\" a nonpublic forum",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them,” including “[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops”); Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir.2004) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[b]ecause Michigan has not passed an applicable time, place, or manner restriction, Dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of Byerley’s residence” (emphasis added)); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.2002) (rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.2004); Blomquist v. Town of Marana, 501 Fed.Appx. 657, 659 (9th Cir.2012) (holding plaintiffs could not maintain a retaliation claim where they “lacked a First Amendment right to picket or otherwise occupy” a nonpublic forum); Olasz v. Welsh, 301 Fed.Appx. 142, 146 (3d Cir.2008) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “restricting ... disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time, place, and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum”); cf. Carreon v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 395 F.3d 786, 796-97 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 786, 796-97",
"parenthetical": "rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them,” including “[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops”); Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir.2004) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[b]ecause Michigan has not passed an applicable time, place, or manner restriction, Dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of Byerley’s residence” (emphasis added)); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.2002) (rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.2004); Blomquist v. Town of Marana, 501 Fed.Appx. 657, 659 (9th Cir.2012) (holding plaintiffs could not maintain a retaliation claim where they “lacked a First Amendment right to picket or otherwise occupy” a nonpublic forum); Olasz v. Welsh, 301 Fed.Appx. 142, 146 (3d Cir.2008) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “restricting ... disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time, place, and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum”); cf. Carreon v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 395 F.3d 786, 796-97 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum)."
} | 4,087,411 | a |
Mocek argues that forum analysis and time, place; and man ner analysis do not apply in determining whether his conduct was "protected speech" for purposes of a retaliation claim, such that any government conduct intended to stop activity that is sometimes protected by the First Amendment is unconstitutional retaliation. But most other circuits have applied forum and time, place, and manner analyses to retaliation claims. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 786, 796-97",
"parenthetical": "rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them,” including “[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops”); Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir.2004) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[b]ecause Michigan has not passed an applicable time, place, or manner restriction, Dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of Byerley’s residence” (emphasis added)); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.2002) (rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.2004); Blomquist v. Town of Marana, 501 Fed.Appx. 657, 659 (9th Cir.2012) (holding plaintiffs could not maintain a retaliation claim where they “lacked a First Amendment right to picket or otherwise occupy” a nonpublic forum); Olasz v. Welsh, 301 Fed.Appx. 142, 146 (3d Cir.2008) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “restricting ... disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time, place, and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum”); cf. Carreon v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 395 F.3d 786, 796-97 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "301 Fed.Appx. 142, 146",
"parenthetical": "holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, \"restricting ... disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time, place, and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum\"",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them,” including “[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops”); Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir.2004) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[b]ecause Michigan has not passed an applicable time, place, or manner restriction, Dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of Byerley’s residence” (emphasis added)); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.2002) (rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.2004); Blomquist v. Town of Marana, 501 Fed.Appx. 657, 659 (9th Cir.2012) (holding plaintiffs could not maintain a retaliation claim where they “lacked a First Amendment right to picket or otherwise occupy” a nonpublic forum); Olasz v. Welsh, 301 Fed.Appx. 142, 146 (3d Cir.2008) (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “restricting ... disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time, place, and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum”); cf. Carreon v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 395 F.3d 786, 796-97 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum)."
} | 4,087,411 | b |
Whatever the perceived inadequacy of the district court's recitation of its reasons, the district court's sentencing decision was amply supported by evidence the government proffered at sentencing -- evidence that was neither contested nor countered by the defense. The defendant thus received a sentence merited by the evidence, and we cannot say -- as we would have to in order to find plain error -- that, but for the claimed error, the defendant's sentence would have been any different. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 F.3d 814, 819",
"parenthetical": "stating defendant can meet his burden on prong three \"by demonstrating a reasonable probability that had the district court ap plied the [proper] sentencing framework, he would have received a lesser sentence\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 1298 (defendant could not meet the third prong of plain error in his challenge to the adequacy of findings under Rule 32(i)(3)(B) given the presence of sufficient evidence to support the enhancement); United States v. Gore, 298 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir.2002) (“If the defendant does not object and there is evidence to sustain the enhancement, the error [under § 3553’s open court provision] is not reversible under the plain error standard.”); United States v. Orlandez-Gamboa, 185 Fed.Appx. 86, 87 n. 1 (2d Cir.2006) (no plain error in failure to make adequate findings in support of enhancement under § 3B1.1 because “there is evidence to sustain the enhancement”); see also United States v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 819 (10th Cir.2005) (stating defendant can meet his burden on prong three “by demonstrating a reasonable probability that had the district court ap plied the [proper] sentencing framework, he would have received a lesser sentence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "298 F.3d 322, 325",
"parenthetical": "\"If the defendant does not object and there is evidence to sustain the enhancement, the error [under SS 3553's open court provision] is not reversible under the plain error standard.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 1298 (defendant could not meet the third prong of plain error in his challenge to the adequacy of findings under Rule 32(i)(3)(B) given the presence of sufficient evidence to support the enhancement); United States v. Gore, 298 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir.2002) (“If the defendant does not object and there is evidence to sustain the enhancement, the error [under § 3553’s open court provision] is not reversible under the plain error standard.”); United States v. Orlandez-Gamboa, 185 Fed.Appx. 86, 87 n. 1 (2d Cir.2006) (no plain error in failure to make adequate findings in support of enhancement under § 3B1.1 because “there is evidence to sustain the enhancement”); see also United States v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 819 (10th Cir.2005) (stating defendant can meet his burden on prong three “by demonstrating a reasonable probability that had the district court ap plied the [proper] sentencing framework, he would have received a lesser sentence”)."
} | 5,894,013 | b |
Whatever the perceived inadequacy of the district court's recitation of its reasons, the district court's sentencing decision was amply supported by evidence the government proffered at sentencing -- evidence that was neither contested nor countered by the defense. The defendant thus received a sentence merited by the evidence, and we cannot say -- as we would have to in order to find plain error -- that, but for the claimed error, the defendant's sentence would have been any different. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 F.3d 814, 819",
"parenthetical": "stating defendant can meet his burden on prong three \"by demonstrating a reasonable probability that had the district court ap plied the [proper] sentencing framework, he would have received a lesser sentence\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 1298 (defendant could not meet the third prong of plain error in his challenge to the adequacy of findings under Rule 32(i)(3)(B) given the presence of sufficient evidence to support the enhancement); United States v. Gore, 298 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir.2002) (“If the defendant does not object and there is evidence to sustain the enhancement, the error [under § 3553’s open court provision] is not reversible under the plain error standard.”); United States v. Orlandez-Gamboa, 185 Fed.Appx. 86, 87 n. 1 (2d Cir.2006) (no plain error in failure to make adequate findings in support of enhancement under § 3B1.1 because “there is evidence to sustain the enhancement”); see also United States v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 819 (10th Cir.2005) (stating defendant can meet his burden on prong three “by demonstrating a reasonable probability that had the district court ap plied the [proper] sentencing framework, he would have received a lesser sentence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no plain error in failure to make adequate findings in support of enhancement under SS 3B1.1 because \"there is evidence to sustain the enhancement\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 1298 (defendant could not meet the third prong of plain error in his challenge to the adequacy of findings under Rule 32(i)(3)(B) given the presence of sufficient evidence to support the enhancement); United States v. Gore, 298 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir.2002) (“If the defendant does not object and there is evidence to sustain the enhancement, the error [under § 3553’s open court provision] is not reversible under the plain error standard.”); United States v. Orlandez-Gamboa, 185 Fed.Appx. 86, 87 n. 1 (2d Cir.2006) (no plain error in failure to make adequate findings in support of enhancement under § 3B1.1 because “there is evidence to sustain the enhancement”); see also United States v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 819 (10th Cir.2005) (stating defendant can meet his burden on prong three “by demonstrating a reasonable probability that had the district court ap plied the [proper] sentencing framework, he would have received a lesser sentence”)."
} | 5,894,013 | b |
The formulation of the Speech or Debate privilege implies that the judiciary cannot avoid determining what are the outer limits of # legitimate legislative process. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 706, 706",
"parenthetical": "Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide",
"sentence": "See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F.Supp. 211 (D.D.C.1980) (ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 45 & n.2 (D.Md.1983) (requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content); cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide). The district court in Benford refused to blindly accept the[ ] conclusory and seemingly self-serving suggestion that [the House Select Committee on Aging] will screen what is and what is not protected. 98 F.R.D. at 45. Review of allegedly privileged material by the Court is allowed and appropriate under the Constitution."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege",
"sentence": "See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F.Supp. 211 (D.D.C.1980) (ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 45 & n.2 (D.Md.1983) (requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content); cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide). The district court in Benford refused to blindly accept the[ ] conclusory and seemingly self-serving suggestion that [the House Select Committee on Aging] will screen what is and what is not protected. 98 F.R.D. at 45. Review of allegedly privileged material by the Court is allowed and appropriate under the Constitution."
} | 3,153,333 | b |
The formulation of the Speech or Debate privilege implies that the judiciary cannot avoid determining what are the outer limits of # legitimate legislative process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege",
"sentence": "See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F.Supp. 211 (D.D.C.1980) (ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 45 & n.2 (D.Md.1983) (requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content); cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide). The district court in Benford refused to blindly accept the[ ] conclusory and seemingly self-serving suggestion that [the House Select Committee on Aging] will screen what is and what is not protected. 98 F.R.D. at 45. Review of allegedly privileged material by the Court is allowed and appropriate under the Constitution."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide",
"sentence": "See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F.Supp. 211 (D.D.C.1980) (ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 45 & n.2 (D.Md.1983) (requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content); cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide). The district court in Benford refused to blindly accept the[ ] conclusory and seemingly self-serving suggestion that [the House Select Committee on Aging] will screen what is and what is not protected. 98 F.R.D. at 45. Review of allegedly privileged material by the Court is allowed and appropriate under the Constitution."
