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Under the Blum test, even heavily-regulated private entities generally are held not to be state actors. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "191 F.3d 206, 206",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fact that a business entity is subject to 'extensive and detailed' state regulation does not convert that organization's actions into those of the state.\"",
"sentence": "Desiderio, 191 F.3d, at 206 (“[T]he fact that a business entity is subject to ‘extensive and detailed’ state regulation does not convert that organization’s actions into those of the state.”); see also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350, 95 S.Ct. 449 (holding that extensively regulated public utilities are not state actors)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that extensively regulated public utilities are not state actors",
"sentence": "Desiderio, 191 F.3d, at 206 (“[T]he fact that a business entity is subject to ‘extensive and detailed’ state regulation does not convert that organization’s actions into those of the state.”); see also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350, 95 S.Ct. 449 (holding that extensively regulated public utilities are not state actors)."
} | 9,393,599 | a |
Rather, we find that the district judge's evaluation of this ease supported employing physical restraints to further an essential state interest. Notably, the district judge identified this interest on the record at both the March 27, 2012, status conference and the jury-selection proceeding, explaining that the measures were put into place for security purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "544 U.S. 628, 628",
"parenthetical": "stating that an essential state interest may include ensuring physical security, preventing escape, or maintaining courtroom decorum",
"sentence": "See Deck, 544 U.S. at 628, 125 S.Ct. at 2012 (stating that an essential state interest may include ensuring physical security, preventing escape, or maintaining courtroom decorum); see also Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1225 (“Courtroom security is a competing interest that may, at times, ‘outweigh[] a defendant’s right to stand trial before the jury untainted by physical reminders of his status as an accused.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Allen, 728 F.2d at 1413)). Given that this case involved violent gang-related charges against multiple defendants, threats against the prosecutors and witnesses that were never proven to be unfounded or untrue, and many trial attendees strongly siding with either the Appellants or the witnesses testifying against them, the district court had a legitimate interest in ensuring the physical security of counsel, witnesses, spectators, and all others who would be present at trial."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "158 F.3d 1225, 1225",
"parenthetical": "\"Courtroom security is a competing interest that may, at times, 'outweigh[] a defendant's right to stand trial before the jury untainted by physical reminders of his status as an accused.'\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Deck, 544 U.S. at 628, 125 S.Ct. at 2012 (stating that an essential state interest may include ensuring physical security, preventing escape, or maintaining courtroom decorum); see also Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1225 (“Courtroom security is a competing interest that may, at times, ‘outweigh[] a defendant’s right to stand trial before the jury untainted by physical reminders of his status as an accused.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Allen, 728 F.2d at 1413)). Given that this case involved violent gang-related charges against multiple defendants, threats against the prosecutors and witnesses that were never proven to be unfounded or untrue, and many trial attendees strongly siding with either the Appellants or the witnesses testifying against them, the district court had a legitimate interest in ensuring the physical security of counsel, witnesses, spectators, and all others who would be present at trial."
} | 4,194,922 | a |
Rather, we find that the district judge's evaluation of this ease supported employing physical restraints to further an essential state interest. Notably, the district judge identified this interest on the record at both the March 27, 2012, status conference and the jury-selection proceeding, explaining that the measures were put into place for security purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "158 F.3d 1225, 1225",
"parenthetical": "\"Courtroom security is a competing interest that may, at times, 'outweigh[] a defendant's right to stand trial before the jury untainted by physical reminders of his status as an accused.'\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Deck, 544 U.S. at 628, 125 S.Ct. at 2012 (stating that an essential state interest may include ensuring physical security, preventing escape, or maintaining courtroom decorum); see also Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1225 (“Courtroom security is a competing interest that may, at times, ‘outweigh[] a defendant’s right to stand trial before the jury untainted by physical reminders of his status as an accused.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Allen, 728 F.2d at 1413)). Given that this case involved violent gang-related charges against multiple defendants, threats against the prosecutors and witnesses that were never proven to be unfounded or untrue, and many trial attendees strongly siding with either the Appellants or the witnesses testifying against them, the district court had a legitimate interest in ensuring the physical security of counsel, witnesses, spectators, and all others who would be present at trial."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 S.Ct. 2012, 2012",
"parenthetical": "stating that an essential state interest may include ensuring physical security, preventing escape, or maintaining courtroom decorum",
"sentence": "See Deck, 544 U.S. at 628, 125 S.Ct. at 2012 (stating that an essential state interest may include ensuring physical security, preventing escape, or maintaining courtroom decorum); see also Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1225 (“Courtroom security is a competing interest that may, at times, ‘outweigh[] a defendant’s right to stand trial before the jury untainted by physical reminders of his status as an accused.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Allen, 728 F.2d at 1413)). Given that this case involved violent gang-related charges against multiple defendants, threats against the prosecutors and witnesses that were never proven to be unfounded or untrue, and many trial attendees strongly siding with either the Appellants or the witnesses testifying against them, the district court had a legitimate interest in ensuring the physical security of counsel, witnesses, spectators, and all others who would be present at trial."
} | 4,194,922 | b |
Whether a debtor may reopen a closed bankruptcy ease when the prejudice to a creditor is cured has been handled on a case by case basis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 B.R. 402, 404",
"parenthetical": "debtor may reopen case as long as creditor is reimbursed for expenses incurred to enforce liens",
"sentence": "See In re Parker, 64 B.R. 402, 404 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1986) (debtor may reopen case as long as creditor is reimbursed for expenses incurred to enforce liens); Noble v. Yingling, 37 B.R. 647, 651 (D.C.Del. 1984) (same); but see In re Bianucci 4 F.3d at 528 (court refused to reopen case when case had been closed for two years and creditor had incurred expenses to revive its judgment) (citations omitted); Hawkins v. Landmark Fin. Co., 727 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.1984) (court refused to reopen case as eight months had elapsed since it was closed and creditor incurred court costs and attorney fees in commencing foreclosure)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "4 F.3d 528, 528",
"parenthetical": "court refused to reopen case when case had been closed for two years and creditor had incurred expenses to revive its judgment",
"sentence": "See In re Parker, 64 B.R. 402, 404 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1986) (debtor may reopen case as long as creditor is reimbursed for expenses incurred to enforce liens); Noble v. Yingling, 37 B.R. 647, 651 (D.C.Del. 1984) (same); but see In re Bianucci 4 F.3d at 528 (court refused to reopen case when case had been closed for two years and creditor had incurred expenses to revive its judgment) (citations omitted); Hawkins v. Landmark Fin. Co., 727 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.1984) (court refused to reopen case as eight months had elapsed since it was closed and creditor incurred court costs and attorney fees in commencing foreclosure)."
} | 6,103,748 | a |
Whether a debtor may reopen a closed bankruptcy ease when the prejudice to a creditor is cured has been handled on a case by case basis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 B.R. 402, 404",
"parenthetical": "debtor may reopen case as long as creditor is reimbursed for expenses incurred to enforce liens",
"sentence": "See In re Parker, 64 B.R. 402, 404 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1986) (debtor may reopen case as long as creditor is reimbursed for expenses incurred to enforce liens); Noble v. Yingling, 37 B.R. 647, 651 (D.C.Del. 1984) (same); but see In re Bianucci 4 F.3d at 528 (court refused to reopen case when case had been closed for two years and creditor had incurred expenses to revive its judgment) (citations omitted); Hawkins v. Landmark Fin. Co., 727 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.1984) (court refused to reopen case as eight months had elapsed since it was closed and creditor incurred court costs and attorney fees in commencing foreclosure)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court refused to reopen case as eight months had elapsed since it was closed and creditor incurred court costs and attorney fees in commencing foreclosure",
"sentence": "See In re Parker, 64 B.R. 402, 404 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1986) (debtor may reopen case as long as creditor is reimbursed for expenses incurred to enforce liens); Noble v. Yingling, 37 B.R. 647, 651 (D.C.Del. 1984) (same); but see In re Bianucci 4 F.3d at 528 (court refused to reopen case when case had been closed for two years and creditor had incurred expenses to revive its judgment) (citations omitted); Hawkins v. Landmark Fin. Co., 727 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.1984) (court refused to reopen case as eight months had elapsed since it was closed and creditor incurred court costs and attorney fees in commencing foreclosure)."
} | 6,103,748 | a |
P79 If, conversely, the direct liability claims against the cab company are dismissed and those claims are permitted to "collapse into" the claims against the driver, then it appeal's that the jury would effectively weigh only Ferrer's fault, on the one hand, and the driver's fault, on the other. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that in the context of imputed or vicarious liability, \"negligence of two or more tortfeasors is treated as a unit, so that so far as the comparative negligence doctrine is concerned it is the same as if only one defendant is involved\"",
"sentence": "See Watson v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 762 P.2d 133, 139-40 (Colo. 1988) (noting that the doctrine of vicarious liability stems from considerations other than the defendant’s individual fault and thus rejecting a rule of imputed comparative negligence); Kussman v. City & Cty. of Denver, 706 P.2d 776, 784 (Colo. 1985) (Neighbors, J., concurring) (“[T]he negligence of persons in an imputed negligence relationship' ought to be treated as a unit, whether they are plaintiffs or defendants, for purposes of comparative negligence.”); see also Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1074 n.13 (Okla. 1978) (noting that in the context of imputed or vicarious liability, “negligence of two or more tortfeasors is treated as a unit, so that so far as the comparative negligence doctrine is concerned it is the same as if only one defendant is involved”). In this scenario (i.e., .the direct liability claims against the cab company are dismissed and those claims are permitted to “collapse into” the claims against driver), if the jury finds the parties equally at fault, then it would apportion fifty percent fault to Ferrer and fifty percent fault to the driver, which would prevent Ferrer from recovering anything."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "762 P.2d 133, 139-40",
"parenthetical": "noting that the doctrine of vicarious liability stems from considerations other than the defendant's individual fault and thus rejecting a rule of imputed comparative negligence",
"sentence": "See Watson v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 762 P.2d 133, 139-40 (Colo. 1988) (noting that the doctrine of vicarious liability stems from considerations other than the defendant’s individual fault and thus rejecting a rule of imputed comparative negligence); Kussman v. City & Cty. of Denver, 706 P.2d 776, 784 (Colo. 1985) (Neighbors, J., concurring) (“[T]he negligence of persons in an imputed negligence relationship' ought to be treated as a unit, whether they are plaintiffs or defendants, for purposes of comparative negligence.”); see also Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1074 n.13 (Okla. 1978) (noting that in the context of imputed or vicarious liability, “negligence of two or more tortfeasors is treated as a unit, so that so far as the comparative negligence doctrine is concerned it is the same as if only one defendant is involved”). In this scenario (i.e., .the direct liability claims against the cab company are dismissed and those claims are permitted to “collapse into” the claims against driver), if the jury finds the parties equally at fault, then it would apportion fifty percent fault to Ferrer and fifty percent fault to the driver, which would prevent Ferrer from recovering anything."
} | 12,341,096 | b |
This does not mean, however, that the HCT Release has no force and effect if the Mitchells characterize an inherent risk of snowmobiling as a negligence claim. It will be for a jury to decide whether the collision occurred because of the inherent risks of snowmobiling or whether it was caused by negligence, including Ms. Mitchell's negligence, that could and should have been avoided. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.”); see also Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc., 162 Vt. 11, 641 A.2d 765, 771 (1994) (ruling that what constitutes an “obvious or necessary risk” of a sport covered by Vermont’s sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury); Nelson v. Snowridge, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 80, 83 (D.Vt.1993) (“The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ruling that what constitutes an \"obvious or necessary risk\" of a sport covered by Vermont's sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.”); see also Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc., 162 Vt. 11, 641 A.2d 765, 771 (1994) (ruling that what constitutes an “obvious or necessary risk” of a sport covered by Vermont’s sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury); Nelson v. Snowridge, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 80, 83 (D.Vt.1993) (“The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.”)."
} | 4,284,065 | a |
This does not mean, however, that the HCT Release has no force and effect if the Mitchells characterize an inherent risk of snowmobiling as a negligence claim. It will be for a jury to decide whether the collision occurred because of the inherent risks of snowmobiling or whether it was caused by negligence, including Ms. Mitchell's negligence, that could and should have been avoided. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "641 A.2d 765, 771",
"parenthetical": "ruling that what constitutes an \"obvious or necessary risk\" of a sport covered by Vermont's sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.”); see also Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc., 162 Vt. 11, 641 A.2d 765, 771 (1994) (ruling that what constitutes an “obvious or necessary risk” of a sport covered by Vermont’s sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury); Nelson v. Snowridge, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 80, 83 (D.Vt.1993) (“The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.”); see also Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc., 162 Vt. 11, 641 A.2d 765, 771 (1994) (ruling that what constitutes an “obvious or necessary risk” of a sport covered by Vermont’s sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury); Nelson v. Snowridge, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 80, 83 (D.Vt.1993) (“The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.”)."
} | 4,284,065 | b |
This does not mean, however, that the HCT Release has no force and effect if the Mitchells characterize an inherent risk of snowmobiling as a negligence claim. It will be for a jury to decide whether the collision occurred because of the inherent risks of snowmobiling or whether it was caused by negligence, including Ms. Mitchell's negligence, that could and should have been avoided. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.”); see also Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc., 162 Vt. 11, 641 A.2d 765, 771 (1994) (ruling that what constitutes an “obvious or necessary risk” of a sport covered by Vermont’s sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury); Nelson v. Snowridge, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 80, 83 (D.Vt.1993) (“The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "818 F.Supp. 80, 83",
"parenthetical": "\"The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.”); see also Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc., 162 Vt. 11, 641 A.2d 765, 771 (1994) (ruling that what constitutes an “obvious or necessary risk” of a sport covered by Vermont’s sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury); Nelson v. Snowridge, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 80, 83 (D.Vt.1993) (“The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.”)."
} | 4,284,065 | a |
This does not mean, however, that the HCT Release has no force and effect if the Mitchells characterize an inherent risk of snowmobiling as a negligence claim. It will be for a jury to decide whether the collision occurred because of the inherent risks of snowmobiling or whether it was caused by negligence, including Ms. Mitchell's negligence, that could and should have been avoided. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 A.2d 463, 467",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.”); see also Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc., 162 Vt. 11, 641 A.2d 765, 771 (1994) (ruling that what constitutes an “obvious or necessary risk” of a sport covered by Vermont’s sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury); Nelson v. Snowridge, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 80, 83 (D.Vt.1993) (“The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ruling that what constitutes an \"obvious or necessary risk\" of a sport covered by Vermont's sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.”); see also Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc., 162 Vt. 11, 641 A.2d 765, 771 (1994) (ruling that what constitutes an “obvious or necessary risk” of a sport covered by Vermont’s sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury); Nelson v. Snowridge, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 80, 83 (D.Vt.1993) (“The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.”)."
