context
stringlengths 58
1.13k
| citation_a
dict | citation_b
dict | case_id
int64 475
12.5M
| label
stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|
An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without independently evaluating the aggrieved employee's situation, the imposition of liability may be appropriate. If such claims are accepted at face value, the subordinate's discriminatory statements and actions may then be fairly imputed to the formal decisionmak-ers and, by virtue of them, to the employer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "252 F.3d 382, 382",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker's action is merely a 'rubber stamp' for the subordinate's recommendation\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | 9,383,808 | b |
An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without independently evaluating the aggrieved employee's situation, the imposition of liability may be appropriate. If such claims are accepted at face value, the subordinate's discriminatory statements and actions may then be fairly imputed to the formal decisionmak-ers and, by virtue of them, to the employer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "524 U.S. 742, 762",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "220 F.3d 1220, 1231",
"parenthetical": "recognizing case law holding that an employer \"may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the 'cat's paw,' for a subordinate employee's prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | 9,383,808 | b |
An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without independently evaluating the aggrieved employee's situation, the imposition of liability may be appropriate. If such claims are accepted at face value, the subordinate's discriminatory statements and actions may then be fairly imputed to the formal decisionmak-ers and, by virtue of them, to the employer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "220 F.3d 1220, 1231",
"parenthetical": "recognizing case law holding that an employer \"may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the 'cat's paw,' for a subordinate employee's prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | 9,383,808 | b |
An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without independently evaluating the aggrieved employee's situation, the imposition of liability may be appropriate. If such claims are accepted at face value, the subordinate's discriminatory statements and actions may then be fairly imputed to the formal decisionmak-ers and, by virtue of them, to the employer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "220 F.3d 1220, 1231",
"parenthetical": "recognizing case law holding that an employer \"may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the 'cat's paw,' for a subordinate employee's prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | 9,383,808 | a |
An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without independently evaluating the aggrieved employee's situation, the imposition of liability may be appropriate. If such claims are accepted at face value, the subordinate's discriminatory statements and actions may then be fairly imputed to the formal decisionmak-ers and, by virtue of them, to the employer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 542, 547",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the 'cat's paw\" of the subordinate\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "524 U.S. 742, 762",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | 9,383,808 | a |
An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without independently evaluating the aggrieved employee's situation, the imposition of liability may be appropriate. If such claims are accepted at face value, the subordinate's discriminatory statements and actions may then be fairly imputed to the formal decisionmak-ers and, by virtue of them, to the employer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 542, 547",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the 'cat's paw\" of the subordinate\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | 9,383,808 | b |
An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without independently evaluating the aggrieved employee's situation, the imposition of liability may be appropriate. If such claims are accepted at face value, the subordinate's discriminatory statements and actions may then be fairly imputed to the formal decisionmak-ers and, by virtue of them, to the employer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 542, 547",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the 'cat's paw\" of the subordinate\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | 9,383,808 | a |
The reasonable possibility inquiry governing the district court's determination is similar to that made in determining whether a trial error of constitutional dimension is harmless: that is, whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "136 F.3d 986, 994",
"parenthetical": "equating reasonable possibility determination regarding extrinsic evidence in jury room to harmless error review",
"sentence": "See Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1211 n. 158 (D.C.Cir.1973) (noting that “[i]n Chapman it was held that before a federal constitutional error can be held ‘harmless,’ the court must be of the belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt [and] must find that there is no reasonable possibility that the error complained of might have contributed to the conviction”) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 5.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), overruled in part by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), and Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)) (emphasis added); United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C.Cir.1994) (“For most constitutional errors, an appellate court is to reverse if it entertains a ‘reasonable doubt’ about whether the error affected the outcome below.”); see also Pyles v. Johnson, 136 F.3d 986, 994 (5th Cir.1998) (equating reasonable possibility determination regarding extrinsic evidence in jury room to harmless error review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "24 F.3d 283, 287",
"parenthetical": "\"For most constitutional errors, an appellate court is to reverse if it entertains a 'reasonable doubt' about whether the error affected the outcome below.\"",
"sentence": "See Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1211 n. 158 (D.C.Cir.1973) (noting that “[i]n Chapman it was held that before a federal constitutional error can be held ‘harmless,’ the court must be of the belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt [and] must find that there is no reasonable possibility that the error complained of might have contributed to the conviction”) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 5.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), overruled in part by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), and Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)) (emphasis added); United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C.Cir.1994) (“For most constitutional errors, an appellate court is to reverse if it entertains a ‘reasonable doubt’ about whether the error affected the outcome below.”); see also Pyles v. Johnson, 136 F.3d 986, 994 (5th Cir.1998) (equating reasonable possibility determination regarding extrinsic evidence in jury room to harmless error review)."
} | 3,674,069 | b |
The Court need not reach the merits of defendants' qualified immunity defense with respect to plaintiffs' section 1983 claims, because they fail to state a claim under that provision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 U.S. 277, 284",
"parenthetical": "Because appellants failed to show deprivation of rights under section 1983, \"it is not necessary ... to decide ... question [of] immunity\"",
"sentence": "See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (Because appellants failed to show deprivation of rights under section 1983, “it is not necessary ... to decide ... question [of] immunity”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 233, 233",
"parenthetical": "no need to consider immunity defense where plaintiff failed to establish constitutional violation, stating that \"[t]his [is] the desirab[le] ... approach\"",
"sentence": "See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233 (no need to consider immunity defense where plaintiff failed to establish constitutional violation, stating that “[t]his [is] the desirab[le] ... approach”)."
} | 196,687 | b |
The Court need not reach the merits of defendants' qualified immunity defense with respect to plaintiffs' section 1983 claims, because they fail to state a claim under that provision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 233, 233",
"parenthetical": "no need to consider immunity defense where plaintiff failed to establish constitutional violation, stating that \"[t]his [is] the desirab[le] ... approach\"",
"sentence": "See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233 (no need to consider immunity defense where plaintiff failed to establish constitutional violation, stating that “[t]his [is] the desirab[le] ... approach”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Because appellants failed to show deprivation of rights under section 1983, \"it is not necessary ... to decide ... question [of] immunity\"",
"sentence": "See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (Because appellants failed to show deprivation of rights under section 1983, “it is not necessary ... to decide ... question [of] immunity”)."
} | 196,687 | a |
The Court need not reach the merits of defendants' qualified immunity defense with respect to plaintiffs' section 1983 claims, because they fail to state a claim under that provision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Because appellants failed to show deprivation of rights under section 1983, \"it is not necessary ... to decide ... question [of] immunity\"",
"sentence": "See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (Because appellants failed to show deprivation of rights under section 1983, “it is not necessary ... to decide ... question [of] immunity”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 233, 233",
"parenthetical": "no need to consider immunity defense where plaintiff failed to establish constitutional violation, stating that \"[t]his [is] the desirab[le] ... approach\"",
"sentence": "See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233 (no need to consider immunity defense where plaintiff failed to establish constitutional violation, stating that “[t]his [is] the desirab[le] ... approach”)."
} | 196,687 | b |
In the rare cases where we have found an abuse of discretion in a district court's refusal to grant an extension of time, our analysis has been highly fact-specific. We have granted relief when the appealing litigant was reasonably surprised by the deadline or the action of the court, or the events leading to the contested decision were unfair. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 1, 4",
"parenthetical": "reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party's delay was attributable to \"an ambiguity in the Local Rules\" and a snafu in the district court clerk's office",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party’s delay was attributable to “an ambiguity in the Local Rules” and a snafu in the district court clerk’s office); United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir.1992) (overturning grant of motion to suppress when government’s failure to respond was due to “interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity”); see also Douglas v. York County, 360 F.3d 286, 290-91 (1st Cir.2004) (holding that it was “simply unfair— and an abuse of discretion” for district court to deny non-moving party’s motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had “switched the basic issue without giving the parties adequate warning”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Assoc., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209 (1st Cir.1994) (reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was “laid low” by the moving party’s “rabbit punch,” and “the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct”); Mendez, 900 F.2d at 7 (declining to overrule district court’s refusal to extend time in part because “the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised” by the filing deadline)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 286, 290-91",
"parenthetical": "holding that it was \"simply unfair-- and an abuse of discretion\" for district court to deny non-moving party's motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had \"switched the basic issue without giving the parties adequate warning\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party’s delay was attributable to “an ambiguity in the Local Rules” and a snafu in the district court clerk’s office); United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir.1992) (overturning grant of motion to suppress when government’s failure to respond was due to “interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity”); see also Douglas v. York County, 360 F.3d 286, 290-91 (1st Cir.2004) (holding that it was “simply unfair— and an abuse of discretion” for district court to deny non-moving party’s motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had “switched the basic issue without giving the parties adequate warning”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Assoc., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209 (1st Cir.1994) (reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was “laid low” by the moving party’s “rabbit punch,” and “the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct”); Mendez, 900 F.2d at 7 (declining to overrule district court’s refusal to extend time in part because “the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised” by the filing deadline)."
} | 82,006 | a |
In the rare cases where we have found an abuse of discretion in a district court's refusal to grant an extension of time, our analysis has been highly fact-specific. We have granted relief when the appealing litigant was reasonably surprised by the deadline or the action of the court, or the events leading to the contested decision were unfair. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 1, 4",
"parenthetical": "reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party's delay was attributable to \"an ambiguity in the Local Rules\" and a snafu in the district court clerk's office",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party’s delay was attributable to “an ambiguity in the Local Rules” and a snafu in the district court clerk’s office); United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir.1992) (overturning grant of motion to suppress when government’s failure to respond was due to “interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity”); see also Douglas v. York County, 360 F.3d 286, 290-91 (1st Cir.2004) (holding that it was “simply unfair— and an abuse of discretion” for district court to deny non-moving party’s motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had “switched the basic issue without giving the parties adequate warning”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Assoc., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209 (1st Cir.1994) (reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was “laid low” by the moving party’s “rabbit punch,” and “the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct”); Mendez, 900 F.2d at 7 (declining to overrule district court’s refusal to extend time in part because “the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised” by the filing deadline)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209",
"parenthetical": "reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was \"laid low\" by the moving party's \"rabbit punch,\" and \"the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party’s delay was attributable to “an ambiguity in the Local Rules” and a snafu in the district court clerk’s office); United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir.1992) (overturning grant of motion to suppress when government’s failure to respond was due to “interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity”); see also Douglas v. York County, 360 F.3d 286, 290-91 (1st Cir.2004) (holding that it was “simply unfair— and an abuse of discretion” for district court to deny non-moving party’s motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had “switched the basic issue without giving the parties adequate warning”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Assoc., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209 (1st Cir.1994) (reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was “laid low” by the moving party’s “rabbit punch,” and “the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct”); Mendez, 900 F.2d at 7 (declining to overrule district court’s refusal to extend time in part because “the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised” by the filing deadline)."
