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B. The Basis For Determinations Although I disagree with giving any deference to the BIA's or the INS's conclusions about whether a particular crime is one necessarily involving moral turpitude, I agree with the majority that in determining whether the crime of which the alien has been convicted falls within one of the grounds for deportation under SS 241(a)(2)(A), both the court and the BIA look only at the definition of the crime under state law, and not at the underlying facts and circumstances of the alien's particular offense. Thus, in addition to the state-law definition of the crime charged, both the BIA and the reviewing court look only at the record of conviction, which includes the crime as described in the indictment or information, the plea, the verdict or judgment, and the sentence, but not any evidence offered in the case or other facts or circumstances involved. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court looked at \"facts of the present case, where petitioner has acknowledged his false statements and the statements made to defraud the United States Government,\" to find that \"the convie-tions may be considered as involving moral turpitude for purposes of denying voluntary departure.\"",
"sentence": "Cabral, 15 F.3d at 196 & n. 6; United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 1003 (9th Cir.1991) (BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case); Alleyne v. U.S. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1185 (3d Cir.1989) (same); but see Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir.) (court looked at “facts of the present case, where petitioner has acknowledged his false statements and the statements made to defraud the United States Government,” to find that “the convie-tions may be considered as involving moral turpitude for purposes of denying voluntary departure.”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982, 109 S.Ct. 533, 102 L.Ed.2d 564 (1988); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.1964) (“record of conviction” includes “the indictment or information, plea, verdict or judgment and sentence”); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N.Dec. 269, 270 (BIA1975) (record of conviction includes “charge or indictment, the plea, the judgment or verdict, and the sentence,” citing United States ex rel. Teper v. Miller, 87 F.Supp. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.1949))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "935 F.2d 990, 1003",
"parenthetical": "BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case",
"sentence": "Cabral, 15 F.3d at 196 & n. 6; United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 1003 (9th Cir.1991) (BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case); Alleyne v. U.S. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1185 (3d Cir.1989) (same); but see Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir.) (court looked at “facts of the present case, where petitioner has acknowledged his false statements and the statements made to defraud the United States Government,” to find that “the convie-tions may be considered as involving moral turpitude for purposes of denying voluntary departure.”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982, 109 S.Ct. 533, 102 L.Ed.2d 564 (1988); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.1964) (“record of conviction” includes “the indictment or information, plea, verdict or judgment and sentence”); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N.Dec. 269, 270 (BIA1975) (record of conviction includes “charge or indictment, the plea, the judgment or verdict, and the sentence,” citing United States ex rel. Teper v. Miller, 87 F.Supp. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.1949))."
} | 7,413,984 | b |
B. The Basis For Determinations Although I disagree with giving any deference to the BIA's or the INS's conclusions about whether a particular crime is one necessarily involving moral turpitude, I agree with the majority that in determining whether the crime of which the alien has been convicted falls within one of the grounds for deportation under SS 241(a)(2)(A), both the court and the BIA look only at the definition of the crime under state law, and not at the underlying facts and circumstances of the alien's particular offense. Thus, in addition to the state-law definition of the crime charged, both the BIA and the reviewing court look only at the record of conviction, which includes the crime as described in the indictment or information, the plea, the verdict or judgment, and the sentence, but not any evidence offered in the case or other facts or circumstances involved. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "329 F.2d 812, 814",
"parenthetical": "\"record of conviction\" includes \"the indictment or information, plea, verdict or judgment and sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cabral, 15 F.3d at 196 & n. 6; United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 1003 (9th Cir.1991) (BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case); Alleyne v. U.S. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1185 (3d Cir.1989) (same); but see Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir.) (court looked at “facts of the present case, where petitioner has acknowledged his false statements and the statements made to defraud the United States Government,” to find that “the convie-tions may be considered as involving moral turpitude for purposes of denying voluntary departure.”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982, 109 S.Ct. 533, 102 L.Ed.2d 564 (1988); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.1964) (“record of conviction” includes “the indictment or information, plea, verdict or judgment and sentence”); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N.Dec. 269, 270 (BIA1975) (record of conviction includes “charge or indictment, the plea, the judgment or verdict, and the sentence,” citing United States ex rel. Teper v. Miller, 87 F.Supp. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.1949))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "935 F.2d 990, 1003",
"parenthetical": "BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case",
"sentence": "Cabral, 15 F.3d at 196 & n. 6; United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 1003 (9th Cir.1991) (BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case); Alleyne v. U.S. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1185 (3d Cir.1989) (same); but see Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir.) (court looked at “facts of the present case, where petitioner has acknowledged his false statements and the statements made to defraud the United States Government,” to find that “the convie-tions may be considered as involving moral turpitude for purposes of denying voluntary departure.”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982, 109 S.Ct. 533, 102 L.Ed.2d 564 (1988); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.1964) (“record of conviction” includes “the indictment or information, plea, verdict or judgment and sentence”); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N.Dec. 269, 270 (BIA1975) (record of conviction includes “charge or indictment, the plea, the judgment or verdict, and the sentence,” citing United States ex rel. Teper v. Miller, 87 F.Supp. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.1949))."
