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Courts have uniformly held voluntary murder to be a "crime involving moral turpitude." Courts have also consistently held that voluntary manslaughter is a crime involving moral turpitude. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in attorney discipline case, court read its precedent as holding that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987",
"sentence": "Op., No. CV91-0320379, 1993 WL 407983, *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept. 30, 1993) (murder and voluntary manslaughter are crimes involving moral turpitude, citing Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 507, 111 A. 861, (1920)); People v. Gutierrez, 14 Cal.App.4th 1425, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376 (1993) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching witness); People v. Ballard, 13 Cal.App.4th 687, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 628 (1993) (parties conceded conviction for voluntary manslaughter was conviction of crime involving moral turpitude); People v. Von Villas, 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 143 (1992) (same conclusion, but such conviction may not be useable for impeachment of witness for other reasons), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993); People v. Foster, 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 246 Cal.Rptr. 855, 857 (1988) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of witness impeachment); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 404, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987) (circumstances surrounding attorney’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon exhibited moral turpitude as a matter of law in attorney discipline case); People v. Partner, 180 Cal.App.3d 178, 225 Cal.Rptr. 502, 506 (1986) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeachment of witness); People v. Parrish, 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709 (1985) (same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant’s arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter); but see Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 379 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1989) (voluntary manslaughter under South Carolina law, and therefore like offense with same elements under New York law, are not crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching a witness); In re Mostman, 47 Cal.3d 725, 254 Cal.Rptr. 286, 292-93, 765 P.2d 448, 454 (1989) (in attorney discipline case, court read its precedent as holding that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987), and In re Nevill, 39 Cal.3d 729, 217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332 (1985)); People v. Thomas, 206 Cal.App.3d 689, 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19 (1988) (in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether “imperfect self-defense” should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn.1976) (concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not “infamous crime” under Tennessee statute ■ allowing use of “infamous crimes,” to be used to impeach credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709",
"parenthetical": "same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant's arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter",
"sentence": "Op., No. CV91-0320379, 1993 WL 407983, *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept. 30, 1993) (murder and voluntary manslaughter are crimes involving moral turpitude, citing Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 507, 111 A. 861, (1920)); People v. Gutierrez, 14 Cal.App.4th 1425, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376 (1993) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching witness); People v. Ballard, 13 Cal.App.4th 687, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 628 (1993) (parties conceded conviction for voluntary manslaughter was conviction of crime involving moral turpitude); People v. Von Villas, 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 143 (1992) (same conclusion, but such conviction may not be useable for impeachment of witness for other reasons), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993); People v. Foster, 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 246 Cal.Rptr. 855, 857 (1988) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of witness impeachment); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 404, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987) (circumstances surrounding attorney’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon exhibited moral turpitude as a matter of law in attorney discipline case); People v. Partner, 180 Cal.App.3d 178, 225 Cal.Rptr. 502, 506 (1986) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeachment of witness); People v. Parrish, 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709 (1985) (same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant’s arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter); but see Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 379 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1989) (voluntary manslaughter under South Carolina law, and therefore like offense with same elements under New York law, are not crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching a witness); In re Mostman, 47 Cal.3d 725, 254 Cal.Rptr. 286, 292-93, 765 P.2d 448, 454 (1989) (in attorney discipline case, court read its precedent as holding that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987), and In re Nevill, 39 Cal.3d 729, 217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332 (1985)); People v. Thomas, 206 Cal.App.3d 689, 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19 (1988) (in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether “imperfect self-defense” should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn.1976) (concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not “infamous crime” under Tennessee statute ■ allowing use of “infamous crimes,” to be used to impeach credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event)."
} | 7,413,984 | b |
Courts have uniformly held voluntary murder to be a "crime involving moral turpitude." Courts have also consistently held that voluntary manslaughter is a crime involving moral turpitude. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709",
"parenthetical": "same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant's arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter",
"sentence": "Op., No. CV91-0320379, 1993 WL 407983, *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept. 30, 1993) (murder and voluntary manslaughter are crimes involving moral turpitude, citing Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 507, 111 A. 861, (1920)); People v. Gutierrez, 14 Cal.App.4th 1425, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376 (1993) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching witness); People v. Ballard, 13 Cal.App.4th 687, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 628 (1993) (parties conceded conviction for voluntary manslaughter was conviction of crime involving moral turpitude); People v. Von Villas, 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 143 (1992) (same conclusion, but such conviction may not be useable for impeachment of witness for other reasons), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993); People v. Foster, 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 246 Cal.Rptr. 855, 857 (1988) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of witness impeachment); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 404, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987) (circumstances surrounding attorney’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon exhibited moral turpitude as a matter of law in attorney discipline case); People v. Partner, 180 Cal.App.3d 178, 225 Cal.Rptr. 502, 506 (1986) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeachment of witness); People v. Parrish, 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709 (1985) (same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant’s arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter); but see Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 379 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1989) (voluntary manslaughter under South Carolina law, and therefore like offense with same elements under New York law, are not crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching a witness); In re Mostman, 47 Cal.3d 725, 254 Cal.Rptr. 286, 292-93, 765 P.2d 448, 454 (1989) (in attorney discipline case, court read its precedent as holding that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987), and In re Nevill, 39 Cal.3d 729, 217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332 (1985)); People v. Thomas, 206 Cal.App.3d 689, 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19 (1988) (in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether “imperfect self-defense” should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn.1976) (concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not “infamous crime” under Tennessee statute ■ allowing use of “infamous crimes,” to be used to impeach credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in attorney discipline case, court read its precedent as holding that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987",
"sentence": "Op., No. CV91-0320379, 1993 WL 407983, *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept. 30, 1993) (murder and voluntary manslaughter are crimes involving moral turpitude, citing Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 507, 111 A. 861, (1920)); People v. Gutierrez, 14 Cal.App.4th 1425, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376 (1993) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching witness); People v. Ballard, 13 Cal.App.4th 687, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 628 (1993) (parties conceded conviction for voluntary manslaughter was conviction of crime involving moral turpitude); People v. Von Villas, 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 143 (1992) (same conclusion, but such conviction may not be useable for impeachment of witness for other reasons), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993); People v. Foster, 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 246 Cal.Rptr. 855, 857 (1988) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of witness impeachment); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 404, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987) (circumstances surrounding attorney’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon exhibited moral turpitude as a matter of law in attorney discipline case); People v. Partner, 180 Cal.App.3d 178, 225 Cal.Rptr. 502, 506 (1986) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeachment of witness); People v. Parrish, 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709 (1985) (same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant’s arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter); but see Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 379 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1989) (voluntary manslaughter under South Carolina law, and therefore like offense with same elements under New York law, are not crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching a witness); In re Mostman, 47 Cal.3d 725, 254 Cal.Rptr. 286, 292-93, 765 P.2d 448, 454 (1989) (in attorney discipline case, court read its precedent as holding that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987), and In re Nevill, 39 Cal.3d 729, 217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332 (1985)); People v. Thomas, 206 Cal.App.3d 689, 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19 (1988) (in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether “imperfect self-defense” should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn.1976) (concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not “infamous crime” under Tennessee statute ■ allowing use of “infamous crimes,” to be used to impeach credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event)."
} | 7,413,984 | a |
Courts have uniformly held voluntary murder to be a "crime involving moral turpitude." Courts have also consistently held that voluntary manslaughter is a crime involving moral turpitude. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether \"imperfect self-defense\" should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude",
"sentence": "Op., No. CV91-0320379, 1993 WL 407983, *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept. 30, 1993) (murder and voluntary manslaughter are crimes involving moral turpitude, citing Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 507, 111 A. 861, (1920)); People v. Gutierrez, 14 Cal.App.4th 1425, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376 (1993) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching witness); People v. Ballard, 13 Cal.App.4th 687, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 628 (1993) (parties conceded conviction for voluntary manslaughter was conviction of crime involving moral turpitude); People v. Von Villas, 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 143 (1992) (same conclusion, but such conviction may not be useable for impeachment of witness for other reasons), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993); People v. Foster, 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 246 Cal.Rptr. 855, 857 (1988) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of witness impeachment); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 404, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987) (circumstances surrounding attorney’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon exhibited moral turpitude as a matter of law in attorney discipline case); People v. Partner, 180 Cal.App.3d 178, 225 Cal.Rptr. 502, 506 (1986) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeachment of witness); People v. Parrish, 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709 (1985) (same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant’s arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter); but see Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 379 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1989) (voluntary manslaughter under South Carolina law, and therefore like offense with same elements under New York law, are not crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching a witness); In re Mostman, 47 Cal.3d 725, 254 Cal.Rptr. 286, 292-93, 765 P.2d 448, 454 (1989) (in attorney discipline case, court read its precedent as holding that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987), and In re Nevill, 39 Cal.3d 729, 217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332 (1985)); People v. Thomas, 206 Cal.App.3d 689, 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19 (1988) (in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether “imperfect self-defense” should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn.1976) (concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not “infamous crime” under Tennessee statute ■ allowing use of “infamous crimes,” to be used to impeach credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709",
"parenthetical": "same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant's arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter",
"sentence": "Op., No. CV91-0320379, 1993 WL 407983, *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept. 30, 1993) (murder and voluntary manslaughter are crimes involving moral turpitude, citing Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 507, 111 A. 861, (1920)); People v. Gutierrez, 14 Cal.App.4th 1425, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376 (1993) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching witness); People v. Ballard, 13 Cal.App.4th 687, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 628 (1993) (parties conceded conviction for voluntary manslaughter was conviction of crime involving moral turpitude); People v. Von Villas, 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 143 (1992) (same conclusion, but such conviction may not be useable for impeachment of witness for other reasons), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993); People v. Foster, 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 246 Cal.Rptr. 855, 857 (1988) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of witness impeachment); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 404, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987) (circumstances surrounding attorney’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon exhibited moral turpitude as a matter of law in attorney discipline case); People v. Partner, 180 Cal.App.3d 178, 225 Cal.Rptr. 502, 506 (1986) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeachment of witness); People v. Parrish, 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709 (1985) (same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant’s arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter); but see Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 379 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1989) (voluntary manslaughter under South Carolina law, and therefore like offense with same elements under New York law, are not crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching a witness); In re Mostman, 47 Cal.3d 725, 254 Cal.Rptr. 286, 292-93, 765 P.2d 448, 454 (1989) (in attorney discipline case, court read its precedent as holding that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987), and In re Nevill, 39 Cal.3d 729, 217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332 (1985)); People v. Thomas, 206 Cal.App.3d 689, 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19 (1988) (in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether “imperfect self-defense” should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn.1976) (concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not “infamous crime” under Tennessee statute ■ allowing use of “infamous crimes,” to be used to impeach credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event)."
} | 7,413,984 | b |
Courts have uniformly held voluntary murder to be a "crime involving moral turpitude." Courts have also consistently held that voluntary manslaughter is a crime involving moral turpitude. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709",
"parenthetical": "same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant's arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter",
"sentence": "Op., No. CV91-0320379, 1993 WL 407983, *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept. 30, 1993) (murder and voluntary manslaughter are crimes involving moral turpitude, citing Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 507, 111 A. 861, (1920)); People v. Gutierrez, 14 Cal.App.4th 1425, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376 (1993) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching witness); People v. Ballard, 13 Cal.App.4th 687, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 628 (1993) (parties conceded conviction for voluntary manslaughter was conviction of crime involving moral turpitude); People v. Von Villas, 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 143 (1992) (same conclusion, but such conviction may not be useable for impeachment of witness for other reasons), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993); People v. Foster, 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 246 Cal.Rptr. 855, 857 (1988) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of witness impeachment); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 404, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987) (circumstances surrounding attorney’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon exhibited moral turpitude as a matter of law in attorney discipline case); People v. Partner, 180 Cal.App.3d 178, 225 Cal.Rptr. 502, 506 (1986) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeachment of witness); People v. Parrish, 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709 (1985) (same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant’s arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter); but see Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 379 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1989) (voluntary manslaughter under South Carolina law, and therefore like offense with same elements under New York law, are not crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching a witness); In re Mostman, 47 Cal.3d 725, 254 Cal.Rptr. 286, 292-93, 765 P.2d 448, 454 (1989) (in attorney discipline case, court read its precedent as holding that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987), and In re Nevill, 39 Cal.3d 729, 217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332 (1985)); People v. Thomas, 206 Cal.App.3d 689, 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19 (1988) (in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether “imperfect self-defense” should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn.1976) (concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not “infamous crime” under Tennessee statute ■ allowing use of “infamous crimes,” to be used to impeach credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19",
"parenthetical": "in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether \"imperfect self-defense\" should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude",
"sentence": "Op., No. CV91-0320379, 1993 WL 407983, *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept. 30, 1993) (murder and voluntary manslaughter are crimes involving moral turpitude, citing Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 507, 111 A. 861, (1920)); People v. Gutierrez, 14 Cal.App.4th 1425, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376 (1993) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching witness); People v. Ballard, 13 Cal.App.4th 687, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 628 (1993) (parties conceded conviction for voluntary manslaughter was conviction of crime involving moral turpitude); People v. Von Villas, 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 143 (1992) (same conclusion, but such conviction may not be useable for impeachment of witness for other reasons), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993); People v. Foster, 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 246 Cal.Rptr. 855, 857 (1988) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of witness impeachment); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 404, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987) (circumstances surrounding attorney’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon exhibited moral turpitude as a matter of law in attorney discipline case); People v. Partner, 180 Cal.App.3d 178, 225 Cal.Rptr. 502, 506 (1986) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeachment of witness); People v. Parrish, 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709 (1985) (same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant’s arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter); but see Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 379 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1989) (voluntary manslaughter under South Carolina law, and therefore like offense with same elements under New York law, are not crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching a witness); In re Mostman, 47 Cal.3d 725, 254 Cal.Rptr. 286, 292-93, 765 P.2d 448, 454 (1989) (in attorney discipline case, court read its precedent as holding that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987), and In re Nevill, 39 Cal.3d 729, 217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332 (1985)); People v. Thomas, 206 Cal.App.3d 689, 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19 (1988) (in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether “imperfect self-defense” should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn.1976) (concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not “infamous crime” under Tennessee statute ■ allowing use of “infamous crimes,” to be used to impeach credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event)."
