context
stringlengths 58
1.13k
| citation_a
dict | citation_b
dict | case_id
int64 475
12.5M
| label
stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "565 P.2d 26, 31",
"parenthetical": "\"Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the 'created by [buyer's] seller' limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti's allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "969 F.2d 1454, 1464",
"parenthetical": "\"Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court's simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "424 U.S. 409, 409",
"parenthetical": "concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a SS 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | 11,529,769 | b |
Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti's allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "870 F.2d 1135, 1138",
"parenthetical": "holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "424 U.S. 409, 409",
"parenthetical": "concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a SS 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | 11,529,769 | b |
Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti's allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "742 F.2d 24, 30",
"parenthetical": "\"A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.\"",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "424 U.S. 409, 409",
"parenthetical": "concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a SS 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | 11,529,769 | b |
Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti's allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a SS 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "969 F.2d 1454, 1464",
"parenthetical": "\"Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court's simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | 11,529,769 | a |
Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti's allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "870 F.2d 1135, 1138",
"parenthetical": "holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a SS 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | 11,529,769 | b |
Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti's allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "742 F.2d 24, 30",
"parenthetical": "\"A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.\"",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a SS 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | 11,529,769 | b |
Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti's allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "969 F.2d 1454, 1464",
"parenthetical": "\"Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court's simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 478, 478",
"parenthetical": "holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | 11,529,769 | b |
Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti's allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 478, 478",
"parenthetical": "holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "870 F.2d 1135, 1138",
"parenthetical": "holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | 11,529,769 | a |
Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti's allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "742 F.2d 24, 30",
"parenthetical": "\"A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.\"",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 478, 478",
"parenthetical": "holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | 11,529,769 | b |
Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti's allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "969 F.2d 1454, 1464",
"parenthetical": "\"Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court's simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | 11,529,769 | b |
Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti's allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "870 F.2d 1135, 1138",
"parenthetical": "holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | 11,529,769 | a |
Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti's allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "742 F.2d 24, 30",
"parenthetical": "\"A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.\"",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing",
"sentence": "See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992) (“Consideration of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity.”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1984) (“A limitation that absolute immunity from common lawsuit can only be invoked if the official acted lawfully would swallow the immunity altogether.”)."
} | 11,529,769 | b |
In both instances, the jury was given a curative instruction. No evidence or information has been presented to counter the presumption that jurors follow the instructions given by the court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "466 F.3d 634, 647",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court's instructions of law or their oaths.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 U.S. 200, 206",
"parenthetical": "there is an \"almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | 4,345,052 | b |
In both instances, the jury was given a curative instruction. No evidence or information has been presented to counter the presumption that jurors follow the instructions given by the court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court's instructions of law or their oaths.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 U.S. 200, 206",
"parenthetical": "there is an \"almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | 4,345,052 | b |
In both instances, the jury was given a curative instruction. No evidence or information has been presented to counter the presumption that jurors follow the instructions given by the court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court's instructions of law or their oaths.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 U.S. 200, 206",
"parenthetical": "there is an \"almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | 4,345,052 | b |
In both instances, the jury was given a curative instruction. No evidence or information has been presented to counter the presumption that jurors follow the instructions given by the court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court's instructions of law or their oaths.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 U.S. 200, 206",
"parenthetical": "there is an \"almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | 4,345,052 | b |
In both instances, the jury was given a curative instruction. No evidence or information has been presented to counter the presumption that jurors follow the instructions given by the court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "there is an \"almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "466 F.3d 634, 647",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court's instructions of law or their oaths.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | 4,345,052 | a |
In both instances, the jury was given a curative instruction. No evidence or information has been presented to counter the presumption that jurors follow the instructions given by the court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court's instructions of law or their oaths.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "there is an \"almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | 4,345,052 | b |
In both instances, the jury was given a curative instruction. No evidence or information has been presented to counter the presumption that jurors follow the instructions given by the court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court's instructions of law or their oaths.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "there is an \"almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | 4,345,052 | b |
In both instances, the jury was given a curative instruction. No evidence or information has been presented to counter the presumption that jurors follow the instructions given by the court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court's instructions of law or their oaths.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "there is an \"almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | 4,345,052 | b |
In both instances, the jury was given a curative instruction. No evidence or information has been presented to counter the presumption that jurors follow the instructions given by the court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "466 F.3d 634, 647",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court's instructions of law or their oaths.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "there is an \"almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | 4,345,052 | b |
In both instances, the jury was given a curative instruction. No evidence or information has been presented to counter the presumption that jurors follow the instructions given by the court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court's instructions of law or their oaths.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "there is an \"almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | 4,345,052 | b |
In both instances, the jury was given a curative instruction. No evidence or information has been presented to counter the presumption that jurors follow the instructions given by the court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "there is an \"almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court's instructions of law or their oaths.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | 4,345,052 | a |
In both instances, the jury was given a curative instruction. No evidence or information has been presented to counter the presumption that jurors follow the instructions given by the court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court's instructions of law or their oaths.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "there is an \"almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.\"",
"sentence": "See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (there is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.”); see also United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 647 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1273, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007) (“[W]e presume juries to be composed of prudent, intelligent individuals, and we will not speculate whether jurors disregard the court’s instructions of law or their oaths.”)."
} | 4,345,052 | b |
It is self-evident and legally true that Zhou's suffering, endured for the safe birth of his third child, amounts to more than harassment. Zhou's flight with his wife from their home to ensure she stayed safely hidden during her pregnancy, in defiance of China's family planning policy, clearly demonstrates past persecution in addition to "other resistance." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "667 F.3d 1308, 1314",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have consistently recognized, being forced to flee from one's home in the face of an immediate threat of severe physical violence or death is squarely encompassed within the rubric of persecution, as long as the persecutors' actions are motivated by [a] protected consideration\"",
"sentence": "See Mendoza-Pablo v. Holder, 667 F.3d 1308, 1314 (9th Cir.2012) (“[W]e have consistently recognized, being forced to flee from one’s home in the face of an immediate threat of severe physical violence or death is squarely encompassed within the rubric of persecution, as long as the persecutors’ actions are motivated by [a] protected consideration”); see also Jiang v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1086, 1093-97 (9th Cir.2010) (finding that a couple’s efforts to marry despite China’s family planning policies, to conceive a child despite a forced abortion, and to flee from home to avoid police and family planning officers constituted “other resistance” and persecution); Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1158-60 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (finding persecution as a result of a forced gynecological examination of a woman and threats of sterilization to her partner)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "611 F.3d 1086, 1093-97",
"parenthetical": "finding that a couple's efforts to marry despite China's family planning policies, to conceive a child despite a forced abortion, and to flee from home to avoid police and family planning officers constituted \"other resistance\" and persecution",
"sentence": "See Mendoza-Pablo v. Holder, 667 F.3d 1308, 1314 (9th Cir.2012) (“[W]e have consistently recognized, being forced to flee from one’s home in the face of an immediate threat of severe physical violence or death is squarely encompassed within the rubric of persecution, as long as the persecutors’ actions are motivated by [a] protected consideration”); see also Jiang v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1086, 1093-97 (9th Cir.2010) (finding that a couple’s efforts to marry despite China’s family planning policies, to conceive a child despite a forced abortion, and to flee from home to avoid police and family planning officers constituted “other resistance” and persecution); Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1158-60 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (finding persecution as a result of a forced gynecological examination of a woman and threats of sterilization to her partner)."
} | 4,355,989 | a |
It is self-evident and legally true that Zhou's suffering, endured for the safe birth of his third child, amounts to more than harassment. Zhou's flight with his wife from their home to ensure she stayed safely hidden during her pregnancy, in defiance of China's family planning policy, clearly demonstrates past persecution in addition to "other resistance." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "667 F.3d 1308, 1314",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have consistently recognized, being forced to flee from one's home in the face of an immediate threat of severe physical violence or death is squarely encompassed within the rubric of persecution, as long as the persecutors' actions are motivated by [a] protected consideration\"",
"sentence": "See Mendoza-Pablo v. Holder, 667 F.3d 1308, 1314 (9th Cir.2012) (“[W]e have consistently recognized, being forced to flee from one’s home in the face of an immediate threat of severe physical violence or death is squarely encompassed within the rubric of persecution, as long as the persecutors’ actions are motivated by [a] protected consideration”); see also Jiang v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1086, 1093-97 (9th Cir.2010) (finding that a couple’s efforts to marry despite China’s family planning policies, to conceive a child despite a forced abortion, and to flee from home to avoid police and family planning officers constituted “other resistance” and persecution); Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1158-60 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (finding persecution as a result of a forced gynecological examination of a woman and threats of sterilization to her partner)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "356 F.3d 1153, 1158-60",
"parenthetical": "finding persecution as a result of a forced gynecological examination of a woman and threats of sterilization to her partner",
"sentence": "See Mendoza-Pablo v. Holder, 667 F.3d 1308, 1314 (9th Cir.2012) (“[W]e have consistently recognized, being forced to flee from one’s home in the face of an immediate threat of severe physical violence or death is squarely encompassed within the rubric of persecution, as long as the persecutors’ actions are motivated by [a] protected consideration”); see also Jiang v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1086, 1093-97 (9th Cir.2010) (finding that a couple’s efforts to marry despite China’s family planning policies, to conceive a child despite a forced abortion, and to flee from home to avoid police and family planning officers constituted “other resistance” and persecution); Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1158-60 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (finding persecution as a result of a forced gynecological examination of a woman and threats of sterilization to her partner)."
} | 4,355,989 | a |
Construing the facts in favor of Plaintiffs, the Court finds that they have stated a plausible claim for relief in regards to whether Taylor was denied benefits at the Mason jail. First, for the reasons explained above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim as to Taylor's denial of benefits during questioning, and finds that the case becomes even more compelling during investigative questioning at the jail and when being read his Miranda rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "539 F.3d 532, 532",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e find that the ADA applies to the post-arrest detention at the jail.\"",
"sentence": "See Tucker, 539 F.3d at 532 (“[W]e find that the ADA applies to the post-arrest detention at the jail.”); see also Calloway v. Boro of Glassboro Dep’t of Police, 89 F.Supp.2d 543, 555-56 (D.N.J.2000) (concluding that deaf individual deprived of benefit of providing information to the police concerning commission of crimes, in witness or suspect capacity, if not provided an interpreter during station-house questioning)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "89 F.Supp.2d 543, 555-56",
"parenthetical": "concluding that deaf individual deprived of benefit of providing information to the police concerning commission of crimes, in witness or suspect capacity, if not provided an interpreter during station-house questioning",
"sentence": "See Tucker, 539 F.3d at 532 (“[W]e find that the ADA applies to the post-arrest detention at the jail.”); see also Calloway v. Boro of Glassboro Dep’t of Police, 89 F.Supp.2d 543, 555-56 (D.N.J.2000) (concluding that deaf individual deprived of benefit of providing information to the police concerning commission of crimes, in witness or suspect capacity, if not provided an interpreter during station-house questioning)."