} | 3,153,333 | a |
The formulation of the Speech or Debate privilege implies that the judiciary cannot avoid determining what are the outer limits of # legitimate legislative process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege",
"sentence": "See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F.Supp. 211 (D.D.C.1980) (ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 45 & n.2 (D.Md.1983) (requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content); cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide). The district court in Benford refused to blindly accept the[ ] conclusory and seemingly self-serving suggestion that [the House Select Committee on Aging] will screen what is and what is not protected. 98 F.R.D. at 45. Review of allegedly privileged material by the Court is allowed and appropriate under the Constitution."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "98 F.R.D. 45, 45",
"parenthetical": "Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide",
"sentence": "See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F.Supp. 211 (D.D.C.1980) (ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 45 & n.2 (D.Md.1983) (requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content); cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide). The district court in Benford refused to blindly accept the[ ] conclusory and seemingly self-serving suggestion that [the House Select Committee on Aging] will screen what is and what is not protected. 98 F.R.D. at 45. Review of allegedly privileged material by the Court is allowed and appropriate under the Constitution."
} | 3,153,333 | a |
The formulation of the Speech or Debate privilege implies that the judiciary cannot avoid determining what are the outer limits of # legitimate legislative process. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 706, 706",
"parenthetical": "Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide",
"sentence": "See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F.Supp. 211 (D.D.C.1980) (ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 45 & n.2 (D.Md.1983) (requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content); cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide). The district court in Benford refused to blindly accept the[ ] conclusory and seemingly self-serving suggestion that [the House Select Committee on Aging] will screen what is and what is not protected. 98 F.R.D. at 45. Review of allegedly privileged material by the Court is allowed and appropriate under the Constitution."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content",
"sentence": "See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F.Supp. 211 (D.D.C.1980) (ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 45 & n.2 (D.Md.1983) (requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content); cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide). The district court in Benford refused to blindly accept the[ ] conclusory and seemingly self-serving suggestion that [the House Select Committee on Aging] will screen what is and what is not protected. 98 F.R.D. at 45. Review of allegedly privileged material by the Court is allowed and appropriate under the Constitution."
} | 3,153,333 | b |
The formulation of the Speech or Debate privilege implies that the judiciary cannot avoid determining what are the outer limits of # legitimate legislative process. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide",
"sentence": "See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F.Supp. 211 (D.D.C.1980) (ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 45 & n.2 (D.Md.1983) (requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content); cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide). The district court in Benford refused to blindly accept the[ ] conclusory and seemingly self-serving suggestion that [the House Select Committee on Aging] will screen what is and what is not protected. 98 F.R.D. at 45. Review of allegedly privileged material by the Court is allowed and appropriate under the Constitution."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content",
"sentence": "See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F.Supp. 211 (D.D.C.1980) (ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 45 & n.2 (D.Md.1983) (requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content); cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide). The district court in Benford refused to blindly accept the[ ] conclusory and seemingly self-serving suggestion that [the House Select Committee on Aging] will screen what is and what is not protected. 98 F.R.D. at 45. Review of allegedly privileged material by the Court is allowed and appropriate under the Constitution."
} | 3,153,333 | b |
The formulation of the Speech or Debate privilege implies that the judiciary cannot avoid determining what are the outer limits of # legitimate legislative process. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "98 F.R.D. 45, 45",
"parenthetical": "Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide",
"sentence": "See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F.Supp. 211 (D.D.C.1980) (ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 45 & n.2 (D.Md.1983) (requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content); cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide). The district court in Benford refused to blindly accept the[ ] conclusory and seemingly self-serving suggestion that [the House Select Committee on Aging] will screen what is and what is not protected. 98 F.R.D. at 45. Review of allegedly privileged material by the Court is allowed and appropriate under the Constitution."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content",
"sentence": "See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F.Supp. 211 (D.D.C.1980) (ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 45 & n.2 (D.Md.1983) (requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content); cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide). The district court in Benford refused to blindly accept the[ ] conclusory and seemingly self-serving suggestion that [the House Select Committee on Aging] will screen what is and what is not protected. 98 F.R.D. at 45. Review of allegedly privileged material by the Court is allowed and appropriate under the Constitution."
} | 3,153,333 | b |
The first canon is the strong presumption against implied repeals. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "75 F.3d 789, 789",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjourts must recognize that Congress does not legislate in a vacuum\" and \"take into account the tacit assumptions that underlie a legislative enactment, including ... preexisting statutory provisions.\"",
"sentence": "Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990); see also Passamaquoddy, 75 F.3d at 789 (“[Cjourts must recognize that Congress does not legislate in a vacuum” and “take into account the tacit assumptions that underlie a legislative enactment, including ... preexisting statutory provisions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "75 F.3d 790, 790",
"parenthetical": "\"We are unequivocally committed to 'the bedrock principle that implied repeals of federal statutes are disfavored.' \" (quoting Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 703",
"sentence": "See Passamaquoddy, 75 F.3d at 790 (“We are unequivocally committed to ‘the bedrock principle that implied repeals of federal statutes are disfavored.’ ” (quoting Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 703)). That canon is based on the well-established assumption that “Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.”"
} | 4,262,324 | b |
The first canon is the strong presumption against implied repeals. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "75 F.3d 789, 789",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjourts must recognize that Congress does not legislate in a vacuum\" and \"take into account the tacit assumptions that underlie a legislative enactment, including ... preexisting statutory provisions.\"",
"sentence": "Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990); see also Passamaquoddy, 75 F.3d at 789 (“[Cjourts must recognize that Congress does not legislate in a vacuum” and “take into account the tacit assumptions that underlie a legislative enactment, including ... preexisting statutory provisions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "19 F.3d 703, 703",
"parenthetical": "\"We are unequivocally committed to 'the bedrock principle that implied repeals of federal statutes are disfavored.' \" (quoting Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 703",
"sentence": "See Passamaquoddy, 75 F.3d at 790 (“We are unequivocally committed to ‘the bedrock principle that implied repeals of federal statutes are disfavored.’ ” (quoting Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 703)). That canon is based on the well-established assumption that “Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.”"
} | 4,262,324 | b |
T41 Furthermore, the prosecutor made the comment only at the outset of his closing argument and did not repeat it at any other point during the trial, including the rebuttal closing. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "888 P.2d 259, 268",
"parenthetical": "reversal required where improper comments repeated over the course of the entire closing argument",
"sentence": "See Munsey, 232 P.3d at 124 (where there are no other allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during closing, it is unlikely that isolated portion of closing argument substantially influenced the verdict); cf. Harris v. People, 888 P.2d 259, 268 (Colo.1995) (reversal required where improper comments repeated over the course of the entire closing argument)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "232 P.3d 124, 124",
"parenthetical": "where there are no other allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during closing, it is unlikely that isolated portion of closing argument substantially influenced the verdict",
"sentence": "See Munsey, 232 P.3d at 124 (where there are no other allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during closing, it is unlikely that isolated portion of closing argument substantially influenced the verdict); cf. Harris v. People, 888 P.2d 259, 268 (Colo.1995) (reversal required where improper comments repeated over the course of the entire closing argument)."
} | 6,973,316 | b |
The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the parties to file additional motions for summary judgment after the applicable law changed. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "124 F.3d 1103, 1105-06",
"parenthetical": "rejecting contention that successive motions for summary judgment were impermissible",
"sentence": "See Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir.2002) (“The district court has considerable latitude in managing the parties’ motion practice[.]”); see also Knox v. Sw. Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir.1997) (rejecting contention that successive motions for summary judgment were impermissible)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "286 F.3d 1118, 1129",
"parenthetical": "\"The district court has considerable latitude in managing the parties' motion practice[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir.2002) (“The district court has considerable latitude in managing the parties’ motion practice[.]”); see also Knox v. Sw. Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir.1997) (rejecting contention that successive motions for summary judgment were impermissible)."
} | 3,903,385 | b |
Most states to have confronted the question have upheld the validity of parole agreements in which the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have held that a parolee's advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... \"",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... ”); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct.App.2000) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches); Sullivan v. Bunting, 133 Ohio St.3d 81, 975 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding the search of a parolee’s email based on his prior consent to warrantless searches); see also Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Alaska 1977) (“Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.”); William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 (2012) (“In most jurisdictions, one of the conditions in [parole] agreements is that the parolee or probationer consents to the search of himself, his possessions, and his residence by a parole officer, and a majority of courts give effect to such provisions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42",
"parenthetical": "\"Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... ”); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct.App.2000) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches); Sullivan v. Bunting, 133 Ohio St.3d 81, 975 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding the search of a parolee’s email based on his prior consent to warrantless searches); see also Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Alaska 1977) (“Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.”); William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 (2012) (“In most jurisdictions, one of the conditions in [parole] agreements is that the parolee or probationer consents to the search of himself, his possessions, and his residence by a parole officer, and a majority of courts give effect to such provisions.”)."
