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Moreover, because the language of article VIII is plain, it is improper to explore its legislative history, as the dissent would have us do. "The rule which should be applied is that laws, and especially foundational laws such as our Constitution, should be interpreted and applied according to the plain import of their language as it would be understood by persons of ordinary intelligence and experience." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "295 P.2d 348, 361",
"parenthetical": "holding that if constitutional provision is clear, \"then extraneous or contemporaneous construction may not be resorted to\"",
"sentence": "State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 938 (Utah 1975), disavowed on other grounds, State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 448 n. 4 (Utah 1983); see also University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 428, 295 P.2d 348, 361 (1956) (holding that if constitutional provision is clear, “then extraneous or contemporaneous construction may not be resorted to”); Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 944 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that because this court is sworn to uphold language of constitution, we must enforce plain and unambiguous language contained therein); cf. Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989) (“Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "779 P.2d 685, 686",
"parenthetical": "\"Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 938 (Utah 1975), disavowed on other grounds, State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 448 n. 4 (Utah 1983); see also University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 428, 295 P.2d 348, 361 (1956) (holding that if constitutional provision is clear, “then extraneous or contemporaneous construction may not be resorted to”); Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 944 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that because this court is sworn to uphold language of constitution, we must enforce plain and unambiguous language contained therein); cf. Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989) (“Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent.”)."
} | 10,354,345 | a |
Perhaps Dosa viewed the bribery of even sympathetic colonels as something one takes for granted as a prison escapee in Togo. Perhaps he was worried about declaring on a government form that he had been involved in bribing an official. We will never know. I do not believe, however, that the IJ's inferences that the bribery never took place, and that Dosa's credibility was undermined by his claim that it did, were so self-evident that the IJ was warranted in relying on them without any explanation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "331 F.3d 308, 308",
"parenthetical": "\"If minor inconsistencies or misrepresentations of unimportant facts cannot constitute the basis for an adverse credibility finding, a fortiori minor omissions cannot.\"",
"sentence": "See Lam v. Ashcroft, 112 Fed.Appx. 477, 479 (6th Cir.2004) (unpublished) (“Courts have diminished the significance of omissions when an applicant testifies at a hearing about something that is left out of his initial application because of the limited space available on the application forms.”) (citing Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308-09 (2d Cir.2003)); Secaida-Rosales, 331 F.3d at 308 (“If minor inconsistencies or misrepresentations of unimportant facts cannot constitute the basis for an adverse credibility finding, a fortiori minor omissions cannot.”); see also Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 342 (9th Cir.1994) (IJ must offer a “specific, cogent reason for any stated disbelief.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "21 F.3d 336, 342",
"parenthetical": "IJ must offer a \"specific, cogent reason for any stated disbelief.\"",
"sentence": "See Lam v. Ashcroft, 112 Fed.Appx. 477, 479 (6th Cir.2004) (unpublished) (“Courts have diminished the significance of omissions when an applicant testifies at a hearing about something that is left out of his initial application because of the limited space available on the application forms.”) (citing Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308-09 (2d Cir.2003)); Secaida-Rosales, 331 F.3d at 308 (“If minor inconsistencies or misrepresentations of unimportant facts cannot constitute the basis for an adverse credibility finding, a fortiori minor omissions cannot.”); see also Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 342 (9th Cir.1994) (IJ must offer a “specific, cogent reason for any stated disbelief.”)."
} | 666,155 | a |
First, the notice requirement is only three days. Second, a university is less able than a city or other entity with police powers to deal with a significant disruption on short notice. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "762 F.2d 1197, 1203",
"parenthetical": "\"[a] college has a right to preserve the campus for its intended purpose and to protect college students from the pressures of solicitation\"",
"sentence": "Mote, 321 F.Supp.2d at 681 (“a University’s resources are limited and the University has an interest in reserving those resources for University community members”); see also Glover v. Cole, 762 F.2d 1197, 1203 (4th Cir.1985) (“[a] college has a right to preserve the campus for its intended purpose and to protect college students from the pressures of solicitation”). In light of the modest nature of the requirement and what the district court described as the University’s reduced capacity to address “the exigencies of determining what, if any, security, crowd control, additional insurance, etc., will be required for a particular event,” we conclude that the advance notice requirement is sufficiently narrowly tailored, and thus permissible."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "321 F.Supp.2d 681, 681",
"parenthetical": "\"a University's resources are limited and the University has an interest in reserving those resources for University community members\"",
"sentence": "Mote, 321 F.Supp.2d at 681 (“a University’s resources are limited and the University has an interest in reserving those resources for University community members”); see also Glover v. Cole, 762 F.2d 1197, 1203 (4th Cir.1985) (“[a] college has a right to preserve the campus for its intended purpose and to protect college students from the pressures of solicitation”). In light of the modest nature of the requirement and what the district court described as the University’s reduced capacity to address “the exigencies of determining what, if any, security, crowd control, additional insurance, etc., will be required for a particular event,” we conclude that the advance notice requirement is sufficiently narrowly tailored, and thus permissible."
} | 5,323,458 | b |
For example, nothing in the statute provides that an ALJ may convene a jury. Under New York law, a party is entitled to have a jury trial on a breach of contract claim for damages. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "75 N.Y.2d 175, 181",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, SS 2 [of the New York Constitution].\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "430 U.S. 442, 459",
"parenthetical": "\"[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | 6,046,253 | a |
For example, nothing in the statute provides that an ALJ may convene a jury. Under New York law, a party is entitled to have a jury trial on a breach of contract claim for damages. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "75 N.Y.2d 175, 181",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, SS 2 [of the New York Constitution].\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | 6,046,253 | a |
For example, nothing in the statute provides that an ALJ may convene a jury. Under New York law, a party is entitled to have a jury trial on a breach of contract claim for damages. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "75 N.Y.2d 175, 181",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, SS 2 [of the New York Constitution].\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | 6,046,253 | b |
For example, nothing in the statute provides that an ALJ may convene a jury. Under New York law, a party is entitled to have a jury trial on a breach of contract claim for damages. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "430 U.S. 442, 459",
"parenthetical": "\"[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, SS 2 [of the New York Constitution].\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | 6,046,253 | b |
For example, nothing in the statute provides that an ALJ may convene a jury. Under New York law, a party is entitled to have a jury trial on a breach of contract claim for damages. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, SS 2 [of the New York Constitution].\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | 6,046,253 | a |
For example, nothing in the statute provides that an ALJ may convene a jury. Under New York law, a party is entitled to have a jury trial on a breach of contract claim for damages. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, SS 2 [of the New York Constitution].\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | 6,046,253 | b |
For example, nothing in the statute provides that an ALJ may convene a jury. Under New York law, a party is entitled to have a jury trial on a breach of contract claim for damages. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, SS 2 [of the New York Constitution].\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "430 U.S. 442, 459",
"parenthetical": "\"[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | 6,046,253 | a |
For example, nothing in the statute provides that an ALJ may convene a jury. Under New York law, a party is entitled to have a jury trial on a breach of contract claim for damages. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, SS 2 [of the New York Constitution].\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | 6,046,253 | a |
For example, nothing in the statute provides that an ALJ may convene a jury. Under New York law, a party is entitled to have a jury trial on a breach of contract claim for damages. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, SS 2 [of the New York Constitution].\"",
"sentence": "Ass’n of the U.S. v. State, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919 (1990) (“[A]ll cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 ... come within the present constitutional guarantee [of a jury trial] in article I, § 2 [of the New York Constitution].”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 459, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (“[S]uits for damages for breach of contract ... were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury.”). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) expressly provides for the admission of evidence that would not be admissible in a court proceeding in “any hearing before the Commissioner” (emphasis added)."
} | 6,046,253 | b |
All the actions enumerated in La. C.C. art. 3494 originate from contractual relationships. For that reason, the courts have uniformly rejected attempts to circumvent that article's three-year prescriptive period by categorizing the entire action as sounding in breach of contract. Starns [v. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "538 So.2d 275, 277",
"parenthetical": "rejecting such an attempt to avoid the three-year period for actions to recover rent under La. C.C. art. 3494(2",
"sentence": "Emmons, 538 So.2d 275, 277 (La.1989) ], supra (rejecting such an attempt to avoid the three-year period for actions to recover rent under La. C.C. art. 3494(2)); see also Dear v. Mabile, 93-1188 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/20/94), 637 So.2d 745 (applying reasoning in Starns, supra, to reject argument three-year period in La. C.C. art. 3494(4) for suits on open account should not apply since a contract theory was also asserted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying reasoning in Starns, supra, to reject argument three-year period in La. C.C. art. 3494(4",
"sentence": "Emmons, 538 So.2d 275, 277 (La.1989) ], supra (rejecting such an attempt to avoid the three-year period for actions to recover rent under La. C.C. art. 3494(2)); see also Dear v. Mabile, 93-1188 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/20/94), 637 So.2d 745 (applying reasoning in Starns, supra, to reject argument three-year period in La. C.C. art. 3494(4) for suits on open account should not apply since a contract theory was also asserted)."
} | 7,056,397 | a |
All the actions enumerated in La. C.C. art. 3494 originate from contractual relationships. For that reason, the courts have uniformly rejected attempts to circumvent that article's three-year prescriptive period by categorizing the entire action as sounding in breach of contract. Starns [v. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "538 So.2d 275, 277",
"parenthetical": "rejecting such an attempt to avoid the three-year period for actions to recover rent under La. C.C. art. 3494(2",
"sentence": "Emmons, 538 So.2d 275, 277 (La.1989) ], supra (rejecting such an attempt to avoid the three-year period for actions to recover rent under La. C.C. art. 3494(2)); see also Dear v. Mabile, 93-1188 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/20/94), 637 So.2d 745 (applying reasoning in Starns, supra, to reject argument three-year period in La. C.C. art. 3494(4) for suits on open account should not apply since a contract theory was also asserted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying reasoning in Starns, supra, to reject argument three-year period in La. C.C. art. 3494(4",
"sentence": "Emmons, 538 So.2d 275, 277 (La.1989) ], supra (rejecting such an attempt to avoid the three-year period for actions to recover rent under La. C.C. art. 3494(2)); see also Dear v. Mabile, 93-1188 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/20/94), 637 So.2d 745 (applying reasoning in Starns, supra, to reject argument three-year period in La. C.C. art. 3494(4) for suits on open account should not apply since a contract theory was also asserted)."