} | 4,130,073 | a |
. If there was no proof of any violation of the APO leading to disclosure of a trade secret to defendants, and no issue of the existence of any trade secret disclosed, there would be no issue of fact to be tried. Plaintiffs would not be entitled to a trial in order to call counsel as witnesses solely for the purpose of impeaching them, if that testimony was the only proof of plaintiffs' cause of action. Plaintiff's suspicions as to defendants' dishonesty cannot defeat summary judgment in the absence of other proof of the claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing jury verdict for plaintiff on ground that mere disbelief of only witness on subject, absent other proof, could not support judgment",
"sentence": "See United States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 262 n. 6 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 1840, 123 L.Ed.2d 467 (1993); Martin v. Citibank, 762 F.2d 212 (2d Cir.1985) (reversing jury verdict for plaintiff on ground that mere disbelief of only witness on subject, absent other proof, could not support judgment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where there is other independent support in the evidence, a jury may draw a negative inference from disbelief of a witness",
"sentence": "See also Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir.1952) (where there is other independent support in the evidence, a jury may draw a negative inference from disbelief of a witness); 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 401[05], at 401-32 n. 16."
} | 7,846,607 | a |
As discussed above, the plaintiffs have failed to indicate any risk concealed by E & Y's allegedly fraudulent audit opinions that then materialized to cause their losses. Furthermore, the first corrective disclosure bearing upon allegations of fraudulent accounting entered the market on July 18, 2002, when the Washington Post published the first of two articles documenting the alleged fraud. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "381 F.Supp.2d 211, 211",
"parenthetical": "establishing that the class's duty to inquire was triggered by the publication of the Washington Post articles",
"sentence": "See In re AOL Time Warner I, 381 F.Supp.2d at 211 (establishing that the class’s duty to inquire was triggered by the publication of the Washington Post articles); cf. Lentell, 396 F.3d at 175 n. 4 (stating that plaintiffs may not argue that they lacked knowledge of a fraud in order to “withstand the statute of limitations” yet argue that the fraud was disclosed for purposes of loss causation prior to the date that they allege they were put on inquiry notice)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that plaintiffs may not argue that they lacked knowledge of a fraud in order to \"withstand the statute of limitations\" yet argue that the fraud was disclosed for purposes of loss causation prior to the date that they allege they were put on inquiry notice",
"sentence": "See In re AOL Time Warner I, 381 F.Supp.2d at 211 (establishing that the class’s duty to inquire was triggered by the publication of the Washington Post articles); cf. Lentell, 396 F.3d at 175 n. 4 (stating that plaintiffs may not argue that they lacked knowledge of a fraud in order to “withstand the statute of limitations” yet argue that the fraud was disclosed for purposes of loss causation prior to the date that they allege they were put on inquiry notice)."
} | 5,702,798 | a |
It is well established that "a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits." In keeping with this principle, many of our sister Circuits have recognized that "[a]ffidavits and other hearsay materials are often received in preliminary injunction proceedings." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "348 F.3d 1182, 1188",
"parenthetical": "\"The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to preliminary injunction hearings.\"",
"sentence": "Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir.1986); see also Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir.1997) (citing Asseo); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir.1995) (“At the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction....”); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir.1993) (courts at preliminary injunction stage “may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, including hearsay”); Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir.1984) (“The urgency of obtaining a preliminary injunction ... makes it difficult to obtain affidavits from persons who would be competent to testify at trial. The trial court may even give inadmissible evidence some weight ....”); cf. Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir.2003) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to preliminary injunction hearings.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "51 F.3d 982, 985",
"parenthetical": "\"At the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction....\"",
"sentence": "Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir.1986); see also Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir.1997) (citing Asseo); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir.1995) (“At the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction....”); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir.1993) (courts at preliminary injunction stage “may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, including hearsay”); Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir.1984) (“The urgency of obtaining a preliminary injunction ... makes it difficult to obtain affidavits from persons who would be competent to testify at trial. The trial court may even give inadmissible evidence some weight ....”); cf. Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir.2003) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to preliminary injunction hearings.”)."
} | 9,247,262 | b |
It is well established that "a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits." In keeping with this principle, many of our sister Circuits have recognized that "[a]ffidavits and other hearsay materials are often received in preliminary injunction proceedings." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "348 F.3d 1182, 1188",
"parenthetical": "\"The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to preliminary injunction hearings.\"",
"sentence": "Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir.1986); see also Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir.1997) (citing Asseo); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir.1995) (“At the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction....”); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir.1993) (courts at preliminary injunction stage “may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, including hearsay”); Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir.1984) (“The urgency of obtaining a preliminary injunction ... makes it difficult to obtain affidavits from persons who would be competent to testify at trial. The trial court may even give inadmissible evidence some weight ....”); cf. Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir.2003) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to preliminary injunction hearings.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "992 F.2d 545, 551",
"parenthetical": "courts at preliminary injunction stage \"may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, including hearsay\"",
"sentence": "Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir.1986); see also Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir.1997) (citing Asseo); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir.1995) (“At the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction....”); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir.1993) (courts at preliminary injunction stage “may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, including hearsay”); Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir.1984) (“The urgency of obtaining a preliminary injunction ... makes it difficult to obtain affidavits from persons who would be competent to testify at trial. The trial court may even give inadmissible evidence some weight ....”); cf. Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir.2003) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to preliminary injunction hearings.”)."
} | 9,247,262 | b |
It is well established that "a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits." In keeping with this principle, many of our sister Circuits have recognized that "[a]ffidavits and other hearsay materials are often received in preliminary injunction proceedings." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "734 F.2d 1389, 1394",
"parenthetical": "\"The urgency of obtaining a preliminary injunction ... makes it difficult to obtain affidavits from persons who would be competent to testify at trial. The trial court may even give inadmissible evidence some weight ....\"",
"sentence": "Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir.1986); see also Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir.1997) (citing Asseo); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir.1995) (“At the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction....”); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir.1993) (courts at preliminary injunction stage “may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, including hearsay”); Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir.1984) (“The urgency of obtaining a preliminary injunction ... makes it difficult to obtain affidavits from persons who would be competent to testify at trial. The trial court may even give inadmissible evidence some weight ....”); cf. Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir.2003) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to preliminary injunction hearings.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "348 F.3d 1182, 1188",
"parenthetical": "\"The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to preliminary injunction hearings.\"",
"sentence": "Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir.1986); see also Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir.1997) (citing Asseo); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir.1995) (“At the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction....”); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir.1993) (courts at preliminary injunction stage “may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, including hearsay”); Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir.1984) (“The urgency of obtaining a preliminary injunction ... makes it difficult to obtain affidavits from persons who would be competent to testify at trial. The trial court may even give inadmissible evidence some weight ....”); cf. Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir.2003) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to preliminary injunction hearings.”)."
} | 9,247,262 | a |
Nonetheless, a disputed term is not thereby insulated from analysis in light of the nature and structure of the statute, the provisions in which the term is used, the possibility of error in the prior construction, and any other relevant considerations in the particular case. When the earlier definition arose for a different HTSUS provision and different products, it is not immune from review and reapplication for different HTSUS provisions and products. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "508 F.3d 1047, 1047",
"parenthetical": "\"The meaning of a tariff term is a question of law, reviewable de novo by this court .... \"",
"sentence": "See Degussa, 508 F.3d at 1047 (“The meaning of a tariff term is a question of law, reviewable de novo by this court .... ”); see also General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595-96, 124 S.Ct. 1236, 157 L.Ed.2d 1094 (2004) (“The presumption of uniform usage [throughout a statute] thus relents when a word used has several commonly understood meanings among which a speaker can alternate in the course of an ordinary conversation, without being confused or getting confusing.” (footnote omitted)); Sherman v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 516, 520 (1st Cir.1961) (“[I]t is not unusual for the same word to have different connotations in the same act and surely no canon of statutory construction forecloses courts from attributing to the word the meaning which the legislature intended that it should have in each instance.”); see also 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction §§ 46:05, 51.02."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "295 F.2d 516, 520",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is not unusual for the same word to have different connotations in the same act and surely no canon of statutory construction forecloses courts from attributing to the word the meaning which the legislature intended that it should have in each instance.\"",
"sentence": "See Degussa, 508 F.3d at 1047 (“The meaning of a tariff term is a question of law, reviewable de novo by this court .... ”); see also General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595-96, 124 S.Ct. 1236, 157 L.Ed.2d 1094 (2004) (“The presumption of uniform usage [throughout a statute] thus relents when a word used has several commonly understood meanings among which a speaker can alternate in the course of an ordinary conversation, without being confused or getting confusing.” (footnote omitted)); Sherman v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 516, 520 (1st Cir.1961) (“[I]t is not unusual for the same word to have different connotations in the same act and surely no canon of statutory construction forecloses courts from attributing to the word the meaning which the legislature intended that it should have in each instance.”); see also 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction §§ 46:05, 51.02."
} | 3,654,655 | a |
Rule 702 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence provides that expert testimony is permissible "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of fact or opinion." This Court has held that "expert testimony is required to establish any matter that is not obvious to a lay person and thus lies beyond common knowledge." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "939 A.2d 1016, 1019, 1022",
"parenthetical": "expert testimony required to establish standard of care owed to plaintiff patient by the staff at facility for the disabled",
"sentence": "Mills, 824 A.2d at 468 (holding expert testimony necessary to establish the “existence of a causal relationship between a particular toxin and its effect on the human body”); see also Broadley v. State, 939 A.2d 1016, 1019, 1022 (R.I.2008) (expert testimony required to establish standard of care owed to plaintiff patient by the staff at facility for the disabled); Boccasile v. Cajun Music Limited, 694 A.2d 686, 690-91 (R.I.1997) (requiring expert testimony to establish standard of care owed to patient in wrongful death action against doctor and nurse)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "824 A.2d 468, 468",
"parenthetical": "holding expert testimony necessary to establish the \"existence of a causal relationship between a particular toxin and its effect on the human body\"",
"sentence": "Mills, 824 A.2d at 468 (holding expert testimony necessary to establish the “existence of a causal relationship between a particular toxin and its effect on the human body”); see also Broadley v. State, 939 A.2d 1016, 1019, 1022 (R.I.2008) (expert testimony required to establish standard of care owed to plaintiff patient by the staff at facility for the disabled); Boccasile v. Cajun Music Limited, 694 A.2d 686, 690-91 (R.I.1997) (requiring expert testimony to establish standard of care owed to patient in wrongful death action against doctor and nurse)."