} | 7,413,984 | a |
Courts have uniformly held voluntary murder to be a "crime involving moral turpitude." Courts have also consistently held that voluntary manslaughter is a crime involving moral turpitude. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709",
"parenthetical": "same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant's arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter",
"sentence": "Op., No. CV91-0320379, 1993 WL 407983, *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept. 30, 1993) (murder and voluntary manslaughter are crimes involving moral turpitude, citing Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 507, 111 A. 861, (1920)); People v. Gutierrez, 14 Cal.App.4th 1425, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376 (1993) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching witness); People v. Ballard, 13 Cal.App.4th 687, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 628 (1993) (parties conceded conviction for voluntary manslaughter was conviction of crime involving moral turpitude); People v. Von Villas, 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 143 (1992) (same conclusion, but such conviction may not be useable for impeachment of witness for other reasons), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993); People v. Foster, 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 246 Cal.Rptr. 855, 857 (1988) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of witness impeachment); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 404, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987) (circumstances surrounding attorney’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon exhibited moral turpitude as a matter of law in attorney discipline case); People v. Partner, 180 Cal.App.3d 178, 225 Cal.Rptr. 502, 506 (1986) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeachment of witness); People v. Parrish, 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709 (1985) (same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant’s arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter); but see Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 379 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1989) (voluntary manslaughter under South Carolina law, and therefore like offense with same elements under New York law, are not crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching a witness); In re Mostman, 47 Cal.3d 725, 254 Cal.Rptr. 286, 292-93, 765 P.2d 448, 454 (1989) (in attorney discipline case, court read its precedent as holding that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987), and In re Nevill, 39 Cal.3d 729, 217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332 (1985)); People v. Thomas, 206 Cal.App.3d 689, 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19 (1988) (in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether “imperfect self-defense” should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn.1976) (concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not “infamous crime” under Tennessee statute ■ allowing use of “infamous crimes,” to be used to impeach credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "541 S.W.2d 385, 390",
"parenthetical": "concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not \"infamous crime\" under Tennessee statute # allowing use of \"infamous crimes,\" to be used to impeach credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event",
"sentence": "Op., No. CV91-0320379, 1993 WL 407983, *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept. 30, 1993) (murder and voluntary manslaughter are crimes involving moral turpitude, citing Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 507, 111 A. 861, (1920)); People v. Gutierrez, 14 Cal.App.4th 1425, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376 (1993) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching witness); People v. Ballard, 13 Cal.App.4th 687, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 628 (1993) (parties conceded conviction for voluntary manslaughter was conviction of crime involving moral turpitude); People v. Von Villas, 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 143 (1992) (same conclusion, but such conviction may not be useable for impeachment of witness for other reasons), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993); People v. Foster, 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 246 Cal.Rptr. 855, 857 (1988) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of witness impeachment); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 404, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987) (circumstances surrounding attorney’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon exhibited moral turpitude as a matter of law in attorney discipline case); People v. Partner, 180 Cal.App.3d 178, 225 Cal.Rptr. 502, 506 (1986) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeachment of witness); People v. Parrish, 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709 (1985) (same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant’s arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter); but see Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 379 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1989) (voluntary manslaughter under South Carolina law, and therefore like offense with same elements under New York law, are not crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching a witness); In re Mostman, 47 Cal.3d 725, 254 Cal.Rptr. 286, 292-93, 765 P.2d 448, 454 (1989) (in attorney discipline case, court read its precedent as holding that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987), and In re Nevill, 39 Cal.3d 729, 217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332 (1985)); People v. Thomas, 206 Cal.App.3d 689, 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19 (1988) (in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether “imperfect self-defense” should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn.1976) (concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not “infamous crime” under Tennessee statute ■ allowing use of “infamous crimes,” to be used to impeach credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event)."
} | 7,413,984 | a |
Accordingly, we hold that the procedure limned in 18 U.S.C. SS 3626(b) applies to any existing prospective relief, regardless of when that relief was first ordered. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "245 F.3d 718, 720",
"parenthetical": "holding that prospective relief made \"in the absence of the required findings\" is immediately terminable \"regardless of when ordered\"",
"sentence": "See Miller, 530 U.S. at 333, 120 S.Ct. 2246 (stating that section 3626(b) applies to “existing injunctions”); Harvey v. Schoen, 245 F.3d 718, 720 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that prospective relief made “in the absence of the required findings” is immediately terminable “regardless of when ordered”); see also Rouse, 129 F.3d at 654 (suggesting that the termination procedures set forth in section 3626(b) apply to all existing federal court orders)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "129 F.3d 654, 654",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that the termination procedures set forth in section 3626(b) apply to all existing federal court orders",
"sentence": "See Miller, 530 U.S. at 333, 120 S.Ct. 2246 (stating that section 3626(b) applies to “existing injunctions”); Harvey v. Schoen, 245 F.3d 718, 720 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that prospective relief made “in the absence of the required findings” is immediately terminable “regardless of when ordered”); see also Rouse, 129 F.3d at 654 (suggesting that the termination procedures set forth in section 3626(b) apply to all existing federal court orders)."
} | 9,211,938 | a |
Furthermore, contrary to He's argument that the agency failed properly to consider a hospital report that allegedly corroborates his testimony, both the IJ and the BIA expressly acknowledged the medical evidence in their decisions and did not err in finding that this single unauthenticated document did not eliminate the various defects in He's testimony and written submissions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "471 F.3d 315, 342",
"parenthetical": "finding that the weight afforded to the applicant's evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency",
"sentence": "See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir.2007) (“[A] single false document or a single instance of false testimony may (if attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence”); see also Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006) (finding that the weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "480 F.3d 160, 170",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] single false document or a single instance of false testimony may (if attributable to the petitioner",
"sentence": "See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir.2007) (“[A] single false document or a single instance of false testimony may (if attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence”); see also Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006) (finding that the weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency)."
} | 5,906,731 | b |
P 10 Moreover, we note that even if this claim of ineffectiveness were reviewable, we would find that Perrin has failed to establish arguable merit. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"in order to succeed on an unpreserved claim of racial discrimination in jury selection, we agree with those jurisdictions that have held that a post-conviction petitioner may not rely on a prima facie case under Batson, but must prove actual, purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, in addition to all other requirements essential to overcome the waiver of the underlying claim.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Uderra, 580 Pa. 492, 862 A.2d 74 (2004) (“in order to succeed on an unpreserved claim of racial discrimination in jury selection, we agree with those jurisdictions that have held that a post-conviction petitioner may not rely on a prima facie case under Batson, but must prove actual, purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, in addition to all other requirements essential to overcome the waiver of the underlying claim.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"To establish any merit to a Batson claim, Appellant must establish a prima facie case of improper use of peremptory challenges.\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Washington, 592 Pa. 698, 927 A.2d 586 (2007) (“To establish any merit to a Batson claim, Appellant must establish a prima facie case of improper use of peremptory challenges.”)."
} | 8,401,343 | b |
P 10 Moreover, we note that even if this claim of ineffectiveness were reviewable, we would find that Perrin has failed to establish arguable merit. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"in order to succeed on an unpreserved claim of racial discrimination in jury selection, we agree with those jurisdictions that have held that a post-conviction petitioner may not rely on a prima facie case under Batson, but must prove actual, purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, in addition to all other requirements essential to overcome the waiver of the underlying claim.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Uderra, 580 Pa. 492, 862 A.2d 74 (2004) (“in order to succeed on an unpreserved claim of racial discrimination in jury selection, we agree with those jurisdictions that have held that a post-conviction petitioner may not rely on a prima facie case under Batson, but must prove actual, purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, in addition to all other requirements essential to overcome the waiver of the underlying claim.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"To establish any merit to a Batson claim, Appellant must establish a prima facie case of improper use of peremptory challenges.\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Washington, 592 Pa. 698, 927 A.2d 586 (2007) (“To establish any merit to a Batson claim, Appellant must establish a prima facie case of improper use of peremptory challenges.”)."
} | 8,401,343 | b |
P 10 Moreover, we note that even if this claim of ineffectiveness were reviewable, we would find that Perrin has failed to establish arguable merit. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"in order to succeed on an unpreserved claim of racial discrimination in jury selection, we agree with those jurisdictions that have held that a post-conviction petitioner may not rely on a prima facie case under Batson, but must prove actual, purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, in addition to all other requirements essential to overcome the waiver of the underlying claim.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Uderra, 580 Pa. 492, 862 A.2d 74 (2004) (“in order to succeed on an unpreserved claim of racial discrimination in jury selection, we agree with those jurisdictions that have held that a post-conviction petitioner may not rely on a prima facie case under Batson, but must prove actual, purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, in addition to all other requirements essential to overcome the waiver of the underlying claim.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"To establish any merit to a Batson claim, Appellant must establish a prima facie case of improper use of peremptory challenges.\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Washington, 592 Pa. 698, 927 A.2d 586 (2007) (“To establish any merit to a Batson claim, Appellant must establish a prima facie case of improper use of peremptory challenges.”)."
} | 8,401,343 | b |
P 10 Moreover, we note that even if this claim of ineffectiveness were reviewable, we would find that Perrin has failed to establish arguable merit. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"in order to succeed on an unpreserved claim of racial discrimination in jury selection, we agree with those jurisdictions that have held that a post-conviction petitioner may not rely on a prima facie case under Batson, but must prove actual, purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, in addition to all other requirements essential to overcome the waiver of the underlying claim.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Uderra, 580 Pa. 492, 862 A.2d 74 (2004) (“in order to succeed on an unpreserved claim of racial discrimination in jury selection, we agree with those jurisdictions that have held that a post-conviction petitioner may not rely on a prima facie case under Batson, but must prove actual, purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, in addition to all other requirements essential to overcome the waiver of the underlying claim.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"To establish any merit to a Batson claim, Appellant must establish a prima facie case of improper use of peremptory challenges.\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Washington, 592 Pa. 698, 927 A.2d 586 (2007) (“To establish any merit to a Batson claim, Appellant must establish a prima facie case of improper use of peremptory challenges.”)."
} | 8,401,343 | b |
A subjective finding of bad faith is required in order to impose sanctions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "914 F.2d 540, 540-43",
"parenthetical": "reviewing objective evidence to determine subjective good faith of attorneys on appeal of sanctions awarded under both Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. SS 1927",
"sentence": "See, generally, Blue, 914 F.2d at 540-43 (reviewing objective evidence to determine subjective good faith of attorneys on appeal of sanctions awarded under both Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Like an award under the court's inherent power, section 1927 also requires a finding of counsel's bad faith as a precondition to the imposition of fees\"",
"sentence": "Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 411 n. 14 (4th Cir.1999); Brubaker, 943 F.2d at 1382 n. 25 (“Like an award under the court’s inherent power, section 1927 also requires a finding of counsel’s bad faith as a precondition to the imposition of fees”). However, such finding must be based on objective evidence as well as the attorney’s representations about his own intentions."
} | 9,403,027 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60",
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "464 F.2d 499, 509",
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60",
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60",
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60",
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60",
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "433 F.2d 48, 54-55",
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60",
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60",
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60",
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "464 F.2d 499, 509",
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "433 F.2d 48, 54-55",
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] SS 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,\" not evil intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51",
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "464 F.2d 499, 509",
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51",
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51",
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51",
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51",
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "433 F.2d 48, 54-55",
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51",
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51",
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51",
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "464 F.2d 499, 509",
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "433 F.2d 48, 54-55",
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court has construed the term to require less than specific intent to violate the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where defendant charged with \"wilfully or unlawfully\" committing \"certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] SS 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 847, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996) (“conclud[ing] that a wilful violation of [General Statutes] § 19a-583 requires only a knowing disclosure of confidential human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] related information,” not evil intent); State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 246, 250-51, 188 A.2d 65 (1963) (holding that where defendant charged with “wilfully or unlawfully” committing “certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child, contrary to [General Statutes] § 53-21 . . . [s]pecific intent is not an element of the crime defined”); see also United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S. Ct. 443, 34 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955, 91 S. Ct. 974, 28 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1971) (defendant may be convicted of wilfully violating securities regulation of which he is unaware); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Sup. 1221, 1234 (D. Conn. 1969) (finding of specific intent not required for criminal violation of federal securities law)."
} | 966,930 | b |
An allowed claim entitles the claimant to receive payments under a confirmed Chapter 13 plan but has no bearing on the validity of a mortgagee's lien. Indeed, a secured creditor who is not seeking a distribution "is not required to file a proof of claim and may choose to ignore the bankruptcy proceeding and look to its lien for satisfaction of the debt." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2012 WL 3839238, at *6",
"parenthetical": "\"[OJnly an unsecured creditor is required to file a proof of claim for the claim to be allowed.\"",
"sentence": "In re Dumain, 492 B.R. 140, 143 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2013) (quoting In re Hogan, 346 B.R. 715, 719 n. 7 (Bankr. N.D.Tex.2006)) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992) (liens “pass through bankruptcy unaffected”); In re Cromer, 185 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[T]he failure of a secured creditor to file a proof of claim ... leaves unaffected the lien of that secured creditor.”); see also Christo v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Christo), No. 12-30083, 2012 WL 3839238, at *6 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio Sept. 4, 2012) (“[OJnly an unsecured creditor is required to file a proof of claim for the claim to be allowed.”). “This lack of connection between avoiding a creditor’s lien and the filing of a proof of claim is part of the structure of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "185 B.R. 1, 3",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he failure of a secured creditor to file a proof of claim ... leaves unaffected the lien of that secured creditor.\"",
"sentence": "In re Dumain, 492 B.R. 140, 143 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2013) (quoting In re Hogan, 346 B.R. 715, 719 n. 7 (Bankr. N.D.Tex.2006)) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992) (liens “pass through bankruptcy unaffected”); In re Cromer, 185 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[T]he failure of a secured creditor to file a proof of claim ... leaves unaffected the lien of that secured creditor.”); see also Christo v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Christo), No. 12-30083, 2012 WL 3839238, at *6 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio Sept. 4, 2012) (“[OJnly an unsecured creditor is required to file a proof of claim for the claim to be allowed.”). “This lack of connection between avoiding a creditor’s lien and the filing of a proof of claim is part of the structure of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.”"