} | 7,068,387 | a |
Most states to have confronted the question have upheld the validity of parole agreements in which the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have held that a parolee's advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... \"",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... ”); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct.App.2000) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches); Sullivan v. Bunting, 133 Ohio St.3d 81, 975 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding the search of a parolee’s email based on his prior consent to warrantless searches); see also Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Alaska 1977) (“Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.”); William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 (2012) (“In most jurisdictions, one of the conditions in [parole] agreements is that the parolee or probationer consents to the search of himself, his possessions, and his residence by a parole officer, and a majority of courts give effect to such provisions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42",
"parenthetical": "\"Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... ”); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct.App.2000) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches); Sullivan v. Bunting, 133 Ohio St.3d 81, 975 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding the search of a parolee’s email based on his prior consent to warrantless searches); see also Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Alaska 1977) (“Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.”); William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 (2012) (“In most jurisdictions, one of the conditions in [parole] agreements is that the parolee or probationer consents to the search of himself, his possessions, and his residence by a parole officer, and a majority of courts give effect to such provisions.”)."
} | 7,068,387 | a |
Most states to have confronted the question have upheld the validity of parole agreements in which the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42",
"parenthetical": "\"Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... ”); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct.App.2000) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches); Sullivan v. Bunting, 133 Ohio St.3d 81, 975 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding the search of a parolee’s email based on his prior consent to warrantless searches); see also Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Alaska 1977) (“Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.”); William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 (2012) (“In most jurisdictions, one of the conditions in [parole] agreements is that the parolee or probationer consents to the search of himself, his possessions, and his residence by a parole officer, and a majority of courts give effect to such provisions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The 'reasonable grounds' requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.\"",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... ”); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct.App.2000) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches); Sullivan v. Bunting, 133 Ohio St.3d 81, 975 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding the search of a parolee’s email based on his prior consent to warrantless searches); see also Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Alaska 1977) (“Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.”); William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 (2012) (“In most jurisdictions, one of the conditions in [parole] agreements is that the parolee or probationer consents to the search of himself, his possessions, and his residence by a parole officer, and a majority of courts give effect to such provisions.”)."
} | 7,068,387 | b |
Most states to have confronted the question have upheld the validity of parole agreements in which the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42",
"parenthetical": "\"Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... ”); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct.App.2000) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches); Sullivan v. Bunting, 133 Ohio St.3d 81, 975 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding the search of a parolee’s email based on his prior consent to warrantless searches); see also Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Alaska 1977) (“Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.”); William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 (2012) (“In most jurisdictions, one of the conditions in [parole] agreements is that the parolee or probationer consents to the search of himself, his possessions, and his residence by a parole officer, and a majority of courts give effect to such provisions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2 P.3d 153, 156",
"parenthetical": "\"The 'reasonable grounds' requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.\"",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... ”); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct.App.2000) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches); Sullivan v. Bunting, 133 Ohio St.3d 81, 975 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding the search of a parolee’s email based on his prior consent to warrantless searches); see also Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Alaska 1977) (“Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.”); William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 (2012) (“In most jurisdictions, one of the conditions in [parole] agreements is that the parolee or probationer consents to the search of himself, his possessions, and his residence by a parole officer, and a majority of courts give effect to such provisions.”)."
} | 7,068,387 | b |
Most states to have confronted the question have upheld the validity of parole agreements in which the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... ”); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct.App.2000) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches); Sullivan v. Bunting, 133 Ohio St.3d 81, 975 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding the search of a parolee’s email based on his prior consent to warrantless searches); see also Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Alaska 1977) (“Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.”); William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 (2012) (“In most jurisdictions, one of the conditions in [parole] agreements is that the parolee or probationer consents to the search of himself, his possessions, and his residence by a parole officer, and a majority of courts give effect to such provisions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42",
"parenthetical": "\"Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... ”); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct.App.2000) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches); Sullivan v. Bunting, 133 Ohio St.3d 81, 975 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding the search of a parolee’s email based on his prior consent to warrantless searches); see also Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Alaska 1977) (“Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.”); William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 (2012) (“In most jurisdictions, one of the conditions in [parole] agreements is that the parolee or probationer consents to the search of himself, his possessions, and his residence by a parole officer, and a majority of courts give effect to such provisions.”)."
} | 7,068,387 | a |
Most states to have confronted the question have upheld the validity of parole agreements in which the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42",
"parenthetical": "\"Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... ”); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct.App.2000) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches); Sullivan v. Bunting, 133 Ohio St.3d 81, 975 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding the search of a parolee’s email based on his prior consent to warrantless searches); see also Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Alaska 1977) (“Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.”); William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 (2012) (“In most jurisdictions, one of the conditions in [parole] agreements is that the parolee or probationer consents to the search of himself, his possessions, and his residence by a parole officer, and a majority of courts give effect to such provisions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... ”); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct.App.2000) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches); Sullivan v. Bunting, 133 Ohio St.3d 81, 975 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding the search of a parolee’s email based on his prior consent to warrantless searches); see also Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Alaska 1977) (“Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.”); William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 (2012) (“In most jurisdictions, one of the conditions in [parole] agreements is that the parolee or probationer consents to the search of himself, his possessions, and his residence by a parole officer, and a majority of courts give effect to such provisions.”)."
} | 7,068,387 | b |
Most states to have confronted the question have upheld the validity of parole agreements in which the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42",
"parenthetical": "\"Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... ”); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct.App.2000) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches); Sullivan v. Bunting, 133 Ohio St.3d 81, 975 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding the search of a parolee’s email based on his prior consent to warrantless searches); see also Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Alaska 1977) (“Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.”); William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 (2012) (“In most jurisdictions, one of the conditions in [parole] agreements is that the parolee or probationer consents to the search of himself, his possessions, and his residence by a parole officer, and a majority of courts give effect to such provisions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042",
"parenthetical": "upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... ”); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct.App.2000) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches); Sullivan v. Bunting, 133 Ohio St.3d 81, 975 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding the search of a parolee’s email based on his prior consent to warrantless searches); see also Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Alaska 1977) (“Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.”); William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 (2012) (“In most jurisdictions, one of the conditions in [parole] agreements is that the parolee or probationer consents to the search of himself, his possessions, and his residence by a parole officer, and a majority of courts give effect to such provisions.”)."
} | 7,068,387 | b |
. There is no question that Texas law governs whether the State Court Claims are derivative or direct claims. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "826 F.2d 347, 349",
"parenthetical": "\"State law determines whether a shareholder may maintain a nonderivative action.\"",
"sentence": "Crocker v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 826 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir.1987) (“State law determines whether a shareholder may maintain a nonderivative action.”); see also In re Blanton, 105 B.R. 811, 821 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1989) (holding that where the entity was incorporated in Texas, and the shareholders reside in Texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in Texas, Texas law — not Arizona law — should be applied)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "105 B.R. 811, 821",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the entity was incorporated in Texas, and the shareholders reside in Texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in Texas, Texas law -- not Arizona law -- should be applied",
"sentence": "Crocker v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 826 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir.1987) (“State law determines whether a shareholder may maintain a nonderivative action.”); see also In re Blanton, 105 B.R. 811, 821 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1989) (holding that where the entity was incorporated in Texas, and the shareholders reside in Texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in Texas, Texas law — not Arizona law — should be applied)."
} | 4,319,370 | a |
Under this section, registration is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the initiation of an infringement action in federal court. E.g., M.G.B. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "683 F.Supp. 1234, 1242",
"parenthetical": "accepting jurisdiction over infringement claim where plaintiff amended complaint to reference certificates of registration obtained after suit was filed",
"sentence": "Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1488 (11th Cir.1990); Dodd v. Fort Smith Special School Dist. No. 100, 666 F.Supp. 1278, 1282 (W.D.Ark.1987); see International Trade Management, Inc. v. United States, 553 F.Supp. 402, 403 (Cl.Ct. 1982) (“A suit for copyright infringement is conditioned on obtaining (or being denied) a certificate of registration”); cf. Haan Crafts Corp. Craft Masters, Inc., 683 F.Supp. 1234, 1242 (N.D.Ind.1988) (accepting jurisdiction over infringement claim where plaintiff amended complaint to reference certificates of registration obtained after suit was filed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 F.Supp. 402, 403",
"parenthetical": "\"A suit for copyright infringement is conditioned on obtaining (or being denied) a certificate of registration\"",
"sentence": "Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1488 (11th Cir.1990); Dodd v. Fort Smith Special School Dist. No. 100, 666 F.Supp. 1278, 1282 (W.D.Ark.1987); see International Trade Management, Inc. v. United States, 553 F.Supp. 402, 403 (Cl.Ct. 1982) (“A suit for copyright infringement is conditioned on obtaining (or being denied) a certificate of registration”); cf. Haan Crafts Corp. Craft Masters, Inc., 683 F.Supp. 1234, 1242 (N.D.Ind.1988) (accepting jurisdiction over infringement claim where plaintiff amended complaint to reference certificates of registration obtained after suit was filed)."
} | 7,847,055 | b |
. The parties agree that statutes of limitations are classified as procedural rather than substantive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "278 F.Supp.2d 945, 953",
"parenthetical": "observing that in breach of contract action statutes of limitations are treated as procedural",
"sentence": "See Horvath v. Davidson, 148 Ind.App. 203, 209, 264 N.E.2d 328, 332 (1970) (“Without exception the statute of limitations has been considered procedural in Indiana.''); see also Bailey v. Skipperliner Indus., Inc., 278 F.Supp.2d 945, 953 (N.D.Ind.2003) (observing that in breach of contract action statutes of limitations are treated as procedural)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "148 Ind.App. 203, 209",
"parenthetical": "\"Without exception the statute of limitations has been considered procedural in Indiana.''",
"sentence": "See Horvath v. Davidson, 148 Ind.App. 203, 209, 264 N.E.2d 328, 332 (1970) (“Without exception the statute of limitations has been considered procedural in Indiana.''); see also Bailey v. Skipperliner Indus., Inc., 278 F.Supp.2d 945, 953 (N.D.Ind.2003) (observing that in breach of contract action statutes of limitations are treated as procedural)."