} | 82,006 | a |
In the rare cases where we have found an abuse of discretion in a district court's refusal to grant an extension of time, our analysis has been highly fact-specific. We have granted relief when the appealing litigant was reasonably surprised by the deadline or the action of the court, or the events leading to the contested decision were unfair. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "900 F.2d 7, 7",
"parenthetical": "declining to overrule district court's refusal to extend time in part because \"the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised\" by the filing deadline",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party’s delay was attributable to “an ambiguity in the Local Rules” and a snafu in the district court clerk’s office); United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir.1992) (overturning grant of motion to suppress when government’s failure to respond was due to “interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity”); see also Douglas v. York County, 360 F.3d 286, 290-91 (1st Cir.2004) (holding that it was “simply unfair— and an abuse of discretion” for district court to deny non-moving party’s motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had “switched the basic issue without giving the parties adequate warning”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Assoc., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209 (1st Cir.1994) (reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was “laid low” by the moving party’s “rabbit punch,” and “the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct”); Mendez, 900 F.2d at 7 (declining to overrule district court’s refusal to extend time in part because “the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised” by the filing deadline)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 1, 4",
"parenthetical": "reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party's delay was attributable to \"an ambiguity in the Local Rules\" and a snafu in the district court clerk's office",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party’s delay was attributable to “an ambiguity in the Local Rules” and a snafu in the district court clerk’s office); United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir.1992) (overturning grant of motion to suppress when government’s failure to respond was due to “interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity”); see also Douglas v. York County, 360 F.3d 286, 290-91 (1st Cir.2004) (holding that it was “simply unfair— and an abuse of discretion” for district court to deny non-moving party’s motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had “switched the basic issue without giving the parties adequate warning”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Assoc., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209 (1st Cir.1994) (reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was “laid low” by the moving party’s “rabbit punch,” and “the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct”); Mendez, 900 F.2d at 7 (declining to overrule district court’s refusal to extend time in part because “the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised” by the filing deadline)."
} | 82,006 | b |
In the rare cases where we have found an abuse of discretion in a district court's refusal to grant an extension of time, our analysis has been highly fact-specific. We have granted relief when the appealing litigant was reasonably surprised by the deadline or the action of the court, or the events leading to the contested decision were unfair. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 286, 290-91",
"parenthetical": "holding that it was \"simply unfair-- and an abuse of discretion\" for district court to deny non-moving party's motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had \"switched the basic issue without giving the parties adequate warning\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party’s delay was attributable to “an ambiguity in the Local Rules” and a snafu in the district court clerk’s office); United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir.1992) (overturning grant of motion to suppress when government’s failure to respond was due to “interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity”); see also Douglas v. York County, 360 F.3d 286, 290-91 (1st Cir.2004) (holding that it was “simply unfair— and an abuse of discretion” for district court to deny non-moving party’s motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had “switched the basic issue without giving the parties adequate warning”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Assoc., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209 (1st Cir.1994) (reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was “laid low” by the moving party’s “rabbit punch,” and “the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct”); Mendez, 900 F.2d at 7 (declining to overrule district court’s refusal to extend time in part because “the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised” by the filing deadline)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "978 F.2d 17, 20-21",
"parenthetical": "overturning grant of motion to suppress when government's failure to respond was due to \"interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party’s delay was attributable to “an ambiguity in the Local Rules” and a snafu in the district court clerk’s office); United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir.1992) (overturning grant of motion to suppress when government’s failure to respond was due to “interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity”); see also Douglas v. York County, 360 F.3d 286, 290-91 (1st Cir.2004) (holding that it was “simply unfair— and an abuse of discretion” for district court to deny non-moving party’s motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had “switched the basic issue without giving the parties adequate warning”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Assoc., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209 (1st Cir.1994) (reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was “laid low” by the moving party’s “rabbit punch,” and “the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct”); Mendez, 900 F.2d at 7 (declining to overrule district court’s refusal to extend time in part because “the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised” by the filing deadline)."
} | 82,006 | b |
In the rare cases where we have found an abuse of discretion in a district court's refusal to grant an extension of time, our analysis has been highly fact-specific. We have granted relief when the appealing litigant was reasonably surprised by the deadline or the action of the court, or the events leading to the contested decision were unfair. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209",
"parenthetical": "reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was \"laid low\" by the moving party's \"rabbit punch,\" and \"the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party’s delay was attributable to “an ambiguity in the Local Rules” and a snafu in the district court clerk’s office); United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir.1992) (overturning grant of motion to suppress when government’s failure to respond was due to “interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity”); see also Douglas v. York County, 360 F.3d 286, 290-91 (1st Cir.2004) (holding that it was “simply unfair— and an abuse of discretion” for district court to deny non-moving party’s motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had “switched the basic issue without giving the parties adequate warning”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Assoc., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209 (1st Cir.1994) (reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was “laid low” by the moving party’s “rabbit punch,” and “the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct”); Mendez, 900 F.2d at 7 (declining to overrule district court’s refusal to extend time in part because “the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised” by the filing deadline)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "978 F.2d 17, 20-21",
"parenthetical": "overturning grant of motion to suppress when government's failure to respond was due to \"interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party’s delay was attributable to “an ambiguity in the Local Rules” and a snafu in the district court clerk’s office); United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir.1992) (overturning grant of motion to suppress when government’s failure to respond was due to “interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity”); see also Douglas v. York County, 360 F.3d 286, 290-91 (1st Cir.2004) (holding that it was “simply unfair— and an abuse of discretion” for district court to deny non-moving party’s motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had “switched the basic issue without giving the parties adequate warning”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Assoc., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209 (1st Cir.1994) (reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was “laid low” by the moving party’s “rabbit punch,” and “the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct”); Mendez, 900 F.2d at 7 (declining to overrule district court’s refusal to extend time in part because “the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised” by the filing deadline)."
} | 82,006 | b |
In the rare cases where we have found an abuse of discretion in a district court's refusal to grant an extension of time, our analysis has been highly fact-specific. We have granted relief when the appealing litigant was reasonably surprised by the deadline or the action of the court, or the events leading to the contested decision were unfair. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "900 F.2d 7, 7",
"parenthetical": "declining to overrule district court's refusal to extend time in part because \"the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised\" by the filing deadline",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party’s delay was attributable to “an ambiguity in the Local Rules” and a snafu in the district court clerk’s office); United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir.1992) (overturning grant of motion to suppress when government’s failure to respond was due to “interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity”); see also Douglas v. York County, 360 F.3d 286, 290-91 (1st Cir.2004) (holding that it was “simply unfair— and an abuse of discretion” for district court to deny non-moving party’s motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had “switched the basic issue without giving the parties adequate warning”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Assoc., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209 (1st Cir.1994) (reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was “laid low” by the moving party’s “rabbit punch,” and “the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct”); Mendez, 900 F.2d at 7 (declining to overrule district court’s refusal to extend time in part because “the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised” by the filing deadline)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "978 F.2d 17, 20-21",
"parenthetical": "overturning grant of motion to suppress when government's failure to respond was due to \"interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party’s delay was attributable to “an ambiguity in the Local Rules” and a snafu in the district court clerk’s office); United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir.1992) (overturning grant of motion to suppress when government’s failure to respond was due to “interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity”); see also Douglas v. York County, 360 F.3d 286, 290-91 (1st Cir.2004) (holding that it was “simply unfair— and an abuse of discretion” for district court to deny non-moving party’s motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had “switched the basic issue without giving the parties adequate warning”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Assoc., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209 (1st Cir.1994) (reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was “laid low” by the moving party’s “rabbit punch,” and “the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct”); Mendez, 900 F.2d at 7 (declining to overrule district court’s refusal to extend time in part because “the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised” by the filing deadline)."
} | 82,006 | b |
We note that our decision is consistent with the law in at least three other circuits. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "823 F.2d 1209, 1211",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's obtaining of more severe indictment after defendant refused to cooperate with police did not arise out of prosecutorial vindictiveness because a defendant does not have a right to refuse to cooperate with authorities",
"sentence": "See United States v. Long, 823 F.2d 1209, 1211 (7th Cir.1987) (prosecutor’s obtaining of more severe indictment after defendant refused to cooperate with police did not arise out of prosecutorial vindictiveness because a defendant does not have a right to refuse to cooperate with authorities); United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125-26 (3d Cir.1986) (no prosecutorial vindictiveness where federal charges were brought because defendant failed to cooperate satisfactorily with local authorities); see also United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir.1980) (government’s decision to seek more severe indictment after defendant rejected offer to plead guilty to initial charges and to cooperate with police did not amount to vindictiveness because defendant was free to accept or reject the proposed offer)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "611 F.2d 770, 773",
"parenthetical": "government's decision to seek more severe indictment after defendant rejected offer to plead guilty to initial charges and to cooperate with police did not amount to vindictiveness because defendant was free to accept or reject the proposed offer",
"sentence": "See United States v. Long, 823 F.2d 1209, 1211 (7th Cir.1987) (prosecutor’s obtaining of more severe indictment after defendant refused to cooperate with police did not arise out of prosecutorial vindictiveness because a defendant does not have a right to refuse to cooperate with authorities); United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125-26 (3d Cir.1986) (no prosecutorial vindictiveness where federal charges were brought because defendant failed to cooperate satisfactorily with local authorities); see also United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir.1980) (government’s decision to seek more severe indictment after defendant rejected offer to plead guilty to initial charges and to cooperate with police did not amount to vindictiveness because defendant was free to accept or reject the proposed offer)."