} | 7,293,351 | b |
Rule 702 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence provides that expert testimony is permissible "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of fact or opinion." This Court has held that "expert testimony is required to establish any matter that is not obvious to a lay person and thus lies beyond common knowledge." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "824 A.2d 468, 468",
"parenthetical": "holding expert testimony necessary to establish the \"existence of a causal relationship between a particular toxin and its effect on the human body\"",
"sentence": "Mills, 824 A.2d at 468 (holding expert testimony necessary to establish the “existence of a causal relationship between a particular toxin and its effect on the human body”); see also Broadley v. State, 939 A.2d 1016, 1019, 1022 (R.I.2008) (expert testimony required to establish standard of care owed to plaintiff patient by the staff at facility for the disabled); Boccasile v. Cajun Music Limited, 694 A.2d 686, 690-91 (R.I.1997) (requiring expert testimony to establish standard of care owed to patient in wrongful death action against doctor and nurse)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "694 A.2d 686, 690-91",
"parenthetical": "requiring expert testimony to establish standard of care owed to patient in wrongful death action against doctor and nurse",
"sentence": "Mills, 824 A.2d at 468 (holding expert testimony necessary to establish the “existence of a causal relationship between a particular toxin and its effect on the human body”); see also Broadley v. State, 939 A.2d 1016, 1019, 1022 (R.I.2008) (expert testimony required to establish standard of care owed to plaintiff patient by the staff at facility for the disabled); Boccasile v. Cajun Music Limited, 694 A.2d 686, 690-91 (R.I.1997) (requiring expert testimony to establish standard of care owed to patient in wrongful death action against doctor and nurse)."
} | 7,293,351 | a |
In order for plaintiff to prevail under the "dog-bite" statute, she need not prove scienter; that is, that Rossi knew of the dog's dangerous propensities. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that one who brings action under a \"dog-bite\" statute is not required to establish dog's past conduct or owners knowledge thereof",
"sentence": "See DeRobertis, 94 N.J. at 151, 462 A.2d 1260 (holding that under the dog-bite statute, “even owners without scienter” become liable upon satisfaction of the statutory elements); see also Nicholes v. Lorenz, 396 Mich. 53, 237 N.W.2d 468, 472 (1976) (holding that one who brings action under a “dog-bite” statute is not required to establish dog’s past conduct or owners knowledge thereof)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 N.J. 151, 151",
"parenthetical": "holding that under the dog-bite statute, \"even owners without scienter\" become liable upon satisfaction of the statutory elements",
"sentence": "See DeRobertis, 94 N.J. at 151, 462 A.2d 1260 (holding that under the dog-bite statute, “even owners without scienter” become liable upon satisfaction of the statutory elements); see also Nicholes v. Lorenz, 396 Mich. 53, 237 N.W.2d 468, 472 (1976) (holding that one who brings action under a “dog-bite” statute is not required to establish dog’s past conduct or owners knowledge thereof)."
} | 1,658,331 | b |
In order for plaintiff to prevail under the "dog-bite" statute, she need not prove scienter; that is, that Rossi knew of the dog's dangerous propensities. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "237 N.W.2d 468, 472",
"parenthetical": "holding that one who brings action under a \"dog-bite\" statute is not required to establish dog's past conduct or owners knowledge thereof",
"sentence": "See DeRobertis, 94 N.J. at 151, 462 A.2d 1260 (holding that under the dog-bite statute, “even owners without scienter” become liable upon satisfaction of the statutory elements); see also Nicholes v. Lorenz, 396 Mich. 53, 237 N.W.2d 468, 472 (1976) (holding that one who brings action under a “dog-bite” statute is not required to establish dog’s past conduct or owners knowledge thereof)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 N.J. 151, 151",
"parenthetical": "holding that under the dog-bite statute, \"even owners without scienter\" become liable upon satisfaction of the statutory elements",
"sentence": "See DeRobertis, 94 N.J. at 151, 462 A.2d 1260 (holding that under the dog-bite statute, “even owners without scienter” become liable upon satisfaction of the statutory elements); see also Nicholes v. Lorenz, 396 Mich. 53, 237 N.W.2d 468, 472 (1976) (holding that one who brings action under a “dog-bite” statute is not required to establish dog’s past conduct or owners knowledge thereof)."
} | 1,658,331 | b |
In order for plaintiff to prevail under the "dog-bite" statute, she need not prove scienter; that is, that Rossi knew of the dog's dangerous propensities. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that one who brings action under a \"dog-bite\" statute is not required to establish dog's past conduct or owners knowledge thereof",
"sentence": "See DeRobertis, 94 N.J. at 151, 462 A.2d 1260 (holding that under the dog-bite statute, “even owners without scienter” become liable upon satisfaction of the statutory elements); see also Nicholes v. Lorenz, 396 Mich. 53, 237 N.W.2d 468, 472 (1976) (holding that one who brings action under a “dog-bite” statute is not required to establish dog’s past conduct or owners knowledge thereof)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that under the dog-bite statute, \"even owners without scienter\" become liable upon satisfaction of the statutory elements",
"sentence": "See DeRobertis, 94 N.J. at 151, 462 A.2d 1260 (holding that under the dog-bite statute, “even owners without scienter” become liable upon satisfaction of the statutory elements); see also Nicholes v. Lorenz, 396 Mich. 53, 237 N.W.2d 468, 472 (1976) (holding that one who brings action under a “dog-bite” statute is not required to establish dog’s past conduct or owners knowledge thereof)."
} | 1,658,331 | b |
In order for plaintiff to prevail under the "dog-bite" statute, she need not prove scienter; that is, that Rossi knew of the dog's dangerous propensities. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "237 N.W.2d 468, 472",
"parenthetical": "holding that one who brings action under a \"dog-bite\" statute is not required to establish dog's past conduct or owners knowledge thereof",
"sentence": "See DeRobertis, 94 N.J. at 151, 462 A.2d 1260 (holding that under the dog-bite statute, “even owners without scienter” become liable upon satisfaction of the statutory elements); see also Nicholes v. Lorenz, 396 Mich. 53, 237 N.W.2d 468, 472 (1976) (holding that one who brings action under a “dog-bite” statute is not required to establish dog’s past conduct or owners knowledge thereof)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that under the dog-bite statute, \"even owners without scienter\" become liable upon satisfaction of the statutory elements",
"sentence": "See DeRobertis, 94 N.J. at 151, 462 A.2d 1260 (holding that under the dog-bite statute, “even owners without scienter” become liable upon satisfaction of the statutory elements); see also Nicholes v. Lorenz, 396 Mich. 53, 237 N.W.2d 468, 472 (1976) (holding that one who brings action under a “dog-bite” statute is not required to establish dog’s past conduct or owners knowledge thereof)."
} | 1,658,331 | b |
(1) (a) When a state court utilizes a legal test contrary to that endorsed by the Supreme Court, may we affirm the denial of federal habeas relief if the ultimate decision of the state court (but not its reasoning) is consistent with precedent of the Supreme Court? | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "529 U.S. 362, 406",
"parenthetical": "\"A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court ... arrives at a result different from our precedent.\"",
"sentence": "See Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir.2005) (affirming denial of federal ha-beas relief where de novo review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim showed that the conduct did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation); cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court’s clearly established precedent if the state court ... arrives at a result different from our precedent.”); Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir.2002) (“[T]he intricacies of the state court’s analysis need not concern us; what matters is whether the decision the court reached was contrary to controlling federal law.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of federal ha-beas relief where de novo review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim showed that the conduct did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation",
"sentence": "See Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir.2005) (affirming denial of federal ha-beas relief where de novo review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim showed that the conduct did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation); cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court’s clearly established precedent if the state court ... arrives at a result different from our precedent.”); Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir.2002) (“[T]he intricacies of the state court’s analysis need not concern us; what matters is whether the decision the court reached was contrary to controlling federal law.”)."
} | 5,197,746 | b |
(1) (a) When a state court utilizes a legal test contrary to that endorsed by the Supreme Court, may we affirm the denial of federal habeas relief if the ultimate decision of the state court (but not its reasoning) is consistent with precedent of the Supreme Court? | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of federal ha-beas relief where de novo review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim showed that the conduct did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation",
"sentence": "See Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir.2005) (affirming denial of federal ha-beas relief where de novo review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim showed that the conduct did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation); cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court’s clearly established precedent if the state court ... arrives at a result different from our precedent.”); Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir.2002) (“[T]he intricacies of the state court’s analysis need not concern us; what matters is whether the decision the court reached was contrary to controlling federal law.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court ... arrives at a result different from our precedent.\"",
"sentence": "See Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir.2005) (affirming denial of federal ha-beas relief where de novo review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim showed that the conduct did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation); cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court’s clearly established precedent if the state court ... arrives at a result different from our precedent.”); Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir.2002) (“[T]he intricacies of the state court’s analysis need not concern us; what matters is whether the decision the court reached was contrary to controlling federal law.”)."
} | 5,197,746 | a |
(1) (a) When a state court utilizes a legal test contrary to that endorsed by the Supreme Court, may we affirm the denial of federal habeas relief if the ultimate decision of the state court (but not its reasoning) is consistent with precedent of the Supreme Court? | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court ... arrives at a result different from our precedent.\"",
"sentence": "See Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir.2005) (affirming denial of federal ha-beas relief where de novo review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim showed that the conduct did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation); cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court’s clearly established precedent if the state court ... arrives at a result different from our precedent.”); Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir.2002) (“[T]he intricacies of the state court’s analysis need not concern us; what matters is whether the decision the court reached was contrary to controlling federal law.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of federal ha-beas relief where de novo review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim showed that the conduct did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation",
"sentence": "See Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir.2005) (affirming denial of federal ha-beas relief where de novo review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim showed that the conduct did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation); cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court’s clearly established precedent if the state court ... arrives at a result different from our precedent.”); Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir.2002) (“[T]he intricacies of the state court’s analysis need not concern us; what matters is whether the decision the court reached was contrary to controlling federal law.”)."