} | 7,056,397 | a |
. Attorneys fees and legal expenses incurred in other proceedings which are proximately caused by a RICO defendant's wrongful conduct may be cognizable injuries under RICO. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "434 F.3d 916, 931-32",
"parenthetical": "attorneys fees incurred in defending against false arrest not considered an injury to business or property under RICO",
"sentence": "See Burger v. Kuimelis, 325 F.Supp.2d 1026, 1035 (N.D.Cal.2004) (plaintiff may be entitled to recover legal fees incurred in other proceedings as a result of a RICO defendant's wrongful conduct); Hondeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1354 (8th Cir.1997) (prior legal expense qualifies as injury to business or property); but see Evans v. City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 916, 931-32 (7th Cir.2006) (attorneys fees incurred in defending against false arrest not considered an injury to business or property under RICO); Kelley v. Watts, 2007 WL 3232080 **2, 3 (E.D.Ark.2007) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "325 F.Supp.2d 1026, 1035",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff may be entitled to recover legal fees incurred in other proceedings as a result of a RICO defendant's wrongful conduct",
"sentence": "See Burger v. Kuimelis, 325 F.Supp.2d 1026, 1035 (N.D.Cal.2004) (plaintiff may be entitled to recover legal fees incurred in other proceedings as a result of a RICO defendant's wrongful conduct); Hondeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1354 (8th Cir.1997) (prior legal expense qualifies as injury to business or property); but see Evans v. City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 916, 931-32 (7th Cir.2006) (attorneys fees incurred in defending against false arrest not considered an injury to business or property under RICO); Kelley v. Watts, 2007 WL 3232080 **2, 3 (E.D.Ark.2007) (same)."
} | 4,184,220 | b |
. Attorneys fees and legal expenses incurred in other proceedings which are proximately caused by a RICO defendant's wrongful conduct may be cognizable injuries under RICO. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "112 F.3d 1339, 1354",
"parenthetical": "prior legal expense qualifies as injury to business or property",
"sentence": "See Burger v. Kuimelis, 325 F.Supp.2d 1026, 1035 (N.D.Cal.2004) (plaintiff may be entitled to recover legal fees incurred in other proceedings as a result of a RICO defendant's wrongful conduct); Hondeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1354 (8th Cir.1997) (prior legal expense qualifies as injury to business or property); but see Evans v. City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 916, 931-32 (7th Cir.2006) (attorneys fees incurred in defending against false arrest not considered an injury to business or property under RICO); Kelley v. Watts, 2007 WL 3232080 **2, 3 (E.D.Ark.2007) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "434 F.3d 916, 931-32",
"parenthetical": "attorneys fees incurred in defending against false arrest not considered an injury to business or property under RICO",
"sentence": "See Burger v. Kuimelis, 325 F.Supp.2d 1026, 1035 (N.D.Cal.2004) (plaintiff may be entitled to recover legal fees incurred in other proceedings as a result of a RICO defendant's wrongful conduct); Hondeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1354 (8th Cir.1997) (prior legal expense qualifies as injury to business or property); but see Evans v. City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 916, 931-32 (7th Cir.2006) (attorneys fees incurred in defending against false arrest not considered an injury to business or property under RICO); Kelley v. Watts, 2007 WL 3232080 **2, 3 (E.D.Ark.2007) (same)."
} | 4,184,220 | a |
Dismissal of Hinkley's inadequate bedding claim was proper as to defendants Warner, Franks, Sinclair, and Knight because Hinkley failed to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants knew that the prison's single-mat policy presented an excessive risk of harm to Hinkley's health and disregarded that risk. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "844 F.2d 628, 633",
"parenthetical": "the causation analysis under SS 1983 is \"individualized and focus[es] on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation\"",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment ... unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]”); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.1988) (the causation analysis under § 1983 is “individualized and focus[es] on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "511 U.S. 825, 837",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment ... unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment ... unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]”); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.1988) (the causation analysis under § 1983 is “individualized and focus[es] on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation”)."
} | 4,353,801 | b |
Dismissal of Hinkley's inadequate bedding claim was proper as to defendants Warner, Franks, Sinclair, and Knight because Hinkley failed to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants knew that the prison's single-mat policy presented an excessive risk of harm to Hinkley's health and disregarded that risk. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment ... unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment ... unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]”); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.1988) (the causation analysis under § 1983 is “individualized and focus[es] on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "844 F.2d 628, 633",
"parenthetical": "the causation analysis under SS 1983 is \"individualized and focus[es] on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation\"",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment ... unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]”); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.1988) (the causation analysis under § 1983 is “individualized and focus[es] on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation”)."
} | 4,353,801 | a |
Dismissal of Hinkley's inadequate bedding claim was proper as to defendants Warner, Franks, Sinclair, and Knight because Hinkley failed to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants knew that the prison's single-mat policy presented an excessive risk of harm to Hinkley's health and disregarded that risk. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "844 F.2d 628, 633",
"parenthetical": "the causation analysis under SS 1983 is \"individualized and focus[es] on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation\"",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment ... unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]”); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.1988) (the causation analysis under § 1983 is “individualized and focus[es] on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment ... unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment ... unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]”); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.1988) (the causation analysis under § 1983 is “individualized and focus[es] on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation”)."
} | 4,353,801 | b |
It must be noted that this issue has been previously decided by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which held that "Apprendi does not apply to [an] increase in [the maximum] sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "331 F.Supp.2d 311, 319-20",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen ... decisions [of the court of appeals] are obviously undermined by more recent opinions of the Supreme Court, the district court has an obligation to recognize the former as overruled.\"",
"sentence": "See Blakely, - U.S. at -, 124 S.Ct. at 2547 n. 1, 2549-50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding that majority's reasoning dictates application to federal sentencing proceedings under the Guidelines and citing DeSumma, 272 F.3d at- 181, as an opinion to the contrary); see also Ameline, 376 F.3d at 978; Booker, 375 F.3d at 513; Leach, 325 F.Supp.2d at 560-61; Croxford, 324 F.Supp.2d at 1260-61; cf. Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F.Supp.2d 311, 319-20 (M.D.Pa.2004) (”[W]hen ... decisions [of the court of appeals] are obviously undermined by more recent opinions of the Supreme Court, the district court has an obligation to recognize the former as overruled.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that majority's reasoning dictates application to federal sentencing proceedings under the Guidelines and citing DeSumma, 272 F.3d at- 181, as an opinion to the contrary",
"sentence": "See Blakely, - U.S. at -, 124 S.Ct. at 2547 n. 1, 2549-50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding that majority's reasoning dictates application to federal sentencing proceedings under the Guidelines and citing DeSumma, 272 F.3d at- 181, as an opinion to the contrary); see also Ameline, 376 F.3d at 978; Booker, 375 F.3d at 513; Leach, 325 F.Supp.2d at 560-61; Croxford, 324 F.Supp.2d at 1260-61; cf. Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F.Supp.2d 311, 319-20 (M.D.Pa.2004) (”[W]hen ... decisions [of the court of appeals] are obviously undermined by more recent opinions of the Supreme Court, the district court has an obligation to recognize the former as overruled.”)."
} | 9,180,162 | b |
On appeal, the California Supreme Court majority accepted the term "systematic exclusion" as "an acceptable shorthand phrase for denoting [Batson/]Wheeler error." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant's right to a representative jury.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "425 F.3d 560, 574",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he trial court's ruling that it was necessary to show a 'systematic exclusion' of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | 5,733,833 | b |
On appeal, the California Supreme Court majority accepted the term "systematic exclusion" as "an acceptable shorthand phrase for denoting [Batson/]Wheeler error." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "425 F.3d 560, 574",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he trial court's ruling that it was necessary to show a 'systematic exclusion' of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant's right to a representative jury.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | 5,733,833 | a |
On appeal, the California Supreme Court majority accepted the term "systematic exclusion" as "an acceptable shorthand phrase for denoting [Batson/]Wheeler error." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "425 F.3d 560, 574",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he trial court's ruling that it was necessary to show a 'systematic exclusion' of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant's right to a representative jury.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | 5,733,833 | a |
On appeal, the California Supreme Court majority accepted the term "systematic exclusion" as "an acceptable shorthand phrase for denoting [Batson/]Wheeler error." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant's right to a representative jury.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he trial court's ruling that it was necessary to show a 'systematic exclusion' of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | 5,733,833 | b |
On appeal, the California Supreme Court majority accepted the term "systematic exclusion" as "an acceptable shorthand phrase for denoting [Batson/]Wheeler error." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he trial court's ruling that it was necessary to show a 'systematic exclusion' of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant's right to a representative jury.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | 5,733,833 | a |
On appeal, the California Supreme Court majority accepted the term "systematic exclusion" as "an acceptable shorthand phrase for denoting [Batson/]Wheeler error." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant's right to a representative jury.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he trial court's ruling that it was necessary to show a 'systematic exclusion' of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | 5,733,833 | b |
On appeal, the California Supreme Court majority accepted the term "systematic exclusion" as "an acceptable shorthand phrase for denoting [Batson/]Wheeler error." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "913 F.2d 1417, 1425",
"parenthetical": "\"Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.\"",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant's right to a representative jury.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | 5,733,833 | a |
On appeal, the California Supreme Court majority accepted the term "systematic exclusion" as "an acceptable shorthand phrase for denoting [Batson/]Wheeler error." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "913 F.2d 1417, 1425",
"parenthetical": "\"Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.\"",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant's right to a representative jury.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | 5,733,833 | a |
On appeal, the California Supreme Court majority accepted the term "systematic exclusion" as "an acceptable shorthand phrase for denoting [Batson/]Wheeler error." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant's right to a representative jury.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "913 F.2d 1417, 1425",
"parenthetical": "\"Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.\"",
"sentence": "See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“For evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object, would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 574 (9th Cir.2005), amended 430 F.3d 1220 (“[T]he trial court’s ruling that it was necessary to show a ‘systematic exclusion’ of prospective jurors was incorrect, as the Constitution forbids striking a single juror for a discriminatory purpose[.]”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (“Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way.”); see also People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, 80 n. 4 (1991) (“The term [systematic exclusion] is not apposite in the Wheeler context, for a single discriminatory exclusion may violate a defendant’s right to a representative jury.” (emphasis added))."
} | 5,733,833 | b |
As the Perkins Court discussed, however, when the police use a ruse to gain entry to an abode, the nature of the ruse informs the analysis of whether the police exceeded the scope of the consent that was given. There, we explained that, because the police had obtained consent to enter the defendant's hotel room only for the purpose of "talking" to him about a noise complaint (which was made up), the scope of the consent did not extend to production of identification or to a visual inspection of the hotel room and bathroom. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "599 F.Supp.2d 592, 609-10",
"parenthetical": "when police obtained consent to enter defendant's trailer by using a ruse that they were investigating potential identity theft by others, they exceeded the scope of the consent by searching defendant's computer for child pornography",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp.2d 592, 609-10 (W.D.Pa.2009) (when police obtained consent to enter defendant’s trailer by using a ruse that they were investigating potential identity theft by others, they exceeded the scope of the consent by searching defendant’s computer for child pornography); but see State v. Nedergard, 51 Wash.App. 304, 753 P.2d 526, 529 (1988) (when defendant consented to police, masquerading as potential homebuyers, “look[ing] around,” police did not exceed the scope of the consent by searching basement of home)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when defendant consented to police, masquerading as potential homebuyers, \"look[ing] around,\" police did not exceed the scope of the consent by searching basement of home",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp.2d 592, 609-10 (W.D.Pa.2009) (when police obtained consent to enter defendant’s trailer by using a ruse that they were investigating potential identity theft by others, they exceeded the scope of the consent by searching defendant’s computer for child pornography); but see State v. Nedergard, 51 Wash.App. 304, 753 P.2d 526, 529 (1988) (when defendant consented to police, masquerading as potential homebuyers, “look[ing] around,” police did not exceed the scope of the consent by searching basement of home)."