} | 7,410,795 | a |
We note that our decision is consistent with the law in at least three other circuits. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "611 F.2d 770, 773",
"parenthetical": "government's decision to seek more severe indictment after defendant rejected offer to plead guilty to initial charges and to cooperate with police did not amount to vindictiveness because defendant was free to accept or reject the proposed offer",
"sentence": "See United States v. Long, 823 F.2d 1209, 1211 (7th Cir.1987) (prosecutor’s obtaining of more severe indictment after defendant refused to cooperate with police did not arise out of prosecutorial vindictiveness because a defendant does not have a right to refuse to cooperate with authorities); United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125-26 (3d Cir.1986) (no prosecutorial vindictiveness where federal charges were brought because defendant failed to cooperate satisfactorily with local authorities); see also United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir.1980) (government’s decision to seek more severe indictment after defendant rejected offer to plead guilty to initial charges and to cooperate with police did not amount to vindictiveness because defendant was free to accept or reject the proposed offer)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "787 F.2d 124, 125-26",
"parenthetical": "no prosecutorial vindictiveness where federal charges were brought because defendant failed to cooperate satisfactorily with local authorities",
"sentence": "See United States v. Long, 823 F.2d 1209, 1211 (7th Cir.1987) (prosecutor’s obtaining of more severe indictment after defendant refused to cooperate with police did not arise out of prosecutorial vindictiveness because a defendant does not have a right to refuse to cooperate with authorities); United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125-26 (3d Cir.1986) (no prosecutorial vindictiveness where federal charges were brought because defendant failed to cooperate satisfactorily with local authorities); see also United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir.1980) (government’s decision to seek more severe indictment after defendant rejected offer to plead guilty to initial charges and to cooperate with police did not amount to vindictiveness because defendant was free to accept or reject the proposed offer)."
} | 7,410,795 | b |
Unless the statutes fall under one of those circumstances, courts must apply the presumption against reading an implied repeal into the second statute. The presumption against implied repeals is even stronger when the two laws are passed during the same legislative session. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "485 U.S. 547, 547",
"parenthetical": "rejecting an implied repeal where \"the same Congress\" had \"not affirmatively evince[d] any intent to repeal or amend\" the original statute, and enacted a second statute only one year later",
"sentence": "See Traynor, 485 U.S. at 547, 108 S.Ct. 1372 (rejecting an implied repeal where “the same Congress” had “not affirmatively evince[d] any intent to repeal or amend” the original statute, and enacted a second statute only one year later); see also Washington Cnty. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 188, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 68 L.Ed.2d 751 (1981) (“It defies common sense to believe that the same Congress ... intended sub silentio ... to abandon the limitations of the equal work approach just one year later, when it enacted Title VIL” (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); Pullen v. Morgenthau, 73 F.2d 281, 283 (2d Cir.1934) (“Where both laws are passed at the same session, the presumption against implied repeal is all the stronger.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "73 F.2d 281, 283",
"parenthetical": "\"Where both laws are passed at the same session, the presumption against implied repeal is all the stronger.\"",
"sentence": "See Traynor, 485 U.S. at 547, 108 S.Ct. 1372 (rejecting an implied repeal where “the same Congress” had “not affirmatively evince[d] any intent to repeal or amend” the original statute, and enacted a second statute only one year later); see also Washington Cnty. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 188, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 68 L.Ed.2d 751 (1981) (“It defies common sense to believe that the same Congress ... intended sub silentio ... to abandon the limitations of the equal work approach just one year later, when it enacted Title VIL” (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); Pullen v. Morgenthau, 73 F.2d 281, 283 (2d Cir.1934) (“Where both laws are passed at the same session, the presumption against implied repeal is all the stronger.”)."
} | 4,262,324 | a |
Unless the statutes fall under one of those circumstances, courts must apply the presumption against reading an implied repeal into the second statute. The presumption against implied repeals is even stronger when the two laws are passed during the same legislative session. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting an implied repeal where \"the same Congress\" had \"not affirmatively evince[d] any intent to repeal or amend\" the original statute, and enacted a second statute only one year later",
"sentence": "See Traynor, 485 U.S. at 547, 108 S.Ct. 1372 (rejecting an implied repeal where “the same Congress” had “not affirmatively evince[d] any intent to repeal or amend” the original statute, and enacted a second statute only one year later); see also Washington Cnty. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 188, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 68 L.Ed.2d 751 (1981) (“It defies common sense to believe that the same Congress ... intended sub silentio ... to abandon the limitations of the equal work approach just one year later, when it enacted Title VIL” (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); Pullen v. Morgenthau, 73 F.2d 281, 283 (2d Cir.1934) (“Where both laws are passed at the same session, the presumption against implied repeal is all the stronger.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "73 F.2d 281, 283",
"parenthetical": "\"Where both laws are passed at the same session, the presumption against implied repeal is all the stronger.\"",
"sentence": "See Traynor, 485 U.S. at 547, 108 S.Ct. 1372 (rejecting an implied repeal where “the same Congress” had “not affirmatively evince[d] any intent to repeal or amend” the original statute, and enacted a second statute only one year later); see also Washington Cnty. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 188, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 68 L.Ed.2d 751 (1981) (“It defies common sense to believe that the same Congress ... intended sub silentio ... to abandon the limitations of the equal work approach just one year later, when it enacted Title VIL” (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); Pullen v. Morgenthau, 73 F.2d 281, 283 (2d Cir.1934) (“Where both laws are passed at the same session, the presumption against implied repeal is all the stronger.”)."
} | 4,262,324 | a |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "892 F.2d 305, 309",
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 157, 159",
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | 10,532,128 | b |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 157, 159",
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | 10,532,128 | b |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 157, 159",
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | 10,532,128 | a |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 157, 159",
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | 10,532,128 | b |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "892 F.2d 305, 309",
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | 10,532,128 | b |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | 10,532,128 | b |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | 10,532,128 | a |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | 10,532,128 | a |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "892 F.2d 305, 309",
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | 10,532,128 | b |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | 10,532,128 | b |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | 10,532,128 | a |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir.) (“waiver by counsel of a defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 628, 121 L.Ed.2d 560 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir.1989) (under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously “to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211, 109 L.Ed.2d 537 (1990)."
} | 10,532,128 | a |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "740 F.2d 780, 789",
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "575 F.2d 132, 137-38",
"parenthetical": "provision that buyer agreed to \"pay as used\" for seller's inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by \"business judgment\" and not merely \"to avoid contractual obligations\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | 1,816,438 | a |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "740 F.2d 780, 789",
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "365 F.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | 1,816,438 | a |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "575 F.2d 132, 137-38",
"parenthetical": "provision that buyer agreed to \"pay as used\" for seller's inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by \"business judgment\" and not merely \"to avoid contractual obligations\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | 1,816,438 | b |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "365 F.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | 1,816,438 | a |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "575 F.2d 132, 137-38",
"parenthetical": "provision that buyer agreed to \"pay as used\" for seller's inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by \"business judgment\" and not merely \"to avoid contractual obligations\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | 1,816,438 | b |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "365 F.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | 1,816,438 | b |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "575 F.2d 132, 137-38",
"parenthetical": "provision that buyer agreed to \"pay as used\" for seller's inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by \"business judgment\" and not merely \"to avoid contractual obligations\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | 1,816,438 | b |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "365 F.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | 1,816,438 | a |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "575 F.2d 132, 137-38",
"parenthetical": "provision that buyer agreed to \"pay as used\" for seller's inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by \"business judgment\" and not merely \"to avoid contractual obligations\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "102 F.2d 630, 632-33",
"parenthetical": "\"Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | 1,816,438 | b |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "102 F.2d 630, 632-33",
"parenthetical": "\"Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "365 F.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985) (“courts will imply a promise that the buyer’s requirements be in good faith”); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-33 (10th Cir.1939) (“Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith”); see also Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137-38 (7th Cir.1978) (provision that buyer agreed to “pay as used” for seller’s inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by “business judgment” and not merely “to avoid contractual obligations”); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1966) (“buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements”)."
} | 1,816,438 | a |
A party to a contract cannot tortiously interfere with her own contract. See, e.g., Cedar Hills Props. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "820 So.2d 963, 965",
"parenthetical": "\"While an agent may be held personally liable for his or her tortious acts, even if committed within the scope of the agent's employment with the principal, an agent is not liable for tortious interference with a contract of which his or her principal is a party.\"",
"sentence": "Corp. v. E. Fed. Corp., 575 So.2d 673, 676-77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that leasing agent “acting within his capacity and scope as an agent, cannot be considered to be a separate entity outside of the contractual relationship which can tortiously interfere with that relationship”); see also Richard Bertram, Inc. v. Sterling Bank & Trust, 820 So.2d 963, 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“While an agent may be held personally liable for his or her tortious acts, even if committed within the scope of the agent’s employment with the principal, an agent is not liable for tortious interference with a contract of which his or her principal is a party.”) (citations omitted); Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So.2d 381, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“For the interference to be unjustified, the defendant must be a third party, external to the business relationship” or an agent who “acts solely with ulterior purposes, without an honest belief that his actions would benefit the employer, and the employee’s conduct concerning the contract or business relationship is not in the employer’s best interest.”); Babson Bros. Co. v. Allison, 337 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (holding that employee of one family-owned corporation who was assigned to terminate a contract of another corporation owned by the same family could not, as a matter of law, be held liable for tortious interference with the contract)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "575 So.2d 673, 676-77",
"parenthetical": "holding that leasing agent \"acting within his capacity and scope as an agent, cannot be considered to be a separate entity outside of the contractual relationship which can tortiously interfere with that relationship\"",
"sentence": "Corp. v. E. Fed. Corp., 575 So.2d 673, 676-77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that leasing agent “acting within his capacity and scope as an agent, cannot be considered to be a separate entity outside of the contractual relationship which can tortiously interfere with that relationship”); see also Richard Bertram, Inc. v. Sterling Bank & Trust, 820 So.2d 963, 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“While an agent may be held personally liable for his or her tortious acts, even if committed within the scope of the agent’s employment with the principal, an agent is not liable for tortious interference with a contract of which his or her principal is a party.”) (citations omitted); Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So.2d 381, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“For the interference to be unjustified, the defendant must be a third party, external to the business relationship” or an agent who “acts solely with ulterior purposes, without an honest belief that his actions would benefit the employer, and the employee’s conduct concerning the contract or business relationship is not in the employer’s best interest.”); Babson Bros. Co. v. Allison, 337 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (holding that employee of one family-owned corporation who was assigned to terminate a contract of another corporation owned by the same family could not, as a matter of law, be held liable for tortious interference with the contract)."