} | 7,413,984 | b |
School officials violate the Equal Protection Clause when they punish a student more severely for his conduct than other students because of the student's race. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "259 F.3d 807, 812-15",
"parenthetical": "discussing the suspect nature of racial classifications in the school context",
"sentence": "Buchanan, 99 F.3d at 1360 (stating in context of an Equal Protection claim alleging difference in discipline based on race that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause requires public institutions to ‘treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.’ ” (quoting Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d at 1328)); see also Billings v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 807, 812-15 (7th Cir.2001) (discussing the suspect nature of racial classifications in the school context); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir.2000) (stating in the context of plaintiffs § 1983 claim of disparate punishment on the basis of gender that “[t]o succeed on a § 1983 equal protection claim, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "99 F.3d 1360, 1360",
"parenthetical": "stating in context of an Equal Protection claim alleging difference in discipline based on race that \"[t]he Equal Protection Clause requires public institutions to 'treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.' \" (quoting Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d at 1328",
"sentence": "Buchanan, 99 F.3d at 1360 (stating in context of an Equal Protection claim alleging difference in discipline based on race that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause requires public institutions to ‘treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.’ ” (quoting Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d at 1328)); see also Billings v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 807, 812-15 (7th Cir.2001) (discussing the suspect nature of racial classifications in the school context); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir.2000) (stating in the context of plaintiffs § 1983 claim of disparate punishment on the basis of gender that “[t]o succeed on a § 1983 equal protection claim, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional.”)."
} | 3,829,024 | b |
School officials violate the Equal Protection Clause when they punish a student more severely for his conduct than other students because of the student's race. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "208 F.3d 736, 740",
"parenthetical": "stating in the context of plaintiffs SS 1983 claim of disparate punishment on the basis of gender that \"[t]o succeed on a SS 1983 equal protection claim, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional.\"",
"sentence": "Buchanan, 99 F.3d at 1360 (stating in context of an Equal Protection claim alleging difference in discipline based on race that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause requires public institutions to ‘treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.’ ” (quoting Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d at 1328)); see also Billings v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 807, 812-15 (7th Cir.2001) (discussing the suspect nature of racial classifications in the school context); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir.2000) (stating in the context of plaintiffs § 1983 claim of disparate punishment on the basis of gender that “[t]o succeed on a § 1983 equal protection claim, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "99 F.3d 1360, 1360",
"parenthetical": "stating in context of an Equal Protection claim alleging difference in discipline based on race that \"[t]he Equal Protection Clause requires public institutions to 'treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.' \" (quoting Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d at 1328",
"sentence": "Buchanan, 99 F.3d at 1360 (stating in context of an Equal Protection claim alleging difference in discipline based on race that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause requires public institutions to ‘treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.’ ” (quoting Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d at 1328)); see also Billings v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 807, 812-15 (7th Cir.2001) (discussing the suspect nature of racial classifications in the school context); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir.2000) (stating in the context of plaintiffs § 1983 claim of disparate punishment on the basis of gender that “[t]o succeed on a § 1983 equal protection claim, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional.”)."