} | 4,284,065 | a |
This does not mean, however, that the HCT Release has no force and effect if the Mitchells characterize an inherent risk of snowmobiling as a negligence claim. It will be for a jury to decide whether the collision occurred because of the inherent risks of snowmobiling or whether it was caused by negligence, including Ms. Mitchell's negligence, that could and should have been avoided. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 A.2d 463, 467",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.”); see also Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc., 162 Vt. 11, 641 A.2d 765, 771 (1994) (ruling that what constitutes an “obvious or necessary risk” of a sport covered by Vermont’s sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury); Nelson v. Snowridge, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 80, 83 (D.Vt.1993) (“The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "641 A.2d 765, 771",
"parenthetical": "ruling that what constitutes an \"obvious or necessary risk\" of a sport covered by Vermont's sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.”); see also Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc., 162 Vt. 11, 641 A.2d 765, 771 (1994) (ruling that what constitutes an “obvious or necessary risk” of a sport covered by Vermont’s sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury); Nelson v. Snowridge, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 80, 83 (D.Vt.1993) (“The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.”)."
} | 4,284,065 | a |
This does not mean, however, that the HCT Release has no force and effect if the Mitchells characterize an inherent risk of snowmobiling as a negligence claim. It will be for a jury to decide whether the collision occurred because of the inherent risks of snowmobiling or whether it was caused by negligence, including Ms. Mitchell's negligence, that could and should have been avoided. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 A.2d 463, 467",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.”); see also Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc., 162 Vt. 11, 641 A.2d 765, 771 (1994) (ruling that what constitutes an “obvious or necessary risk” of a sport covered by Vermont’s sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury); Nelson v. Snowridge, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 80, 83 (D.Vt.1993) (“The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "818 F.Supp. 80, 83",
"parenthetical": "\"The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.”); see also Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc., 162 Vt. 11, 641 A.2d 765, 771 (1994) (ruling that what constitutes an “obvious or necessary risk” of a sport covered by Vermont’s sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury); Nelson v. Snowridge, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 80, 83 (D.Vt.1993) (“The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.”)."
} | 4,284,065 | a |
Contrary to appellant's assertions, there is no requirement that an affidavit in support of an arrest warrant supply the probable cause. That some of the information reflected in the affidavits may have been based on hearsay statements given to officers during their investigation does not render the affidavits invalid. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "287 Ga. 770, 773",
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that arrest warrant was illegal because supporting affidavit contained inaccurate and incomplete information where evidence did \"not suggest an intentional or reckless falsehood on the part of the affiant and was not necessary to a finding of probable cause\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 271 (80 SCt 725, 4 LE2d 697) (1960) (fact that affidavit submitted in support of search warrant relied on hearsay was not alone sufficient to render affidavit invalid), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U. S. 83 (100 SCt 2547, 65 LE2d 619) (1980); Strauss v. Stynchcombe, 224 Ga. 859, 864-865 (165 SE2d 302) (1968) (finding it well settled that probable cause to arrest may be established by hearsay evidence); see also Jones v. State, 287 Ga. 770, 773 (7) (700 SE2d 350) (2010) (rejecting claim that arrest warrant was illegal because supporting affidavit contained inaccurate and incomplete information where evidence did “not suggest an intentional or reckless falsehood on the part of the affiant and was not necessary to a finding of probable cause”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "224 Ga. 859, 864-865",
"parenthetical": "finding it well settled that probable cause to arrest may be established by hearsay evidence",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 271 (80 SCt 725, 4 LE2d 697) (1960) (fact that affidavit submitted in support of search warrant relied on hearsay was not alone sufficient to render affidavit invalid), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U. S. 83 (100 SCt 2547, 65 LE2d 619) (1980); Strauss v. Stynchcombe, 224 Ga. 859, 864-865 (165 SE2d 302) (1968) (finding it well settled that probable cause to arrest may be established by hearsay evidence); see also Jones v. State, 287 Ga. 770, 773 (7) (700 SE2d 350) (2010) (rejecting claim that arrest warrant was illegal because supporting affidavit contained inaccurate and incomplete information where evidence did “not suggest an intentional or reckless falsehood on the part of the affiant and was not necessary to a finding of probable cause”)."
} | 6,780,987 | b |
See McAllister, 29 F.3d at 118A-85 ("[W]hile interpreting federal statutes is a question of federal law, Congress can make the meaning of a statute dependent on state law."). The decisions in Dickerson and Bustamante still stand for the proposition that, absent legislative indication to the contrary, the meaning of "conviction" for purposes of a federal statutory scheme is to be determined under prevailing federal law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "998 F.2d 231, 236",
"parenthetical": "\"[Dickerson ] still stands for the general proposition that federal law governs the application of Congressional statutes in the absence of a plain language to the contrary.\"",
"sentence": "See Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir.1993) (“[Dickerson ] still stands for the general proposition that federal law governs the application of Congressional statutes in the absence of a plain language to the contrary.”); cf. McAllister, 29 F.3d at 1185 (treating Dickerson as still authoritative, outside context of gun laws, for principle that guilty plea plus probation equals conviction under federal law)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "29 F.3d 1185, 1185",
"parenthetical": "treating Dickerson as still authoritative, outside context of gun laws, for principle that guilty plea plus probation equals conviction under federal law",
"sentence": "See Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir.1993) (“[Dickerson ] still stands for the general proposition that federal law governs the application of Congressional statutes in the absence of a plain language to the contrary.”); cf. McAllister, 29 F.3d at 1185 (treating Dickerson as still authoritative, outside context of gun laws, for principle that guilty plea plus probation equals conviction under federal law)."
} | 748 | a |
Therefore, Harris contends, the case must be remanded for the district court to make this Rule 403 determination. We disagree. Under the circumstances, the interest in judicial economy, combined with the fact that this is not a close question, lead us to conduct the Rule 403 balancing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "612 F.2d 73, 80",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have viewed the evidence ... with our own eyes, and can judge the likely prejudice resulting from it as well as the trial judge.\"",
"sentence": "See US v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir.1979) (“[W]e have viewed the evidence ... with our own eyes, and can judge the likely prejudice resulting from it as well as the trial judge.”); cf. US v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 748 n. 15 (3d Cir.1996) (“[W]e must make this determination in the first instance as the district court record is devoid of any references to a Rule 403 analysis.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e must make this determination in the first instance as the district court record is devoid of any references to a Rule 403 analysis.\"",
"sentence": "See US v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir.1979) (“[W]e have viewed the evidence ... with our own eyes, and can judge the likely prejudice resulting from it as well as the trial judge.”); cf. US v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 748 n. 15 (3d Cir.1996) (“[W]e must make this determination in the first instance as the district court record is devoid of any references to a Rule 403 analysis.”)."
} | 5,238,416 | a |
Concerns as to whether a proposed plan is abusive of the bankruptcy process can be addressed through the good faith requirement of SS 1129(a)(3). Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process (hereafter "Adjusting Chapter 11 ") 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 551, 562-63 (Fall, 1995); Markell, Clueless, 11 Bankr.Dev. J. 38; Rusch, Gerrymandering, 63 U. Colo. L.Rev. at 204. Furthermore, before a plan can be crammed down, the proponent must demonstrate that the plan does not unfairly discriminate against and is fair and equita ble to any class that rejects it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "485 U.S. 197, 206",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code\"",
"sentence": "See ZRM-Oklahoma, 156 B.R. at 71 (observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III and its progeny are adequately addressed through other provisions of the Code such as §§ 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(7) & 1129(b)); see also Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11, 69 Am.Bankr.L.J. at 562; Markel, Clueless, 11 Bankr.Dev. J. at 43; Rusch, Gerrymandering, 63 U. Colo. L.Rev. at 200-01. Furthermore, we must presume that Congress carefully crafted the provisions of § 1129 with an eye toward ensuring that the reorganization process does not impose inequitable results upon the parties in involved. Cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) (stating that “whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confínes of the Bankruptcy Code”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "156 B.R. 71, 71",
"parenthetical": "observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III and its progeny are adequately addressed through other provisions of the Code such as SSSS 1129(a",
"sentence": "See ZRM-Oklahoma, 156 B.R. at 71 (observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III and its progeny are adequately addressed through other provisions of the Code such as §§ 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(7) & 1129(b)); see also Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11, 69 Am.Bankr.L.J. at 562; Markel, Clueless, 11 Bankr.Dev. J. at 43; Rusch, Gerrymandering, 63 U. Colo. L.Rev. at 200-01. Furthermore, we must presume that Congress carefully crafted the provisions of § 1129 with an eye toward ensuring that the reorganization process does not impose inequitable results upon the parties in involved. Cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) (stating that “whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confínes of the Bankruptcy Code”)."
} | 11,490,566 | b |
Concerns as to whether a proposed plan is abusive of the bankruptcy process can be addressed through the good faith requirement of SS 1129(a)(3). Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process (hereafter "Adjusting Chapter 11 ") 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 551, 562-63 (Fall, 1995); Markell, Clueless, 11 Bankr.Dev. J. 38; Rusch, Gerrymandering, 63 U. Colo. L.Rev. at 204. Furthermore, before a plan can be crammed down, the proponent must demonstrate that the plan does not unfairly discriminate against and is fair and equita ble to any class that rejects it. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "156 B.R. 71, 71",
"parenthetical": "observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III and its progeny are adequately addressed through other provisions of the Code such as SSSS 1129(a",
"sentence": "See ZRM-Oklahoma, 156 B.R. at 71 (observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III and its progeny are adequately addressed through other provisions of the Code such as §§ 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(7) & 1129(b)); see also Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11, 69 Am.Bankr.L.J. at 562; Markel, Clueless, 11 Bankr.Dev. J. at 43; Rusch, Gerrymandering, 63 U. Colo. L.Rev. at 200-01. Furthermore, we must presume that Congress carefully crafted the provisions of § 1129 with an eye toward ensuring that the reorganization process does not impose inequitable results upon the parties in involved. Cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) (stating that “whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confínes of the Bankruptcy Code”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code\"",
"sentence": "See ZRM-Oklahoma, 156 B.R. at 71 (observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III and its progeny are adequately addressed through other provisions of the Code such as §§ 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(7) & 1129(b)); see also Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11, 69 Am.Bankr.L.J. at 562; Markel, Clueless, 11 Bankr.Dev. J. at 43; Rusch, Gerrymandering, 63 U. Colo. L.Rev. at 200-01. Furthermore, we must presume that Congress carefully crafted the provisions of § 1129 with an eye toward ensuring that the reorganization process does not impose inequitable results upon the parties in involved. Cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) (stating that “whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confínes of the Bankruptcy Code”)."
} | 11,490,566 | a |
Concerns as to whether a proposed plan is abusive of the bankruptcy process can be addressed through the good faith requirement of SS 1129(a)(3). Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process (hereafter "Adjusting Chapter 11 ") 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 551, 562-63 (Fall, 1995); Markell, Clueless, 11 Bankr.Dev. J. 38; Rusch, Gerrymandering, 63 U. Colo. L.Rev. at 204. Furthermore, before a plan can be crammed down, the proponent must demonstrate that the plan does not unfairly discriminate against and is fair and equita ble to any class that rejects it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code\"",
"sentence": "See ZRM-Oklahoma, 156 B.R. at 71 (observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III and its progeny are adequately addressed through other provisions of the Code such as §§ 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(7) & 1129(b)); see also Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11, 69 Am.Bankr.L.J. at 562; Markel, Clueless, 11 Bankr.Dev. J. at 43; Rusch, Gerrymandering, 63 U. Colo. L.Rev. at 200-01. Furthermore, we must presume that Congress carefully crafted the provisions of § 1129 with an eye toward ensuring that the reorganization process does not impose inequitable results upon the parties in involved. Cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) (stating that “whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confínes of the Bankruptcy Code”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "156 B.R. 71, 71",
"parenthetical": "observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III and its progeny are adequately addressed through other provisions of the Code such as SSSS 1129(a",
"sentence": "See ZRM-Oklahoma, 156 B.R. at 71 (observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III and its progeny are adequately addressed through other provisions of the Code such as §§ 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(7) & 1129(b)); see also Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11, 69 Am.Bankr.L.J. at 562; Markel, Clueless, 11 Bankr.Dev. J. at 43; Rusch, Gerrymandering, 63 U. Colo. L.Rev. at 200-01. Furthermore, we must presume that Congress carefully crafted the provisions of § 1129 with an eye toward ensuring that the reorganization process does not impose inequitable results upon the parties in involved. Cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) (stating that “whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confínes of the Bankruptcy Code”)."
} | 11,490,566 | b |
In the absence of any physical evidence to determine the medical effects of the accident on Mr. Parra, his list of illnesses is too long to attribute causation to the accident. To support her case for benefits, it is the plaintiffs burden to establish that the accident caused her husband's death, or at least was an external event that set in motion a series of events that resulted in his death. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "198 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1162",
"parenthetical": "defining \"accidental death\" as caused by some event or occurrence unforeseen and external to the deceased that is the proximate or sole cause of death",
"sentence": "See Ells, 20 Cal.2d at 304, 125 P.2d 457 (holding that the burden is on the plaintiff); see Brooks, 27 Cal.2d at 309-10, 163 P.2d 689 (finding a preexisting illness is no bar to recovery if it sets in motion a chain of events resulting in death); see also Khatchatrian v. Continental Casualty Co., 198 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1162 (C.D.Cal.2002) (defining “accidental death” as caused by some event or occurrence unforeseen and external to the deceased that is the proximate or sole cause of death). Plaintiff does not present the Court with enough evidence to satisfy her burden."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 Cal.2d 309, 309-10",
"parenthetical": "finding a preexisting illness is no bar to recovery if it sets in motion a chain of events resulting in death",
"sentence": "See Ells, 20 Cal.2d at 304, 125 P.2d 457 (holding that the burden is on the plaintiff); see Brooks, 27 Cal.2d at 309-10, 163 P.2d 689 (finding a preexisting illness is no bar to recovery if it sets in motion a chain of events resulting in death); see also Khatchatrian v. Continental Casualty Co., 198 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1162 (C.D.Cal.2002) (defining “accidental death” as caused by some event or occurrence unforeseen and external to the deceased that is the proximate or sole cause of death). Plaintiff does not present the Court with enough evidence to satisfy her burden."
} | 9,123,645 | b |
In the absence of any physical evidence to determine the medical effects of the accident on Mr. Parra, his list of illnesses is too long to attribute causation to the accident. To support her case for benefits, it is the plaintiffs burden to establish that the accident caused her husband's death, or at least was an external event that set in motion a series of events that resulted in his death. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding a preexisting illness is no bar to recovery if it sets in motion a chain of events resulting in death",
"sentence": "See Ells, 20 Cal.2d at 304, 125 P.2d 457 (holding that the burden is on the plaintiff); see Brooks, 27 Cal.2d at 309-10, 163 P.2d 689 (finding a preexisting illness is no bar to recovery if it sets in motion a chain of events resulting in death); see also Khatchatrian v. Continental Casualty Co., 198 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1162 (C.D.Cal.2002) (defining “accidental death” as caused by some event or occurrence unforeseen and external to the deceased that is the proximate or sole cause of death). Plaintiff does not present the Court with enough evidence to satisfy her burden."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "198 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1162",
"parenthetical": "defining \"accidental death\" as caused by some event or occurrence unforeseen and external to the deceased that is the proximate or sole cause of death",
"sentence": "See Ells, 20 Cal.2d at 304, 125 P.2d 457 (holding that the burden is on the plaintiff); see Brooks, 27 Cal.2d at 309-10, 163 P.2d 689 (finding a preexisting illness is no bar to recovery if it sets in motion a chain of events resulting in death); see also Khatchatrian v. Continental Casualty Co., 198 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1162 (C.D.Cal.2002) (defining “accidental death” as caused by some event or occurrence unforeseen and external to the deceased that is the proximate or sole cause of death). Plaintiff does not present the Court with enough evidence to satisfy her burden."
