context
stringlengths 58
1.13k
| citation_a
dict | citation_b
dict | case_id
int64 475
12.5M
| label
stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|
. Judge Bacon erred in holding that only a "national" policy against discrimination based on sexual orientation could constitute a compelling governmental interest. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "73 S.Ct. 1007, 1012",
"parenthetical": "District of Columbia has same power as state to enact \"legislation which prohibits discrimination''",
"sentence": "See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (state law against sex discrimination, more extensive than its federal counterpart, furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (state Sunday closing law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed.2d 645 (state child labor law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); see also District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109, 73 S.Ct. 1007, 1012, 97 L.Ed. 1480 (1953) (District of Columbia has same power as state to enact \"legislation which prohibits discrimination’’); cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597, 97 S.Ct. 869, 875, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977) (“we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern\")."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "97 S.Ct. 869, 875",
"parenthetical": "\"we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern\"",
"sentence": "See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (state law against sex discrimination, more extensive than its federal counterpart, furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (state Sunday closing law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed.2d 645 (state child labor law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); see also District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109, 73 S.Ct. 1007, 1012, 97 L.Ed. 1480 (1953) (District of Columbia has same power as state to enact \"legislation which prohibits discrimination’’); cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597, 97 S.Ct. 869, 875, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977) (“we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern\")."
} | 7,866,922 | a |
. Judge Bacon erred in holding that only a "national" policy against discrimination based on sexual orientation could constitute a compelling governmental interest. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern\"",
"sentence": "See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (state law against sex discrimination, more extensive than its federal counterpart, furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (state Sunday closing law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed.2d 645 (state child labor law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); see also District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109, 73 S.Ct. 1007, 1012, 97 L.Ed. 1480 (1953) (District of Columbia has same power as state to enact \"legislation which prohibits discrimination’’); cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597, 97 S.Ct. 869, 875, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977) (“we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "73 S.Ct. 1007, 1012",
"parenthetical": "District of Columbia has same power as state to enact \"legislation which prohibits discrimination''",
"sentence": "See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (state law against sex discrimination, more extensive than its federal counterpart, furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (state Sunday closing law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed.2d 645 (state child labor law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); see also District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109, 73 S.Ct. 1007, 1012, 97 L.Ed. 1480 (1953) (District of Columbia has same power as state to enact \"legislation which prohibits discrimination’’); cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597, 97 S.Ct. 869, 875, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977) (“we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern\")."
} | 7,866,922 | b |
. Judge Bacon erred in holding that only a "national" policy against discrimination based on sexual orientation could constitute a compelling governmental interest. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "District of Columbia has same power as state to enact \"legislation which prohibits discrimination''",
"sentence": "See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (state law against sex discrimination, more extensive than its federal counterpart, furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (state Sunday closing law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed.2d 645 (state child labor law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); see also District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109, 73 S.Ct. 1007, 1012, 97 L.Ed. 1480 (1953) (District of Columbia has same power as state to enact \"legislation which prohibits discrimination’’); cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597, 97 S.Ct. 869, 875, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977) (“we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern\")."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "429 U.S. 589, 597",
"parenthetical": "\"we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern\"",
"sentence": "See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (state law against sex discrimination, more extensive than its federal counterpart, furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (state Sunday closing law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed.2d 645 (state child labor law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); see also District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109, 73 S.Ct. 1007, 1012, 97 L.Ed. 1480 (1953) (District of Columbia has same power as state to enact \"legislation which prohibits discrimination’’); cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597, 97 S.Ct. 869, 875, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977) (“we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern\")."
} | 7,866,922 | a |
. Judge Bacon erred in holding that only a "national" policy against discrimination based on sexual orientation could constitute a compelling governmental interest. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "97 S.Ct. 869, 875",
"parenthetical": "\"we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern\"",
"sentence": "See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (state law against sex discrimination, more extensive than its federal counterpart, furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (state Sunday closing law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed.2d 645 (state child labor law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); see also District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109, 73 S.Ct. 1007, 1012, 97 L.Ed. 1480 (1953) (District of Columbia has same power as state to enact \"legislation which prohibits discrimination’’); cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597, 97 S.Ct. 869, 875, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977) (“we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "District of Columbia has same power as state to enact \"legislation which prohibits discrimination''",
"sentence": "See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (state law against sex discrimination, more extensive than its federal counterpart, furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (state Sunday closing law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed.2d 645 (state child labor law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); see also District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109, 73 S.Ct. 1007, 1012, 97 L.Ed. 1480 (1953) (District of Columbia has same power as state to enact \"legislation which prohibits discrimination’’); cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597, 97 S.Ct. 869, 875, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977) (“we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern\")."
} | 7,866,922 | b |
. Judge Bacon erred in holding that only a "national" policy against discrimination based on sexual orientation could constitute a compelling governmental interest. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern\"",
"sentence": "See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (state law against sex discrimination, more extensive than its federal counterpart, furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (state Sunday closing law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed.2d 645 (state child labor law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); see also District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109, 73 S.Ct. 1007, 1012, 97 L.Ed. 1480 (1953) (District of Columbia has same power as state to enact \"legislation which prohibits discrimination’’); cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597, 97 S.Ct. 869, 875, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977) (“we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "District of Columbia has same power as state to enact \"legislation which prohibits discrimination''",
"sentence": "See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (state law against sex discrimination, more extensive than its federal counterpart, furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (state Sunday closing law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed.2d 645 (state child labor law furthered compelling governmental interest and outweighed First Amendment burden); see also District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109, 73 S.Ct. 1007, 1012, 97 L.Ed. 1480 (1953) (District of Columbia has same power as state to enact \"legislation which prohibits discrimination’’); cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597, 97 S.Ct. 869, 875, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977) (“we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern\")."
} | 7,866,922 | b |
Given that Smith has been given notice and an opportunity to respond to the procedural bar and that the State did not intentionally waive the bar, we deem it appropriate for this court to apply the procedural bar. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 312, 316",
"parenthetical": "stating that a court of appeals has discretion to apply Teague despite state waiver",
"sentence": "See Washington v. James, 996 F.2d 1442, 1451 (2d Cir.1993) (stating that a court of appeals may raise the procedural bar sua sponte despite the. fact that the issue was not addressed in the district court); cf. Blankenship v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 312, 316 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that a court of appeals has discretion to apply Teague despite state waiver); Graham v. Johnson, 94 F.3d 958, 970 (5th Cir.1996) (stating that a court of appeals •has discretion to require exhaustion of state court remedies despite state waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "996 F.2d 1442, 1451",
"parenthetical": "stating that a court of appeals may raise the procedural bar sua sponte despite the. fact that the issue was not addressed in the district court",
"sentence": "See Washington v. James, 996 F.2d 1442, 1451 (2d Cir.1993) (stating that a court of appeals may raise the procedural bar sua sponte despite the. fact that the issue was not addressed in the district court); cf. Blankenship v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 312, 316 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that a court of appeals has discretion to apply Teague despite state waiver); Graham v. Johnson, 94 F.3d 958, 970 (5th Cir.1996) (stating that a court of appeals •has discretion to require exhaustion of state court remedies despite state waiver)."
} | 11,211,906 | b |
Given that Smith has been given notice and an opportunity to respond to the procedural bar and that the State did not intentionally waive the bar, we deem it appropriate for this court to apply the procedural bar. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 958, 970",
"parenthetical": "stating that a court of appeals *has discretion to require exhaustion of state court remedies despite state waiver",
"sentence": "See Washington v. James, 996 F.2d 1442, 1451 (2d Cir.1993) (stating that a court of appeals may raise the procedural bar sua sponte despite the. fact that the issue was not addressed in the district court); cf. Blankenship v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 312, 316 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that a court of appeals has discretion to apply Teague despite state waiver); Graham v. Johnson, 94 F.3d 958, 970 (5th Cir.1996) (stating that a court of appeals •has discretion to require exhaustion of state court remedies despite state waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "996 F.2d 1442, 1451",
"parenthetical": "stating that a court of appeals may raise the procedural bar sua sponte despite the. fact that the issue was not addressed in the district court",
"sentence": "See Washington v. James, 996 F.2d 1442, 1451 (2d Cir.1993) (stating that a court of appeals may raise the procedural bar sua sponte despite the. fact that the issue was not addressed in the district court); cf. Blankenship v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 312, 316 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that a court of appeals has discretion to apply Teague despite state waiver); Graham v. Johnson, 94 F.3d 958, 970 (5th Cir.1996) (stating that a court of appeals •has discretion to require exhaustion of state court remedies despite state waiver)."
} | 11,211,906 | b |
Even if Keene had proven duplication, credit would not be permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "725 F.2d 1003, 1005",
"parenthetical": "where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements",
"sentence": "See Dobson v. Camden, 725 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir.1984) (where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "credit not permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable",
"sentence": "See also Touche Ross, 854 F.2d at 1235 n. 17 (credit not permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable); Phillips, 813 F.2d at 1176 (settlement amounts may ordinarily be set off against any judgment obtained against the other joint tortfeasors); Dykes v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 801 F.2d 810 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 1975, 95 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987) (implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff); Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1508 (under Georgia law, there may be an offset for settlement amounts received from joint tortfeasors for an indivisible injury); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 267 (2d Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952, 78 S.Ct. 536, 2 L.Ed.2d 529 (1958) (to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint); Yost v. American Overseas Marine Corp., 798 F.Supp. 313, 318 (E.D.Va.1992) (where tortfeasors are jointly liable for the entire harm, a payment by one diminishes the claim against the other joint tortfeasors); Hill v. Budget Finance & Thrift Co., 383 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1964, no writ hist.) (joint tortfeasor is entitled to credit if it is able to show that the same injury was com pensated by a payment made by another joint tortfeasor)."
} | 3,875,365 | a |
Even if Keene had proven duplication, credit would not be permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "813 F.2d 1176, 1176",
"parenthetical": "settlement amounts may ordinarily be set off against any judgment obtained against the other joint tortfeasors",
"sentence": "See also Touche Ross, 854 F.2d at 1235 n. 17 (credit not permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable); Phillips, 813 F.2d at 1176 (settlement amounts may ordinarily be set off against any judgment obtained against the other joint tortfeasors); Dykes v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 801 F.2d 810 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 1975, 95 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987) (implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff); Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1508 (under Georgia law, there may be an offset for settlement amounts received from joint tortfeasors for an indivisible injury); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 267 (2d Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952, 78 S.Ct. 536, 2 L.Ed.2d 529 (1958) (to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint); Yost v. American Overseas Marine Corp., 798 F.Supp. 313, 318 (E.D.Va.1992) (where tortfeasors are jointly liable for the entire harm, a payment by one diminishes the claim against the other joint tortfeasors); Hill v. Budget Finance & Thrift Co., 383 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1964, no writ hist.) (joint tortfeasor is entitled to credit if it is able to show that the same injury was com pensated by a payment made by another joint tortfeasor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "725 F.2d 1003, 1005",
"parenthetical": "where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements",
"sentence": "See Dobson v. Camden, 725 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir.1984) (where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements)."
} | 3,875,365 | b |
Even if Keene had proven duplication, credit would not be permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff",
"sentence": "See also Touche Ross, 854 F.2d at 1235 n. 17 (credit not permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable); Phillips, 813 F.2d at 1176 (settlement amounts may ordinarily be set off against any judgment obtained against the other joint tortfeasors); Dykes v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 801 F.2d 810 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 1975, 95 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987) (implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff); Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1508 (under Georgia law, there may be an offset for settlement amounts received from joint tortfeasors for an indivisible injury); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 267 (2d Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952, 78 S.Ct. 536, 2 L.Ed.2d 529 (1958) (to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint); Yost v. American Overseas Marine Corp., 798 F.Supp. 313, 318 (E.D.Va.1992) (where tortfeasors are jointly liable for the entire harm, a payment by one diminishes the claim against the other joint tortfeasors); Hill v. Budget Finance & Thrift Co., 383 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1964, no writ hist.) (joint tortfeasor is entitled to credit if it is able to show that the same injury was com pensated by a payment made by another joint tortfeasor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "725 F.2d 1003, 1005",
"parenthetical": "where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements",
"sentence": "See Dobson v. Camden, 725 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir.1984) (where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements)."
