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PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "869 F.2d 142, 146-47",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | a |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "869 F.2d 142, 146-47",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | a |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84",
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | b |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | a |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | b |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | b |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | b |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84",
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | a |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | b |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | b |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | a |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | b |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84",
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | a |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | b |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | b |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | a |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | a |
Businesses may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their information contained in their records. See G.M. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "387 U.S. 541, 544",
"parenthetical": "Fourth Amendment applies to government's \"perusal of financial books and records\"",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "429 U.S. 338, 352",
"parenthetical": "seizure of corporate books and records implicated company's privacy interest",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | 3,904,693 | b |
Businesses may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their information contained in their records. See G.M. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "429 U.S. 338, 352",
"parenthetical": "seizure of corporate books and records implicated company's privacy interest",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Fourth Amendment applies to government's \"perusal of financial books and records\"",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | 3,904,693 | a |
Businesses may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their information contained in their records. See G.M. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Fourth Amendment applies to government's \"perusal of financial books and records\"",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "429 U.S. 338, 352",
"parenthetical": "seizure of corporate books and records implicated company's privacy interest",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | 3,904,693 | b |
Businesses may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their information contained in their records. See G.M. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "387 U.S. 541, 544",
"parenthetical": "Fourth Amendment applies to government's \"perusal of financial books and records\"",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "seizure of corporate books and records implicated company's privacy interest",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | 3,904,693 | b |
Businesses may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their information contained in their records. See G.M. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "seizure of corporate books and records implicated company's privacy interest",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Fourth Amendment applies to government's \"perusal of financial books and records\"",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | 3,904,693 | a |
Businesses may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their information contained in their records. See G.M. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Fourth Amendment applies to government's \"perusal of financial books and records\"",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "seizure of corporate books and records implicated company's privacy interest",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | 3,904,693 | b |
Businesses may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their information contained in their records. See G.M. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "seizure of corporate books and records implicated company's privacy interest",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "387 U.S. 541, 544",
"parenthetical": "Fourth Amendment applies to government's \"perusal of financial books and records\"",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | 3,904,693 | a |
Businesses may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their information contained in their records. See G.M. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Fourth Amendment applies to government's \"perusal of financial books and records\"",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "seizure of corporate books and records implicated company's privacy interest",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | 3,904,693 | b |
Businesses may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their information contained in their records. See G.M. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Fourth Amendment applies to government's \"perusal of financial books and records\"",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "seizure of corporate books and records implicated company's privacy interest",
"sentence": "Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (seizure of corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of financial books and records”)."
} | 3,904,693 | b |
Similarly, Kentucky courts have also compelled employees to arbitrate statutory civil rights claims. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "compelling arbitration of sexual harassment and discrimination claims under K.R.S. SS 344",
"sentence": "See Hill v. Hilliard, 945 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Ky.App.1997) (dismissing claims of sexual harassment and retaliation arising under K.R.S. 344 and compelling employee to submit claims to binding arbitration), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 981, 118 S.Ct. 442, 139 L.Ed.2d 378 (1997); see also Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.1991) (compelling arbitration of sexual harassment and discrimination claims under K.R.S. § 344). Kentucky courts have also required common law tort claims to be arbitrable. Hill, supra."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims of sexual harassment and retaliation arising under K.R.S. 344 and compelling employee to submit claims to binding arbitration",
"sentence": "See Hill v. Hilliard, 945 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Ky.App.1997) (dismissing claims of sexual harassment and retaliation arising under K.R.S. 344 and compelling employee to submit claims to binding arbitration), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 981, 118 S.Ct. 442, 139 L.Ed.2d 378 (1997); see also Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.1991) (compelling arbitration of sexual harassment and discrimination claims under K.R.S. § 344). Kentucky courts have also required common law tort claims to be arbitrable. Hill, supra."
} | 8,445,313 | b |
Similarly, Kentucky courts have also compelled employees to arbitrate statutory civil rights claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims of sexual harassment and retaliation arising under K.R.S. 344 and compelling employee to submit claims to binding arbitration",
"sentence": "See Hill v. Hilliard, 945 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Ky.App.1997) (dismissing claims of sexual harassment and retaliation arising under K.R.S. 344 and compelling employee to submit claims to binding arbitration), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 981, 118 S.Ct. 442, 139 L.Ed.2d 378 (1997); see also Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.1991) (compelling arbitration of sexual harassment and discrimination claims under K.R.S. § 344). Kentucky courts have also required common law tort claims to be arbitrable. Hill, supra."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "compelling arbitration of sexual harassment and discrimination claims under K.R.S. SS 344",
"sentence": "See Hill v. Hilliard, 945 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Ky.App.1997) (dismissing claims of sexual harassment and retaliation arising under K.R.S. 344 and compelling employee to submit claims to binding arbitration), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 981, 118 S.Ct. 442, 139 L.Ed.2d 378 (1997); see also Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.1991) (compelling arbitration of sexual harassment and discrimination claims under K.R.S. § 344). Kentucky courts have also required common law tort claims to be arbitrable. Hill, supra."
} | 8,445,313 | a |
Similarly, Kentucky courts have also compelled employees to arbitrate statutory civil rights claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims of sexual harassment and retaliation arising under K.R.S. 344 and compelling employee to submit claims to binding arbitration",
"sentence": "See Hill v. Hilliard, 945 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Ky.App.1997) (dismissing claims of sexual harassment and retaliation arising under K.R.S. 344 and compelling employee to submit claims to binding arbitration), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 981, 118 S.Ct. 442, 139 L.Ed.2d 378 (1997); see also Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.1991) (compelling arbitration of sexual harassment and discrimination claims under K.R.S. § 344). Kentucky courts have also required common law tort claims to be arbitrable. Hill, supra."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "compelling arbitration of sexual harassment and discrimination claims under K.R.S. SS 344",
"sentence": "See Hill v. Hilliard, 945 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Ky.App.1997) (dismissing claims of sexual harassment and retaliation arising under K.R.S. 344 and compelling employee to submit claims to binding arbitration), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 981, 118 S.Ct. 442, 139 L.Ed.2d 378 (1997); see also Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.1991) (compelling arbitration of sexual harassment and discrimination claims under K.R.S. § 344). Kentucky courts have also required common law tort claims to be arbitrable. Hill, supra."
} | 8,445,313 | a |
Similarly, Kentucky courts have also compelled employees to arbitrate statutory civil rights claims. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "compelling arbitration of sexual harassment and discrimination claims under K.R.S. SS 344",
"sentence": "See Hill v. Hilliard, 945 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Ky.App.1997) (dismissing claims of sexual harassment and retaliation arising under K.R.S. 344 and compelling employee to submit claims to binding arbitration), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 981, 118 S.Ct. 442, 139 L.Ed.2d 378 (1997); see also Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.1991) (compelling arbitration of sexual harassment and discrimination claims under K.R.S. § 344). Kentucky courts have also required common law tort claims to be arbitrable. Hill, supra."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims of sexual harassment and retaliation arising under K.R.S. 344 and compelling employee to submit claims to binding arbitration",
"sentence": "See Hill v. Hilliard, 945 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Ky.App.1997) (dismissing claims of sexual harassment and retaliation arising under K.R.S. 344 and compelling employee to submit claims to binding arbitration), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 981, 118 S.Ct. 442, 139 L.Ed.2d 378 (1997); see also Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.1991) (compelling arbitration of sexual harassment and discrimination claims under K.R.S. § 344). Kentucky courts have also required common law tort claims to be arbitrable. Hill, supra."
} | 8,445,313 | b |
Finally, as noted, Appellant offers no authority requiring trial courts to list each category of catchall mitigation evidence on the verdict slip. In fact, case law of this Court has held to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that a verdict slip that was identical to the form mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 358A [renumbered as Pa.R.Crim.P. 808] prevented the jury from considering mitigation evidence presented by the defendant because such evidence was not specifically listed on the form or enumerated in the jury charge",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 604 (2000) (rejecting claim that a verdict slip that was identical to the form mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 358A [renumbered as Pa.R.Crim.P. 808] prevented the jury from considering mitigation evidence presented by the defendant because such evidence was not specifically listed on the form or enumerated in the jury charge); see also Commonwealth v. Reyes, 600 Pa. 45, 963 A.2d 436, 442 (2009) (holding that the jury’s finding of various factors supporting the “catch-all” mitigating circumstance set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8) “did not metamorphose those factors into additional statutory mitigators”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the jury's finding of various factors supporting the \"catch-all\" mitigating circumstance set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. SS 9711(e)(8) \"did not metamorphose those factors into additional statutory mitigators\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 604 (2000) (rejecting claim that a verdict slip that was identical to the form mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 358A [renumbered as Pa.R.Crim.P. 808] prevented the jury from considering mitigation evidence presented by the defendant because such evidence was not specifically listed on the form or enumerated in the jury charge); see also Commonwealth v. Reyes, 600 Pa. 45, 963 A.2d 436, 442 (2009) (holding that the jury’s finding of various factors supporting the “catch-all” mitigating circumstance set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8) “did not metamorphose those factors into additional statutory mitigators”)."