} | 3,829,024 | b |
School officials violate the Equal Protection Clause when they punish a student more severely for his conduct than other students because of the student's race. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "259 F.3d 807, 812-15",
"parenthetical": "discussing the suspect nature of racial classifications in the school context",
"sentence": "Buchanan, 99 F.3d at 1360 (stating in context of an Equal Protection claim alleging difference in discipline based on race that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause requires public institutions to ‘treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.’ ” (quoting Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d at 1328)); see also Billings v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 807, 812-15 (7th Cir.2001) (discussing the suspect nature of racial classifications in the school context); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir.2000) (stating in the context of plaintiffs § 1983 claim of disparate punishment on the basis of gender that “[t]o succeed on a § 1983 equal protection claim, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "860 F.2d 1328, 1328",
"parenthetical": "stating in context of an Equal Protection claim alleging difference in discipline based on race that \"[t]he Equal Protection Clause requires public institutions to 'treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.' \" (quoting Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d at 1328",
"sentence": "Buchanan, 99 F.3d at 1360 (stating in context of an Equal Protection claim alleging difference in discipline based on race that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause requires public institutions to ‘treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.’ ” (quoting Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d at 1328)); see also Billings v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 807, 812-15 (7th Cir.2001) (discussing the suspect nature of racial classifications in the school context); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir.2000) (stating in the context of plaintiffs § 1983 claim of disparate punishment on the basis of gender that “[t]o succeed on a § 1983 equal protection claim, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional.”)."
} | 3,829,024 | b |
School officials violate the Equal Protection Clause when they punish a student more severely for his conduct than other students because of the student's race. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "860 F.2d 1328, 1328",
"parenthetical": "stating in context of an Equal Protection claim alleging difference in discipline based on race that \"[t]he Equal Protection Clause requires public institutions to 'treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.' \" (quoting Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d at 1328",
"sentence": "Buchanan, 99 F.3d at 1360 (stating in context of an Equal Protection claim alleging difference in discipline based on race that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause requires public institutions to ‘treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.’ ” (quoting Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d at 1328)); see also Billings v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 807, 812-15 (7th Cir.2001) (discussing the suspect nature of racial classifications in the school context); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir.2000) (stating in the context of plaintiffs § 1983 claim of disparate punishment on the basis of gender that “[t]o succeed on a § 1983 equal protection claim, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "208 F.3d 736, 740",
"parenthetical": "stating in the context of plaintiffs SS 1983 claim of disparate punishment on the basis of gender that \"[t]o succeed on a SS 1983 equal protection claim, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional.\"",
"sentence": "Buchanan, 99 F.3d at 1360 (stating in context of an Equal Protection claim alleging difference in discipline based on race that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause requires public institutions to ‘treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.’ ” (quoting Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d at 1328)); see also Billings v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 807, 812-15 (7th Cir.2001) (discussing the suspect nature of racial classifications in the school context); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir.2000) (stating in the context of plaintiffs § 1983 claim of disparate punishment on the basis of gender that “[t]o succeed on a § 1983 equal protection claim, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional.”)."
} | 3,829,024 | a |
The first factor concerns the composition of the photographic array itself. In this regard, courts have analyzed whether the photographs used were selected or displayed in such a manner as to emphasize or highlight the individual whom the police believe is the suspect. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "at first step in two-pronged test, court \"consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive \"when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant's photograph\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | 5,764,830 | b |
The first factor concerns the composition of the photographic array itself. In this regard, courts have analyzed whether the photographs used were selected or displayed in such a manner as to emphasize or highlight the individual whom the police believe is the suspect. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "475 F.3d 408, 413",
"parenthetical": "court must \"examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive \"when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant's photograph\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | 5,764,830 | b |
The first factor concerns the composition of the photographic array itself. In this regard, courts have analyzed whether the photographs used were selected or displayed in such a manner as to emphasize or highlight the individual whom the police believe is the suspect. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "at first step in two-pronged test, court \"consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness' selection",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | 5,764,830 | b |
The first factor concerns the composition of the photographic array itself. In this regard, courts have analyzed whether the photographs used were selected or displayed in such a manner as to emphasize or highlight the individual whom the police believe is the suspect. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness' selection",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "475 F.3d 408, 413",
"parenthetical": "court must \"examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | 5,764,830 | a |
The first factor concerns the composition of the photographic array itself. In this regard, courts have analyzed whether the photographs used were selected or displayed in such a manner as to emphasize or highlight the individual whom the police believe is the suspect. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "180 Conn. 619, 656",