} | 3,875,365 | b |
Even if Keene had proven duplication, credit would not be permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff",
"sentence": "See also Touche Ross, 854 F.2d at 1235 n. 17 (credit not permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable); Phillips, 813 F.2d at 1176 (settlement amounts may ordinarily be set off against any judgment obtained against the other joint tortfeasors); Dykes v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 801 F.2d 810 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 1975, 95 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987) (implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff); Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1508 (under Georgia law, there may be an offset for settlement amounts received from joint tortfeasors for an indivisible injury); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 267 (2d Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952, 78 S.Ct. 536, 2 L.Ed.2d 529 (1958) (to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint); Yost v. American Overseas Marine Corp., 798 F.Supp. 313, 318 (E.D.Va.1992) (where tortfeasors are jointly liable for the entire harm, a payment by one diminishes the claim against the other joint tortfeasors); Hill v. Budget Finance & Thrift Co., 383 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1964, no writ hist.) (joint tortfeasor is entitled to credit if it is able to show that the same injury was com pensated by a payment made by another joint tortfeasor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "725 F.2d 1003, 1005",
"parenthetical": "where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements",
"sentence": "See Dobson v. Camden, 725 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir.1984) (where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements)."
} | 3,875,365 | b |
Even if Keene had proven duplication, credit would not be permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff",
"sentence": "See also Touche Ross, 854 F.2d at 1235 n. 17 (credit not permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable); Phillips, 813 F.2d at 1176 (settlement amounts may ordinarily be set off against any judgment obtained against the other joint tortfeasors); Dykes v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 801 F.2d 810 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 1975, 95 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987) (implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff); Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1508 (under Georgia law, there may be an offset for settlement amounts received from joint tortfeasors for an indivisible injury); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 267 (2d Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952, 78 S.Ct. 536, 2 L.Ed.2d 529 (1958) (to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint); Yost v. American Overseas Marine Corp., 798 F.Supp. 313, 318 (E.D.Va.1992) (where tortfeasors are jointly liable for the entire harm, a payment by one diminishes the claim against the other joint tortfeasors); Hill v. Budget Finance & Thrift Co., 383 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1964, no writ hist.) (joint tortfeasor is entitled to credit if it is able to show that the same injury was com pensated by a payment made by another joint tortfeasor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "725 F.2d 1003, 1005",
"parenthetical": "where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements",
"sentence": "See Dobson v. Camden, 725 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir.1984) (where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements)."
} | 3,875,365 | b |
Even if Keene had proven duplication, credit would not be permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "725 F.2d 1003, 1005",
"parenthetical": "where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements",
"sentence": "See Dobson v. Camden, 725 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir.1984) (where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff",
"sentence": "See also Touche Ross, 854 F.2d at 1235 n. 17 (credit not permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable); Phillips, 813 F.2d at 1176 (settlement amounts may ordinarily be set off against any judgment obtained against the other joint tortfeasors); Dykes v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 801 F.2d 810 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 1975, 95 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987) (implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff); Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1508 (under Georgia law, there may be an offset for settlement amounts received from joint tortfeasors for an indivisible injury); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 267 (2d Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952, 78 S.Ct. 536, 2 L.Ed.2d 529 (1958) (to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint); Yost v. American Overseas Marine Corp., 798 F.Supp. 313, 318 (E.D.Va.1992) (where tortfeasors are jointly liable for the entire harm, a payment by one diminishes the claim against the other joint tortfeasors); Hill v. Budget Finance & Thrift Co., 383 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1964, no writ hist.) (joint tortfeasor is entitled to credit if it is able to show that the same injury was com pensated by a payment made by another joint tortfeasor)."
} | 3,875,365 | a |
Even if Keene had proven duplication, credit would not be permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "776 F.2d 1508, 1508",
"parenthetical": "under Georgia law, there may be an offset for settlement amounts received from joint tortfeasors for an indivisible injury",
"sentence": "See also Touche Ross, 854 F.2d at 1235 n. 17 (credit not permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable); Phillips, 813 F.2d at 1176 (settlement amounts may ordinarily be set off against any judgment obtained against the other joint tortfeasors); Dykes v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 801 F.2d 810 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 1975, 95 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987) (implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff); Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1508 (under Georgia law, there may be an offset for settlement amounts received from joint tortfeasors for an indivisible injury); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 267 (2d Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952, 78 S.Ct. 536, 2 L.Ed.2d 529 (1958) (to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint); Yost v. American Overseas Marine Corp., 798 F.Supp. 313, 318 (E.D.Va.1992) (where tortfeasors are jointly liable for the entire harm, a payment by one diminishes the claim against the other joint tortfeasors); Hill v. Budget Finance & Thrift Co., 383 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1964, no writ hist.) (joint tortfeasor is entitled to credit if it is able to show that the same injury was com pensated by a payment made by another joint tortfeasor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "725 F.2d 1003, 1005",
"parenthetical": "where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements",
"sentence": "See Dobson v. Camden, 725 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir.1984) (where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements)."
} | 3,875,365 | b |
Even if Keene had proven duplication, credit would not be permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "725 F.2d 1003, 1005",
"parenthetical": "where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements",
"sentence": "See Dobson v. Camden, 725 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir.1984) (where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "248 F.2d 260, 267",
"parenthetical": "to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint",
"sentence": "See also Touche Ross, 854 F.2d at 1235 n. 17 (credit not permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable); Phillips, 813 F.2d at 1176 (settlement amounts may ordinarily be set off against any judgment obtained against the other joint tortfeasors); Dykes v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 801 F.2d 810 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 1975, 95 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987) (implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff); Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1508 (under Georgia law, there may be an offset for settlement amounts received from joint tortfeasors for an indivisible injury); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 267 (2d Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952, 78 S.Ct. 536, 2 L.Ed.2d 529 (1958) (to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint); Yost v. American Overseas Marine Corp., 798 F.Supp. 313, 318 (E.D.Va.1992) (where tortfeasors are jointly liable for the entire harm, a payment by one diminishes the claim against the other joint tortfeasors); Hill v. Budget Finance & Thrift Co., 383 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1964, no writ hist.) (joint tortfeasor is entitled to credit if it is able to show that the same injury was com pensated by a payment made by another joint tortfeasor)."
} | 3,875,365 | a |
Even if Keene had proven duplication, credit would not be permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint",
"sentence": "See also Touche Ross, 854 F.2d at 1235 n. 17 (credit not permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable); Phillips, 813 F.2d at 1176 (settlement amounts may ordinarily be set off against any judgment obtained against the other joint tortfeasors); Dykes v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 801 F.2d 810 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 1975, 95 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987) (implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff); Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1508 (under Georgia law, there may be an offset for settlement amounts received from joint tortfeasors for an indivisible injury); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 267 (2d Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952, 78 S.Ct. 536, 2 L.Ed.2d 529 (1958) (to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint); Yost v. American Overseas Marine Corp., 798 F.Supp. 313, 318 (E.D.Va.1992) (where tortfeasors are jointly liable for the entire harm, a payment by one diminishes the claim against the other joint tortfeasors); Hill v. Budget Finance & Thrift Co., 383 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1964, no writ hist.) (joint tortfeasor is entitled to credit if it is able to show that the same injury was com pensated by a payment made by another joint tortfeasor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "725 F.2d 1003, 1005",
"parenthetical": "where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements",
"sentence": "See Dobson v. Camden, 725 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir.1984) (where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements)."
} | 3,875,365 | b |
Even if Keene had proven duplication, credit would not be permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "725 F.2d 1003, 1005",
"parenthetical": "where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements",
"sentence": "See Dobson v. Camden, 725 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir.1984) (where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint",
"sentence": "See also Touche Ross, 854 F.2d at 1235 n. 17 (credit not permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable); Phillips, 813 F.2d at 1176 (settlement amounts may ordinarily be set off against any judgment obtained against the other joint tortfeasors); Dykes v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 801 F.2d 810 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 1975, 95 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987) (implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff); Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1508 (under Georgia law, there may be an offset for settlement amounts received from joint tortfeasors for an indivisible injury); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 267 (2d Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952, 78 S.Ct. 536, 2 L.Ed.2d 529 (1958) (to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint); Yost v. American Overseas Marine Corp., 798 F.Supp. 313, 318 (E.D.Va.1992) (where tortfeasors are jointly liable for the entire harm, a payment by one diminishes the claim against the other joint tortfeasors); Hill v. Budget Finance & Thrift Co., 383 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1964, no writ hist.) (joint tortfeasor is entitled to credit if it is able to show that the same injury was com pensated by a payment made by another joint tortfeasor)."
} | 3,875,365 | a |
Even if Keene had proven duplication, credit would not be permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "725 F.2d 1003, 1005",
"parenthetical": "where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements",
"sentence": "See Dobson v. Camden, 725 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir.1984) (where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint",
"sentence": "See also Touche Ross, 854 F.2d at 1235 n. 17 (credit not permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable); Phillips, 813 F.2d at 1176 (settlement amounts may ordinarily be set off against any judgment obtained against the other joint tortfeasors); Dykes v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 801 F.2d 810 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 1975, 95 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987) (implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff); Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1508 (under Georgia law, there may be an offset for settlement amounts received from joint tortfeasors for an indivisible injury); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 267 (2d Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952, 78 S.Ct. 536, 2 L.Ed.2d 529 (1958) (to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint); Yost v. American Overseas Marine Corp., 798 F.Supp. 313, 318 (E.D.Va.1992) (where tortfeasors are jointly liable for the entire harm, a payment by one diminishes the claim against the other joint tortfeasors); Hill v. Budget Finance & Thrift Co., 383 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1964, no writ hist.) (joint tortfeasor is entitled to credit if it is able to show that the same injury was com pensated by a payment made by another joint tortfeasor)."
} | 3,875,365 | a |
Even if Keene had proven duplication, credit would not be permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "725 F.2d 1003, 1005",
"parenthetical": "where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements",
"sentence": "See Dobson v. Camden, 725 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir.1984) (where there is no joint and several liability, there can be no offset for settlements)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "798 F.Supp. 313, 318",
"parenthetical": "where tortfeasors are jointly liable for the entire harm, a payment by one diminishes the claim against the other joint tortfeasors",
"sentence": "See also Touche Ross, 854 F.2d at 1235 n. 17 (credit not permitted for any award of damages based on a claim for which the defendants were not jointly and severally liable); Phillips, 813 F.2d at 1176 (settlement amounts may ordinarily be set off against any judgment obtained against the other joint tortfeasors); Dykes v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 801 F.2d 810 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 1975, 95 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987) (implicitly recognizing that a finding of joint liability is a prerequisite to setoff); Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1508 (under Georgia law, there may be an offset for settlement amounts received from joint tortfeasors for an indivisible injury); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 267 (2d Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952, 78 S.Ct. 536, 2 L.Ed.2d 529 (1958) (to determine the impact of settlement on the plaintiffs award, the court must first determine whether liability of the defendants is joint); Yost v. American Overseas Marine Corp., 798 F.Supp. 313, 318 (E.D.Va.1992) (where tortfeasors are jointly liable for the entire harm, a payment by one diminishes the claim against the other joint tortfeasors); Hill v. Budget Finance & Thrift Co., 383 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1964, no writ hist.) (joint tortfeasor is entitled to credit if it is able to show that the same injury was com pensated by a payment made by another joint tortfeasor)."
} | 3,875,365 | a |
"The legislature enacted the statutes governing the operation of motor vehicles . . . for the protection of the lives and property of the citizens of this state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "167 Conn. 304, 307-308",
"parenthetical": "holding General Statutes SS 14-66 (a), requiring licensing to engage in operating wrecker for purpose of towing, valid exercise of police power",
"sentence": "State v. Swain, 245 Conn. 442, 456, 718 A.2d 1 (1998) (concluding General Statutes § 14-111, governing suspension or revocation of operator’s license, valid exercise of state police power); see also C & H Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 167 Conn. 304, 307-308, 355 A.2d 247 (1974) (holding General Statutes § 14-66 (a), requiring licensing to engage in operating wrecker for purpose of towing, valid exercise of police power)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "245 Conn. 442, 456",
"parenthetical": "concluding General Statutes SS 14-111, governing suspension or revocation of operator's license, valid exercise of state police power",
"sentence": "State v. Swain, 245 Conn. 442, 456, 718 A.2d 1 (1998) (concluding General Statutes § 14-111, governing suspension or revocation of operator’s license, valid exercise of state police power); see also C & H Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 167 Conn. 304, 307-308, 355 A.2d 247 (1974) (holding General Statutes § 14-66 (a), requiring licensing to engage in operating wrecker for purpose of towing, valid exercise of police power)."