} | 3,676,644 | a |
As the Perkins Court discussed, however, when the police use a ruse to gain entry to an abode, the nature of the ruse informs the analysis of whether the police exceeded the scope of the consent that was given. There, we explained that, because the police had obtained consent to enter the defendant's hotel room only for the purpose of "talking" to him about a noise complaint (which was made up), the scope of the consent did not extend to production of identification or to a visual inspection of the hotel room and bathroom. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "599 F.Supp.2d 592, 609-10",
"parenthetical": "when police obtained consent to enter defendant's trailer by using a ruse that they were investigating potential identity theft by others, they exceeded the scope of the consent by searching defendant's computer for child pornography",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp.2d 592, 609-10 (W.D.Pa.2009) (when police obtained consent to enter defendant’s trailer by using a ruse that they were investigating potential identity theft by others, they exceeded the scope of the consent by searching defendant’s computer for child pornography); but see State v. Nedergard, 51 Wash.App. 304, 753 P.2d 526, 529 (1988) (when defendant consented to police, masquerading as potential homebuyers, “look[ing] around,” police did not exceed the scope of the consent by searching basement of home)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "753 P.2d 526, 529",
"parenthetical": "when defendant consented to police, masquerading as potential homebuyers, \"look[ing] around,\" police did not exceed the scope of the consent by searching basement of home",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp.2d 592, 609-10 (W.D.Pa.2009) (when police obtained consent to enter defendant’s trailer by using a ruse that they were investigating potential identity theft by others, they exceeded the scope of the consent by searching defendant’s computer for child pornography); but see State v. Nedergard, 51 Wash.App. 304, 753 P.2d 526, 529 (1988) (when defendant consented to police, masquerading as potential homebuyers, “look[ing] around,” police did not exceed the scope of the consent by searching basement of home)."
} | 3,676,644 | a |
Fortuities in the government's subsequent decisionmaking process have no effect on the objective truth or falsity of the claimant's asserted entitlement, and should thus have no effect on the claimant's potential liability under the Act. This reading of the Act is consistent with this court's analysis of analogous provisions in the criminal False Claims Act and related statutes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "602 F.2d 231, 233",
"parenthetical": "holding, in the context of the criminal False Claims Act, that \"[t]o prove Falsity, the government only had to prove that the statement was known to be untrue at the time [the defendant] made it\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d 231, 233 (9th Cir.1979) (holding, in the context of the criminal False Claims Act, that “[t]o prove Falsity, the government only had to prove that the statement was known to be untrue at the time [the defendant] made it”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Leahy, 82 F.3d 624, 633 n. 11 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that the defendant contractor violated 18 U.S.C. § 286 — a companion statute to the criminal FCA — because his claims were false when submitted, even though the false claims were ultimately irrelevant to the total amount paid by the government to the contractor)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the defendant contractor violated 18 U.S.C. SS 286 -- a companion statute to the criminal FCA -- because his claims were false when submitted, even though the false claims were ultimately irrelevant to the total amount paid by the government to the contractor",
"sentence": "See United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d 231, 233 (9th Cir.1979) (holding, in the context of the criminal False Claims Act, that “[t]o prove Falsity, the government only had to prove that the statement was known to be untrue at the time [the defendant] made it”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Leahy, 82 F.3d 624, 633 n. 11 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that the defendant contractor violated 18 U.S.C. § 286 — a companion statute to the criminal FCA — because his claims were false when submitted, even though the false claims were ultimately irrelevant to the total amount paid by the government to the contractor)."
} | 9,438,722 | a |
Furthermore, he makes conclusory statements without supporting authority. Therefore, we decline to address these issues on the merits. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "348 S.C. 76, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review.\"",
"sentence": "Bryson v. Bryson, 378 S.C. 502, 510, 662 S.E.2d 611, 615 (Ct.App.2008) (“An issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority.”); see also Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct.App.2001) (“[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "378 S.C. 502, 510",
"parenthetical": "\"An issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority.\"",
"sentence": "Bryson v. Bryson, 378 S.C. 502, 510, 662 S.E.2d 611, 615 (Ct.App.2008) (“An issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority.”); see also Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct.App.2001) (“[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review.”)."
} | 3,861,063 | b |
Furthermore, he makes conclusory statements without supporting authority. Therefore, we decline to address these issues on the merits. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "557 S.E.2d 689, 691",
"parenthetical": "\"[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review.\"",
"sentence": "Bryson v. Bryson, 378 S.C. 502, 510, 662 S.E.2d 611, 615 (Ct.App.2008) (“An issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority.”); see also Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct.App.2001) (“[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "378 S.C. 502, 510",
"parenthetical": "\"An issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority.\"",
"sentence": "Bryson v. Bryson, 378 S.C. 502, 510, 662 S.E.2d 611, 615 (Ct.App.2008) (“An issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority.”); see also Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct.App.2001) (“[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review.”)."
} | 3,861,063 | b |
Furthermore, he makes conclusory statements without supporting authority. Therefore, we decline to address these issues on the merits. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "348 S.C. 76, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review.\"",
"sentence": "Bryson v. Bryson, 378 S.C. 502, 510, 662 S.E.2d 611, 615 (Ct.App.2008) (“An issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority.”); see also Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct.App.2001) (“[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "662 S.E.2d 611, 615",
"parenthetical": "\"An issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority.\"",
"sentence": "Bryson v. Bryson, 378 S.C. 502, 510, 662 S.E.2d 611, 615 (Ct.App.2008) (“An issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority.”); see also Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct.App.2001) (“[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review.”)."
} | 3,861,063 | b |
Furthermore, he makes conclusory statements without supporting authority. Therefore, we decline to address these issues on the merits. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "557 S.E.2d 689, 691",
"parenthetical": "\"[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review.\"",
"sentence": "Bryson v. Bryson, 378 S.C. 502, 510, 662 S.E.2d 611, 615 (Ct.App.2008) (“An issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority.”); see also Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct.App.2001) (“[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "662 S.E.2d 611, 615",
"parenthetical": "\"An issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority.\"",
"sentence": "Bryson v. Bryson, 378 S.C. 502, 510, 662 S.E.2d 611, 615 (Ct.App.2008) (“An issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority.”); see also Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct.App.2001) (“[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review.”)."
} | 3,861,063 | b |
When a court remands under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), the court retains jurisdiction and thus the ability to award EAJA compensation for post-remand administrative work. By contrast, when a court remands under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), ordinarily the court will not retain jurisdiction to permit EAJA fees for post-remand administrative work. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a sentence four remand terminates a civil action",
"sentence": "See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. at 299-300 & n. 4, 113 S.Ct. 2625 (explaining that a sentence four remand terminates a civil action); but see Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 571 (9th Cir.1995) (where district court erroneously retained jurisdiction after sentence four remand without objection, the claimant was deemed eligible for EAJA fees for post-remand administrative work)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "49 F.3d 562, 571",
"parenthetical": "where district court erroneously retained jurisdiction after sentence four remand without objection, the claimant was deemed eligible for EAJA fees for post-remand administrative work",
"sentence": "See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. at 299-300 & n. 4, 113 S.Ct. 2625 (explaining that a sentence four remand terminates a civil action); but see Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 571 (9th Cir.1995) (where district court erroneously retained jurisdiction after sentence four remand without objection, the claimant was deemed eligible for EAJA fees for post-remand administrative work)."
} | 4,197,837 | a |
When a court remands under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), the court retains jurisdiction and thus the ability to award EAJA compensation for post-remand administrative work. By contrast, when a court remands under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), ordinarily the court will not retain jurisdiction to permit EAJA fees for post-remand administrative work. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "49 F.3d 562, 571",
"parenthetical": "where district court erroneously retained jurisdiction after sentence four remand without objection, the claimant was deemed eligible for EAJA fees for post-remand administrative work",
"sentence": "See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. at 299-300 & n. 4, 113 S.Ct. 2625 (explaining that a sentence four remand terminates a civil action); but see Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 571 (9th Cir.1995) (where district court erroneously retained jurisdiction after sentence four remand without objection, the claimant was deemed eligible for EAJA fees for post-remand administrative work)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a sentence four remand terminates a civil action",
"sentence": "See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. at 299-300 & n. 4, 113 S.Ct. 2625 (explaining that a sentence four remand terminates a civil action); but see Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 571 (9th Cir.1995) (where district court erroneously retained jurisdiction after sentence four remand without objection, the claimant was deemed eligible for EAJA fees for post-remand administrative work)."
} | 4,197,837 | b |
In our view, the fact that equitable tolling is barred under section 2501 does not mean that class action statutory tolling also is barred. The two concepts are different. Equitable tolling is a principle that permits courts to modify a statutory time limit and "extend equitable relief' when appropriate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "493 U.S. 20, 27",
"parenthetical": "a \"traditional equitable tolling principle\" should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when \"the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine); see also, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989) (a “traditional equitable tolling principle” should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when “the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "498 U.S. 96, 96",
"parenthetical": "describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine",
"sentence": "See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine); see also, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989) (a “traditional equitable tolling principle” should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when “the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements”)."
} | 4,285,395 | b |
In our view, the fact that equitable tolling is barred under section 2501 does not mean that class action statutory tolling also is barred. The two concepts are different. Equitable tolling is a principle that permits courts to modify a statutory time limit and "extend equitable relief' when appropriate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a \"traditional equitable tolling principle\" should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when \"the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine); see also, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989) (a “traditional equitable tolling principle” should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when “the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "498 U.S. 96, 96",
"parenthetical": "describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine",
"sentence": "See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine); see also, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989) (a “traditional equitable tolling principle” should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when “the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements”)."
} | 4,285,395 | b |
In our view, the fact that equitable tolling is barred under section 2501 does not mean that class action statutory tolling also is barred. The two concepts are different. Equitable tolling is a principle that permits courts to modify a statutory time limit and "extend equitable relief' when appropriate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a \"traditional equitable tolling principle\" should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when \"the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine); see also, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989) (a “traditional equitable tolling principle” should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when “the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "498 U.S. 96, 96",
"parenthetical": "describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine",
"sentence": "See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine); see also, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989) (a “traditional equitable tolling principle” should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when “the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements”)."