} | 7,332,076 | a |
Finally, as noted, Appellant offers no authority requiring trial courts to list each category of catchall mitigation evidence on the verdict slip. In fact, case law of this Court has held to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that a verdict slip that was identical to the form mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 358A [renumbered as Pa.R.Crim.P. 808] prevented the jury from considering mitigation evidence presented by the defendant because such evidence was not specifically listed on the form or enumerated in the jury charge",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 604 (2000) (rejecting claim that a verdict slip that was identical to the form mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 358A [renumbered as Pa.R.Crim.P. 808] prevented the jury from considering mitigation evidence presented by the defendant because such evidence was not specifically listed on the form or enumerated in the jury charge); see also Commonwealth v. Reyes, 600 Pa. 45, 963 A.2d 436, 442 (2009) (holding that the jury’s finding of various factors supporting the “catch-all” mitigating circumstance set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8) “did not metamorphose those factors into additional statutory mitigators”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "963 A.2d 436, 442",
"parenthetical": "holding that the jury's finding of various factors supporting the \"catch-all\" mitigating circumstance set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. SS 9711(e)(8) \"did not metamorphose those factors into additional statutory mitigators\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 604 (2000) (rejecting claim that a verdict slip that was identical to the form mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 358A [renumbered as Pa.R.Crim.P. 808] prevented the jury from considering mitigation evidence presented by the defendant because such evidence was not specifically listed on the form or enumerated in the jury charge); see also Commonwealth v. Reyes, 600 Pa. 45, 963 A.2d 436, 442 (2009) (holding that the jury’s finding of various factors supporting the “catch-all” mitigating circumstance set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8) “did not metamorphose those factors into additional statutory mitigators”)."
} | 7,332,076 | a |
Finally, as noted, Appellant offers no authority requiring trial courts to list each category of catchall mitigation evidence on the verdict slip. In fact, case law of this Court has held to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the jury's finding of various factors supporting the \"catch-all\" mitigating circumstance set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. SS 9711(e)(8) \"did not metamorphose those factors into additional statutory mitigators\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 604 (2000) (rejecting claim that a verdict slip that was identical to the form mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 358A [renumbered as Pa.R.Crim.P. 808] prevented the jury from considering mitigation evidence presented by the defendant because such evidence was not specifically listed on the form or enumerated in the jury charge); see also Commonwealth v. Reyes, 600 Pa. 45, 963 A.2d 436, 442 (2009) (holding that the jury’s finding of various factors supporting the “catch-all” mitigating circumstance set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8) “did not metamorphose those factors into additional statutory mitigators”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "746 A.2d 592, 604",
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that a verdict slip that was identical to the form mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 358A [renumbered as Pa.R.Crim.P. 808] prevented the jury from considering mitigation evidence presented by the defendant because such evidence was not specifically listed on the form or enumerated in the jury charge",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 604 (2000) (rejecting claim that a verdict slip that was identical to the form mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 358A [renumbered as Pa.R.Crim.P. 808] prevented the jury from considering mitigation evidence presented by the defendant because such evidence was not specifically listed on the form or enumerated in the jury charge); see also Commonwealth v. Reyes, 600 Pa. 45, 963 A.2d 436, 442 (2009) (holding that the jury’s finding of various factors supporting the “catch-all” mitigating circumstance set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8) “did not metamorphose those factors into additional statutory mitigators”)."
} | 7,332,076 | b |
Finally, as noted, Appellant offers no authority requiring trial courts to list each category of catchall mitigation evidence on the verdict slip. In fact, case law of this Court has held to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "963 A.2d 436, 442",
"parenthetical": "holding that the jury's finding of various factors supporting the \"catch-all\" mitigating circumstance set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. SS 9711(e)(8) \"did not metamorphose those factors into additional statutory mitigators\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 604 (2000) (rejecting claim that a verdict slip that was identical to the form mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 358A [renumbered as Pa.R.Crim.P. 808] prevented the jury from considering mitigation evidence presented by the defendant because such evidence was not specifically listed on the form or enumerated in the jury charge); see also Commonwealth v. Reyes, 600 Pa. 45, 963 A.2d 436, 442 (2009) (holding that the jury’s finding of various factors supporting the “catch-all” mitigating circumstance set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8) “did not metamorphose those factors into additional statutory mitigators”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "746 A.2d 592, 604",
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that a verdict slip that was identical to the form mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 358A [renumbered as Pa.R.Crim.P. 808] prevented the jury from considering mitigation evidence presented by the defendant because such evidence was not specifically listed on the form or enumerated in the jury charge",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 604 (2000) (rejecting claim that a verdict slip that was identical to the form mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 358A [renumbered as Pa.R.Crim.P. 808] prevented the jury from considering mitigation evidence presented by the defendant because such evidence was not specifically listed on the form or enumerated in the jury charge); see also Commonwealth v. Reyes, 600 Pa. 45, 963 A.2d 436, 442 (2009) (holding that the jury’s finding of various factors supporting the “catch-all” mitigating circumstance set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8) “did not metamorphose those factors into additional statutory mitigators”)."
} | 7,332,076 | b |
The same fundamental problems noted above apply to the issue of damages. Indiana law requires a sufficient degree of certainty to support damage awards. The typical recovery for breach of contract is a party's expectation interest (i.e., the benefit of the bargain). | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "978 F.2d 996, 1001",
"parenthetical": "affh-ming summary judgment because \"[ajppellant presented nothing outside the pleadings that allowed any inference of damage\"",
"sentence": "Consultants, Inc. v. Barnes, 978 F.2d 996, 1001 (7th Cir.1992) (affh-ming summary judgment because “[ajppellant presented nothing outside the pleadings that allowed any inference of damage”); see also Mid-America Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co., Ltd., 100 F.3d 1353, 1363 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that where a party could not prove its lost profits with reasonable certainty, summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law may be appropriate)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "100 F.3d 1353, 1363",
"parenthetical": "noting that where a party could not prove its lost profits with reasonable certainty, summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law may be appropriate",
"sentence": "Consultants, Inc. v. Barnes, 978 F.2d 996, 1001 (7th Cir.1992) (affh-ming summary judgment because “[ajppellant presented nothing outside the pleadings that allowed any inference of damage”); see also Mid-America Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co., Ltd., 100 F.3d 1353, 1363 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that where a party could not prove its lost profits with reasonable certainty, summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law may be appropriate)."
} | 3,723,944 | a |
"If [ECMC] develop[s] proof of consent that requires burdensome, individualized in quiries," the Court can either handle such issues in the context of classwide proceedings or, if necessary, revisit certification. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2014 WL 4627271, at *12",
"parenthetical": "noting that class certification can be revisited if individualized issues of consent prove unmanageable",
"sentence": "See Kristensen, 12 F.Supp.3d at 1307-08 (finding-superiority requirement met in a putative class action where the court could review individual affidavits averring lack of consent rather than holding thousands of separate trials); see also Ades, 2014 WL 4627271, at *12 (noting that class certification can be revisited if individualized issues of consent prove unmanageable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "12 F.Supp.3d 1307, 1307-08",
"parenthetical": "finding-superiority requirement met in a putative class action where the court could review individual affidavits averring lack of consent rather than holding thousands of separate trials",
"sentence": "See Kristensen, 12 F.Supp.3d at 1307-08 (finding-superiority requirement met in a putative class action where the court could review individual affidavits averring lack of consent rather than holding thousands of separate trials); see also Ades, 2014 WL 4627271, at *12 (noting that class certification can be revisited if individualized issues of consent prove unmanageable)."
} | 12,420,481 | b |
The Supreme Court decided about the same time that a prison regulation that restricts prisoners' contact with the press is valid but only "[s]o long as this restriction operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." And it has likewise been decided that a prison regulation that operates in the area of inmates' First Amendment rights must have some rational connection with a legitimate governmental interest, and that regulation must "operate[] in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 520, 551",
"parenthetical": "upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers",
"sentence": "See also, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1880, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 78, 89-90",
"parenthetical": "upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral",
"sentence": "Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral)."
} | 3,706,466 | b |
The Supreme Court decided about the same time that a prison regulation that restricts prisoners' contact with the press is valid but only "[s]o long as this restriction operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." And it has likewise been decided that a prison regulation that operates in the area of inmates' First Amendment rights must have some rational connection with a legitimate governmental interest, and that regulation must "operate[] in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1861, 1880",
"parenthetical": "upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers",
"sentence": "See also, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1880, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 78, 89-90",
"parenthetical": "upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral",
"sentence": "Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral)."