} | 6,925,590 | b |
. The parties agree that statutes of limitations are classified as procedural rather than substantive. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "264 N.E.2d 328, 332",
"parenthetical": "\"Without exception the statute of limitations has been considered procedural in Indiana.''",
"sentence": "See Horvath v. Davidson, 148 Ind.App. 203, 209, 264 N.E.2d 328, 332 (1970) (“Without exception the statute of limitations has been considered procedural in Indiana.''); see also Bailey v. Skipperliner Indus., Inc., 278 F.Supp.2d 945, 953 (N.D.Ind.2003) (observing that in breach of contract action statutes of limitations are treated as procedural)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "278 F.Supp.2d 945, 953",
"parenthetical": "observing that in breach of contract action statutes of limitations are treated as procedural",
"sentence": "See Horvath v. Davidson, 148 Ind.App. 203, 209, 264 N.E.2d 328, 332 (1970) (“Without exception the statute of limitations has been considered procedural in Indiana.''); see also Bailey v. Skipperliner Indus., Inc., 278 F.Supp.2d 945, 953 (N.D.Ind.2003) (observing that in breach of contract action statutes of limitations are treated as procedural)."
} | 6,925,590 | a |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was \"removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence, Viz., the area within his control\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 173 Mich.App. 420, 434 N.W.2d 422, 426 (1988) (quoting Criminal Jury Instruction 23:2:01 which says “the property must have been taken from the person of the complainant,” and defines “‘[f]rom the person’ [to] mean[] that the property must have been taken from the body of the complainant or from within his [or her] immediate area of control or immediate presence”); People v. Smith, 68 Mich.App. 551, 243 N.W.2d 681, 683 (1976) (holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was “removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence, Viz., the area within his control”); People v. Johnson, 25 Mich.App. 258, 181 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1970) (finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room)."
} | 11,779,348 | b |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "518 N.W.2d 511, 513",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was \"removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence, Viz., the area within his control\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 173 Mich.App. 420, 434 N.W.2d 422, 426 (1988) (quoting Criminal Jury Instruction 23:2:01 which says “the property must have been taken from the person of the complainant,” and defines “‘[f]rom the person’ [to] mean[] that the property must have been taken from the body of the complainant or from within his [or her] immediate area of control or immediate presence”); People v. Smith, 68 Mich.App. 551, 243 N.W.2d 681, 683 (1976) (holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was “removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence, Viz., the area within his control”); People v. Johnson, 25 Mich.App. 258, 181 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1970) (finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room)."
} | 11,779,348 | b |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "243 N.W.2d 681, 683",
"parenthetical": "holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was \"removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence, Viz., the area within his control\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 173 Mich.App. 420, 434 N.W.2d 422, 426 (1988) (quoting Criminal Jury Instruction 23:2:01 which says “the property must have been taken from the person of the complainant,” and defines “‘[f]rom the person’ [to] mean[] that the property must have been taken from the body of the complainant or from within his [or her] immediate area of control or immediate presence”); People v. Smith, 68 Mich.App. 551, 243 N.W.2d 681, 683 (1976) (holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was “removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence, Viz., the area within his control”); People v. Johnson, 25 Mich.App. 258, 181 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1970) (finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room)."
} | 11,779,348 | b |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "518 N.W.2d 511, 513",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "243 N.W.2d 681, 683",
"parenthetical": "holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was \"removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence, Viz., the area within his control\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 173 Mich.App. 420, 434 N.W.2d 422, 426 (1988) (quoting Criminal Jury Instruction 23:2:01 which says “the property must have been taken from the person of the complainant,” and defines “‘[f]rom the person’ [to] mean[] that the property must have been taken from the body of the complainant or from within his [or her] immediate area of control or immediate presence”); People v. Smith, 68 Mich.App. 551, 243 N.W.2d 681, 683 (1976) (holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was “removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence, Viz., the area within his control”); People v. Johnson, 25 Mich.App. 258, 181 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1970) (finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room)."
} | 11,779,348 | b |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 173 Mich.App. 420, 434 N.W.2d 422, 426 (1988) (quoting Criminal Jury Instruction 23:2:01 which says “the property must have been taken from the person of the complainant,” and defines “‘[f]rom the person’ [to] mean[] that the property must have been taken from the body of the complainant or from within his [or her] immediate area of control or immediate presence”); People v. Smith, 68 Mich.App. 551, 243 N.W.2d 681, 683 (1976) (holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was “removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence, Viz., the area within his control”); People v. Johnson, 25 Mich.App. 258, 181 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1970) (finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan)."
} | 11,779,348 | a |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 173 Mich.App. 420, 434 N.W.2d 422, 426 (1988) (quoting Criminal Jury Instruction 23:2:01 which says “the property must have been taken from the person of the complainant,” and defines “‘[f]rom the person’ [to] mean[] that the property must have been taken from the body of the complainant or from within his [or her] immediate area of control or immediate presence”); People v. Smith, 68 Mich.App. 551, 243 N.W.2d 681, 683 (1976) (holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was “removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence, Viz., the area within his control”); People v. Johnson, 25 Mich.App. 258, 181 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1970) (finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "518 N.W.2d 511, 513",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan)."
} | 11,779,348 | a |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "181 N.W.2d 425, 428",
"parenthetical": "finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 173 Mich.App. 420, 434 N.W.2d 422, 426 (1988) (quoting Criminal Jury Instruction 23:2:01 which says “the property must have been taken from the person of the complainant,” and defines “‘[f]rom the person’ [to] mean[] that the property must have been taken from the body of the complainant or from within his [or her] immediate area of control or immediate presence”); People v. Smith, 68 Mich.App. 551, 243 N.W.2d 681, 683 (1976) (holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was “removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence, Viz., the area within his control”); People v. Johnson, 25 Mich.App. 258, 181 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1970) (finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room)."
} | 11,779,348 | b |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "181 N.W.2d 425, 428",
"parenthetical": "finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 173 Mich.App. 420, 434 N.W.2d 422, 426 (1988) (quoting Criminal Jury Instruction 23:2:01 which says “the property must have been taken from the person of the complainant,” and defines “‘[f]rom the person’ [to] mean[] that the property must have been taken from the body of the complainant or from within his [or her] immediate area of control or immediate presence”); People v. Smith, 68 Mich.App. 551, 243 N.W.2d 681, 683 (1976) (holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was “removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence, Viz., the area within his control”); People v. Johnson, 25 Mich.App. 258, 181 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1970) (finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "518 N.W.2d 511, 513",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan)."
} | 11,779,348 | a |
. The Government argues that even if the execution of the search warrant impermissi-bly intruded on legislative activity, the careful procedures established by the Government here are sufficient to protect Congressman Jefferson from suffering any prejudice. The Court finds that a harmless-error analysis is not appropriate in the context of the Speech or Debate privilege. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "62 F.3d 419, 419",
"parenthetical": "The degree of disruption [of the legislative process] is immaterial .... any probing of legislative acts is sufficient to trigger the immunity.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1548 n. 21 (11th Cir.1992) (a harmless-error analysis will not excuse a violation [of the Speech or Debate Clause]); cf. Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 419 (The degree of disruption [of the legislative process] is immaterial .... any probing of legislative acts is sufficient to trigger the immunity.) (emphasis in original). Here, there was no intrusion into legitimate legislative activity, as the search warrant sought only non-privileged material, and the Congressman was not compelled to provide any testimony as to his legitimate legislative activity."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a harmless-error analysis will not excuse a violation [of the Speech or Debate Clause]",
"sentence": "See United States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1548 n. 21 (11th Cir.1992) (a harmless-error analysis will not excuse a violation [of the Speech or Debate Clause]); cf. Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 419 (The degree of disruption [of the legislative process] is immaterial .... any probing of legislative acts is sufficient to trigger the immunity.) (emphasis in original). Here, there was no intrusion into legitimate legislative activity, as the search warrant sought only non-privileged material, and the Congressman was not compelled to provide any testimony as to his legitimate legislative activity."
} | 3,153,333 | b |
Not only do the above-cited eases show that the jury award of $1 million for pain and suffering in this case was not excessive as a whole, but most of that award (70%) was for Mr. Carmody's past pain and suffering, which was unquestionably severe, and which ProNav barely challenges. Further, Mr. Carmody's injuries were not of the ordinary kind, and the seriousness of his illness, which nearly resulted in his death, makes this case more compelling than the garden-variety case involving an injury aboard ship. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "925 F.Supp. 1025, 1025",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]his case is set apart by the magnitude of the physical injuries suffered by the plaintiff.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shea, 925 F.Supp. at 1025 (“[T]his case is set apart by the magnitude of the physical injuries suffered by the plaintiff.”); see also Marcoux, 290 F.Supp.2d at 478 (although the jury verdict for pain and suffering was on the “high end of the spectrum ..., given the severity and debilitating nature of plaintiffs ... injuries, the award [was] solidly within that spectrum and fairly reflected] the nature and extent of the injuries sustained, the permanence and extent of the pain caused by those injuries, [and] the loss of enjoyment of life....”). On the facts and circumstances of this case, the jury’s award for pain and suffering does not shock the conscience, and, therefore, the Court will not disturb that award."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "290 F.Supp.2d 478, 478",
"parenthetical": "although the jury verdict for pain and suffering was on the \"high end of the spectrum ..., given the severity and debilitating nature of plaintiffs ... injuries, the award [was] solidly within that spectrum and fairly reflected] the nature and extent of the injuries sustained, the permanence and extent of the pain caused by those injuries, [and] the loss of enjoyment of life....\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shea, 925 F.Supp. at 1025 (“[T]his case is set apart by the magnitude of the physical injuries suffered by the plaintiff.”); see also Marcoux, 290 F.Supp.2d at 478 (although the jury verdict for pain and suffering was on the “high end of the spectrum ..., given the severity and debilitating nature of plaintiffs ... injuries, the award [was] solidly within that spectrum and fairly reflected] the nature and extent of the injuries sustained, the permanence and extent of the pain caused by those injuries, [and] the loss of enjoyment of life....”). On the facts and circumstances of this case, the jury’s award for pain and suffering does not shock the conscience, and, therefore, the Court will not disturb that award."