"parenthetical": "\"[when] afeature is placed on the defendant's photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness' description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "at first step in two-pronged test, court \"consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | 5,764,830 | a |
The first factor concerns the composition of the photographic array itself. In this regard, courts have analyzed whether the photographs used were selected or displayed in such a manner as to emphasize or highlight the individual whom the police believe is the suspect. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "180 Conn. 619, 656",
"parenthetical": "\"[when] afeature is placed on the defendant's photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness' description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "475 F.3d 408, 413",
"parenthetical": "court must \"examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | 5,764,830 | a |
The first factor concerns the composition of the photographic array itself. In this regard, courts have analyzed whether the photographs used were selected or displayed in such a manner as to emphasize or highlight the individual whom the police believe is the suspect. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[when] afeature is placed on the defendant's photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness' description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "at first step in two-pronged test, court \"consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | 5,764,830 | a |
The first factor concerns the composition of the photographic array itself. In this regard, courts have analyzed whether the photographs used were selected or displayed in such a manner as to emphasize or highlight the individual whom the police believe is the suspect. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "475 F.3d 408, 413",
"parenthetical": "court must \"examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[when] afeature is placed on the defendant's photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness' description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | 5,764,830 | b |
The first factor concerns the composition of the photographic array itself. In this regard, courts have analyzed whether the photographs used were selected or displayed in such a manner as to emphasize or highlight the individual whom the police believe is the suspect. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "at first step in two-pronged test, court \"consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[when] afeature is placed on the defendant's photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness' description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | 5,764,830 | b |
The first factor concerns the composition of the photographic array itself. In this regard, courts have analyzed whether the photographs used were selected or displayed in such a manner as to emphasize or highlight the individual whom the police believe is the suspect. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "475 F.3d 408, 413",
"parenthetical": "court must \"examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[when] afeature is placed on the defendant's photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness' description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | 5,764,830 | b |
The first factor concerns the composition of the photographic array itself. In this regard, courts have analyzed whether the photographs used were selected or displayed in such a manner as to emphasize or highlight the individual whom the police believe is the suspect. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[when] afeature is placed on the defendant's photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness' description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "at first step in two-pronged test, court \"consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | 5,764,830 | a |
The first factor concerns the composition of the photographic array itself. In this regard, courts have analyzed whether the photographs used were selected or displayed in such a manner as to emphasize or highlight the individual whom the police believe is the suspect. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "475 F.3d 408, 413",
"parenthetical": "court must \"examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[when] afeature is placed on the defendant's photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness' description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | 5,764,830 | b |
The first factor concerns the composition of the photographic array itself. In this regard, courts have analyzed whether the photographs used were selected or displayed in such a manner as to emphasize or highlight the individual whom the police believe is the suspect. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "at first step in two-pronged test, court \"consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[when] afeature is placed on the defendant's photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness' description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | 5,764,830 | b |
The first factor concerns the composition of the photographic array itself. In this regard, courts have analyzed whether the photographs used were selected or displayed in such a manner as to emphasize or highlight the individual whom the police believe is the suspect. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[when] afeature is placed on the defendant's photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness' description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "475 F.3d 408, 413",
"parenthetical": "court must \"examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, supra, 203 Conn. 176 (multiple photographs of same individual in same or subsequent photographic arrays possibly suggestive “when, in the context of the entire array, the recurrence unnecessarily emphasizes the defendant’s photograph”); State v. Fullwood, supra, 193 Conn. 247 (to be unnecessarily suggestive, variations in array photographs must highlight defendant to point that it affects witness’ selection); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 656, 431 A.2d 501 (“[when] afeature is placed on the defendant’s photograph in order to make the picture conform to the witness’ description of the criminal he or she had seen, the identification proceeding has been held to have been rendered highly suggestive”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980); see also United States v. DeCologero, supra, 530 F.3d 62 (at first step in two-pronged test, court “consider^] whether the photo [graphic] array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect”); United States v. Rattler, 475 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (court must “examine the suggestivity of irregularities between the subjects in the array”)."