} | 4,285,395 | b |
In our view, the fact that equitable tolling is barred under section 2501 does not mean that class action statutory tolling also is barred. The two concepts are different. Equitable tolling is a principle that permits courts to modify a statutory time limit and "extend equitable relief' when appropriate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "493 U.S. 20, 27",
"parenthetical": "a \"traditional equitable tolling principle\" should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when \"the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine); see also, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989) (a “traditional equitable tolling principle” should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when “the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine",
"sentence": "See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine); see also, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989) (a “traditional equitable tolling principle” should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when “the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements”)."
} | 4,285,395 | b |
In our view, the fact that equitable tolling is barred under section 2501 does not mean that class action statutory tolling also is barred. The two concepts are different. Equitable tolling is a principle that permits courts to modify a statutory time limit and "extend equitable relief' when appropriate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a \"traditional equitable tolling principle\" should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when \"the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine); see also, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989) (a “traditional equitable tolling principle” should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when “the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine",
"sentence": "See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine); see also, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989) (a “traditional equitable tolling principle” should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when “the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements”)."
} | 4,285,395 | b |
In our view, the fact that equitable tolling is barred under section 2501 does not mean that class action statutory tolling also is barred. The two concepts are different. Equitable tolling is a principle that permits courts to modify a statutory time limit and "extend equitable relief' when appropriate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine",
"sentence": "See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine); see also, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989) (a “traditional equitable tolling principle” should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when “the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a \"traditional equitable tolling principle\" should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when \"the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (describing the range of instances in which courts have applied the equitable tolling doctrine); see also, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989) (a “traditional equitable tolling principle” should not be applied to a statutory limitations period when “the equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements”)."
} | 4,285,395 | a |
However, in cases where the object is not inherently dangerous and has a non-violent, commonplace use, the government must prove that the actor actually used the object in a dangerous manner. This is an objective test, and has nothing to do with the actor's subjective intent to use the weapon dangerously. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "485 A.2d 596, 601",
"parenthetical": "rejecting appellant's argument that \"unless one is possessed with the specific intent to use an object offensively, it is not a dangerous weapon.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 485 A.2d 596, 601 (D.C.1984) (rejecting appellant’s argument that “unless one is possessed with the specific intent to use an object offensively, it is not a dangerous weapon.”); Williamson, 445 A.2d at 977 (rejecting appellant’s argument that “where the weapon is not dangerous ‘per se,’ this court should require the government to prove a specific intent to cause physical injury to the victim, or an attempted battery.”); see also Commonwealth v. Connolly, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 424, 730 N.E.2d 318, 319 (2000) (“The dangerousness of an object that is not inherently dangerous turns on the manner in which it is used (objective test), not the intention of the actor when using it (subjective test).”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The dangerousness of an object that is not inherently dangerous turns on the manner in which it is used (objective test), not the intention of the actor when using it (subjective test).\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 485 A.2d 596, 601 (D.C.1984) (rejecting appellant’s argument that “unless one is possessed with the specific intent to use an object offensively, it is not a dangerous weapon.”); Williamson, 445 A.2d at 977 (rejecting appellant’s argument that “where the weapon is not dangerous ‘per se,’ this court should require the government to prove a specific intent to cause physical injury to the victim, or an attempted battery.”); see also Commonwealth v. Connolly, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 424, 730 N.E.2d 318, 319 (2000) (“The dangerousness of an object that is not inherently dangerous turns on the manner in which it is used (objective test), not the intention of the actor when using it (subjective test).”)."
} | 7,299,389 | a |
However, in cases where the object is not inherently dangerous and has a non-violent, commonplace use, the government must prove that the actor actually used the object in a dangerous manner. This is an objective test, and has nothing to do with the actor's subjective intent to use the weapon dangerously. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "730 N.E.2d 318, 319",
"parenthetical": "\"The dangerousness of an object that is not inherently dangerous turns on the manner in which it is used (objective test), not the intention of the actor when using it (subjective test).\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 485 A.2d 596, 601 (D.C.1984) (rejecting appellant’s argument that “unless one is possessed with the specific intent to use an object offensively, it is not a dangerous weapon.”); Williamson, 445 A.2d at 977 (rejecting appellant’s argument that “where the weapon is not dangerous ‘per se,’ this court should require the government to prove a specific intent to cause physical injury to the victim, or an attempted battery.”); see also Commonwealth v. Connolly, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 424, 730 N.E.2d 318, 319 (2000) (“The dangerousness of an object that is not inherently dangerous turns on the manner in which it is used (objective test), not the intention of the actor when using it (subjective test).”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "485 A.2d 596, 601",
"parenthetical": "rejecting appellant's argument that \"unless one is possessed with the specific intent to use an object offensively, it is not a dangerous weapon.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 485 A.2d 596, 601 (D.C.1984) (rejecting appellant’s argument that “unless one is possessed with the specific intent to use an object offensively, it is not a dangerous weapon.”); Williamson, 445 A.2d at 977 (rejecting appellant’s argument that “where the weapon is not dangerous ‘per se,’ this court should require the government to prove a specific intent to cause physical injury to the victim, or an attempted battery.”); see also Commonwealth v. Connolly, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 424, 730 N.E.2d 318, 319 (2000) (“The dangerousness of an object that is not inherently dangerous turns on the manner in which it is used (objective test), not the intention of the actor when using it (subjective test).”)."
} | 7,299,389 | b |
However, in cases where the object is not inherently dangerous and has a non-violent, commonplace use, the government must prove that the actor actually used the object in a dangerous manner. This is an objective test, and has nothing to do with the actor's subjective intent to use the weapon dangerously. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The dangerousness of an object that is not inherently dangerous turns on the manner in which it is used (objective test), not the intention of the actor when using it (subjective test).\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 485 A.2d 596, 601 (D.C.1984) (rejecting appellant’s argument that “unless one is possessed with the specific intent to use an object offensively, it is not a dangerous weapon.”); Williamson, 445 A.2d at 977 (rejecting appellant’s argument that “where the weapon is not dangerous ‘per se,’ this court should require the government to prove a specific intent to cause physical injury to the victim, or an attempted battery.”); see also Commonwealth v. Connolly, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 424, 730 N.E.2d 318, 319 (2000) (“The dangerousness of an object that is not inherently dangerous turns on the manner in which it is used (objective test), not the intention of the actor when using it (subjective test).”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "445 A.2d 977, 977",
"parenthetical": "rejecting appellant's argument that \"where the weapon is not dangerous 'per se,' this court should require the government to prove a specific intent to cause physical injury to the victim, or an attempted battery.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 485 A.2d 596, 601 (D.C.1984) (rejecting appellant’s argument that “unless one is possessed with the specific intent to use an object offensively, it is not a dangerous weapon.”); Williamson, 445 A.2d at 977 (rejecting appellant’s argument that “where the weapon is not dangerous ‘per se,’ this court should require the government to prove a specific intent to cause physical injury to the victim, or an attempted battery.”); see also Commonwealth v. Connolly, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 424, 730 N.E.2d 318, 319 (2000) (“The dangerousness of an object that is not inherently dangerous turns on the manner in which it is used (objective test), not the intention of the actor when using it (subjective test).”)."
} | 7,299,389 | b |
However, in cases where the object is not inherently dangerous and has a non-violent, commonplace use, the government must prove that the actor actually used the object in a dangerous manner. This is an objective test, and has nothing to do with the actor's subjective intent to use the weapon dangerously. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "445 A.2d 977, 977",
"parenthetical": "rejecting appellant's argument that \"where the weapon is not dangerous 'per se,' this court should require the government to prove a specific intent to cause physical injury to the victim, or an attempted battery.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 485 A.2d 596, 601 (D.C.1984) (rejecting appellant’s argument that “unless one is possessed with the specific intent to use an object offensively, it is not a dangerous weapon.”); Williamson, 445 A.2d at 977 (rejecting appellant’s argument that “where the weapon is not dangerous ‘per se,’ this court should require the government to prove a specific intent to cause physical injury to the victim, or an attempted battery.”); see also Commonwealth v. Connolly, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 424, 730 N.E.2d 318, 319 (2000) (“The dangerousness of an object that is not inherently dangerous turns on the manner in which it is used (objective test), not the intention of the actor when using it (subjective test).”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "730 N.E.2d 318, 319",
"parenthetical": "\"The dangerousness of an object that is not inherently dangerous turns on the manner in which it is used (objective test), not the intention of the actor when using it (subjective test).\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 485 A.2d 596, 601 (D.C.1984) (rejecting appellant’s argument that “unless one is possessed with the specific intent to use an object offensively, it is not a dangerous weapon.”); Williamson, 445 A.2d at 977 (rejecting appellant’s argument that “where the weapon is not dangerous ‘per se,’ this court should require the government to prove a specific intent to cause physical injury to the victim, or an attempted battery.”); see also Commonwealth v. Connolly, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 424, 730 N.E.2d 318, 319 (2000) (“The dangerousness of an object that is not inherently dangerous turns on the manner in which it is used (objective test), not the intention of the actor when using it (subjective test).”)."
} | 7,299,389 | a |
The continuing viability of both the "general test" and "general rule" evidenced by these Texas Supreme Court cases forces us to decide which measure of standing should apply to the named plaintiffs. The supreme court has used the "general test" for standing mostly (if not exclusively) in the context of declaratory judgment actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "53 S.W.3d 305, 305",
"parenthetical": "applying \"general test\" to city councilman who claimed that mayor usurped his authority",
"sentence": "See Todd, 53 S.W.3d at 305 (applying “general test” to city councilman who claimed that mayor usurped his authority); Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex.1998) (applying “general test” to city that claimed statute impermissibly delegated legislative authority); Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 661-62 (applying “general test” to appraisal district that challenged the constitutionality of a statute it was charged with enforcing); Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 517-18 (Tex.1995) (applying “general test” to challenge regarding the constitutionality of statute); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 (applying “general test” to plaintiff association challenging a statute’s constitutionality); see also Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Disk, 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex.1996) (following Garcia’s analysis on plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "925 S.W.2d 618, 626",
"parenthetical": "following Garcia's analysis on plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of statute",
"sentence": "See Todd, 53 S.W.3d at 305 (applying “general test” to city councilman who claimed that mayor usurped his authority); Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex.1998) (applying “general test” to city that claimed statute impermissibly delegated legislative authority); Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 661-62 (applying “general test” to appraisal district that challenged the constitutionality of a statute it was charged with enforcing); Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 517-18 (Tex.1995) (applying “general test” to challenge regarding the constitutionality of statute); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 (applying “general test” to plaintiff association challenging a statute’s constitutionality); see also Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Disk, 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex.1996) (following Garcia’s analysis on plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of statute)."