} | 1,217,026 | b |
"The legislature enacted the statutes governing the operation of motor vehicles . . . for the protection of the lives and property of the citizens of this state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding General Statutes SS 14-66 (a), requiring licensing to engage in operating wrecker for purpose of towing, valid exercise of police power",
"sentence": "State v. Swain, 245 Conn. 442, 456, 718 A.2d 1 (1998) (concluding General Statutes § 14-111, governing suspension or revocation of operator’s license, valid exercise of state police power); see also C & H Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 167 Conn. 304, 307-308, 355 A.2d 247 (1974) (holding General Statutes § 14-66 (a), requiring licensing to engage in operating wrecker for purpose of towing, valid exercise of police power)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "245 Conn. 442, 456",
"parenthetical": "concluding General Statutes SS 14-111, governing suspension or revocation of operator's license, valid exercise of state police power",
"sentence": "State v. Swain, 245 Conn. 442, 456, 718 A.2d 1 (1998) (concluding General Statutes § 14-111, governing suspension or revocation of operator’s license, valid exercise of state police power); see also C & H Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 167 Conn. 304, 307-308, 355 A.2d 247 (1974) (holding General Statutes § 14-66 (a), requiring licensing to engage in operating wrecker for purpose of towing, valid exercise of police power)."
} | 1,217,026 | b |
"The legislature enacted the statutes governing the operation of motor vehicles . . . for the protection of the lives and property of the citizens of this state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "167 Conn. 304, 307-308",
"parenthetical": "holding General Statutes SS 14-66 (a), requiring licensing to engage in operating wrecker for purpose of towing, valid exercise of police power",
"sentence": "State v. Swain, 245 Conn. 442, 456, 718 A.2d 1 (1998) (concluding General Statutes § 14-111, governing suspension or revocation of operator’s license, valid exercise of state police power); see also C & H Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 167 Conn. 304, 307-308, 355 A.2d 247 (1974) (holding General Statutes § 14-66 (a), requiring licensing to engage in operating wrecker for purpose of towing, valid exercise of police power)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding General Statutes SS 14-111, governing suspension or revocation of operator's license, valid exercise of state police power",
"sentence": "State v. Swain, 245 Conn. 442, 456, 718 A.2d 1 (1998) (concluding General Statutes § 14-111, governing suspension or revocation of operator’s license, valid exercise of state police power); see also C & H Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 167 Conn. 304, 307-308, 355 A.2d 247 (1974) (holding General Statutes § 14-66 (a), requiring licensing to engage in operating wrecker for purpose of towing, valid exercise of police power)."
} | 1,217,026 | b |
"The legislature enacted the statutes governing the operation of motor vehicles . . . for the protection of the lives and property of the citizens of this state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding General Statutes SS 14-111, governing suspension or revocation of operator's license, valid exercise of state police power",
"sentence": "State v. Swain, 245 Conn. 442, 456, 718 A.2d 1 (1998) (concluding General Statutes § 14-111, governing suspension or revocation of operator’s license, valid exercise of state police power); see also C & H Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 167 Conn. 304, 307-308, 355 A.2d 247 (1974) (holding General Statutes § 14-66 (a), requiring licensing to engage in operating wrecker for purpose of towing, valid exercise of police power)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding General Statutes SS 14-66 (a), requiring licensing to engage in operating wrecker for purpose of towing, valid exercise of police power",
"sentence": "State v. Swain, 245 Conn. 442, 456, 718 A.2d 1 (1998) (concluding General Statutes § 14-111, governing suspension or revocation of operator’s license, valid exercise of state police power); see also C & H Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 167 Conn. 304, 307-308, 355 A.2d 247 (1974) (holding General Statutes § 14-66 (a), requiring licensing to engage in operating wrecker for purpose of towing, valid exercise of police power)."
} | 1,217,026 | a |
. Although Plaintiff argues that his excessive force claim is governed by the Eighth Amendment, the district court properly analyzed Plaintiffs excessive-force claim as arising under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "972 F.2d 1566, 1571",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Eighth Amendment applies only after a prisoner is convicted.\"",
"sentence": "See Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1169 (11th Cir. 2000) (analyzing a claim of excessive force arising from ail arrest under the Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1571 (11th Cir. 1992) (\"[T]he Eighth Amendment applies only after a prisoner is convicted.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "206 F.3d 1156, 1169",
"parenthetical": "analyzing a claim of excessive force arising from ail arrest under the Fourth Amendment",
"sentence": "See Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1169 (11th Cir. 2000) (analyzing a claim of excessive force arising from ail arrest under the Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1571 (11th Cir. 1992) (\"[T]he Eighth Amendment applies only after a prisoner is convicted.”)."
} | 12,149,401 | b |
At the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, defendant offers the same qualifications-based justification as discussed in Part II.B, supra, and as in the race discrimination context, this justification is sufficient. Unlike Ms. Simpson's race discrimination claim, however, at the final stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis her age discrimination claim is supported by evidence sufficient to permit an inference that defendant's proffered explanation is pretextual. Klafehn's statements were not "direct" in the sense that they applied specifically to Ms. Simpson or to this position specifically because there were directed at hiring decisions more generally. They may, however, support an inference of age-based discrimination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "930 F.2d 1434, 1439",
"parenthetical": "sexist comments reflecting the supervisor's stereotypical images of men and women raised a genuine issue of fact with respect to pretext",
"sentence": "See Threadgill v. Spellings, 377 F.Supp.2d 158, 164-66 (D.D.C.2005) (holding that repeated remarks about need to bring in “new blood” or “young blood” by one of the decision-makers were not “stray remarks” and may permit inference of discrimination); see also Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir.1991) (sexist comments reflecting the supervisor’s stereotypical images of men and women raised a genuine issue of fact with respect to pretext); Lindemann & Gross-man, 1 Employment Discrimination Law 28."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "377 F.Supp.2d 158, 164-66",
"parenthetical": "holding that repeated remarks about need to bring in \"new blood\" or \"young blood\" by one of the decision-makers were not \"stray remarks\" and may permit inference of discrimination",
"sentence": "See Threadgill v. Spellings, 377 F.Supp.2d 158, 164-66 (D.D.C.2005) (holding that repeated remarks about need to bring in “new blood” or “young blood” by one of the decision-makers were not “stray remarks” and may permit inference of discrimination); see also Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir.1991) (sexist comments reflecting the supervisor’s stereotypical images of men and women raised a genuine issue of fact with respect to pretext); Lindemann & Gross-man, 1 Employment Discrimination Law 28."
} | 5,663,657 | b |
Based on the general nature of Quinta-na's objections, and the course of the proceedings as just described, we are convinced that Quintana's objections were not sufficiently specific to preclude the district court's reliance on the PSR. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "132 F.3d 440, 441",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's argument that her PSR overstated the seriousness of her past conduct was not a sufficiently specific objection to the fact of her previous conviction",
"sentence": "See United, States v. Flores, 9 F.3d 54, 55-56 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that a defendant’s general objection to his PSR’s recommendation of a sentence increase did not serve as an objection to specific factual allegations in the PSR); see also, United States v. Coleman, 132 F.3d 440, 441 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that a defendant’s argument that her PSR overstated the seriousness of her past conduct was not a sufficiently specific objection to the fact of her previous conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "9 F.3d 54, 55-56",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's general objection to his PSR's recommendation of a sentence increase did not serve as an objection to specific factual allegations in the PSR",
"sentence": "See United, States v. Flores, 9 F.3d 54, 55-56 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that a defendant’s general objection to his PSR’s recommendation of a sentence increase did not serve as an objection to specific factual allegations in the PSR); see also, United States v. Coleman, 132 F.3d 440, 441 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that a defendant’s argument that her PSR overstated the seriousness of her past conduct was not a sufficiently specific objection to the fact of her previous conviction)."
} | 9,101,879 | b |
The defendants contend that the evidence of the drug deal affected the jury's verdict on both punitive and compensatory damages. Although it is not clear whether the evidentiary error discussed above necessarily vitiated the compensatory damage award entered against the defendants, we believe the proper remedy would be to require a new trial on all issues. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "231 So.2d 532, 536",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"better practice and procedure requires that one jury determine both the compensatory and punitive damages\"",
"sentence": "See White v. Burger King Corp., 433 So.2d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); see also DuPuis v. 79th Street Hotel, Inc., 231 So.2d 532, 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) on reh’g (stating that “better practice and procedure requires that one jury determine both the compensatory and punitive damages”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "remanding only for a new trial on punitive damages where the plaintiff alleged no error in the trial on compensatory damages nor the specific amount of the award",
"sentence": "But see Stephens v. Rohde, 478 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (remanding only for a new trial on punitive damages where the plaintiff alleged no error in the trial on compensatory damages nor the specific amount of the award)."
} | 8,976,234 | a |
Richardson, to be clear, does not hold that a state felon disenfranchisement law may never raise equal protection concerns. If a state enacts a law which disenfranchises felons "with the intent of disenfranchising blacks," that state has run afoul of SS 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "471 U.S. 222, 229",
"parenthetical": "holding Alabama's petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 U.S. 432, 477",
"parenthetical": "\"[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | a |
Richardson, to be clear, does not hold that a state felon disenfranchisement law may never raise equal protection concerns. If a state enacts a law which disenfranchises felons "with the intent of disenfranchising blacks," that state has run afoul of SS 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "471 U.S. 222, 229",
"parenthetical": "holding Alabama's petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25",
"parenthetical": "\"[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | a |
Richardson, to be clear, does not hold that a state felon disenfranchisement law may never raise equal protection concerns. If a state enacts a law which disenfranchises felons "with the intent of disenfranchising blacks," that state has run afoul of SS 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "471 U.S. 222, 229",
"parenthetical": "holding Alabama's petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | a |
Richardson, to be clear, does not hold that a state felon disenfranchisement law may never raise equal protection concerns. If a state enacts a law which disenfranchises felons "with the intent of disenfranchising blacks," that state has run afoul of SS 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding Alabama's petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 U.S. 432, 477",
"parenthetical": "\"[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | a |
Richardson, to be clear, does not hold that a state felon disenfranchisement law may never raise equal protection concerns. If a state enacts a law which disenfranchises felons "with the intent of disenfranchising blacks," that state has run afoul of SS 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25",
"parenthetical": "\"[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding Alabama's petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | b |
Richardson, to be clear, does not hold that a state felon disenfranchisement law may never raise equal protection concerns. If a state enacts a law which disenfranchises felons "with the intent of disenfranchising blacks," that state has run afoul of SS 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding Alabama's petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | a |
Richardson, to be clear, does not hold that a state felon disenfranchisement law may never raise equal protection concerns. If a state enacts a law which disenfranchises felons "with the intent of disenfranchising blacks," that state has run afoul of SS 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 U.S. 432, 477",
"parenthetical": "\"[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding Alabama's petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | b |
Richardson, to be clear, does not hold that a state felon disenfranchisement law may never raise equal protection concerns. If a state enacts a law which disenfranchises felons "with the intent of disenfranchising blacks," that state has run afoul of SS 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding Alabama's petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25",
"parenthetical": "\"[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | a |
Richardson, to be clear, does not hold that a state felon disenfranchisement law may never raise equal protection concerns. If a state enacts a law which disenfranchises felons "with the intent of disenfranchising blacks," that state has run afoul of SS 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding Alabama's petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding Alabama’s petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 477, 105 S.Ct. 3249, n. 25, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (“[In Hunter ], we did not suggest that felons could not be deprived of the vote through a statute motivated by some purpose other than racial discrimination.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | a |
It is undisputed that no separate jurisdictional basis for these claims exists in this case. Because the court finds dismissal appropriate with respect to each of plaintiffs' claims arising under federal law, the court declines to exercise its discretion to address the merits of plaintiffs' remaining state law claims. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "997 F.2d 712, 717",
"parenthetical": "in light of Tenth Circuit's affir-mance of district court's dismissal of plaintiffs \"jurisdietionally predicate\" federal claims under SS 1983, dismissal of plaintiffs pendent state law claims appropriate",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Smith v. City of Enid, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir.1998) (“When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”); see also Pride v. Does, 997 F.2d 712, 717 (10th Cir.1993) (in light of Tenth Circuit’s affir-mance of district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs “jurisdietionally predicate” federal claims under § 1983, dismissal of plaintiffs pendent state law claims appropriate)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "149 F.3d 1151, 1156",
"parenthetical": "\"When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.\"",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Smith v. City of Enid, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir.1998) (“When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”); see also Pride v. Does, 997 F.2d 712, 717 (10th Cir.1993) (in light of Tenth Circuit’s affir-mance of district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs “jurisdietionally predicate” federal claims under § 1983, dismissal of plaintiffs pendent state law claims appropriate)."