} | 9,098,202 | b |
A party to a contract cannot tortiously interfere with her own contract. See, e.g., Cedar Hills Props. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "742 So.2d 381, 386",
"parenthetical": "\"For the interference to be unjustified, the defendant must be a third party, external to the business relationship\" or an agent who \"acts solely with ulterior purposes, without an honest belief that his actions would benefit the employer, and the employee's conduct concerning the contract or business relationship is not in the employer's best interest.\"",
"sentence": "Corp. v. E. Fed. Corp., 575 So.2d 673, 676-77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that leasing agent “acting within his capacity and scope as an agent, cannot be considered to be a separate entity outside of the contractual relationship which can tortiously interfere with that relationship”); see also Richard Bertram, Inc. v. Sterling Bank & Trust, 820 So.2d 963, 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“While an agent may be held personally liable for his or her tortious acts, even if committed within the scope of the agent’s employment with the principal, an agent is not liable for tortious interference with a contract of which his or her principal is a party.”) (citations omitted); Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So.2d 381, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“For the interference to be unjustified, the defendant must be a third party, external to the business relationship” or an agent who “acts solely with ulterior purposes, without an honest belief that his actions would benefit the employer, and the employee’s conduct concerning the contract or business relationship is not in the employer’s best interest.”); Babson Bros. Co. v. Allison, 337 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (holding that employee of one family-owned corporation who was assigned to terminate a contract of another corporation owned by the same family could not, as a matter of law, be held liable for tortious interference with the contract)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "575 So.2d 673, 676-77",
"parenthetical": "holding that leasing agent \"acting within his capacity and scope as an agent, cannot be considered to be a separate entity outside of the contractual relationship which can tortiously interfere with that relationship\"",
"sentence": "Corp. v. E. Fed. Corp., 575 So.2d 673, 676-77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that leasing agent “acting within his capacity and scope as an agent, cannot be considered to be a separate entity outside of the contractual relationship which can tortiously interfere with that relationship”); see also Richard Bertram, Inc. v. Sterling Bank & Trust, 820 So.2d 963, 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“While an agent may be held personally liable for his or her tortious acts, even if committed within the scope of the agent’s employment with the principal, an agent is not liable for tortious interference with a contract of which his or her principal is a party.”) (citations omitted); Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So.2d 381, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“For the interference to be unjustified, the defendant must be a third party, external to the business relationship” or an agent who “acts solely with ulterior purposes, without an honest belief that his actions would benefit the employer, and the employee’s conduct concerning the contract or business relationship is not in the employer’s best interest.”); Babson Bros. Co. v. Allison, 337 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (holding that employee of one family-owned corporation who was assigned to terminate a contract of another corporation owned by the same family could not, as a matter of law, be held liable for tortious interference with the contract)."
} | 9,098,202 | b |
A party to a contract cannot tortiously interfere with her own contract. See, e.g., Cedar Hills Props. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that employee of one family-owned corporation who was assigned to terminate a contract of another corporation owned by the same family could not, as a matter of law, be held liable for tortious interference with the contract",
"sentence": "Corp. v. E. Fed. Corp., 575 So.2d 673, 676-77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that leasing agent “acting within his capacity and scope as an agent, cannot be considered to be a separate entity outside of the contractual relationship which can tortiously interfere with that relationship”); see also Richard Bertram, Inc. v. Sterling Bank & Trust, 820 So.2d 963, 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“While an agent may be held personally liable for his or her tortious acts, even if committed within the scope of the agent’s employment with the principal, an agent is not liable for tortious interference with a contract of which his or her principal is a party.”) (citations omitted); Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So.2d 381, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“For the interference to be unjustified, the defendant must be a third party, external to the business relationship” or an agent who “acts solely with ulterior purposes, without an honest belief that his actions would benefit the employer, and the employee’s conduct concerning the contract or business relationship is not in the employer’s best interest.”); Babson Bros. Co. v. Allison, 337 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (holding that employee of one family-owned corporation who was assigned to terminate a contract of another corporation owned by the same family could not, as a matter of law, be held liable for tortious interference with the contract)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "575 So.2d 673, 676-77",
"parenthetical": "holding that leasing agent \"acting within his capacity and scope as an agent, cannot be considered to be a separate entity outside of the contractual relationship which can tortiously interfere with that relationship\"",
"sentence": "Corp. v. E. Fed. Corp., 575 So.2d 673, 676-77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that leasing agent “acting within his capacity and scope as an agent, cannot be considered to be a separate entity outside of the contractual relationship which can tortiously interfere with that relationship”); see also Richard Bertram, Inc. v. Sterling Bank & Trust, 820 So.2d 963, 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“While an agent may be held personally liable for his or her tortious acts, even if committed within the scope of the agent’s employment with the principal, an agent is not liable for tortious interference with a contract of which his or her principal is a party.”) (citations omitted); Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So.2d 381, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“For the interference to be unjustified, the defendant must be a third party, external to the business relationship” or an agent who “acts solely with ulterior purposes, without an honest belief that his actions would benefit the employer, and the employee’s conduct concerning the contract or business relationship is not in the employer’s best interest.”); Babson Bros. Co. v. Allison, 337 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (holding that employee of one family-owned corporation who was assigned to terminate a contract of another corporation owned by the same family could not, as a matter of law, be held liable for tortious interference with the contract)."
} | 9,098,202 | b |
Congress has unmistakably preempted certain state law claims pertaining to medical devices. Congress enacted this express preemption clause to prevent manufacturers from being subject to inconsistent laws and regulations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "552 U.S. 326, 326",
"parenthetical": "explaining that without the FDA's central oversight, juries would \"apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations,\" thus subjecting medical device manufacturers to the whims of juries in all 50 states",
"sentence": "See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 326, 128 S.Ct. 999 (explaining that without the FDA’s central oversight, juries would “apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations,” thus subjecting medical device manufacturers to the whims of juries in all 50 states); see also Gavin v. Medtronic, Inc., 2013 WL 3791612, at *4 (E.D.La. July 19, 2013) (noting that express preemption “preserve[s] federal regulatory authority over medical devices and thereby enable[s] the FDA to balance various statutory objectives”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2013 WL 3791612, at *4",
"parenthetical": "noting that express preemption \"preserve[s] federal regulatory authority over medical devices and thereby enable[s] the FDA to balance various statutory objectives\"",
"sentence": "See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 326, 128 S.Ct. 999 (explaining that without the FDA’s central oversight, juries would “apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations,” thus subjecting medical device manufacturers to the whims of juries in all 50 states); see also Gavin v. Medtronic, Inc., 2013 WL 3791612, at *4 (E.D.La. July 19, 2013) (noting that express preemption “preserve[s] federal regulatory authority over medical devices and thereby enable[s] the FDA to balance various statutory objectives”)."
} | 4,220,477 | a |
Congress has unmistakably preempted certain state law claims pertaining to medical devices. Congress enacted this express preemption clause to prevent manufacturers from being subject to inconsistent laws and regulations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2013 WL 3791612, at *4",
"parenthetical": "noting that express preemption \"preserve[s] federal regulatory authority over medical devices and thereby enable[s] the FDA to balance various statutory objectives\"",
"sentence": "See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 326, 128 S.Ct. 999 (explaining that without the FDA’s central oversight, juries would “apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations,” thus subjecting medical device manufacturers to the whims of juries in all 50 states); see also Gavin v. Medtronic, Inc., 2013 WL 3791612, at *4 (E.D.La. July 19, 2013) (noting that express preemption “preserve[s] federal regulatory authority over medical devices and thereby enable[s] the FDA to balance various statutory objectives”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that without the FDA's central oversight, juries would \"apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations,\" thus subjecting medical device manufacturers to the whims of juries in all 50 states",
"sentence": "See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 326, 128 S.Ct. 999 (explaining that without the FDA’s central oversight, juries would “apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations,” thus subjecting medical device manufacturers to the whims of juries in all 50 states); see also Gavin v. Medtronic, Inc., 2013 WL 3791612, at *4 (E.D.La. July 19, 2013) (noting that express preemption “preserve[s] federal regulatory authority over medical devices and thereby enable[s] the FDA to balance various statutory objectives”)."
} | 4,220,477 | b |
What Arsenault's argument actually amounts to is faulting the judge for "not assigning] the weight to certain factors that [he] thought appropriate" and not taking into account specific considerations -- such as the elderly-prisoner problem -- which he finds relevant. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "595 F.3d 42, 49",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the district judge's silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record \"evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rossignol, 780 F.3d 475, 479 (1st Cir. 2015) (“That the [appellant] would prefer an alternative weighing of the circumstances does not undermine the district court’s sentencing decision.”); see also United States v. Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2010) (concluding that the district judge’s silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record “evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "780 F.3d 475, 479",
"parenthetical": "\"That the [appellant] would prefer an alternative weighing of the circumstances does not undermine the district court's sentencing decision.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rossignol, 780 F.3d 475, 479 (1st Cir. 2015) (“That the [appellant] would prefer an alternative weighing of the circumstances does not undermine the district court’s sentencing decision.”); see also United States v. Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2010) (concluding that the district judge’s silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record “evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors”)."
} | 4,352,245 | b |
P 10 The State contends, and Hansen concedes, that if A.R.S. SS 13-804.D is substantive, it indisputably governs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, 375 ¶6, 982 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1999) (“Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____”); see also Brown, 194 Ariz. at 342 ¶ 5, 982 P.2d at 817 (“In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, 375 ¶6, 982 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1999) (“Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____”); see also Brown, 194 Ariz. at 342 ¶ 5, 982 P.2d at 817 (“In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.”)."
} | 3,520,620 | a |
P 10 The State contends, and Hansen concedes, that if A.R.S. SS 13-804.D is substantive, it indisputably governs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, 375 ¶6, 982 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1999) (“Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____”); see also Brown, 194 Ariz. at 342 ¶ 5, 982 P.2d at 817 (“In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "982 P.2d 817, 817",
"parenthetical": "\"In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, 375 ¶6, 982 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1999) (“Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____”); see also Brown, 194 Ariz. at 342 ¶ 5, 982 P.2d at 817 (“In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.”)."