} | 5,913,239 | b |
As to the substantive due process claim, the presence of a valid Second Amendment claim would preclude the Court from engaging in a substantive due process analysis. Likewise, the Court would compress Hightower's equal protection claim into her Second Amendment claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "346 F.3d 11, 15",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"we see little basis or justification for applying equal protection analysis\" in a situation where an equal protection claims substantially overlaps with a stronger Bill of Rights claim",
"sentence": "See Rosenfeld v. Egy, 346 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2003) (stating that “we see little basis or justification for applying equal protection analysis” in a situation where an equal protection claims substantially overlaps with a stronger Bill of Rights claim); see also Nestor Colón Medina & Sucesores, 964 F.2d at 44-45 (same); Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 794 (9th Cir.2011) (rejecting an equal protection claim brought in conjunction with Second Amendment concerns by noting that “although the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right, that right is more appropriately analyzed under the Second Amendment”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "644 F.3d 776, 794",
"parenthetical": "rejecting an equal protection claim brought in conjunction with Second Amendment concerns by noting that \"although the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right, that right is more appropriately analyzed under the Second Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See Rosenfeld v. Egy, 346 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2003) (stating that “we see little basis or justification for applying equal protection analysis” in a situation where an equal protection claims substantially overlaps with a stronger Bill of Rights claim); see also Nestor Colón Medina & Sucesores, 964 F.2d at 44-45 (same); Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 794 (9th Cir.2011) (rejecting an equal protection claim brought in conjunction with Second Amendment concerns by noting that “although the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right, that right is more appropriately analyzed under the Second Amendment”) (citation omitted)."
} | 5,732,690 | a |
A broader, rather than narrower, reading of SS 104 is consistent with the LMRDA's democratic purposes. The Court is well aware that the democratic purposes of the LMRDA do not mandate broad interpretations of SS 104 which go beyond its terms. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "818 F.2d 926, 929, 934",
"parenthetical": "LMRDA's general objectives of democracy do not create rights beyond its specific terms",
"sentence": "See Tanzillo, 769 F.2d at 148 (restricting right to copy of agreement under § 104 to current employees and members); see also generally Carrothers v. Presser, 818 F.2d 926, 929, 934 (D.C.Cir.1987) (LMRDA’s general objectives of democracy do not create rights beyond its specific terms)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "769 F.2d 148, 148",
"parenthetical": "restricting right to copy of agreement under SS 104 to current employees and members",
"sentence": "See Tanzillo, 769 F.2d at 148 (restricting right to copy of agreement under § 104 to current employees and members); see also generally Carrothers v. Presser, 818 F.2d 926, 929, 934 (D.C.Cir.1987) (LMRDA’s general objectives of democracy do not create rights beyond its specific terms)."
} | 4,121,004 | b |
Even so, our confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase is not undermined by counsel's error. We have found similar comments either not improper or harmless under the circumstances. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "762 So.2d 879, 905",
"parenthetical": "reversing for a new penalty phase for cumulative error where prosecutor made repeated comments about the violent and vicious nature of the defendant as well as numerous other improper comments",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Salazar v. State, 991 So.2d 364, 377 (Fla.2008) (finding prosecutor’s use of the word “terrorizing” in reference to the burglary aggravating offense was not improper); Bonifay v. State, 680 So.2d 413, 418 (Fla.1996) (finding prosecutor’s use of the word “exterminate” in the context of the case improper but harmless); cf. Brooks v. State, 762 So.2d 879, 905 (Fla.2000) (reversing for a new penalty phase for cumulative error where prosecutor made repeated comments about the violent and vicious nature of the defendant as well as numerous other improper comments)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "991 So.2d 364, 377",
"parenthetical": "finding prosecutor's use of the word \"terrorizing\" in reference to the burglary aggravating offense was not improper",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Salazar v. State, 991 So.2d 364, 377 (Fla.2008) (finding prosecutor’s use of the word “terrorizing” in reference to the burglary aggravating offense was not improper); Bonifay v. State, 680 So.2d 413, 418 (Fla.1996) (finding prosecutor’s use of the word “exterminate” in the context of the case improper but harmless); cf. Brooks v. State, 762 So.2d 879, 905 (Fla.2000) (reversing for a new penalty phase for cumulative error where prosecutor made repeated comments about the violent and vicious nature of the defendant as well as numerous other improper comments)."
} | 7,028,891 | b |
Even so, our confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase is not undermined by counsel's error. We have found similar comments either not improper or harmless under the circumstances. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "680 So.2d 413, 418",
"parenthetical": "finding prosecutor's use of the word \"exterminate\" in the context of the case improper but harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Salazar v. State, 991 So.2d 364, 377 (Fla.2008) (finding prosecutor’s use of the word “terrorizing” in reference to the burglary aggravating offense was not improper); Bonifay v. State, 680 So.2d 413, 418 (Fla.1996) (finding prosecutor’s use of the word “exterminate” in the context of the case improper but harmless); cf. Brooks v. State, 762 So.2d 879, 905 (Fla.2000) (reversing for a new penalty phase for cumulative error where prosecutor made repeated comments about the violent and vicious nature of the defendant as well as numerous other improper comments)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "762 So.2d 879, 905",
"parenthetical": "reversing for a new penalty phase for cumulative error where prosecutor made repeated comments about the violent and vicious nature of the defendant as well as numerous other improper comments",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Salazar v. State, 991 So.2d 364, 377 (Fla.2008) (finding prosecutor’s use of the word “terrorizing” in reference to the burglary aggravating offense was not improper); Bonifay v. State, 680 So.2d 413, 418 (Fla.1996) (finding prosecutor’s use of the word “exterminate” in the context of the case improper but harmless); cf. Brooks v. State, 762 So.2d 879, 905 (Fla.2000) (reversing for a new penalty phase for cumulative error where prosecutor made repeated comments about the violent and vicious nature of the defendant as well as numerous other improper comments)."
} | 7,028,891 | a |
Other state courts have also applied Luce to impeachment by a statement obtained in violation of a defendant's Miranda rights. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "682 N.W.2d 459, 459-60",
"parenthetical": "ruling that the defendant had to testify at trial to preserve for review his challenge to the trial court's in limine ruling that allowed into evidence his post-arrest silence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wagner v. State, 347 P.3d 109, 109-10 (Alaska 2015) (declining to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with a statement obtained in violation of Miranda because, without his testimony, “it is impossible to tell whether the court’s ruling affected [his] decision not to testify, whether the prosecution would have impeached him with his police statement, or whether this evidence would have affected the jury”); Jordan v. State, 591 A.2d 875, 876-78 (Md. 1991) (concluding that the appellate court could not review the defendant’s constitutional argument that the trial court erred by allowing the State to use his allegedly involuntary confession to impeach him because he elected not to testily); cf. People v. Boyd, 682 N.W.2d 459, 459-60 (Mich. 2004) (ruling that the defendant had to testify at trial to preserve for review his challenge to the trial court’s in limine ruling that allowed into evidence his post-arrest silence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "347 P.3d 109, 109-10",
"parenthetical": "declining to review the defendant's claim that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with a statement obtained in violation of Miranda because, without his testimony, \"it is impossible to tell whether the court's ruling affected [his] decision not to testify, whether the prosecution would have impeached him with his police statement, or whether this evidence would have affected the jury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wagner v. State, 347 P.3d 109, 109-10 (Alaska 2015) (declining to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with a statement obtained in violation of Miranda because, without his testimony, “it is impossible to tell whether the court’s ruling affected [his] decision not to testify, whether the prosecution would have impeached him with his police statement, or whether this evidence would have affected the jury”); Jordan v. State, 591 A.2d 875, 876-78 (Md. 1991) (concluding that the appellate court could not review the defendant’s constitutional argument that the trial court erred by allowing the State to use his allegedly involuntary confession to impeach him because he elected not to testily); cf. People v. Boyd, 682 N.W.2d 459, 459-60 (Mich. 2004) (ruling that the defendant had to testify at trial to preserve for review his challenge to the trial court’s in limine ruling that allowed into evidence his post-arrest silence)."
} | 12,460,316 | b |
Other state courts have also applied Luce to impeachment by a statement obtained in violation of a defendant's Miranda rights. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "83 P.3d 123, 125-26",
"parenthetical": "concluding that when a defendant elects not to testify, but has made an adequate offer of proof as to the testimony he would have given, he may challenge on appeal the trial court's decision to allow impeachment with evidence allegedly obtained in violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "But see, e.g., State v. Brunelle, 534 A.2d 198, 199-200, 204 (Vt. 1987) (ruling that the defendant could challenge on appeal the trial court’s decision allowing the State to impeach him with evidence that had been obtained in violation of his Miranda, rights, even though he neither testified nor made an offer of proof at trial); cf. State v. Cherry, 83 P.3d 123, 125-26 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that when a defendant elects not to testify, but has made an adequate offer of proof as to the testimony he would have given, he may challenge on appeal the trial court’s decision to allow impeachment with evidence allegedly obtained in violation of his constitutional rights)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "347 P.3d 109, 109-10",
"parenthetical": "declining to review the defendant's claim that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with a statement obtained in violation of Miranda because, without his testimony, \"it is impossible to tell whether the court's ruling affected [his] decision not to testify, whether the prosecution would have impeached him with his police statement, or whether this evidence would have affected the jury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wagner v. State, 347 P.3d 109, 109-10 (Alaska 2015) (declining to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with a statement obtained in violation of Miranda because, without his testimony, “it is impossible to tell whether the court’s ruling affected [his] decision not to testify, whether the prosecution would have impeached him with his police statement, or whether this evidence would have affected the jury”); Jordan v. State, 591 A.2d 875, 876-78 (Md. 1991) (concluding that the appellate court could not review the defendant’s constitutional argument that the trial court erred by allowing the State to use his allegedly involuntary confession to impeach him because he elected not to testily); cf. People v. Boyd, 682 N.W.2d 459, 459-60 (Mich. 2004) (ruling that the defendant had to testify at trial to preserve for review his challenge to the trial court’s in limine ruling that allowed into evidence his post-arrest silence)."
} | 12,460,316 | b |
Other state courts have also applied Luce to impeachment by a statement obtained in violation of a defendant's Miranda rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "591 A.2d 875, 876-78",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the appellate court could not review the defendant's constitutional argument that the trial court erred by allowing the State to use his allegedly involuntary confession to impeach him because he elected not to testily",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wagner v. State, 347 P.3d 109, 109-10 (Alaska 2015) (declining to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with a statement obtained in violation of Miranda because, without his testimony, “it is impossible to tell whether the court’s ruling affected [his] decision not to testify, whether the prosecution would have impeached him with his police statement, or whether this evidence would have affected the jury”); Jordan v. State, 591 A.2d 875, 876-78 (Md. 1991) (concluding that the appellate court could not review the defendant’s constitutional argument that the trial court erred by allowing the State to use his allegedly involuntary confession to impeach him because he elected not to testily); cf. People v. Boyd, 682 N.W.2d 459, 459-60 (Mich. 2004) (ruling that the defendant had to testify at trial to preserve for review his challenge to the trial court’s in limine ruling that allowed into evidence his post-arrest silence)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "682 N.W.2d 459, 459-60",
"parenthetical": "ruling that the defendant had to testify at trial to preserve for review his challenge to the trial court's in limine ruling that allowed into evidence his post-arrest silence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wagner v. State, 347 P.3d 109, 109-10 (Alaska 2015) (declining to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with a statement obtained in violation of Miranda because, without his testimony, “it is impossible to tell whether the court’s ruling affected [his] decision not to testify, whether the prosecution would have impeached him with his police statement, or whether this evidence would have affected the jury”); Jordan v. State, 591 A.2d 875, 876-78 (Md. 1991) (concluding that the appellate court could not review the defendant’s constitutional argument that the trial court erred by allowing the State to use his allegedly involuntary confession to impeach him because he elected not to testily); cf. People v. Boyd, 682 N.W.2d 459, 459-60 (Mich. 2004) (ruling that the defendant had to testify at trial to preserve for review his challenge to the trial court’s in limine ruling that allowed into evidence his post-arrest silence)."
} | 12,460,316 | a |
Other state courts have also applied Luce to impeachment by a statement obtained in violation of a defendant's Miranda rights. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "83 P.3d 123, 125-26",
"parenthetical": "concluding that when a defendant elects not to testify, but has made an adequate offer of proof as to the testimony he would have given, he may challenge on appeal the trial court's decision to allow impeachment with evidence allegedly obtained in violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "But see, e.g., State v. Brunelle, 534 A.2d 198, 199-200, 204 (Vt. 1987) (ruling that the defendant could challenge on appeal the trial court’s decision allowing the State to impeach him with evidence that had been obtained in violation of his Miranda, rights, even though he neither testified nor made an offer of proof at trial); cf. State v. Cherry, 83 P.3d 123, 125-26 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that when a defendant elects not to testify, but has made an adequate offer of proof as to the testimony he would have given, he may challenge on appeal the trial court’s decision to allow impeachment with evidence allegedly obtained in violation of his constitutional rights)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "591 A.2d 875, 876-78",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the appellate court could not review the defendant's constitutional argument that the trial court erred by allowing the State to use his allegedly involuntary confession to impeach him because he elected not to testily",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wagner v. State, 347 P.3d 109, 109-10 (Alaska 2015) (declining to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with a statement obtained in violation of Miranda because, without his testimony, “it is impossible to tell whether the court’s ruling affected [his] decision not to testify, whether the prosecution would have impeached him with his police statement, or whether this evidence would have affected the jury”); Jordan v. State, 591 A.2d 875, 876-78 (Md. 1991) (concluding that the appellate court could not review the defendant’s constitutional argument that the trial court erred by allowing the State to use his allegedly involuntary confession to impeach him because he elected not to testily); cf. People v. Boyd, 682 N.W.2d 459, 459-60 (Mich. 2004) (ruling that the defendant had to testify at trial to preserve for review his challenge to the trial court’s in limine ruling that allowed into evidence his post-arrest silence)."