} | 11,235,669 | b |
R. at 978. The trial court found no mitigating factors. Abel contends the trial court did not "adequately support" the sentence it imposed. Br. of Appellant at 17. In so doing he does not challenge the propriety of the sole aggravating factor the trial court relied on to enhance his sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "702 N.E.2d 694, 699",
"parenthetical": "observing that only one valid aggravating factor is necessary to enhance the presumptive sentence",
"sentence": "See Smith v. State, 675 N.E.2d 693, 698 (Ind.1996) (noting that the particular circumstances of a crime can be an aggravating circumstance); see also Sherwood v. State, 702 N.E.2d 694, 699 (Ind. 1998) (observing that only one valid aggravating factor is necessary to enhance the presumptive sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "675 N.E.2d 693, 698",
"parenthetical": "noting that the particular circumstances of a crime can be an aggravating circumstance",
"sentence": "See Smith v. State, 675 N.E.2d 693, 698 (Ind.1996) (noting that the particular circumstances of a crime can be an aggravating circumstance); see also Sherwood v. State, 702 N.E.2d 694, 699 (Ind. 1998) (observing that only one valid aggravating factor is necessary to enhance the presumptive sentence)."
} | 11,413,939 | b |
Its chief drawback, as demonstrated here, is its duration. Congress, though, has addressed the matter of delay directly, see 15 U.S.C. SS 717r(d)(2); 33 U.S.C. SS 1341(a)(1), and by divesting states of their customary review of state agency orders and opinions in this field, see 15 U.S.C. SS 717r(d)(l). We see no indication that Congress otherwise intended to dictate how (as opposed to how quickly) MassDEP conducts its internal decision-making before finally acting. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "482 F.3d 658, 667",
"parenthetical": "\"In the CWA, Congress expressed its respect for states' role through a scheme of cooperative federalism that enables states to 'implement ... permit programs' like [the one at issue here.]\"",
"sentence": "See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources .... ”); United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir. 2007) (“In the CWA, Congress expressed its respect for states’ role through a scheme of cooperative federalism that enables states to ‘implement ... permit programs’ like [the one at issue here.]”); S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enf't, Dep’t of Interior, 20 F.3d 1418, 1427 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he CWA sets up a system of ‘cooperative federalism,’ in which states may choose to be primarily responsible for running federally-approved programs.”); cf. Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, 723 F.3d 238, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting that the NGA “expressly does not preempt” certain environmental protection laws like the Clean Air Act that contemplate a robust role for states)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "723 F.3d 238, 240",
"parenthetical": "noting that the NGA \"expressly does not preempt\" certain environmental protection laws like the Clean Air Act that contemplate a robust role for states",
"sentence": "See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources .... ”); United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir. 2007) (“In the CWA, Congress expressed its respect for states’ role through a scheme of cooperative federalism that enables states to ‘implement ... permit programs’ like [the one at issue here.]”); S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enf't, Dep’t of Interior, 20 F.3d 1418, 1427 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he CWA sets up a system of ‘cooperative federalism,’ in which states may choose to be primarily responsible for running federally-approved programs.”); cf. Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, 723 F.3d 238, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting that the NGA “expressly does not preempt” certain environmental protection laws like the Clean Air Act that contemplate a robust role for states)."
} | 12,277,172 | a |
Its chief drawback, as demonstrated here, is its duration. Congress, though, has addressed the matter of delay directly, see 15 U.S.C. SS 717r(d)(2); 33 U.S.C. SS 1341(a)(1), and by divesting states of their customary review of state agency orders and opinions in this field, see 15 U.S.C. SS 717r(d)(l). We see no indication that Congress otherwise intended to dictate how (as opposed to how quickly) MassDEP conducts its internal decision-making before finally acting. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "20 F.3d 1418, 1427",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he CWA sets up a system of 'cooperative federalism,' in which states may choose to be primarily responsible for running federally-approved programs.\"",
"sentence": "See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources .... ”); United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir. 2007) (“In the CWA, Congress expressed its respect for states’ role through a scheme of cooperative federalism that enables states to ‘implement ... permit programs’ like [the one at issue here.]”); S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enf't, Dep’t of Interior, 20 F.3d 1418, 1427 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he CWA sets up a system of ‘cooperative federalism,’ in which states may choose to be primarily responsible for running federally-approved programs.”); cf. Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, 723 F.3d 238, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting that the NGA “expressly does not preempt” certain environmental protection laws like the Clean Air Act that contemplate a robust role for states)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "723 F.3d 238, 240",
"parenthetical": "noting that the NGA \"expressly does not preempt\" certain environmental protection laws like the Clean Air Act that contemplate a robust role for states",
"sentence": "See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources .... ”); United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir. 2007) (“In the CWA, Congress expressed its respect for states’ role through a scheme of cooperative federalism that enables states to ‘implement ... permit programs’ like [the one at issue here.]”); S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enf't, Dep’t of Interior, 20 F.3d 1418, 1427 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he CWA sets up a system of ‘cooperative federalism,’ in which states may choose to be primarily responsible for running federally-approved programs.”); cf. Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, 723 F.3d 238, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting that the NGA “expressly does not preempt” certain environmental protection laws like the Clean Air Act that contemplate a robust role for states)."
} | 12,277,172 | a |
The claim must be one for money damages against the United States." The Fifth Amendment is the only provision of the Constitution that has 'been held to fall under the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "328 U.S. 256, 267",
"parenthetical": "\"If there is a taking, the claim is 'founded upon the Constitution' and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (“If there is a taking, the claim is ‘founded upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine.”); Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 343, 47 S.Ct. 611, 71 L.Ed. 1083 (1927) (“Under the Fifth Amendment plaintiffs were entitled to just compensation, and ... the claim is one founded on the Constitution.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 1475, 1476",
"parenthetical": "explaining that this Court does not have jurisdiction over claims involving due process violations of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment",
"sentence": "Cf. Carruth v. United States, 224 Ct.Cl. 422, 627 F.2d 1068 (1980); Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed.Cir.1997) (explaining that this Court does not have jurisdiction over claims involving due process violations of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment)."
} | 1,200,868 | a |
The claim must be one for money damages against the United States." The Fifth Amendment is the only provision of the Constitution that has 'been held to fall under the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 1475, 1476",
"parenthetical": "explaining that this Court does not have jurisdiction over claims involving due process violations of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment",
"sentence": "Cf. Carruth v. United States, 224 Ct.Cl. 422, 627 F.2d 1068 (1980); Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed.Cir.1997) (explaining that this Court does not have jurisdiction over claims involving due process violations of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If there is a taking, the claim is 'founded upon the Constitution' and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (“If there is a taking, the claim is ‘founded upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine.”); Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 343, 47 S.Ct. 611, 71 L.Ed. 1083 (1927) (“Under the Fifth Amendment plaintiffs were entitled to just compensation, and ... the claim is one founded on the Constitution.”)."
} | 1,200,868 | b |
The claim must be one for money damages against the United States." The Fifth Amendment is the only provision of the Constitution that has 'been held to fall under the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 1475, 1476",
"parenthetical": "explaining that this Court does not have jurisdiction over claims involving due process violations of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment",
"sentence": "Cf. Carruth v. United States, 224 Ct.Cl. 422, 627 F.2d 1068 (1980); Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed.Cir.1997) (explaining that this Court does not have jurisdiction over claims involving due process violations of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If there is a taking, the claim is 'founded upon the Constitution' and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (“If there is a taking, the claim is ‘founded upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine.”); Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 343, 47 S.Ct. 611, 71 L.Ed. 1083 (1927) (“Under the Fifth Amendment plaintiffs were entitled to just compensation, and ... the claim is one founded on the Constitution.”)."
} | 1,200,868 | b |
The claim must be one for money damages against the United States." The Fifth Amendment is the only provision of the Constitution that has 'been held to fall under the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 1475, 1476",
"parenthetical": "explaining that this Court does not have jurisdiction over claims involving due process violations of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment",
"sentence": "Cf. Carruth v. United States, 224 Ct.Cl. 422, 627 F.2d 1068 (1980); Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed.Cir.1997) (explaining that this Court does not have jurisdiction over claims involving due process violations of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "274 U.S. 341, 343",
"parenthetical": "\"Under the Fifth Amendment plaintiffs were entitled to just compensation, and ... the claim is one founded on the Constitution.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (“If there is a taking, the claim is ‘founded upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine.”); Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 343, 47 S.Ct. 611, 71 L.Ed. 1083 (1927) (“Under the Fifth Amendment plaintiffs were entitled to just compensation, and ... the claim is one founded on the Constitution.”)."
} | 1,200,868 | b |
The claim must be one for money damages against the United States." The Fifth Amendment is the only provision of the Constitution that has 'been held to fall under the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Under the Fifth Amendment plaintiffs were entitled to just compensation, and ... the claim is one founded on the Constitution.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (“If there is a taking, the claim is ‘founded upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine.”); Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 343, 47 S.Ct. 611, 71 L.Ed. 1083 (1927) (“Under the Fifth Amendment plaintiffs were entitled to just compensation, and ... the claim is one founded on the Constitution.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 1475, 1476",
"parenthetical": "explaining that this Court does not have jurisdiction over claims involving due process violations of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment",
"sentence": "Cf. Carruth v. United States, 224 Ct.Cl. 422, 627 F.2d 1068 (1980); Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed.Cir.1997) (explaining that this Court does not have jurisdiction over claims involving due process violations of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment)."
} | 1,200,868 | a |
The claim must be one for money damages against the United States." The Fifth Amendment is the only provision of the Constitution that has 'been held to fall under the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 1475, 1476",
"parenthetical": "explaining that this Court does not have jurisdiction over claims involving due process violations of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment",
"sentence": "Cf. Carruth v. United States, 224 Ct.Cl. 422, 627 F.2d 1068 (1980); Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed.Cir.1997) (explaining that this Court does not have jurisdiction over claims involving due process violations of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Under the Fifth Amendment plaintiffs were entitled to just compensation, and ... the claim is one founded on the Constitution.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (“If there is a taking, the claim is ‘founded upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine.”); Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 343, 47 S.Ct. 611, 71 L.Ed. 1083 (1927) (“Under the Fifth Amendment plaintiffs were entitled to just compensation, and ... the claim is one founded on the Constitution.”)."
} | 1,200,868 | b |
The particular facts in this left-hand turn situation required that the charge be given. Specifically, the fact that Barry could not see to the passenger side of the van operated by Eldred A. More, provided ample reason for her to take special precautions under the particularly hazardous circumstances. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "166 N.J.Super. 52, 55",
"parenthetical": "driver not relieved of duty to exercise increased amount of care in making turn, even though proceeding in accordance with traffic light",
"sentence": "Cf. Zec v. Thompson, 166 N.J.Super. 52, 55 (App.Div.1979) (driver not relieved of duty to exercise increased amount of care in making turn, even though proceeding in accordance with traffic light)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "29 N.J. 144, 144",
"parenthetical": "standard of care of reasonable person involves consideration of varied amounts of care in relation to amount of risk of harm involved",
"sentence": "See Ambrose v. Cyphers, supra, 29 N.J. at 144 (standard of care of reasonable person involves consideration of varied amounts of care in relation to amount of risk of harm involved)."
} | 1,875,583 | b |
(Pis.' Opp'n at 19). This argument is not persuasive for two reasons: first, it is contrary to the law of immunity in analogous situations that the wrongfulness of the alleged act does not take it beyond the scope of authority for immunity purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "101 F.3d 239, 244",
"parenthetical": "noting that revisions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act removed sovereign immunity for acts of state-sponsored terrorism only under particular circumstances",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1287-88 (D.C.Cir.2008) (individual Israeli military officer immune under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act from suit alleging war crimes); Princz v. Fed. Repub. of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C.Cir.1994) (foreign state does not waive sovereign immunity by violating jus cogens); see also Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir.1996) (noting that revisions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act removed sovereign immunity for acts of state-sponsored terrorism only under particular circumstances); 14 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Procedure § 3655 (3d ed. 2015) (“The fact that the defendant officer’s acts were wrongful or erroneous is not sufficient to demonstrate that they are outside the scope of his or her official authority.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "515 F.3d 1279, 1287-88",
"parenthetical": "individual Israeli military officer immune under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act from suit alleging war crimes",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1287-88 (D.C.Cir.2008) (individual Israeli military officer immune under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act from suit alleging war crimes); Princz v. Fed. Repub. of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C.Cir.1994) (foreign state does not waive sovereign immunity by violating jus cogens); see also Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir.1996) (noting that revisions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act removed sovereign immunity for acts of state-sponsored terrorism only under particular circumstances); 14 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Procedure § 3655 (3d ed. 2015) (“The fact that the defendant officer’s acts were wrongful or erroneous is not sufficient to demonstrate that they are outside the scope of his or her official authority.”)."