} | 9,123,645 | a |
Once we conclude (as we must here) that the employer's asserted reason for the decision involves legislative activity protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, I believe (unlike the majority opinion) that the case must come to an end. I do not see how a plaintiff employee such as Howard can attempt to prove either that she in fact adequately performed her legislative activities or that her performance of legislative activities was not the actual reason for the employment action without forcing the employer to produce evidence that she did not adequately perform her legislative activities and that her poor performance of legislative activities was the actual reason for the employment action. But the Speech or Debate Clause protects the defendant from being forced to produce such evidence of legislative activities. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "971 F.2d 1531, 1546",
"parenthetical": "permissive inference violated Speech or Debate Clause where it \"virtually compelled] Swindall to justify his legislative actions\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1303 (D.C.Cir.1995) (distinguishing voluntary production of protected evidence from production that “is necessary”); see also United States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1546 (11th Cir.1992) (permissive inference violated Speech or Debate Clause where it “virtually compelled] Swindall to justify his legislative actions”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "59 F.3d 1291, 1303",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing voluntary production of protected evidence from production that \"is necessary\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1303 (D.C.Cir.1995) (distinguishing voluntary production of protected evidence from production that “is necessary”); see also United States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1546 (11th Cir.1992) (permissive inference violated Speech or Debate Clause where it “virtually compelled] Swindall to justify his legislative actions”)."
} | 3,664,820 | b |
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the Commission could not prove its case as pleaded. As the Supreme Court explained in Christiansburg, a prevailing defendant in a Title VII action may be awarded attorney fees if the plaintiffs claim was "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or ... the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." A party alleging a disparate-impact theory must allege a specific employment practice in the complaint. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "189 Fed.Appx. 106, 111",
"parenthetical": "requiring in an ADEA case that the plaintiffs plead a specific employment practice to be challenged when alleging a disparate-impact claim",
"sentence": "See Johnson, 30 F.3d at 48; see also Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 642 (3d Cir.1993) (requiring plaintiff to plead specific employment practice in complaint); Kulkarni v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 01 CIV. 10628(DLC), 2002 WL 1315596, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2002) (“Swierkiewicz does not, however, relieve plaintiff of the obligation to identify in his pleadings a specific employment practice that is the cause of the disparate impact.”); cf. Seasonwein v. First Montauk Sec. Corp., 189 Fed.Appx. 106, 111 (3d Cir.2006) (requiring in an ADEA case that the plaintiffs plead a specific employment practice to be challenged when alleging a disparate-impact claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2002 WL 1315596, at *2",
"parenthetical": "\"Swierkiewicz does not, however, relieve plaintiff of the obligation to identify in his pleadings a specific employment practice that is the cause of the disparate impact.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, 30 F.3d at 48; see also Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 642 (3d Cir.1993) (requiring plaintiff to plead specific employment practice in complaint); Kulkarni v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 01 CIV. 10628(DLC), 2002 WL 1315596, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2002) (“Swierkiewicz does not, however, relieve plaintiff of the obligation to identify in his pleadings a specific employment practice that is the cause of the disparate impact.”); cf. Seasonwein v. First Montauk Sec. Corp., 189 Fed.Appx. 106, 111 (3d Cir.2006) (requiring in an ADEA case that the plaintiffs plead a specific employment practice to be challenged when alleging a disparate-impact claim)."
} | 3,710,562 | b |
. Plaintiff's argument regarding an alleged waiver of defendants' right to bring this motion is unavailing. Essentially, plaintiff urges this Court to consider defense counsel's representation to the Court during a pre-trial conference, that he would not bring this motion as a stumbling block to his right to bring the motion at all. Clearly, this Court cannot prevent a party from making a motion that it is entitled to bring under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "204 F.3d 393, 397",
"parenthetical": "\"Although we have recognized that it is within the judge's discretion to hold a pre-motion conference for the purpose of persuading a party not to file a perceived meritless motion, we have made it clear that the judge may not require that the court's permission be secured at such a conference before a party may file the motion.\"",
"sentence": "See Eisemann v. Greene, 204 F.3d 393, 397 (2d Cir.2000) (\"Although we have recognized that it is within the judge's discretion to hold a pre-motion conference for the purpose of persuading a party not to file a perceived meritless motion, we have made it clear that the judge may not require that the court’s permission be secured at such a conference before a party may file the motion.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647, 652 (2d Cir.1987) (“Absent extraordinary circumstances, ... a court has no power to prevent a party from filing pleadings, motions or appeals authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "825 F.2d 647, 652",
"parenthetical": "\"Absent extraordinary circumstances, ... a court has no power to prevent a party from filing pleadings, motions or appeals authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\"",
"sentence": "See Eisemann v. Greene, 204 F.3d 393, 397 (2d Cir.2000) (\"Although we have recognized that it is within the judge's discretion to hold a pre-motion conference for the purpose of persuading a party not to file a perceived meritless motion, we have made it clear that the judge may not require that the court’s permission be secured at such a conference before a party may file the motion.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647, 652 (2d Cir.1987) (“Absent extraordinary circumstances, ... a court has no power to prevent a party from filing pleadings, motions or appeals authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”)."
} | 9,432,789 | a |
Plaintiff argues that the core function of the IRGC is commercial, and therefore it is merely an agency or instrumentality of the state and is subject to punitive damages. In previous actions, this Court has repeatedly declined to award punitive damages against the IRGC finding that, under Roeder, the IRGC is governmental rather than a commercial entity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "466 F.Supp.2d 270, 270-71",
"parenthetical": "concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial",
"sentence": "See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); Blais, 459 F.Supp.2d at 60-61 (same); Prevatt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 421 F.Supp.2d 152, 162 (D.D.C.2006) (Lam-berth, J.) (finding no evidence that the IRGC’s functions are commercial rather than governmental); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F.Supp.2d 1, 32-33 (D.D.C.2005) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (declining to award punitive damages but acknowledging that the IRGC “appears to be a true ‘instrumentality’ of the dominant party of the state, used by the government and its officials in largely ‘illegal,’ paramilitary, and sub rosa activities”); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F.Supp.2d 105, 116 (D.D.C.2005) (Bates, J.) (recognizing that “the IRGC does not easily fit into Roeder’s dichotomy” but determining that the IRGC is more like an “armed force” than a commercial agency or instrumentality of the state); Welch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. A. No. 01-863, 2004 WL 2216534, *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004) (Kay, Mag. J.) (finding that the IRGC’s core functions were analogous to those of MOIS); but see Bayani v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46 (D.D.C.2007) (Kennedy, J.) (awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46",
"parenthetical": "awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million",
"sentence": "See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); Blais, 459 F.Supp.2d at 60-61 (same); Prevatt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 421 F.Supp.2d 152, 162 (D.D.C.2006) (Lam-berth, J.) (finding no evidence that the IRGC’s functions are commercial rather than governmental); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F.Supp.2d 1, 32-33 (D.D.C.2005) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (declining to award punitive damages but acknowledging that the IRGC “appears to be a true ‘instrumentality’ of the dominant party of the state, used by the government and its officials in largely ‘illegal,’ paramilitary, and sub rosa activities”); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F.Supp.2d 105, 116 (D.D.C.2005) (Bates, J.) (recognizing that “the IRGC does not easily fit into Roeder’s dichotomy” but determining that the IRGC is more like an “armed force” than a commercial agency or instrumentality of the state); Welch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. A. No. 01-863, 2004 WL 2216534, *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004) (Kay, Mag. J.) (finding that the IRGC’s core functions were analogous to those of MOIS); but see Bayani v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46 (D.D.C.2007) (Kennedy, J.) (awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million)."
} | 3,834,803 | a |
Plaintiff argues that the core function of the IRGC is commercial, and therefore it is merely an agency or instrumentality of the state and is subject to punitive damages. In previous actions, this Court has repeatedly declined to award punitive damages against the IRGC finding that, under Roeder, the IRGC is governmental rather than a commercial entity. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46",
"parenthetical": "awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million",
"sentence": "See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); Blais, 459 F.Supp.2d at 60-61 (same); Prevatt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 421 F.Supp.2d 152, 162 (D.D.C.2006) (Lam-berth, J.) (finding no evidence that the IRGC’s functions are commercial rather than governmental); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F.Supp.2d 1, 32-33 (D.D.C.2005) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (declining to award punitive damages but acknowledging that the IRGC “appears to be a true ‘instrumentality’ of the dominant party of the state, used by the government and its officials in largely ‘illegal,’ paramilitary, and sub rosa activities”); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F.Supp.2d 105, 116 (D.D.C.2005) (Bates, J.) (recognizing that “the IRGC does not easily fit into Roeder’s dichotomy” but determining that the IRGC is more like an “armed force” than a commercial agency or instrumentality of the state); Welch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. A. No. 01-863, 2004 WL 2216534, *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004) (Kay, Mag. J.) (finding that the IRGC’s core functions were analogous to those of MOIS); but see Bayani v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46 (D.D.C.2007) (Kennedy, J.) (awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "421 F.Supp.2d 152, 162",
"parenthetical": "finding no evidence that the IRGC's functions are commercial rather than governmental",
"sentence": "See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); Blais, 459 F.Supp.2d at 60-61 (same); Prevatt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 421 F.Supp.2d 152, 162 (D.D.C.2006) (Lam-berth, J.) (finding no evidence that the IRGC’s functions are commercial rather than governmental); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F.Supp.2d 1, 32-33 (D.D.C.2005) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (declining to award punitive damages but acknowledging that the IRGC “appears to be a true ‘instrumentality’ of the dominant party of the state, used by the government and its officials in largely ‘illegal,’ paramilitary, and sub rosa activities”); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F.Supp.2d 105, 116 (D.D.C.2005) (Bates, J.) (recognizing that “the IRGC does not easily fit into Roeder’s dichotomy” but determining that the IRGC is more like an “armed force” than a commercial agency or instrumentality of the state); Welch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. A. No. 01-863, 2004 WL 2216534, *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004) (Kay, Mag. J.) (finding that the IRGC’s core functions were analogous to those of MOIS); but see Bayani v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46 (D.D.C.2007) (Kennedy, J.) (awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million)."
} | 3,834,803 | b |
Plaintiff argues that the core function of the IRGC is commercial, and therefore it is merely an agency or instrumentality of the state and is subject to punitive damages. In previous actions, this Court has repeatedly declined to award punitive damages against the IRGC finding that, under Roeder, the IRGC is governmental rather than a commercial entity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "496 F.Supp.2d 1, 32-33",
"parenthetical": "declining to award punitive damages but acknowledging that the IRGC \"appears to be a true 'instrumentality' of the dominant party of the state, used by the government and its officials in largely 'illegal,' paramilitary, and sub rosa activities\"",
"sentence": "See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); Blais, 459 F.Supp.2d at 60-61 (same); Prevatt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 421 F.Supp.2d 152, 162 (D.D.C.2006) (Lam-berth, J.) (finding no evidence that the IRGC’s functions are commercial rather than governmental); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F.Supp.2d 1, 32-33 (D.D.C.2005) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (declining to award punitive damages but acknowledging that the IRGC “appears to be a true ‘instrumentality’ of the dominant party of the state, used by the government and its officials in largely ‘illegal,’ paramilitary, and sub rosa activities”); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F.Supp.2d 105, 116 (D.D.C.2005) (Bates, J.) (recognizing that “the IRGC does not easily fit into Roeder’s dichotomy” but determining that the IRGC is more like an “armed force” than a commercial agency or instrumentality of the state); Welch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. A. No. 01-863, 2004 WL 2216534, *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004) (Kay, Mag. J.) (finding that the IRGC’s core functions were analogous to those of MOIS); but see Bayani v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46 (D.D.C.2007) (Kennedy, J.) (awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46",
"parenthetical": "awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million",
"sentence": "See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); Blais, 459 F.Supp.2d at 60-61 (same); Prevatt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 421 F.Supp.2d 152, 162 (D.D.C.2006) (Lam-berth, J.) (finding no evidence that the IRGC’s functions are commercial rather than governmental); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F.Supp.2d 1, 32-33 (D.D.C.2005) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (declining to award punitive damages but acknowledging that the IRGC “appears to be a true ‘instrumentality’ of the dominant party of the state, used by the government and its officials in largely ‘illegal,’ paramilitary, and sub rosa activities”); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F.Supp.2d 105, 116 (D.D.C.2005) (Bates, J.) (recognizing that “the IRGC does not easily fit into Roeder’s dichotomy” but determining that the IRGC is more like an “armed force” than a commercial agency or instrumentality of the state); Welch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. A. No. 01-863, 2004 WL 2216534, *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004) (Kay, Mag. J.) (finding that the IRGC’s core functions were analogous to those of MOIS); but see Bayani v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46 (D.D.C.2007) (Kennedy, J.) (awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million)."
} | 3,834,803 | a |
Plaintiff argues that the core function of the IRGC is commercial, and therefore it is merely an agency or instrumentality of the state and is subject to punitive damages. In previous actions, this Court has repeatedly declined to award punitive damages against the IRGC finding that, under Roeder, the IRGC is governmental rather than a commercial entity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "370 F.Supp.2d 105, 116",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"the IRGC does not easily fit into Roeder's dichotomy\" but determining that the IRGC is more like an \"armed force\" than a commercial agency or instrumentality of the state",
"sentence": "See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); Blais, 459 F.Supp.2d at 60-61 (same); Prevatt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 421 F.Supp.2d 152, 162 (D.D.C.2006) (Lam-berth, J.) (finding no evidence that the IRGC’s functions are commercial rather than governmental); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F.Supp.2d 1, 32-33 (D.D.C.2005) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (declining to award punitive damages but acknowledging that the IRGC “appears to be a true ‘instrumentality’ of the dominant party of the state, used by the government and its officials in largely ‘illegal,’ paramilitary, and sub rosa activities”); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F.Supp.2d 105, 116 (D.D.C.2005) (Bates, J.) (recognizing that “the IRGC does not easily fit into Roeder’s dichotomy” but determining that the IRGC is more like an “armed force” than a commercial agency or instrumentality of the state); Welch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. A. No. 01-863, 2004 WL 2216534, *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004) (Kay, Mag. J.) (finding that the IRGC’s core functions were analogous to those of MOIS); but see Bayani v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46 (D.D.C.2007) (Kennedy, J.) (awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46",
"parenthetical": "awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million",
"sentence": "See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); Blais, 459 F.Supp.2d at 60-61 (same); Prevatt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 421 F.Supp.2d 152, 162 (D.D.C.2006) (Lam-berth, J.) (finding no evidence that the IRGC’s functions are commercial rather than governmental); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F.Supp.2d 1, 32-33 (D.D.C.2005) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (declining to award punitive damages but acknowledging that the IRGC “appears to be a true ‘instrumentality’ of the dominant party of the state, used by the government and its officials in largely ‘illegal,’ paramilitary, and sub rosa activities”); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F.Supp.2d 105, 116 (D.D.C.2005) (Bates, J.) (recognizing that “the IRGC does not easily fit into Roeder’s dichotomy” but determining that the IRGC is more like an “armed force” than a commercial agency or instrumentality of the state); Welch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. A. No. 01-863, 2004 WL 2216534, *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004) (Kay, Mag. J.) (finding that the IRGC’s core functions were analogous to those of MOIS); but see Bayani v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46 (D.D.C.2007) (Kennedy, J.) (awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million)."