} | 3,706,466 | b |
The Supreme Court decided about the same time that a prison regulation that restricts prisoners' contact with the press is valid but only "[s]o long as this restriction operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." And it has likewise been decided that a prison regulation that operates in the area of inmates' First Amendment rights must have some rational connection with a legitimate governmental interest, and that regulation must "operate[] in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers",
"sentence": "See also, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1880, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 78, 89-90",
"parenthetical": "upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral",
"sentence": "Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral)."
} | 3,706,466 | b |
The Supreme Court decided about the same time that a prison regulation that restricts prisoners' contact with the press is valid but only "[s]o long as this restriction operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." And it has likewise been decided that a prison regulation that operates in the area of inmates' First Amendment rights must have some rational connection with a legitimate governmental interest, and that regulation must "operate[] in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 520, 551",
"parenthetical": "upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers",
"sentence": "See also, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1880, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62",
"parenthetical": "upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral",
"sentence": "Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral)."
} | 3,706,466 | b |
The Supreme Court decided about the same time that a prison regulation that restricts prisoners' contact with the press is valid but only "[s]o long as this restriction operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." And it has likewise been decided that a prison regulation that operates in the area of inmates' First Amendment rights must have some rational connection with a legitimate governmental interest, and that regulation must "operate[] in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62",
"parenthetical": "upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral",
"sentence": "Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1861, 1880",
"parenthetical": "upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers",
"sentence": "See also, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1880, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers)."
} | 3,706,466 | a |
The Supreme Court decided about the same time that a prison regulation that restricts prisoners' contact with the press is valid but only "[s]o long as this restriction operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." And it has likewise been decided that a prison regulation that operates in the area of inmates' First Amendment rights must have some rational connection with a legitimate governmental interest, and that regulation must "operate[] in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers",
"sentence": "See also, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1880, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62",
"parenthetical": "upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral",
"sentence": "Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral)."
} | 3,706,466 | b |
The Supreme Court decided about the same time that a prison regulation that restricts prisoners' contact with the press is valid but only "[s]o long as this restriction operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." And it has likewise been decided that a prison regulation that operates in the area of inmates' First Amendment rights must have some rational connection with a legitimate governmental interest, and that regulation must "operate[] in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 520, 551",
"parenthetical": "upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers",
"sentence": "See also, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1880, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral",
"sentence": "Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral)."
} | 3,706,466 | b |
The Supreme Court decided about the same time that a prison regulation that restricts prisoners' contact with the press is valid but only "[s]o long as this restriction operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." And it has likewise been decided that a prison regulation that operates in the area of inmates' First Amendment rights must have some rational connection with a legitimate governmental interest, and that regulation must "operate[] in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1861, 1880",
"parenthetical": "upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers",
"sentence": "See also, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1880, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral",
"sentence": "Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral)."
} | 3,706,466 | b |
The Supreme Court decided about the same time that a prison regulation that restricts prisoners' contact with the press is valid but only "[s]o long as this restriction operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." And it has likewise been decided that a prison regulation that operates in the area of inmates' First Amendment rights must have some rational connection with a legitimate governmental interest, and that regulation must "operate[] in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers",
"sentence": "See also, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1880, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (upholding content-neutral regulation requiring that hard cover books be sent only by publishers)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral",
"sentence": "Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (upholding ban on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence in part because it was content-neutral)."
} | 3,706,466 | b |
The majority of circuit courts to have considered the question, however, have answered it in the affirmative. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff",
"sentence": "See Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that the parties’ settlement agreement conveyed prevailing party status upon plaintiff because “until the district court signed the dismissal Order retaining jurisdiction, the Agreement was not yet in affect” and, therefore, “it was the court’s order that created the change in the legal relationship between plaintiffs and ... defendants”); Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that if a private settlement is enforceable against opposing party through a court order, even though the order is titled “Consent Decree,” the party in whose favor that order is entered may be termed the prevailing party); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.2002) (“[A]n order containing an agreement reached by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.”); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed., 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2002) (interpreting footnote 7 in Buckhan-non as “dictum [which merely] suggests that a plaintiff ‘prevails’ only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or enters into a court-supervised consent decree” and finding plaintiff to be a prevailing party because he obtained a legally enforceable settlement agreement); Am. Disability Assoc., Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.2002) (“if the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement,” and its authority to do so “clearly establishes a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,’ as required by Buckhannon, because the plaintiff thereafter may return to court to have the settlement enforced”); but see, Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990 (8th Cir.2003) (continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the parties' settlement agreement conveyed prevailing party status upon plaintiff because \"until the district court signed the dismissal Order retaining jurisdiction, the Agreement was not yet in affect\" and, therefore, \"it was the court's order that created the change in the legal relationship between plaintiffs and ... defendants\"",
"sentence": "See Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that the parties’ settlement agreement conveyed prevailing party status upon plaintiff because “until the district court signed the dismissal Order retaining jurisdiction, the Agreement was not yet in affect” and, therefore, “it was the court’s order that created the change in the legal relationship between plaintiffs and ... defendants”); Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that if a private settlement is enforceable against opposing party through a court order, even though the order is titled “Consent Decree,” the party in whose favor that order is entered may be termed the prevailing party); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.2002) (“[A]n order containing an agreement reached by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.”); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed., 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2002) (interpreting footnote 7 in Buckhan-non as “dictum [which merely] suggests that a plaintiff ‘prevails’ only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or enters into a court-supervised consent decree” and finding plaintiff to be a prevailing party because he obtained a legally enforceable settlement agreement); Am. Disability Assoc., Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.2002) (“if the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement,” and its authority to do so “clearly establishes a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,’ as required by Buckhannon, because the plaintiff thereafter may return to court to have the settlement enforced”); but see, Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990 (8th Cir.2003) (continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff)."
} | 5,317,711 | b |
The majority of circuit courts to have considered the question, however, have answered it in the affirmative. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff",
"sentence": "See Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that the parties’ settlement agreement conveyed prevailing party status upon plaintiff because “until the district court signed the dismissal Order retaining jurisdiction, the Agreement was not yet in affect” and, therefore, “it was the court’s order that created the change in the legal relationship between plaintiffs and ... defendants”); Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that if a private settlement is enforceable against opposing party through a court order, even though the order is titled “Consent Decree,” the party in whose favor that order is entered may be termed the prevailing party); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.2002) (“[A]n order containing an agreement reached by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.”); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed., 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2002) (interpreting footnote 7 in Buckhan-non as “dictum [which merely] suggests that a plaintiff ‘prevails’ only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or enters into a court-supervised consent decree” and finding plaintiff to be a prevailing party because he obtained a legally enforceable settlement agreement); Am. Disability Assoc., Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.2002) (“if the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement,” and its authority to do so “clearly establishes a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,’ as required by Buckhannon, because the plaintiff thereafter may return to court to have the settlement enforced”); but see, Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990 (8th Cir.2003) (continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that if a private settlement is enforceable against opposing party through a court order, even though the order is titled \"Consent Decree,\" the party in whose favor that order is entered may be termed the prevailing party",
"sentence": "See Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that the parties’ settlement agreement conveyed prevailing party status upon plaintiff because “until the district court signed the dismissal Order retaining jurisdiction, the Agreement was not yet in affect” and, therefore, “it was the court’s order that created the change in the legal relationship between plaintiffs and ... defendants”); Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that if a private settlement is enforceable against opposing party through a court order, even though the order is titled “Consent Decree,” the party in whose favor that order is entered may be termed the prevailing party); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.2002) (“[A]n order containing an agreement reached by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.”); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed., 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2002) (interpreting footnote 7 in Buckhan-non as “dictum [which merely] suggests that a plaintiff ‘prevails’ only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or enters into a court-supervised consent decree” and finding plaintiff to be a prevailing party because he obtained a legally enforceable settlement agreement); Am. Disability Assoc., Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.2002) (“if the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement,” and its authority to do so “clearly establishes a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,’ as required by Buckhannon, because the plaintiff thereafter may return to court to have the settlement enforced”); but see, Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990 (8th Cir.2003) (continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff)."