} | 9,301,702 | a |
The continuing viability of both the "general test" and "general rule" evidenced by these Texas Supreme Court cases forces us to decide which measure of standing should apply to the named plaintiffs. The supreme court has used the "general test" for standing mostly (if not exclusively) in the context of declaratory judgment actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "972 S.W.2d 729, 734",
"parenthetical": "applying \"general test\" to city that claimed statute impermissibly delegated legislative authority",
"sentence": "See Todd, 53 S.W.3d at 305 (applying “general test” to city councilman who claimed that mayor usurped his authority); Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex.1998) (applying “general test” to city that claimed statute impermissibly delegated legislative authority); Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 661-62 (applying “general test” to appraisal district that challenged the constitutionality of a statute it was charged with enforcing); Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 517-18 (Tex.1995) (applying “general test” to challenge regarding the constitutionality of statute); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 (applying “general test” to plaintiff association challenging a statute’s constitutionality); see also Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Disk, 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex.1996) (following Garcia’s analysis on plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "925 S.W.2d 618, 626",
"parenthetical": "following Garcia's analysis on plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of statute",
"sentence": "See Todd, 53 S.W.3d at 305 (applying “general test” to city councilman who claimed that mayor usurped his authority); Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex.1998) (applying “general test” to city that claimed statute impermissibly delegated legislative authority); Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 661-62 (applying “general test” to appraisal district that challenged the constitutionality of a statute it was charged with enforcing); Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 517-18 (Tex.1995) (applying “general test” to challenge regarding the constitutionality of statute); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 (applying “general test” to plaintiff association challenging a statute’s constitutionality); see also Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Disk, 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex.1996) (following Garcia’s analysis on plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of statute)."
} | 9,301,702 | a |
The continuing viability of both the "general test" and "general rule" evidenced by these Texas Supreme Court cases forces us to decide which measure of standing should apply to the named plaintiffs. The supreme court has used the "general test" for standing mostly (if not exclusively) in the context of declaratory judgment actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "925 S.W.2d 661, 661-62",
"parenthetical": "applying \"general test\" to appraisal district that challenged the constitutionality of a statute it was charged with enforcing",
"sentence": "See Todd, 53 S.W.3d at 305 (applying “general test” to city councilman who claimed that mayor usurped his authority); Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex.1998) (applying “general test” to city that claimed statute impermissibly delegated legislative authority); Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 661-62 (applying “general test” to appraisal district that challenged the constitutionality of a statute it was charged with enforcing); Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 517-18 (Tex.1995) (applying “general test” to challenge regarding the constitutionality of statute); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 (applying “general test” to plaintiff association challenging a statute’s constitutionality); see also Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Disk, 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex.1996) (following Garcia’s analysis on plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "925 S.W.2d 618, 626",
"parenthetical": "following Garcia's analysis on plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of statute",
"sentence": "See Todd, 53 S.W.3d at 305 (applying “general test” to city councilman who claimed that mayor usurped his authority); Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex.1998) (applying “general test” to city that claimed statute impermissibly delegated legislative authority); Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 661-62 (applying “general test” to appraisal district that challenged the constitutionality of a statute it was charged with enforcing); Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 517-18 (Tex.1995) (applying “general test” to challenge regarding the constitutionality of statute); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 (applying “general test” to plaintiff association challenging a statute’s constitutionality); see also Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Disk, 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex.1996) (following Garcia’s analysis on plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of statute)."
} | 9,301,702 | a |
The continuing viability of both the "general test" and "general rule" evidenced by these Texas Supreme Court cases forces us to decide which measure of standing should apply to the named plaintiffs. The supreme court has used the "general test" for standing mostly (if not exclusively) in the context of declaratory judgment actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "925 S.W.2d 618, 626",
"parenthetical": "following Garcia's analysis on plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of statute",
"sentence": "See Todd, 53 S.W.3d at 305 (applying “general test” to city councilman who claimed that mayor usurped his authority); Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex.1998) (applying “general test” to city that claimed statute impermissibly delegated legislative authority); Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 661-62 (applying “general test” to appraisal district that challenged the constitutionality of a statute it was charged with enforcing); Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 517-18 (Tex.1995) (applying “general test” to challenge regarding the constitutionality of statute); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 (applying “general test” to plaintiff association challenging a statute’s constitutionality); see also Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Disk, 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex.1996) (following Garcia’s analysis on plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "893 S.W.2d 504, 517-18",
"parenthetical": "applying \"general test\" to challenge regarding the constitutionality of statute",
"sentence": "See Todd, 53 S.W.3d at 305 (applying “general test” to city councilman who claimed that mayor usurped his authority); Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex.1998) (applying “general test” to city that claimed statute impermissibly delegated legislative authority); Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 661-62 (applying “general test” to appraisal district that challenged the constitutionality of a statute it was charged with enforcing); Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 517-18 (Tex.1995) (applying “general test” to challenge regarding the constitutionality of statute); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 (applying “general test” to plaintiff association challenging a statute’s constitutionality); see also Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Disk, 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex.1996) (following Garcia’s analysis on plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of statute)."
} | 9,301,702 | b |
The continuing viability of both the "general test" and "general rule" evidenced by these Texas Supreme Court cases forces us to decide which measure of standing should apply to the named plaintiffs. The supreme court has used the "general test" for standing mostly (if not exclusively) in the context of declaratory judgment actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "852 S.W.2d 444, 444",
"parenthetical": "applying \"general test\" to plaintiff association challenging a statute's constitutionality",
"sentence": "See Todd, 53 S.W.3d at 305 (applying “general test” to city councilman who claimed that mayor usurped his authority); Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex.1998) (applying “general test” to city that claimed statute impermissibly delegated legislative authority); Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 661-62 (applying “general test” to appraisal district that challenged the constitutionality of a statute it was charged with enforcing); Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 517-18 (Tex.1995) (applying “general test” to challenge regarding the constitutionality of statute); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 (applying “general test” to plaintiff association challenging a statute’s constitutionality); see also Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Disk, 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex.1996) (following Garcia’s analysis on plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "925 S.W.2d 618, 626",
"parenthetical": "following Garcia's analysis on plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of statute",
"sentence": "See Todd, 53 S.W.3d at 305 (applying “general test” to city councilman who claimed that mayor usurped his authority); Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex.1998) (applying “general test” to city that claimed statute impermissibly delegated legislative authority); Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 661-62 (applying “general test” to appraisal district that challenged the constitutionality of a statute it was charged with enforcing); Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 517-18 (Tex.1995) (applying “general test” to challenge regarding the constitutionality of statute); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 (applying “general test” to plaintiff association challenging a statute’s constitutionality); see also Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Disk, 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex.1996) (following Garcia’s analysis on plaintiffs challenge to constitutionality of statute)."
} | 9,301,702 | a |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "509 F.2d 1352, 1356",
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | b |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "509 F.2d 1352, 1356",
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | b |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "509 F.2d 1352, 1356",
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | a |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "509 F.2d 1352, 1356",
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | a |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "509 F.2d 1352, 1356",
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | b |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | a |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | a |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | b |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | a |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | b |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | a |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | a |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | a |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | a |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | b |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | b |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | b |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | a |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | a |
The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue, however, have allowed the district courts a reasonable period after the 120 days to decide a timely filed motion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (emphasis added) (“if a motion to reduce sentence is properly filed within the 120 days required by the statute, the district court retains jurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days in those rare circumstances in which it is unable to decide the motion within the 120 day period”); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (“district judge . . . retains jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion after the expiration of the 120 day period for such reasonable time as, under the circumstances, is required for its consideration and disposition’’); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.) (“as long as the district judge acts with reasonable speed after the timely motion is filed, the time limit should be flexible enough to give him an opportunity to hear and consider new evidence regarding the appropriateness of the sentence”), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court had power to reduce sentence 167 days after sentencing where motion was timely filed); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974) (district court has jurisdiction to reduce sentence imposed in September 1972 in July 1973 where motion was timely filed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975)."
} | 1,262,209 | a |
The Ninth Circuit has also instructed district courts to - consider the lodestar cross-check as one factor in assessing the reasonableness of a fee request. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "654 F.3d 943, 943",
"parenthetical": "encouraging \"comparison between the lodestar amount and a reasonable percentage award\"",
"sentence": "See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050 (recognizing “the lodestar may provide a useful perspective on the reasonableness of a given percentage award”); see also In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 943 (encouraging “comparison between the lodestar amount and a reasonable percentage award”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "290 F.3d 1050, 1050",
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"the lodestar may provide a useful perspective on the reasonableness of a given percentage award\"",
"sentence": "See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050 (recognizing “the lodestar may provide a useful perspective on the reasonableness of a given percentage award”); see also In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 943 (encouraging “comparison between the lodestar amount and a reasonable percentage award”)."
} | 4,066,337 | b |
Although plaintiff allege[d] that, because of the schedule revisions, he was forced to come in two hours early for his shift, 'a mere inconvenience' is not sufficiently adverse to sustain a prima facie case.") (citation omitted). More significantly, plaintiff cannot refute the defendant's legitimate reason for his transfer, namely, that the defendant complied with plaintiffs request that he not work under Mr. Wallace's supervision. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "999 F.Supp. 97, 106",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff established a prima facie claim of retaliation because the defendant's failure to transfer her out of her abusive working environment could be viewed as an \"adverse personnel action\" and there was a causal link between the filing of plaintiffs complaint and the defendant's failure to transfer her",
"sentence": "See Lofton v. Roskens, 743 F.Supp. 6, 10 (D.D.C.1990), aff'd, 950 F.2d 797 (D.C.Cir.1991) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish that her transfer to another department was retaliatory as opposed to her employer’s attempt to “diffuse a personality conflict.”); cf. Villines v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, 999 F.Supp. 97, 106 (D.D.C.1998) (holding that plaintiff established a prima facie claim of retaliation because the defendant’s failure to transfer her out of her abusive working environment could be viewed as an “adverse personnel action” and there was a causal link between the filing of plaintiffs complaint and the defendant’s failure to transfer her)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "743 F.Supp. 6, 10",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff failed to establish that her transfer to another department was retaliatory as opposed to her employer's attempt to \"diffuse a personality conflict.\"",
"sentence": "See Lofton v. Roskens, 743 F.Supp. 6, 10 (D.D.C.1990), aff'd, 950 F.2d 797 (D.C.Cir.1991) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish that her transfer to another department was retaliatory as opposed to her employer’s attempt to “diffuse a personality conflict.”); cf. Villines v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, 999 F.Supp. 97, 106 (D.D.C.1998) (holding that plaintiff established a prima facie claim of retaliation because the defendant’s failure to transfer her out of her abusive working environment could be viewed as an “adverse personnel action” and there was a causal link between the filing of plaintiffs complaint and the defendant’s failure to transfer her)."