} | 3,834,803 | a |
The two defense experts essentially testified that the most logical theory was that Mansur stood as he was shot, with his right arm out of the way, as if he were reaching for something, but they agreed this was not the only theory that could explain the forensic evidence. Dr. MacDonell would have agreed that the defense theory was the most, maybe only, logical outcome, but that one "can't be a certain of a theory like that," because "anything is possible," The difference between Dr. MacDonell's opinion and the other experts' opinions was negligible. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "427 U.S. 97, 114",
"parenthetical": "noting that the alleged Brady material did not contradict any evidence already admitted and was similar to other evidence in the record in holding that there was no Brady violation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gonzalez, 62 M.J. 303, 307 (C.A.A.F.2006) (noting that the overlapping nature of the evidence undercuts an argument that the failure to disclose pursuant to Brady was prejudicial); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 114, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (noting that the alleged Brady material did not contradict any evidence already admitted and was similar to other evidence in the record in holding that there was no Brady violation)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "62 M.J. 303, 307",
"parenthetical": "noting that the overlapping nature of the evidence undercuts an argument that the failure to disclose pursuant to Brady was prejudicial",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gonzalez, 62 M.J. 303, 307 (C.A.A.F.2006) (noting that the overlapping nature of the evidence undercuts an argument that the failure to disclose pursuant to Brady was prejudicial); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 114, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (noting that the alleged Brady material did not contradict any evidence already admitted and was similar to other evidence in the record in holding that there was no Brady violation)."
} | 3,982,978 | b |
The two defense experts essentially testified that the most logical theory was that Mansur stood as he was shot, with his right arm out of the way, as if he were reaching for something, but they agreed this was not the only theory that could explain the forensic evidence. Dr. MacDonell would have agreed that the defense theory was the most, maybe only, logical outcome, but that one "can't be a certain of a theory like that," because "anything is possible," The difference between Dr. MacDonell's opinion and the other experts' opinions was negligible. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the alleged Brady material did not contradict any evidence already admitted and was similar to other evidence in the record in holding that there was no Brady violation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gonzalez, 62 M.J. 303, 307 (C.A.A.F.2006) (noting that the overlapping nature of the evidence undercuts an argument that the failure to disclose pursuant to Brady was prejudicial); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 114, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (noting that the alleged Brady material did not contradict any evidence already admitted and was similar to other evidence in the record in holding that there was no Brady violation)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "62 M.J. 303, 307",
"parenthetical": "noting that the overlapping nature of the evidence undercuts an argument that the failure to disclose pursuant to Brady was prejudicial",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gonzalez, 62 M.J. 303, 307 (C.A.A.F.2006) (noting that the overlapping nature of the evidence undercuts an argument that the failure to disclose pursuant to Brady was prejudicial); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 114, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (noting that the alleged Brady material did not contradict any evidence already admitted and was similar to other evidence in the record in holding that there was no Brady violation)."
} | 3,982,978 | b |
The two defense experts essentially testified that the most logical theory was that Mansur stood as he was shot, with his right arm out of the way, as if he were reaching for something, but they agreed this was not the only theory that could explain the forensic evidence. Dr. MacDonell would have agreed that the defense theory was the most, maybe only, logical outcome, but that one "can't be a certain of a theory like that," because "anything is possible," The difference between Dr. MacDonell's opinion and the other experts' opinions was negligible. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the alleged Brady material did not contradict any evidence already admitted and was similar to other evidence in the record in holding that there was no Brady violation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gonzalez, 62 M.J. 303, 307 (C.A.A.F.2006) (noting that the overlapping nature of the evidence undercuts an argument that the failure to disclose pursuant to Brady was prejudicial); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 114, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (noting that the alleged Brady material did not contradict any evidence already admitted and was similar to other evidence in the record in holding that there was no Brady violation)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "62 M.J. 303, 307",
"parenthetical": "noting that the overlapping nature of the evidence undercuts an argument that the failure to disclose pursuant to Brady was prejudicial",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gonzalez, 62 M.J. 303, 307 (C.A.A.F.2006) (noting that the overlapping nature of the evidence undercuts an argument that the failure to disclose pursuant to Brady was prejudicial); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 114, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (noting that the alleged Brady material did not contradict any evidence already admitted and was similar to other evidence in the record in holding that there was no Brady violation)."
} | 3,982,978 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment because the complaint, filed more than eleven years after St. Amand's claims accrued, was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations, and St. Amand failed to establish circumstances warranting equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "292 F.3d 1063, 1066",
"parenthetical": "equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases and is appropriate only if there are extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiffs control making it impossible to timely file",
"sentence": "See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.2004) (for § 1983 actions, “courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding tolling”); Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 n. 2 (9th Cir.2002) (California personal injury statute of limitations is applicable to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims); Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340(c) (2000) (personal injury claims subject to one-year statute of limitations); cf. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir.2002) (equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases and is appropriate only if there are extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiffs control making it impossible to timely file)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "393 F.3d 918, 927",
"parenthetical": "for SS 1983 actions, \"courts apply the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state's law regarding tolling\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.2004) (for § 1983 actions, “courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding tolling”); Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 n. 2 (9th Cir.2002) (California personal injury statute of limitations is applicable to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims); Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340(c) (2000) (personal injury claims subject to one-year statute of limitations); cf. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir.2002) (equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases and is appropriate only if there are extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiffs control making it impossible to timely file)."
} | 3,942,130 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment because the complaint, filed more than eleven years after St. Amand's claims accrued, was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations, and St. Amand failed to establish circumstances warranting equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "California personal injury statute of limitations is applicable to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims",
"sentence": "See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.2004) (for § 1983 actions, “courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding tolling”); Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 n. 2 (9th Cir.2002) (California personal injury statute of limitations is applicable to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims); Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340(c) (2000) (personal injury claims subject to one-year statute of limitations); cf. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir.2002) (equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases and is appropriate only if there are extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiffs control making it impossible to timely file)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "292 F.3d 1063, 1066",
"parenthetical": "equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases and is appropriate only if there are extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiffs control making it impossible to timely file",
"sentence": "See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.2004) (for § 1983 actions, “courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding tolling”); Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 n. 2 (9th Cir.2002) (California personal injury statute of limitations is applicable to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims); Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340(c) (2000) (personal injury claims subject to one-year statute of limitations); cf. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir.2002) (equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases and is appropriate only if there are extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiffs control making it impossible to timely file)."
} | 3,942,130 | a |
All three individuals timely filed their own administrative charges, and in this lawsuit are pressing claims brought in those charges. It follows that Dancy, Shumaker, and Russell may not rely on McQueen's charge or any of its claims, including the disparate impact claim, in an effort to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "440 F.3d 564, 564-65",
"parenthetical": "\"allowing an individual who has previously filed a charge to abandon that charge and piggyback onto the charge of another individual would too often frustrate the EEOC's statutorily-mandated efforts to resolve an individual charge through informal conciliation\"",
"sentence": "See Holowecki, 440 F.3d at 564-65 (“allowing an individual who has previously filed a charge to abandon that charge and piggyback onto the charge of another individual would too often frustrate the EEOC’s statutorily-mandated efforts to resolve an individual charge through informal conciliation”); Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 F.3d 554, 558 (11th Cir.1997) (“such a plaintiff should be required to rely upon his or her own ... charge, and cannot reasonably rely upon [an]other claimant’s charge”); Anderson v. Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302, 309 (8th Cir.1995) (“once they file separate administrative charges, they cannot rely any further on the other claimant’s actions and must timely file suit after receiving their right-to-sue letters”); Flemming, 2004 WL 2314962, at *2 (single-filing rule “implies that a plaintiff who does receive a right-to-sue letter may not enjoy the benefit of piggy-backing”); see also Campbell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25 (D.D.C.2001) (“The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25",
"parenthetical": "\"The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.\"",
"sentence": "See Holowecki, 440 F.3d at 564-65 (“allowing an individual who has previously filed a charge to abandon that charge and piggyback onto the charge of another individual would too often frustrate the EEOC’s statutorily-mandated efforts to resolve an individual charge through informal conciliation”); Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 F.3d 554, 558 (11th Cir.1997) (“such a plaintiff should be required to rely upon his or her own ... charge, and cannot reasonably rely upon [an]other claimant’s charge”); Anderson v. Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302, 309 (8th Cir.1995) (“once they file separate administrative charges, they cannot rely any further on the other claimant’s actions and must timely file suit after receiving their right-to-sue letters”); Flemming, 2004 WL 2314962, at *2 (single-filing rule “implies that a plaintiff who does receive a right-to-sue letter may not enjoy the benefit of piggy-backing”); see also Campbell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25 (D.D.C.2001) (“The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.”)."
} | 4,162,707 | a |
All three individuals timely filed their own administrative charges, and in this lawsuit are pressing claims brought in those charges. It follows that Dancy, Shumaker, and Russell may not rely on McQueen's charge or any of its claims, including the disparate impact claim, in an effort to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25",
"parenthetical": "\"The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.\"",
"sentence": "See Holowecki, 440 F.3d at 564-65 (“allowing an individual who has previously filed a charge to abandon that charge and piggyback onto the charge of another individual would too often frustrate the EEOC’s statutorily-mandated efforts to resolve an individual charge through informal conciliation”); Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 F.3d 554, 558 (11th Cir.1997) (“such a plaintiff should be required to rely upon his or her own ... charge, and cannot reasonably rely upon [an]other claimant’s charge”); Anderson v. Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302, 309 (8th Cir.1995) (“once they file separate administrative charges, they cannot rely any further on the other claimant’s actions and must timely file suit after receiving their right-to-sue letters”); Flemming, 2004 WL 2314962, at *2 (single-filing rule “implies that a plaintiff who does receive a right-to-sue letter may not enjoy the benefit of piggy-backing”); see also Campbell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25 (D.D.C.2001) (“The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "129 F.3d 554, 558",
"parenthetical": "\"such a plaintiff should be required to rely upon his or her own ... charge, and cannot reasonably rely upon [an]other claimant's charge\"",
"sentence": "See Holowecki, 440 F.3d at 564-65 (“allowing an individual who has previously filed a charge to abandon that charge and piggyback onto the charge of another individual would too often frustrate the EEOC’s statutorily-mandated efforts to resolve an individual charge through informal conciliation”); Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 F.3d 554, 558 (11th Cir.1997) (“such a plaintiff should be required to rely upon his or her own ... charge, and cannot reasonably rely upon [an]other claimant’s charge”); Anderson v. Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302, 309 (8th Cir.1995) (“once they file separate administrative charges, they cannot rely any further on the other claimant’s actions and must timely file suit after receiving their right-to-sue letters”); Flemming, 2004 WL 2314962, at *2 (single-filing rule “implies that a plaintiff who does receive a right-to-sue letter may not enjoy the benefit of piggy-backing”); see also Campbell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25 (D.D.C.2001) (“The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.”)."
} | 4,162,707 | b |
All three individuals timely filed their own administrative charges, and in this lawsuit are pressing claims brought in those charges. It follows that Dancy, Shumaker, and Russell may not rely on McQueen's charge or any of its claims, including the disparate impact claim, in an effort to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "47 F.3d 302, 309",
"parenthetical": "\"once they file separate administrative charges, they cannot rely any further on the other claimant's actions and must timely file suit after receiving their right-to-sue letters\"",
"sentence": "See Holowecki, 440 F.3d at 564-65 (“allowing an individual who has previously filed a charge to abandon that charge and piggyback onto the charge of another individual would too often frustrate the EEOC’s statutorily-mandated efforts to resolve an individual charge through informal conciliation”); Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 F.3d 554, 558 (11th Cir.1997) (“such a plaintiff should be required to rely upon his or her own ... charge, and cannot reasonably rely upon [an]other claimant’s charge”); Anderson v. Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302, 309 (8th Cir.1995) (“once they file separate administrative charges, they cannot rely any further on the other claimant’s actions and must timely file suit after receiving their right-to-sue letters”); Flemming, 2004 WL 2314962, at *2 (single-filing rule “implies that a plaintiff who does receive a right-to-sue letter may not enjoy the benefit of piggy-backing”); see also Campbell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25 (D.D.C.2001) (“The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25",
"parenthetical": "\"The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.\"",
"sentence": "See Holowecki, 440 F.3d at 564-65 (“allowing an individual who has previously filed a charge to abandon that charge and piggyback onto the charge of another individual would too often frustrate the EEOC’s statutorily-mandated efforts to resolve an individual charge through informal conciliation”); Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 F.3d 554, 558 (11th Cir.1997) (“such a plaintiff should be required to rely upon his or her own ... charge, and cannot reasonably rely upon [an]other claimant’s charge”); Anderson v. Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302, 309 (8th Cir.1995) (“once they file separate administrative charges, they cannot rely any further on the other claimant’s actions and must timely file suit after receiving their right-to-sue letters”); Flemming, 2004 WL 2314962, at *2 (single-filing rule “implies that a plaintiff who does receive a right-to-sue letter may not enjoy the benefit of piggy-backing”); see also Campbell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25 (D.D.C.2001) (“The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.”)."
} | 4,162,707 | a |
All three individuals timely filed their own administrative charges, and in this lawsuit are pressing claims brought in those charges. It follows that Dancy, Shumaker, and Russell may not rely on McQueen's charge or any of its claims, including the disparate impact claim, in an effort to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25",
"parenthetical": "\"The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.\"",
"sentence": "See Holowecki, 440 F.3d at 564-65 (“allowing an individual who has previously filed a charge to abandon that charge and piggyback onto the charge of another individual would too often frustrate the EEOC’s statutorily-mandated efforts to resolve an individual charge through informal conciliation”); Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 F.3d 554, 558 (11th Cir.1997) (“such a plaintiff should be required to rely upon his or her own ... charge, and cannot reasonably rely upon [an]other claimant’s charge”); Anderson v. Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302, 309 (8th Cir.1995) (“once they file separate administrative charges, they cannot rely any further on the other claimant’s actions and must timely file suit after receiving their right-to-sue letters”); Flemming, 2004 WL 2314962, at *2 (single-filing rule “implies that a plaintiff who does receive a right-to-sue letter may not enjoy the benefit of piggy-backing”); see also Campbell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25 (D.D.C.2001) (“The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2004 WL 2314962, at *2",
"parenthetical": "single-filing rule \"implies that a plaintiff who does receive a right-to-sue letter may not enjoy the benefit of piggy-backing\"",
"sentence": "See Holowecki, 440 F.3d at 564-65 (“allowing an individual who has previously filed a charge to abandon that charge and piggyback onto the charge of another individual would too often frustrate the EEOC’s statutorily-mandated efforts to resolve an individual charge through informal conciliation”); Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 F.3d 554, 558 (11th Cir.1997) (“such a plaintiff should be required to rely upon his or her own ... charge, and cannot reasonably rely upon [an]other claimant’s charge”); Anderson v. Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302, 309 (8th Cir.1995) (“once they file separate administrative charges, they cannot rely any further on the other claimant’s actions and must timely file suit after receiving their right-to-sue letters”); Flemming, 2004 WL 2314962, at *2 (single-filing rule “implies that a plaintiff who does receive a right-to-sue letter may not enjoy the benefit of piggy-backing”); see also Campbell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25 (D.D.C.2001) (“The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.”)."