} | 5,317,711 | b |
The majority of circuit courts to have considered the question, however, have answered it in the affirmative. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n order containing an agreement reached by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.\"",
"sentence": "See Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that the parties’ settlement agreement conveyed prevailing party status upon plaintiff because “until the district court signed the dismissal Order retaining jurisdiction, the Agreement was not yet in affect” and, therefore, “it was the court’s order that created the change in the legal relationship between plaintiffs and ... defendants”); Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that if a private settlement is enforceable against opposing party through a court order, even though the order is titled “Consent Decree,” the party in whose favor that order is entered may be termed the prevailing party); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.2002) (“[A]n order containing an agreement reached by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.”); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed., 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2002) (interpreting footnote 7 in Buckhan-non as “dictum [which merely] suggests that a plaintiff ‘prevails’ only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or enters into a court-supervised consent decree” and finding plaintiff to be a prevailing party because he obtained a legally enforceable settlement agreement); Am. Disability Assoc., Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.2002) (“if the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement,” and its authority to do so “clearly establishes a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,’ as required by Buckhannon, because the plaintiff thereafter may return to court to have the settlement enforced”); but see, Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990 (8th Cir.2003) (continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff",
"sentence": "See Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that the parties’ settlement agreement conveyed prevailing party status upon plaintiff because “until the district court signed the dismissal Order retaining jurisdiction, the Agreement was not yet in affect” and, therefore, “it was the court’s order that created the change in the legal relationship between plaintiffs and ... defendants”); Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that if a private settlement is enforceable against opposing party through a court order, even though the order is titled “Consent Decree,” the party in whose favor that order is entered may be termed the prevailing party); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.2002) (“[A]n order containing an agreement reached by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.”); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed., 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2002) (interpreting footnote 7 in Buckhan-non as “dictum [which merely] suggests that a plaintiff ‘prevails’ only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or enters into a court-supervised consent decree” and finding plaintiff to be a prevailing party because he obtained a legally enforceable settlement agreement); Am. Disability Assoc., Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.2002) (“if the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement,” and its authority to do so “clearly establishes a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,’ as required by Buckhannon, because the plaintiff thereafter may return to court to have the settlement enforced”); but see, Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990 (8th Cir.2003) (continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff)."
} | 5,317,711 | a |
The majority of circuit courts to have considered the question, however, have answered it in the affirmative. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff",
"sentence": "See Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that the parties’ settlement agreement conveyed prevailing party status upon plaintiff because “until the district court signed the dismissal Order retaining jurisdiction, the Agreement was not yet in affect” and, therefore, “it was the court’s order that created the change in the legal relationship between plaintiffs and ... defendants”); Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that if a private settlement is enforceable against opposing party through a court order, even though the order is titled “Consent Decree,” the party in whose favor that order is entered may be termed the prevailing party); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.2002) (“[A]n order containing an agreement reached by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.”); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed., 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2002) (interpreting footnote 7 in Buckhan-non as “dictum [which merely] suggests that a plaintiff ‘prevails’ only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or enters into a court-supervised consent decree” and finding plaintiff to be a prevailing party because he obtained a legally enforceable settlement agreement); Am. Disability Assoc., Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.2002) (“if the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement,” and its authority to do so “clearly establishes a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,’ as required by Buckhannon, because the plaintiff thereafter may return to court to have the settlement enforced”); but see, Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990 (8th Cir.2003) (continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interpreting footnote 7 in Buckhan-non as \"dictum [which merely] suggests that a plaintiff 'prevails' only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or enters into a court-supervised consent decree\" and finding plaintiff to be a prevailing party because he obtained a legally enforceable settlement agreement",
"sentence": "See Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that the parties’ settlement agreement conveyed prevailing party status upon plaintiff because “until the district court signed the dismissal Order retaining jurisdiction, the Agreement was not yet in affect” and, therefore, “it was the court’s order that created the change in the legal relationship between plaintiffs and ... defendants”); Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that if a private settlement is enforceable against opposing party through a court order, even though the order is titled “Consent Decree,” the party in whose favor that order is entered may be termed the prevailing party); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.2002) (“[A]n order containing an agreement reached by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.”); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed., 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2002) (interpreting footnote 7 in Buckhan-non as “dictum [which merely] suggests that a plaintiff ‘prevails’ only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or enters into a court-supervised consent decree” and finding plaintiff to be a prevailing party because he obtained a legally enforceable settlement agreement); Am. Disability Assoc., Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.2002) (“if the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement,” and its authority to do so “clearly establishes a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,’ as required by Buckhannon, because the plaintiff thereafter may return to court to have the settlement enforced”); but see, Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990 (8th Cir.2003) (continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff)."
} | 5,317,711 | b |
The majority of circuit courts to have considered the question, however, have answered it in the affirmative. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff",
"sentence": "See Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that the parties’ settlement agreement conveyed prevailing party status upon plaintiff because “until the district court signed the dismissal Order retaining jurisdiction, the Agreement was not yet in affect” and, therefore, “it was the court’s order that created the change in the legal relationship between plaintiffs and ... defendants”); Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that if a private settlement is enforceable against opposing party through a court order, even though the order is titled “Consent Decree,” the party in whose favor that order is entered may be termed the prevailing party); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.2002) (“[A]n order containing an agreement reached by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.”); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed., 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2002) (interpreting footnote 7 in Buckhan-non as “dictum [which merely] suggests that a plaintiff ‘prevails’ only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or enters into a court-supervised consent decree” and finding plaintiff to be a prevailing party because he obtained a legally enforceable settlement agreement); Am. Disability Assoc., Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.2002) (“if the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement,” and its authority to do so “clearly establishes a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,’ as required by Buckhannon, because the plaintiff thereafter may return to court to have the settlement enforced”); but see, Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990 (8th Cir.2003) (continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"if the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties' agreement,\" and its authority to do so \"clearly establishes a 'judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,' as required by Buckhannon, because the plaintiff thereafter may return to court to have the settlement enforced\"",
"sentence": "See Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that the parties’ settlement agreement conveyed prevailing party status upon plaintiff because “until the district court signed the dismissal Order retaining jurisdiction, the Agreement was not yet in affect” and, therefore, “it was the court’s order that created the change in the legal relationship between plaintiffs and ... defendants”); Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that if a private settlement is enforceable against opposing party through a court order, even though the order is titled “Consent Decree,” the party in whose favor that order is entered may be termed the prevailing party); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.2002) (“[A]n order containing an agreement reached by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.”); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed., 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2002) (interpreting footnote 7 in Buckhan-non as “dictum [which merely] suggests that a plaintiff ‘prevails’ only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or enters into a court-supervised consent decree” and finding plaintiff to be a prevailing party because he obtained a legally enforceable settlement agreement); Am. Disability Assoc., Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.2002) (“if the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement,” and its authority to do so “clearly establishes a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,’ as required by Buckhannon, because the plaintiff thereafter may return to court to have the settlement enforced”); but see, Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990 (8th Cir.2003) (continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff)."
} | 5,317,711 | b |
As the court noted above, the issue of whether a PRP has standing to bring a cost recovery action is hotly-debated, and neither the Third Circuit nor the Supreme Court has directly confronted the issue. Based upon a thorough review of the existing case law, the statute, and the legislative history and policy goals of CERCLA, the court must side with those courts that have found that any person who incurs response costs, regardless of their own potential or actual liability, has standing to bring a cost recovery action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "925 F.Supp. 631, 631",
"parenthetical": "noting that after careful consideration of all decisions on the issue, the court found the majority decisions less persuasive",
"sentence": "See Laidlaw Waste Systems, 925 F.Supp. at 631 (noting that after careful consideration of all decisions on the issue, the court found the majority decisions less persuasive); see also Charter Tp. of Oshtemo, 910 F.Supp. at 337 (finding that interpreting CERCLA such as to bar § 107 cost recovery actions by PRPs “ignores the plain language of section 107, serves some of the purposes of CERCLA less well, and appears to conflict with the Supreme Court’s language in Key Tronic ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "910 F.Supp. 337, 337",
"parenthetical": "finding that interpreting CERCLA such as to bar SS 107 cost recovery actions by PRPs \"ignores the plain language of section 107, serves some of the purposes of CERCLA less well, and appears to conflict with the Supreme Court's language in Key Tronic \"",
"sentence": "See Laidlaw Waste Systems, 925 F.Supp. at 631 (noting that after careful consideration of all decisions on the issue, the court found the majority decisions less persuasive); see also Charter Tp. of Oshtemo, 910 F.Supp. at 337 (finding that interpreting CERCLA such as to bar § 107 cost recovery actions by PRPs “ignores the plain language of section 107, serves some of the purposes of CERCLA less well, and appears to conflict with the Supreme Court’s language in Key Tronic ”)."