} | 1,496,950 | a |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "458 F.Supp. 388, 408",
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "458 F.Supp. 388, 408",
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | 1,736,270 | a |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980)."
} | 1,736,270 | a |
In reviewing the district court's judgment of this issue, we must refrain from second-guessing the district court's assessment, unless we find that the court abused its discretion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "418 F.3d 46, 46",
"parenthetical": "\"[J]udgment calls and issues that demand the balancing of conflicting factors are reviewed deferentially.\"",
"sentence": "See George Weston Bakeries, 570 F.3d at 8 (“[W]e afford considerable deference to the trial court’s balancing of equities.”); see also Wine & Spirits Retailers, 418 F.3d at 46 (“[J]udgment calls and issues that demand the balancing of conflicting factors are reviewed deferentially.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "570 F.3d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e afford considerable deference to the trial court's balancing of equities.\"",
"sentence": "See George Weston Bakeries, 570 F.3d at 8 (“[W]e afford considerable deference to the trial court’s balancing of equities.”); see also Wine & Spirits Retailers, 418 F.3d at 46 (“[J]udgment calls and issues that demand the balancing of conflicting factors are reviewed deferentially.”)."
} | 5,682,193 | b |
However, it has been well-established that Bivens is not applicable for the purposes of asserting a constitutional claim against a private corporate entity. See Corr. Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "foreclosing the extension of a Bivens remedy to the context of employer liability",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (foreclosing the extension of a Bivens remedy to the context of employer liability); see also Stoutt v. Banco Popular de P.R., 320 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that no Bivens claim existed against a defendant bank that supplied information required by law to the Federal Bureau of Investigations)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "320 F.3d 26, 33",
"parenthetical": "holding that no Bivens claim existed against a defendant bank that supplied information required by law to the Federal Bureau of Investigations",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (foreclosing the extension of a Bivens remedy to the context of employer liability); see also Stoutt v. Banco Popular de P.R., 320 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that no Bivens claim existed against a defendant bank that supplied information required by law to the Federal Bureau of Investigations)."
} | 3,767,968 | a |
However, it has been well-established that Bivens is not applicable for the purposes of asserting a constitutional claim against a private corporate entity. See Corr. Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "320 F.3d 26, 33",
"parenthetical": "holding that no Bivens claim existed against a defendant bank that supplied information required by law to the Federal Bureau of Investigations",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (foreclosing the extension of a Bivens remedy to the context of employer liability); see also Stoutt v. Banco Popular de P.R., 320 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that no Bivens claim existed against a defendant bank that supplied information required by law to the Federal Bureau of Investigations)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "foreclosing the extension of a Bivens remedy to the context of employer liability",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (foreclosing the extension of a Bivens remedy to the context of employer liability); see also Stoutt v. Banco Popular de P.R., 320 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that no Bivens claim existed against a defendant bank that supplied information required by law to the Federal Bureau of Investigations)."
} | 3,767,968 | b |
However, it has been well-established that Bivens is not applicable for the purposes of asserting a constitutional claim against a private corporate entity. See Corr. Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "foreclosing the extension of a Bivens remedy to the context of employer liability",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (foreclosing the extension of a Bivens remedy to the context of employer liability); see also Stoutt v. Banco Popular de P.R., 320 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that no Bivens claim existed against a defendant bank that supplied information required by law to the Federal Bureau of Investigations)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "320 F.3d 26, 33",
"parenthetical": "holding that no Bivens claim existed against a defendant bank that supplied information required by law to the Federal Bureau of Investigations",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (foreclosing the extension of a Bivens remedy to the context of employer liability); see also Stoutt v. Banco Popular de P.R., 320 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that no Bivens claim existed against a defendant bank that supplied information required by law to the Federal Bureau of Investigations)."
} | 3,767,968 | a |
(Compl. P 33.) Indeed, Plaintiffs rely on this fact to counter Defendants' argument for dismissal under Morrison. (Doc. No. 175, at 4.) Despite this clear definition, Plaintiffs urge the Court to look to the subsection heading of the statute, which refers to the "Exclusive Federal regulation of nationally traded securities." 15 U.S.C. SS 77r(b)(l). Plaintiffs claim the inclusion of "trading" in the heading implies a trading requirement for qualification as a "covered security," even though the definition portion of the statute, which follows, makes no reference to trading. (Doc. No. 175, at 10.) Plaintiffs' reliance on the heading of the' SLUSA subsection is misplaced. See, e.g., Penn. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "636 F.3d 677, 681",
"parenthetical": "finding reference to a subtitle \"unnecessary and inappropriate\" where there was no ambiguity in the subsection",
"sentence": "Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (“[T]he title of a statute ... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text” and is “of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase.”); see also United States v. Hoang, 636 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir.2011) (finding reference to a subtitle “unnecessary and inappropriate” where there was no ambiguity in the subsection)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "524 U.S. 206, 212",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he title of a statute ... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text\" and is \"of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase.\"",
"sentence": "Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (“[T]he title of a statute ... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text” and is “of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase.”); see also United States v. Hoang, 636 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir.2011) (finding reference to a subtitle “unnecessary and inappropriate” where there was no ambiguity in the subsection)."
} | 3,776,071 | b |
(Compl. P 33.) Indeed, Plaintiffs rely on this fact to counter Defendants' argument for dismissal under Morrison. (Doc. No. 175, at 4.) Despite this clear definition, Plaintiffs urge the Court to look to the subsection heading of the statute, which refers to the "Exclusive Federal regulation of nationally traded securities." 15 U.S.C. SS 77r(b)(l). Plaintiffs claim the inclusion of "trading" in the heading implies a trading requirement for qualification as a "covered security," even though the definition portion of the statute, which follows, makes no reference to trading. (Doc. No. 175, at 10.) Plaintiffs' reliance on the heading of the' SLUSA subsection is misplaced. See, e.g., Penn. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he title of a statute ... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text\" and is \"of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase.\"",
"sentence": "Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (“[T]he title of a statute ... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text” and is “of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase.”); see also United States v. Hoang, 636 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir.2011) (finding reference to a subtitle “unnecessary and inappropriate” where there was no ambiguity in the subsection)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "636 F.3d 677, 681",
"parenthetical": "finding reference to a subtitle \"unnecessary and inappropriate\" where there was no ambiguity in the subsection",
"sentence": "Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (“[T]he title of a statute ... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text” and is “of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase.”); see also United States v. Hoang, 636 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir.2011) (finding reference to a subtitle “unnecessary and inappropriate” where there was no ambiguity in the subsection)."
} | 3,776,071 | a |
(Compl. P 33.) Indeed, Plaintiffs rely on this fact to counter Defendants' argument for dismissal under Morrison. (Doc. No. 175, at 4.) Despite this clear definition, Plaintiffs urge the Court to look to the subsection heading of the statute, which refers to the "Exclusive Federal regulation of nationally traded securities." 15 U.S.C. SS 77r(b)(l). Plaintiffs claim the inclusion of "trading" in the heading implies a trading requirement for qualification as a "covered security," even though the definition portion of the statute, which follows, makes no reference to trading. (Doc. No. 175, at 10.) Plaintiffs' reliance on the heading of the' SLUSA subsection is misplaced. See, e.g., Penn. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "636 F.3d 677, 681",
"parenthetical": "finding reference to a subtitle \"unnecessary and inappropriate\" where there was no ambiguity in the subsection",
"sentence": "Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (“[T]he title of a statute ... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text” and is “of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase.”); see also United States v. Hoang, 636 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir.2011) (finding reference to a subtitle “unnecessary and inappropriate” where there was no ambiguity in the subsection)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he title of a statute ... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text\" and is \"of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase.\"",
"sentence": "Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (“[T]he title of a statute ... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text” and is “of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase.”); see also United States v. Hoang, 636 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir.2011) (finding reference to a subtitle “unnecessary and inappropriate” where there was no ambiguity in the subsection)."
} | 3,776,071 | b |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "821 F.2d 923, 923-24",
"parenthetical": "holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 106, 109-10",
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | 4,331,995 | a |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "821 F.2d 923, 923-24",
"parenthetical": "holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | 4,331,995 | b |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 4592785, at *8",
"parenthetical": "holding that tightening \"handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons\" along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 106, 109-10",
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | 4,331,995 | a |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 4592785, at *8",
"parenthetical": "holding that tightening \"handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons\" along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | 4,331,995 | b |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 106, 109-10",
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2009 WL 2226105, at *9",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face\" could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | 4,331,995 | b |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2009 WL 2226105, at *9",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face\" could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | 4,331,995 | a |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 608125, at *11",
"parenthetical": "holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 106, 109-10",
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | 4,331,995 | a |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 608125, at *11",
"parenthetical": "holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641, 2011 WL 4592785, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that tightening “handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons” along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force); Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-3633, 2009 WL 2226105, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (holding that “purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face” could be excessive force); Davenport v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force); see also Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only “minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,” pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result of police officer allegedly shoving her, causing her to hit her head) supplemented, 108 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir.2004)."