} | 9,292,115 | b |
Although plaintiff allege[d] that, because of the schedule revisions, he was forced to come in two hours early for his shift, 'a mere inconvenience' is not sufficiently adverse to sustain a prima facie case.") (citation omitted). More significantly, plaintiff cannot refute the defendant's legitimate reason for his transfer, namely, that the defendant complied with plaintiffs request that he not work under Mr. Wallace's supervision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff failed to establish that her transfer to another department was retaliatory as opposed to her employer's attempt to \"diffuse a personality conflict.\"",
"sentence": "See Lofton v. Roskens, 743 F.Supp. 6, 10 (D.D.C.1990), aff'd, 950 F.2d 797 (D.C.Cir.1991) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish that her transfer to another department was retaliatory as opposed to her employer’s attempt to “diffuse a personality conflict.”); cf. Villines v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, 999 F.Supp. 97, 106 (D.D.C.1998) (holding that plaintiff established a prima facie claim of retaliation because the defendant’s failure to transfer her out of her abusive working environment could be viewed as an “adverse personnel action” and there was a causal link between the filing of plaintiffs complaint and the defendant’s failure to transfer her)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "999 F.Supp. 97, 106",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff established a prima facie claim of retaliation because the defendant's failure to transfer her out of her abusive working environment could be viewed as an \"adverse personnel action\" and there was a causal link between the filing of plaintiffs complaint and the defendant's failure to transfer her",
"sentence": "See Lofton v. Roskens, 743 F.Supp. 6, 10 (D.D.C.1990), aff'd, 950 F.2d 797 (D.C.Cir.1991) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish that her transfer to another department was retaliatory as opposed to her employer’s attempt to “diffuse a personality conflict.”); cf. Villines v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, 999 F.Supp. 97, 106 (D.D.C.1998) (holding that plaintiff established a prima facie claim of retaliation because the defendant’s failure to transfer her out of her abusive working environment could be viewed as an “adverse personnel action” and there was a causal link between the filing of plaintiffs complaint and the defendant’s failure to transfer her)."
} | 9,292,115 | a |
More importantly, I question whether the Commonwealth can rely on a felon's purported incapacity to vote responsibly as the "non-punitive rationale" for Article 120 given that neither the ability to vote responsibly nor respect for the existing law remain "reasonable ground[s] of eligibility for voting." Rather, the idea that a particular group may be disqualified from voting based on a lack of respect for existing criminal law now constitutes a form of viewpoint discrimination that has been expressly rejected. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 U.S. 89, 94",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "405 U.S. 330, 354-56",
"parenthetical": "rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | b |
More importantly, I question whether the Commonwealth can rely on a felon's purported incapacity to vote responsibly as the "non-punitive rationale" for Article 120 given that neither the ability to vote responsibly nor respect for the existing law remain "reasonable ground[s] of eligibility for voting." Rather, the idea that a particular group may be disqualified from voting based on a lack of respect for existing criminal law now constitutes a form of viewpoint discrimination that has been expressly rejected. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "405 U.S. 330, 354-56",
"parenthetical": "rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | b |
More importantly, I question whether the Commonwealth can rely on a felon's purported incapacity to vote responsibly as the "non-punitive rationale" for Article 120 given that neither the ability to vote responsibly nor respect for the existing law remain "reasonable ground[s] of eligibility for voting." Rather, the idea that a particular group may be disqualified from voting based on a lack of respect for existing criminal law now constitutes a form of viewpoint discrimination that has been expressly rejected. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "405 U.S. 330, 354-56",
"parenthetical": "rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | b |
More importantly, I question whether the Commonwealth can rely on a felon's purported incapacity to vote responsibly as the "non-punitive rationale" for Article 120 given that neither the ability to vote responsibly nor respect for the existing law remain "reasonable ground[s] of eligibility for voting." Rather, the idea that a particular group may be disqualified from voting based on a lack of respect for existing criminal law now constitutes a form of viewpoint discrimination that has been expressly rejected. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 U.S. 89, 94",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | a |
More importantly, I question whether the Commonwealth can rely on a felon's purported incapacity to vote responsibly as the "non-punitive rationale" for Article 120 given that neither the ability to vote responsibly nor respect for the existing law remain "reasonable ground[s] of eligibility for voting." Rather, the idea that a particular group may be disqualified from voting based on a lack of respect for existing criminal law now constitutes a form of viewpoint discrimination that has been expressly rejected. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | a |
More importantly, I question whether the Commonwealth can rely on a felon's purported incapacity to vote responsibly as the "non-punitive rationale" for Article 120 given that neither the ability to vote responsibly nor respect for the existing law remain "reasonable ground[s] of eligibility for voting." Rather, the idea that a particular group may be disqualified from voting based on a lack of respect for existing criminal law now constitutes a form of viewpoint discrimination that has been expressly rejected. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | b |
More importantly, I question whether the Commonwealth can rely on a felon's purported incapacity to vote responsibly as the "non-punitive rationale" for Article 120 given that neither the ability to vote responsibly nor respect for the existing law remain "reasonable ground[s] of eligibility for voting." Rather, the idea that a particular group may be disqualified from voting based on a lack of respect for existing criminal law now constitutes a form of viewpoint discrimination that has been expressly rejected. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 U.S. 89, 94",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | a |
More importantly, I question whether the Commonwealth can rely on a felon's purported incapacity to vote responsibly as the "non-punitive rationale" for Article 120 given that neither the ability to vote responsibly nor respect for the existing law remain "reasonable ground[s] of eligibility for voting." Rather, the idea that a particular group may be disqualified from voting based on a lack of respect for existing criminal law now constitutes a form of viewpoint discrimination that has been expressly rejected. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | b |
More importantly, I question whether the Commonwealth can rely on a felon's purported incapacity to vote responsibly as the "non-punitive rationale" for Article 120 given that neither the ability to vote responsibly nor respect for the existing law remain "reasonable ground[s] of eligibility for voting." Rather, the idea that a particular group may be disqualified from voting based on a lack of respect for existing criminal law now constitutes a form of viewpoint discrimination that has been expressly rejected. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (see parenthetical, supra, n. 43); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (rejecting durational residency requirements that rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values before they were permitted to vote); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (“ ‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”)."
} | 4,035,681 | b |
However, the issues were available to Interiano's post-conviction counsel as evidenced from Interiano's own original pro se Rule 29.15 motion, in which he alleged that he had not been able to communicate with his trial attorney or understand and participate in the trial court proceedings. Thus, it was his post-conviction counsel's failure to raise these available claims and pursue them in the state court post-conviction proceedings, not a deficiency by his trial counsel, that resulted in the procedural default. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "381 F.3d 744, 752",
"parenthetical": "\"In order for deficient trial work to constitute the kind of 'cause' that would excuse a procedural bar ... petitioner [also] must have independently presented this ineffective assistance claim to the state court for adjudication.\"",
"sentence": "See Osborne, 411 F.3d at 919-20 (finding no cause to excuse the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where the claim was presented in the petitioner’s Rule 29.15 motion but was not pursued on appeal); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 489, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (“The principle of comity that underlies the exhaustion doctrine would be ill served by a rule that allowed a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation, ... whether an ineffective assistance claim is asserted as cause for a procedural default or denominated as an independent ground for habeas relief.” (internal citations and marks omitted)); Clemons v. Luebbers, 381 F.3d 744, 752 (8th Cir.2004) (“In order for deficient trial work to constitute the kind of ‘cause’ that would excuse a procedural bar ... petitioner [also] must have independently presented this ineffective assistance claim to the state court for adjudication.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 41, 163 L.Ed.2d 75 (2005)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "411 F.3d 919, 919-20",
"parenthetical": "finding no cause to excuse the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where the claim was presented in the petitioner's Rule 29.15 motion but was not pursued on appeal",
"sentence": "See Osborne, 411 F.3d at 919-20 (finding no cause to excuse the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where the claim was presented in the petitioner’s Rule 29.15 motion but was not pursued on appeal); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 489, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (“The principle of comity that underlies the exhaustion doctrine would be ill served by a rule that allowed a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation, ... whether an ineffective assistance claim is asserted as cause for a procedural default or denominated as an independent ground for habeas relief.” (internal citations and marks omitted)); Clemons v. Luebbers, 381 F.3d 744, 752 (8th Cir.2004) (“In order for deficient trial work to constitute the kind of ‘cause’ that would excuse a procedural bar ... petitioner [also] must have independently presented this ineffective assistance claim to the state court for adjudication.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 41, 163 L.Ed.2d 75 (2005)."
} | 6,045,694 | b |
However, the issues were available to Interiano's post-conviction counsel as evidenced from Interiano's own original pro se Rule 29.15 motion, in which he alleged that he had not been able to communicate with his trial attorney or understand and participate in the trial court proceedings. Thus, it was his post-conviction counsel's failure to raise these available claims and pursue them in the state court post-conviction proceedings, not a deficiency by his trial counsel, that resulted in the procedural default. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In order for deficient trial work to constitute the kind of 'cause' that would excuse a procedural bar ... petitioner [also] must have independently presented this ineffective assistance claim to the state court for adjudication.\"",
"sentence": "See Osborne, 411 F.3d at 919-20 (finding no cause to excuse the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where the claim was presented in the petitioner’s Rule 29.15 motion but was not pursued on appeal); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 489, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (“The principle of comity that underlies the exhaustion doctrine would be ill served by a rule that allowed a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation, ... whether an ineffective assistance claim is asserted as cause for a procedural default or denominated as an independent ground for habeas relief.” (internal citations and marks omitted)); Clemons v. Luebbers, 381 F.3d 744, 752 (8th Cir.2004) (“In order for deficient trial work to constitute the kind of ‘cause’ that would excuse a procedural bar ... petitioner [also] must have independently presented this ineffective assistance claim to the state court for adjudication.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 41, 163 L.Ed.2d 75 (2005)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "411 F.3d 919, 919-20",
"parenthetical": "finding no cause to excuse the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where the claim was presented in the petitioner's Rule 29.15 motion but was not pursued on appeal",
"sentence": "See Osborne, 411 F.3d at 919-20 (finding no cause to excuse the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where the claim was presented in the petitioner’s Rule 29.15 motion but was not pursued on appeal); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 489, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (“The principle of comity that underlies the exhaustion doctrine would be ill served by a rule that allowed a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation, ... whether an ineffective assistance claim is asserted as cause for a procedural default or denominated as an independent ground for habeas relief.” (internal citations and marks omitted)); Clemons v. Luebbers, 381 F.3d 744, 752 (8th Cir.2004) (“In order for deficient trial work to constitute the kind of ‘cause’ that would excuse a procedural bar ... petitioner [also] must have independently presented this ineffective assistance claim to the state court for adjudication.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 41, 163 L.Ed.2d 75 (2005)."