} | 7,653,633 | a |
Respondent's testimony indicates that Smith's violent behavior was an unreasonable reaction to a reasonable demand for Smith to return Respondent's medicine. Further, after Smith attacked Respondent and Respondent retreated to his bedroom, Respondent's reappearance at the kitchen's threshold with a loaded pistol by his side was lawful, as he had a right to defend his home and demand that Smith leave. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "126 S.C. 533, 533",
"parenthetical": "\"A man who attempts to force himself into another's dwelling, or who, being in the dwelling by invitation or license refuses to leave when the owner makes that demand, is a trespasser....\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See State v. Rye, 375 S.C. 119, 123, 651 S.E.2d 321, 323 (2007) (“As the defense of habitation provides, defending one’s home or premises means ending an unwarranted intrusion through the use of reasonably necessary means of ejection.” (citing State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 533, 120 S.E. 240, 242 (1923))); Bradley, 126 S.C. at 533, 120 S.E. at 242 (“A man who attempts to force himself into another’s dwelling, or who, being in the dwelling by invitation or license refuses to leave when the owner makes that demand, is a trespasser....” (emphasis added)); cf. State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499-501, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101-02 (2011) (concluding that the accused, an armed security guard for an apartment complex, was without fault in bringing about the difficulty as a matter of law because he was exercising his right to eject trespassers in good faith)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "394 S.C. 491, 499-501",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the accused, an armed security guard for an apartment complex, was without fault in bringing about the difficulty as a matter of law because he was exercising his right to eject trespassers in good faith",
"sentence": "See State v. Rye, 375 S.C. 119, 123, 651 S.E.2d 321, 323 (2007) (“As the defense of habitation provides, defending one’s home or premises means ending an unwarranted intrusion through the use of reasonably necessary means of ejection.” (citing State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 533, 120 S.E. 240, 242 (1923))); Bradley, 126 S.C. at 533, 120 S.E. at 242 (“A man who attempts to force himself into another’s dwelling, or who, being in the dwelling by invitation or license refuses to leave when the owner makes that demand, is a trespasser....” (emphasis added)); cf. State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499-501, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101-02 (2011) (concluding that the accused, an armed security guard for an apartment complex, was without fault in bringing about the difficulty as a matter of law because he was exercising his right to eject trespassers in good faith)."
} | 4,080,476 | a |
Respondent's testimony indicates that Smith's violent behavior was an unreasonable reaction to a reasonable demand for Smith to return Respondent's medicine. Further, after Smith attacked Respondent and Respondent retreated to his bedroom, Respondent's reappearance at the kitchen's threshold with a loaded pistol by his side was lawful, as he had a right to defend his home and demand that Smith leave. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "126 S.C. 533, 533",
"parenthetical": "\"A man who attempts to force himself into another's dwelling, or who, being in the dwelling by invitation or license refuses to leave when the owner makes that demand, is a trespasser....\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See State v. Rye, 375 S.C. 119, 123, 651 S.E.2d 321, 323 (2007) (“As the defense of habitation provides, defending one’s home or premises means ending an unwarranted intrusion through the use of reasonably necessary means of ejection.” (citing State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 533, 120 S.E. 240, 242 (1923))); Bradley, 126 S.C. at 533, 120 S.E. at 242 (“A man who attempts to force himself into another’s dwelling, or who, being in the dwelling by invitation or license refuses to leave when the owner makes that demand, is a trespasser....” (emphasis added)); cf. State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499-501, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101-02 (2011) (concluding that the accused, an armed security guard for an apartment complex, was without fault in bringing about the difficulty as a matter of law because he was exercising his right to eject trespassers in good faith)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "716 S.E.2d 97, 101-02",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the accused, an armed security guard for an apartment complex, was without fault in bringing about the difficulty as a matter of law because he was exercising his right to eject trespassers in good faith",
"sentence": "See State v. Rye, 375 S.C. 119, 123, 651 S.E.2d 321, 323 (2007) (“As the defense of habitation provides, defending one’s home or premises means ending an unwarranted intrusion through the use of reasonably necessary means of ejection.” (citing State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 533, 120 S.E. 240, 242 (1923))); Bradley, 126 S.C. at 533, 120 S.E. at 242 (“A man who attempts to force himself into another’s dwelling, or who, being in the dwelling by invitation or license refuses to leave when the owner makes that demand, is a trespasser....” (emphasis added)); cf. State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499-501, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101-02 (2011) (concluding that the accused, an armed security guard for an apartment complex, was without fault in bringing about the difficulty as a matter of law because he was exercising his right to eject trespassers in good faith)."
} | 4,080,476 | a |
Respondent's testimony indicates that Smith's violent behavior was an unreasonable reaction to a reasonable demand for Smith to return Respondent's medicine. Further, after Smith attacked Respondent and Respondent retreated to his bedroom, Respondent's reappearance at the kitchen's threshold with a loaded pistol by his side was lawful, as he had a right to defend his home and demand that Smith leave. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 S.E. 242, 242",
"parenthetical": "\"A man who attempts to force himself into another's dwelling, or who, being in the dwelling by invitation or license refuses to leave when the owner makes that demand, is a trespasser....\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See State v. Rye, 375 S.C. 119, 123, 651 S.E.2d 321, 323 (2007) (“As the defense of habitation provides, defending one’s home or premises means ending an unwarranted intrusion through the use of reasonably necessary means of ejection.” (citing State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 533, 120 S.E. 240, 242 (1923))); Bradley, 126 S.C. at 533, 120 S.E. at 242 (“A man who attempts to force himself into another’s dwelling, or who, being in the dwelling by invitation or license refuses to leave when the owner makes that demand, is a trespasser....” (emphasis added)); cf. State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499-501, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101-02 (2011) (concluding that the accused, an armed security guard for an apartment complex, was without fault in bringing about the difficulty as a matter of law because he was exercising his right to eject trespassers in good faith)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "394 S.C. 491, 499-501",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the accused, an armed security guard for an apartment complex, was without fault in bringing about the difficulty as a matter of law because he was exercising his right to eject trespassers in good faith",
"sentence": "See State v. Rye, 375 S.C. 119, 123, 651 S.E.2d 321, 323 (2007) (“As the defense of habitation provides, defending one’s home or premises means ending an unwarranted intrusion through the use of reasonably necessary means of ejection.” (citing State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 533, 120 S.E. 240, 242 (1923))); Bradley, 126 S.C. at 533, 120 S.E. at 242 (“A man who attempts to force himself into another’s dwelling, or who, being in the dwelling by invitation or license refuses to leave when the owner makes that demand, is a trespasser....” (emphasis added)); cf. State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499-501, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101-02 (2011) (concluding that the accused, an armed security guard for an apartment complex, was without fault in bringing about the difficulty as a matter of law because he was exercising his right to eject trespassers in good faith)."
} | 4,080,476 | a |
Respondent's testimony indicates that Smith's violent behavior was an unreasonable reaction to a reasonable demand for Smith to return Respondent's medicine. Further, after Smith attacked Respondent and Respondent retreated to his bedroom, Respondent's reappearance at the kitchen's threshold with a loaded pistol by his side was lawful, as he had a right to defend his home and demand that Smith leave. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "716 S.E.2d 97, 101-02",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the accused, an armed security guard for an apartment complex, was without fault in bringing about the difficulty as a matter of law because he was exercising his right to eject trespassers in good faith",
"sentence": "See State v. Rye, 375 S.C. 119, 123, 651 S.E.2d 321, 323 (2007) (“As the defense of habitation provides, defending one’s home or premises means ending an unwarranted intrusion through the use of reasonably necessary means of ejection.” (citing State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 533, 120 S.E. 240, 242 (1923))); Bradley, 126 S.C. at 533, 120 S.E. at 242 (“A man who attempts to force himself into another’s dwelling, or who, being in the dwelling by invitation or license refuses to leave when the owner makes that demand, is a trespasser....” (emphasis added)); cf. State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499-501, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101-02 (2011) (concluding that the accused, an armed security guard for an apartment complex, was without fault in bringing about the difficulty as a matter of law because he was exercising his right to eject trespassers in good faith)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 S.E. 242, 242",
"parenthetical": "\"A man who attempts to force himself into another's dwelling, or who, being in the dwelling by invitation or license refuses to leave when the owner makes that demand, is a trespasser....\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See State v. Rye, 375 S.C. 119, 123, 651 S.E.2d 321, 323 (2007) (“As the defense of habitation provides, defending one’s home or premises means ending an unwarranted intrusion through the use of reasonably necessary means of ejection.” (citing State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 533, 120 S.E. 240, 242 (1923))); Bradley, 126 S.C. at 533, 120 S.E. at 242 (“A man who attempts to force himself into another’s dwelling, or who, being in the dwelling by invitation or license refuses to leave when the owner makes that demand, is a trespasser....” (emphasis added)); cf. State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499-501, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101-02 (2011) (concluding that the accused, an armed security guard for an apartment complex, was without fault in bringing about the difficulty as a matter of law because he was exercising his right to eject trespassers in good faith)."