} | 4,065,728 | b |
(Pis.' Opp'n at 19). This argument is not persuasive for two reasons: first, it is contrary to the law of immunity in analogous situations that the wrongfulness of the alleged act does not take it beyond the scope of authority for immunity purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "26 F.3d 1166, 1174",
"parenthetical": "foreign state does not waive sovereign immunity by violating jus cogens",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1287-88 (D.C.Cir.2008) (individual Israeli military officer immune under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act from suit alleging war crimes); Princz v. Fed. Repub. of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C.Cir.1994) (foreign state does not waive sovereign immunity by violating jus cogens); see also Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir.1996) (noting that revisions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act removed sovereign immunity for acts of state-sponsored terrorism only under particular circumstances); 14 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Procedure § 3655 (3d ed. 2015) (“The fact that the defendant officer’s acts were wrongful or erroneous is not sufficient to demonstrate that they are outside the scope of his or her official authority.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "101 F.3d 239, 244",
"parenthetical": "noting that revisions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act removed sovereign immunity for acts of state-sponsored terrorism only under particular circumstances",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1287-88 (D.C.Cir.2008) (individual Israeli military officer immune under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act from suit alleging war crimes); Princz v. Fed. Repub. of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C.Cir.1994) (foreign state does not waive sovereign immunity by violating jus cogens); see also Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir.1996) (noting that revisions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act removed sovereign immunity for acts of state-sponsored terrorism only under particular circumstances); 14 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Procedure § 3655 (3d ed. 2015) (“The fact that the defendant officer’s acts were wrongful or erroneous is not sufficient to demonstrate that they are outside the scope of his or her official authority.”)."
} | 4,065,728 | a |
In the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the attorneys for the parties elaborated on the underlying factual basis for the complaint in explanation of the asserted grounds for dismissal. However, no stipulation of fact was made, no affidavit or other evidence was submitted, and the transcript does not indicate that the court converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment, as contemplated by Rule 56, SCRCP. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "353 S.E.2d 698, 698-99",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he trial court may treat a 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment and consider matters presented outside of the pleadings if the parties are afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to such matters in accordance with Rule 56(c) and (e",
"sentence": "See Cobb v. Benjamin, 325 S.C. 573, 482 S.E.2d 589 (Ct.App.1997) (where there is no stipulation, a representation of fact by counsel in written briefs, memoranda or made during oral argument, may not be considered by the court where it is unsupported by the record); see also Brown, 291 S.C. at 367, 353 S.E.2d at 698-99 (“[T]he trial court may treat a 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment and consider matters presented outside of the pleadings if the parties are afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to such matters in accordance with Rule 56(c) and (e) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where there is no stipulation, a representation of fact by counsel in written briefs, memoranda or made during oral argument, may not be considered by the court where it is unsupported by the record",
"sentence": "See Cobb v. Benjamin, 325 S.C. 573, 482 S.E.2d 589 (Ct.App.1997) (where there is no stipulation, a representation of fact by counsel in written briefs, memoranda or made during oral argument, may not be considered by the court where it is unsupported by the record); see also Brown, 291 S.C. at 367, 353 S.E.2d at 698-99 (“[T]he trial court may treat a 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment and consider matters presented outside of the pleadings if the parties are afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to such matters in accordance with Rule 56(c) and (e) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.”)."
} | 281,851 | b |
In the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the attorneys for the parties elaborated on the underlying factual basis for the complaint in explanation of the asserted grounds for dismissal. However, no stipulation of fact was made, no affidavit or other evidence was submitted, and the transcript does not indicate that the court converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment, as contemplated by Rule 56, SCRCP. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where there is no stipulation, a representation of fact by counsel in written briefs, memoranda or made during oral argument, may not be considered by the court where it is unsupported by the record",
"sentence": "See Cobb v. Benjamin, 325 S.C. 573, 482 S.E.2d 589 (Ct.App.1997) (where there is no stipulation, a representation of fact by counsel in written briefs, memoranda or made during oral argument, may not be considered by the court where it is unsupported by the record); see also Brown, 291 S.C. at 367, 353 S.E.2d at 698-99 (“[T]he trial court may treat a 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment and consider matters presented outside of the pleadings if the parties are afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to such matters in accordance with Rule 56(c) and (e) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "353 S.E.2d 698, 698-99",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he trial court may treat a 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment and consider matters presented outside of the pleadings if the parties are afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to such matters in accordance with Rule 56(c) and (e",
"sentence": "See Cobb v. Benjamin, 325 S.C. 573, 482 S.E.2d 589 (Ct.App.1997) (where there is no stipulation, a representation of fact by counsel in written briefs, memoranda or made during oral argument, may not be considered by the court where it is unsupported by the record); see also Brown, 291 S.C. at 367, 353 S.E.2d at 698-99 (“[T]he trial court may treat a 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment and consider matters presented outside of the pleadings if the parties are afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to such matters in accordance with Rule 56(c) and (e) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.”)."
} | 281,851 | a |
The plaintiff contends that a liberty interest in his continued participation in the work release program arises directly under the Due Process Clause. According to the plaintiff, his participation in the work release program can be analogized to other conditional restrictions imposed upon a prisoner's freedom -- such as parole, probation and conditional release programs -- the revocation of which have been held to be protected by the Due Process Clause of its own force. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "64 F.3d 563, 566-67",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] prisoner release program which permits a convict to exist, albeit conditionally, in society on a full-time basis more closely resembles parole or probation than even the more permissive forms of institutional confinement.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1760, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (revocation of probation status); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2601, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (revocation of parole); Edwards v. Lockhart, 908 F.2d 299, 302 (8th Cir.1990) (revocation of participation in program bearing many of the same characteristics as parole); see also Harper v. Young, 64 F.3d 563, 566-67 (10th Cir.1995) (“[A] prisoner release program which permits a convict to exist, albeit conditionally, in society on a full-time basis more closely resembles parole or probation than even the more permissive forms of institutional confinement.”), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-1598 (U.S. Apr. 4, 1996); United States v. Stephenson, 928 F.2d 728, 732 (6th Cir.1991) (finding inherent liberty interest in continued placement in supervised release program that allowed convicts to live in society)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "908 F.2d 299, 302",
"parenthetical": "revocation of participation in program bearing many of the same characteristics as parole",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1760, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (revocation of probation status); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2601, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (revocation of parole); Edwards v. Lockhart, 908 F.2d 299, 302 (8th Cir.1990) (revocation of participation in program bearing many of the same characteristics as parole); see also Harper v. Young, 64 F.3d 563, 566-67 (10th Cir.1995) (“[A] prisoner release program which permits a convict to exist, albeit conditionally, in society on a full-time basis more closely resembles parole or probation than even the more permissive forms of institutional confinement.”), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-1598 (U.S. Apr. 4, 1996); United States v. Stephenson, 928 F.2d 728, 732 (6th Cir.1991) (finding inherent liberty interest in continued placement in supervised release program that allowed convicts to live in society)."
} | 7,776,397 | b |
The plaintiff contends that a liberty interest in his continued participation in the work release program arises directly under the Due Process Clause. According to the plaintiff, his participation in the work release program can be analogized to other conditional restrictions imposed upon a prisoner's freedom -- such as parole, probation and conditional release programs -- the revocation of which have been held to be protected by the Due Process Clause of its own force. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "908 F.2d 299, 302",
"parenthetical": "revocation of participation in program bearing many of the same characteristics as parole",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1760, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (revocation of probation status); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2601, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (revocation of parole); Edwards v. Lockhart, 908 F.2d 299, 302 (8th Cir.1990) (revocation of participation in program bearing many of the same characteristics as parole); see also Harper v. Young, 64 F.3d 563, 566-67 (10th Cir.1995) (“[A] prisoner release program which permits a convict to exist, albeit conditionally, in society on a full-time basis more closely resembles parole or probation than even the more permissive forms of institutional confinement.”), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-1598 (U.S. Apr. 4, 1996); United States v. Stephenson, 928 F.2d 728, 732 (6th Cir.1991) (finding inherent liberty interest in continued placement in supervised release program that allowed convicts to live in society)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "928 F.2d 728, 732",
"parenthetical": "finding inherent liberty interest in continued placement in supervised release program that allowed convicts to live in society",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1760, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (revocation of probation status); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2601, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (revocation of parole); Edwards v. Lockhart, 908 F.2d 299, 302 (8th Cir.1990) (revocation of participation in program bearing many of the same characteristics as parole); see also Harper v. Young, 64 F.3d 563, 566-67 (10th Cir.1995) (“[A] prisoner release program which permits a convict to exist, albeit conditionally, in society on a full-time basis more closely resembles parole or probation than even the more permissive forms of institutional confinement.”), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-1598 (U.S. Apr. 4, 1996); United States v. Stephenson, 928 F.2d 728, 732 (6th Cir.1991) (finding inherent liberty interest in continued placement in supervised release program that allowed convicts to live in society)."
} | 7,776,397 | a |
The Court rejects Griffin's argument that her actions did not violate SS 362(h) because the Debtor had previously entered into an oral contract with Griffin to repay the Prepetition Debt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that creditor willfully violated automatic stay where creditor repossessed collateral in reliance on reaffirmation agreement which had not been approved by bankruptcy court",
"sentence": "See In re Esposito, 154 B.R. 1011 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1993) (finding that creditor willfully violated automatic stay where creditor repossessed collateral in reliance on reaffirmation agreement which had not been approved by bankruptcy court); cf. In re Baker, 183 B.R. 30 (Bankr.D.R.1.1995) (finding that creditor’s ex parte negotiation of reaffirmation agreement with debtor constituted willful violation of the automatic stay)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that creditor's ex parte negotiation of reaffirmation agreement with debtor constituted willful violation of the automatic stay",
"sentence": "See In re Esposito, 154 B.R. 1011 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1993) (finding that creditor willfully violated automatic stay where creditor repossessed collateral in reliance on reaffirmation agreement which had not been approved by bankruptcy court); cf. In re Baker, 183 B.R. 30 (Bankr.D.R.1.1995) (finding that creditor’s ex parte negotiation of reaffirmation agreement with debtor constituted willful violation of the automatic stay)."
} | 11,299,382 | a |
Because none of the parties has identified non-party witnesses, this factor adds little to the court's analysis. Certainly, defendants have not demonstrated that the factor favors transfer. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1993 WL 341274, *4",
"parenthetical": "\"The movant is obligated to clearly specify the key witnesses to be called and make at least a generalized statement of what their testimony would have included\"",
"sentence": "See Bohara, 390 F.Supp.2d at 963 (“If the [requested] transfer is for the convenience of witnesses, [the] defendant must name the witnesses it wishes to call, the anticipated area of their testimony and its relevance, and the reasons why the present forum would present hardship to them”); see also Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. National Bank for Cooperatives, No. C 92-2667 BAC, 1993 WL 341274, *4 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 27, 1993) (“The movant is obligated to clearly specify the key witnesses to be called and make at least a generalized statement of what their testimony would have included”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "390 F.Supp.2d 963, 963",
"parenthetical": "\"If the [requested] transfer is for the convenience of witnesses, [the] defendant must name the witnesses it wishes to call, the anticipated area of their testimony and its relevance, and the reasons why the present forum would present hardship to them\"",
"sentence": "See Bohara, 390 F.Supp.2d at 963 (“If the [requested] transfer is for the convenience of witnesses, [the] defendant must name the witnesses it wishes to call, the anticipated area of their testimony and its relevance, and the reasons why the present forum would present hardship to them”); see also Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. National Bank for Cooperatives, No. C 92-2667 BAC, 1993 WL 341274, *4 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 27, 1993) (“The movant is obligated to clearly specify the key witnesses to be called and make at least a generalized statement of what their testimony would have included”)."
} | 3,803,654 | b |
In such a circumstance, the court will assume that the statements actually misled consumers. On the other hand, if the statements at issue are either ambiguous or true but misleading, the plaintiff must present evidence of actual deception. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "960 F.2d 297, 297",
"parenthetical": "stating that when a \"plaintiffs theory of recovery is premised upon a claim of implied falsehood, a plaintiff must demonstrate, by extrinsic evidence, that the challenged commercials tend to mislead or confuse\"",
"sentence": "See American Council, 185 F.3d at 616; Smithkline, 960 F.2d at 297 (stating that when a “plaintiffs theory of recovery is premised upon a claim of implied falsehood, a plaintiff must demonstrate, by extrinsic evidence, that the challenged commercials tend to mislead or confuse”); Avila, 84 F.3d at 227. The plaintiff may not rely on the judge or the jury to determine, “based solely upon his or her own intuitive reaction, whether the advertisement is deceptive.” Smithkline, 960 F.2d at 297. Instead, proof of actual deception requires proof that “consumers were actually deceived by the defendant’s ambiguous or true-but-misleading statements.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "782 F.2d 381, 386",
"parenthetical": "stating that the plaintiff's claim fails due to its failure to introduce evidence establishing that the public was actually deceived by the statements at issue",
"sentence": "American Council, 185 F.3d at 616; see also Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 782 F.2d 381, 386 (2d Cir.1986)(stating that the plaintiff's claim fails due to its failure to introduce evidence establishing that the public was actually deceived by the statements at issue)."