} | 12,460,316 | b |
Defendant's commercial activity on its Web site constitutes a small portion of its revenue -- no more than 0.11% of RCGA's gross sales. Ross Decl. at P 20. However, "the critical inquiry in determining whether there was a purposeful availment of the forum state is the quality, nor merely the quantity, of the contacts." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "5 F.Supp.2d 762, 763",
"parenthetical": "finding purposeful availment is shown if the defendant transacted business with residents of the forum through the defendant's Web site",
"sentence": "Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO LLC, 61 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1078 (C.D.Cal.1999) (holding that “by advertising and offering its products for sale via the Internet,” the defendant purposely availed itself of the forum state, even though only two sales had been consummated with forum residents, both of which were to plaintiffs president and his friend after the motion to dismiss the complaint had been made); see also Park Inns International v. Pacific Plaza Hotels, 5 F.Supp.2d 762, 763 (D.Ariz.1998) (finding purposeful availment is shown if the defendant transacted business with residents of the forum through the defendant’s Web site); but see S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F.Supp.2d 537, 542-43 (E.D.Pa.1999) (finding defendant’s commercial sale of only five products to forum residents via its Web site to be “the kind of fortuitous, random, and attenuated contacts that the Supreme Court has held insufficient to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "61 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1078",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"by advertising and offering its products for sale via the Internet,\" the defendant purposely availed itself of the forum state, even though only two sales had been consummated with forum residents, both of which were to plaintiffs president and his friend after the motion to dismiss the complaint had been made",
"sentence": "Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO LLC, 61 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1078 (C.D.Cal.1999) (holding that “by advertising and offering its products for sale via the Internet,” the defendant purposely availed itself of the forum state, even though only two sales had been consummated with forum residents, both of which were to plaintiffs president and his friend after the motion to dismiss the complaint had been made); see also Park Inns International v. Pacific Plaza Hotels, 5 F.Supp.2d 762, 763 (D.Ariz.1998) (finding purposeful availment is shown if the defendant transacted business with residents of the forum through the defendant’s Web site); but see S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F.Supp.2d 537, 542-43 (E.D.Pa.1999) (finding defendant’s commercial sale of only five products to forum residents via its Web site to be “the kind of fortuitous, random, and attenuated contacts that the Supreme Court has held insufficient to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 11,172,565 | b |
Defendant's commercial activity on its Web site constitutes a small portion of its revenue -- no more than 0.11% of RCGA's gross sales. Ross Decl. at P 20. However, "the critical inquiry in determining whether there was a purposeful availment of the forum state is the quality, nor merely the quantity, of the contacts." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "79 F.Supp.2d 537, 542-43",
"parenthetical": "finding defendant's commercial sale of only five products to forum residents via its Web site to be \"the kind of fortuitous, random, and attenuated contacts that the Supreme Court has held insufficient to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO LLC, 61 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1078 (C.D.Cal.1999) (holding that “by advertising and offering its products for sale via the Internet,” the defendant purposely availed itself of the forum state, even though only two sales had been consummated with forum residents, both of which were to plaintiffs president and his friend after the motion to dismiss the complaint had been made); see also Park Inns International v. Pacific Plaza Hotels, 5 F.Supp.2d 762, 763 (D.Ariz.1998) (finding purposeful availment is shown if the defendant transacted business with residents of the forum through the defendant’s Web site); but see S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F.Supp.2d 537, 542-43 (E.D.Pa.1999) (finding defendant’s commercial sale of only five products to forum residents via its Web site to be “the kind of fortuitous, random, and attenuated contacts that the Supreme Court has held insufficient to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "61 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1078",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"by advertising and offering its products for sale via the Internet,\" the defendant purposely availed itself of the forum state, even though only two sales had been consummated with forum residents, both of which were to plaintiffs president and his friend after the motion to dismiss the complaint had been made",
"sentence": "Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO LLC, 61 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1078 (C.D.Cal.1999) (holding that “by advertising and offering its products for sale via the Internet,” the defendant purposely availed itself of the forum state, even though only two sales had been consummated with forum residents, both of which were to plaintiffs president and his friend after the motion to dismiss the complaint had been made); see also Park Inns International v. Pacific Plaza Hotels, 5 F.Supp.2d 762, 763 (D.Ariz.1998) (finding purposeful availment is shown if the defendant transacted business with residents of the forum through the defendant’s Web site); but see S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F.Supp.2d 537, 542-43 (E.D.Pa.1999) (finding defendant’s commercial sale of only five products to forum residents via its Web site to be “the kind of fortuitous, random, and attenuated contacts that the Supreme Court has held insufficient to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 11,172,565 | b |
Defendant's commercial activity on its Web site constitutes a small portion of its revenue -- no more than 0.11% of RCGA's gross sales. Ross Decl. at P 20. However, "the critical inquiry in determining whether there was a purposeful availment of the forum state is the quality, nor merely the quantity, of the contacts." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "5 F.Supp.2d 762, 763",
"parenthetical": "finding purposeful availment is shown if the defendant transacted business with residents of the forum through the defendant's Web site",
"sentence": "Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO LLC, 61 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1078 (C.D.Cal.1999) (holding that “by advertising and offering its products for sale via the Internet,” the defendant purposely availed itself of the forum state, even though only two sales had been consummated with forum residents, both of which were to plaintiffs president and his friend after the motion to dismiss the complaint had been made); see also Park Inns International v. Pacific Plaza Hotels, 5 F.Supp.2d 762, 763 (D.Ariz.1998) (finding purposeful availment is shown if the defendant transacted business with residents of the forum through the defendant’s Web site); but see S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F.Supp.2d 537, 542-43 (E.D.Pa.1999) (finding defendant’s commercial sale of only five products to forum residents via its Web site to be “the kind of fortuitous, random, and attenuated contacts that the Supreme Court has held insufficient to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "79 F.Supp.2d 537, 542-43",
"parenthetical": "finding defendant's commercial sale of only five products to forum residents via its Web site to be \"the kind of fortuitous, random, and attenuated contacts that the Supreme Court has held insufficient to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO LLC, 61 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1078 (C.D.Cal.1999) (holding that “by advertising and offering its products for sale via the Internet,” the defendant purposely availed itself of the forum state, even though only two sales had been consummated with forum residents, both of which were to plaintiffs president and his friend after the motion to dismiss the complaint had been made); see also Park Inns International v. Pacific Plaza Hotels, 5 F.Supp.2d 762, 763 (D.Ariz.1998) (finding purposeful availment is shown if the defendant transacted business with residents of the forum through the defendant’s Web site); but see S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F.Supp.2d 537, 542-43 (E.D.Pa.1999) (finding defendant’s commercial sale of only five products to forum residents via its Web site to be “the kind of fortuitous, random, and attenuated contacts that the Supreme Court has held insufficient to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 11,172,565 | a |
By contrast, in Powell and Orwig, no definitive homestead selection had ever been declared by the original owner. Consequently, the owner's uncertain intention with respect to this fundamental prerequisite was the issue. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "233 P. 1086, 1086",
"parenthetical": "noting original owner's contradictory statements regarding past homestead intentions were \"of doubtful value\" to resolution of dispute between grantees",
"sentence": "See Powell, 116 P.2d at 890 (“The question therefore is whether the deceased had selected the [property] as his homestead.”); see also Orwig, 233 P. at 1086 (noting original owner’s contradictory statements regarding past homestead intentions were “of doubtful value” to resolution of dispute between grantees)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "116 P.2d 890, 890",
"parenthetical": "\"The question therefore is whether the deceased had selected the [property] as his homestead.\"",
"sentence": "See Powell, 116 P.2d at 890 (“The question therefore is whether the deceased had selected the [property] as his homestead.”); see also Orwig, 233 P. at 1086 (noting original owner’s contradictory statements regarding past homestead intentions were “of doubtful value” to resolution of dispute between grantees)."
} | 11,311,471 | b |
Nonetheless, there are instances in which ERISA still controls even where misconduct takes place after plan termination. See, e.g., Horn v. Berdon, Inc. Defined Ben. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "567 F.3d 1021, 1027",
"parenthetical": "indicating that, even after plan termination, a plan could be \" 'viewed as continuing to exist for the purpose of distributing the equitably vested benefits' \"",
"sentence": "Pension Plan, 938 F.2d 125 (9th Cir.1991) (applying ERISA to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty where, after plan terminated, employer found that there was a surplus — ie., plan assets exceeded liabilities— and distributed surplus to corporation rather than beneficiaries); see also Vaughn v. Bay Environmental Management, Inc., 567 F.3d 1021, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009) (indicating that, even after plan termination, a plan could be “ ‘viewed as continuing to exist for the purpose of distributing the equitably vested benefits’ ”); cf. Gallagher v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. C 07-05224 SBA, 2008 WL 753733, at *12, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119693, at *36-37 (N.D.Cal."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying ERISA to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty where, after plan terminated, employer found that there was a surplus -- ie., plan assets exceeded liabilities-- and distributed surplus to corporation rather than beneficiaries",
"sentence": "Pension Plan, 938 F.2d 125 (9th Cir.1991) (applying ERISA to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty where, after plan terminated, employer found that there was a surplus — ie., plan assets exceeded liabilities— and distributed surplus to corporation rather than beneficiaries); see also Vaughn v. Bay Environmental Management, Inc., 567 F.3d 1021, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009) (indicating that, even after plan termination, a plan could be “ ‘viewed as continuing to exist for the purpose of distributing the equitably vested benefits’ ”); cf. Gallagher v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. C 07-05224 SBA, 2008 WL 753733, at *12, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119693, at *36-37 (N.D.Cal."
} | 3,880,320 | b |
As stated earlier in this decision, the SIPA definition of a customer should be construed narrowly. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "295 F.3d 1108, 1108, n. 7",
"parenthetical": "customer status under SIPA requires a claimant to prove intent to invest in a security, as that term is defined by SIPA",
"sentence": "Corp., 295 F.3d at 1108, n. 7 (customer status under SIPA requires a claimant to prove intent to invest in a security, as that term is defined by SIPA). Such a narrow reading is further supported by the fact that research “guidance” may be used as a basis not to purchase a security at all or to make an investment that does not qualify for SIPA protection."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "223 F.3d 1305, 1305",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] deposit of funds with only the vaguest instructions to make 'stock market investments' would not qualify as a deposit 'for the purpose of purchasing securities.' \"",
"sentence": "See Old Naples Secs., 223 F.3d at 1305 (“[A] deposit of funds with only the vaguest instructions to make ‘stock market investments’ would not qualify as a deposit ‘for the purpose of purchasing securities.’ ”) (citation omitted)."
} | 4,143,885 | a |
It was an investigation that GuideOne was entitled to conduct but was also one that GuideOne has not even attempted to show netted a single additional detail relating to the congregation's lease of Adas Terrace to Deli Plus. GuideOne's investigation into the Heschel incident cannot excuse its failure to promptly act after learning the essential details of the Deli Plus lease arrangement, and which were completely unrelated to Heschel's on-premises injury and subsequent death. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "291 A.D.2d 484, 485",
"parenthetical": "insurer's attempt to justify its delay on the ground that it had to investigate the incident further is \"an insufficient excuse as a matter of law, as that investigation was unrelated to the reason for the disclaimer based on late notice and could have been asserted at any time\"",
"sentence": "See McGinnis v. Mandracchia, 291 A.D.2d 484, 485, 739 N.Y.S.2d 160, 162 (2d Dep’t 2002) (insurer’s attempt to justify its delay on the ground that it had to investigate the incident further is “an insufficient excuse as a matter of law, as that investigation was unrelated to the reason for the disclaimer based on late notice and could have been asserted at any time”); see also City of N.Y. v. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y., 284 A.D.2d 291, 292, 725 NY.S.2d 374, 375 (2d Dep’t 2001) (noting that an insurer’s defense that it required additional time to investigate was “insufficient excuse as a matter of law, as such an investigation was unrelated to the reason for the disclaimer and could have been asserted at any time”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "284 A.D.2d 291, 292",
"parenthetical": "noting that an insurer's defense that it required additional time to investigate was \"insufficient excuse as a matter of law, as such an investigation was unrelated to the reason for the disclaimer and could have been asserted at any time\"",
"sentence": "See McGinnis v. Mandracchia, 291 A.D.2d 484, 485, 739 N.Y.S.2d 160, 162 (2d Dep’t 2002) (insurer’s attempt to justify its delay on the ground that it had to investigate the incident further is “an insufficient excuse as a matter of law, as that investigation was unrelated to the reason for the disclaimer based on late notice and could have been asserted at any time”); see also City of N.Y. v. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y., 284 A.D.2d 291, 292, 725 NY.S.2d 374, 375 (2d Dep’t 2001) (noting that an insurer’s defense that it required additional time to investigate was “insufficient excuse as a matter of law, as such an investigation was unrelated to the reason for the disclaimer and could have been asserted at any time”)."