} | 4,331,995 | a |
The district court's admission of Officer Nanney's testimony violated Buffington's rights under the Confrontation Clause. Mrs. Buffington's statement was testimonial because she provided Officer Nanney with the information about the blankets and sleeping bag in the context of a police interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "506 F.3d 486, 486-87",
"parenthetical": "\"[Whether defendant] had long guns, shotguns, or rifles in his bedroom was not offered for its truth because the testimony did not bear on [his] alleged possession of the .380 Llama pistol with which he was charged.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Martin, 897 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir.1990) [E]ven if an out of court statement is purportedly offered to explain an investigation, it nevertheless may be inadmissible hearsay where it goes ‘to the very heart of the prosecution’s case.’ ”); Cromer, 389 F.3d at 677 (Cl’s statement that defendant’s hangout was a “residence associated with selling drugs” was not merely background evidence because it went to the very heart of the prosecutor’s case against defendant); cf. Gibbs, 506 F.3d at 486-87 (“[Whether defendant] had long guns, shotguns, or rifles in his bedroom was not offered for its truth because the testimony did not bear on [his] alleged possession of the .380 Llama pistol with which he was charged.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "405 F.3d 399, 399",
"parenthetical": "statement of identification was testimonial where declarant could reasonably assume that the statement would be used against the suspects in either an investigation or a prosecution",
"sentence": "Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354; Pugh, 405 F.3d at 399 (statement of identification was testimonial where declarant could reasonably assume that the statement would be used against the suspects in either an investigation or a prosecution). Also, because the statement at issue pertains to the question of whether Buffington possessed the firearms, it goes to the heart of the Government’s case."
} | 3,874,684 | b |
The district court's admission of Officer Nanney's testimony violated Buffington's rights under the Confrontation Clause. Mrs. Buffington's statement was testimonial because she provided Officer Nanney with the information about the blankets and sleeping bag in the context of a police interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "506 F.3d 486, 486-87",
"parenthetical": "\"[Whether defendant] had long guns, shotguns, or rifles in his bedroom was not offered for its truth because the testimony did not bear on [his] alleged possession of the .380 Llama pistol with which he was charged.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Martin, 897 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir.1990) [E]ven if an out of court statement is purportedly offered to explain an investigation, it nevertheless may be inadmissible hearsay where it goes ‘to the very heart of the prosecution’s case.’ ”); Cromer, 389 F.3d at 677 (Cl’s statement that defendant’s hangout was a “residence associated with selling drugs” was not merely background evidence because it went to the very heart of the prosecutor’s case against defendant); cf. Gibbs, 506 F.3d at 486-87 (“[Whether defendant] had long guns, shotguns, or rifles in his bedroom was not offered for its truth because the testimony did not bear on [his] alleged possession of the .380 Llama pistol with which he was charged.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "389 F.3d 677, 677",
"parenthetical": "Cl's statement that defendant's hangout was a \"residence associated with selling drugs\" was not merely background evidence because it went to the very heart of the prosecutor's case against defendant",
"sentence": "United States v. Martin, 897 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir.1990) [E]ven if an out of court statement is purportedly offered to explain an investigation, it nevertheless may be inadmissible hearsay where it goes ‘to the very heart of the prosecution’s case.’ ”); Cromer, 389 F.3d at 677 (Cl’s statement that defendant’s hangout was a “residence associated with selling drugs” was not merely background evidence because it went to the very heart of the prosecutor’s case against defendant); cf. Gibbs, 506 F.3d at 486-87 (“[Whether defendant] had long guns, shotguns, or rifles in his bedroom was not offered for its truth because the testimony did not bear on [his] alleged possession of the .380 Llama pistol with which he was charged.”)."
} | 3,874,684 | b |
Most relate to the circumstances of the stop of Wiggins' car, which the Court has determined was legal. In any event, none raises any inference of racial animus in the decision to stop, search, forcibly restrain, or arrest Wiggins. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "826 F.3d 995, 1000",
"parenthetical": "black plaintiff who claimed that white officer was in a good position to see her race from his car, and that officer did not immediately pull her car over when she broke the law, did not sufficiently establish that officer's racial animus motivated the arrest",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Crooks, 826 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir.2003) (black plaintiff who claimed that white officer was in a good position to see her race from his car, and that officer did not immediately pull her car over when she broke the law, did not sufficiently establish that officer’s racial animus motivated the arrest); McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 738 F.Supp. 1293, 1301 (N.D.Cal.1990) (where the only evidence was that plaintiffs were black and that the police officers “immediately resorted to the use of force in a situation whose objective context did not call for this force,” plaintiffs’ conjecture of racially discriminatory intent could not support their section 1981 claim); cf. Alexis, 67 F.3d at 348 (officer’s statement to black plaintiffs, “You people have no rights. You better shut up your [expletive] mouth before I arrest you too,” gave rise to an inference of racial animus making summary judgment inappropriate)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "67 F.3d 348, 348",
"parenthetical": "officer's statement to black plaintiffs, \"You people have no rights. You better shut up your [expletive] mouth before I arrest you too,\" gave rise to an inference of racial animus making summary judgment inappropriate",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Crooks, 826 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir.2003) (black plaintiff who claimed that white officer was in a good position to see her race from his car, and that officer did not immediately pull her car over when she broke the law, did not sufficiently establish that officer’s racial animus motivated the arrest); McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 738 F.Supp. 1293, 1301 (N.D.Cal.1990) (where the only evidence was that plaintiffs were black and that the police officers “immediately resorted to the use of force in a situation whose objective context did not call for this force,” plaintiffs’ conjecture of racially discriminatory intent could not support their section 1981 claim); cf. Alexis, 67 F.3d at 348 (officer’s statement to black plaintiffs, “You people have no rights. You better shut up your [expletive] mouth before I arrest you too,” gave rise to an inference of racial animus making summary judgment inappropriate)."
} | 9,216,598 | a |
Most relate to the circumstances of the stop of Wiggins' car, which the Court has determined was legal. In any event, none raises any inference of racial animus in the decision to stop, search, forcibly restrain, or arrest Wiggins. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "67 F.3d 348, 348",
"parenthetical": "officer's statement to black plaintiffs, \"You people have no rights. You better shut up your [expletive] mouth before I arrest you too,\" gave rise to an inference of racial animus making summary judgment inappropriate",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Crooks, 826 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir.2003) (black plaintiff who claimed that white officer was in a good position to see her race from his car, and that officer did not immediately pull her car over when she broke the law, did not sufficiently establish that officer’s racial animus motivated the arrest); McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 738 F.Supp. 1293, 1301 (N.D.Cal.1990) (where the only evidence was that plaintiffs were black and that the police officers “immediately resorted to the use of force in a situation whose objective context did not call for this force,” plaintiffs’ conjecture of racially discriminatory intent could not support their section 1981 claim); cf. Alexis, 67 F.3d at 348 (officer’s statement to black plaintiffs, “You people have no rights. You better shut up your [expletive] mouth before I arrest you too,” gave rise to an inference of racial animus making summary judgment inappropriate)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "738 F.Supp. 1293, 1301",
"parenthetical": "where the only evidence was that plaintiffs were black and that the police officers \"immediately resorted to the use of force in a situation whose objective context did not call for this force,\" plaintiffs' conjecture of racially discriminatory intent could not support their section 1981 claim",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Crooks, 826 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir.2003) (black plaintiff who claimed that white officer was in a good position to see her race from his car, and that officer did not immediately pull her car over when she broke the law, did not sufficiently establish that officer’s racial animus motivated the arrest); McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 738 F.Supp. 1293, 1301 (N.D.Cal.1990) (where the only evidence was that plaintiffs were black and that the police officers “immediately resorted to the use of force in a situation whose objective context did not call for this force,” plaintiffs’ conjecture of racially discriminatory intent could not support their section 1981 claim); cf. Alexis, 67 F.3d at 348 (officer’s statement to black plaintiffs, “You people have no rights. You better shut up your [expletive] mouth before I arrest you too,” gave rise to an inference of racial animus making summary judgment inappropriate)."
} | 9,216,598 | b |
Other courts have sustained complaints that merely refer to the possibility that some law has been violated. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "FLSA's anti-retaliation provision protects conduct based on good faith, although mistaken belief that employer's conduct is illegal",
"sentence": "See E.E.O.C. v. Romeo Community Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir.1992) (plaintiff who told school district that she believed they were “breaking some sort of law” by paying her lower wages than previously paid to male employees had “filed any complaint” under the FLSA); See also Malone v. Signal Processing Tech., 826 F.Supp. 370 (D.Colo.1993) (FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision protects conduct based on good faith, although mistaken belief that employer’s conduct is illegal). However, while a specific law need not be sighted or even known and the claim need not be meritorious, all of the interpretations of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision contend that the complaint must contain some sort of allegation of illegality in order to be protected under the Act."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "976 F.2d 985, 989",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff who told school district that she believed they were \"breaking some sort of law\" by paying her lower wages than previously paid to male employees had \"filed any complaint\" under the FLSA",
"sentence": "See E.E.O.C. v. Romeo Community Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir.1992) (plaintiff who told school district that she believed they were “breaking some sort of law” by paying her lower wages than previously paid to male employees had “filed any complaint” under the FLSA); See also Malone v. Signal Processing Tech., 826 F.Supp. 370 (D.Colo.1993) (FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision protects conduct based on good faith, although mistaken belief that employer’s conduct is illegal). However, while a specific law need not be sighted or even known and the claim need not be meritorious, all of the interpretations of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision contend that the complaint must contain some sort of allegation of illegality in order to be protected under the Act."