} | 5,197,746 | b |
Bankruptcy Code section 501 specifically permits creditors to file proofs of claim. "[T]he filing of a Proof of Claim before a bankruptcy court ... is the logical equivalent of a request for relief from the automatic stay, which cannot in itself constitute a violation of the stay...." Other courts considering the issue have reached a similar conclusion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "234 B.R. 528, 534",
"parenthetical": "\"The contention that the exercise of a mandated statutory right under the Bankruptcy Code [such as the filing of a nondischargeability complaint] is a violation of the automatic stay is almost as absurd as a contention that any creditor who files a proof of claim in bankruptcy violated the automatic stay\"",
"sentence": "See also In re Nelson, 234 B.R. 528, 534 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1999) (“The contention that the exercise of a mandated statutory right under the Bankruptcy Code [such as the filing of a nondischargeability complaint] is a violation of the automatic stay is almost as absurd as a contention that any creditor who files a proof of claim in bankruptcy violated the automatic stay”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"For obvious reasons ... courts have recognized that SS 362(a",
"sentence": "See e.g. U.S. v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“For obvious reasons ... courts have recognized that § 362(a) cannot stay actions specifically authorized elsewhere in the bankruptcy code”); In re Surprise, 342 B.R. 119, 122 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.2006) (concurring with Sammon); In re Sims, 278 B.R. 457, 472 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2002) (accord); In re I.C.H. Corp., 219 B.R. 176, 190 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1998), rev’d on other grounds, 230 B.R. 88 (N.D.Tex.1999) (“The automatic stay is not applicable to assertion of a claim in a proof of claim filed in a Bankruptcy Court”)."
} | 4,061,307 | b |
Bankruptcy Code section 501 specifically permits creditors to file proofs of claim. "[T]he filing of a Proof of Claim before a bankruptcy court ... is the logical equivalent of a request for relief from the automatic stay, which cannot in itself constitute a violation of the stay...." Other courts considering the issue have reached a similar conclusion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "234 B.R. 528, 534",
"parenthetical": "\"The contention that the exercise of a mandated statutory right under the Bankruptcy Code [such as the filing of a nondischargeability complaint] is a violation of the automatic stay is almost as absurd as a contention that any creditor who files a proof of claim in bankruptcy violated the automatic stay\"",
"sentence": "See also In re Nelson, 234 B.R. 528, 534 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1999) (“The contention that the exercise of a mandated statutory right under the Bankruptcy Code [such as the filing of a nondischargeability complaint] is a violation of the automatic stay is almost as absurd as a contention that any creditor who files a proof of claim in bankruptcy violated the automatic stay”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "219 B.R. 176, 190",
"parenthetical": "\"The automatic stay is not applicable to assertion of a claim in a proof of claim filed in a Bankruptcy Court\"",
"sentence": "See e.g. U.S. v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“For obvious reasons ... courts have recognized that § 362(a) cannot stay actions specifically authorized elsewhere in the bankruptcy code”); In re Surprise, 342 B.R. 119, 122 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.2006) (concurring with Sammon); In re Sims, 278 B.R. 457, 472 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2002) (accord); In re I.C.H. Corp., 219 B.R. 176, 190 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1998), rev’d on other grounds, 230 B.R. 88 (N.D.Tex.1999) (“The automatic stay is not applicable to assertion of a claim in a proof of claim filed in a Bankruptcy Court”)."
} | 4,061,307 | b |
Bankruptcy Code section 501 specifically permits creditors to file proofs of claim. "[T]he filing of a Proof of Claim before a bankruptcy court ... is the logical equivalent of a request for relief from the automatic stay, which cannot in itself constitute a violation of the stay...." Other courts considering the issue have reached a similar conclusion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The automatic stay is not applicable to assertion of a claim in a proof of claim filed in a Bankruptcy Court\"",
"sentence": "See e.g. U.S. v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“For obvious reasons ... courts have recognized that § 362(a) cannot stay actions specifically authorized elsewhere in the bankruptcy code”); In re Surprise, 342 B.R. 119, 122 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.2006) (concurring with Sammon); In re Sims, 278 B.R. 457, 472 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2002) (accord); In re I.C.H. Corp., 219 B.R. 176, 190 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1998), rev’d on other grounds, 230 B.R. 88 (N.D.Tex.1999) (“The automatic stay is not applicable to assertion of a claim in a proof of claim filed in a Bankruptcy Court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "234 B.R. 528, 534",
"parenthetical": "\"The contention that the exercise of a mandated statutory right under the Bankruptcy Code [such as the filing of a nondischargeability complaint] is a violation of the automatic stay is almost as absurd as a contention that any creditor who files a proof of claim in bankruptcy violated the automatic stay\"",
"sentence": "See also In re Nelson, 234 B.R. 528, 534 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1999) (“The contention that the exercise of a mandated statutory right under the Bankruptcy Code [such as the filing of a nondischargeability complaint] is a violation of the automatic stay is almost as absurd as a contention that any creditor who files a proof of claim in bankruptcy violated the automatic stay”)."
} | 4,061,307 | a |
The imposition of joint and several liability is appropriate because of Suman and Rahman's close relationship as husband and wife, and their actions in concert with one another. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "409 F.Supp.2d 346, 346",
"parenthetical": "ordering joint and several liability where defendant \"was to share equally in the proceeds of the fraudulent scheme he enabled\"",
"sentence": "See S.E.C. v. Hughes Capital Corp., 124 F.3d 449, 455 (3d Cir.1997) (citing First Jersey, 101 F.3d at 1475 (ordering joint and several liability where defendant was “intimately involved” in the fraud)); see also Svoboda, 409 F.Supp.2d at 346 (ordering joint and several liability where defendant “was to share equally in the proceeds of the fraudulent scheme he enabled”). Accordingly, Defendants are jointly and severally liable for $1,039,440 together with prejudgment interest at the IRS underpayment rate."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 F.3d 1475, 1475",
"parenthetical": "ordering joint and several liability where defendant was \"intimately involved\" in the fraud",
"sentence": "See S.E.C. v. Hughes Capital Corp., 124 F.3d 449, 455 (3d Cir.1997) (citing First Jersey, 101 F.3d at 1475 (ordering joint and several liability where defendant was “intimately involved” in the fraud)); see also Svoboda, 409 F.Supp.2d at 346 (ordering joint and several liability where defendant “was to share equally in the proceeds of the fraudulent scheme he enabled”). Accordingly, Defendants are jointly and severally liable for $1,039,440 together with prejudgment interest at the IRS underpayment rate."
} | 3,605,882 | b |
In light of our holding that Breeland's sawed-off shotgun met the definition of firearm in 26 U.S.C. SS 5845(a)(2), the Government's proof that Breeland possessed an unregistered firearm was overwhelming. Consequently, we hold that the Government's statements, even if improper, were harmless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "461 U.S. 499, 511-12",
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 511-12, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1982, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 124 (5th Cir.1995) (“To warrant reversal of a conviction, prosecutorial misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it casts serious doubts upon the correctness of the jury’s verdict.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 117, 124",
"parenthetical": "\"To warrant reversal of a conviction, prosecutorial misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it casts serious doubts upon the correctness of the jury's verdict.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 511-12, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1982, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 124 (5th Cir.1995) (“To warrant reversal of a conviction, prosecutorial misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it casts serious doubts upon the correctness of the jury’s verdict.”)."
} | 572,922 | a |
In light of our holding that Breeland's sawed-off shotgun met the definition of firearm in 26 U.S.C. SS 5845(a)(2), the Government's proof that Breeland possessed an unregistered firearm was overwhelming. Consequently, we hold that the Government's statements, even if improper, were harmless. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 117, 124",
"parenthetical": "\"To warrant reversal of a conviction, prosecutorial misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it casts serious doubts upon the correctness of the jury's verdict.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 511-12, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1982, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 124 (5th Cir.1995) (“To warrant reversal of a conviction, prosecutorial misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it casts serious doubts upon the correctness of the jury’s verdict.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "103 S.Ct. 1974, 1982",
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 511-12, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1982, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 124 (5th Cir.1995) (“To warrant reversal of a conviction, prosecutorial misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it casts serious doubts upon the correctness of the jury’s verdict.”)."
} | 572,922 | b |
In light of our holding that Breeland's sawed-off shotgun met the definition of firearm in 26 U.S.C. SS 5845(a)(2), the Government's proof that Breeland possessed an unregistered firearm was overwhelming. Consequently, we hold that the Government's statements, even if improper, were harmless. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 117, 124",
"parenthetical": "\"To warrant reversal of a conviction, prosecutorial misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it casts serious doubts upon the correctness of the jury's verdict.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 511-12, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1982, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 124 (5th Cir.1995) (“To warrant reversal of a conviction, prosecutorial misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it casts serious doubts upon the correctness of the jury’s verdict.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 511-12, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1982, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 124 (5th Cir.1995) (“To warrant reversal of a conviction, prosecutorial misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it casts serious doubts upon the correctness of the jury’s verdict.”)."
} | 572,922 | b |
Because the petitioner did not even submit the dockets from the underlying Housing Court actions, the single justice did not know (apart from the petitioner's bare allegation) whether the petitioner had, in fact, filed a notice of appeal in those actions. Moreover, the petitioner does not allege, and the dockets do not indicate, that he made any attempt in the trial court to compel or facilitate the assembly of the record. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indicating that clerk's failure to process the petitioner's appeal would have been correctable with appropriate motion in trial court",
"sentence": "See Jordan v. Superior Court, 426 Mass. 1019 (1998) (indicating that clerk’s failure to process the petitioner’s appeal would have been correctable with appropriate motion in trial court)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "425 Mass. 1021, 1022",
"parenthetical": "discussing petitioner's burden of demonstrating absence or inadequacy of other remedies",
"sentence": "Matthews v. D’Arcy, 425 Mass. 1021, 1022 (1997), and cases cited (discussing petitioner’s burden of demonstrating absence or inadequacy of other remedies)."