} | 11,190,182 | a |
Landgraf demands an "unambiguous directive" from Congress before a court may apply a statute retrospectively. A negative inference from Section 108's exclusion of RICO is an ambiguous directive, if that. I therefore conclude that the PSLRA provides no explicit or (sufficiently clear) implicit indication of Congressional intent to apply the RICO amendments to actions involving pre-en-actment events. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "119 S.Ct. 2004, 2004",
"parenthetical": "\"This language falls short of demonstrating a 'clear congressional intent' favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.\" (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483",
"sentence": "See Mathews, 161 F.3d at 170 (“[W]e find defendants’ reliance on unstated intentions, absent language, and explicit congressional directives in non-RICO areas of the Reform Act to be far from the clear evidence we seek when discerning congressional intent.”); Baker, 940 F.Supp. at 1177 (“[I]t is unlikely that Congress chose to indicate its desire for retroactive application of the RICO Amendments — which will likely affect hundreds of pending cases — by such a roundabout method.”); District 65 Retirement Trust, 925 F.Supp. at 1569; cf. Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2004 (“This language falls short of demonstrating a ‘clear congressional intent’ favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.” (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "161 F.3d 170, 170",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e find defendants' reliance on unstated intentions, absent language, and explicit congressional directives in non-RICO areas of the Reform Act to be far from the clear evidence we seek when discerning congressional intent.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathews, 161 F.3d at 170 (“[W]e find defendants’ reliance on unstated intentions, absent language, and explicit congressional directives in non-RICO areas of the Reform Act to be far from the clear evidence we seek when discerning congressional intent.”); Baker, 940 F.Supp. at 1177 (“[I]t is unlikely that Congress chose to indicate its desire for retroactive application of the RICO Amendments — which will likely affect hundreds of pending cases — by such a roundabout method.”); District 65 Retirement Trust, 925 F.Supp. at 1569; cf. Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2004 (“This language falls short of demonstrating a ‘clear congressional intent’ favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.” (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483))."
} | 647,255 | b |
Landgraf demands an "unambiguous directive" from Congress before a court may apply a statute retrospectively. A negative inference from Section 108's exclusion of RICO is an ambiguous directive, if that. I therefore conclude that the PSLRA provides no explicit or (sufficiently clear) implicit indication of Congressional intent to apply the RICO amendments to actions involving pre-en-actment events. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "161 F.3d 170, 170",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e find defendants' reliance on unstated intentions, absent language, and explicit congressional directives in non-RICO areas of the Reform Act to be far from the clear evidence we seek when discerning congressional intent.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathews, 161 F.3d at 170 (“[W]e find defendants’ reliance on unstated intentions, absent language, and explicit congressional directives in non-RICO areas of the Reform Act to be far from the clear evidence we seek when discerning congressional intent.”); Baker, 940 F.Supp. at 1177 (“[I]t is unlikely that Congress chose to indicate its desire for retroactive application of the RICO Amendments — which will likely affect hundreds of pending cases — by such a roundabout method.”); District 65 Retirement Trust, 925 F.Supp. at 1569; cf. Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2004 (“This language falls short of demonstrating a ‘clear congressional intent’ favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.” (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "511 U.S. 280, 280",
"parenthetical": "\"This language falls short of demonstrating a 'clear congressional intent' favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.\" (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483",
"sentence": "See Mathews, 161 F.3d at 170 (“[W]e find defendants’ reliance on unstated intentions, absent language, and explicit congressional directives in non-RICO areas of the Reform Act to be far from the clear evidence we seek when discerning congressional intent.”); Baker, 940 F.Supp. at 1177 (“[I]t is unlikely that Congress chose to indicate its desire for retroactive application of the RICO Amendments — which will likely affect hundreds of pending cases — by such a roundabout method.”); District 65 Retirement Trust, 925 F.Supp. at 1569; cf. Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2004 (“This language falls short of demonstrating a ‘clear congressional intent’ favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.” (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483))."
} | 647,255 | a |
Landgraf demands an "unambiguous directive" from Congress before a court may apply a statute retrospectively. A negative inference from Section 108's exclusion of RICO is an ambiguous directive, if that. I therefore conclude that the PSLRA provides no explicit or (sufficiently clear) implicit indication of Congressional intent to apply the RICO amendments to actions involving pre-en-actment events. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "161 F.3d 170, 170",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e find defendants' reliance on unstated intentions, absent language, and explicit congressional directives in non-RICO areas of the Reform Act to be far from the clear evidence we seek when discerning congressional intent.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathews, 161 F.3d at 170 (“[W]e find defendants’ reliance on unstated intentions, absent language, and explicit congressional directives in non-RICO areas of the Reform Act to be far from the clear evidence we seek when discerning congressional intent.”); Baker, 940 F.Supp. at 1177 (“[I]t is unlikely that Congress chose to indicate its desire for retroactive application of the RICO Amendments — which will likely affect hundreds of pending cases — by such a roundabout method.”); District 65 Retirement Trust, 925 F.Supp. at 1569; cf. Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2004 (“This language falls short of demonstrating a ‘clear congressional intent’ favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.” (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"This language falls short of demonstrating a 'clear congressional intent' favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.\" (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483",
"sentence": "See Mathews, 161 F.3d at 170 (“[W]e find defendants’ reliance on unstated intentions, absent language, and explicit congressional directives in non-RICO areas of the Reform Act to be far from the clear evidence we seek when discerning congressional intent.”); Baker, 940 F.Supp. at 1177 (“[I]t is unlikely that Congress chose to indicate its desire for retroactive application of the RICO Amendments — which will likely affect hundreds of pending cases — by such a roundabout method.”); District 65 Retirement Trust, 925 F.Supp. at 1569; cf. Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2004 (“This language falls short of demonstrating a ‘clear congressional intent’ favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.” (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483))."
} | 647,255 | a |
Landgraf demands an "unambiguous directive" from Congress before a court may apply a statute retrospectively. A negative inference from Section 108's exclusion of RICO is an ambiguous directive, if that. I therefore conclude that the PSLRA provides no explicit or (sufficiently clear) implicit indication of Congressional intent to apply the RICO amendments to actions involving pre-en-actment events. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "119 S.Ct. 2004, 2004",
"parenthetical": "\"This language falls short of demonstrating a 'clear congressional intent' favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.\" (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483",
"sentence": "See Mathews, 161 F.3d at 170 (“[W]e find defendants’ reliance on unstated intentions, absent language, and explicit congressional directives in non-RICO areas of the Reform Act to be far from the clear evidence we seek when discerning congressional intent.”); Baker, 940 F.Supp. at 1177 (“[I]t is unlikely that Congress chose to indicate its desire for retroactive application of the RICO Amendments — which will likely affect hundreds of pending cases — by such a roundabout method.”); District 65 Retirement Trust, 925 F.Supp. at 1569; cf. Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2004 (“This language falls short of demonstrating a ‘clear congressional intent’ favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.” (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "940 F.Supp. 1177, 1177",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is unlikely that Congress chose to indicate its desire for retroactive application of the RICO Amendments -- which will likely affect hundreds of pending cases -- by such a roundabout method.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathews, 161 F.3d at 170 (“[W]e find defendants’ reliance on unstated intentions, absent language, and explicit congressional directives in non-RICO areas of the Reform Act to be far from the clear evidence we seek when discerning congressional intent.”); Baker, 940 F.Supp. at 1177 (“[I]t is unlikely that Congress chose to indicate its desire for retroactive application of the RICO Amendments — which will likely affect hundreds of pending cases — by such a roundabout method.”); District 65 Retirement Trust, 925 F.Supp. at 1569; cf. Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2004 (“This language falls short of demonstrating a ‘clear congressional intent’ favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.” (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483))."
} | 647,255 | b |
Landgraf demands an "unambiguous directive" from Congress before a court may apply a statute retrospectively. A negative inference from Section 108's exclusion of RICO is an ambiguous directive, if that. I therefore conclude that the PSLRA provides no explicit or (sufficiently clear) implicit indication of Congressional intent to apply the RICO amendments to actions involving pre-en-actment events. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "940 F.Supp. 1177, 1177",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is unlikely that Congress chose to indicate its desire for retroactive application of the RICO Amendments -- which will likely affect hundreds of pending cases -- by such a roundabout method.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathews, 161 F.3d at 170 (“[W]e find defendants’ reliance on unstated intentions, absent language, and explicit congressional directives in non-RICO areas of the Reform Act to be far from the clear evidence we seek when discerning congressional intent.”); Baker, 940 F.Supp. at 1177 (“[I]t is unlikely that Congress chose to indicate its desire for retroactive application of the RICO Amendments — which will likely affect hundreds of pending cases — by such a roundabout method.”); District 65 Retirement Trust, 925 F.Supp. at 1569; cf. Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2004 (“This language falls short of demonstrating a ‘clear congressional intent’ favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.” (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "511 U.S. 280, 280",
"parenthetical": "\"This language falls short of demonstrating a 'clear congressional intent' favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.\" (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483",
"sentence": "See Mathews, 161 F.3d at 170 (“[W]e find defendants’ reliance on unstated intentions, absent language, and explicit congressional directives in non-RICO areas of the Reform Act to be far from the clear evidence we seek when discerning congressional intent.”); Baker, 940 F.Supp. at 1177 (“[I]t is unlikely that Congress chose to indicate its desire for retroactive application of the RICO Amendments — which will likely affect hundreds of pending cases — by such a roundabout method.”); District 65 Retirement Trust, 925 F.Supp. at 1569; cf. Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2004 (“This language falls short of demonstrating a ‘clear congressional intent’ favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.” (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483))."
} | 647,255 | a |
Landgraf demands an "unambiguous directive" from Congress before a court may apply a statute retrospectively. A negative inference from Section 108's exclusion of RICO is an ambiguous directive, if that. I therefore conclude that the PSLRA provides no explicit or (sufficiently clear) implicit indication of Congressional intent to apply the RICO amendments to actions involving pre-en-actment events. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"This language falls short of demonstrating a 'clear congressional intent' favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.\" (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483",
"sentence": "See Mathews, 161 F.3d at 170 (“[W]e find defendants’ reliance on unstated intentions, absent language, and explicit congressional directives in non-RICO areas of the Reform Act to be far from the clear evidence we seek when discerning congressional intent.”); Baker, 940 F.Supp. at 1177 (“[I]t is unlikely that Congress chose to indicate its desire for retroactive application of the RICO Amendments — which will likely affect hundreds of pending cases — by such a roundabout method.”); District 65 Retirement Trust, 925 F.Supp. at 1569; cf. Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2004 (“This language falls short of demonstrating a ‘clear congressional intent’ favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.” (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "940 F.Supp. 1177, 1177",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is unlikely that Congress chose to indicate its desire for retroactive application of the RICO Amendments -- which will likely affect hundreds of pending cases -- by such a roundabout method.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathews, 161 F.3d at 170 (“[W]e find defendants’ reliance on unstated intentions, absent language, and explicit congressional directives in non-RICO areas of the Reform Act to be far from the clear evidence we seek when discerning congressional intent.”); Baker, 940 F.Supp. at 1177 (“[I]t is unlikely that Congress chose to indicate its desire for retroactive application of the RICO Amendments — which will likely affect hundreds of pending cases — by such a roundabout method.”); District 65 Retirement Trust, 925 F.Supp. at 1569; cf. Martin, 119 S.Ct. at 2004 (“This language falls short of demonstrating a ‘clear congressional intent’ favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations.” (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483))."
} | 647,255 | b |
An-tonick's claims rest on the contention that the source code of the Sega Madden games infringed on the source code for Apple II Madden. But, none of the source code was in evidence. The jury therefore could not compare the works to determine substantial similarity. And, absent evidence of the copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing works, the record is insufficient to allow appellate review of the jury's verdict. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "919 F.2d 1353, 1355",
"parenthetical": "\"We have frequently affirmed summary judgment in favor of copyright defendants on the issue of substantial similarity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988) (granting JMOL to copyright defendant because no reasonable jury could have found substantial,similarity); cf. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990) (“We have frequently affirmed summary judgment in favor of copyright defendants on the issue of substantial similarity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "855 F.2d 1446, 1448, 1451",
"parenthetical": "granting JMOL to copyright defendant because no reasonable jury could have found substantial,similarity",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988) (granting JMOL to copyright defendant because no reasonable jury could have found substantial,similarity); cf. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990) (“We have frequently affirmed summary judgment in favor of copyright defendants on the issue of substantial similarity.”)."