} | 4,080,476 | b |
If a plaintiff fails to rebut the presumption "by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary," a verdict will be directed that the product was "not defective." For this reason the Kentucky courts have not generally permitted advising the jury of any presumptions except in a narrow set of circumstances not applicable here. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "412 S.W.2d 571, 574",
"parenthetical": "general prohibition against instructing jury as to questions of law or fact",
"sentence": "See Lowe v. McMurray, 412 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Ky.1967) (general prohibition against instructing jury as to questions of law or fact); Mason, 565 S.W.2d at 141 (jury should not be informed of presumption of sanity in criminal cases)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "561 S.W.2d 85, 86",
"parenthetical": "particular statute involving expert testimony creates a presumption of fact and jury may be informed of it",
"sentence": "But cf. Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 86 (Ky.1978) (particular statute involving expert testimony creates a presumption of fact and jury may be informed of it)."
} | 10,542,100 | a |
If a plaintiff fails to rebut the presumption "by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary," a verdict will be directed that the product was "not defective." For this reason the Kentucky courts have not generally permitted advising the jury of any presumptions except in a narrow set of circumstances not applicable here. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "565 S.W.2d 141, 141",
"parenthetical": "jury should not be informed of presumption of sanity in criminal cases",
"sentence": "See Lowe v. McMurray, 412 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Ky.1967) (general prohibition against instructing jury as to questions of law or fact); Mason, 565 S.W.2d at 141 (jury should not be informed of presumption of sanity in criminal cases)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "561 S.W.2d 85, 86",
"parenthetical": "particular statute involving expert testimony creates a presumption of fact and jury may be informed of it",
"sentence": "But cf. Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 86 (Ky.1978) (particular statute involving expert testimony creates a presumption of fact and jury may be informed of it)."
} | 10,542,100 | a |
. The Court does not find the decisions Plaintiff cites, relating to the economic consequences of participation in administrative reviews, to be of direct relevance. On the other hand, cases challenging the scope of agency authority support the Court's rationale. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "residual jurisdiction found where the existence of the anti-dumping duty order itself was called into question",
"sentence": "See Techsnabexport 16 CIT 420, 795 F.Supp. 428 (residual jurisdiction found where the existence of the anti-dumping duty order itself was called into question); see also Jia Farn, 17 CIT at 191, 817 F.Supp. 969, 973 (while exercising its residual jurisdiction, the Court found Commerce’s initiation of a changed circumstances review for the purpose of reinstatement of an antidumping duty order, to be within the scope of agency authority under section 1675)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "17 CIT 191, 191",
"parenthetical": "while exercising its residual jurisdiction, the Court found Commerce's initiation of a changed circumstances review for the purpose of reinstatement of an antidumping duty order, to be within the scope of agency authority under section 1675",
"sentence": "See Techsnabexport 16 CIT 420, 795 F.Supp. 428 (residual jurisdiction found where the existence of the anti-dumping duty order itself was called into question); see also Jia Farn, 17 CIT at 191, 817 F.Supp. 969, 973 (while exercising its residual jurisdiction, the Court found Commerce’s initiation of a changed circumstances review for the purpose of reinstatement of an antidumping duty order, to be within the scope of agency authority under section 1675)."
} | 3,415,120 | a |
. The Court does not find the decisions Plaintiff cites, relating to the economic consequences of participation in administrative reviews, to be of direct relevance. On the other hand, cases challenging the scope of agency authority support the Court's rationale. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "residual jurisdiction found where the existence of the anti-dumping duty order itself was called into question",
"sentence": "See Techsnabexport 16 CIT 420, 795 F.Supp. 428 (residual jurisdiction found where the existence of the anti-dumping duty order itself was called into question); see also Jia Farn, 17 CIT at 191, 817 F.Supp. 969, 973 (while exercising its residual jurisdiction, the Court found Commerce’s initiation of a changed circumstances review for the purpose of reinstatement of an antidumping duty order, to be within the scope of agency authority under section 1675)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 F.Supp. 969, 973",
"parenthetical": "while exercising its residual jurisdiction, the Court found Commerce's initiation of a changed circumstances review for the purpose of reinstatement of an antidumping duty order, to be within the scope of agency authority under section 1675",
"sentence": "See Techsnabexport 16 CIT 420, 795 F.Supp. 428 (residual jurisdiction found where the existence of the anti-dumping duty order itself was called into question); see also Jia Farn, 17 CIT at 191, 817 F.Supp. 969, 973 (while exercising its residual jurisdiction, the Court found Commerce’s initiation of a changed circumstances review for the purpose of reinstatement of an antidumping duty order, to be within the scope of agency authority under section 1675)."
} | 3,415,120 | a |
. The Court does not find the decisions Plaintiff cites, relating to the economic consequences of participation in administrative reviews, to be of direct relevance. On the other hand, cases challenging the scope of agency authority support the Court's rationale. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "residual jurisdiction found where the existence of the anti-dumping duty order itself was called into question",
"sentence": "See Techsnabexport 16 CIT 420, 795 F.Supp. 428 (residual jurisdiction found where the existence of the anti-dumping duty order itself was called into question); see also Jia Farn, 17 CIT at 191, 817 F.Supp. 969, 973 (while exercising its residual jurisdiction, the Court found Commerce’s initiation of a changed circumstances review for the purpose of reinstatement of an antidumping duty order, to be within the scope of agency authority under section 1675)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "17 CIT 191, 191",
"parenthetical": "while exercising its residual jurisdiction, the Court found Commerce's initiation of a changed circumstances review for the purpose of reinstatement of an antidumping duty order, to be within the scope of agency authority under section 1675",
"sentence": "See Techsnabexport 16 CIT 420, 795 F.Supp. 428 (residual jurisdiction found where the existence of the anti-dumping duty order itself was called into question); see also Jia Farn, 17 CIT at 191, 817 F.Supp. 969, 973 (while exercising its residual jurisdiction, the Court found Commerce’s initiation of a changed circumstances review for the purpose of reinstatement of an antidumping duty order, to be within the scope of agency authority under section 1675)."
} | 3,415,120 | a |
. The Court does not find the decisions Plaintiff cites, relating to the economic consequences of participation in administrative reviews, to be of direct relevance. On the other hand, cases challenging the scope of agency authority support the Court's rationale. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "residual jurisdiction found where the existence of the anti-dumping duty order itself was called into question",
"sentence": "See Techsnabexport 16 CIT 420, 795 F.Supp. 428 (residual jurisdiction found where the existence of the anti-dumping duty order itself was called into question); see also Jia Farn, 17 CIT at 191, 817 F.Supp. 969, 973 (while exercising its residual jurisdiction, the Court found Commerce’s initiation of a changed circumstances review for the purpose of reinstatement of an antidumping duty order, to be within the scope of agency authority under section 1675)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 F.Supp. 969, 973",
"parenthetical": "while exercising its residual jurisdiction, the Court found Commerce's initiation of a changed circumstances review for the purpose of reinstatement of an antidumping duty order, to be within the scope of agency authority under section 1675",
"sentence": "See Techsnabexport 16 CIT 420, 795 F.Supp. 428 (residual jurisdiction found where the existence of the anti-dumping duty order itself was called into question); see also Jia Farn, 17 CIT at 191, 817 F.Supp. 969, 973 (while exercising its residual jurisdiction, the Court found Commerce’s initiation of a changed circumstances review for the purpose of reinstatement of an antidumping duty order, to be within the scope of agency authority under section 1675)."
} | 3,415,120 | a |
Here, because there was no evidence that Okolo attempted to conceal or hide the collateral, the banks could reasonably expect to recover the value of the vehicles securing the loans. We therefore find that the value of the vehicles should have been deducted from the unpaid balances of the loans to determine the amount of the loss. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 F.3d 681, 686",
"parenthetical": "upholding use of full amount of car loan as intended loss where defendant attempted to conceal the vehicle, but reversing use of full value of loan for tools where \"there is no evidence that Mr. Williams intended to conceal the tools\"",
"sentence": "Id.; see United States v. Baum, 974 F.2d 496, 498 (4th Cir.1992) (reversing district court’s determination that amount of loss was equal to face amount of fraudulently obtained loan and requiring that “value of the security interest should be deducted from the amount of the loan in determin ing ‘loss’ ” and payments on loans “should also be considered”); see also United States v. Williams, 292 F.3d 681, 686 (10th Cir.2002) (upholding use of full amount of car loan as intended loss where defendant attempted to conceal the vehicle, but reversing use of full value of loan for tools where “there is no evidence that Mr. Williams intended to conceal the tools”); United States v. Nichols, 229 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir.2000) (finding determination of loss as full amount of loan “clearly erroneous” where loan secured by collateral and there was no evidence “that the Defendant intended to permanently deprive the creditor of the collateral through concealment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "974 F.2d 496, 498",
"parenthetical": "reversing district court's determination that amount of loss was equal to face amount of fraudulently obtained loan and requiring that \"value of the security interest should be deducted from the amount of the loan in determin ing 'loss' \" and payments on loans \"should also be considered\"",
"sentence": "Id.; see United States v. Baum, 974 F.2d 496, 498 (4th Cir.1992) (reversing district court’s determination that amount of loss was equal to face amount of fraudulently obtained loan and requiring that “value of the security interest should be deducted from the amount of the loan in determin ing ‘loss’ ” and payments on loans “should also be considered”); see also United States v. Williams, 292 F.3d 681, 686 (10th Cir.2002) (upholding use of full amount of car loan as intended loss where defendant attempted to conceal the vehicle, but reversing use of full value of loan for tools where “there is no evidence that Mr. Williams intended to conceal the tools”); United States v. Nichols, 229 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir.2000) (finding determination of loss as full amount of loan “clearly erroneous” where loan secured by collateral and there was no evidence “that the Defendant intended to permanently deprive the creditor of the collateral through concealment”)."