} | 4,162,707 | b |
For these reasons, the in camera evidence showed that the informant, as an eyewitness to the purchase, could potentially give testimony necessary to a fair determination of appellant's guilt or innocence, specifically, appellant's entrapment defense. See Tex.R. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "807 S.W.2d 318, 318-19",
"parenthetical": "holding trial court erred in not holding in camera hearing when defendant showed that he needed to know, for possible entrapment defense, whether informant was certain individual who had been in appellant's apartment on given day",
"sentence": "Evid. 508(c)(2); Anderson, 817 S.W.2d at 72 (holding defendant met initial burden under rule 508(c)(2) because showed informant was eyewitness to crime); cf. Bodin, 807 S.W.2d at 318-19 (holding trial court erred in not holding in camera hearing when defendant showed that he needed to know, for possible entrapment defense, whether informant was certain individual who had been in appellant’s apartment on given day)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "817 S.W.2d 72, 72",
"parenthetical": "holding defendant met initial burden under rule 508(c)(2) because showed informant was eyewitness to crime",
"sentence": "Evid. 508(c)(2); Anderson, 817 S.W.2d at 72 (holding defendant met initial burden under rule 508(c)(2) because showed informant was eyewitness to crime); cf. Bodin, 807 S.W.2d at 318-19 (holding trial court erred in not holding in camera hearing when defendant showed that he needed to know, for possible entrapment defense, whether informant was certain individual who had been in appellant’s apartment on given day)."
} | 9,355,570 | b |
This statement is plainly insufficient to show substantial prejudice. Defendant offered no specific explanation as to what his testimony would have been in the case involving J.G., nor did he explain why he could not give this testimony at a joint trial. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] particularized showing must be made concerning the testimony the defendant wishes to give and his reasons for remaining silent on the joined counts, so that the court can make an independent evaluation of whether the defendant will be prejudiced to an extent that outweighs the interest favoring joinder.\"",
"sentence": "See id. (basing conclusion on similar reasoning); Baker, 401 F.2d at 977 (“[N]o need for a severance exists until the defendant makes a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.”); see also United States v. Jamar, 561 F.2d 1103, 1108 n.9 (4th Cir. 1977) (“[A] particularized showing must be made concerning the testimony the defendant wishes to give and his reasons for remaining silent on the joined counts, so that the court can make an independent evaluation of whether the defendant will be prejudiced to an extent that outweighs the interest favoring joinder.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "401 F.2d 977, 977",
"parenthetical": "\"[N]o need for a severance exists until the defendant makes a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.\"",
"sentence": "See id. (basing conclusion on similar reasoning); Baker, 401 F.2d at 977 (“[N]o need for a severance exists until the defendant makes a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.”); see also United States v. Jamar, 561 F.2d 1103, 1108 n.9 (4th Cir. 1977) (“[A] particularized showing must be made concerning the testimony the defendant wishes to give and his reasons for remaining silent on the joined counts, so that the court can make an independent evaluation of whether the defendant will be prejudiced to an extent that outweighs the interest favoring joinder.”)."
} | 3,587,789 | b |
We doubt that Mills's sentence was imposed in a procedurally unreasonable manner. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The sentencing judge should set forth [reasoning] enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.\"",
"sentence": "See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (“The sentencing judge should set forth [reasoning] enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.”); see also United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir.2007) (stating that although “[n]on-frivolous arguments fór a non-Guidelines sentence” may require some discussion, “we do not insist that the district court address every argument the defendant has made or discuss every § 3553(a) factor individually”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "502 F.3d 204, 210",
"parenthetical": "stating that although \"[n]on-frivolous arguments for a non-Guidelines sentence\" may require some discussion, \"we do not insist that the district court address every argument the defendant has made or discuss every SS 3553(a",
"sentence": "See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (“The sentencing judge should set forth [reasoning] enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.”); see also United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir.2007) (stating that although “[n]on-frivolous arguments fór a non-Guidelines sentence” may require some discussion, “we do not insist that the district court address every argument the defendant has made or discuss every § 3553(a) factor individually”)."
} | 3,664,999 | a |
We doubt that Mills's sentence was imposed in a procedurally unreasonable manner. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "502 F.3d 204, 210",
"parenthetical": "stating that although \"[n]on-frivolous arguments for a non-Guidelines sentence\" may require some discussion, \"we do not insist that the district court address every argument the defendant has made or discuss every SS 3553(a",
"sentence": "See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (“The sentencing judge should set forth [reasoning] enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.”); see also United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir.2007) (stating that although “[n]on-frivolous arguments fór a non-Guidelines sentence” may require some discussion, “we do not insist that the district court address every argument the defendant has made or discuss every § 3553(a) factor individually”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468",
"parenthetical": "\"The sentencing judge should set forth [reasoning] enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.\"",
"sentence": "See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (“The sentencing judge should set forth [reasoning] enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.”); see also United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir.2007) (stating that although “[n]on-frivolous arguments fór a non-Guidelines sentence” may require some discussion, “we do not insist that the district court address every argument the defendant has made or discuss every § 3553(a) factor individually”)."
} | 3,664,999 | b |
We doubt that Mills's sentence was imposed in a procedurally unreasonable manner. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The sentencing judge should set forth [reasoning] enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.\"",
"sentence": "See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (“The sentencing judge should set forth [reasoning] enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.”); see also United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir.2007) (stating that although “[n]on-frivolous arguments fór a non-Guidelines sentence” may require some discussion, “we do not insist that the district court address every argument the defendant has made or discuss every § 3553(a) factor individually”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "502 F.3d 204, 210",
"parenthetical": "stating that although \"[n]on-frivolous arguments for a non-Guidelines sentence\" may require some discussion, \"we do not insist that the district court address every argument the defendant has made or discuss every SS 3553(a",
"sentence": "See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (“The sentencing judge should set forth [reasoning] enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.”); see also United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir.2007) (stating that although “[n]on-frivolous arguments fór a non-Guidelines sentence” may require some discussion, “we do not insist that the district court address every argument the defendant has made or discuss every § 3553(a) factor individually”)."
} | 3,664,999 | a |
. Although the Armstrong and Bass Courts focused on similarly situated as part of the discriminatory effect analysis, evidence of differential treatment is also probative of discriminatory intent. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "730 F.3d 1142, 1158",
"parenthetical": "indicating that, in a civil case where discrimination is alleged, preferential treatment of a similarly situated person can be evidence of discriminatory intent",
"sentence": "See United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 809 (11th Cir.2000) (\"recognizing] that the nature of the two prongs of a selective prosecution showing are such that they -will often overlap to some extent”); cf. Pac. Shores Props., LLC v. City of Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir.2013) (indicating that, in a civil case where discrimination is alleged, preferential treatment of a similarly situated person can be evidence of discriminatory intent)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "231 F.3d 800, 809",
"parenthetical": "\"recognizing] that the nature of the two prongs of a selective prosecution showing are such that they -will often overlap to some extent\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 809 (11th Cir.2000) (\"recognizing] that the nature of the two prongs of a selective prosecution showing are such that they -will often overlap to some extent”); cf. Pac. Shores Props., LLC v. City of Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir.2013) (indicating that, in a civil case where discrimination is alleged, preferential treatment of a similarly situated person can be evidence of discriminatory intent)."
} | 12,135,345 | b |
A statement in the WPEA's legislative history suggests that at least' some of its provisions could apply retroactively to cover appeals pending on or after the Act's effective date. That statement, however, is insufficient, standing alone, to override the unequivocal statutory language and demonstrate a "clear intent" that the WPEA apply retroactively to provide the board with jurisdiction over agency removal actions occurring long before its enactment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "375 F.3d 1106, 1110",
"parenthetical": "\"The language of the statute at issue in- this case is clear and unambiguous, and absent extraordinary circumstances our inquiry must end here.\"",
"sentence": "Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272-73, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (“Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfair ness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.”); see also Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“If the statute is unambiguous, our inquiry is at an end; we must enforce the congressional intent embodied in that plain wording.”); Norfolk Dredging Co., Inc. v. United States, 375 F.3d 1106, 1110 (Fed. Cir.2004) (“The language of the statute at issue in- this case is clear and unambiguous, and absent extraordinary circumstances our inquiry must end here.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "511 U.S. 272, 272-73",
"parenthetical": "\"Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfair ness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.\"",
"sentence": "Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272-73, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (“Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfair ness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.”); see also Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“If the statute is unambiguous, our inquiry is at an end; we must enforce the congressional intent embodied in that plain wording.”); Norfolk Dredging Co., Inc. v. United States, 375 F.3d 1106, 1110 (Fed. Cir.2004) (“The language of the statute at issue in- this case is clear and unambiguous, and absent extraordinary circumstances our inquiry must end here.”)."
} | 4,254,509 | b |
A statement in the WPEA's legislative history suggests that at least' some of its provisions could apply retroactively to cover appeals pending on or after the Act's effective date. That statement, however, is insufficient, standing alone, to override the unequivocal statutory language and demonstrate a "clear intent" that the WPEA apply retroactively to provide the board with jurisdiction over agency removal actions occurring long before its enactment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfair ness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.\"",
"sentence": "Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272-73, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (“Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfair ness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.”); see also Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“If the statute is unambiguous, our inquiry is at an end; we must enforce the congressional intent embodied in that plain wording.”); Norfolk Dredging Co., Inc. v. United States, 375 F.3d 1106, 1110 (Fed. Cir.2004) (“The language of the statute at issue in- this case is clear and unambiguous, and absent extraordinary circumstances our inquiry must end here.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "375 F.3d 1106, 1110",
"parenthetical": "\"The language of the statute at issue in- this case is clear and unambiguous, and absent extraordinary circumstances our inquiry must end here.\"",
"sentence": "Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272-73, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (“Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfair ness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.”); see also Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“If the statute is unambiguous, our inquiry is at an end; we must enforce the congressional intent embodied in that plain wording.”); Norfolk Dredging Co., Inc. v. United States, 375 F.3d 1106, 1110 (Fed. Cir.2004) (“The language of the statute at issue in- this case is clear and unambiguous, and absent extraordinary circumstances our inquiry must end here.”)."
} | 4,254,509 | a |
Although the prosecutor did improperly vouch for government witnesses by mentioning during rebuttal argument that the border patrol agents were "sworn to uphold the law," the district court immediately sustained the defense attorney's objection, and instructed the jury to disregard the comment, rendering any error harmless. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Alcantara's request for a curative instruction, as the district court properly held that the jury had been fully instructed concerning the credibility of government witnesses, and its prompt instruction to disregard the isolated comment sufficiently remedied any error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "677 F.3d 944, 955",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court's swift response instructing the jury to disregard the improper comment \"prevented ... [the] improper comment from materially affecting the verdict\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dorsey, 677 F.3d 944, 955 (9th Cir.2012) (holding that the district court’s swift response instructing the jury to disregard the improper comment “prevented ... [the] improper comment from materially affecting the verdict”) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Washington, 462 F.3d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir.2006) (“A judge’s prompt corrective action in response to improper comments usually is sufficient to cure any problems arising from such improper comments....”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "462 F.3d 1124, 1136",
"parenthetical": "\"A judge's prompt corrective action in response to improper comments usually is sufficient to cure any problems arising from such improper comments....\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dorsey, 677 F.3d 944, 955 (9th Cir.2012) (holding that the district court’s swift response instructing the jury to disregard the improper comment “prevented ... [the] improper comment from materially affecting the verdict”) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Washington, 462 F.3d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir.2006) (“A judge’s prompt corrective action in response to improper comments usually is sufficient to cure any problems arising from such improper comments....”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,229,433 | a |
The plaintiff has pled that Caremark is a "fiduciary" because "it exercises authority and control over Plan assets and when negotiating and/or collecting rebates, discounts, interest, fees, and other pricing mechanisms with or forms of compensation from entities dealing with the Plans." (Docket No. 44 P 21.) The plaintiff has also pled that "Caremark is an ERISA fiduciary in its relationship to the Plans because Caremark exercises discretionary authority and control over the administration and management of the Plans." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2005 WL 991897, at *8",
"parenthetical": "concluding, on a motion to dismiss in a factually similar case, that defendant pharmacy benefit managers were not ERISA fiduciaries",
"sentence": "Id. at ¶ 22. Because plaintiffs have alleged that Caremark, Inc. has wide discretion to administer and manage benefits under the Plan, the court finds that it has adequately pled Caremark Inc.’s status as a fiduciary to survive a motion to dismiss. See Hill, 409 F.3d at 717 (finding that, because plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the defendant had discretion to grant or deny plaintiffs’ claims, plaintiffs had adequately pled ERISA fiduciary status to survive a motion to dismiss); see also Mulder v. PCS Health Sys., Inc., Civ. No. 98-1003(WGB), at 16 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 1999) (concluding, in a factually similar case, that “[hjowever skeptical the Court may be of the existence of evidentiary support for this allegation, it is sufficient to establish PCS’s fiduciary status for the purpose of this motion to dismiss.”). But see Chicago Dist. Council of Carpenters Welfare Fund v. Caremark Rx, Inc., No. 04 C 5868, 2005 WL 991897, at *8 (N.D.Ill. April 14, 2005) (concluding, on a motion to dismiss in a factually similar case, that defendant pharmacy benefit managers were not ERISA fiduciaries); Bickley, 361 F.Supp.2d at 1334 (same)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "409 F.3d 717, 717",
"parenthetical": "finding that, because plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the defendant had discretion to grant or deny plaintiffs' claims, plaintiffs had adequately pled ERISA fiduciary status to survive a motion to dismiss",
"sentence": "Id. at ¶ 22. Because plaintiffs have alleged that Caremark, Inc. has wide discretion to administer and manage benefits under the Plan, the court finds that it has adequately pled Caremark Inc.’s status as a fiduciary to survive a motion to dismiss. See Hill, 409 F.3d at 717 (finding that, because plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the defendant had discretion to grant or deny plaintiffs’ claims, plaintiffs had adequately pled ERISA fiduciary status to survive a motion to dismiss); see also Mulder v. PCS Health Sys., Inc., Civ. No. 98-1003(WGB), at 16 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 1999) (concluding, in a factually similar case, that “[hjowever skeptical the Court may be of the existence of evidentiary support for this allegation, it is sufficient to establish PCS’s fiduciary status for the purpose of this motion to dismiss.”). But see Chicago Dist. Council of Carpenters Welfare Fund v. Caremark Rx, Inc., No. 04 C 5868, 2005 WL 991897, at *8 (N.D.Ill. April 14, 2005) (concluding, on a motion to dismiss in a factually similar case, that defendant pharmacy benefit managers were not ERISA fiduciaries); Bickley, 361 F.Supp.2d at 1334 (same)."