} | 3,520,620 | a |
P 10 The State contends, and Hansen concedes, that if A.R.S. SS 13-804.D is substantive, it indisputably governs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, 375 ¶6, 982 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1999) (“Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____”); see also Brown, 194 Ariz. at 342 ¶ 5, 982 P.2d at 817 (“In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "982 P.2d 1287, 1289",
"parenthetical": "\"Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, 375 ¶6, 982 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1999) (“Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____”); see also Brown, 194 Ariz. at 342 ¶ 5, 982 P.2d at 817 (“In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.”)."
} | 3,520,620 | b |
P 10 The State contends, and Hansen concedes, that if A.R.S. SS 13-804.D is substantive, it indisputably governs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "982 P.2d 1287, 1289",
"parenthetical": "\"Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, 375 ¶6, 982 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1999) (“Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____”); see also Brown, 194 Ariz. at 342 ¶ 5, 982 P.2d at 817 (“In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "982 P.2d 817, 817",
"parenthetical": "\"In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, 375 ¶6, 982 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1999) (“Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____”); see also Brown, 194 Ariz. at 342 ¶ 5, 982 P.2d at 817 (“In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.”)."
} | 3,520,620 | a |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\"",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "73 U.S. 582, 584",
"parenthetical": "extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | 6,964,782 | b |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\"",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | 6,964,782 | a |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\"",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | 6,964,782 | b |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "981 F.2d 590, 596-97",
"parenthetical": "equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\"",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | 6,964,782 | a |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\"",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | 6,964,782 | a |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\"",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | 6,964,782 | b |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\"",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | 6,964,782 | b |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\"",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "164 F.2d 767, 768-69",
"parenthetical": "extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War); Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 590, 596-97 (Oth Cir.1991) (equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768-69 (2d Cir.1947) (extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II); see also Brod-eur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.8d 139, 150 n. 12 (Colo.2007) (discussing cases involving facts \"where the plaintiff was truly precluded from bringing a claim by circumstances outside his or her control\"); Dean Witter Reynolds, 911 P.2d at 1097 (the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\")."
} | 6,964,782 | b |
Because we conclude that section 609.74(1) does not reach appellants' conduct, we need not consider their other arguments under the U.S. Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "713 N.W.2d 350, 355",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e do not reach constitutional issues if the matter can be resolved otherwise.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Wyatt, 361 N.W.2d 839, 840 (Minn.1985) (“Having disposed of this case on a factual basis, we need not consider the constitutional challenge.”); see also State ex. rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 713 N.W.2d 350, 355 (Minn. 2006) (“[W]e do not reach constitutional issues if the matter can be resolved otherwise.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "361 N.W.2d 839, 840",
"parenthetical": "\"Having disposed of this case on a factual basis, we need not consider the constitutional challenge.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Wyatt, 361 N.W.2d 839, 840 (Minn.1985) (“Having disposed of this case on a factual basis, we need not consider the constitutional challenge.”); see also State ex. rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 713 N.W.2d 350, 355 (Minn. 2006) (“[W]e do not reach constitutional issues if the matter can be resolved otherwise.”)."
} | 8,307,925 | b |
We agree with the Seventh Circuit that, "[although an employee's status as a policymaker bears considerable attention when weighing the interests of the government, the policymaking employee exception does not apply and courts must apply Pickering balancing when the speech at issue does not implicate the employee's politics or substantive policy viewpoints." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "165 F.3d 154, 162",
"parenthetical": "\"Although it is true that, consistent with the First Amendment, a policymaking employee may be discharged on the basis of political affiliation such as membership (or lack of membership",
"sentence": "Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 979 (7th Cir.2000); see also Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir.) (“Although it is true that, consistent with the First Amendment, a policymaking employee may be discharged on the basis of political affiliation such as membership (or lack of membership) in a particular political party, that same employee may not be discharged on the basis of specific speech on matters of public concern unless the Pickering balancing test favors the government employer.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 70, 145 L.Ed.2d 60 (1999); but see, Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir.1997) (“Because we hold that [plaintiffs] position ... was a policymaking one, we do not address [plaintiffs] claim that under the Pickering balancing test his interest in free speech outweighs the [employer’s] interest in running an efficient office.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 1328, 1334",
"parenthetical": "\"Because we hold that [plaintiffs] position ... was a policymaking one, we do not address [plaintiffs] claim that under the Pickering balancing test his interest in free speech outweighs the [employer's] interest in running an efficient office.\"",
"sentence": "Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 979 (7th Cir.2000); see also Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir.) (“Although it is true that, consistent with the First Amendment, a policymaking employee may be discharged on the basis of political affiliation such as membership (or lack of membership) in a particular political party, that same employee may not be discharged on the basis of specific speech on matters of public concern unless the Pickering balancing test favors the government employer.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 70, 145 L.Ed.2d 60 (1999); but see, Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir.1997) (“Because we hold that [plaintiffs] position ... was a policymaking one, we do not address [plaintiffs] claim that under the Pickering balancing test his interest in free speech outweighs the [employer’s] interest in running an efficient office.”)."
} | 11,220,312 | a |
We agree with the Seventh Circuit that, "[although an employee's status as a policymaker bears considerable attention when weighing the interests of the government, the policymaking employee exception does not apply and courts must apply Pickering balancing when the speech at issue does not implicate the employee's politics or substantive policy viewpoints." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 1328, 1334",
"parenthetical": "\"Because we hold that [plaintiffs] position ... was a policymaking one, we do not address [plaintiffs] claim that under the Pickering balancing test his interest in free speech outweighs the [employer's] interest in running an efficient office.\"",
"sentence": "Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 979 (7th Cir.2000); see also Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir.) (“Although it is true that, consistent with the First Amendment, a policymaking employee may be discharged on the basis of political affiliation such as membership (or lack of membership) in a particular political party, that same employee may not be discharged on the basis of specific speech on matters of public concern unless the Pickering balancing test favors the government employer.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 70, 145 L.Ed.2d 60 (1999); but see, Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir.1997) (“Because we hold that [plaintiffs] position ... was a policymaking one, we do not address [plaintiffs] claim that under the Pickering balancing test his interest in free speech outweighs the [employer’s] interest in running an efficient office.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Although it is true that, consistent with the First Amendment, a policymaking employee may be discharged on the basis of political affiliation such as membership (or lack of membership",
"sentence": "Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 979 (7th Cir.2000); see also Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir.) (“Although it is true that, consistent with the First Amendment, a policymaking employee may be discharged on the basis of political affiliation such as membership (or lack of membership) in a particular political party, that same employee may not be discharged on the basis of specific speech on matters of public concern unless the Pickering balancing test favors the government employer.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 70, 145 L.Ed.2d 60 (1999); but see, Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir.1997) (“Because we hold that [plaintiffs] position ... was a policymaking one, we do not address [plaintiffs] claim that under the Pickering balancing test his interest in free speech outweighs the [employer’s] interest in running an efficient office.”)."
} | 11,220,312 | b |
We agree with the Seventh Circuit that, "[although an employee's status as a policymaker bears considerable attention when weighing the interests of the government, the policymaking employee exception does not apply and courts must apply Pickering balancing when the speech at issue does not implicate the employee's politics or substantive policy viewpoints." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Although it is true that, consistent with the First Amendment, a policymaking employee may be discharged on the basis of political affiliation such as membership (or lack of membership",
"sentence": "Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 979 (7th Cir.2000); see also Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir.) (“Although it is true that, consistent with the First Amendment, a policymaking employee may be discharged on the basis of political affiliation such as membership (or lack of membership) in a particular political party, that same employee may not be discharged on the basis of specific speech on matters of public concern unless the Pickering balancing test favors the government employer.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 70, 145 L.Ed.2d 60 (1999); but see, Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir.1997) (“Because we hold that [plaintiffs] position ... was a policymaking one, we do not address [plaintiffs] claim that under the Pickering balancing test his interest in free speech outweighs the [employer’s] interest in running an efficient office.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 1328, 1334",
"parenthetical": "\"Because we hold that [plaintiffs] position ... was a policymaking one, we do not address [plaintiffs] claim that under the Pickering balancing test his interest in free speech outweighs the [employer's] interest in running an efficient office.\"",
"sentence": "Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 979 (7th Cir.2000); see also Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir.) (“Although it is true that, consistent with the First Amendment, a policymaking employee may be discharged on the basis of political affiliation such as membership (or lack of membership) in a particular political party, that same employee may not be discharged on the basis of specific speech on matters of public concern unless the Pickering balancing test favors the government employer.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 70, 145 L.Ed.2d 60 (1999); but see, Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir.1997) (“Because we hold that [plaintiffs] position ... was a policymaking one, we do not address [plaintiffs] claim that under the Pickering balancing test his interest in free speech outweighs the [employer’s] interest in running an efficient office.”)."
} | 11,220,312 | a |
Additionally, our court has held that a transfer or reassignment can be the equivalent of a demotion, and thus constitute an adverse employment action. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 757, 770",
"parenthetical": "\"A job transfer that includes a shift change that involves changes in duties or compensation or can be objectively characterized as a demotion may be an 'adverse employment action'.... \"",
"sentence": "Id. at 613 (quoting Sharp v. City of Hous., 164 F.3d 923, 933 (5th Cir.1999)); Pegram, 361 F.3d at 283 (“[A]n employment transfer may qualify as an adverse employment action if the change makes the job objectively worse.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 770 (5th Cir.2001) (“A job transfer that includes a shift change that involves changes in duties or compensation or can be objectively characterized as a demotion may be an ‘adverse employment action’.... ”); see, e.g., Sharp, 164 F.3d at 933 (“The jury could have viewed transferring from the elite Mounted Patrol to a teaching post at the Police Academy to be, objectively, a demotion.”); Forsyth v. City of Doll., 91 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir.1996) (recognizing as demotions the reassignment of two police officers from the Intelligence Unit to night patrol because the Intelligence Unit positions “were more prestigious, had better work ing hours, and were more interesting than night patrol” and “few officers voluntarily-transferred from the Intelligence Unit to night patrol and other officers had been so transferred as punishment”); Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir.1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "164 F.3d 933, 933",
"parenthetical": "\"The jury could have viewed transferring from the elite Mounted Patrol to a teaching post at the Police Academy to be, objectively, a demotion.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 613 (quoting Sharp v. City of Hous., 164 F.3d 923, 933 (5th Cir.1999)); Pegram, 361 F.3d at 283 (“[A]n employment transfer may qualify as an adverse employment action if the change makes the job objectively worse.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 770 (5th Cir.2001) (“A job transfer that includes a shift change that involves changes in duties or compensation or can be objectively characterized as a demotion may be an ‘adverse employment action’.... ”); see, e.g., Sharp, 164 F.3d at 933 (“The jury could have viewed transferring from the elite Mounted Patrol to a teaching post at the Police Academy to be, objectively, a demotion.”); Forsyth v. City of Doll., 91 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir.1996) (recognizing as demotions the reassignment of two police officers from the Intelligence Unit to night patrol because the Intelligence Unit positions “were more prestigious, had better work ing hours, and were more interesting than night patrol” and “few officers voluntarily-transferred from the Intelligence Unit to night patrol and other officers had been so transferred as punishment”); Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir.1992)."