} | 285,296 | b |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "290 S.C. 492, 492",
"parenthetical": "holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant's home",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | a |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "290 S.C. 492, 492",
"parenthetical": "holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant's home",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "308 A.2d 734, 739-40",
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | a |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "351 S.E.2d 572, 572",
"parenthetical": "holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant's home",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | b |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "351 S.E.2d 572, 572",
"parenthetical": "holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant's home",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "308 A.2d 734, 739-40",
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | a |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "271 S.C. 498, 501",
"parenthetical": "finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | b |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "271 S.C. 498, 501",
"parenthetical": "finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "308 A.2d 734, 739-40",
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | a |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "248 S.E.2d 475, 477",
"parenthetical": "finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | a |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "308 A.2d 734, 739-40",
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "248 S.E.2d 475, 477",
"parenthetical": "finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | b |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "268 S.C. 214, 218",
"parenthetical": "holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | b |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "308 A.2d 734, 739-40",
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "268 S.C. 214, 218",
"parenthetical": "holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | b |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "232 S.E.2d 889, 891",
"parenthetical": "holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | a |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "308 A.2d 734, 739-40",
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "232 S.E.2d 889, 891",
"parenthetical": "holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | b |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "262 S.C. 526, 531-33",
"parenthetical": "concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | a |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "308 A.2d 734, 739-40",
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "262 S.C. 526, 531-33",
"parenthetical": "concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | b |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "205 S.E.2d 827, 830",
"parenthetical": "concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | b |
Upon further investigation, the officers found a bag of "wash clothes" near the Jeep that smelled of bleach and the inside of the Jeep was wet with bleach. Thus, based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence of a crime, and the necessity to preserve the potential blood evidence, the warrantless search and subsequent seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "308 A.2d 734, 739-40",
"parenthetical": "outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "205 S.E.2d 827, 830",
"parenthetical": "concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods",
"sentence": "See Cox, 290 S.C. at 492, 351 S.E.2d at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant’s home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police stopped vehicle after receiving information from confidential informant that defendant was driving vehicle containing marijuana); State v. Hayden, 268 S.C. 214, 218, 232 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1977) (holding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of automobile where officers received information from an informant that defendants would be traveling in a vehicle containing illegal drugs and due to the lateness of the hour it would have been impractical to get a search warrant); State v. Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 531-33, 205 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1974) (concluding warrantless search of automobile was proper where officer had strong reasons to believe that the automobile was being used in criminal activity and that it very probably contained stolen goods); see also Robinson v. State, 18 Md.App. 678, 308 A.2d 734, 739-40 (1973) (outlining cases holding exigency existed for the search of a vehicle and then removal to police garage)."
} | 452,275 | b |
However, the concerns animating these cases -- namely, the need to deter warrant-less property searches -- do not apply with equal force to the facts of this case. Not only were Lieutenant Paul and his fellow officers lawfully on the premises pursuant to a valid search warrant -- thus reducing any significant concern that applying the inevitable discovery doctrine in this case would subvert the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement -- the evidence here, and the logical inferences therefrom, demonstrate that the police would have obtained Heath's currency during a valid search conducted pursuant to a well-established exception to the warrant requirement, namely, a search incident to a lawful arrest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "986 F.2d 1354, 1357",
"parenthetical": "\"[E]ven assuming that the [pat-down search of the defendant was conducted] prior to [the discovery of] the cocaine [on his companion], [the defendant] could ... have been searched seconds later, once the cocaine provided probable cause to arrest.... Therefore, the search was incident to a lawful arrest regardless of the exact sequence of events (emphases added",
"sentence": "See United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1357 (10th Cir.1993) (“[E]ven assuming that the [pat-down search of the defendant was conducted] prior to [the discovery of] the cocaine [on his companion], [the defendant] could ... have been searched seconds later, once the cocaine provided probable cause to arrest.... Therefore, the search was incident to a lawful arrest regardless of the exact sequence of events (emphases added); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir.1982) (recognizing, without inquiring whether the officers would necessarily have arrested the defendant, that the “discovery of the marijuana in the van provided probable cause to arrest [the defendant], and upon arrest the officers unquestionably would have searched [the defendant] and discovered the marijuana in his pocket”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Eylicio-Montoya, 70 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (10th Cir.1995) (applying inevitable discovery exception because, although the defendant had been “prematurely arrested,” the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle and would have noticed the suspicious burlap bags “during the course of a lawful Terry stop”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 1158, 1166-67",
"parenthetical": "applying inevitable discovery exception because, although the defendant had been \"prematurely arrested,\" the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle and would have noticed the suspicious burlap bags \"during the course of a lawful Terry stop\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1357 (10th Cir.1993) (“[E]ven assuming that the [pat-down search of the defendant was conducted] prior to [the discovery of] the cocaine [on his companion], [the defendant] could ... have been searched seconds later, once the cocaine provided probable cause to arrest.... Therefore, the search was incident to a lawful arrest regardless of the exact sequence of events (emphases added); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir.1982) (recognizing, without inquiring whether the officers would necessarily have arrested the defendant, that the “discovery of the marijuana in the van provided probable cause to arrest [the defendant], and upon arrest the officers unquestionably would have searched [the defendant] and discovered the marijuana in his pocket”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Eylicio-Montoya, 70 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (10th Cir.1995) (applying inevitable discovery exception because, although the defendant had been “prematurely arrested,” the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle and would have noticed the suspicious burlap bags “during the course of a lawful Terry stop”)."
} | 3,251,225 | a |
However, the concerns animating these cases -- namely, the need to deter warrant-less property searches -- do not apply with equal force to the facts of this case. Not only were Lieutenant Paul and his fellow officers lawfully on the premises pursuant to a valid search warrant -- thus reducing any significant concern that applying the inevitable discovery doctrine in this case would subvert the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement -- the evidence here, and the logical inferences therefrom, demonstrate that the police would have obtained Heath's currency during a valid search conducted pursuant to a well-established exception to the warrant requirement, namely, a search incident to a lawful arrest. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 1158, 1166-67",
"parenthetical": "applying inevitable discovery exception because, although the defendant had been \"prematurely arrested,\" the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle and would have noticed the suspicious burlap bags \"during the course of a lawful Terry stop\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1357 (10th Cir.1993) (“[E]ven assuming that the [pat-down search of the defendant was conducted] prior to [the discovery of] the cocaine [on his companion], [the defendant] could ... have been searched seconds later, once the cocaine provided probable cause to arrest.... Therefore, the search was incident to a lawful arrest regardless of the exact sequence of events (emphases added); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir.1982) (recognizing, without inquiring whether the officers would necessarily have arrested the defendant, that the “discovery of the marijuana in the van provided probable cause to arrest [the defendant], and upon arrest the officers unquestionably would have searched [the defendant] and discovered the marijuana in his pocket”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Eylicio-Montoya, 70 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (10th Cir.1995) (applying inevitable discovery exception because, although the defendant had been “prematurely arrested,” the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle and would have noticed the suspicious burlap bags “during the course of a lawful Terry stop”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "692 F.2d 699, 704",
"parenthetical": "recognizing, without inquiring whether the officers would necessarily have arrested the defendant, that the \"discovery of the marijuana in the van provided probable cause to arrest [the defendant], and upon arrest the officers unquestionably would have searched [the defendant] and discovered the marijuana in his pocket\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1357 (10th Cir.1993) (“[E]ven assuming that the [pat-down search of the defendant was conducted] prior to [the discovery of] the cocaine [on his companion], [the defendant] could ... have been searched seconds later, once the cocaine provided probable cause to arrest.... Therefore, the search was incident to a lawful arrest regardless of the exact sequence of events (emphases added); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir.1982) (recognizing, without inquiring whether the officers would necessarily have arrested the defendant, that the “discovery of the marijuana in the van provided probable cause to arrest [the defendant], and upon arrest the officers unquestionably would have searched [the defendant] and discovered the marijuana in his pocket”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Eylicio-Montoya, 70 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (10th Cir.1995) (applying inevitable discovery exception because, although the defendant had been “prematurely arrested,” the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle and would have noticed the suspicious burlap bags “during the course of a lawful Terry stop”)."
} | 3,251,225 | b |
Second, the issue must have been "actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction" in the first trial. Third, preclusion in the second trial must not work an unfairness. Preclusion is sometimes unfair if the party to be bound lacked an incentive to litigate in the first trial, especially in comparison to the stakes of the second trial. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "439 U.S. 330, 330",
"parenthetical": "heightened concern for potential unfairness from preclusion against defendant in second action brought by plaintiff not a party to the first suit",
"sentence": "See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 402 U.S. at 333, 91 S.Ct. at 1445 (in connection with preclusion against plaintiff in second action who lost as plaintiff in first action against a different defendant); see also Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330, 99 S.Ct. at 651 (heightened concern for potential unfairness from preclusion against defendant in second action brought by plaintiff not a party to the first suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "402 U.S. 333, 333",
"parenthetical": "in connection with preclusion against plaintiff in second action who lost as plaintiff in first action against a different defendant",
"sentence": "See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 402 U.S. at 333, 91 S.Ct. at 1445 (in connection with preclusion against plaintiff in second action who lost as plaintiff in first action against a different defendant); see also Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330, 99 S.Ct. at 651 (heightened concern for potential unfairness from preclusion against defendant in second action brought by plaintiff not a party to the first suit)."
} | 3,642,903 | b |
Second, the issue must have been "actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction" in the first trial. Third, preclusion in the second trial must not work an unfairness. Preclusion is sometimes unfair if the party to be bound lacked an incentive to litigate in the first trial, especially in comparison to the stakes of the second trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "402 U.S. 333, 333",
"parenthetical": "in connection with preclusion against plaintiff in second action who lost as plaintiff in first action against a different defendant",
"sentence": "See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 402 U.S. at 333, 91 S.Ct. at 1445 (in connection with preclusion against plaintiff in second action who lost as plaintiff in first action against a different defendant); see also Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330, 99 S.Ct. at 651 (heightened concern for potential unfairness from preclusion against defendant in second action brought by plaintiff not a party to the first suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 651, 651",
"parenthetical": "heightened concern for potential unfairness from preclusion against defendant in second action brought by plaintiff not a party to the first suit",
"sentence": "See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 402 U.S. at 333, 91 S.Ct. at 1445 (in connection with preclusion against plaintiff in second action who lost as plaintiff in first action against a different defendant); see also Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330, 99 S.Ct. at 651 (heightened concern for potential unfairness from preclusion against defendant in second action brought by plaintiff not a party to the first suit)."
} | 3,642,903 | a |
Second, the issue must have been "actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction" in the first trial. Third, preclusion in the second trial must not work an unfairness. Preclusion is sometimes unfair if the party to be bound lacked an incentive to litigate in the first trial, especially in comparison to the stakes of the second trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "91 S.Ct. 1445, 1445",
"parenthetical": "in connection with preclusion against plaintiff in second action who lost as plaintiff in first action against a different defendant",
"sentence": "See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 402 U.S. at 333, 91 S.Ct. at 1445 (in connection with preclusion against plaintiff in second action who lost as plaintiff in first action against a different defendant); see also Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330, 99 S.Ct. at 651 (heightened concern for potential unfairness from preclusion against defendant in second action brought by plaintiff not a party to the first suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "439 U.S. 330, 330",
"parenthetical": "heightened concern for potential unfairness from preclusion against defendant in second action brought by plaintiff not a party to the first suit",
"sentence": "See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 402 U.S. at 333, 91 S.Ct. at 1445 (in connection with preclusion against plaintiff in second action who lost as plaintiff in first action against a different defendant); see also Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330, 99 S.Ct. at 651 (heightened concern for potential unfairness from preclusion against defendant in second action brought by plaintiff not a party to the first suit)."