} | 8,930,033 | b |
Further, even assuming that there is some mandate requiring, generally, that waist chains be used for inmates such as Ashley, C. Warren is incorrect in arguing that the misapplication of the waist chain in this instance would open the BOP up to FTCA liability. The Court considers the application of restraints to be a delicate policy-balancing act involving considerations of the individual prisoner and the specific circumstances requiring the prisoner's restraint, similar to the discretionary decisions the BOP must make when designating inmates to particular facilities and placing inmates in cells with other inmates. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "499 U.S. 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same polices which led to the promulgation of the regulations.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (“[I]f a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same polices which led to the promulgation of the regulations.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.3d 1055, at 1060-61",
"parenthetical": "\"Rather, when the relevant law leaves room for officials to exercise policy-oriented discretion in a particu lar area, that discretion will be protected even with regard to what may seem to be details of implementation.\"",
"sentence": "See Lopez v. United States, 376 F.3d 1055, at 1060-61 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Rather, when the relevant law leaves room for officials to exercise policy-oriented discretion in a particu lar area, that discretion will be protected even with regard to what may seem to be details of implementation.”)(emphasis added)."
} | 12,275,050 | b |
Further, even assuming that there is some mandate requiring, generally, that waist chains be used for inmates such as Ashley, C. Warren is incorrect in arguing that the misapplication of the waist chain in this instance would open the BOP up to FTCA liability. The Court considers the application of restraints to be a delicate policy-balancing act involving considerations of the individual prisoner and the specific circumstances requiring the prisoner's restraint, similar to the discretionary decisions the BOP must make when designating inmates to particular facilities and placing inmates in cells with other inmates. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same polices which led to the promulgation of the regulations.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (“[I]f a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same polices which led to the promulgation of the regulations.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.3d 1055, at 1060-61",
"parenthetical": "\"Rather, when the relevant law leaves room for officials to exercise policy-oriented discretion in a particu lar area, that discretion will be protected even with regard to what may seem to be details of implementation.\"",
"sentence": "See Lopez v. United States, 376 F.3d 1055, at 1060-61 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Rather, when the relevant law leaves room for officials to exercise policy-oriented discretion in a particu lar area, that discretion will be protected even with regard to what may seem to be details of implementation.”)(emphasis added)."
} | 12,275,050 | b |
Further, even assuming that there is some mandate requiring, generally, that waist chains be used for inmates such as Ashley, C. Warren is incorrect in arguing that the misapplication of the waist chain in this instance would open the BOP up to FTCA liability. The Court considers the application of restraints to be a delicate policy-balancing act involving considerations of the individual prisoner and the specific circumstances requiring the prisoner's restraint, similar to the discretionary decisions the BOP must make when designating inmates to particular facilities and placing inmates in cells with other inmates. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 F.3d 1344, 1344",
"parenthetical": "\"Deciding how to classify prisoners and choosing the institution in which to place them are part and parcel of the inherently policy-laden endeavor of maintaining order and preserving security within our nation's prisons.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d at 1344 (“Deciding how to classify prisoners and choosing the institution in which to place them are part and parcel of the inherently policy-laden endeavor of maintaining order and preserving security within our nation’s prisons.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.3d 1055, at 1060-61",
"parenthetical": "\"Rather, when the relevant law leaves room for officials to exercise policy-oriented discretion in a particu lar area, that discretion will be protected even with regard to what may seem to be details of implementation.\"",
"sentence": "See Lopez v. United States, 376 F.3d 1055, at 1060-61 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Rather, when the relevant law leaves room for officials to exercise policy-oriented discretion in a particu lar area, that discretion will be protected even with regard to what may seem to be details of implementation.”)(emphasis added)."
} | 12,275,050 | b |
Further, even assuming that there is some mandate requiring, generally, that waist chains be used for inmates such as Ashley, C. Warren is incorrect in arguing that the misapplication of the waist chain in this instance would open the BOP up to FTCA liability. The Court considers the application of restraints to be a delicate policy-balancing act involving considerations of the individual prisoner and the specific circumstances requiring the prisoner's restraint, similar to the discretionary decisions the BOP must make when designating inmates to particular facilities and placing inmates in cells with other inmates. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "499 U.S. 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same polices which led to the promulgation of the regulations.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (“[I]f a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same polices which led to the promulgation of the regulations.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 F.3d 1344, 1344",
"parenthetical": "\"Deciding how to classify prisoners and choosing the institution in which to place them are part and parcel of the inherently policy-laden endeavor of maintaining order and preserving security within our nation's prisons.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d at 1344 (“Deciding how to classify prisoners and choosing the institution in which to place them are part and parcel of the inherently policy-laden endeavor of maintaining order and preserving security within our nation’s prisons.”)."
} | 12,275,050 | a |
Further, even assuming that there is some mandate requiring, generally, that waist chains be used for inmates such as Ashley, C. Warren is incorrect in arguing that the misapplication of the waist chain in this instance would open the BOP up to FTCA liability. The Court considers the application of restraints to be a delicate policy-balancing act involving considerations of the individual prisoner and the specific circumstances requiring the prisoner's restraint, similar to the discretionary decisions the BOP must make when designating inmates to particular facilities and placing inmates in cells with other inmates. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 F.3d 1344, 1344",
"parenthetical": "\"Deciding how to classify prisoners and choosing the institution in which to place them are part and parcel of the inherently policy-laden endeavor of maintaining order and preserving security within our nation's prisons.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d at 1344 (“Deciding how to classify prisoners and choosing the institution in which to place them are part and parcel of the inherently policy-laden endeavor of maintaining order and preserving security within our nation’s prisons.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same polices which led to the promulgation of the regulations.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (“[I]f a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same polices which led to the promulgation of the regulations.”)."
} | 12,275,050 | b |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1 Cal.2d 468, 472",
"parenthetical": "short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government); Columbia River, 232 Or. at 232, 375 P.2d at 72 (ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "232 Or. 230, 233",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse). We agree, therefore, with the many cases Miller cited that criticize the use of short titles containing either untrue representations designed to defraud potential signatories, or highly inflammatory language calculated to incite partisan rage."
} | 1,459,030 | b |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "232 Or. 230, 233",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse). We agree, therefore, with the many cases Miller cited that criticize the use of short titles containing either untrue representations designed to defraud potential signatories, or highly inflammatory language calculated to incite partisan rage."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "35 P.2d 533, 534",
"parenthetical": "short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government); Columbia River, 232 Or. at 232, 375 P.2d at 72 (ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River)."
} | 1,459,030 | a |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "232 Or. 232, 232",
"parenthetical": "ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government); Columbia River, 232 Or. at 232, 375 P.2d at 72 (ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "232 Or. 230, 233",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse). We agree, therefore, with the many cases Miller cited that criticize the use of short titles containing either untrue representations designed to defraud potential signatories, or highly inflammatory language calculated to incite partisan rage."
} | 1,459,030 | b |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "232 Or. 230, 233",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse). We agree, therefore, with the many cases Miller cited that criticize the use of short titles containing either untrue representations designed to defraud potential signatories, or highly inflammatory language calculated to incite partisan rage."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "375 P.2d 72, 72",
"parenthetical": "ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government); Columbia River, 232 Or. at 232, 375 P.2d at 72 (ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River)."
} | 1,459,030 | a |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "375 P.2d 71, 72",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse). We agree, therefore, with the many cases Miller cited that criticize the use of short titles containing either untrue representations designed to defraud potential signatories, or highly inflammatory language calculated to incite partisan rage."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1 Cal.2d 468, 472",
"parenthetical": "short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government); Columbia River, 232 Or. at 232, 375 P.2d at 72 (ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River)."
} | 1,459,030 | a |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "35 P.2d 533, 534",
"parenthetical": "short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government); Columbia River, 232 Or. at 232, 375 P.2d at 72 (ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "375 P.2d 71, 72",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse). We agree, therefore, with the many cases Miller cited that criticize the use of short titles containing either untrue representations designed to defraud potential signatories, or highly inflammatory language calculated to incite partisan rage."
} | 1,459,030 | b |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "232 Or. 232, 232",
"parenthetical": "ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government); Columbia River, 232 Or. at 232, 375 P.2d at 72 (ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "375 P.2d 71, 72",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse). We agree, therefore, with the many cases Miller cited that criticize the use of short titles containing either untrue representations designed to defraud potential signatories, or highly inflammatory language calculated to incite partisan rage."
} | 1,459,030 | b |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "375 P.2d 71, 72",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse). We agree, therefore, with the many cases Miller cited that criticize the use of short titles containing either untrue representations designed to defraud potential signatories, or highly inflammatory language calculated to incite partisan rage."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "375 P.2d 72, 72",
"parenthetical": "ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government); Columbia River, 232 Or. at 232, 375 P.2d at 72 (ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River)."
} | 1,459,030 | a |
The Court notes that an appellant who feels that the deferral of a decision in his claim was not appropriate or has delayed a final decision unreasonably is not without recourse. The appropriate action would be to file a petition with the Court challenging the Secretary's delay. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57",
"parenthetical": "noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process a pending claim",
"sentence": "Cf. DiCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57 (2006) (noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process a pending claim); but see Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (cautioning that a petition for extraordinary relief may only be granted where: (1) The petitioner lacks adequate alternative means to attain the desired relief; (2) the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to the writ; and (3) the Court is convinced that the issuance of the writ is warranted)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "542 U.S. 367, 380-81",
"parenthetical": "cautioning that a petition for extraordinary relief may only be granted where: (1",
"sentence": "Cf. DiCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57 (2006) (noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process a pending claim); but see Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (cautioning that a petition for extraordinary relief may only be granted where: (1) The petitioner lacks adequate alternative means to attain the desired relief; (2) the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to the writ; and (3) the Court is convinced that the issuance of the writ is warranted)."
} | 4,152,772 | a |
The Court notes that an appellant who feels that the deferral of a decision in his claim was not appropriate or has delayed a final decision unreasonably is not without recourse. The appropriate action would be to file a petition with the Court challenging the Secretary's delay. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57",
"parenthetical": "noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process a pending claim",
"sentence": "Cf. DiCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57 (2006) (noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process a pending claim); but see Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (cautioning that a petition for extraordinary relief may only be granted where: (1) The petitioner lacks adequate alternative means to attain the desired relief; (2) the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to the writ; and (3) the Court is convinced that the issuance of the writ is warranted)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cautioning that a petition for extraordinary relief may only be granted where: (1",
"sentence": "Cf. DiCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57 (2006) (noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process a pending claim); but see Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (cautioning that a petition for extraordinary relief may only be granted where: (1) The petitioner lacks adequate alternative means to attain the desired relief; (2) the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to the writ; and (3) the Court is convinced that the issuance of the writ is warranted)."
} | 4,152,772 | a |
The Court notes that an appellant who feels that the deferral of a decision in his claim was not appropriate or has delayed a final decision unreasonably is not without recourse. The appropriate action would be to file a petition with the Court challenging the Secretary's delay. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57",
"parenthetical": "noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process a pending claim",
"sentence": "Cf. DiCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57 (2006) (noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process a pending claim); but see Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (cautioning that a petition for extraordinary relief may only be granted where: (1) The petitioner lacks adequate alternative means to attain the desired relief; (2) the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to the writ; and (3) the Court is convinced that the issuance of the writ is warranted)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cautioning that a petition for extraordinary relief may only be granted where: (1",
"sentence": "Cf. DiCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57 (2006) (noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process a pending claim); but see Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (cautioning that a petition for extraordinary relief may only be granted where: (1) The petitioner lacks adequate alternative means to attain the desired relief; (2) the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to the writ; and (3) the Court is convinced that the issuance of the writ is warranted)."
} | 4,152,772 | a |
To the extent that Dorman bases its defamation claim on statements made by Dayco that assert or imply only that Dorman's products are inferior, it has failed to state a cause of action. Allegations that another company's products are inferior are "par for the course" in business and are "the most innocuous kind of puffing," generally not capable of misleading the public. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "170 Cal.App.3d 543, 550",
"parenthetical": "\"[F]alse statements simply indicating that plaintiffs business goods were of inferior quality ... do not accuse plaintiff of dishonesty, lack of integrity or incompetence nor even imply any reprehensible personal characteristic, and are therefore not defamatory.\"",
"sentence": "U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 898 F.2d at 925 (statement by Blue Cross-Blue Shield asserting that personal choice insurance was “Better than HMO” not actionable as defamation claim by U.S. Healthcare, a leading provider of HMOs); See also Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court, 170 Cal.App.3d 543, 550, 216 Cal.Rptr. 252 (Cal.CtApp.1985) (“[F]alse statements simply indicating that plaintiffs business goods were of inferior quality ... do not accuse plaintiff of dishonesty, lack of integrity or incompetence nor even imply any reprehensible personal characteristic, and are therefore not defamatory.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "898 F.2d 925, 925",
"parenthetical": "statement by Blue Cross-Blue Shield asserting that personal choice insurance was \"Better than HMO\" not actionable as defamation claim by U.S. Healthcare, a leading provider of HMOs",
"sentence": "U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 898 F.2d at 925 (statement by Blue Cross-Blue Shield asserting that personal choice insurance was “Better than HMO” not actionable as defamation claim by U.S. Healthcare, a leading provider of HMOs); See also Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court, 170 Cal.App.3d 543, 550, 216 Cal.Rptr. 252 (Cal.CtApp.1985) (“[F]alse statements simply indicating that plaintiffs business goods were of inferior quality ... do not accuse plaintiff of dishonesty, lack of integrity or incompetence nor even imply any reprehensible personal characteristic, and are therefore not defamatory.”)."
} | 4,262,487 | b |
To the extent that Dorman bases its defamation claim on statements made by Dayco that assert or imply only that Dorman's products are inferior, it has failed to state a cause of action. Allegations that another company's products are inferior are "par for the course" in business and are "the most innocuous kind of puffing," generally not capable of misleading the public. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "898 F.2d 925, 925",
"parenthetical": "statement by Blue Cross-Blue Shield asserting that personal choice insurance was \"Better than HMO\" not actionable as defamation claim by U.S. Healthcare, a leading provider of HMOs",
"sentence": "U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 898 F.2d at 925 (statement by Blue Cross-Blue Shield asserting that personal choice insurance was “Better than HMO” not actionable as defamation claim by U.S. Healthcare, a leading provider of HMOs); See also Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court, 170 Cal.App.3d 543, 550, 216 Cal.Rptr. 252 (Cal.CtApp.1985) (“[F]alse statements simply indicating that plaintiffs business goods were of inferior quality ... do not accuse plaintiff of dishonesty, lack of integrity or incompetence nor even imply any reprehensible personal characteristic, and are therefore not defamatory.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[F]alse statements simply indicating that plaintiffs business goods were of inferior quality ... do not accuse plaintiff of dishonesty, lack of integrity or incompetence nor even imply any reprehensible personal characteristic, and are therefore not defamatory.\"",
"sentence": "U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 898 F.2d at 925 (statement by Blue Cross-Blue Shield asserting that personal choice insurance was “Better than HMO” not actionable as defamation claim by U.S. Healthcare, a leading provider of HMOs); See also Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court, 170 Cal.App.3d 543, 550, 216 Cal.Rptr. 252 (Cal.CtApp.1985) (“[F]alse statements simply indicating that plaintiffs business goods were of inferior quality ... do not accuse plaintiff of dishonesty, lack of integrity or incompetence nor even imply any reprehensible personal characteristic, and are therefore not defamatory.”)."