} | 9,456,455 | b |
Though the Texas Supreme Court has impliedly frowned on the Butts/McConnell rule, it has not expressly overruled those cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "374 S.W.2d 871, 875",
"parenthetical": "\"After a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the [Texas] Supreme Court, ... the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by the same court or other courts of lower rank when the very point is again presented in a subsequent suit between different parties.\"",
"sentence": "See Guest, 195 S.W.3d at 688-89 (assuming that Butts and McConnell have “survive[d]” and citing several cases espousing a reasonable, but liberal, interpretation of the applicable rules so that the right of appeal is not lost due to overly technical application of rules). We are duty bound to follow the Texas Supreme Court’s authoritative expressions of law. See In re K.S., 76 S.W.3d 36, 49 (Tex.App.Amarillo 2002, no pet.); see also Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex.1964) (“After a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the [Texas] Supreme Court, ... the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by the same court or other courts of lower rank when the very point is again presented in a subsequent suit between different parties.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 S.W.3d 688, 688-89",
"parenthetical": "assuming that Butts and McConnell have \"survive[d]\" and citing several cases espousing a reasonable, but liberal, interpretation of the applicable rules so that the right of appeal is not lost due to overly technical application of rules",
"sentence": "See Guest, 195 S.W.3d at 688-89 (assuming that Butts and McConnell have “survive[d]” and citing several cases espousing a reasonable, but liberal, interpretation of the applicable rules so that the right of appeal is not lost due to overly technical application of rules). We are duty bound to follow the Texas Supreme Court’s authoritative expressions of law. See In re K.S., 76 S.W.3d 36, 49 (Tex.App.Amarillo 2002, no pet.); see also Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex.1964) (“After a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the [Texas] Supreme Court, ... the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by the same court or other courts of lower rank when the very point is again presented in a subsequent suit between different parties.”)."
} | 7,325,484 | b |
Though the Texas Supreme Court has impliedly frowned on the Butts/McConnell rule, it has not expressly overruled those cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "374 S.W.2d 871, 875",
"parenthetical": "\"After a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the [Texas] Supreme Court, ... the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by the same court or other courts of lower rank when the very point is again presented in a subsequent suit between different parties.\"",
"sentence": "See Guest, 195 S.W.3d at 688-89 (assuming that Butts and McConnell have “survive[d]” and citing several cases espousing a reasonable, but liberal, interpretation of the applicable rules so that the right of appeal is not lost due to overly technical application of rules). We are duty bound to follow the Texas Supreme Court’s authoritative expressions of law. See In re K.S., 76 S.W.3d 36, 49 (Tex.App.Amarillo 2002, no pet.); see also Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex.1964) (“After a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the [Texas] Supreme Court, ... the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by the same court or other courts of lower rank when the very point is again presented in a subsequent suit between different parties.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "76 S.W.3d 36, 49",
"parenthetical": "assuming that Butts and McConnell have \"survive[d]\" and citing several cases espousing a reasonable, but liberal, interpretation of the applicable rules so that the right of appeal is not lost due to overly technical application of rules",
"sentence": "See Guest, 195 S.W.3d at 688-89 (assuming that Butts and McConnell have “survive[d]” and citing several cases espousing a reasonable, but liberal, interpretation of the applicable rules so that the right of appeal is not lost due to overly technical application of rules). We are duty bound to follow the Texas Supreme Court’s authoritative expressions of law. See In re K.S., 76 S.W.3d 36, 49 (Tex.App.Amarillo 2002, no pet.); see also Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex.1964) (“After a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the [Texas] Supreme Court, ... the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by the same court or other courts of lower rank when the very point is again presented in a subsequent suit between different parties.”)."
} | 7,325,484 | b |
. In one area--work on the fee petition--the district court elected not to quantify hours reasonably spent, but assigned a flat dollar figure instead ($5000). The court offered clear, pointed findings to underbrace this determination. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "712 F.2d 1507, 1507",
"parenthetical": "\"task of organizing facts or researching and presenting legal precedents has to be more demanding than documenting what a lawyer did and why he or she did it\"",
"sentence": "MDC IV, supra, at 11. Given the fact that we have regularly encouraged district courts to use lower rates for such drudge work, e.g., Gabriele, 712 F.2d at 1507 (\"task of organizing facts or researching and presenting legal precedents has to be more demanding than documenting what a lawyer did and why he or she did it”), we deem this ruling—which equates to allowing approximately 70 hours as time reasonably spent and valuing the time at a rate of roughly $70 per hour—supportable."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "825 F.2d 563, 563",
"parenthetical": "approving $60/hr rate for work on fee petition, as contrasted to $90/hr rate for other work by same attorney",
"sentence": "See Jacobs, 825 F.2d at 563 (approving $60/hr rate for work on fee petition, as contrasted to $90/hr rate for other work by same attorney); Gabriele, 712 F.2d at 1507 (similar)."
} | 1,778,289 | a |
The reasonableness of a creditor's reliance, in our view, should be judged in light of the totality of the circumstances. The bankruptcy court may consider, among other things: whether there had been previous business dealings with the debtor that gave rise to a relationship of trust; whether there were any "red flags" that would have alerted an ordinarily prudent lender to the possibility that the representations relied upon were not accurate; and whether even minimal investigation would have revealed the inaccuracy of the debtor's representations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 F.2d 677, 679",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he reasonableness of a creditor's reliance will be evaluated according to the particular facts and circumstances present in a given case.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556, 1560 (6th Cir.1992) (setting forth circumstances that may be considered in context of section 523(a)(2)(A) reasonableness of reliance determination), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1272, 122 L.Ed.2d 667 (1993); see also In re Mullet, 817 F.2d 677, 679 (10th Cir.1987) (“[T]he reasonableness of a creditor’s reliance will be evaluated according to the particular facts and circumstances present in a given case.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "970 F.2d 1556, 1560",
"parenthetical": "setting forth circumstances that may be considered in context of section 523(a",
"sentence": "See In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556, 1560 (6th Cir.1992) (setting forth circumstances that may be considered in context of section 523(a)(2)(A) reasonableness of reliance determination), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1272, 122 L.Ed.2d 667 (1993); see also In re Mullet, 817 F.2d 677, 679 (10th Cir.1987) (“[T]he reasonableness of a creditor’s reliance will be evaluated according to the particular facts and circumstances present in a given case.”)."
} | 10,510,767 | b |
The reasonableness of a creditor's reliance, in our view, should be judged in light of the totality of the circumstances. The bankruptcy court may consider, among other things: whether there had been previous business dealings with the debtor that gave rise to a relationship of trust; whether there were any "red flags" that would have alerted an ordinarily prudent lender to the possibility that the representations relied upon were not accurate; and whether even minimal investigation would have revealed the inaccuracy of the debtor's representations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 F.2d 677, 679",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he reasonableness of a creditor's reliance will be evaluated according to the particular facts and circumstances present in a given case.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556, 1560 (6th Cir.1992) (setting forth circumstances that may be considered in context of section 523(a)(2)(A) reasonableness of reliance determination), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1272, 122 L.Ed.2d 667 (1993); see also In re Mullet, 817 F.2d 677, 679 (10th Cir.1987) (“[T]he reasonableness of a creditor’s reliance will be evaluated according to the particular facts and circumstances present in a given case.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth circumstances that may be considered in context of section 523(a",
"sentence": "See In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556, 1560 (6th Cir.1992) (setting forth circumstances that may be considered in context of section 523(a)(2)(A) reasonableness of reliance determination), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1272, 122 L.Ed.2d 667 (1993); see also In re Mullet, 817 F.2d 677, 679 (10th Cir.1987) (“[T]he reasonableness of a creditor’s reliance will be evaluated according to the particular facts and circumstances present in a given case.”)."
} | 10,510,767 | b |
The reasonableness of a creditor's reliance, in our view, should be judged in light of the totality of the circumstances. The bankruptcy court may consider, among other things: whether there had been previous business dealings with the debtor that gave rise to a relationship of trust; whether there were any "red flags" that would have alerted an ordinarily prudent lender to the possibility that the representations relied upon were not accurate; and whether even minimal investigation would have revealed the inaccuracy of the debtor's representations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 F.2d 677, 679",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he reasonableness of a creditor's reliance will be evaluated according to the particular facts and circumstances present in a given case.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556, 1560 (6th Cir.1992) (setting forth circumstances that may be considered in context of section 523(a)(2)(A) reasonableness of reliance determination), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1272, 122 L.Ed.2d 667 (1993); see also In re Mullet, 817 F.2d 677, 679 (10th Cir.1987) (“[T]he reasonableness of a creditor’s reliance will be evaluated according to the particular facts and circumstances present in a given case.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth circumstances that may be considered in context of section 523(a",
"sentence": "See In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556, 1560 (6th Cir.1992) (setting forth circumstances that may be considered in context of section 523(a)(2)(A) reasonableness of reliance determination), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1272, 122 L.Ed.2d 667 (1993); see also In re Mullet, 817 F.2d 677, 679 (10th Cir.1987) (“[T]he reasonableness of a creditor’s reliance will be evaluated according to the particular facts and circumstances present in a given case.”)."