} | 3,642,903 | a |
Second, the issue must have been "actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction" in the first trial. Third, preclusion in the second trial must not work an unfairness. Preclusion is sometimes unfair if the party to be bound lacked an incentive to litigate in the first trial, especially in comparison to the stakes of the second trial. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 651, 651",
"parenthetical": "heightened concern for potential unfairness from preclusion against defendant in second action brought by plaintiff not a party to the first suit",
"sentence": "See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 402 U.S. at 333, 91 S.Ct. at 1445 (in connection with preclusion against plaintiff in second action who lost as plaintiff in first action against a different defendant); see also Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330, 99 S.Ct. at 651 (heightened concern for potential unfairness from preclusion against defendant in second action brought by plaintiff not a party to the first suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "91 S.Ct. 1445, 1445",
"parenthetical": "in connection with preclusion against plaintiff in second action who lost as plaintiff in first action against a different defendant",
"sentence": "See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 402 U.S. at 333, 91 S.Ct. at 1445 (in connection with preclusion against plaintiff in second action who lost as plaintiff in first action against a different defendant); see also Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330, 99 S.Ct. at 651 (heightened concern for potential unfairness from preclusion against defendant in second action brought by plaintiff not a party to the first suit)."
} | 3,642,903 | b |
There is, however, one exception to this rule. Under Crim. P. 85(a), a challenge to what was formerly known as an "HMlegal" sentence, now termed a sentence "not authorized by law," may be raised "at any time." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "169 Colo. 262, 264",
"parenthetical": "there is \"no requirement\" that a Crim. P. 85(a) challenge \"be raised on writ of error from the convietion or be thereafter waived\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Wenzinger, 155 P.3d 415, 418 (Colo.App.2006) (discussing the past and present terminology in Crim. P. 85(a)); see also People v. Bradley, 169 Colo. 262, 264, 455 P.2d 199, 200 (1969) (there is \"no requirement\" that a Crim. P. 85(a) challenge \"be raised on writ of error from the convietion or be thereafter waived\"); People v. Watkins, 83 P.3d 1182, 1187 (Colo.App.20083) (illegal sentence issues are jurisdictional in nature)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "155 P.3d 415, 418",
"parenthetical": "discussing the past and present terminology in Crim. P. 85(a",
"sentence": "See People v. Wenzinger, 155 P.3d 415, 418 (Colo.App.2006) (discussing the past and present terminology in Crim. P. 85(a)); see also People v. Bradley, 169 Colo. 262, 264, 455 P.2d 199, 200 (1969) (there is \"no requirement\" that a Crim. P. 85(a) challenge \"be raised on writ of error from the convietion or be thereafter waived\"); People v. Watkins, 83 P.3d 1182, 1187 (Colo.App.20083) (illegal sentence issues are jurisdictional in nature)."
} | 6,990,598 | b |
There is, however, one exception to this rule. Under Crim. P. 85(a), a challenge to what was formerly known as an "HMlegal" sentence, now termed a sentence "not authorized by law," may be raised "at any time." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "155 P.3d 415, 418",
"parenthetical": "discussing the past and present terminology in Crim. P. 85(a",
"sentence": "See People v. Wenzinger, 155 P.3d 415, 418 (Colo.App.2006) (discussing the past and present terminology in Crim. P. 85(a)); see also People v. Bradley, 169 Colo. 262, 264, 455 P.2d 199, 200 (1969) (there is \"no requirement\" that a Crim. P. 85(a) challenge \"be raised on writ of error from the convietion or be thereafter waived\"); People v. Watkins, 83 P.3d 1182, 1187 (Colo.App.20083) (illegal sentence issues are jurisdictional in nature)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "455 P.2d 199, 200",
"parenthetical": "there is \"no requirement\" that a Crim. P. 85(a) challenge \"be raised on writ of error from the convietion or be thereafter waived\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Wenzinger, 155 P.3d 415, 418 (Colo.App.2006) (discussing the past and present terminology in Crim. P. 85(a)); see also People v. Bradley, 169 Colo. 262, 264, 455 P.2d 199, 200 (1969) (there is \"no requirement\" that a Crim. P. 85(a) challenge \"be raised on writ of error from the convietion or be thereafter waived\"); People v. Watkins, 83 P.3d 1182, 1187 (Colo.App.20083) (illegal sentence issues are jurisdictional in nature)."
} | 6,990,598 | a |
Whether the vehicle's engine was running when the trooper initiated his seizure of the defendant is a matter of critical importance to the defendant's motion to suppress, for "operation]" of a motor vehicle, G. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "263 Mass. 22, 24",
"parenthetical": "\"[a] person operates a motor vehicle within the meaning of G. L. c. 90, SS 24, when, in the vehicle, he intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Uski, 263 Mass. 22, 24 (1928) (“[a] person operates a motor vehicle within the meaning of G. L. c. 90, § 24, when, in the vehicle, he intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "400 Mass. 181, 184",
"parenthetical": "starting engine of vehicle, or making use of power provided by engine, constitutes \"operation\" of motor vehicle for purposes of G. L. c. 90, SS 24",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Ginnetti, 400 Mass. 181, 184 (1987) (starting engine of vehicle, or making use of power provided by engine, constitutes “operation” of motor vehicle for purposes of G. L. c. 90, § 24); Commonwealth v. Sudderth, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 317, 320-321 (1994) (intoxicated driver asleep in vehicle with key in ignition and engine running warrants inference of “operation”; driver’s intention in starting vehicle is not element of statutory offense of operating while under influence)."
} | 286,822 | a |
Plaintiffs' concerns about the conclusions these experts' experience led them to, and the believability of those conclusions, go to the weight of the testimony and can be appropriately addressed through cross-examination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "924 F.Supp.2d 74, 96",
"parenthetical": "\"If the District has an issue with how Mr. Day classified certain late releases, it may address this on cross-examination.\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. H & R Block, Inc., 831 F.Supp.2d 27, 34 (D.D.C.2011) (noting that “technical deficiencies that can be adequately explored on cross-examination generally go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence, unless the methodological deficiencies are so sweeping or fundamental as to render the survey wholly unreliable and therefore inadmissible”); see also Groobert, 219 F.Supp.2d at 9 (recognizing that “[t]he D.C. Circuit has stated that, ‘by attempting to evaluate the credibility of opposing experts and the persuasiveness of - competing studies, the district court conflate[s] the questions of the admissibility of expert testimony and the weight appropriately to be accorded such testimony by a factfinder’ ”) (quoting Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 141); Barnes v. District of Columbia, 924 F.Supp.2d 74, 96 (D.D.C.2013) (“If the District has an issue with how Mr. Day classified certain late releases, it may address this on cross-examination.”); Harris v. Koenig, 815 F.Supp.2d 6, 10 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Whether or not [expert’s testimony] is based on ‘unreasonable assumptions’ will be determined at trial after full cross-examination.”); S.E.C. v. Johnson, 525 F.Supp.2d 70, 76 (D.D.C.2007) (“It is for the jury,- not the Court, to determine whether [expert’s] opinions are suspect be cause the facts upon which he relied were shown to be inaccurate or unproven”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "831 F.Supp.2d 27, 34",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"technical deficiencies that can be adequately explored on cross-examination generally go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence, unless the methodological deficiencies are so sweeping or fundamental as to render the survey wholly unreliable and therefore inadmissible\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. H & R Block, Inc., 831 F.Supp.2d 27, 34 (D.D.C.2011) (noting that “technical deficiencies that can be adequately explored on cross-examination generally go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence, unless the methodological deficiencies are so sweeping or fundamental as to render the survey wholly unreliable and therefore inadmissible”); see also Groobert, 219 F.Supp.2d at 9 (recognizing that “[t]he D.C. Circuit has stated that, ‘by attempting to evaluate the credibility of opposing experts and the persuasiveness of - competing studies, the district court conflate[s] the questions of the admissibility of expert testimony and the weight appropriately to be accorded such testimony by a factfinder’ ”) (quoting Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 141); Barnes v. District of Columbia, 924 F.Supp.2d 74, 96 (D.D.C.2013) (“If the District has an issue with how Mr. Day classified certain late releases, it may address this on cross-examination.”); Harris v. Koenig, 815 F.Supp.2d 6, 10 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Whether or not [expert’s testimony] is based on ‘unreasonable assumptions’ will be determined at trial after full cross-examination.”); S.E.C. v. Johnson, 525 F.Supp.2d 70, 76 (D.D.C.2007) (“It is for the jury,- not the Court, to determine whether [expert’s] opinions are suspect be cause the facts upon which he relied were shown to be inaccurate or unproven”)."
} | 3,935,969 | b |
Plaintiffs' concerns about the conclusions these experts' experience led them to, and the believability of those conclusions, go to the weight of the testimony and can be appropriately addressed through cross-examination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "831 F.Supp.2d 27, 34",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"technical deficiencies that can be adequately explored on cross-examination generally go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence, unless the methodological deficiencies are so sweeping or fundamental as to render the survey wholly unreliable and therefore inadmissible\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. H & R Block, Inc., 831 F.Supp.2d 27, 34 (D.D.C.2011) (noting that “technical deficiencies that can be adequately explored on cross-examination generally go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence, unless the methodological deficiencies are so sweeping or fundamental as to render the survey wholly unreliable and therefore inadmissible”); see also Groobert, 219 F.Supp.2d at 9 (recognizing that “[t]he D.C. Circuit has stated that, ‘by attempting to evaluate the credibility of opposing experts and the persuasiveness of - competing studies, the district court conflate[s] the questions of the admissibility of expert testimony and the weight appropriately to be accorded such testimony by a factfinder’ ”) (quoting Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 141); Barnes v. District of Columbia, 924 F.Supp.2d 74, 96 (D.D.C.2013) (“If the District has an issue with how Mr. Day classified certain late releases, it may address this on cross-examination.”); Harris v. Koenig, 815 F.Supp.2d 6, 10 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Whether or not [expert’s testimony] is based on ‘unreasonable assumptions’ will be determined at trial after full cross-examination.”); S.E.C. v. Johnson, 525 F.Supp.2d 70, 76 (D.D.C.2007) (“It is for the jury,- not the Court, to determine whether [expert’s] opinions are suspect be cause the facts upon which he relied were shown to be inaccurate or unproven”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "815 F.Supp.2d 6, 10",
"parenthetical": "\"Whether or not [expert's testimony] is based on 'unreasonable assumptions' will be determined at trial after full cross-examination.\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. H & R Block, Inc., 831 F.Supp.2d 27, 34 (D.D.C.2011) (noting that “technical deficiencies that can be adequately explored on cross-examination generally go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence, unless the methodological deficiencies are so sweeping or fundamental as to render the survey wholly unreliable and therefore inadmissible”); see also Groobert, 219 F.Supp.2d at 9 (recognizing that “[t]he D.C. Circuit has stated that, ‘by attempting to evaluate the credibility of opposing experts and the persuasiveness of - competing studies, the district court conflate[s] the questions of the admissibility of expert testimony and the weight appropriately to be accorded such testimony by a factfinder’ ”) (quoting Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 141); Barnes v. District of Columbia, 924 F.Supp.2d 74, 96 (D.D.C.2013) (“If the District has an issue with how Mr. Day classified certain late releases, it may address this on cross-examination.”); Harris v. Koenig, 815 F.Supp.2d 6, 10 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Whether or not [expert’s testimony] is based on ‘unreasonable assumptions’ will be determined at trial after full cross-examination.”); S.E.C. v. Johnson, 525 F.Supp.2d 70, 76 (D.D.C.2007) (“It is for the jury,- not the Court, to determine whether [expert’s] opinions are suspect be cause the facts upon which he relied were shown to be inaccurate or unproven”)."