} | 3,700,396 | a |
It was an investigation that GuideOne was entitled to conduct but was also one that GuideOne has not even attempted to show netted a single additional detail relating to the congregation's lease of Adas Terrace to Deli Plus. GuideOne's investigation into the Heschel incident cannot excuse its failure to promptly act after learning the essential details of the Deli Plus lease arrangement, and which were completely unrelated to Heschel's on-premises injury and subsequent death. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "739 N.Y.S.2d 160, 162",
"parenthetical": "insurer's attempt to justify its delay on the ground that it had to investigate the incident further is \"an insufficient excuse as a matter of law, as that investigation was unrelated to the reason for the disclaimer based on late notice and could have been asserted at any time\"",
"sentence": "See McGinnis v. Mandracchia, 291 A.D.2d 484, 485, 739 N.Y.S.2d 160, 162 (2d Dep’t 2002) (insurer’s attempt to justify its delay on the ground that it had to investigate the incident further is “an insufficient excuse as a matter of law, as that investigation was unrelated to the reason for the disclaimer based on late notice and could have been asserted at any time”); see also City of N.Y. v. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y., 284 A.D.2d 291, 292, 725 NY.S.2d 374, 375 (2d Dep’t 2001) (noting that an insurer’s defense that it required additional time to investigate was “insufficient excuse as a matter of law, as such an investigation was unrelated to the reason for the disclaimer and could have been asserted at any time”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "284 A.D.2d 291, 292",
"parenthetical": "noting that an insurer's defense that it required additional time to investigate was \"insufficient excuse as a matter of law, as such an investigation was unrelated to the reason for the disclaimer and could have been asserted at any time\"",
"sentence": "See McGinnis v. Mandracchia, 291 A.D.2d 484, 485, 739 N.Y.S.2d 160, 162 (2d Dep’t 2002) (insurer’s attempt to justify its delay on the ground that it had to investigate the incident further is “an insufficient excuse as a matter of law, as that investigation was unrelated to the reason for the disclaimer based on late notice and could have been asserted at any time”); see also City of N.Y. v. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y., 284 A.D.2d 291, 292, 725 NY.S.2d 374, 375 (2d Dep’t 2001) (noting that an insurer’s defense that it required additional time to investigate was “insufficient excuse as a matter of law, as such an investigation was unrelated to the reason for the disclaimer and could have been asserted at any time”)."
} | 3,700,396 | a |
Here, we conclude the requisite articulable reasonable suspicion existed to stop defendant's car as a result of the officer's observations that (a) the car was the same color and make, and it had the same peculiar tire feature, as the car used by suspects in a homicide; and (b) the car had a cracked windshield and an item dangling from the rearview mirror. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "948 P.2d 506, 508",
"parenthetical": "reasonable suspicion from cracked taillight and windshield and missing headlight",
"sentence": "See People v. Melanson, 937 P.2d 826, 834 (Colo.App.1996)(reasonable suspicion from tip that a possible crime was being committed by person driving white Cadillac with out-of-state plates); see also People v. Jackson, 948 P.2d 506, 508 (Colo.1997)(reasonable suspicion from cracked taillight and windshield and missing headlight); People v. Altman, 938 P.2d 142, 145 (Colo.1997)(reasonable suspicion from cracked windshield and obstructed license plate)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "937 P.2d 826, 834",
"parenthetical": "reasonable suspicion from tip that a possible crime was being committed by person driving white Cadillac with out-of-state plates",
"sentence": "See People v. Melanson, 937 P.2d 826, 834 (Colo.App.1996)(reasonable suspicion from tip that a possible crime was being committed by person driving white Cadillac with out-of-state plates); see also People v. Jackson, 948 P.2d 506, 508 (Colo.1997)(reasonable suspicion from cracked taillight and windshield and missing headlight); People v. Altman, 938 P.2d 142, 145 (Colo.1997)(reasonable suspicion from cracked windshield and obstructed license plate)."
} | 9,153,179 | b |
P 13 Opinion testimony by an expert witness that encompasses an ultimate issue is generally admissible when it alludes to an inference that the trier of fact should make, or uses a term that has both a lay factual meaning and legal meaning, and it is clear that the witness is using only the factual term. Additionally, such opinion testimony is admissible when helpful to the jury under Rule 702. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "10 F.3d 405, 414-15",
"parenthetical": "relationship between opinion and ultimate issue is important in determining helpfulness of testimony",
"sentence": "See United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 414-15 (7th Cir.1993) (relationship between opinion and ultimate issue is important in determining helpfulness of testimony); see also, United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 159-60 (4th Cir.2006) (civil action alleging excessive force, testimony regarding defendant’s reasonableness of use of force did not impermissibly state a legal conclusion because it did not address objective reasonableness; instead the testimony focused on the witness’ personal assessments of the defendant’s conduct); Maffei v. N. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 12 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir.1993) (testimony properly allowed because opinions were helpful to determine whether defendant was involved in the conspiracy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "12 F.3d 892, 897",
"parenthetical": "testimony properly allowed because opinions were helpful to determine whether defendant was involved in the conspiracy",
"sentence": "See United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 414-15 (7th Cir.1993) (relationship between opinion and ultimate issue is important in determining helpfulness of testimony); see also, United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 159-60 (4th Cir.2006) (civil action alleging excessive force, testimony regarding defendant’s reasonableness of use of force did not impermissibly state a legal conclusion because it did not address objective reasonableness; instead the testimony focused on the witness’ personal assessments of the defendant’s conduct); Maffei v. N. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 12 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir.1993) (testimony properly allowed because opinions were helpful to determine whether defendant was involved in the conspiracy)."
} | 5,545,427 | a |
Almond argued that the deposition pertained to a question central to the validity of the suit, namely whether Bayview Loan was the owner of the note and mortgage on the date it filed suit. See Country Place Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Mortg. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "913 So.2d 1281, 1285",
"parenthetical": "stating that party's standing is determined at time suit is filed and cannot be acquired after the fact",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 51 So.3d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (noting that party lacks standing to file foreclosure action if it does not own or possess note and mortgage when it files suit); see also Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. McGrath Cmty. Chiropractic, 913 So.2d 1281, 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (stating that party’s standing is determined at time suit is filed and cannot be acquired after the fact)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "51 So.3d 1176, 1179",
"parenthetical": "noting that party lacks standing to file foreclosure action if it does not own or possess note and mortgage when it files suit",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 51 So.3d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (noting that party lacks standing to file foreclosure action if it does not own or possess note and mortgage when it files suit); see also Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. McGrath Cmty. Chiropractic, 913 So.2d 1281, 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (stating that party’s standing is determined at time suit is filed and cannot be acquired after the fact)."
} | 7,020,921 | b |
First, as a threshold matter, because the Montreal Convention provides the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs, any theory of agency liability concerping airlines involved in the underlying ticket transaction or accident must arise from a provision of the Convention itself. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "348 F.Supp.2d 106, 111",
"parenthetical": "\"The Conventions preempt all state law claims within their scope.\"",
"sentence": "See Paradis v. Ghana Airways, Ltd., 348 F.Supp.2d 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 194 Fed.Appx. 5 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The Conventions preempt all state law claims within their scope.”); see also, Asiedu-Ofei v. South African Airlines, 2016 WL 8229875, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 17, 2016) (holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the Montreal Convention); Shirobokova v. CSA Czech Airlines, Inc., 376 F.Supp.2d 439, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (enumerating claims for negligence, breach of warranty, and negligent misrepresentation as state law claims specifically preempted by the Montreal Convention)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2016 WL 8229875, at *2",
"parenthetical": "holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the Montreal Convention",
"sentence": "See Paradis v. Ghana Airways, Ltd., 348 F.Supp.2d 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 194 Fed.Appx. 5 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The Conventions preempt all state law claims within their scope.”); see also, Asiedu-Ofei v. South African Airlines, 2016 WL 8229875, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 17, 2016) (holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the Montreal Convention); Shirobokova v. CSA Czech Airlines, Inc., 376 F.Supp.2d 439, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (enumerating claims for negligence, breach of warranty, and negligent misrepresentation as state law claims specifically preempted by the Montreal Convention)."
} | 12,267,410 | a |
First, as a threshold matter, because the Montreal Convention provides the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs, any theory of agency liability concerping airlines involved in the underlying ticket transaction or accident must arise from a provision of the Convention itself. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "376 F.Supp.2d 439, 441",
"parenthetical": "enumerating claims for negligence, breach of warranty, and negligent misrepresentation as state law claims specifically preempted by the Montreal Convention",
"sentence": "See Paradis v. Ghana Airways, Ltd., 348 F.Supp.2d 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 194 Fed.Appx. 5 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The Conventions preempt all state law claims within their scope.”); see also, Asiedu-Ofei v. South African Airlines, 2016 WL 8229875, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 17, 2016) (holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the Montreal Convention); Shirobokova v. CSA Czech Airlines, Inc., 376 F.Supp.2d 439, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (enumerating claims for negligence, breach of warranty, and negligent misrepresentation as state law claims specifically preempted by the Montreal Convention)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "348 F.Supp.2d 106, 111",
"parenthetical": "\"The Conventions preempt all state law claims within their scope.\"",
"sentence": "See Paradis v. Ghana Airways, Ltd., 348 F.Supp.2d 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 194 Fed.Appx. 5 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The Conventions preempt all state law claims within their scope.”); see also, Asiedu-Ofei v. South African Airlines, 2016 WL 8229875, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 17, 2016) (holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the Montreal Convention); Shirobokova v. CSA Czech Airlines, Inc., 376 F.Supp.2d 439, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (enumerating claims for negligence, breach of warranty, and negligent misrepresentation as state law claims specifically preempted by the Montreal Convention)."
} | 12,267,410 | b |
First, as a threshold matter, because the Montreal Convention provides the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs, any theory of agency liability concerping airlines involved in the underlying ticket transaction or accident must arise from a provision of the Convention itself. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Conventions preempt all state law claims within their scope.\"",
"sentence": "See Paradis v. Ghana Airways, Ltd., 348 F.Supp.2d 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 194 Fed.Appx. 5 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The Conventions preempt all state law claims within their scope.”); see also, Asiedu-Ofei v. South African Airlines, 2016 WL 8229875, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 17, 2016) (holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the Montreal Convention); Shirobokova v. CSA Czech Airlines, Inc., 376 F.Supp.2d 439, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (enumerating claims for negligence, breach of warranty, and negligent misrepresentation as state law claims specifically preempted by the Montreal Convention)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2016 WL 8229875, at *2",
"parenthetical": "holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the Montreal Convention",
"sentence": "See Paradis v. Ghana Airways, Ltd., 348 F.Supp.2d 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 194 Fed.Appx. 5 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The Conventions preempt all state law claims within their scope.”); see also, Asiedu-Ofei v. South African Airlines, 2016 WL 8229875, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 17, 2016) (holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the Montreal Convention); Shirobokova v. CSA Czech Airlines, Inc., 376 F.Supp.2d 439, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (enumerating claims for negligence, breach of warranty, and negligent misrepresentation as state law claims specifically preempted by the Montreal Convention)."
} | 12,267,410 | a |
First, as a threshold matter, because the Montreal Convention provides the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs, any theory of agency liability concerping airlines involved in the underlying ticket transaction or accident must arise from a provision of the Convention itself. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Conventions preempt all state law claims within their scope.\"",
"sentence": "See Paradis v. Ghana Airways, Ltd., 348 F.Supp.2d 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 194 Fed.Appx. 5 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The Conventions preempt all state law claims within their scope.”); see also, Asiedu-Ofei v. South African Airlines, 2016 WL 8229875, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 17, 2016) (holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the Montreal Convention); Shirobokova v. CSA Czech Airlines, Inc., 376 F.Supp.2d 439, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (enumerating claims for negligence, breach of warranty, and negligent misrepresentation as state law claims specifically preempted by the Montreal Convention)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "376 F.Supp.2d 439, 441",
"parenthetical": "enumerating claims for negligence, breach of warranty, and negligent misrepresentation as state law claims specifically preempted by the Montreal Convention",
"sentence": "See Paradis v. Ghana Airways, Ltd., 348 F.Supp.2d 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 194 Fed.Appx. 5 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The Conventions preempt all state law claims within their scope.”); see also, Asiedu-Ofei v. South African Airlines, 2016 WL 8229875, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 17, 2016) (holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the Montreal Convention); Shirobokova v. CSA Czech Airlines, Inc., 376 F.Supp.2d 439, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (enumerating claims for negligence, breach of warranty, and negligent misrepresentation as state law claims specifically preempted by the Montreal Convention)."
} | 12,267,410 | a |
Second, contrary to Joseph's contention, the trial judge did not tell the jury that a battery tester was a deadly weapon. Rather, the trial judge merely mentioned the battery tester and instructed the jury to find whether that object constituted a deadly weapon. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "429 F.2d 552, 556",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury that a pistol is a deadly weapon, \"as the question was one for the jury, and that a weapon may or may not be deadly according to its size and the manner of its use\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863, 870 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant had used a baton because that fact was undisputed, and noting that the jury itself had to determine whether the baton constituted a dangerous weapon), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 950, 123 S. Ct. 395, 154 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2002); cf. United States v. Davis, 429 F.2d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury that a pistol is a deadly weapon, “as the question was one for the jury, and that a weapon may or may not be deadly according to its size and the manner of its use”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "293 F.3d 863, 870",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant had used a baton because that fact was undisputed, and noting that the jury itself had to determine whether the baton constituted a dangerous weapon",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863, 870 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant had used a baton because that fact was undisputed, and noting that the jury itself had to determine whether the baton constituted a dangerous weapon), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 950, 123 S. Ct. 395, 154 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2002); cf. United States v. Davis, 429 F.2d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury that a pistol is a deadly weapon, “as the question was one for the jury, and that a weapon may or may not be deadly according to its size and the manner of its use”)."
} | 3,511,042 | b |
Second, contrary to Joseph's contention, the trial judge did not tell the jury that a battery tester was a deadly weapon. Rather, the trial judge merely mentioned the battery tester and instructed the jury to find whether that object constituted a deadly weapon. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant had used a baton because that fact was undisputed, and noting that the jury itself had to determine whether the baton constituted a dangerous weapon",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863, 870 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant had used a baton because that fact was undisputed, and noting that the jury itself had to determine whether the baton constituted a dangerous weapon), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 950, 123 S. Ct. 395, 154 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2002); cf. United States v. Davis, 429 F.2d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury that a pistol is a deadly weapon, “as the question was one for the jury, and that a weapon may or may not be deadly according to its size and the manner of its use”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "429 F.2d 552, 556",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury that a pistol is a deadly weapon, \"as the question was one for the jury, and that a weapon may or may not be deadly according to its size and the manner of its use\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863, 870 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant had used a baton because that fact was undisputed, and noting that the jury itself had to determine whether the baton constituted a dangerous weapon), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 950, 123 S. Ct. 395, 154 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2002); cf. United States v. Davis, 429 F.2d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury that a pistol is a deadly weapon, “as the question was one for the jury, and that a weapon may or may not be deadly according to its size and the manner of its use”)."