} | 6,045,694 | b |
However, the issues were available to Interiano's post-conviction counsel as evidenced from Interiano's own original pro se Rule 29.15 motion, in which he alleged that he had not been able to communicate with his trial attorney or understand and participate in the trial court proceedings. Thus, it was his post-conviction counsel's failure to raise these available claims and pursue them in the state court post-conviction proceedings, not a deficiency by his trial counsel, that resulted in the procedural default. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "411 F.3d 919, 919-20",
"parenthetical": "finding no cause to excuse the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where the claim was presented in the petitioner's Rule 29.15 motion but was not pursued on appeal",
"sentence": "See Osborne, 411 F.3d at 919-20 (finding no cause to excuse the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where the claim was presented in the petitioner’s Rule 29.15 motion but was not pursued on appeal); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 489, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (“The principle of comity that underlies the exhaustion doctrine would be ill served by a rule that allowed a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation, ... whether an ineffective assistance claim is asserted as cause for a procedural default or denominated as an independent ground for habeas relief.” (internal citations and marks omitted)); Clemons v. Luebbers, 381 F.3d 744, 752 (8th Cir.2004) (“In order for deficient trial work to constitute the kind of ‘cause’ that would excuse a procedural bar ... petitioner [also] must have independently presented this ineffective assistance claim to the state court for adjudication.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 41, 163 L.Ed.2d 75 (2005)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In order for deficient trial work to constitute the kind of 'cause' that would excuse a procedural bar ... petitioner [also] must have independently presented this ineffective assistance claim to the state court for adjudication.\"",
"sentence": "See Osborne, 411 F.3d at 919-20 (finding no cause to excuse the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where the claim was presented in the petitioner’s Rule 29.15 motion but was not pursued on appeal); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 489, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (“The principle of comity that underlies the exhaustion doctrine would be ill served by a rule that allowed a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation, ... whether an ineffective assistance claim is asserted as cause for a procedural default or denominated as an independent ground for habeas relief.” (internal citations and marks omitted)); Clemons v. Luebbers, 381 F.3d 744, 752 (8th Cir.2004) (“In order for deficient trial work to constitute the kind of ‘cause’ that would excuse a procedural bar ... petitioner [also] must have independently presented this ineffective assistance claim to the state court for adjudication.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 41, 163 L.Ed.2d 75 (2005)."
} | 6,045,694 | a |
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has approved of multipliers in other areas. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "proper for district court to consider 2.0 multiplier in SS 1983 prisoner litigation",
"sentence": "See Perotti v. Seiter, 935 F.2d 761 (6th Cir. 1991) (proper for district court to consider 2.0 multiplier in § 1983 prisoner litigation); Fite v. First Tennessee Prod. Credit Ass’n., 861 F.2d 884 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming multiplier of 1.75 in age discrimination case for contingent nature of the case)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "906 F.2d 762, 767",
"parenthetical": "reversing grant of 1.5 multiplier and awarding 2.0 multiplier in contingency Title VII case",
"sentence": "See also King v. Palmer, 906 F.2d 762, 767 (D.C.Cir.1990) (reversing grant of 1.5 multiplier and awarding 2.0 multiplier in contingency Title VII case); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3rd Cir.1990) (contingency multiplier is appropriate in some cases); Fadhl v. City of San Francisco, 859 F.2d 649, 650 (9th Cir.1988) (affirming multiplier of 2 in Title VII contingency case)."
} | 3,719,144 | a |
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has approved of multipliers in other areas. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming multiplier of 1.75 in age discrimination case for contingent nature of the case",
"sentence": "See Perotti v. Seiter, 935 F.2d 761 (6th Cir. 1991) (proper for district court to consider 2.0 multiplier in § 1983 prisoner litigation); Fite v. First Tennessee Prod. Credit Ass’n., 861 F.2d 884 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming multiplier of 1.75 in age discrimination case for contingent nature of the case)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "906 F.2d 762, 767",
"parenthetical": "reversing grant of 1.5 multiplier and awarding 2.0 multiplier in contingency Title VII case",
"sentence": "See also King v. Palmer, 906 F.2d 762, 767 (D.C.Cir.1990) (reversing grant of 1.5 multiplier and awarding 2.0 multiplier in contingency Title VII case); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3rd Cir.1990) (contingency multiplier is appropriate in some cases); Fadhl v. City of San Francisco, 859 F.2d 649, 650 (9th Cir.1988) (affirming multiplier of 2 in Title VII contingency case)."
} | 3,719,144 | a |
Based on our assessment of the parties' submissions,, the applicable case law, and the record on appeal, we conclude that petitioner's claims are without merit. , In the affidavit and brief he submitted to the BIA, petitioner, who was duly represented by new counsel on appeal, failed to comply with any of the Lozada requirements, and the explanation he now offers for that failure -- namely, that he believed he was precluded from filing a disciplinary complaint against his original attorney because he had earlier signed a statement indicating his "satisfaction] with the services provided" -- was never presented to the BIA. Nor does petitioner's explanation here address in any way his failure to comply with the remaining Lozada requirements, which are likewise essential to establishing a full administrative record before the BIA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "19 I. & N. Dec. 639, 639",
"parenthetical": "emphasizing that \"[w]here essential information is lacking, it is impossible to evaluate the substance of such claim\" and that \"the potential for abuse is apparent where no mechanism exists for allowing former counsel, whose integrity or competence is being, impugned, to present his version of events if he so chooses, thereby discouraging baseless allegations\"",
"sentence": "See Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639 (emphasizing that “[w]here essential information is lacking, it is impossible to evaluate the substance of such claim” and that “the potential for abuse is apparent where no mechanism exists for allowing former counsel, whose integrity or competence is being, impugned, to present his version of events if he so chooses, thereby discouraging baseless allegations”); see also Twum v. INS, 411 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir.2005) (stating that “[w]e have upheld the application of [the Loza-da ] requirements to screen ineffective assistance claims wfere appropriate” because “these requirements serve to deter meritless claims and to provide a basis for determining whether counsel’s assistance was in fact ineffective”). ."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "411 F.3d 54, 59",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]e have upheld the application of [the Loza-da ] requirements to screen ineffective assistance claims wfere appropriate\" because \"these requirements serve to deter meritless claims and to provide a basis for determining whether counsel's assistance was in fact ineffective\"",
"sentence": "See Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639 (emphasizing that “[w]here essential information is lacking, it is impossible to evaluate the substance of such claim” and that “the potential for abuse is apparent where no mechanism exists for allowing former counsel, whose integrity or competence is being, impugned, to present his version of events if he so chooses, thereby discouraging baseless allegations”); see also Twum v. INS, 411 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir.2005) (stating that “[w]e have upheld the application of [the Loza-da ] requirements to screen ineffective assistance claims wfere appropriate” because “these requirements serve to deter meritless claims and to provide a basis for determining whether counsel’s assistance was in fact ineffective”). ."
} | 3,113,271 | a |
[A]n individual is subject to FMLA liability when he or she exercises "supervisory authority over the complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation" while acting in the employer's interest. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "414 U.S. 190, 195",
"parenthetical": "holding that a company exercising \"substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work\" of the employees is an employer under the FLSA",
"sentence": "Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir.1984) (quoting Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir.1983)); see also Falk v. Bren nan, 414 U.S. 190, 195, 94 S.Ct. 427, 38 L.Ed.2d 406 (1973) (holding that a company exercising “substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work” of the employees is an employer under the FLSA)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "831 F.2d 690, 694",
"parenthetical": "discussing individual liability under the FLSA's analogous definition of an \"employer\"",
"sentence": "Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing individual liability under the FLSA’s analogous definition of an “employer”). As the Fifth Circuit explained in interpreting the FLSA’s analogous employer provision, an individual supervisor has adequate authority over the complaining employee when the supervisor “independently exercise[s] control over the work situation.”"
} | 4,017,921 | b |
[A]n individual is subject to FMLA liability when he or she exercises "supervisory authority over the complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation" while acting in the employer's interest. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a company exercising \"substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work\" of the employees is an employer under the FLSA",
"sentence": "Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir.1984) (quoting Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir.1983)); see also Falk v. Bren nan, 414 U.S. 190, 195, 94 S.Ct. 427, 38 L.Ed.2d 406 (1973) (holding that a company exercising “substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work” of the employees is an employer under the FLSA)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "831 F.2d 690, 694",
"parenthetical": "discussing individual liability under the FLSA's analogous definition of an \"employer\"",
"sentence": "Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing individual liability under the FLSA’s analogous definition of an “employer”). As the Fifth Circuit explained in interpreting the FLSA’s analogous employer provision, an individual supervisor has adequate authority over the complaining employee when the supervisor “independently exercise[s] control over the work situation.”"
} | 4,017,921 | b |
[A]n individual is subject to FMLA liability when he or she exercises "supervisory authority over the complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation" while acting in the employer's interest. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a company exercising \"substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work\" of the employees is an employer under the FLSA",
"sentence": "Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir.1984) (quoting Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir.1983)); see also Falk v. Bren nan, 414 U.S. 190, 195, 94 S.Ct. 427, 38 L.Ed.2d 406 (1973) (holding that a company exercising “substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work” of the employees is an employer under the FLSA)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "831 F.2d 690, 694",
"parenthetical": "discussing individual liability under the FLSA's analogous definition of an \"employer\"",
"sentence": "Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing individual liability under the FLSA’s analogous definition of an “employer”). As the Fifth Circuit explained in interpreting the FLSA’s analogous employer provision, an individual supervisor has adequate authority over the complaining employee when the supervisor “independently exercise[s] control over the work situation.”"
} | 4,017,921 | b |
In this case, the Retirement System does have the "power and privileges of a corporation," S.C.Code Ann. SSSS 9-1-20, 9-11-20, including the powers to "sue and be sued," to "make contracts," and to buy and sell property, id. SS 33-3-102. But, contrary to the plaintiffs' argument, the designation of an entity as a corporation with the power to sue and be sued is not conclusive in establishing its autonomy. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "278 U.S. 194, 199",
"parenthetical": "\"It is unnecessary for us to consider the effect of the general grant of power to sue or be sued ... -- this suit, in effect, is against the state and must be so treated\"",
"sentence": "See Oberg, 745 F.3d at 139 (finding that the autonomy factor “cut both ways,” even though the entity had the “power to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and purchase and sell property in its own name”); see also State Highway Comm’n v. Utah Const. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199, 49 S.Ct. 104, 73 L.Ed. 262 (1929) (“It is unnecessary for us to consider the effect of the general grant of power to sue or be sued ... — this suit, in effect, is against the state and must be so treated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "745 F.3d 139, 139",
"parenthetical": "finding that the autonomy factor \"cut both ways,\" even though the entity had the \"power to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and purchase and sell property in its own name\"",
"sentence": "See Oberg, 745 F.3d at 139 (finding that the autonomy factor “cut both ways,” even though the entity had the “power to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and purchase and sell property in its own name”); see also State Highway Comm’n v. Utah Const. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199, 49 S.Ct. 104, 73 L.Ed. 262 (1929) (“It is unnecessary for us to consider the effect of the general grant of power to sue or be sued ... — this suit, in effect, is against the state and must be so treated”)."