} | 4,183,165 | a |
Additionally, our court has held that a transfer or reassignment can be the equivalent of a demotion, and thus constitute an adverse employment action. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 757, 770",
"parenthetical": "\"A job transfer that includes a shift change that involves changes in duties or compensation or can be objectively characterized as a demotion may be an 'adverse employment action'.... \"",
"sentence": "Id. at 613 (quoting Sharp v. City of Hous., 164 F.3d 923, 933 (5th Cir.1999)); Pegram, 361 F.3d at 283 (“[A]n employment transfer may qualify as an adverse employment action if the change makes the job objectively worse.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 770 (5th Cir.2001) (“A job transfer that includes a shift change that involves changes in duties or compensation or can be objectively characterized as a demotion may be an ‘adverse employment action’.... ”); see, e.g., Sharp, 164 F.3d at 933 (“The jury could have viewed transferring from the elite Mounted Patrol to a teaching post at the Police Academy to be, objectively, a demotion.”); Forsyth v. City of Doll., 91 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir.1996) (recognizing as demotions the reassignment of two police officers from the Intelligence Unit to night patrol because the Intelligence Unit positions “were more prestigious, had better work ing hours, and were more interesting than night patrol” and “few officers voluntarily-transferred from the Intelligence Unit to night patrol and other officers had been so transferred as punishment”); Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir.1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "91 F.3d 769, 774",
"parenthetical": "recognizing as demotions the reassignment of two police officers from the Intelligence Unit to night patrol because the Intelligence Unit positions \"were more prestigious, had better work ing hours, and were more interesting than night patrol\" and \"few officers voluntarily-transferred from the Intelligence Unit to night patrol and other officers had been so transferred as punishment\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 613 (quoting Sharp v. City of Hous., 164 F.3d 923, 933 (5th Cir.1999)); Pegram, 361 F.3d at 283 (“[A]n employment transfer may qualify as an adverse employment action if the change makes the job objectively worse.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 770 (5th Cir.2001) (“A job transfer that includes a shift change that involves changes in duties or compensation or can be objectively characterized as a demotion may be an ‘adverse employment action’.... ”); see, e.g., Sharp, 164 F.3d at 933 (“The jury could have viewed transferring from the elite Mounted Patrol to a teaching post at the Police Academy to be, objectively, a demotion.”); Forsyth v. City of Doll., 91 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir.1996) (recognizing as demotions the reassignment of two police officers from the Intelligence Unit to night patrol because the Intelligence Unit positions “were more prestigious, had better work ing hours, and were more interesting than night patrol” and “few officers voluntarily-transferred from the Intelligence Unit to night patrol and other officers had been so transferred as punishment”); Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir.1992)."
} | 4,183,165 | a |
Texas courts have consistently held that stock options acquired during marriage are a contingent property interest and a community asset subject to division upon divorce. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "544 S.W.2d 665, 665-66",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee spouse's accrued but un-vested retirement benefits are a contingent property interest and a community asset",
"sentence": "Kline, 17 S.W.3d at 446; Bodin, 955 S.W.2d at 381; see also Cearley, 544 S.W.2d at 665-66 (holding that employee spouse’s accrued but un-vested retirement benefits are a contingent property interest and a community asset)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "755 S.W.2d 496, 498",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee spouses's interest in his company's profit sharing stock plan awarded for work done outside of marriage was spouse's separate property",
"sentence": "But see Acosta v. Acosta, 836 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, no writ) (holding that stock plan to which employer and employee spouse both made contributions and whose value was dependent on length of employee spouse’s employment was a deferred compensation retirement plan); In re Marriage of Joiner, 755 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ) (holding that employee spouses’s interest in his company’s profit sharing stock plan awarded for work done outside of marriage was spouse’s separate property)."
} | 9,394,875 | a |
I would adopt the third district's reasoning in its entirety. Thus, I would affirm the trial courts' denials of the appellants' motions for post-conviction relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 So.3d 886, 888",
"parenthetical": "agreeing with Geter, adopting its reasoning in its entirety, and holding that Miller should not be applied retroactively",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez v. State, 101 So.3d 886, 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (agreeing with Geter, adopting its reasoning in its entirety, and holding that Miller should not be applied retroactively); but see Toye v. State, 133 So.3d 540, 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (concluding that Miller applies retroactively and certifying conflict with Geter and Gonzalez)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "133 So.3d 540, 547",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Miller applies retroactively and certifying conflict with Geter and Gonzalez",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez v. State, 101 So.3d 886, 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (agreeing with Geter, adopting its reasoning in its entirety, and holding that Miller should not be applied retroactively); but see Toye v. State, 133 So.3d 540, 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (concluding that Miller applies retroactively and certifying conflict with Geter and Gonzalez)."
} | 6,937,630 | a |
Indeed, this testimony does not fall into either category of victim-related evidence. Troy testified regarding his thoughts at the time of the incident; he did not testify regarding the effect that the crime had had on his life or how the incident had affected him and his family. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "67 S.W.3d 918, 928",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he testimony in the present case did not involve testimony about how third persons were affected by the crime, nor was there any discussion about the character of the victim.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 928 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (“[T]he testimony in the present case did not involve testimony about how third persons were affected by the crime, nor was there any discussion about the character of the victim.”); see also Hayden, 296 S.W.3d at 553 (characterizing, in murder case, victim-impact evidence as “evidence of the effect the victim’s death has on other people”); Espinosa, 194 S.W.3d at 711 (“Relevant victim impact evidence may include the physical, psychological, or economic effects of a crime on the victim or the victim’s family.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "296 S.W.3d 553, 553",
"parenthetical": "characterizing, in murder case, victim-impact evidence as \"evidence of the effect the victim's death has on other people\"",
"sentence": "See Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 928 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (“[T]he testimony in the present case did not involve testimony about how third persons were affected by the crime, nor was there any discussion about the character of the victim.”); see also Hayden, 296 S.W.3d at 553 (characterizing, in murder case, victim-impact evidence as “evidence of the effect the victim’s death has on other people”); Espinosa, 194 S.W.3d at 711 (“Relevant victim impact evidence may include the physical, psychological, or economic effects of a crime on the victim or the victim’s family.”)."
} | 7,314,599 | a |
Indeed, this testimony does not fall into either category of victim-related evidence. Troy testified regarding his thoughts at the time of the incident; he did not testify regarding the effect that the crime had had on his life or how the incident had affected him and his family. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "194 S.W.3d 711, 711",
"parenthetical": "\"Relevant victim impact evidence may include the physical, psychological, or economic effects of a crime on the victim or the victim's family.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 928 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (“[T]he testimony in the present case did not involve testimony about how third persons were affected by the crime, nor was there any discussion about the character of the victim.”); see also Hayden, 296 S.W.3d at 553 (characterizing, in murder case, victim-impact evidence as “evidence of the effect the victim’s death has on other people”); Espinosa, 194 S.W.3d at 711 (“Relevant victim impact evidence may include the physical, psychological, or economic effects of a crime on the victim or the victim’s family.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "67 S.W.3d 918, 928",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he testimony in the present case did not involve testimony about how third persons were affected by the crime, nor was there any discussion about the character of the victim.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 928 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (“[T]he testimony in the present case did not involve testimony about how third persons were affected by the crime, nor was there any discussion about the character of the victim.”); see also Hayden, 296 S.W.3d at 553 (characterizing, in murder case, victim-impact evidence as “evidence of the effect the victim’s death has on other people”); Espinosa, 194 S.W.3d at 711 (“Relevant victim impact evidence may include the physical, psychological, or economic effects of a crime on the victim or the victim’s family.”)."
} | 7,314,599 | b |
New Jersey courts have held manufacturers strictly liable for products, despite another's subsequent substantial alterations, when those alterations were objectively foreseeable and likely to cause injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring a product to be \"suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered\"",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiring a product to be “suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered”); Soler v. Castmaster, 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225, 1232 (1984); McDermott v. TENDUN Constructors, 211 N.J.Super. 196, 511 A.2d 690, 698-99 (1986); cf. Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982) (imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiring a product to be “suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered”); Soler v. Castmaster, 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225, 1232 (1984); McDermott v. TENDUN Constructors, 211 N.J.Super. 196, 511 A.2d 690, 698-99 (1986); cf. Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982) (imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries)."
} | 11,084,851 | a |
New Jersey courts have held manufacturers strictly liable for products, despite another's subsequent substantial alterations, when those alterations were objectively foreseeable and likely to cause injury. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiring a product to be “suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered”); Soler v. Castmaster, 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225, 1232 (1984); McDermott v. TENDUN Constructors, 211 N.J.Super. 196, 511 A.2d 690, 698-99 (1986); cf. Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982) (imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring a product to be \"suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered\"",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiring a product to be “suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered”); Soler v. Castmaster, 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225, 1232 (1984); McDermott v. TENDUN Constructors, 211 N.J.Super. 196, 511 A.2d 690, 698-99 (1986); cf. Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982) (imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries)."
} | 11,084,851 | b |
New Jersey courts have held manufacturers strictly liable for products, despite another's subsequent substantial alterations, when those alterations were objectively foreseeable and likely to cause injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41",
"parenthetical": "requiring a product to be \"suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered\"",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiring a product to be “suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered”); Soler v. Castmaster, 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225, 1232 (1984); McDermott v. TENDUN Constructors, 211 N.J.Super. 196, 511 A.2d 690, 698-99 (1986); cf. Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982) (imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiring a product to be “suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered”); Soler v. Castmaster, 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225, 1232 (1984); McDermott v. TENDUN Constructors, 211 N.J.Super. 196, 511 A.2d 690, 698-99 (1986); cf. Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982) (imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries)."