} | 3,511,042 | a |
Second, contrary to Joseph's contention, the trial judge did not tell the jury that a battery tester was a deadly weapon. Rather, the trial judge merely mentioned the battery tester and instructed the jury to find whether that object constituted a deadly weapon. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant had used a baton because that fact was undisputed, and noting that the jury itself had to determine whether the baton constituted a dangerous weapon",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863, 870 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant had used a baton because that fact was undisputed, and noting that the jury itself had to determine whether the baton constituted a dangerous weapon), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 950, 123 S. Ct. 395, 154 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2002); cf. United States v. Davis, 429 F.2d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury that a pistol is a deadly weapon, “as the question was one for the jury, and that a weapon may or may not be deadly according to its size and the manner of its use”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "429 F.2d 552, 556",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury that a pistol is a deadly weapon, \"as the question was one for the jury, and that a weapon may or may not be deadly according to its size and the manner of its use\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863, 870 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant had used a baton because that fact was undisputed, and noting that the jury itself had to determine whether the baton constituted a dangerous weapon), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 950, 123 S. Ct. 395, 154 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2002); cf. United States v. Davis, 429 F.2d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury that a pistol is a deadly weapon, “as the question was one for the jury, and that a weapon may or may not be deadly according to its size and the manner of its use”)."
} | 3,511,042 | a |
Second, contrary to Joseph's contention, the trial judge did not tell the jury that a battery tester was a deadly weapon. Rather, the trial judge merely mentioned the battery tester and instructed the jury to find whether that object constituted a deadly weapon. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "429 F.2d 552, 556",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury that a pistol is a deadly weapon, \"as the question was one for the jury, and that a weapon may or may not be deadly according to its size and the manner of its use\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863, 870 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant had used a baton because that fact was undisputed, and noting that the jury itself had to determine whether the baton constituted a dangerous weapon), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 950, 123 S. Ct. 395, 154 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2002); cf. United States v. Davis, 429 F.2d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury that a pistol is a deadly weapon, “as the question was one for the jury, and that a weapon may or may not be deadly according to its size and the manner of its use”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant had used a baton because that fact was undisputed, and noting that the jury itself had to determine whether the baton constituted a dangerous weapon",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863, 870 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant had used a baton because that fact was undisputed, and noting that the jury itself had to determine whether the baton constituted a dangerous weapon), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 950, 123 S. Ct. 395, 154 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2002); cf. United States v. Davis, 429 F.2d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury that a pistol is a deadly weapon, “as the question was one for the jury, and that a weapon may or may not be deadly according to its size and the manner of its use”)."
} | 3,511,042 | b |
There are no reported Virginia cases construing the term "paid" as it is used in Va.Code Ann. SS 6.1-330.57(A). Since the statute does not provide a definition, the court must assume that the term is to be given its normal, everyday meaning. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "249 Va. 458, 460-61",
"parenthetical": "looking to Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's Dictionary for the everyday meaning of terms in an insurance policy",
"sentence": "See Bell v. Dorey Elec. Co., 248 Va. 378, 382, 448 S.E.2d 622, 624, (1994) (turning to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s for the everyday meaning of terms of a statute); see also Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Keller, 249 Va. 458, 460-61, 456 S.E.2d 525, 526 (1995) (looking to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s Dictionary for the everyday meaning of terms in an insurance policy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "248 Va. 378, 382",
"parenthetical": "turning to Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's for the everyday meaning of terms of a statute",
"sentence": "See Bell v. Dorey Elec. Co., 248 Va. 378, 382, 448 S.E.2d 622, 624, (1994) (turning to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s for the everyday meaning of terms of a statute); see also Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Keller, 249 Va. 458, 460-61, 456 S.E.2d 525, 526 (1995) (looking to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s Dictionary for the everyday meaning of terms in an insurance policy)."
} | 11,548,806 | b |
There are no reported Virginia cases construing the term "paid" as it is used in Va.Code Ann. SS 6.1-330.57(A). Since the statute does not provide a definition, the court must assume that the term is to be given its normal, everyday meaning. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "456 S.E.2d 525, 526",
"parenthetical": "looking to Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's Dictionary for the everyday meaning of terms in an insurance policy",
"sentence": "See Bell v. Dorey Elec. Co., 248 Va. 378, 382, 448 S.E.2d 622, 624, (1994) (turning to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s for the everyday meaning of terms of a statute); see also Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Keller, 249 Va. 458, 460-61, 456 S.E.2d 525, 526 (1995) (looking to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s Dictionary for the everyday meaning of terms in an insurance policy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "248 Va. 378, 382",
"parenthetical": "turning to Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's for the everyday meaning of terms of a statute",
"sentence": "See Bell v. Dorey Elec. Co., 248 Va. 378, 382, 448 S.E.2d 622, 624, (1994) (turning to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s for the everyday meaning of terms of a statute); see also Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Keller, 249 Va. 458, 460-61, 456 S.E.2d 525, 526 (1995) (looking to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s Dictionary for the everyday meaning of terms in an insurance policy)."
} | 11,548,806 | b |
There are no reported Virginia cases construing the term "paid" as it is used in Va.Code Ann. SS 6.1-330.57(A). Since the statute does not provide a definition, the court must assume that the term is to be given its normal, everyday meaning. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "448 S.E.2d 622, 624",
"parenthetical": "turning to Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's for the everyday meaning of terms of a statute",
"sentence": "See Bell v. Dorey Elec. Co., 248 Va. 378, 382, 448 S.E.2d 622, 624, (1994) (turning to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s for the everyday meaning of terms of a statute); see also Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Keller, 249 Va. 458, 460-61, 456 S.E.2d 525, 526 (1995) (looking to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s Dictionary for the everyday meaning of terms in an insurance policy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "249 Va. 458, 460-61",
"parenthetical": "looking to Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's Dictionary for the everyday meaning of terms in an insurance policy",
"sentence": "See Bell v. Dorey Elec. Co., 248 Va. 378, 382, 448 S.E.2d 622, 624, (1994) (turning to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s for the everyday meaning of terms of a statute); see also Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Keller, 249 Va. 458, 460-61, 456 S.E.2d 525, 526 (1995) (looking to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s Dictionary for the everyday meaning of terms in an insurance policy)."
} | 11,548,806 | a |
There are no reported Virginia cases construing the term "paid" as it is used in Va.Code Ann. SS 6.1-330.57(A). Since the statute does not provide a definition, the court must assume that the term is to be given its normal, everyday meaning. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "448 S.E.2d 622, 624",
"parenthetical": "turning to Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's for the everyday meaning of terms of a statute",
"sentence": "See Bell v. Dorey Elec. Co., 248 Va. 378, 382, 448 S.E.2d 622, 624, (1994) (turning to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s for the everyday meaning of terms of a statute); see also Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Keller, 249 Va. 458, 460-61, 456 S.E.2d 525, 526 (1995) (looking to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s Dictionary for the everyday meaning of terms in an insurance policy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "456 S.E.2d 525, 526",
"parenthetical": "looking to Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's Dictionary for the everyday meaning of terms in an insurance policy",
"sentence": "See Bell v. Dorey Elec. Co., 248 Va. 378, 382, 448 S.E.2d 622, 624, (1994) (turning to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s for the everyday meaning of terms of a statute); see also Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Keller, 249 Va. 458, 460-61, 456 S.E.2d 525, 526 (1995) (looking to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s Dictionary for the everyday meaning of terms in an insurance policy)."
} | 11,548,806 | a |
With respect to Del Rosario's testimony, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to immunize Del Rosario. In light of the evidence, we find reasonable the District Court's determination that the disclosure of Del Rosario's statement implicating Zo-letta would not have changed the decision to deny Del Rosario use immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "judicial immunity properly denied where proposed immunized testimony would not have been \"clearly exculpatory\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Steele, 685 F.2d 793-808 (3d Cir.1982) (judicial immunity properly denied where proposed immunized testimony would not have been “clearly exculpatory”); United States v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 950, 965 (3d Cir.1981) (same); see also United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 251 n. 8 (3d Cir.1983) (judicial immunity properly denied where “the exculpatory nature of [the] testimony is at best speculative”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "judicial immunity properly denied where \"the exculpatory nature of [the] testimony is at best speculative\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Steele, 685 F.2d 793-808 (3d Cir.1982) (judicial immunity properly denied where proposed immunized testimony would not have been “clearly exculpatory”); United States v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 950, 965 (3d Cir.1981) (same); see also United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 251 n. 8 (3d Cir.1983) (judicial immunity properly denied where “the exculpatory nature of [the] testimony is at best speculative”)."
} | 9,393,346 | a |
The agency denied Chen's asylum and withholding claims based on an adverse credibility determination. We lack jurisdiction to consider Chen's contentions regarding the adverse credibility determination, because he failed to raise them to the BIA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "296 F.3d 871, 877",
"parenthetical": "\"we may not entertain due process claims based on correctable procedural errors unless the alien raised them below\"",
"sentence": "See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004) (this court lacks jurisdiction to review issues not raised before the agency); see also Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir.2002) (“we may not entertain due process claims based on correctable procedural errors unless the alien raised them below”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "358 F.3d 674, 678",
"parenthetical": "this court lacks jurisdiction to review issues not raised before the agency",
"sentence": "See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004) (this court lacks jurisdiction to review issues not raised before the agency); see also Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir.2002) (“we may not entertain due process claims based on correctable procedural errors unless the alien raised them below”)."
} | 4,345,407 | b |
Although state court findings of fact made in the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to deference ... and although district court findings are subject to the clearly erroneous standard ..., both the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact." While making clear that ineffectiveness questions are "mixed," this announcement in no way clarifies the appropriate standard of review. Indeed, other state courts have been struggling with this very question and reaching different results. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "741 N.E.2d 697, 699-700",
"parenthetical": "supporting a deferential standard of review: \"We will reverse a negative judgment after a non-jury trial only if 'the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court.' \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 741 N.E.2d 697, 699-700 (Ind.2000) (supporting a deferential standard of review: “We will reverse a negative judgment after a non-jury trial only if ‘the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court.’ ”); State v. Gill, 967 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex.App.1998) (noting that court reviews Strickland standards “through the prism of an abuse of discretion standard”); but see State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 932 P.2d 981, 1005 (1997) (holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 741 N.E.2d 697, 699-700 (Ind.2000) (supporting a deferential standard of review: “We will reverse a negative judgment after a non-jury trial only if ‘the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court.’ ”); State v. Gill, 967 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex.App.1998) (noting that court reviews Strickland standards “through the prism of an abuse of discretion standard”); but see State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 932 P.2d 981, 1005 (1997) (holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo)."
} | 8,413,739 | a |
Although state court findings of fact made in the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to deference ... and although district court findings are subject to the clearly erroneous standard ..., both the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact." While making clear that ineffectiveness questions are "mixed," this announcement in no way clarifies the appropriate standard of review. Indeed, other state courts have been struggling with this very question and reaching different results. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "932 P.2d 981, 1005",
"parenthetical": "holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 741 N.E.2d 697, 699-700 (Ind.2000) (supporting a deferential standard of review: “We will reverse a negative judgment after a non-jury trial only if ‘the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court.’ ”); State v. Gill, 967 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex.App.1998) (noting that court reviews Strickland standards “through the prism of an abuse of discretion standard”); but see State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 932 P.2d 981, 1005 (1997) (holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "741 N.E.2d 697, 699-700",
"parenthetical": "supporting a deferential standard of review: \"We will reverse a negative judgment after a non-jury trial only if 'the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court.' \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 741 N.E.2d 697, 699-700 (Ind.2000) (supporting a deferential standard of review: “We will reverse a negative judgment after a non-jury trial only if ‘the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court.’ ”); State v. Gill, 967 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex.App.1998) (noting that court reviews Strickland standards “through the prism of an abuse of discretion standard”); but see State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 932 P.2d 981, 1005 (1997) (holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo)."
} | 8,413,739 | b |
Although state court findings of fact made in the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to deference ... and although district court findings are subject to the clearly erroneous standard ..., both the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact." While making clear that ineffectiveness questions are "mixed," this announcement in no way clarifies the appropriate standard of review. Indeed, other state courts have been struggling with this very question and reaching different results. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 741 N.E.2d 697, 699-700 (Ind.2000) (supporting a deferential standard of review: “We will reverse a negative judgment after a non-jury trial only if ‘the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court.’ ”); State v. Gill, 967 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex.App.1998) (noting that court reviews Strickland standards “through the prism of an abuse of discretion standard”); but see State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 932 P.2d 981, 1005 (1997) (holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "967 S.W.2d 540, 542",
"parenthetical": "noting that court reviews Strickland standards \"through the prism of an abuse of discretion standard\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 741 N.E.2d 697, 699-700 (Ind.2000) (supporting a deferential standard of review: “We will reverse a negative judgment after a non-jury trial only if ‘the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court.’ ”); State v. Gill, 967 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex.App.1998) (noting that court reviews Strickland standards “through the prism of an abuse of discretion standard”); but see State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 932 P.2d 981, 1005 (1997) (holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo)."
} | 8,413,739 | b |
Although state court findings of fact made in the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to deference ... and although district court findings are subject to the clearly erroneous standard ..., both the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact." While making clear that ineffectiveness questions are "mixed," this announcement in no way clarifies the appropriate standard of review. Indeed, other state courts have been struggling with this very question and reaching different results. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "932 P.2d 981, 1005",
"parenthetical": "holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 741 N.E.2d 697, 699-700 (Ind.2000) (supporting a deferential standard of review: “We will reverse a negative judgment after a non-jury trial only if ‘the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court.’ ”); State v. Gill, 967 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex.App.1998) (noting that court reviews Strickland standards “through the prism of an abuse of discretion standard”); but see State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 932 P.2d 981, 1005 (1997) (holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "967 S.W.2d 540, 542",
"parenthetical": "noting that court reviews Strickland standards \"through the prism of an abuse of discretion standard\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 741 N.E.2d 697, 699-700 (Ind.2000) (supporting a deferential standard of review: “We will reverse a negative judgment after a non-jury trial only if ‘the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court.’ ”); State v. Gill, 967 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex.App.1998) (noting that court reviews Strickland standards “through the prism of an abuse of discretion standard”); but see State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 932 P.2d 981, 1005 (1997) (holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo)."