} | 4,262,487 | a |
Finally, the close proximity in both time and location between the crime and the Show-up here helped ensure its reliability. The fact that the Show-up took place approximately four blocks away from the crime, and within thirty to forty-five minutes of the event, mitigated any potential prejudice that might have resulted from Farmian viewing Valtin in police custody. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "496 F.Supp. 804, 809",
"parenthetical": "\"Such promptness of identification is recognized to be a powerful sign of its trustworthiness, for it suggests that the identification was based on a fresh mental picture of the criminal's features.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Gilmore, 940 F.2d 665, 1991 WL 155984, at *4 (7th Cir. Aug.15, 1991) (unpublished table decision) (show-up occurring twelve to eighteen minutes after crime is close enough in proximity to “significantly diminish[ ] the concern of misidentification due to fading memory”); Zelker, 455 F.2d at 716 (holding show-up to be reasonable because “[w]hen the two suspects were brought to [be seen by the identifier], only 30 minutes had elapsed since [the identifier had] reported the crime.”); see also Willin v. Ajello, 496 F.Supp. 804, 809 (D.Conn.1980) (“Such promptness of identification is recognized to be a powerful sign of its trustworthiness, for it suggests that the identification was based on a fresh mental picture of the criminal’s features.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "455 F.2d 716, 716",
"parenthetical": "holding show-up to be reasonable because \"[w]hen the two suspects were brought to [be seen by the identifier], only 30 minutes had elapsed since [the identifier had] reported the crime.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Gilmore, 940 F.2d 665, 1991 WL 155984, at *4 (7th Cir. Aug.15, 1991) (unpublished table decision) (show-up occurring twelve to eighteen minutes after crime is close enough in proximity to “significantly diminish[ ] the concern of misidentification due to fading memory”); Zelker, 455 F.2d at 716 (holding show-up to be reasonable because “[w]hen the two suspects were brought to [be seen by the identifier], only 30 minutes had elapsed since [the identifier had] reported the crime.”); see also Willin v. Ajello, 496 F.Supp. 804, 809 (D.Conn.1980) (“Such promptness of identification is recognized to be a powerful sign of its trustworthiness, for it suggests that the identification was based on a fresh mental picture of the criminal’s features.”)."
} | 9,341,599 | b |
Surely, the concept cannot place on the allegedly aggrieved party the burden of demonstrating that the trier of fact would certainly have come to a different conclusion had the evidence been before it. We have also said that the exclusion of particular evidence would not require a new trial where, analyzing the facts, it was most unlikely that the jury would have been affected by the error (if indeed there had been any error). | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "386 Mass. 88, 94",
"parenthetical": "the erroneous exclusion of evidence requires a new trial \"unless it can be seen that, even if it had been admitted and believed, still the verdict\" would have been the same",
"sentence": "Drake v. Goodman, 386 Mass. 88, 94 (1982). See Daley v. American Printing Co., 150 Mass. 77, 81 (1889) (the erroneous exclusion of evidence requires a new trial “unless it can be seen that, even if it had been admitted and believed, still the verdict” would have been the same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "315 Mass. 59, 65",
"parenthetical": "party showing error in exclusion of evidence must also show \"reasonable probability of harm\"",
"sentence": "But see Bendett v. Bendett, 315 Mass. 59, 65 (1943) (party showing error in exclusion of evidence must also show “reasonable probability of harm”)."
} | 484,755 | a |
Surely, the concept cannot place on the allegedly aggrieved party the burden of demonstrating that the trier of fact would certainly have come to a different conclusion had the evidence been before it. We have also said that the exclusion of particular evidence would not require a new trial where, analyzing the facts, it was most unlikely that the jury would have been affected by the error (if indeed there had been any error). | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "315 Mass. 59, 65",
"parenthetical": "party showing error in exclusion of evidence must also show \"reasonable probability of harm\"",
"sentence": "But see Bendett v. Bendett, 315 Mass. 59, 65 (1943) (party showing error in exclusion of evidence must also show “reasonable probability of harm”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "150 Mass. 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "the erroneous exclusion of evidence requires a new trial \"unless it can be seen that, even if it had been admitted and believed, still the verdict\" would have been the same",
"sentence": "Drake v. Goodman, 386 Mass. 88, 94 (1982). See Daley v. American Printing Co., 150 Mass. 77, 81 (1889) (the erroneous exclusion of evidence requires a new trial “unless it can be seen that, even if it had been admitted and believed, still the verdict” would have been the same)."
} | 484,755 | b |
. The parties agree that, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer, Boone is a public official for purposes of this defamation action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice); see also Botchie v. O’Dowd, 315 S.C. 126, 432 S.E.2d 458 (1993) (applying actual malice standard to deputy sheriff's defamation action); Gause v. Doe, 317 S.C. 39, 451 S.E.2d 408 (Ct.App.1994) (public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice); see also Botchie v. O’Dowd, 315 S.C. 126, 432 S.E.2d 458 (1993) (applying actual malice standard to deputy sheriff's defamation action); Gause v. Doe, 317 S.C. 39, 451 S.E.2d 408 (Ct.App.1994) (public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice)."
} | 214,306 | a |
. The parties agree that, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer, Boone is a public official for purposes of this defamation action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice); see also Botchie v. O’Dowd, 315 S.C. 126, 432 S.E.2d 458 (1993) (applying actual malice standard to deputy sheriff's defamation action); Gause v. Doe, 317 S.C. 39, 451 S.E.2d 408 (Ct.App.1994) (public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice); see also Botchie v. O’Dowd, 315 S.C. 126, 432 S.E.2d 458 (1993) (applying actual malice standard to deputy sheriff's defamation action); Gause v. Doe, 317 S.C. 39, 451 S.E.2d 408 (Ct.App.1994) (public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice)."
} | 214,306 | a |
. The parties agree that, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer, Boone is a public official for purposes of this defamation action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice); see also Botchie v. O’Dowd, 315 S.C. 126, 432 S.E.2d 458 (1993) (applying actual malice standard to deputy sheriff's defamation action); Gause v. Doe, 317 S.C. 39, 451 S.E.2d 408 (Ct.App.1994) (public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice); see also Botchie v. O’Dowd, 315 S.C. 126, 432 S.E.2d 458 (1993) (applying actual malice standard to deputy sheriff's defamation action); Gause v. Doe, 317 S.C. 39, 451 S.E.2d 408 (Ct.App.1994) (public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice)."
} | 214,306 | a |
. The parties agree that, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer, Boone is a public official for purposes of this defamation action. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice); see also Botchie v. O’Dowd, 315 S.C. 126, 432 S.E.2d 458 (1993) (applying actual malice standard to deputy sheriff's defamation action); Gause v. Doe, 317 S.C. 39, 451 S.E.2d 408 (Ct.App.1994) (public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice); see also Botchie v. O’Dowd, 315 S.C. 126, 432 S.E.2d 458 (1993) (applying actual malice standard to deputy sheriff's defamation action); Gause v. Doe, 317 S.C. 39, 451 S.E.2d 408 (Ct.App.1994) (public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice)."
} | 214,306 | b |
The Second Circuit, prior to Daubert, departed from a strict application of the Frye general acceptance test, though, as in Dau- bert, acceptance of the proffered evidence in the scientific community has been a considered factor. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "895 F.Supp. 582, 585",
"parenthetical": "noting that defendant's argument that Rea and Bortnovsky must be revisited in light of Daubert was tenuous, as the Second Circuit found in Williams that a determination of admissibility of scientific evidence should be made under the Federal Rules",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lech, 895 F.Supp. 582, 585 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (noting that defendant’s argument that Rea and Bortnovsky must be revisited in light of Daubert was tenuous, as the Second Circuit found in Williams that a determination of admissibility of scientific evidence should be made under the Federal Rules)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "958 F.2d 1206, 1224",
"parenthetical": "referring to absence of demonstrated reliability and relevance of polygraph evidence in record, as later mandated to be considered in Daubert",
"sentence": "United States v. Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d 30, 35 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1224 (2d Cir.1992) (referring to absence of demonstrated reliability and relevance of polygraph evidence in record, as later mandated to be considered in Daubert). Therefore, defendants argue that under the standard later enunciated in Daubert, the Second Circuit has already found polygraph evidence inadmissible under Rule 702."
} | 7,655,785 | b |
. This court's child custody cases manifest a tension between older decisions that apply a "fitness" test and more recent ones that focus instead on the "best interests of the child." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing the two lines of child custody cases but declining to resolve conflict",
"sentence": "Compare Johnson v. Lloyd, 211 A.2d 764, 765 (D.C. 1965) (\"The established rule in this jurisdiction is that one who would withhold a child from its natural parent has the burden of proving that the natural parent is unfit to have custody and that the child’s welfare compels awarding custody to the nonparent.”) with In re K.A., 484 A.2d 992, 997 & n. 2 (D.C.1984) (applying \"best interests of the child” test to termination of parental rights where natural father refused to consent but never had had custody of child); see also Shelton, 526 A.2d at 580 n. 3 (recognizing the two lines of child custody cases but declining to resolve conflict)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "211 A.2d 764, 765",
"parenthetical": "\"The established rule in this jurisdiction is that one who would withhold a child from its natural parent has the burden of proving that the natural parent is unfit to have custody and that the child's welfare compels awarding custody to the nonparent.\"",
"sentence": "Compare Johnson v. Lloyd, 211 A.2d 764, 765 (D.C. 1965) (\"The established rule in this jurisdiction is that one who would withhold a child from its natural parent has the burden of proving that the natural parent is unfit to have custody and that the child’s welfare compels awarding custody to the nonparent.”) with In re K.A., 484 A.2d 992, 997 & n. 2 (D.C.1984) (applying \"best interests of the child” test to termination of parental rights where natural father refused to consent but never had had custody of child); see also Shelton, 526 A.2d at 580 n. 3 (recognizing the two lines of child custody cases but declining to resolve conflict)."
} | 12,022,652 | b |
But the fact that a contract may be substantively or proce durally unconscionable as violative of public policy does not automatically shoehorn a party's conduct in entering into the contract with a consumer into the DTPA's definition of "unconscionable action or course of action." See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. SS 17.45(5) (defining "unconscionable action or course of action" as meaning "an act or practice which, to a consumer's detriment, takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of the consumer to a grossly unfair degree"). Case law uniformly holds to the contrary; the unconscionable-act-or-course-of-action element of a DTPA section 17.50 unconseionability claim requires proof of each consumer's knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity. Id. SS 17.50. A DTPA section 17.50(a)(3) unconseionability claim requires a consumer (here the Keys and each class member) to show that the defendant's acts (the acts of LSRC) took advantage of the consumer's lack of knowledge and that .the resulting unfairness was glaringly noticeable, flagrant, complete, and unmitigated. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "435 S.W.3d 222, 228",
"parenthetical": "holding that even under the UCC--as opposed to the DTPA here--court is to make a \"highly fact-specific inquiry into the circumstances of the bargain, such as the commercial atmosphere in which the agreement was made, the alternatives available to the parties at the time and their ability to bargain, any illegality or public policy concerns, and the agreement's oppressive or shocking nature\" when determining unconseionability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ryan, 477 S.W.3d at 913-14 (reversing class certification of DTPA unconseionability claim because “determining whether Hicks’[s] actions were unconscionable requires evaluation of each member’s individual circumstances”); Wall v. Parkway Chevrolet, Inc., 176 S.W.3d 98, 105-06 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (affirming denial of class certification of DTPA unconseionability claini because individualized inquiry into each buyer’s circumstances is required to answer the question “whether the charging of a fee under the designations such as ‘NACC,’ ‘Consumer Benefits & Services (ECBP),’ ‘NADW,’ ‘Intelesys,’ and/or other similar designations is an unconscionable ... act”); Peltier Enter., Inc. v. Hilton, 51 S.W.3d 616, 623-24 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, pet. denied) (reversing class certification of DTPA unconscionability claim because “[t]here must be a showing of what the consumer could have or would have done if he had known about the information ... there would need to be some showing of each customer’s ‘knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity”’); see also Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex. 2014) (holding that even under the UCC—as opposed to the DTPA here—court is to make a “highly fact-specific inquiry into the circumstances of the bargain, such as the commercial atmosphere in which the agreement was made, the alternatives available to the parties at the time and their ability to bargain, any illegality or public policy concerns, and the agreement’s oppressive or shocking nature” when determining unconseionability)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "477 S.W.3d 913, 913-14",
"parenthetical": "reversing class certification of DTPA unconseionability claim because \"determining whether Hicks'[s] actions were unconscionable requires evaluation of each member's individual circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ryan, 477 S.W.3d at 913-14 (reversing class certification of DTPA unconseionability claim because “determining whether Hicks’[s] actions were unconscionable requires evaluation of each member’s individual circumstances”); Wall v. Parkway Chevrolet, Inc., 176 S.W.3d 98, 105-06 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (affirming denial of class certification of DTPA unconseionability claini because individualized inquiry into each buyer’s circumstances is required to answer the question “whether the charging of a fee under the designations such as ‘NACC,’ ‘Consumer Benefits & Services (ECBP),’ ‘NADW,’ ‘Intelesys,’ and/or other similar designations is an unconscionable ... act”); Peltier Enter., Inc. v. Hilton, 51 S.W.3d 616, 623-24 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, pet. denied) (reversing class certification of DTPA unconscionability claim because “[t]here must be a showing of what the consumer could have or would have done if he had known about the information ... there would need to be some showing of each customer’s ‘knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity”’); see also Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex. 2014) (holding that even under the UCC—as opposed to the DTPA here—court is to make a “highly fact-specific inquiry into the circumstances of the bargain, such as the commercial atmosphere in which the agreement was made, the alternatives available to the parties at the time and their ability to bargain, any illegality or public policy concerns, and the agreement’s oppressive or shocking nature” when determining unconseionability)."
} | 12,386,566 | b |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 F.3d 1127, 1132",
"parenthetical": "holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "506 U.S. 534, 539",
"parenthetical": "discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | 5,717,166 | b |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "506 U.S. 534, 539",
"parenthetical": "discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "686 F.3d 758, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that \"[n]either decision is 'clearly established Federal law' sufficient to support a habeas challenge under SS 2254\"",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | 5,717,166 | a |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 F.3d 1127, 1132",
"parenthetical": "holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | 5,717,166 | a |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "686 F.3d 758, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that \"[n]either decision is 'clearly established Federal law' sufficient to support a habeas challenge under SS 2254\"",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | 5,717,166 | b |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 F.3d 1127, 1132",
"parenthetical": "holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | 5,717,166 | b |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "686 F.3d 758, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that \"[n]either decision is 'clearly established Federal law' sufficient to support a habeas challenge under SS 2254\"",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | 5,717,166 | a |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 F.3d 1127, 1132",
"parenthetical": "holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | 5,717,166 | a |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "686 F.3d 758, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that \"[n]either decision is 'clearly established Federal law' sufficient to support a habeas challenge under SS 2254\"",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | 5,717,166 | b |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 F.3d 1127, 1132",
"parenthetical": "holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | 5,717,166 | b |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "686 F.3d 758, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that \"[n]either decision is 'clearly established Federal law' sufficient to support a habeas challenge under SS 2254\"",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | 5,717,166 | a |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 F.3d 1127, 1132",
"parenthetical": "holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | 5,717,166 | b |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "686 F.3d 758, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that \"[n]either decision is 'clearly established Federal law' sufficient to support a habeas challenge under SS 2254\"",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir.2012) (reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that “[n]either decision is ‘clearly established Federal law’ sufficient to support a habeas challenge under § 2254”)."