} | 11,084,851 | a |
New Jersey courts have held manufacturers strictly liable for products, despite another's subsequent substantial alterations, when those alterations were objectively foreseeable and likely to cause injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41",
"parenthetical": "requiring a product to be \"suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered\"",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiring a product to be “suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered”); Soler v. Castmaster, 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225, 1232 (1984); McDermott v. TENDUN Constructors, 211 N.J.Super. 196, 511 A.2d 690, 698-99 (1986); cf. Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982) (imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiring a product to be “suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered”); Soler v. Castmaster, 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225, 1232 (1984); McDermott v. TENDUN Constructors, 211 N.J.Super. 196, 511 A.2d 690, 698-99 (1986); cf. Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982) (imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries)."
} | 11,084,851 | a |
The district court held that, because this claim is foreclosed by clear precedent, the state court's rejection of it was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "530 U.S. 156, 169",
"parenthetical": "parole eligibility instruction required \"only ... [in] instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison\"",
"sentence": "See Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 169, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 147 L.Ed.2d 125 (2000) (parole eligibility instruction required “only ... [in] instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison”); see also Elizalde v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 323, 332-33 (5th Cir.2004) (collecting cases holding that Constitution does not require Texas trial courts to instruct juries as to the meaning of life in prison because the defendant would not, if sentenced to life imprisonment, be ineligible for parole)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "362 F.3d 323, 332-33",
"parenthetical": "collecting cases holding that Constitution does not require Texas trial courts to instruct juries as to the meaning of life in prison because the defendant would not, if sentenced to life imprisonment, be ineligible for parole",
"sentence": "See Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 169, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 147 L.Ed.2d 125 (2000) (parole eligibility instruction required “only ... [in] instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison”); see also Elizalde v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 323, 332-33 (5th Cir.2004) (collecting cases holding that Constitution does not require Texas trial courts to instruct juries as to the meaning of life in prison because the defendant would not, if sentenced to life imprisonment, be ineligible for parole)."
} | 2,212,714 | a |
The district court held that, because this claim is foreclosed by clear precedent, the state court's rejection of it was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parole eligibility instruction required \"only ... [in] instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison\"",
"sentence": "See Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 169, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 147 L.Ed.2d 125 (2000) (parole eligibility instruction required “only ... [in] instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison”); see also Elizalde v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 323, 332-33 (5th Cir.2004) (collecting cases holding that Constitution does not require Texas trial courts to instruct juries as to the meaning of life in prison because the defendant would not, if sentenced to life imprisonment, be ineligible for parole)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "362 F.3d 323, 332-33",
"parenthetical": "collecting cases holding that Constitution does not require Texas trial courts to instruct juries as to the meaning of life in prison because the defendant would not, if sentenced to life imprisonment, be ineligible for parole",
"sentence": "See Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 169, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 147 L.Ed.2d 125 (2000) (parole eligibility instruction required “only ... [in] instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison”); see also Elizalde v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 323, 332-33 (5th Cir.2004) (collecting cases holding that Constitution does not require Texas trial courts to instruct juries as to the meaning of life in prison because the defendant would not, if sentenced to life imprisonment, be ineligible for parole)."
} | 2,212,714 | a |
The district court held that, because this claim is foreclosed by clear precedent, the state court's rejection of it was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "362 F.3d 323, 332-33",
"parenthetical": "collecting cases holding that Constitution does not require Texas trial courts to instruct juries as to the meaning of life in prison because the defendant would not, if sentenced to life imprisonment, be ineligible for parole",
"sentence": "See Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 169, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 147 L.Ed.2d 125 (2000) (parole eligibility instruction required “only ... [in] instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison”); see also Elizalde v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 323, 332-33 (5th Cir.2004) (collecting cases holding that Constitution does not require Texas trial courts to instruct juries as to the meaning of life in prison because the defendant would not, if sentenced to life imprisonment, be ineligible for parole)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parole eligibility instruction required \"only ... [in] instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison\"",
"sentence": "See Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 169, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 147 L.Ed.2d 125 (2000) (parole eligibility instruction required “only ... [in] instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison”); see also Elizalde v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 323, 332-33 (5th Cir.2004) (collecting cases holding that Constitution does not require Texas trial courts to instruct juries as to the meaning of life in prison because the defendant would not, if sentenced to life imprisonment, be ineligible for parole)."
} | 2,212,714 | b |
To begin with, the remedies under RICO do not include setting aside a prior judgment or undermining its preclusive effect by a collateral attack. The circuits to consider the matter have rejected such relief. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "512 F.3d 742, 747, 749-50",
"parenthetical": "RICO suit was impermissible collateral attack on foreign arbitration award",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata); Gekas v. Pipin (In re Met-LWood Corp.), 861 F.2d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir.1988) (“RICO is many things, but it is not an exception to res judicata.”); see also Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 512 F.3d 742, 747, 749-50 (5th Cir.2008) (RICO suit was impermissible collateral attack on foreign arbitration award); Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, 387 F.3d 721, 731-32 (8th Cir.2004) (RICO claims by nonparty to bankruptcy action were impermissible collateral attack on bankruptcy judgment that was good against the world)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "891 F.2d 583, 585-87",
"parenthetical": "collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata); Gekas v. Pipin (In re Met-LWood Corp.), 861 F.2d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir.1988) (“RICO is many things, but it is not an exception to res judicata.”); see also Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 512 F.3d 742, 747, 749-50 (5th Cir.2008) (RICO suit was impermissible collateral attack on foreign arbitration award); Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, 387 F.3d 721, 731-32 (8th Cir.2004) (RICO claims by nonparty to bankruptcy action were impermissible collateral attack on bankruptcy judgment that was good against the world)."
} | 4,064,084 | b |
To begin with, the remedies under RICO do not include setting aside a prior judgment or undermining its preclusive effect by a collateral attack. The circuits to consider the matter have rejected such relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "891 F.2d 583, 585-87",
"parenthetical": "collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata); Gekas v. Pipin (In re Met-LWood Corp.), 861 F.2d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir.1988) (“RICO is many things, but it is not an exception to res judicata.”); see also Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 512 F.3d 742, 747, 749-50 (5th Cir.2008) (RICO suit was impermissible collateral attack on foreign arbitration award); Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, 387 F.3d 721, 731-32 (8th Cir.2004) (RICO claims by nonparty to bankruptcy action were impermissible collateral attack on bankruptcy judgment that was good against the world)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "387 F.3d 721, 731-32",
"parenthetical": "RICO claims by nonparty to bankruptcy action were impermissible collateral attack on bankruptcy judgment that was good against the world",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata); Gekas v. Pipin (In re Met-LWood Corp.), 861 F.2d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir.1988) (“RICO is many things, but it is not an exception to res judicata.”); see also Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 512 F.3d 742, 747, 749-50 (5th Cir.2008) (RICO suit was impermissible collateral attack on foreign arbitration award); Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, 387 F.3d 721, 731-32 (8th Cir.2004) (RICO claims by nonparty to bankruptcy action were impermissible collateral attack on bankruptcy judgment that was good against the world)."
} | 4,064,084 | a |
To begin with, the remedies under RICO do not include setting aside a prior judgment or undermining its preclusive effect by a collateral attack. The circuits to consider the matter have rejected such relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "861 F.2d 1012, 1016",
"parenthetical": "\"RICO is many things, but it is not an exception to res judicata.\"",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata); Gekas v. Pipin (In re Met-LWood Corp.), 861 F.2d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir.1988) (“RICO is many things, but it is not an exception to res judicata.”); see also Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 512 F.3d 742, 747, 749-50 (5th Cir.2008) (RICO suit was impermissible collateral attack on foreign arbitration award); Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, 387 F.3d 721, 731-32 (8th Cir.2004) (RICO claims by nonparty to bankruptcy action were impermissible collateral attack on bankruptcy judgment that was good against the world)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "512 F.3d 742, 747, 749-50",
"parenthetical": "RICO suit was impermissible collateral attack on foreign arbitration award",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata); Gekas v. Pipin (In re Met-LWood Corp.), 861 F.2d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir.1988) (“RICO is many things, but it is not an exception to res judicata.”); see also Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 512 F.3d 742, 747, 749-50 (5th Cir.2008) (RICO suit was impermissible collateral attack on foreign arbitration award); Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, 387 F.3d 721, 731-32 (8th Cir.2004) (RICO claims by nonparty to bankruptcy action were impermissible collateral attack on bankruptcy judgment that was good against the world)."
} | 4,064,084 | a |
To begin with, the remedies under RICO do not include setting aside a prior judgment or undermining its preclusive effect by a collateral attack. The circuits to consider the matter have rejected such relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "861 F.2d 1012, 1016",
"parenthetical": "\"RICO is many things, but it is not an exception to res judicata.\"",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata); Gekas v. Pipin (In re Met-LWood Corp.), 861 F.2d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir.1988) (“RICO is many things, but it is not an exception to res judicata.”); see also Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 512 F.3d 742, 747, 749-50 (5th Cir.2008) (RICO suit was impermissible collateral attack on foreign arbitration award); Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, 387 F.3d 721, 731-32 (8th Cir.2004) (RICO claims by nonparty to bankruptcy action were impermissible collateral attack on bankruptcy judgment that was good against the world)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "387 F.3d 721, 731-32",
"parenthetical": "RICO claims by nonparty to bankruptcy action were impermissible collateral attack on bankruptcy judgment that was good against the world",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata); Gekas v. Pipin (In re Met-LWood Corp.), 861 F.2d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir.1988) (“RICO is many things, but it is not an exception to res judicata.”); see also Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 512 F.3d 742, 747, 749-50 (5th Cir.2008) (RICO suit was impermissible collateral attack on foreign arbitration award); Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, 387 F.3d 721, 731-32 (8th Cir.2004) (RICO claims by nonparty to bankruptcy action were impermissible collateral attack on bankruptcy judgment that was good against the world)."
} | 4,064,084 | a |
We find that Defendants' convictions for conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. SSSS 841(b)(1)(C), 846, and conspiracy to defraud the United States or commit any offense against the United States (la, provide and possess contraband in prison), in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 371, although both stemming from the same events, were not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a single conspiracy \"can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause\"",
"sentence": "See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (recognizing that a single conspiracy “can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause”); see also United States v. Holloway, 128 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that convictions under §§ 846 and 371 do not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "128 F.3d 1254, 1257-58",
"parenthetical": "holding that convictions under SSSS 846 and 371 do not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause",
"sentence": "See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (recognizing that a single conspiracy “can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause”); see also United States v. Holloway, 128 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that convictions under §§ 846 and 371 do not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause)."