} | 8,413,739 | b |
Elliot's claim he previously issued Miranda warnings warranted an exception to the exclusionary rule. However, we note that, contrary to the trend in the Fourth Amendment area, courts have declined to create a "good faith" exception in the context of the Fifth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "708 F.2d 1540, 1544",
"parenthetical": "\"once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, knowledge of that request is imputed to all law enforcement officers who subsequently deal with the suspect\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (“once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, knowledge of that request is imputed to all law enforcement officers who subsequently deal with the suspect”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to create exception absent clear indication from United States Supreme Court",
"sentence": "See also Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2101, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (implicitly rejecting \"good faith\" argument); White v. Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 885, 887 n. 9 (7th Cir.1982) (declining to create exception absent clear indication from United States Supreme Court), vacated on other grounds, 465 U.S. 1075, 104 S.Ct. 1433, 79 L.Ed.2d 756 (1984)."
} | 10,381,123 | a |
Elliot's claim he previously issued Miranda warnings warranted an exception to the exclusionary rule. However, we note that, contrary to the trend in the Fourth Amendment area, courts have declined to create a "good faith" exception in the context of the Fifth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "708 F.2d 1540, 1544",
"parenthetical": "\"once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, knowledge of that request is imputed to all law enforcement officers who subsequently deal with the suspect\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (“once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, knowledge of that request is imputed to all law enforcement officers who subsequently deal with the suspect”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to create exception absent clear indication from United States Supreme Court",
"sentence": "See also Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2101, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (implicitly rejecting \"good faith\" argument); White v. Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 885, 887 n. 9 (7th Cir.1982) (declining to create exception absent clear indication from United States Supreme Court), vacated on other grounds, 465 U.S. 1075, 104 S.Ct. 1433, 79 L.Ed.2d 756 (1984)."
} | 10,381,123 | a |
Elliot's claim he previously issued Miranda warnings warranted an exception to the exclusionary rule. However, we note that, contrary to the trend in the Fourth Amendment area, courts have declined to create a "good faith" exception in the context of the Fifth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "708 F.2d 1540, 1544",
"parenthetical": "\"once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, knowledge of that request is imputed to all law enforcement officers who subsequently deal with the suspect\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (“once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, knowledge of that request is imputed to all law enforcement officers who subsequently deal with the suspect”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to create exception absent clear indication from United States Supreme Court",
"sentence": "See also Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2101, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (implicitly rejecting \"good faith\" argument); White v. Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 885, 887 n. 9 (7th Cir.1982) (declining to create exception absent clear indication from United States Supreme Court), vacated on other grounds, 465 U.S. 1075, 104 S.Ct. 1433, 79 L.Ed.2d 756 (1984)."
} | 10,381,123 | a |
Elliot's claim he previously issued Miranda warnings warranted an exception to the exclusionary rule. However, we note that, contrary to the trend in the Fourth Amendment area, courts have declined to create a "good faith" exception in the context of the Fifth Amendment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "708 F.2d 1540, 1544",
"parenthetical": "\"once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, knowledge of that request is imputed to all law enforcement officers who subsequently deal with the suspect\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (“once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, knowledge of that request is imputed to all law enforcement officers who subsequently deal with the suspect”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to create exception absent clear indication from United States Supreme Court",
"sentence": "See also Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2101, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (implicitly rejecting \"good faith\" argument); White v. Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 885, 887 n. 9 (7th Cir.1982) (declining to create exception absent clear indication from United States Supreme Court), vacated on other grounds, 465 U.S. 1075, 104 S.Ct. 1433, 79 L.Ed.2d 756 (1984)."
} | 10,381,123 | a |
Even circuits that clearly permit sua sponte summary judgment generally enforce the ten day notice requirement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "483 F.2d 1351, 1353",
"parenthetical": "court has no authority to grant summary judgment without first giving ten days notice",
"sentence": "See Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765-66 (11th Cir.1984) (court strictly enforces ten day notice require ment); Davis Elliott International, Inc. v. Pan American Container Corp., 705 F.2d 705, 707 (3d Cir.1983) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte, ten days notice is required); Yashon v. Gregory, 737 F.2d 547, 552 (6th Cir.1984) (\"clearly established rule in this circuit is that a district court must afford the party against whom sua sponte summary judgment is to be entered ten-days notice and an adequate opportunity to respond\"); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education, 649 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1981) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte ten days notice is required); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134, 135 (6th Cir.1979) (district court must comply with ten day notice requirement even when summary judgment motion is made on the day of trial); Herzog & Straus v. GRT Corp., 553 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir.1977) (ten day notice and hearing also required when judge considers sua sponte summary judgment); see also Adams v. Campbell County School District, 483 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir.1973) (court has no authority to grant summary judgment without first giving ten days notice); Winfrey v. Brewer, 570 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.1978) (strictly construing ten day notice requirement); Utility Control Corp. v. Prince William Construction Co., Inc., 558 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir.1977) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "705 F.2d 705, 707",
"parenthetical": "although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte, ten days notice is required",
"sentence": "See Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765-66 (11th Cir.1984) (court strictly enforces ten day notice require ment); Davis Elliott International, Inc. v. Pan American Container Corp., 705 F.2d 705, 707 (3d Cir.1983) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte, ten days notice is required); Yashon v. Gregory, 737 F.2d 547, 552 (6th Cir.1984) (\"clearly established rule in this circuit is that a district court must afford the party against whom sua sponte summary judgment is to be entered ten-days notice and an adequate opportunity to respond\"); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education, 649 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1981) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte ten days notice is required); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134, 135 (6th Cir.1979) (district court must comply with ten day notice requirement even when summary judgment motion is made on the day of trial); Herzog & Straus v. GRT Corp., 553 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir.1977) (ten day notice and hearing also required when judge considers sua sponte summary judgment); see also Adams v. Campbell County School District, 483 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir.1973) (court has no authority to grant summary judgment without first giving ten days notice); Winfrey v. Brewer, 570 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.1978) (strictly construing ten day notice requirement); Utility Control Corp. v. Prince William Construction Co., Inc., 558 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir.1977) (same)."
} | 12,044,783 | b |
Even circuits that clearly permit sua sponte summary judgment generally enforce the ten day notice requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "737 F.2d 547, 552",
"parenthetical": "\"clearly established rule in this circuit is that a district court must afford the party against whom sua sponte summary judgment is to be entered ten-days notice and an adequate opportunity to respond\"",
"sentence": "See Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765-66 (11th Cir.1984) (court strictly enforces ten day notice require ment); Davis Elliott International, Inc. v. Pan American Container Corp., 705 F.2d 705, 707 (3d Cir.1983) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte, ten days notice is required); Yashon v. Gregory, 737 F.2d 547, 552 (6th Cir.1984) (\"clearly established rule in this circuit is that a district court must afford the party against whom sua sponte summary judgment is to be entered ten-days notice and an adequate opportunity to respond\"); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education, 649 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1981) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte ten days notice is required); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134, 135 (6th Cir.1979) (district court must comply with ten day notice requirement even when summary judgment motion is made on the day of trial); Herzog & Straus v. GRT Corp., 553 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir.1977) (ten day notice and hearing also required when judge considers sua sponte summary judgment); see also Adams v. Campbell County School District, 483 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir.1973) (court has no authority to grant summary judgment without first giving ten days notice); Winfrey v. Brewer, 570 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.1978) (strictly construing ten day notice requirement); Utility Control Corp. v. Prince William Construction Co., Inc., 558 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir.1977) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "483 F.2d 1351, 1353",
"parenthetical": "court has no authority to grant summary judgment without first giving ten days notice",
"sentence": "See Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765-66 (11th Cir.1984) (court strictly enforces ten day notice require ment); Davis Elliott International, Inc. v. Pan American Container Corp., 705 F.2d 705, 707 (3d Cir.1983) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte, ten days notice is required); Yashon v. Gregory, 737 F.2d 547, 552 (6th Cir.1984) (\"clearly established rule in this circuit is that a district court must afford the party against whom sua sponte summary judgment is to be entered ten-days notice and an adequate opportunity to respond\"); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education, 649 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1981) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte ten days notice is required); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134, 135 (6th Cir.1979) (district court must comply with ten day notice requirement even when summary judgment motion is made on the day of trial); Herzog & Straus v. GRT Corp., 553 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir.1977) (ten day notice and hearing also required when judge considers sua sponte summary judgment); see also Adams v. Campbell County School District, 483 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir.1973) (court has no authority to grant summary judgment without first giving ten days notice); Winfrey v. Brewer, 570 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.1978) (strictly construing ten day notice requirement); Utility Control Corp. v. Prince William Construction Co., Inc., 558 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir.1977) (same)."
} | 12,044,783 | a |
Even circuits that clearly permit sua sponte summary judgment generally enforce the ten day notice requirement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "483 F.2d 1351, 1353",
"parenthetical": "court has no authority to grant summary judgment without first giving ten days notice",
"sentence": "See Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765-66 (11th Cir.1984) (court strictly enforces ten day notice require ment); Davis Elliott International, Inc. v. Pan American Container Corp., 705 F.2d 705, 707 (3d Cir.1983) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte, ten days notice is required); Yashon v. Gregory, 737 F.2d 547, 552 (6th Cir.1984) (\"clearly established rule in this circuit is that a district court must afford the party against whom sua sponte summary judgment is to be entered ten-days notice and an adequate opportunity to respond\"); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education, 649 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1981) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte ten days notice is required); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134, 135 (6th Cir.1979) (district court must comply with ten day notice requirement even when summary judgment motion is made on the day of trial); Herzog & Straus v. GRT Corp., 553 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir.1977) (ten day notice and hearing also required when judge considers sua sponte summary judgment); see also Adams v. Campbell County School District, 483 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir.1973) (court has no authority to grant summary judgment without first giving ten days notice); Winfrey v. Brewer, 570 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.1978) (strictly construing ten day notice requirement); Utility Control Corp. v. Prince William Construction Co., Inc., 558 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir.1977) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "649 F.2d 434, 436",
"parenthetical": "although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte ten days notice is required",
"sentence": "See Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765-66 (11th Cir.1984) (court strictly enforces ten day notice require ment); Davis Elliott International, Inc. v. Pan American Container Corp., 705 F.2d 705, 707 (3d Cir.1983) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte, ten days notice is required); Yashon v. Gregory, 737 F.2d 547, 552 (6th Cir.1984) (\"clearly established rule in this circuit is that a district court must afford the party against whom sua sponte summary judgment is to be entered ten-days notice and an adequate opportunity to respond\"); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education, 649 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1981) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte ten days notice is required); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134, 135 (6th Cir.1979) (district court must comply with ten day notice requirement even when summary judgment motion is made on the day of trial); Herzog & Straus v. GRT Corp., 553 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir.1977) (ten day notice and hearing also required when judge considers sua sponte summary judgment); see also Adams v. Campbell County School District, 483 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir.1973) (court has no authority to grant summary judgment without first giving ten days notice); Winfrey v. Brewer, 570 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.1978) (strictly construing ten day notice requirement); Utility Control Corp. v. Prince William Construction Co., Inc., 558 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir.1977) (same)."
} | 12,044,783 | b |
Even circuits that clearly permit sua sponte summary judgment generally enforce the ten day notice requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "611 F.2d 134, 135",
"parenthetical": "district court must comply with ten day notice requirement even when summary judgment motion is made on the day of trial",
"sentence": "See Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765-66 (11th Cir.1984) (court strictly enforces ten day notice require ment); Davis Elliott International, Inc. v. Pan American Container Corp., 705 F.2d 705, 707 (3d Cir.1983) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte, ten days notice is required); Yashon v. Gregory, 737 F.2d 547, 552 (6th Cir.1984) (\"clearly established rule in this circuit is that a district court must afford the party against whom sua sponte summary judgment is to be entered ten-days notice and an adequate opportunity to respond\"); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education, 649 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1981) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte ten days notice is required); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134, 135 (6th Cir.1979) (district court must comply with ten day notice requirement even when summary judgment motion is made on the day of trial); Herzog & Straus v. GRT Corp., 553 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir.1977) (ten day notice and hearing also required when judge considers sua sponte summary judgment); see also Adams v. Campbell County School District, 483 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir.1973) (court has no authority to grant summary judgment without first giving ten days notice); Winfrey v. Brewer, 570 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.1978) (strictly construing ten day notice requirement); Utility Control Corp. v. Prince William Construction Co., Inc., 558 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir.1977) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "483 F.2d 1351, 1353",
"parenthetical": "court has no authority to grant summary judgment without first giving ten days notice",
"sentence": "See Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765-66 (11th Cir.1984) (court strictly enforces ten day notice require ment); Davis Elliott International, Inc. v. Pan American Container Corp., 705 F.2d 705, 707 (3d Cir.1983) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte, ten days notice is required); Yashon v. Gregory, 737 F.2d 547, 552 (6th Cir.1984) (\"clearly established rule in this circuit is that a district court must afford the party against whom sua sponte summary judgment is to be entered ten-days notice and an adequate opportunity to respond\"); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education, 649 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1981) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte ten days notice is required); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134, 135 (6th Cir.1979) (district court must comply with ten day notice requirement even when summary judgment motion is made on the day of trial); Herzog & Straus v. GRT Corp., 553 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir.1977) (ten day notice and hearing also required when judge considers sua sponte summary judgment); see also Adams v. Campbell County School District, 483 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir.1973) (court has no authority to grant summary judgment without first giving ten days notice); Winfrey v. Brewer, 570 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.1978) (strictly construing ten day notice requirement); Utility Control Corp. v. Prince William Construction Co., Inc., 558 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir.1977) (same)."