} | 5,717,166 | a |
Because Oncor's failure to turn off an existing energized electrical transformer was not contemporaneous with Murillo's injury, it is insufficient to create liability for general negligence. Without evidence of contemporaneous conduct, Murillo's claim against Oncor is "a nonfeasance theory, based on [Oncor's] failure to take measures to .make the property safe," and not an activity "based on affirmative, contemporaneous conduct by [Oncor] that caused the injury." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "493 S.W.2d 742, 748",
"parenthetical": "holding that premises owner had no duty to warn electrical subcontractor of potential for electric shock from condition which subcontractor was hired to repair",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex.1973) (holding that premises owner had no duty to warn electrical subcontractor of potential for electric shock from condition which subcontractor was hired to repair); Shell Oil Co. v. Songer, 710 S.W.2d 615, 620-21 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that Shell did not have legal duty to protect electrician-contractor by de-energizing electrical system while under repair); Corpus v. K-J Oil Co., 720 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex.App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that premises occupier was not liable for crew-member’s injury when rig boom made contact with overhead electric power line; power line was reasonably apparent condition and did not give rise to duty to warn); Allen v. Tex. Elec. Serv. Co., 350 S.W.2d 866, 868-69 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e) (affirming take-nothing judgment on grounds that electric service company had no right of control and owed no duty to warn electrical worker hired to repair power lines injured when he came into contact with energized line); see also Le Vonas v. Acme Paper Bd. Co., 184 Md. 16, 40 A.2d 43, 47 (1944) (holding that company that retained independent contractor to hoist steel beams to roof had no duty to warn contractor’s employees who sustained injuries when beam made contact with live wires hanging near cable used to hoist beams), cited with approval in Allen, 350 S.W.2d at 869."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that company that retained independent contractor to hoist steel beams to roof had no duty to warn contractor's employees who sustained injuries when beam made contact with live wires hanging near cable used to hoist beams",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex.1973) (holding that premises owner had no duty to warn electrical subcontractor of potential for electric shock from condition which subcontractor was hired to repair); Shell Oil Co. v. Songer, 710 S.W.2d 615, 620-21 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that Shell did not have legal duty to protect electrician-contractor by de-energizing electrical system while under repair); Corpus v. K-J Oil Co., 720 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex.App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that premises occupier was not liable for crew-member’s injury when rig boom made contact with overhead electric power line; power line was reasonably apparent condition and did not give rise to duty to warn); Allen v. Tex. Elec. Serv. Co., 350 S.W.2d 866, 868-69 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e) (affirming take-nothing judgment on grounds that electric service company had no right of control and owed no duty to warn electrical worker hired to repair power lines injured when he came into contact with energized line); see also Le Vonas v. Acme Paper Bd. Co., 184 Md. 16, 40 A.2d 43, 47 (1944) (holding that company that retained independent contractor to hoist steel beams to roof had no duty to warn contractor’s employees who sustained injuries when beam made contact with live wires hanging near cable used to hoist beams), cited with approval in Allen, 350 S.W.2d at 869."
} | 6,902,659 | a |
Because Oncor's failure to turn off an existing energized electrical transformer was not contemporaneous with Murillo's injury, it is insufficient to create liability for general negligence. Without evidence of contemporaneous conduct, Murillo's claim against Oncor is "a nonfeasance theory, based on [Oncor's] failure to take measures to .make the property safe," and not an activity "based on affirmative, contemporaneous conduct by [Oncor] that caused the injury." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "493 S.W.2d 742, 748",
"parenthetical": "holding that premises owner had no duty to warn electrical subcontractor of potential for electric shock from condition which subcontractor was hired to repair",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex.1973) (holding that premises owner had no duty to warn electrical subcontractor of potential for electric shock from condition which subcontractor was hired to repair); Shell Oil Co. v. Songer, 710 S.W.2d 615, 620-21 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that Shell did not have legal duty to protect electrician-contractor by de-energizing electrical system while under repair); Corpus v. K-J Oil Co., 720 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex.App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that premises occupier was not liable for crew-member’s injury when rig boom made contact with overhead electric power line; power line was reasonably apparent condition and did not give rise to duty to warn); Allen v. Tex. Elec. Serv. Co., 350 S.W.2d 866, 868-69 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e) (affirming take-nothing judgment on grounds that electric service company had no right of control and owed no duty to warn electrical worker hired to repair power lines injured when he came into contact with energized line); see also Le Vonas v. Acme Paper Bd. Co., 184 Md. 16, 40 A.2d 43, 47 (1944) (holding that company that retained independent contractor to hoist steel beams to roof had no duty to warn contractor’s employees who sustained injuries when beam made contact with live wires hanging near cable used to hoist beams), cited with approval in Allen, 350 S.W.2d at 869."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "40 A.2d 43, 47",
"parenthetical": "holding that company that retained independent contractor to hoist steel beams to roof had no duty to warn contractor's employees who sustained injuries when beam made contact with live wires hanging near cable used to hoist beams",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex.1973) (holding that premises owner had no duty to warn electrical subcontractor of potential for electric shock from condition which subcontractor was hired to repair); Shell Oil Co. v. Songer, 710 S.W.2d 615, 620-21 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that Shell did not have legal duty to protect electrician-contractor by de-energizing electrical system while under repair); Corpus v. K-J Oil Co., 720 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex.App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that premises occupier was not liable for crew-member’s injury when rig boom made contact with overhead electric power line; power line was reasonably apparent condition and did not give rise to duty to warn); Allen v. Tex. Elec. Serv. Co., 350 S.W.2d 866, 868-69 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e) (affirming take-nothing judgment on grounds that electric service company had no right of control and owed no duty to warn electrical worker hired to repair power lines injured when he came into contact with energized line); see also Le Vonas v. Acme Paper Bd. Co., 184 Md. 16, 40 A.2d 43, 47 (1944) (holding that company that retained independent contractor to hoist steel beams to roof had no duty to warn contractor’s employees who sustained injuries when beam made contact with live wires hanging near cable used to hoist beams), cited with approval in Allen, 350 S.W.2d at 869."
} | 6,902,659 | a |
Because Oncor's failure to turn off an existing energized electrical transformer was not contemporaneous with Murillo's injury, it is insufficient to create liability for general negligence. Without evidence of contemporaneous conduct, Murillo's claim against Oncor is "a nonfeasance theory, based on [Oncor's] failure to take measures to .make the property safe," and not an activity "based on affirmative, contemporaneous conduct by [Oncor] that caused the injury." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "350 S.W.2d 869, 869",
"parenthetical": "holding that company that retained independent contractor to hoist steel beams to roof had no duty to warn contractor's employees who sustained injuries when beam made contact with live wires hanging near cable used to hoist beams",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex.1973) (holding that premises owner had no duty to warn electrical subcontractor of potential for electric shock from condition which subcontractor was hired to repair); Shell Oil Co. v. Songer, 710 S.W.2d 615, 620-21 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that Shell did not have legal duty to protect electrician-contractor by de-energizing electrical system while under repair); Corpus v. K-J Oil Co., 720 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex.App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that premises occupier was not liable for crew-member’s injury when rig boom made contact with overhead electric power line; power line was reasonably apparent condition and did not give rise to duty to warn); Allen v. Tex. Elec. Serv. Co., 350 S.W.2d 866, 868-69 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e) (affirming take-nothing judgment on grounds that electric service company had no right of control and owed no duty to warn electrical worker hired to repair power lines injured when he came into contact with energized line); see also Le Vonas v. Acme Paper Bd. Co., 184 Md. 16, 40 A.2d 43, 47 (1944) (holding that company that retained independent contractor to hoist steel beams to roof had no duty to warn contractor’s employees who sustained injuries when beam made contact with live wires hanging near cable used to hoist beams), cited with approval in Allen, 350 S.W.2d at 869."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "493 S.W.2d 742, 748",
"parenthetical": "holding that premises owner had no duty to warn electrical subcontractor of potential for electric shock from condition which subcontractor was hired to repair",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex.1973) (holding that premises owner had no duty to warn electrical subcontractor of potential for electric shock from condition which subcontractor was hired to repair); Shell Oil Co. v. Songer, 710 S.W.2d 615, 620-21 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that Shell did not have legal duty to protect electrician-contractor by de-energizing electrical system while under repair); Corpus v. K-J Oil Co., 720 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex.App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that premises occupier was not liable for crew-member’s injury when rig boom made contact with overhead electric power line; power line was reasonably apparent condition and did not give rise to duty to warn); Allen v. Tex. Elec. Serv. Co., 350 S.W.2d 866, 868-69 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e) (affirming take-nothing judgment on grounds that electric service company had no right of control and owed no duty to warn electrical worker hired to repair power lines injured when he came into contact with energized line); see also Le Vonas v. Acme Paper Bd. Co., 184 Md. 16, 40 A.2d 43, 47 (1944) (holding that company that retained independent contractor to hoist steel beams to roof had no duty to warn contractor’s employees who sustained injuries when beam made contact with live wires hanging near cable used to hoist beams), cited with approval in Allen, 350 S.W.2d at 869."
} | 6,902,659 | b |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.); Hargrove v. State, ex rel. Dennis, 1964 OK CR 105, 396 P.2d 675, 676 (appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case)."
} | 6,860,463 | b |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.); Hargrove v. State, ex rel. Dennis, 1964 OK CR 105, 396 P.2d 675, 676 (appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case)."
} | 6,860,463 | b |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.); Hargrove v. State, ex rel. Dennis, 1964 OK CR 105, 396 P.2d 675, 676 (appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case)."
} | 6,860,463 | b |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.); Hargrove v. State, ex rel. Dennis, 1964 OK CR 105, 396 P.2d 675, 676 (appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | 6,860,463 | a |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.); Hargrove v. State, ex rel. Dennis, 1964 OK CR 105, 396 P.2d 675, 676 (appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case)."
} | 6,860,463 | b |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.); Hargrove v. State, ex rel. Dennis, 1964 OK CR 105, 396 P.2d 675, 676 (appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | 6,860,463 | a |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "396 P.2d 675, 676",
"parenthetical": "appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.); Hargrove v. State, ex rel. Dennis, 1964 OK CR 105, 396 P.2d 675, 676 (appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | 6,860,463 | a |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "396 P.2d 675, 676",
"parenthetical": "appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.); Hargrove v. State, ex rel. Dennis, 1964 OK CR 105, 396 P.2d 675, 676 (appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | 6,860,463 | a |
From the evidence presented, we conclude that the jury could infer that, had the styrofoam loads been enclosed with mesh wrapping or lifted on a platform with guardrails, the incident would have more likely than not been prevented. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "24 S.W.3d 357, 361",
"parenthetical": "finding an expert's opinions would not be helpful to the jury, as the conclusions simply told the jury how to view the facts and involved matters within the average juror's common knowledge",
"sentence": "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 807 So.2d 382, 388 (Miss.2001) (“The general rule in Mississippi is that expert testimony is not required where the facts surrounding the alleged negligence are easily comprehensible to the jury.”); see also K-Mart Corp. v. Honeycutt, 24 S.W.3d 357, 361 (Tex.2000) (finding an expert’s opinions would not be helpful to the jury, as the conclusions simply told the jury how to view the facts and involved matters within the average juror’s common knowledge)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "179 F.2d 593, 595",
"parenthetical": "finding that company rules and common sense made it the appellant's duty to see that a pistol was loaded properly, and the jury could have found that the appellant's negligence was the sole proximate cause of an accident",
"sentence": "See Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. Cox, 179 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir.1950) (finding that company rules and common sense made it the appellant’s duty to see that a pistol was loaded properly, and the jury could have found that the appellant’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of an accident). We agree with the trial judge that this case involved the basic common sense of an average layperson and, therefore, West’s failure to present expert testimony on causation was not detrimental to his negligence claim."
} | 4,046,555 | b |
From the evidence presented, we conclude that the jury could infer that, had the styrofoam loads been enclosed with mesh wrapping or lifted on a platform with guardrails, the incident would have more likely than not been prevented. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "24 S.W.3d 357, 361",
"parenthetical": "finding an expert's opinions would not be helpful to the jury, as the conclusions simply told the jury how to view the facts and involved matters within the average juror's common knowledge",
"sentence": "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 807 So.2d 382, 388 (Miss.2001) (“The general rule in Mississippi is that expert testimony is not required where the facts surrounding the alleged negligence are easily comprehensible to the jury.”); see also K-Mart Corp. v. Honeycutt, 24 S.W.3d 357, 361 (Tex.2000) (finding an expert’s opinions would not be helpful to the jury, as the conclusions simply told the jury how to view the facts and involved matters within the average juror’s common knowledge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "807 So.2d 382, 388",
"parenthetical": "\"The general rule in Mississippi is that expert testimony is not required where the facts surrounding the alleged negligence are easily comprehensible to the jury.\"",
"sentence": "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 807 So.2d 382, 388 (Miss.2001) (“The general rule in Mississippi is that expert testimony is not required where the facts surrounding the alleged negligence are easily comprehensible to the jury.”); see also K-Mart Corp. v. Honeycutt, 24 S.W.3d 357, 361 (Tex.2000) (finding an expert’s opinions would not be helpful to the jury, as the conclusions simply told the jury how to view the facts and involved matters within the average juror’s common knowledge)."
} | 4,046,555 | b |
Moreover, because the language of article VIII is plain, it is improper to explore its legislative history, as the dissent would have us do. "The rule which should be applied is that laws, and especially foundational laws such as our Constitution, should be interpreted and applied according to the plain import of their language as it would be understood by persons of ordinary intelligence and experience." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "779 P.2d 685, 686",
"parenthetical": "\"Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 938 (Utah 1975), disavowed on other grounds, State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 448 n. 4 (Utah 1983); see also University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 428, 295 P.2d 348, 361 (1956) (holding that if constitutional provision is clear, “then extraneous or contemporaneous construction may not be resorted to”); Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 944 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that because this court is sworn to uphold language of constitution, we must enforce plain and unambiguous language contained therein); cf. Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989) (“Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "4 Utah 2d 408, 428",
"parenthetical": "holding that if constitutional provision is clear, \"then extraneous or contemporaneous construction may not be resorted to\"",
"sentence": "State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 938 (Utah 1975), disavowed on other grounds, State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 448 n. 4 (Utah 1983); see also University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 428, 295 P.2d 348, 361 (1956) (holding that if constitutional provision is clear, “then extraneous or contemporaneous construction may not be resorted to”); Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 944 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that because this court is sworn to uphold language of constitution, we must enforce plain and unambiguous language contained therein); cf. Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989) (“Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent.”)."
} | 10,354,345 | b |
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