} | 5,739,239 | a |
We find that Defendants' convictions for conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. SSSS 841(b)(1)(C), 846, and conspiracy to defraud the United States or commit any offense against the United States (la, provide and possess contraband in prison), in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 371, although both stemming from the same events, were not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "128 F.3d 1254, 1257-58",
"parenthetical": "holding that convictions under SSSS 846 and 371 do not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause",
"sentence": "See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (recognizing that a single conspiracy “can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause”); see also United States v. Holloway, 128 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that convictions under §§ 846 and 371 do not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a single conspiracy \"can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause\"",
"sentence": "See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (recognizing that a single conspiracy “can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause”); see also United States v. Holloway, 128 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that convictions under §§ 846 and 371 do not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause)."
} | 5,739,239 | b |
We find that Defendants' convictions for conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. SSSS 841(b)(1)(C), 846, and conspiracy to defraud the United States or commit any offense against the United States (la, provide and possess contraband in prison), in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 371, although both stemming from the same events, were not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a single conspiracy \"can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause\"",
"sentence": "See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (recognizing that a single conspiracy “can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause”); see also United States v. Holloway, 128 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that convictions under §§ 846 and 371 do not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "128 F.3d 1254, 1257-58",
"parenthetical": "holding that convictions under SSSS 846 and 371 do not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause",
"sentence": "See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (recognizing that a single conspiracy “can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause”); see also United States v. Holloway, 128 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that convictions under §§ 846 and 371 do not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause)."
} | 5,739,239 | a |
We cannot agree, however, that Dr. Lichtman's omission of General Assembly election data from his analysis undermines the validity of this methodology or the probativeness of his results. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 F.3d 1393, 1397",
"parenthetical": "based on statistical evidence from exogenous elections, court concludes that racially polarized voting exists",
"sentence": "See NAACP, 252 F.3d at 370 (“the exogenous character of elections does not render them nonpro-bative”); Solomon v. Liberty County Comm’rs, 221 F.3d 1218, 1227 (11th Cir.2000) (district court not required to consider endogenous elections more probative); Monroe v. Woodville, 881 F.2d 1327, 1330 (5th Cir.1989) (exogenous election data not per se irrelevant); see also Clark v. Calhoun County, 88 F.3d 1393, 1397 (5th Cir.1996) (based on statistical evidence from exogenous elections, court concludes that racially polarized voting exists)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "252 F.3d 370, 370",
"parenthetical": "\"the exogenous character of elections does not render them nonpro-bative\"",
"sentence": "See NAACP, 252 F.3d at 370 (“the exogenous character of elections does not render them nonpro-bative”); Solomon v. Liberty County Comm’rs, 221 F.3d 1218, 1227 (11th Cir.2000) (district court not required to consider endogenous elections more probative); Monroe v. Woodville, 881 F.2d 1327, 1330 (5th Cir.1989) (exogenous election data not per se irrelevant); see also Clark v. Calhoun County, 88 F.3d 1393, 1397 (5th Cir.1996) (based on statistical evidence from exogenous elections, court concludes that racially polarized voting exists)."
} | 9,435,357 | b |
We cannot agree, however, that Dr. Lichtman's omission of General Assembly election data from his analysis undermines the validity of this methodology or the probativeness of his results. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "221 F.3d 1218, 1227",
"parenthetical": "district court not required to consider endogenous elections more probative",
"sentence": "See NAACP, 252 F.3d at 370 (“the exogenous character of elections does not render them nonpro-bative”); Solomon v. Liberty County Comm’rs, 221 F.3d 1218, 1227 (11th Cir.2000) (district court not required to consider endogenous elections more probative); Monroe v. Woodville, 881 F.2d 1327, 1330 (5th Cir.1989) (exogenous election data not per se irrelevant); see also Clark v. Calhoun County, 88 F.3d 1393, 1397 (5th Cir.1996) (based on statistical evidence from exogenous elections, court concludes that racially polarized voting exists)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 F.3d 1393, 1397",
"parenthetical": "based on statistical evidence from exogenous elections, court concludes that racially polarized voting exists",
"sentence": "See NAACP, 252 F.3d at 370 (“the exogenous character of elections does not render them nonpro-bative”); Solomon v. Liberty County Comm’rs, 221 F.3d 1218, 1227 (11th Cir.2000) (district court not required to consider endogenous elections more probative); Monroe v. Woodville, 881 F.2d 1327, 1330 (5th Cir.1989) (exogenous election data not per se irrelevant); see also Clark v. Calhoun County, 88 F.3d 1393, 1397 (5th Cir.1996) (based on statistical evidence from exogenous elections, court concludes that racially polarized voting exists)."
} | 9,435,357 | a |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 F.3d 45, 48",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | 4,038,982 | a |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 F.3d 45, 48",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | 4,038,982 | b |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 F.3d 45, 48",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | 4,038,982 | a |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "486 F.3d 1342, 1347",
"parenthetical": "noting \"a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction\" and applying the enrolled bill rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | 4,038,982 | b |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "486 F.3d 1342, 1347",
"parenthetical": "noting \"a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction\" and applying the enrolled bill rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | 4,038,982 | b |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "486 F.3d 1342, 1347",
"parenthetical": "noting \"a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction\" and applying the enrolled bill rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | 4,038,982 | b |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "139 F.3d 247, 255",
"parenthetical": "\"[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | 4,038,982 | b |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "139 F.3d 247, 255",
"parenthetical": "\"[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | 4,038,982 | b |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "139 F.3d 247, 255",
"parenthetical": "\"[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question”); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting “a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction” and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens”); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, “like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted)."
} | 4,038,982 | b |
Indeed, the importance of disclosure to the tribunal of potential mental disabilities is so central to the integrity of judicial determinations that it is well settled that even a private plaintiff has statutory and common-law obligations to come forward with information that the party against whom he seeks relief may be mentally disabled and therefore unable to adequately represent himself. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is the [landlord’s] obligation to bring the [tenant’s] possible mental incompeténcy to the Court’s attention .... ”); see also Oneida Nat’l Bank v. Unczur, 37 A.D.2d 480, 326 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461-62 (4th Dep’t 1971) (interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55 (providing for entry of judgment by default where defendant “is not an infant or incompetent person”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is the [landlord's] obligation to bring the [tenant's] possible mental incompetency to the Court's attention .... \"",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is the [landlord’s] obligation to bring the [tenant’s] possible mental incompeténcy to the Court’s attention .... ”); see also Oneida Nat’l Bank v. Unczur, 37 A.D.2d 480, 326 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461-62 (4th Dep’t 1971) (interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55 (providing for entry of judgment by default where defendant “is not an infant or incompetent person”)."
} | 9,179,492 | b |
Indeed, the importance of disclosure to the tribunal of potential mental disabilities is so central to the integrity of judicial determinations that it is well settled that even a private plaintiff has statutory and common-law obligations to come forward with information that the party against whom he seeks relief may be mentally disabled and therefore unable to adequately represent himself. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is the [landlord's] obligation to bring the [tenant's] possible mental incompetency to the Court's attention .... \"",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is the [landlord’s] obligation to bring the [tenant’s] possible mental incompeténcy to the Court’s attention .... ”); see also Oneida Nat’l Bank v. Unczur, 37 A.D.2d 480, 326 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461-62 (4th Dep’t 1971) (interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55 (providing for entry of judgment by default where defendant “is not an infant or incompetent person”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "326 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461-62",
"parenthetical": "interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is the [landlord’s] obligation to bring the [tenant’s] possible mental incompeténcy to the Court’s attention .... ”); see also Oneida Nat’l Bank v. Unczur, 37 A.D.2d 480, 326 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461-62 (4th Dep’t 1971) (interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55 (providing for entry of judgment by default where defendant “is not an infant or incompetent person”)."
} | 9,179,492 | a |
Indeed, the importance of disclosure to the tribunal of potential mental disabilities is so central to the integrity of judicial determinations that it is well settled that even a private plaintiff has statutory and common-law obligations to come forward with information that the party against whom he seeks relief may be mentally disabled and therefore unable to adequately represent himself. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97",
"parenthetical": "\"It is the [landlord's] obligation to bring the [tenant's] possible mental incompetency to the Court's attention .... \"",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is the [landlord’s] obligation to bring the [tenant’s] possible mental incompeténcy to the Court’s attention .... ”); see also Oneida Nat’l Bank v. Unczur, 37 A.D.2d 480, 326 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461-62 (4th Dep’t 1971) (interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55 (providing for entry of judgment by default where defendant “is not an infant or incompetent person”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is the [landlord’s] obligation to bring the [tenant’s] possible mental incompeténcy to the Court’s attention .... ”); see also Oneida Nat’l Bank v. Unczur, 37 A.D.2d 480, 326 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461-62 (4th Dep’t 1971) (interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55 (providing for entry of judgment by default where defendant “is not an infant or incompetent person”)."
} | 9,179,492 | a |
Indeed, the importance of disclosure to the tribunal of potential mental disabilities is so central to the integrity of judicial determinations that it is well settled that even a private plaintiff has statutory and common-law obligations to come forward with information that the party against whom he seeks relief may be mentally disabled and therefore unable to adequately represent himself. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "326 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461-62",
"parenthetical": "interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is the [landlord’s] obligation to bring the [tenant’s] possible mental incompeténcy to the Court’s attention .... ”); see also Oneida Nat’l Bank v. Unczur, 37 A.D.2d 480, 326 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461-62 (4th Dep’t 1971) (interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55 (providing for entry of judgment by default where defendant “is not an infant or incompetent person”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97",
"parenthetical": "\"It is the [landlord's] obligation to bring the [tenant's] possible mental incompetency to the Court's attention .... \"",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is the [landlord’s] obligation to bring the [tenant’s] possible mental incompeténcy to the Court’s attention .... ”); see also Oneida Nat’l Bank v. Unczur, 37 A.D.2d 480, 326 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461-62 (4th Dep’t 1971) (interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55 (providing for entry of judgment by default where defendant “is not an infant or incompetent person”)."
} | 9,179,492 | b |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.