} | 10,510,767 | b |
In this case, however, describing the variance sentence in mathematical terms is not very helpful because the district court imposed no imprisonment when the advisory guideline range called for 63-78 months' imprisonment. Thus, the variance sentence represents a 100% decrease even though in actual months it is less than the extent of variances that other courts have concluded are reasonable. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "437 F.3d 432, 432",
"parenthetical": "remanding for imposition of a variance sentence no more than 120 months below the advisory guideline range",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 68 months below the advisory guideline range of 188-235 months’ imprisonment); United States v. Hewlett, 453 F.3d 876, 881 (7th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment when the advisory guidelines called for life imprisonment); United States v. Krutsinger, 449 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence 79 months below the advisory guideline range of 100-125 months’ imprisonment); cf. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432 (remanding for imposition of a variance sentence no more than 120 months below the advisory guideline range)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "461 F.3d 805, 809",
"parenthetical": "affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 68 months below the advisory guideline range of 188-235 months' imprisonment",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 68 months below the advisory guideline range of 188-235 months’ imprisonment); United States v. Hewlett, 453 F.3d 876, 881 (7th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment when the advisory guidelines called for life imprisonment); United States v. Krutsinger, 449 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence 79 months below the advisory guideline range of 100-125 months’ imprisonment); cf. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432 (remanding for imposition of a variance sentence no more than 120 months below the advisory guideline range)."
} | 3,865,218 | b |
In this case, however, describing the variance sentence in mathematical terms is not very helpful because the district court imposed no imprisonment when the advisory guideline range called for 63-78 months' imprisonment. Thus, the variance sentence represents a 100% decrease even though in actual months it is less than the extent of variances that other courts have concluded are reasonable. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "437 F.3d 432, 432",
"parenthetical": "remanding for imposition of a variance sentence no more than 120 months below the advisory guideline range",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 68 months below the advisory guideline range of 188-235 months’ imprisonment); United States v. Hewlett, 453 F.3d 876, 881 (7th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment when the advisory guidelines called for life imprisonment); United States v. Krutsinger, 449 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence 79 months below the advisory guideline range of 100-125 months’ imprisonment); cf. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432 (remanding for imposition of a variance sentence no more than 120 months below the advisory guideline range)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "453 F.3d 876, 881",
"parenthetical": "affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 240 months' imprisonment when the advisory guidelines called for life imprisonment",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 68 months below the advisory guideline range of 188-235 months’ imprisonment); United States v. Hewlett, 453 F.3d 876, 881 (7th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment when the advisory guidelines called for life imprisonment); United States v. Krutsinger, 449 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence 79 months below the advisory guideline range of 100-125 months’ imprisonment); cf. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432 (remanding for imposition of a variance sentence no more than 120 months below the advisory guideline range)."
} | 3,865,218 | b |
In this case, however, describing the variance sentence in mathematical terms is not very helpful because the district court imposed no imprisonment when the advisory guideline range called for 63-78 months' imprisonment. Thus, the variance sentence represents a 100% decrease even though in actual months it is less than the extent of variances that other courts have concluded are reasonable. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "437 F.3d 432, 432",
"parenthetical": "remanding for imposition of a variance sentence no more than 120 months below the advisory guideline range",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 68 months below the advisory guideline range of 188-235 months’ imprisonment); United States v. Hewlett, 453 F.3d 876, 881 (7th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment when the advisory guidelines called for life imprisonment); United States v. Krutsinger, 449 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence 79 months below the advisory guideline range of 100-125 months’ imprisonment); cf. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432 (remanding for imposition of a variance sentence no more than 120 months below the advisory guideline range)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "449 F.3d 827, 831",
"parenthetical": "affirming as reasonable a variance sentence 79 months below the advisory guideline range of 100-125 months' imprisonment",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 68 months below the advisory guideline range of 188-235 months’ imprisonment); United States v. Hewlett, 453 F.3d 876, 881 (7th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment when the advisory guidelines called for life imprisonment); United States v. Krutsinger, 449 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence 79 months below the advisory guideline range of 100-125 months’ imprisonment); cf. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432 (remanding for imposition of a variance sentence no more than 120 months below the advisory guideline range)."
} | 3,865,218 | b |
Although Emigrant's denial of Mayers' claim was arbitrary and capricious, and done without a full and fair review, the administrative record is insufficient to determine whether Mayers was terminated "for cause." Only after a more thorough investigation of the allegations raised in Mayers' affidavit will such a determination be possible. The appropriate remedy, however, is not to schedule a trial date but rather is to remand the case to Emigrant's Fiduciary Committee "with instructions to consider additional evidence." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "559 F.3d 140, 149",
"parenthetical": "Remand of arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits claim warranted where \"additional evidence might produce a reasonable conclusion permitting denial of [plaintiffs] claim.\"",
"sentence": "Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir.1995) (“Because district courts are required to limit their review to the administrative record, it follows that, if upon review a district court concludes that the [plan administrator’s] decision was arbitrary and capricious, it must remand to the [plan administrator] with instructions to consider additional evidence unless no new evidence could produce a reasonable conclusion permitting denial of the claim or remand would otherwise be a ‘useless formality.’ ”); see, e.g., Pepe v. Newspaper & Mail Deliveries’-Publishers’ Pension Fund, 559 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir.2009) (Remand of arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits claim warranted where “additional evidence might produce a reasonable conclusion permitting denial of [plaintiffs] claim.”); Krauss v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 517 F.3d 614, 630 (2d Cir.2008) (“A full and fair review concerns a beneficiary’s procedural rights, for which the typical remedy is remand for further administrative review.”); Magee v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 07 Civ. 8816, 2009 WL 3682423 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2009) (“MetLife failed to consider much of the evidence."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "72 F.3d 1066, 1071",
"parenthetical": "\"Because district courts are required to limit their review to the administrative record, it follows that, if upon review a district court concludes that the [plan administrator's] decision was arbitrary and capricious, it must remand to the [plan administrator] with instructions to consider additional evidence unless no new evidence could produce a reasonable conclusion permitting denial of the claim or remand would otherwise be a 'useless formality.' \"",
"sentence": "Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir.1995) (“Because district courts are required to limit their review to the administrative record, it follows that, if upon review a district court concludes that the [plan administrator’s] decision was arbitrary and capricious, it must remand to the [plan administrator] with instructions to consider additional evidence unless no new evidence could produce a reasonable conclusion permitting denial of the claim or remand would otherwise be a ‘useless formality.’ ”); see, e.g., Pepe v. Newspaper & Mail Deliveries’-Publishers’ Pension Fund, 559 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir.2009) (Remand of arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits claim warranted where “additional evidence might produce a reasonable conclusion permitting denial of [plaintiffs] claim.”); Krauss v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 517 F.3d 614, 630 (2d Cir.2008) (“A full and fair review concerns a beneficiary’s procedural rights, for which the typical remedy is remand for further administrative review.”); Magee v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 07 Civ. 8816, 2009 WL 3682423 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2009) (“MetLife failed to consider much of the evidence."
} | 4,195,015 | b |
Although Emigrant's denial of Mayers' claim was arbitrary and capricious, and done without a full and fair review, the administrative record is insufficient to determine whether Mayers was terminated "for cause." Only after a more thorough investigation of the allegations raised in Mayers' affidavit will such a determination be possible. The appropriate remedy, however, is not to schedule a trial date but rather is to remand the case to Emigrant's Fiduciary Committee "with instructions to consider additional evidence." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "72 F.3d 1066, 1071",
"parenthetical": "\"Because district courts are required to limit their review to the administrative record, it follows that, if upon review a district court concludes that the [plan administrator's] decision was arbitrary and capricious, it must remand to the [plan administrator] with instructions to consider additional evidence unless no new evidence could produce a reasonable conclusion permitting denial of the claim or remand would otherwise be a 'useless formality.' \"",
"sentence": "Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir.1995) (“Because district courts are required to limit their review to the administrative record, it follows that, if upon review a district court concludes that the [plan administrator’s] decision was arbitrary and capricious, it must remand to the [plan administrator] with instructions to consider additional evidence unless no new evidence could produce a reasonable conclusion permitting denial of the claim or remand would otherwise be a ‘useless formality.’ ”); see, e.g., Pepe v. Newspaper & Mail Deliveries’-Publishers’ Pension Fund, 559 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir.2009) (Remand of arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits claim warranted where “additional evidence might produce a reasonable conclusion permitting denial of [plaintiffs] claim.”); Krauss v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 517 F.3d 614, 630 (2d Cir.2008) (“A full and fair review concerns a beneficiary’s procedural rights, for which the typical remedy is remand for further administrative review.”); Magee v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 07 Civ. 8816, 2009 WL 3682423 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2009) (“MetLife failed to consider much of the evidence."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "517 F.3d 614, 630",
"parenthetical": "\"A full and fair review concerns a beneficiary's procedural rights, for which the typical remedy is remand for further administrative review.\"",
"sentence": "Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir.1995) (“Because district courts are required to limit their review to the administrative record, it follows that, if upon review a district court concludes that the [plan administrator’s] decision was arbitrary and capricious, it must remand to the [plan administrator] with instructions to consider additional evidence unless no new evidence could produce a reasonable conclusion permitting denial of the claim or remand would otherwise be a ‘useless formality.’ ”); see, e.g., Pepe v. Newspaper & Mail Deliveries’-Publishers’ Pension Fund, 559 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir.2009) (Remand of arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits claim warranted where “additional evidence might produce a reasonable conclusion permitting denial of [plaintiffs] claim.”); Krauss v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 517 F.3d 614, 630 (2d Cir.2008) (“A full and fair review concerns a beneficiary’s procedural rights, for which the typical remedy is remand for further administrative review.”); Magee v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 07 Civ. 8816, 2009 WL 3682423 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2009) (“MetLife failed to consider much of the evidence."
} | 4,195,015 | a |
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