} | 12,175,944 | b |
.Few courts have considered the issue of whether personal notes of officials are public records, but the majority have adopted a similar position. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report",
"sentence": "But cf. Tingling v. Lang, 39 Misc.2d 338, 240 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1963) (allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding . Governor's daily appointment schedule with notes were not subject to state FOIA",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Courier-Journal v. Jones, 895 S.W.2d 6 (Ky.App.1995) (holding . Governor's daily appointment schedule with notes were not subject to state FOIA); In State, ex rel. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, v. Gosser, 20 Ohio St.3d 30, 485 N.E.2d 706, 710 (1985) (finding judge's personal notes regarding trial and sentencing hearing were not public records); American Fedn. of Govt. Emp., Local 2782 v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 632 F.Supp. 1272 (D.D.C.1986), aff'd 907 F.2d 203 (D.C.Cir.1990) (holding employees' personal notes not intended for distribution through usual agency channels are beyond the scope of the federal FOIA)."
} | 11,412,416 | b |
.Few courts have considered the issue of whether personal notes of officials are public records, but the majority have adopted a similar position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding . Governor's daily appointment schedule with notes were not subject to state FOIA",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Courier-Journal v. Jones, 895 S.W.2d 6 (Ky.App.1995) (holding . Governor's daily appointment schedule with notes were not subject to state FOIA); In State, ex rel. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, v. Gosser, 20 Ohio St.3d 30, 485 N.E.2d 706, 710 (1985) (finding judge's personal notes regarding trial and sentencing hearing were not public records); American Fedn. of Govt. Emp., Local 2782 v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 632 F.Supp. 1272 (D.D.C.1986), aff'd 907 F.2d 203 (D.C.Cir.1990) (holding employees' personal notes not intended for distribution through usual agency channels are beyond the scope of the federal FOIA)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report",
"sentence": "But cf. Tingling v. Lang, 39 Misc.2d 338, 240 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1963) (allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report)."
} | 11,412,416 | a |
.Few courts have considered the issue of whether personal notes of officials are public records, but the majority have adopted a similar position. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report",
"sentence": "But cf. Tingling v. Lang, 39 Misc.2d 338, 240 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1963) (allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding judge's personal notes regarding trial and sentencing hearing were not public records",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Courier-Journal v. Jones, 895 S.W.2d 6 (Ky.App.1995) (holding . Governor's daily appointment schedule with notes were not subject to state FOIA); In State, ex rel. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, v. Gosser, 20 Ohio St.3d 30, 485 N.E.2d 706, 710 (1985) (finding judge's personal notes regarding trial and sentencing hearing were not public records); American Fedn. of Govt. Emp., Local 2782 v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 632 F.Supp. 1272 (D.D.C.1986), aff'd 907 F.2d 203 (D.C.Cir.1990) (holding employees' personal notes not intended for distribution through usual agency channels are beyond the scope of the federal FOIA)."
} | 11,412,416 | b |
.Few courts have considered the issue of whether personal notes of officials are public records, but the majority have adopted a similar position. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report",
"sentence": "But cf. Tingling v. Lang, 39 Misc.2d 338, 240 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1963) (allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding judge's personal notes regarding trial and sentencing hearing were not public records",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Courier-Journal v. Jones, 895 S.W.2d 6 (Ky.App.1995) (holding . Governor's daily appointment schedule with notes were not subject to state FOIA); In State, ex rel. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, v. Gosser, 20 Ohio St.3d 30, 485 N.E.2d 706, 710 (1985) (finding judge's personal notes regarding trial and sentencing hearing were not public records); American Fedn. of Govt. Emp., Local 2782 v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 632 F.Supp. 1272 (D.D.C.1986), aff'd 907 F.2d 203 (D.C.Cir.1990) (holding employees' personal notes not intended for distribution through usual agency channels are beyond the scope of the federal FOIA)."
} | 11,412,416 | b |
.Few courts have considered the issue of whether personal notes of officials are public records, but the majority have adopted a similar position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "485 N.E.2d 706, 710",
"parenthetical": "finding judge's personal notes regarding trial and sentencing hearing were not public records",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Courier-Journal v. Jones, 895 S.W.2d 6 (Ky.App.1995) (holding . Governor's daily appointment schedule with notes were not subject to state FOIA); In State, ex rel. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, v. Gosser, 20 Ohio St.3d 30, 485 N.E.2d 706, 710 (1985) (finding judge's personal notes regarding trial and sentencing hearing were not public records); American Fedn. of Govt. Emp., Local 2782 v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 632 F.Supp. 1272 (D.D.C.1986), aff'd 907 F.2d 203 (D.C.Cir.1990) (holding employees' personal notes not intended for distribution through usual agency channels are beyond the scope of the federal FOIA)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report",
"sentence": "But cf. Tingling v. Lang, 39 Misc.2d 338, 240 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1963) (allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report)."
} | 11,412,416 | a |
.Few courts have considered the issue of whether personal notes of officials are public records, but the majority have adopted a similar position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "485 N.E.2d 706, 710",
"parenthetical": "finding judge's personal notes regarding trial and sentencing hearing were not public records",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Courier-Journal v. Jones, 895 S.W.2d 6 (Ky.App.1995) (holding . Governor's daily appointment schedule with notes were not subject to state FOIA); In State, ex rel. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, v. Gosser, 20 Ohio St.3d 30, 485 N.E.2d 706, 710 (1985) (finding judge's personal notes regarding trial and sentencing hearing were not public records); American Fedn. of Govt. Emp., Local 2782 v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 632 F.Supp. 1272 (D.D.C.1986), aff'd 907 F.2d 203 (D.C.Cir.1990) (holding employees' personal notes not intended for distribution through usual agency channels are beyond the scope of the federal FOIA)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report",
"sentence": "But cf. Tingling v. Lang, 39 Misc.2d 338, 240 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1963) (allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report)."
} | 11,412,416 | a |
.Few courts have considered the issue of whether personal notes of officials are public records, but the majority have adopted a similar position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding employees' personal notes not intended for distribution through usual agency channels are beyond the scope of the federal FOIA",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Courier-Journal v. Jones, 895 S.W.2d 6 (Ky.App.1995) (holding . Governor's daily appointment schedule with notes were not subject to state FOIA); In State, ex rel. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, v. Gosser, 20 Ohio St.3d 30, 485 N.E.2d 706, 710 (1985) (finding judge's personal notes regarding trial and sentencing hearing were not public records); American Fedn. of Govt. Emp., Local 2782 v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 632 F.Supp. 1272 (D.D.C.1986), aff'd 907 F.2d 203 (D.C.Cir.1990) (holding employees' personal notes not intended for distribution through usual agency channels are beyond the scope of the federal FOIA)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report",
"sentence": "But cf. Tingling v. Lang, 39 Misc.2d 338, 240 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1963) (allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report)."
} | 11,412,416 | a |
.Few courts have considered the issue of whether personal notes of officials are public records, but the majority have adopted a similar position. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report",
"sentence": "But cf. Tingling v. Lang, 39 Misc.2d 338, 240 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1963) (allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding employees' personal notes not intended for distribution through usual agency channels are beyond the scope of the federal FOIA",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Courier-Journal v. Jones, 895 S.W.2d 6 (Ky.App.1995) (holding . Governor's daily appointment schedule with notes were not subject to state FOIA); In State, ex rel. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, v. Gosser, 20 Ohio St.3d 30, 485 N.E.2d 706, 710 (1985) (finding judge's personal notes regarding trial and sentencing hearing were not public records); American Fedn. of Govt. Emp., Local 2782 v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 632 F.Supp. 1272 (D.D.C.1986), aff'd 907 F.2d 203 (D.C.Cir.1990) (holding employees' personal notes not intended for distribution through usual agency channels are beyond the scope of the federal FOIA)."
} | 11,412,416 | b |
.Few courts have considered the issue of whether personal notes of officials are public records, but the majority have adopted a similar position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding employees' personal notes not intended for distribution through usual agency channels are beyond the scope of the federal FOIA",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Courier-Journal v. Jones, 895 S.W.2d 6 (Ky.App.1995) (holding . Governor's daily appointment schedule with notes were not subject to state FOIA); In State, ex rel. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, v. Gosser, 20 Ohio St.3d 30, 485 N.E.2d 706, 710 (1985) (finding judge's personal notes regarding trial and sentencing hearing were not public records); American Fedn. of Govt. Emp., Local 2782 v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 632 F.Supp. 1272 (D.D.C.1986), aff'd 907 F.2d 203 (D.C.Cir.1990) (holding employees' personal notes not intended for distribution through usual agency channels are beyond the scope of the federal FOIA)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report",
"sentence": "But cf. Tingling v. Lang, 39 Misc.2d 338, 240 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1963) (allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report)."
} | 11,412,416 | a |
.Few courts have considered the issue of whether personal notes of officials are public records, but the majority have adopted a similar position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding employees' personal notes not intended for distribution through usual agency channels are beyond the scope of the federal FOIA",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Courier-Journal v. Jones, 895 S.W.2d 6 (Ky.App.1995) (holding . Governor's daily appointment schedule with notes were not subject to state FOIA); In State, ex rel. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, v. Gosser, 20 Ohio St.3d 30, 485 N.E.2d 706, 710 (1985) (finding judge's personal notes regarding trial and sentencing hearing were not public records); American Fedn. of Govt. Emp., Local 2782 v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 632 F.Supp. 1272 (D.D.C.1986), aff'd 907 F.2d 203 (D.C.Cir.1990) (holding employees' personal notes not intended for distribution through usual agency channels are beyond the scope of the federal FOIA)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report",
"sentence": "But cf. Tingling v. Lang, 39 Misc.2d 338, 240 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1963) (allowing inspection of written notes and computations made in course of audit proceedings under state FOIA where court found notes formed a part of the file and inquiry and could have been used for guidance in final audit report)."
} | 11,412,416 | a |
In my view, appellant was deprived of a liberty interest. When a claimant asserts that government action has wrongly deprived him of a liberty interest and the claim is fact intensive, a hearing to develop the factual basis of the claim is a necessary part of the review guaranteed by due process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "376 S.C. 165, 171",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that due process requires a trial-type hearing for fact-specific, adjudicatory decisions by administrative agencies",
"sentence": "Id. at 557-58, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (“This analysis as to liberty parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property. The Court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests.”); see also Kurschner v. City of Camden Planning Comm’n, 376 S.C. 165, 171, 656 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008) (recognizing that due process requires a trial-type hearing for fact-specific, adjudicatory decisions by administrative agencies)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"This analysis as to liberty parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property. The Court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 557-58, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (“This analysis as to liberty parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property. The Court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests.”); see also Kurschner v. City of Camden Planning Comm’n, 376 S.C. 165, 171, 656 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008) (recognizing that due process requires a trial-type hearing for fact-specific, adjudicatory decisions by administrative agencies)."
} | 3,882,796 | b |
In my view, appellant was deprived of a liberty interest. When a claimant asserts that government action has wrongly deprived him of a liberty interest and the claim is fact intensive, a hearing to develop the factual basis of the claim is a necessary part of the review guaranteed by due process. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"This analysis as to liberty parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property. The Court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 557-58, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (“This analysis as to liberty parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property. The Court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests.”); see also Kurschner v. City of Camden Planning Comm’n, 376 S.C. 165, 171, 656 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008) (recognizing that due process requires a trial-type hearing for fact-specific, adjudicatory decisions by administrative agencies)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "656 S.E.2d 346, 350",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that due process requires a trial-type hearing for fact-specific, adjudicatory decisions by administrative agencies",
"sentence": "Id. at 557-58, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (“This analysis as to liberty parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property. The Court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests.”); see also Kurschner v. City of Camden Planning Comm’n, 376 S.C. 165, 171, 656 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008) (recognizing that due process requires a trial-type hearing for fact-specific, adjudicatory decisions by administrative agencies)."