} | 12,044,783 | a |
Even circuits that clearly permit sua sponte summary judgment generally enforce the ten day notice requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 789, 792",
"parenthetical": "ten day notice and hearing also required when judge considers sua sponte summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765-66 (11th Cir.1984) (court strictly enforces ten day notice require ment); Davis Elliott International, Inc. v. Pan American Container Corp., 705 F.2d 705, 707 (3d Cir.1983) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte, ten days notice is required); Yashon v. Gregory, 737 F.2d 547, 552 (6th Cir.1984) (\"clearly established rule in this circuit is that a district court must afford the party against whom sua sponte summary judgment is to be entered ten-days notice and an adequate opportunity to respond\"); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education, 649 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1981) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte ten days notice is required); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134, 135 (6th Cir.1979) (district court must comply with ten day notice requirement even when summary judgment motion is made on the day of trial); Herzog & Straus v. GRT Corp., 553 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir.1977) (ten day notice and hearing also required when judge considers sua sponte summary judgment); see also Adams v. Campbell County School District, 483 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir.1973) (court has no authority to grant summary judgment without first giving ten days notice); Winfrey v. Brewer, 570 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.1978) (strictly construing ten day notice requirement); Utility Control Corp. v. Prince William Construction Co., Inc., 558 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir.1977) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "483 F.2d 1351, 1353",
"parenthetical": "court has no authority to grant summary judgment without first giving ten days notice",
"sentence": "See Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765-66 (11th Cir.1984) (court strictly enforces ten day notice require ment); Davis Elliott International, Inc. v. Pan American Container Corp., 705 F.2d 705, 707 (3d Cir.1983) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte, ten days notice is required); Yashon v. Gregory, 737 F.2d 547, 552 (6th Cir.1984) (\"clearly established rule in this circuit is that a district court must afford the party against whom sua sponte summary judgment is to be entered ten-days notice and an adequate opportunity to respond\"); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education, 649 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1981) (although district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte ten days notice is required); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134, 135 (6th Cir.1979) (district court must comply with ten day notice requirement even when summary judgment motion is made on the day of trial); Herzog & Straus v. GRT Corp., 553 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir.1977) (ten day notice and hearing also required when judge considers sua sponte summary judgment); see also Adams v. Campbell County School District, 483 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir.1973) (court has no authority to grant summary judgment without first giving ten days notice); Winfrey v. Brewer, 570 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.1978) (strictly construing ten day notice requirement); Utility Control Corp. v. Prince William Construction Co., Inc., 558 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir.1977) (same)."
} | 12,044,783 | a |
Evid. 801(e)(2)(C),(D). Moreover, such discrepancy goes to the weight, not the admissibility of the translated statement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that discrepancy between declarant's testimony at preliminary hearing compared to his translated statement offered at trial went to weight not admissibility of statement",
"sentence": "See Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (stating any discrepancy in testimony goes only to weight of evidence and not its admissibility); see also State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348, 502 N.W.2d 601, 610 (1993) (holding that discrepancy between declarant's testimony at preliminary hearing compared to his translated statement offered at trial went to weight not admissibility of statement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "788 S.W.2d 1, 10",
"parenthetical": "stating any discrepancy in testimony goes only to weight of evidence and not its admissibility",
"sentence": "See Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (stating any discrepancy in testimony goes only to weight of evidence and not its admissibility); see also State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348, 502 N.W.2d 601, 610 (1993) (holding that discrepancy between declarant's testimony at preliminary hearing compared to his translated statement offered at trial went to weight not admissibility of statement)."
} | 11,086,569 | b |
Evid. 801(e)(2)(C),(D). Moreover, such discrepancy goes to the weight, not the admissibility of the translated statement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "788 S.W.2d 1, 10",
"parenthetical": "stating any discrepancy in testimony goes only to weight of evidence and not its admissibility",
"sentence": "See Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (stating any discrepancy in testimony goes only to weight of evidence and not its admissibility); see also State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348, 502 N.W.2d 601, 610 (1993) (holding that discrepancy between declarant's testimony at preliminary hearing compared to his translated statement offered at trial went to weight not admissibility of statement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "502 N.W.2d 601, 610",
"parenthetical": "holding that discrepancy between declarant's testimony at preliminary hearing compared to his translated statement offered at trial went to weight not admissibility of statement",
"sentence": "See Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (stating any discrepancy in testimony goes only to weight of evidence and not its admissibility); see also State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348, 502 N.W.2d 601, 610 (1993) (holding that discrepancy between declarant's testimony at preliminary hearing compared to his translated statement offered at trial went to weight not admissibility of statement)."
} | 11,086,569 | a |
Yet these facts, if true, are insufficient to meet the "conscience-shocking" standard. "This standard is exceedingly difficult to meet, a fact underscored by the cases in which courts have declined to find a violation of substantive due process rights under substantially more egregious allegations than presented by [Ms. Hays]." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "159 F.3d 529, 529",
"parenthetical": "holding that a law school professor's substantive due process rights were not violated despite his allegations that the university failed to warn him that his conduct was prohibited",
"sentence": "Seabourn v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1-300, 775 F.Supp.2d 1306, 1314 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (holding that a “career teacher’s” substantive due process rights were not violated when the school board decided not to renew her contract due to concerns about her performance) (citing cases); see also Tonkovich, 159 F.3d at 529 (holding that a law school professor’s substantive due process rights were not violated despite his allegations that the university failed to warn him that his conduct was prohibited)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "775 F.Supp.2d 1306, 1314",
"parenthetical": "holding that a \"career teacher's\" substantive due process rights were not violated when the school board decided not to renew her contract due to concerns about her performance",
"sentence": "Seabourn v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1-300, 775 F.Supp.2d 1306, 1314 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (holding that a “career teacher’s” substantive due process rights were not violated when the school board decided not to renew her contract due to concerns about her performance) (citing cases); see also Tonkovich, 159 F.3d at 529 (holding that a law school professor’s substantive due process rights were not violated despite his allegations that the university failed to warn him that his conduct was prohibited)."
} | 12,271,994 | b |
Such an interpretation does not square with the statute's explicit reference to "the spouse ... surviving at such member's death" (emphasis added), which plainly implies that only one person can be eligible to receive such benefits. We thus hold that a former spouse is not a surviving spouse and may not collect death benefits under the statute. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "584 S.W.2d 896, 899",
"parenthetical": "interpreting a Texas pension plan and reaching a similar conclusion",
"sentence": "See Koelsch v. Koelsch, 148 Ariz. 176, 178, 713 P.2d 1234, 1236 (1986) (“The statute restricts death benefits to current spouses and children.”); see also Lack v. Lack, 584 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex.App.1979) (interpreting a Texas pension plan and reaching a similar conclusion); Arnold v. Department of Retirement Sys., 128 Wash.2d 765, 912 P.2d 463, 465 (1996) (excluding former spouses from receipt of death benefits)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "148 Ariz. 176, 178",
"parenthetical": "\"The statute restricts death benefits to current spouses and children.\"",
"sentence": "See Koelsch v. Koelsch, 148 Ariz. 176, 178, 713 P.2d 1234, 1236 (1986) (“The statute restricts death benefits to current spouses and children.”); see also Lack v. Lack, 584 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex.App.1979) (interpreting a Texas pension plan and reaching a similar conclusion); Arnold v. Department of Retirement Sys., 128 Wash.2d 765, 912 P.2d 463, 465 (1996) (excluding former spouses from receipt of death benefits)."
} | 208,630 | b |
Such an interpretation does not square with the statute's explicit reference to "the spouse ... surviving at such member's death" (emphasis added), which plainly implies that only one person can be eligible to receive such benefits. We thus hold that a former spouse is not a surviving spouse and may not collect death benefits under the statute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "713 P.2d 1234, 1236",
"parenthetical": "\"The statute restricts death benefits to current spouses and children.\"",
"sentence": "See Koelsch v. Koelsch, 148 Ariz. 176, 178, 713 P.2d 1234, 1236 (1986) (“The statute restricts death benefits to current spouses and children.”); see also Lack v. Lack, 584 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex.App.1979) (interpreting a Texas pension plan and reaching a similar conclusion); Arnold v. Department of Retirement Sys., 128 Wash.2d 765, 912 P.2d 463, 465 (1996) (excluding former spouses from receipt of death benefits)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "584 S.W.2d 896, 899",
"parenthetical": "interpreting a Texas pension plan and reaching a similar conclusion",
"sentence": "See Koelsch v. Koelsch, 148 Ariz. 176, 178, 713 P.2d 1234, 1236 (1986) (“The statute restricts death benefits to current spouses and children.”); see also Lack v. Lack, 584 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex.App.1979) (interpreting a Texas pension plan and reaching a similar conclusion); Arnold v. Department of Retirement Sys., 128 Wash.2d 765, 912 P.2d 463, 465 (1996) (excluding former spouses from receipt of death benefits)."
} | 208,630 | a |
Plaintiff contends that his filing an application with the DOT BCMR on November 3, 2006, renders his claim timely. Plaintiff reasons that this filing tolled the court's general statute of limitations. Nevertheless, it is a canon of military-pay jurisprudence that seeking permissive administrative review does not toll the statute of limitations in the Tucker Act. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "333 F.3d 1295, 1312",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is well settled that the statute of limitations for Tucker Act claims is not tolled by the claimant's exercise of his right to seek permissive administrative review of his claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“[I]t is well settled that the statute of limitations for Tucker Act claims is not tolled by the claimant’s exercise of his right to seek permissive administrative review of his claim.”); see also Brighton Village Assocs. v. United States, 52 F.3d 1056, 1060 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (holding that administrative challenges “did not postpone accrual of ... claims”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "52 F.3d 1056, 1060",
"parenthetical": "holding that administrative challenges \"did not postpone accrual of ... claims\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“[I]t is well settled that the statute of limitations for Tucker Act claims is not tolled by the claimant’s exercise of his right to seek permissive administrative review of his claim.”); see also Brighton Village Assocs. v. United States, 52 F.3d 1056, 1060 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (holding that administrative challenges “did not postpone accrual of ... claims”)."
} | 3,804,064 | a |
The outstanding mortgage held by S/N-l at the time it foreclosed was $605,000. Fall River's outstanding liens for taxes and interest totaled approximately $190,000 as of January of 1999. Under the City Assessor's most recent valuation of the property in January of 1998, the value of the property is $642,000; therefore, any attempt by Fall River to foreclose on its tax liens will impair the value Plaintiff would receive through a foreclosure of its lien. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "21 F.3d 100, 101",
"parenthetical": "finding sufficient equity to permit a tax sale where the property value was $529,578, the delinquent taxes were $73,-488.83, and the outstanding value of the FDIC's interest was $196,689.73",
"sentence": "See Matagorda, 19 F.3d at 225 n. 11 (noting that with insufficient value in the property to satisfy both liens, allowing state to foreclose if they “preserve” the FDIC’s lien is “not a realistic solution”); but see Donna Indep. School Dist. v. Balli, 21 F.3d 100, 101 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding sufficient equity to permit a tax sale where the property value was $529,578, the delinquent taxes were $73,-488.83, and the outstanding value of the FDIC’s interest was $196,689.73)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that with insufficient value in the property to satisfy both liens, allowing state to foreclose if they \"preserve\" the FDIC's lien is \"not a realistic solution\"",
"sentence": "See Matagorda, 19 F.3d at 225 n. 11 (noting that with insufficient value in the property to satisfy both liens, allowing state to foreclose if they “preserve” the FDIC’s lien is “not a realistic solution”); but see Donna Indep. School Dist. v. Balli, 21 F.3d 100, 101 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding sufficient equity to permit a tax sale where the property value was $529,578, the delinquent taxes were $73,-488.83, and the outstanding value of the FDIC’s interest was $196,689.73)."
} | 11,478,557 | b |
Moreover, even if the order had required the parent coordinator to apply the same statutory standard that governs a judge in ruling on a complaint for modification, the statute authorizes, and indeed obligates, the judge to issue the final decision on any modification to the family's custody arrangement. In similar cases we have held that a judge cannot shift the final decision-making authority granted by statute to a third party. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "438 Mass. 725, 736-737",
"parenthetical": "judge could not grant therapist \"sole authority\" to determine when parent-child visitation would be appropriate where statute obligated judge to make specific findings on issue of visitation",
"sentence": "See Silverman v. Spiro, 438 Mass. 725, 736-737 (2003) (judge could not grant therapist “sole authority” to determine when parent-child visitation would be appropriate where statute obligated judge to make specific findings on issue of visitation); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Marble, 316 Mass. 294, 301 (1944) (judge could not delegate to trustee authority to determine what constitutes “reasonable” legal fees where statute requires judge to make that determination)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "61 Mass. App. Ct. 779, 785-786",
"parenthetical": "judge cannot delegate wholesale to guardian ad litem statutory duty to conduct in camera review of documents over which privilege asserted",
"sentence": "See also P.W. v. M.S., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 779, 785-786 (2006) (judge cannot delegate wholesale to guardian ad litem statutory duty to conduct in camera review of documents over which privilege asserted)."
} | 4,309,111 | a |
Moreover, even if the order had required the parent coordinator to apply the same statutory standard that governs a judge in ruling on a complaint for modification, the statute authorizes, and indeed obligates, the judge to issue the final decision on any modification to the family's custody arrangement. In similar cases we have held that a judge cannot shift the final decision-making authority granted by statute to a third party. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "316 Mass. 294, 301",
"parenthetical": "judge could not delegate to trustee authority to determine what constitutes \"reasonable\" legal fees where statute requires judge to make that determination",
"sentence": "See Silverman v. Spiro, 438 Mass. 725, 736-737 (2003) (judge could not grant therapist “sole authority” to determine when parent-child visitation would be appropriate where statute obligated judge to make specific findings on issue of visitation); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Marble, 316 Mass. 294, 301 (1944) (judge could not delegate to trustee authority to determine what constitutes “reasonable” legal fees where statute requires judge to make that determination)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "61 Mass. App. Ct. 779, 785-786",
"parenthetical": "judge cannot delegate wholesale to guardian ad litem statutory duty to conduct in camera review of documents over which privilege asserted",
"sentence": "See also P.W. v. M.S., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 779, 785-786 (2006) (judge cannot delegate wholesale to guardian ad litem statutory duty to conduct in camera review of documents over which privilege asserted)."
} | 4,309,111 | a |
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