} | 3,935,969 | a |
Plaintiffs' concerns about the conclusions these experts' experience led them to, and the believability of those conclusions, go to the weight of the testimony and can be appropriately addressed through cross-examination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "525 F.Supp.2d 70, 76",
"parenthetical": "\"It is for the jury,- not the Court, to determine whether [expert's] opinions are suspect be cause the facts upon which he relied were shown to be inaccurate or unproven\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. H & R Block, Inc., 831 F.Supp.2d 27, 34 (D.D.C.2011) (noting that “technical deficiencies that can be adequately explored on cross-examination generally go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence, unless the methodological deficiencies are so sweeping or fundamental as to render the survey wholly unreliable and therefore inadmissible”); see also Groobert, 219 F.Supp.2d at 9 (recognizing that “[t]he D.C. Circuit has stated that, ‘by attempting to evaluate the credibility of opposing experts and the persuasiveness of - competing studies, the district court conflate[s] the questions of the admissibility of expert testimony and the weight appropriately to be accorded such testimony by a factfinder’ ”) (quoting Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 141); Barnes v. District of Columbia, 924 F.Supp.2d 74, 96 (D.D.C.2013) (“If the District has an issue with how Mr. Day classified certain late releases, it may address this on cross-examination.”); Harris v. Koenig, 815 F.Supp.2d 6, 10 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Whether or not [expert’s testimony] is based on ‘unreasonable assumptions’ will be determined at trial after full cross-examination.”); S.E.C. v. Johnson, 525 F.Supp.2d 70, 76 (D.D.C.2007) (“It is for the jury,- not the Court, to determine whether [expert’s] opinions are suspect be cause the facts upon which he relied were shown to be inaccurate or unproven”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "831 F.Supp.2d 27, 34",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"technical deficiencies that can be adequately explored on cross-examination generally go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence, unless the methodological deficiencies are so sweeping or fundamental as to render the survey wholly unreliable and therefore inadmissible\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. H & R Block, Inc., 831 F.Supp.2d 27, 34 (D.D.C.2011) (noting that “technical deficiencies that can be adequately explored on cross-examination generally go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence, unless the methodological deficiencies are so sweeping or fundamental as to render the survey wholly unreliable and therefore inadmissible”); see also Groobert, 219 F.Supp.2d at 9 (recognizing that “[t]he D.C. Circuit has stated that, ‘by attempting to evaluate the credibility of opposing experts and the persuasiveness of - competing studies, the district court conflate[s] the questions of the admissibility of expert testimony and the weight appropriately to be accorded such testimony by a factfinder’ ”) (quoting Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 141); Barnes v. District of Columbia, 924 F.Supp.2d 74, 96 (D.D.C.2013) (“If the District has an issue with how Mr. Day classified certain late releases, it may address this on cross-examination.”); Harris v. Koenig, 815 F.Supp.2d 6, 10 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Whether or not [expert’s testimony] is based on ‘unreasonable assumptions’ will be determined at trial after full cross-examination.”); S.E.C. v. Johnson, 525 F.Supp.2d 70, 76 (D.D.C.2007) (“It is for the jury,- not the Court, to determine whether [expert’s] opinions are suspect be cause the facts upon which he relied were shown to be inaccurate or unproven”)."
} | 3,935,969 | b |
As appellee points out, Wilson was a case in which the defendant appealed after the trial court denied his motion to suppress, and did not involve a State's appeal. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "692 S.W.2d 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress",
"sentence": "Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress); Flores, 871 S.W.2d at 720. Although distinguishable in this respect, the reasoning of Wilson is still applicable to the instant case and the observations made in Wilson remain true regardless of which party originally initiates the appellate process."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "692 S.W.2d 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "recognizing though not relying upon the line of cases which hold the government may raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal regardless of whether the motion to suppress was granted or denied",
"sentence": "Cf. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (recognizing though not relying upon the line of cases which hold the government may raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal regardless of whether the motion to suppress was granted or denied); State v. Brady, 763 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.) (considering the standing issue sua sponte despite fact that State did not contest the issue before the trial court or on appeal in a case where defendant’s suppression motion was granted); see also, United States v. Caicedo-Llanos, 960 F.2d 158, 162-63 (D.C.Cir.1992) (declaring the personal nature of Fourth Amendment rights obligates the party asserting them to prove his rights were violated and may allow appellate consideration of questions of law, such as standing, which were neither pressed nor passed upon by the court below); United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.1984) (finding government lost right to challenge standing issue by making inconsistent arguments at the suppression hearing and on appeal); United States v. Hultgren, 713 F.2d 79, 83 n. 6 (5th Cir.1983) (noting that standing is no longer considered a separate and distinct issue from a Fourth Amendment claim and that the issue might not be waived by the government for failure to assert it before the trial court); United States v. Hansen, 652 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir.1981) (allowing government to challenge standing issue for first time on appeal after defendant’s motion to suppress was granted)."
} | 10,008,032 | a |
As appellee points out, Wilson was a case in which the defendant appealed after the trial court denied his motion to suppress, and did not involve a State's appeal. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "692 S.W.2d 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress",
"sentence": "Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress); Flores, 871 S.W.2d at 720. Although distinguishable in this respect, the reasoning of Wilson is still applicable to the instant case and the observations made in Wilson remain true regardless of which party originally initiates the appellate process."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "960 F.2d 158, 162-63",
"parenthetical": "declaring the personal nature of Fourth Amendment rights obligates the party asserting them to prove his rights were violated and may allow appellate consideration of questions of law, such as standing, which were neither pressed nor passed upon by the court below",
"sentence": "Cf. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (recognizing though not relying upon the line of cases which hold the government may raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal regardless of whether the motion to suppress was granted or denied); State v. Brady, 763 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.) (considering the standing issue sua sponte despite fact that State did not contest the issue before the trial court or on appeal in a case where defendant’s suppression motion was granted); see also, United States v. Caicedo-Llanos, 960 F.2d 158, 162-63 (D.C.Cir.1992) (declaring the personal nature of Fourth Amendment rights obligates the party asserting them to prove his rights were violated and may allow appellate consideration of questions of law, such as standing, which were neither pressed nor passed upon by the court below); United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.1984) (finding government lost right to challenge standing issue by making inconsistent arguments at the suppression hearing and on appeal); United States v. Hultgren, 713 F.2d 79, 83 n. 6 (5th Cir.1983) (noting that standing is no longer considered a separate and distinct issue from a Fourth Amendment claim and that the issue might not be waived by the government for failure to assert it before the trial court); United States v. Hansen, 652 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir.1981) (allowing government to challenge standing issue for first time on appeal after defendant’s motion to suppress was granted)."
} | 10,008,032 | a |
As appellee points out, Wilson was a case in which the defendant appealed after the trial court denied his motion to suppress, and did not involve a State's appeal. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "692 S.W.2d 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress",
"sentence": "Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress); Flores, 871 S.W.2d at 720. Although distinguishable in this respect, the reasoning of Wilson is still applicable to the instant case and the observations made in Wilson remain true regardless of which party originally initiates the appellate process."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "737 F.2d 761, 764",
"parenthetical": "finding government lost right to challenge standing issue by making inconsistent arguments at the suppression hearing and on appeal",
"sentence": "Cf. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (recognizing though not relying upon the line of cases which hold the government may raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal regardless of whether the motion to suppress was granted or denied); State v. Brady, 763 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.) (considering the standing issue sua sponte despite fact that State did not contest the issue before the trial court or on appeal in a case where defendant’s suppression motion was granted); see also, United States v. Caicedo-Llanos, 960 F.2d 158, 162-63 (D.C.Cir.1992) (declaring the personal nature of Fourth Amendment rights obligates the party asserting them to prove his rights were violated and may allow appellate consideration of questions of law, such as standing, which were neither pressed nor passed upon by the court below); United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.1984) (finding government lost right to challenge standing issue by making inconsistent arguments at the suppression hearing and on appeal); United States v. Hultgren, 713 F.2d 79, 83 n. 6 (5th Cir.1983) (noting that standing is no longer considered a separate and distinct issue from a Fourth Amendment claim and that the issue might not be waived by the government for failure to assert it before the trial court); United States v. Hansen, 652 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir.1981) (allowing government to challenge standing issue for first time on appeal after defendant’s motion to suppress was granted)."
} | 10,008,032 | a |
As appellee points out, Wilson was a case in which the defendant appealed after the trial court denied his motion to suppress, and did not involve a State's appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that standing is no longer considered a separate and distinct issue from a Fourth Amendment claim and that the issue might not be waived by the government for failure to assert it before the trial court",
"sentence": "Cf. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (recognizing though not relying upon the line of cases which hold the government may raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal regardless of whether the motion to suppress was granted or denied); State v. Brady, 763 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.) (considering the standing issue sua sponte despite fact that State did not contest the issue before the trial court or on appeal in a case where defendant’s suppression motion was granted); see also, United States v. Caicedo-Llanos, 960 F.2d 158, 162-63 (D.C.Cir.1992) (declaring the personal nature of Fourth Amendment rights obligates the party asserting them to prove his rights were violated and may allow appellate consideration of questions of law, such as standing, which were neither pressed nor passed upon by the court below); United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.1984) (finding government lost right to challenge standing issue by making inconsistent arguments at the suppression hearing and on appeal); United States v. Hultgren, 713 F.2d 79, 83 n. 6 (5th Cir.1983) (noting that standing is no longer considered a separate and distinct issue from a Fourth Amendment claim and that the issue might not be waived by the government for failure to assert it before the trial court); United States v. Hansen, 652 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir.1981) (allowing government to challenge standing issue for first time on appeal after defendant’s motion to suppress was granted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "692 S.W.2d 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress",
"sentence": "Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress); Flores, 871 S.W.2d at 720. Although distinguishable in this respect, the reasoning of Wilson is still applicable to the instant case and the observations made in Wilson remain true regardless of which party originally initiates the appellate process."