} | 3,882,796 | a |
. Apparently, in Texas no one can have a vested right in a utility rate until the rate is administratively and judicially final. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "615 S.W.2d 957, 957",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Commission, on remand, can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original Commission activity",
"sentence": "Southwestern Bell v. PUC, 615 S.W.2d at 957 (holding that the Commission, on remand, can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original Commission activity); but see New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 116 R.I. 356, 358 A.2d 1, 22 (1976) (\"[E]stablished rates are presumed to be valid while they are in force and ... neither the commission nor the court has the power to alter such rules retroactively.\")"
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[E]stablished rates are presumed to be valid while they are in force and ... neither the commission nor the court has the power to alter such rules retroactively.\"",
"sentence": "Southwestern Bell v. PUC, 615 S.W.2d at 957 (holding that the Commission, on remand, can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original Commission activity); but see New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 116 R.I. 356, 358 A.2d 1, 22 (1976) (\"[E]stablished rates are presumed to be valid while they are in force and ... neither the commission nor the court has the power to alter such rules retroactively.\")"
} | 9,990,649 | a |
. Apparently, in Texas no one can have a vested right in a utility rate until the rate is administratively and judicially final. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "358 A.2d 1, 22",
"parenthetical": "\"[E]stablished rates are presumed to be valid while they are in force and ... neither the commission nor the court has the power to alter such rules retroactively.\"",
"sentence": "Southwestern Bell v. PUC, 615 S.W.2d at 957 (holding that the Commission, on remand, can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original Commission activity); but see New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 116 R.I. 356, 358 A.2d 1, 22 (1976) (\"[E]stablished rates are presumed to be valid while they are in force and ... neither the commission nor the court has the power to alter such rules retroactively.\")"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "615 S.W.2d 957, 957",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Commission, on remand, can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original Commission activity",
"sentence": "Southwestern Bell v. PUC, 615 S.W.2d at 957 (holding that the Commission, on remand, can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original Commission activity); but see New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 116 R.I. 356, 358 A.2d 1, 22 (1976) (\"[E]stablished rates are presumed to be valid while they are in force and ... neither the commission nor the court has the power to alter such rules retroactively.\")"
} | 9,990,649 | b |
The court held that the plaintiffs amended complaint, filed after her appointment as administratrix, would relate back to the original filing date. See E.R. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "93 F.3d 781, 790",
"parenthetical": "permitting relation back of statutory claim which initially lacked sufficient allegation of unreimbursed expenses",
"sentence": "Hakusan II, 954 F.2d 874, 886-87 (3d Cir.1992) (allowing omission of a non-diverse defendant and allowing relation back to original filing); see also Black v. Sec’y of Health and Human Sens., 93 F.3d 781, 790 (Fed.Cir.1996) (permitting relation back of statutory claim which initially lacked sufficient allegation of unreimbursed expenses)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "241 F.3d 154, 163",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"where a change in parties, necessary to the existence of jurisdiction, is appropriate and is made (even on or after appeal",
"sentence": "Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Lloyd’s & Cos., 241 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir.2001) (noting that “where a change in parties, necessary to the existence of jurisdiction, is appropriate and is made (even on or after appeal), appellate courts have acted as if the trial court had jurisdiction from the beginning of the litigation”); Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. The M.V."
} | 4,156,567 | b |
The court held that the plaintiffs amended complaint, filed after her appointment as administratrix, would relate back to the original filing date. See E.R. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "93 F.3d 781, 790",
"parenthetical": "permitting relation back of statutory claim which initially lacked sufficient allegation of unreimbursed expenses",
"sentence": "Hakusan II, 954 F.2d 874, 886-87 (3d Cir.1992) (allowing omission of a non-diverse defendant and allowing relation back to original filing); see also Black v. Sec’y of Health and Human Sens., 93 F.3d 781, 790 (Fed.Cir.1996) (permitting relation back of statutory claim which initially lacked sufficient allegation of unreimbursed expenses)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "954 F.2d 874, 886-87",
"parenthetical": "allowing omission of a non-diverse defendant and allowing relation back to original filing",
"sentence": "Hakusan II, 954 F.2d 874, 886-87 (3d Cir.1992) (allowing omission of a non-diverse defendant and allowing relation back to original filing); see also Black v. Sec’y of Health and Human Sens., 93 F.3d 781, 790 (Fed.Cir.1996) (permitting relation back of statutory claim which initially lacked sufficient allegation of unreimbursed expenses)."
} | 4,156,567 | b |
Although the [Fourteenth] Amendment does not generally require police officers to provide medical assistance to private citizens, DeShaney v. [Winnebago County Dept. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "489 U.S. 189, 197",
"parenthetical": "holding that the due process clause does not generally confer affirmative rights to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life",
"sentence": "Soc. Svcs., 489 U.S. 189, 197, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) ] (holding that the due process clause does not generally confer affirmative rights to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life), when a state officer’s conduct places a person in peril in deliberate indifference to their safety, that conduct creates a constitutional claim."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a valid section 1983 claim existed against a state police officer who caused a woman to be stranded in a high-crime area at night where she was subsequently raped",
"sentence": "See L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir.1992) [¶]... ] (concluding a valid section 1983 claim existed against a supervisor at a state facility who placed plaintiff in danger by assigning her to work with an inmate sex offender who had a history of violent assaults on women; he subsequently raped and kidnaped her); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.1989) [¶]... ] (concluding that a valid section 1983 claim existed against a state police officer who caused a woman to be stranded in a high-crime area at night where she was subsequently raped)."
} | 3,553,497 | a |
Although the [Fourteenth] Amendment does not generally require police officers to provide medical assistance to private citizens, DeShaney v. [Winnebago County Dept. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a valid section 1983 claim existed against a state police officer who caused a woman to be stranded in a high-crime area at night where she was subsequently raped",
"sentence": "See L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir.1992) [¶]... ] (concluding a valid section 1983 claim existed against a supervisor at a state facility who placed plaintiff in danger by assigning her to work with an inmate sex offender who had a history of violent assaults on women; he subsequently raped and kidnaped her); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.1989) [¶]... ] (concluding that a valid section 1983 claim existed against a state police officer who caused a woman to be stranded in a high-crime area at night where she was subsequently raped)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the due process clause does not generally confer affirmative rights to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life",
"sentence": "Soc. Svcs., 489 U.S. 189, 197, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) ] (holding that the due process clause does not generally confer affirmative rights to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life), when a state officer’s conduct places a person in peril in deliberate indifference to their safety, that conduct creates a constitutional claim."
} | 3,553,497 | b |
Although the [Fourteenth] Amendment does not generally require police officers to provide medical assistance to private citizens, DeShaney v. [Winnebago County Dept. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the due process clause does not generally confer affirmative rights to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life",
"sentence": "Soc. Svcs., 489 U.S. 189, 197, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) ] (holding that the due process clause does not generally confer affirmative rights to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life), when a state officer’s conduct places a person in peril in deliberate indifference to their safety, that conduct creates a constitutional claim."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a valid section 1983 claim existed against a state police officer who caused a woman to be stranded in a high-crime area at night where she was subsequently raped",
"sentence": "See L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir.1992) [¶]... ] (concluding a valid section 1983 claim existed against a supervisor at a state facility who placed plaintiff in danger by assigning her to work with an inmate sex offender who had a history of violent assaults on women; he subsequently raped and kidnaped her); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.1989) [¶]... ] (concluding that a valid section 1983 claim existed against a state police officer who caused a woman to be stranded in a high-crime area at night where she was subsequently raped)."
} | 3,553,497 | a |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "865 F.2d 1352, 1359",
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "488 F.2d 761, 766-67",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | b |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "488 F.2d 761, 766-67",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | b |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "488 F.2d 761, 766-67",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | a |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "488 F.2d 761, 766-67",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | b |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "865 F.2d 1352, 1359",
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | b |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | a |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | b |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | b |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "865 F.2d 1352, 1359",
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | a |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | a |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | a |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | b |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "865 F.2d 1352, 1359",
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | b |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | a |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | a |
The defendant's argument is unpersuasive. The federal government is not inappropriately intervening in New York's affairs by prosecuting the defendant under the mail fraud statute -- the government is acting pursuant to the federal interest in protecting the United States Mails from misuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes \"any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means-- the mails--are 'employed.'\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because \"the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that mail fraud prosecution improperly intervened in state affairs, because “the focus of the statute is upon misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); see also United States v. Porcelli 865 F.2d 1352, 1359 (2d Cir.1989) (noting in dicta that the broad federal mail .statute punishes “any scheme or artifice to defraud in which the jurisdictional means— the mails—are ‘employed.’”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). In view of the federal interest in protecting the mails from misuse, it does not violate any principles of federalism to prosecute the defendant under the mail fraud statute even if the underlying conduct is not criminalized by the State of New York."
} | 47,246 | b |
A finding of sanity does not preclude consideration of the statutory mitigating factors concerning a defendant's mental condition. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "639 So.2d 6, 13",
"parenthetical": "finding error in trial court's rejection of mental mitigators on the basis that the defendant was sane",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 639 So.2d 6, 13 (Fla.1994) (finding error in trial court’s rejection of mental mitigators on the basis that the defendant was sane); Knowles v. State, 632 So.2d 62, 67 (Fla.1993) (remanding for resen-tencing where trial court failed to find statutory mental mitigation because the defendant was sane even though evidence indicated that defendant suffered from organic brain damage and that he was in an acute psychotic state at the time of the murder); Huckaby v. State, 343 So.2d 29, 33-34 (Fla.1977) (vacating death sentence where trial court completely ignored evidence of mental mitigation partially on the basis that the defendant understood the difference between right and wrong); cf. Smith v. State, 407 So.2d 894, 902 (Fla,1981) (declining to follow Huckáby where the trial court considered mental mitigation, but found that the testimony did not compel application of mental mitigators)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "407 So.2d 894, 902",
"parenthetical": "declining to follow Huckaby where the trial court considered mental mitigation, but found that the testimony did not compel application of mental mitigators",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 639 So.2d 6, 13 (Fla.1994) (finding error in trial court’s rejection of mental mitigators on the basis that the defendant was sane); Knowles v. State, 632 So.2d 62, 67 (Fla.1993) (remanding for resen-tencing where trial court failed to find statutory mental mitigation because the defendant was sane even though evidence indicated that defendant suffered from organic brain damage and that he was in an acute psychotic state at the time of the murder); Huckaby v. State, 343 So.2d 29, 33-34 (Fla.1977) (vacating death sentence where trial court completely ignored evidence of mental mitigation partially on the basis that the defendant understood the difference between right and wrong); cf. Smith v. State, 407 So.2d 894, 902 (Fla,1981) (declining to follow Huckáby where the trial court considered mental mitigation, but found that the testimony did not compel application of mental mitigators)."
} | 9,202,890 | a |
A finding of sanity does not preclude consideration of the statutory mitigating factors concerning a defendant's mental condition. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "407 So.2d 894, 902",
"parenthetical": "declining to follow Huckaby where the trial court considered mental mitigation, but found that the testimony did not compel application of mental mitigators",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 639 So.2d 6, 13 (Fla.1994) (finding error in trial court’s rejection of mental mitigators on the basis that the defendant was sane); Knowles v. State, 632 So.2d 62, 67 (Fla.1993) (remanding for resen-tencing where trial court failed to find statutory mental mitigation because the defendant was sane even though evidence indicated that defendant suffered from organic brain damage and that he was in an acute psychotic state at the time of the murder); Huckaby v. State, 343 So.2d 29, 33-34 (Fla.1977) (vacating death sentence where trial court completely ignored evidence of mental mitigation partially on the basis that the defendant understood the difference between right and wrong); cf. Smith v. State, 407 So.2d 894, 902 (Fla,1981) (declining to follow Huckáby where the trial court considered mental mitigation, but found that the testimony did not compel application of mental mitigators)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "632 So.2d 62, 67",
"parenthetical": "remanding for resen-tencing where trial court failed to find statutory mental mitigation because the defendant was sane even though evidence indicated that defendant suffered from organic brain damage and that he was in an acute psychotic state at the time of the murder",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 639 So.2d 6, 13 (Fla.1994) (finding error in trial court’s rejection of mental mitigators on the basis that the defendant was sane); Knowles v. State, 632 So.2d 62, 67 (Fla.1993) (remanding for resen-tencing where trial court failed to find statutory mental mitigation because the defendant was sane even though evidence indicated that defendant suffered from organic brain damage and that he was in an acute psychotic state at the time of the murder); Huckaby v. State, 343 So.2d 29, 33-34 (Fla.1977) (vacating death sentence where trial court completely ignored evidence of mental mitigation partially on the basis that the defendant understood the difference between right and wrong); cf. Smith v. State, 407 So.2d 894, 902 (Fla,1981) (declining to follow Huckáby where the trial court considered mental mitigation, but found that the testimony did not compel application of mental mitigators)."
} | 9,202,890 | b |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.