} | 4,315,938 | b |
In this case, the Retirement System does have the "power and privileges of a corporation," S.C.Code Ann. SSSS 9-1-20, 9-11-20, including the powers to "sue and be sued," to "make contracts," and to buy and sell property, id. SS 33-3-102. But, contrary to the plaintiffs' argument, the designation of an entity as a corporation with the power to sue and be sued is not conclusive in establishing its autonomy. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "745 F.3d 139, 139",
"parenthetical": "finding that the autonomy factor \"cut both ways,\" even though the entity had the \"power to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and purchase and sell property in its own name\"",
"sentence": "See Oberg, 745 F.3d at 139 (finding that the autonomy factor “cut both ways,” even though the entity had the “power to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and purchase and sell property in its own name”); see also State Highway Comm’n v. Utah Const. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199, 49 S.Ct. 104, 73 L.Ed. 262 (1929) (“It is unnecessary for us to consider the effect of the general grant of power to sue or be sued ... — this suit, in effect, is against the state and must be so treated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is unnecessary for us to consider the effect of the general grant of power to sue or be sued ... -- this suit, in effect, is against the state and must be so treated\"",
"sentence": "See Oberg, 745 F.3d at 139 (finding that the autonomy factor “cut both ways,” even though the entity had the “power to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and purchase and sell property in its own name”); see also State Highway Comm’n v. Utah Const. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199, 49 S.Ct. 104, 73 L.Ed. 262 (1929) (“It is unnecessary for us to consider the effect of the general grant of power to sue or be sued ... — this suit, in effect, is against the state and must be so treated”)."
} | 4,315,938 | a |
In this case, the Retirement System does have the "power and privileges of a corporation," S.C.Code Ann. SSSS 9-1-20, 9-11-20, including the powers to "sue and be sued," to "make contracts," and to buy and sell property, id. SS 33-3-102. But, contrary to the plaintiffs' argument, the designation of an entity as a corporation with the power to sue and be sued is not conclusive in establishing its autonomy. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is unnecessary for us to consider the effect of the general grant of power to sue or be sued ... -- this suit, in effect, is against the state and must be so treated\"",
"sentence": "See Oberg, 745 F.3d at 139 (finding that the autonomy factor “cut both ways,” even though the entity had the “power to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and purchase and sell property in its own name”); see also State Highway Comm’n v. Utah Const. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199, 49 S.Ct. 104, 73 L.Ed. 262 (1929) (“It is unnecessary for us to consider the effect of the general grant of power to sue or be sued ... — this suit, in effect, is against the state and must be so treated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "745 F.3d 139, 139",
"parenthetical": "finding that the autonomy factor \"cut both ways,\" even though the entity had the \"power to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and purchase and sell property in its own name\"",
"sentence": "See Oberg, 745 F.3d at 139 (finding that the autonomy factor “cut both ways,” even though the entity had the “power to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and purchase and sell property in its own name”); see also State Highway Comm’n v. Utah Const. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199, 49 S.Ct. 104, 73 L.Ed. 262 (1929) (“It is unnecessary for us to consider the effect of the general grant of power to sue or be sued ... — this suit, in effect, is against the state and must be so treated”)."
} | 4,315,938 | b |
B. The Basis For Determinations Although I disagree with giving any deference to the BIA's or the INS's conclusions about whether a particular crime is one necessarily involving moral turpitude, I agree with the majority that in determining whether the crime of which the alien has been convicted falls within one of the grounds for deportation under SS 241(a)(2)(A), both the court and the BIA look only at the definition of the crime under state law, and not at the underlying facts and circumstances of the alien's particular offense. Thus, in addition to the state-law definition of the crime charged, both the BIA and the reviewing court look only at the record of conviction, which includes the crime as described in the indictment or information, the plea, the verdict or judgment, and the sentence, but not any evidence offered in the case or other facts or circumstances involved. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "837 F.2d 753, 758",
"parenthetical": "court looked at \"facts of the present case, where petitioner has acknowledged his false statements and the statements made to defraud the United States Government,\" to find that \"the convie-tions may be considered as involving moral turpitude for purposes of denying voluntary departure.\"",
"sentence": "Cabral, 15 F.3d at 196 & n. 6; United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 1003 (9th Cir.1991) (BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case); Alleyne v. U.S. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1185 (3d Cir.1989) (same); but see Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir.) (court looked at “facts of the present case, where petitioner has acknowledged his false statements and the statements made to defraud the United States Government,” to find that “the convie-tions may be considered as involving moral turpitude for purposes of denying voluntary departure.”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982, 109 S.Ct. 533, 102 L.Ed.2d 564 (1988); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.1964) (“record of conviction” includes “the indictment or information, plea, verdict or judgment and sentence”); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N.Dec. 269, 270 (BIA1975) (record of conviction includes “charge or indictment, the plea, the judgment or verdict, and the sentence,” citing United States ex rel. Teper v. Miller, 87 F.Supp. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.1949))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "935 F.2d 990, 1003",
"parenthetical": "BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case",
"sentence": "Cabral, 15 F.3d at 196 & n. 6; United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 1003 (9th Cir.1991) (BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case); Alleyne v. U.S. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1185 (3d Cir.1989) (same); but see Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir.) (court looked at “facts of the present case, where petitioner has acknowledged his false statements and the statements made to defraud the United States Government,” to find that “the convie-tions may be considered as involving moral turpitude for purposes of denying voluntary departure.”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982, 109 S.Ct. 533, 102 L.Ed.2d 564 (1988); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.1964) (“record of conviction” includes “the indictment or information, plea, verdict or judgment and sentence”); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N.Dec. 269, 270 (BIA1975) (record of conviction includes “charge or indictment, the plea, the judgment or verdict, and the sentence,” citing United States ex rel. Teper v. Miller, 87 F.Supp. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.1949))."
} | 7,413,984 | b |
B. The Basis For Determinations Although I disagree with giving any deference to the BIA's or the INS's conclusions about whether a particular crime is one necessarily involving moral turpitude, I agree with the majority that in determining whether the crime of which the alien has been convicted falls within one of the grounds for deportation under SS 241(a)(2)(A), both the court and the BIA look only at the definition of the crime under state law, and not at the underlying facts and circumstances of the alien's particular offense. Thus, in addition to the state-law definition of the crime charged, both the BIA and the reviewing court look only at the record of conviction, which includes the crime as described in the indictment or information, the plea, the verdict or judgment, and the sentence, but not any evidence offered in the case or other facts or circumstances involved. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "935 F.2d 990, 1003",
"parenthetical": "BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case",
"sentence": "Cabral, 15 F.3d at 196 & n. 6; United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 1003 (9th Cir.1991) (BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case); Alleyne v. U.S. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1185 (3d Cir.1989) (same); but see Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir.) (court looked at “facts of the present case, where petitioner has acknowledged his false statements and the statements made to defraud the United States Government,” to find that “the convie-tions may be considered as involving moral turpitude for purposes of denying voluntary departure.”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982, 109 S.Ct. 533, 102 L.Ed.2d 564 (1988); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.1964) (“record of conviction” includes “the indictment or information, plea, verdict or judgment and sentence”); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N.Dec. 269, 270 (BIA1975) (record of conviction includes “charge or indictment, the plea, the judgment or verdict, and the sentence,” citing United States ex rel. Teper v. Miller, 87 F.Supp. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.1949))."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court looked at \"facts of the present case, where petitioner has acknowledged his false statements and the statements made to defraud the United States Government,\" to find that \"the convie-tions may be considered as involving moral turpitude for purposes of denying voluntary departure.\"",
"sentence": "Cabral, 15 F.3d at 196 & n. 6; United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 1003 (9th Cir.1991) (BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case); Alleyne v. U.S. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1185 (3d Cir.1989) (same); but see Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir.) (court looked at “facts of the present case, where petitioner has acknowledged his false statements and the statements made to defraud the United States Government,” to find that “the convie-tions may be considered as involving moral turpitude for purposes of denying voluntary departure.”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982, 109 S.Ct. 533, 102 L.Ed.2d 564 (1988); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.1964) (“record of conviction” includes “the indictment or information, plea, verdict or judgment and sentence”); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N.Dec. 269, 270 (BIA1975) (record of conviction includes “charge or indictment, the plea, the judgment or verdict, and the sentence,” citing United States ex rel. Teper v. Miller, 87 F.Supp. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.1949))."
} | 7,413,984 | a |
B. The Basis For Determinations Although I disagree with giving any deference to the BIA's or the INS's conclusions about whether a particular crime is one necessarily involving moral turpitude, I agree with the majority that in determining whether the crime of which the alien has been convicted falls within one of the grounds for deportation under SS 241(a)(2)(A), both the court and the BIA look only at the definition of the crime under state law, and not at the underlying facts and circumstances of the alien's particular offense. Thus, in addition to the state-law definition of the crime charged, both the BIA and the reviewing court look only at the record of conviction, which includes the crime as described in the indictment or information, the plea, the verdict or judgment, and the sentence, but not any evidence offered in the case or other facts or circumstances involved. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "935 F.2d 990, 1003",
"parenthetical": "BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case",
"sentence": "Cabral, 15 F.3d at 196 & n. 6; United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 1003 (9th Cir.1991) (BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case); Alleyne v. U.S. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1185 (3d Cir.1989) (same); but see Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir.) (court looked at “facts of the present case, where petitioner has acknowledged his false statements and the statements made to defraud the United States Government,” to find that “the convie-tions may be considered as involving moral turpitude for purposes of denying voluntary departure.”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982, 109 S.Ct. 533, 102 L.Ed.2d 564 (1988); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.1964) (“record of conviction” includes “the indictment or information, plea, verdict or judgment and sentence”); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N.Dec. 269, 270 (BIA1975) (record of conviction includes “charge or indictment, the plea, the judgment or verdict, and the sentence,” citing United States ex rel. Teper v. Miller, 87 F.Supp. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.1949))."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court looked at \"facts of the present case, where petitioner has acknowledged his false statements and the statements made to defraud the United States Government,\" to find that \"the convie-tions may be considered as involving moral turpitude for purposes of denying voluntary departure.\"",
"sentence": "Cabral, 15 F.3d at 196 & n. 6; United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 1003 (9th Cir.1991) (BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case); Alleyne v. U.S. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1185 (3d Cir.1989) (same); but see Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir.) (court looked at “facts of the present case, where petitioner has acknowledged his false statements and the statements made to defraud the United States Government,” to find that “the convie-tions may be considered as involving moral turpitude for purposes of denying voluntary departure.”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982, 109 S.Ct. 533, 102 L.Ed.2d 564 (1988); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.1964) (“record of conviction” includes “the indictment or information, plea, verdict or judgment and sentence”); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N.Dec. 269, 270 (BIA1975) (record of conviction includes “charge or indictment, the plea, the judgment or verdict, and the sentence,” citing United States ex rel. Teper v. Miller, 87 F.Supp. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.1949))."
} | 7,413,984 | a |
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