} | 10,008,032 | b |
As appellee points out, Wilson was a case in which the defendant appealed after the trial court denied his motion to suppress, and did not involve a State's appeal. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "692 S.W.2d 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress",
"sentence": "Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress); Flores, 871 S.W.2d at 720. Although distinguishable in this respect, the reasoning of Wilson is still applicable to the instant case and the observations made in Wilson remain true regardless of which party originally initiates the appellate process."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing government to challenge standing issue for first time on appeal after defendant's motion to suppress was granted",
"sentence": "Cf. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (recognizing though not relying upon the line of cases which hold the government may raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal regardless of whether the motion to suppress was granted or denied); State v. Brady, 763 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.) (considering the standing issue sua sponte despite fact that State did not contest the issue before the trial court or on appeal in a case where defendant’s suppression motion was granted); see also, United States v. Caicedo-Llanos, 960 F.2d 158, 162-63 (D.C.Cir.1992) (declaring the personal nature of Fourth Amendment rights obligates the party asserting them to prove his rights were violated and may allow appellate consideration of questions of law, such as standing, which were neither pressed nor passed upon by the court below); United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.1984) (finding government lost right to challenge standing issue by making inconsistent arguments at the suppression hearing and on appeal); United States v. Hultgren, 713 F.2d 79, 83 n. 6 (5th Cir.1983) (noting that standing is no longer considered a separate and distinct issue from a Fourth Amendment claim and that the issue might not be waived by the government for failure to assert it before the trial court); United States v. Hansen, 652 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir.1981) (allowing government to challenge standing issue for first time on appeal after defendant’s motion to suppress was granted)."
} | 10,008,032 | a |
The bankruptcy court also correctly held that Olson is not entitled to be compensated from the estate to prosecute the state court appeal or to handle the dischargeability litigation. The clear weight of authority supports the proposition that reasonable compensation under SS 330(a)(1) for actual, necessary services means services that benefit the debtor's estate, not the debtor. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "82 B.R. 929, 931-32",
"parenthetical": "all decisions interpreting SS 330 of Bankruptcy Code carry over near-unanimous view that, as a matter of law, attorneys may recover from the estate only if their labors actually benefit the estate",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Matter of Ryan, 82 B.R. 929, 931-32 (N.D.Ill.1987) (all decisions interpreting § 330 of Bankruptcy Code carry over near-unanimous view that, as a matter of law, attorneys may recover from the estate only if their labors actually benefit the estate); In re Taylor, 66 B.R. 390, 395 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1986); In re Moore, 57 B.R. 270, 271 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1986); Matter of Zweig, 35 B.R. 37, 38 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1983); In re Rosen, 25 B.R. 81, 86 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1982); see also Matters of Jones, 665 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (Bankruptcy Act case) (fees related to defending against objections to discharge not payable from estate); In re Cleveland, 80 B.R. 204, 205 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1987) (case law is well-settled that an attorney for a debtor in a chapter 7 case is Hot entitled to compensation out of the estate for services beneficial only to debtor; defense of non-discharge-ability action not compensable out of estate); but see In re Deihl, 80 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr.D.Maine 1987) (debtor’s attorney entitled to compensation under § 330 for defense of dischargeability complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "fees related to defending against objections to discharge not payable from estate",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Matter of Ryan, 82 B.R. 929, 931-32 (N.D.Ill.1987) (all decisions interpreting § 330 of Bankruptcy Code carry over near-unanimous view that, as a matter of law, attorneys may recover from the estate only if their labors actually benefit the estate); In re Taylor, 66 B.R. 390, 395 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1986); In re Moore, 57 B.R. 270, 271 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1986); Matter of Zweig, 35 B.R. 37, 38 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1983); In re Rosen, 25 B.R. 81, 86 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1982); see also Matters of Jones, 665 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (Bankruptcy Act case) (fees related to defending against objections to discharge not payable from estate); In re Cleveland, 80 B.R. 204, 205 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1987) (case law is well-settled that an attorney for a debtor in a chapter 7 case is Hot entitled to compensation out of the estate for services beneficial only to debtor; defense of non-discharge-ability action not compensable out of estate); but see In re Deihl, 80 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr.D.Maine 1987) (debtor’s attorney entitled to compensation under § 330 for defense of dischargeability complaint)."
} | 6,469,861 | a |
The bankruptcy court also correctly held that Olson is not entitled to be compensated from the estate to prosecute the state court appeal or to handle the dischargeability litigation. The clear weight of authority supports the proposition that reasonable compensation under SS 330(a)(1) for actual, necessary services means services that benefit the debtor's estate, not the debtor. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "80 B.R. 1, 2",
"parenthetical": "debtor's attorney entitled to compensation under SS 330 for defense of dischargeability complaint",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Matter of Ryan, 82 B.R. 929, 931-32 (N.D.Ill.1987) (all decisions interpreting § 330 of Bankruptcy Code carry over near-unanimous view that, as a matter of law, attorneys may recover from the estate only if their labors actually benefit the estate); In re Taylor, 66 B.R. 390, 395 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1986); In re Moore, 57 B.R. 270, 271 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1986); Matter of Zweig, 35 B.R. 37, 38 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1983); In re Rosen, 25 B.R. 81, 86 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1982); see also Matters of Jones, 665 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (Bankruptcy Act case) (fees related to defending against objections to discharge not payable from estate); In re Cleveland, 80 B.R. 204, 205 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1987) (case law is well-settled that an attorney for a debtor in a chapter 7 case is Hot entitled to compensation out of the estate for services beneficial only to debtor; defense of non-discharge-ability action not compensable out of estate); but see In re Deihl, 80 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr.D.Maine 1987) (debtor’s attorney entitled to compensation under § 330 for defense of dischargeability complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "82 B.R. 929, 931-32",
"parenthetical": "all decisions interpreting SS 330 of Bankruptcy Code carry over near-unanimous view that, as a matter of law, attorneys may recover from the estate only if their labors actually benefit the estate",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Matter of Ryan, 82 B.R. 929, 931-32 (N.D.Ill.1987) (all decisions interpreting § 330 of Bankruptcy Code carry over near-unanimous view that, as a matter of law, attorneys may recover from the estate only if their labors actually benefit the estate); In re Taylor, 66 B.R. 390, 395 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1986); In re Moore, 57 B.R. 270, 271 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1986); Matter of Zweig, 35 B.R. 37, 38 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1983); In re Rosen, 25 B.R. 81, 86 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1982); see also Matters of Jones, 665 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (Bankruptcy Act case) (fees related to defending against objections to discharge not payable from estate); In re Cleveland, 80 B.R. 204, 205 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1987) (case law is well-settled that an attorney for a debtor in a chapter 7 case is Hot entitled to compensation out of the estate for services beneficial only to debtor; defense of non-discharge-ability action not compensable out of estate); but see In re Deihl, 80 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr.D.Maine 1987) (debtor’s attorney entitled to compensation under § 330 for defense of dischargeability complaint)."
} | 6,469,861 | b |
The bankruptcy court also correctly held that Olson is not entitled to be compensated from the estate to prosecute the state court appeal or to handle the dischargeability litigation. The clear weight of authority supports the proposition that reasonable compensation under SS 330(a)(1) for actual, necessary services means services that benefit the debtor's estate, not the debtor. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "80 B.R. 1, 2",
"parenthetical": "debtor's attorney entitled to compensation under SS 330 for defense of dischargeability complaint",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Matter of Ryan, 82 B.R. 929, 931-32 (N.D.Ill.1987) (all decisions interpreting § 330 of Bankruptcy Code carry over near-unanimous view that, as a matter of law, attorneys may recover from the estate only if their labors actually benefit the estate); In re Taylor, 66 B.R. 390, 395 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1986); In re Moore, 57 B.R. 270, 271 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1986); Matter of Zweig, 35 B.R. 37, 38 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1983); In re Rosen, 25 B.R. 81, 86 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1982); see also Matters of Jones, 665 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (Bankruptcy Act case) (fees related to defending against objections to discharge not payable from estate); In re Cleveland, 80 B.R. 204, 205 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1987) (case law is well-settled that an attorney for a debtor in a chapter 7 case is Hot entitled to compensation out of the estate for services beneficial only to debtor; defense of non-discharge-ability action not compensable out of estate); but see In re Deihl, 80 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr.D.Maine 1987) (debtor’s attorney entitled to compensation under § 330 for defense of dischargeability complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "fees related to defending against objections to discharge not payable from estate",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Matter of Ryan, 82 B.R. 929, 931-32 (N.D.Ill.1987) (all decisions interpreting § 330 of Bankruptcy Code carry over near-unanimous view that, as a matter of law, attorneys may recover from the estate only if their labors actually benefit the estate); In re Taylor, 66 B.R. 390, 395 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1986); In re Moore, 57 B.R. 270, 271 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1986); Matter of Zweig, 35 B.R. 37, 38 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1983); In re Rosen, 25 B.R. 81, 86 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1982); see also Matters of Jones, 665 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (Bankruptcy Act case) (fees related to defending against objections to discharge not payable from estate); In re Cleveland, 80 B.R. 204, 205 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1987) (case law is well-settled that an attorney for a debtor in a chapter 7 case is Hot entitled to compensation out of the estate for services beneficial only to debtor; defense of non-discharge-ability action not compensable out of estate); but see In re Deihl, 80 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr.D.Maine 1987) (debtor’s attorney entitled to compensation under § 330 for defense of dischargeability complaint)."
} | 6,469,861 | b |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "554 F.Supp. 86, 86",
"parenthetical": "where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | a |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "605 F.2d 1248, 1248",
"parenthetical": "defendant's liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | b |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "421 N.Y.2d 747, 747",
"parenthetical": "action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | b |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68",
"parenthetical": "requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "554 F.Supp. 86, 86",
"parenthetical": "where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | a |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "605 F.2d 1248, 1248",
"parenthetical": "defendant's liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68",
"parenthetical": "requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | b |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68",
"parenthetical": "requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "421 N.Y.2d 747, 747",
"parenthetical": "action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | a |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "554 F.Supp. 86, 86",
"parenthetical": "where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | b |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "605 F.2d 1248, 1248",
"parenthetical": "defendant's liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | b |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "421 N.Y.2d 747, 747",
"parenthetical": "action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | b |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "554 F.Supp. 86, 86",
"parenthetical": "where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | a |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "605 F.2d 1248, 1248",
"parenthetical": "defendant's liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | b |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "421 N.Y.2d 747, 747",
"parenthetical": "action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | a |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "554 F.Supp. 86, 86",
"parenthetical": "where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | b |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.