} | 1,198,057 | b |
Here, because there was no evidence that Okolo attempted to conceal or hide the collateral, the banks could reasonably expect to recover the value of the vehicles securing the loans. We therefore find that the value of the vehicles should have been deducted from the unpaid balances of the loans to determine the amount of the loss. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "229 F.3d 975, 979",
"parenthetical": "finding determination of loss as full amount of loan \"clearly erroneous\" where loan secured by collateral and there was no evidence \"that the Defendant intended to permanently deprive the creditor of the collateral through concealment\"",
"sentence": "Id.; see United States v. Baum, 974 F.2d 496, 498 (4th Cir.1992) (reversing district court’s determination that amount of loss was equal to face amount of fraudulently obtained loan and requiring that “value of the security interest should be deducted from the amount of the loan in determin ing ‘loss’ ” and payments on loans “should also be considered”); see also United States v. Williams, 292 F.3d 681, 686 (10th Cir.2002) (upholding use of full amount of car loan as intended loss where defendant attempted to conceal the vehicle, but reversing use of full value of loan for tools where “there is no evidence that Mr. Williams intended to conceal the tools”); United States v. Nichols, 229 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir.2000) (finding determination of loss as full amount of loan “clearly erroneous” where loan secured by collateral and there was no evidence “that the Defendant intended to permanently deprive the creditor of the collateral through concealment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "974 F.2d 496, 498",
"parenthetical": "reversing district court's determination that amount of loss was equal to face amount of fraudulently obtained loan and requiring that \"value of the security interest should be deducted from the amount of the loan in determin ing 'loss' \" and payments on loans \"should also be considered\"",
"sentence": "Id.; see United States v. Baum, 974 F.2d 496, 498 (4th Cir.1992) (reversing district court’s determination that amount of loss was equal to face amount of fraudulently obtained loan and requiring that “value of the security interest should be deducted from the amount of the loan in determin ing ‘loss’ ” and payments on loans “should also be considered”); see also United States v. Williams, 292 F.3d 681, 686 (10th Cir.2002) (upholding use of full amount of car loan as intended loss where defendant attempted to conceal the vehicle, but reversing use of full value of loan for tools where “there is no evidence that Mr. Williams intended to conceal the tools”); United States v. Nichols, 229 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir.2000) (finding determination of loss as full amount of loan “clearly erroneous” where loan secured by collateral and there was no evidence “that the Defendant intended to permanently deprive the creditor of the collateral through concealment”)."
} | 1,198,057 | b |
Accordingly, the rule established in Waller does not apply to this case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t would be unjustifiably impractical to require the police to take affirmative steps to confirm the actual authority of a consenting individual whose authority was apparent____\"",
"sentence": "See id. (discussing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (“[I]t would be unjustifiably impractical to require the police to take affirmative steps to confirm the actual authority of a consenting individual whose authority was apparent____”)); see also Penney, 576 F.3d at 309 (“Lovers’ quarrels and reconciliations are as much of a ‘reality in today’s world’ as is cohabitation without ‘legal formalities,’ and the police cannot be faulted for not presuming that a particular quarrel put an end to the couple’s relationship and living arrangements.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "576 F.3d 309, 309",
"parenthetical": "\"Lovers' quarrels and reconciliations are as much of a 'reality in today's world' as is cohabitation without 'legal formalities,' and the police cannot be faulted for not presuming that a particular quarrel put an end to the couple's relationship and living arrangements.\"",
"sentence": "See id. (discussing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (“[I]t would be unjustifiably impractical to require the police to take affirmative steps to confirm the actual authority of a consenting individual whose authority was apparent____”)); see also Penney, 576 F.3d at 309 (“Lovers’ quarrels and reconciliations are as much of a ‘reality in today’s world’ as is cohabitation without ‘legal formalities,’ and the police cannot be faulted for not presuming that a particular quarrel put an end to the couple’s relationship and living arrangements.”)."
} | 4,079,326 | a |
Accordingly, the rule established in Waller does not apply to this case. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "576 F.3d 309, 309",
"parenthetical": "\"Lovers' quarrels and reconciliations are as much of a 'reality in today's world' as is cohabitation without 'legal formalities,' and the police cannot be faulted for not presuming that a particular quarrel put an end to the couple's relationship and living arrangements.\"",
"sentence": "See id. (discussing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (“[I]t would be unjustifiably impractical to require the police to take affirmative steps to confirm the actual authority of a consenting individual whose authority was apparent____”)); see also Penney, 576 F.3d at 309 (“Lovers’ quarrels and reconciliations are as much of a ‘reality in today’s world’ as is cohabitation without ‘legal formalities,’ and the police cannot be faulted for not presuming that a particular quarrel put an end to the couple’s relationship and living arrangements.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t would be unjustifiably impractical to require the police to take affirmative steps to confirm the actual authority of a consenting individual whose authority was apparent____\"",
"sentence": "See id. (discussing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (“[I]t would be unjustifiably impractical to require the police to take affirmative steps to confirm the actual authority of a consenting individual whose authority was apparent____”)); see also Penney, 576 F.3d at 309 (“Lovers’ quarrels and reconciliations are as much of a ‘reality in today’s world’ as is cohabitation without ‘legal formalities,’ and the police cannot be faulted for not presuming that a particular quarrel put an end to the couple’s relationship and living arrangements.”)."
} | 4,079,326 | b |
Accordingly, the rule established in Waller does not apply to this case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t would be unjustifiably impractical to require the police to take affirmative steps to confirm the actual authority of a consenting individual whose authority was apparent____\"",
"sentence": "See id. (discussing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (“[I]t would be unjustifiably impractical to require the police to take affirmative steps to confirm the actual authority of a consenting individual whose authority was apparent____”)); see also Penney, 576 F.3d at 309 (“Lovers’ quarrels and reconciliations are as much of a ‘reality in today’s world’ as is cohabitation without ‘legal formalities,’ and the police cannot be faulted for not presuming that a particular quarrel put an end to the couple’s relationship and living arrangements.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "576 F.3d 309, 309",
"parenthetical": "\"Lovers' quarrels and reconciliations are as much of a 'reality in today's world' as is cohabitation without 'legal formalities,' and the police cannot be faulted for not presuming that a particular quarrel put an end to the couple's relationship and living arrangements.\"",
"sentence": "See id. (discussing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (“[I]t would be unjustifiably impractical to require the police to take affirmative steps to confirm the actual authority of a consenting individual whose authority was apparent____”)); see also Penney, 576 F.3d at 309 (“Lovers’ quarrels and reconciliations are as much of a ‘reality in today’s world’ as is cohabitation without ‘legal formalities,’ and the police cannot be faulted for not presuming that a particular quarrel put an end to the couple’s relationship and living arrangements.”)."
} | 4,079,326 | a |
P28 Thus, we follow suit and hold that, under A.R.S. SS 8-535(F), the essential question in deciding if reasonable grounds exist to believe a parent is mentally incompetent is whether the parent is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings or assist in his or her defense. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "613 A.2d 784, 784",
"parenthetical": "\"By definition, a mentally incompetent person is one who is unable to understand the nature of the termination proceeding and unable to assist in the presentation of his or her case.\"",
"sentence": "Alexander V., 613 A.2d at 784 (“By definition, a mentally incompetent person is one who is unable to understand the nature of the termination proceeding and unable to assist in the presentation of his or her case.”); Adoption of Kirk, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 533, 623 N.E.2d 492, 495 (1993) (same); see also Sherry S. Zimmerman, Annotation, Parents’ Mental Illness or Mental Deficiency as Ground for Termination of Parental Rights—Issues Concerning Guardian Ad Litem and Counsel, 118 A.L.R. 5th 561 (2004) (whether “parents are capable of understanding the nature of proceedings dealing with the issue of termination of their parental rights and are able to help their attorneys prepare a defense on their behalf’)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "whether \"parents are capable of understanding the nature of proceedings dealing with the issue of termination of their parental rights and are able to help their attorneys prepare a defense on their behalf'",
"sentence": "Alexander V., 613 A.2d at 784 (“By definition, a mentally incompetent person is one who is unable to understand the nature of the termination proceeding and unable to assist in the presentation of his or her case.”); Adoption of Kirk, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 533, 623 N.E.2d 492, 495 (1993) (same); see also Sherry S. Zimmerman, Annotation, Parents’ Mental Illness or Mental Deficiency as Ground for Termination of Parental Rights—Issues Concerning Guardian Ad Litem and Counsel, 118 A.L.R. 5th 561 (2004) (whether “parents are capable of understanding the nature of proceedings dealing with the issue of termination of their parental rights and are able to help their attorneys prepare a defense on their behalf’)."
} | 5,270,622 | a |
. Although the average victim of malicious prosecution may not have experienced such a high degree of stress and anxiety from Trigg's malicious prosecution, "a defendant must take a plaintiff as [s]he finds him" and, therefore, is responsible for the harm she inflicts on a person even if that harm is exacerbated by the person's unknown infirmities. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing the trial court's grant of remittitur on a jury award of $500,000 for a plaintiff who sustained minor physical injuries and an \"acute psychotic breakdown\" resulting from a car accident",
"sentence": "Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 103 A.D.2d 632, 481 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546-47 (4th Dep't 1984) (reversing the trial court’s grant of remittitur on a jury award of $500,000 for a plaintiff who sustained minor physical injuries and an “acute psychotic breakdown” resulting from a car accident) (citing McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 616 (1911)); cf. Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169, 1172 (2d Cir.1970) (Friendly, /.) (reversing a verdict in defendant's favor on the ground that the plaintiff’s theory of the case — that a defendant is liable for the emergence of schizophrenia resulting from the emotional trauma suffered by a passenger in a minor car accident caused by the defendant— is legally valid); Williams v. Bright, 230 A.D.2d 548, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910, 912 n. 2 (1st Dep’t 1997) (recognizing that the \"eggshell skull doctrine\" is \"traditionally [applied] to a plaintiff's preexisting physical condition, mental illness or psychological disability” (internal citations omitted))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "421 F.2d 1169, 1172",
"parenthetical": "reversing a verdict in defendant's favor on the ground that the plaintiff's theory of the case -- that a defendant is liable for the emergence of schizophrenia resulting from the emotional trauma suffered by a passenger in a minor car accident caused by the defendant-- is legally valid",
"sentence": "Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 103 A.D.2d 632, 481 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546-47 (4th Dep't 1984) (reversing the trial court’s grant of remittitur on a jury award of $500,000 for a plaintiff who sustained minor physical injuries and an “acute psychotic breakdown” resulting from a car accident) (citing McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 616 (1911)); cf. Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169, 1172 (2d Cir.1970) (Friendly, /.) (reversing a verdict in defendant's favor on the ground that the plaintiff’s theory of the case — that a defendant is liable for the emergence of schizophrenia resulting from the emotional trauma suffered by a passenger in a minor car accident caused by the defendant— is legally valid); Williams v. Bright, 230 A.D.2d 548, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910, 912 n. 2 (1st Dep’t 1997) (recognizing that the \"eggshell skull doctrine\" is \"traditionally [applied] to a plaintiff's preexisting physical condition, mental illness or psychological disability” (internal citations omitted))."
} | 4,152,209 | a |
. Although the average victim of malicious prosecution may not have experienced such a high degree of stress and anxiety from Trigg's malicious prosecution, "a defendant must take a plaintiff as [s]he finds him" and, therefore, is responsible for the harm she inflicts on a person even if that harm is exacerbated by the person's unknown infirmities. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "481 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546-47",
"parenthetical": "reversing the trial court's grant of remittitur on a jury award of $500,000 for a plaintiff who sustained minor physical injuries and an \"acute psychotic breakdown\" resulting from a car accident",
"sentence": "Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 103 A.D.2d 632, 481 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546-47 (4th Dep't 1984) (reversing the trial court’s grant of remittitur on a jury award of $500,000 for a plaintiff who sustained minor physical injuries and an “acute psychotic breakdown” resulting from a car accident) (citing McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 616 (1911)); cf. Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169, 1172 (2d Cir.1970) (Friendly, /.) (reversing a verdict in defendant's favor on the ground that the plaintiff’s theory of the case — that a defendant is liable for the emergence of schizophrenia resulting from the emotional trauma suffered by a passenger in a minor car accident caused by the defendant— is legally valid); Williams v. Bright, 230 A.D.2d 548, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910, 912 n. 2 (1st Dep’t 1997) (recognizing that the \"eggshell skull doctrine\" is \"traditionally [applied] to a plaintiff's preexisting physical condition, mental illness or psychological disability” (internal citations omitted))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "421 F.2d 1169, 1172",
"parenthetical": "reversing a verdict in defendant's favor on the ground that the plaintiff's theory of the case -- that a defendant is liable for the emergence of schizophrenia resulting from the emotional trauma suffered by a passenger in a minor car accident caused by the defendant-- is legally valid",
"sentence": "Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 103 A.D.2d 632, 481 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546-47 (4th Dep't 1984) (reversing the trial court’s grant of remittitur on a jury award of $500,000 for a plaintiff who sustained minor physical injuries and an “acute psychotic breakdown” resulting from a car accident) (citing McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 616 (1911)); cf. Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169, 1172 (2d Cir.1970) (Friendly, /.) (reversing a verdict in defendant's favor on the ground that the plaintiff’s theory of the case — that a defendant is liable for the emergence of schizophrenia resulting from the emotional trauma suffered by a passenger in a minor car accident caused by the defendant— is legally valid); Williams v. Bright, 230 A.D.2d 548, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910, 912 n. 2 (1st Dep’t 1997) (recognizing that the \"eggshell skull doctrine\" is \"traditionally [applied] to a plaintiff's preexisting physical condition, mental illness or psychological disability” (internal citations omitted))."
} | 4,152,209 | a |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | 3,706,781 | a |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner's security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer's pos session",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "565 P.2d 26, 31",
"parenthetical": "\"Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the 'created by [buyer's] seller' limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | 3,706,781 | a |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | 3,706,781 | a |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner's security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer's pos session",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "565 P.2d 26, 31",
"parenthetical": "\"Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the 'created by [buyer's] seller' limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | 3,706,781 | a |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | 3,706,781 | a |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | 3,706,781 | a |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner's security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer's pos session",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | 3,706,781 | a |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "565 P.2d 26, 31",
"parenthetical": "\"Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the 'created by [buyer's] seller' limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner's security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer's pos session",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "565 P.2d 26, 31",
"parenthetical": "\"Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the 'created by [buyer's] seller' limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | 3,706,781 | a |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | 3,706,781 | a |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner's security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer's pos session",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "565 P.2d 26, 31",
"parenthetical": "\"Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the 'created by [buyer's] seller' limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | 3,706,781 | a |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | 3,706,781 | a |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner's security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer's pos session",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "565 P.2d 26, 31",
"parenthetical": "\"Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the 'created by [buyer's] seller' limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | 3,706,781 | a |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | 3,706,781 | a |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | 3,706,781 | a |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner's security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer's pos session",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "565 P.2d 26, 31",
"parenthetical": "\"Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the 'created by [buyer's] seller' limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
Flowever, MBCC's security interest was not created by Duty Free (the buyer's seller), but rather by Duty Free's transferor, Customer. Therefore, Walden cannot claim the benefit of section 9-320, and MBCC's "security interest... continues in [the car] notwithstanding sale... or other disposition thereof...." 13 Pa.C.S. SS9315. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner's security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer's pos session",
"sentence": "Cf. Schultz v. Bank of the West, CBC, 325 Or. 81, 934 P.2d 421 (1997) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took free and clear of security interest created by original owner where original owner consigned motor home to dealer); C&J Leasing II, Ltd. Partnership v. Agri Financial Services Inc., 439 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1989) (purchaser of used farm equipment from dealer took free of security interest created by original owner where dealer was instrumental in creating original owner’s security interest and original owner left equipment in dealer’s pos session); Adams v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1977) (“Nothing in the comments to article 9 required the ‘created by [buyer’s] seller’ limitation to be an insurmountable barrier to good faith acquisition of pre-encumbered property from a dealer who himself was instrumental in creating the encumbrance and conflict”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner",
"sentence": "See Gordon v. Hamm, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1998) (purchaser of used motor home from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys Inc., 129 Misc.2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Erie Cty. 1985) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner); Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer, 188 N.J. Super. 509, 457 A.2d 1225 (1983) (purchaser of used boat from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner, even though dealer had been involved in obtaining that security interest); Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 440 N.E.2d 320 (4th Dist. 1982) (purchaser of used bulldozer from dealer took subject to security interest created by original owner)."
} | 3,706,781 | b |
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