} | 5,764,830 | a |
However, the plaintiff does not refer to anything in the record supporting her contention as required by Fed.RXiv.Pro. 56 and D.Kan. Rule 56.1 and, therefore, the fact is deemed uncontroverted. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "927 F.2d 955, 956",
"parenthetical": "\"Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.\"",
"sentence": "Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10th Cir.l995)(holding that in order to withstand summary judgment, the non-movant must identify a genuine issue of material fact by reference to an affidavit, a deposition transcript, or a specific exhibit incorporated therein and that a court need not search the record to find uncited evidence which controverts a material fact); see also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991) (\"Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.\")"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "53 F.3d 1531, 1546",
"parenthetical": "holding that in order to withstand summary judgment, the non-movant must identify a genuine issue of material fact by reference to an affidavit, a deposition transcript, or a specific exhibit incorporated therein and that a court need not search the record to find uncited evidence which controverts a material fact",
"sentence": "Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10th Cir.l995)(holding that in order to withstand summary judgment, the non-movant must identify a genuine issue of material fact by reference to an affidavit, a deposition transcript, or a specific exhibit incorporated therein and that a court need not search the record to find uncited evidence which controverts a material fact); see also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991) (\"Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.\")"
} | 395,778 | b |
However, effects of the Act have been declared in violation of the ex post facto clause contained in the Indiana Constitution, as applied to persons who had committed their crimes prior to the imposition of any registration requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "905 N.E.2d 371, 384",
"parenthetical": "defendant's conviction for failing to register as a sex offender was reversed because the registration statute, as applied to him, added punishment beyond that which could have been imposed when he committed his crime",
"sentence": "See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.2009) (defendant’s conviction for failing to register as a sex offender was reversed because the registration statute, as applied to him, added punishment beyond that which could have been imposed when he committed his crime), reh’g denied; see also State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1154 (Ind.2009) (trial court properly dismissed charge that Pollard violated the residency restriction provision of the Sex Offender Registration Act when he had served his sentence before the Act was enacted and application to him would add punishment beyond that possible when his crime was committed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "908 N.E.2d 1145, 1154",
"parenthetical": "trial court properly dismissed charge that Pollard violated the residency restriction provision of the Sex Offender Registration Act when he had served his sentence before the Act was enacted and application to him would add punishment beyond that possible when his crime was committed",
"sentence": "See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.2009) (defendant’s conviction for failing to register as a sex offender was reversed because the registration statute, as applied to him, added punishment beyond that which could have been imposed when he committed his crime), reh’g denied; see also State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1154 (Ind.2009) (trial court properly dismissed charge that Pollard violated the residency restriction provision of the Sex Offender Registration Act when he had served his sentence before the Act was enacted and application to him would add punishment beyond that possible when his crime was committed)."
} | 7,143,807 | a |
The contract provided in part that if the purchaser failed to obtain financing, "[purchaser shall not be entitled to a refund of its earnest money deposit." But where a contract is held unenforceable, the contract's "provision concerning forfeiture of the funds is also unenforceable." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "176 Ga. 343, 347",
"parenthetical": "\"without a binding contract there can be no breach, ergo no damages for a breach\"",
"sentence": "O’Dell v. Pine Ridge Investments, LLC, 293 Ga. App. 696, 700 (667 SE2d 912) (2008); see Gateway Family &c. v. H.O.P.E. Foundation Ministries, 244 Ga. App. 286, 288 (2) (535 SE2d 286) (2000) (buyer entitled to return of earnest money where property description in sales contract inadequate); see also Woodall v. Williams, 176 Ga. 343, 347 (167 SE 886) (1933) (“without a binding contract there can be no breach, ergo no damages for a breach”). As we have held in Division 1 that the real estate sales contract was unenforceable, the provision concerning the earnest money is also unenforceable."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "244 Ga. App. 286, 288",
"parenthetical": "buyer entitled to return of earnest money where property description in sales contract inadequate",
"sentence": "O’Dell v. Pine Ridge Investments, LLC, 293 Ga. App. 696, 700 (667 SE2d 912) (2008); see Gateway Family &c. v. H.O.P.E. Foundation Ministries, 244 Ga. App. 286, 288 (2) (535 SE2d 286) (2000) (buyer entitled to return of earnest money where property description in sales contract inadequate); see also Woodall v. Williams, 176 Ga. 343, 347 (167 SE 886) (1933) (“without a binding contract there can be no breach, ergo no damages for a breach”). As we have held in Division 1 that the real estate sales contract was unenforceable, the provision concerning the earnest money is also unenforceable."
} | 12,145,763 | b |
The contract provided in part that if the purchaser failed to obtain financing, "[purchaser shall not be entitled to a refund of its earnest money deposit." But where a contract is held unenforceable, the contract's "provision concerning forfeiture of the funds is also unenforceable." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"without a binding contract there can be no breach, ergo no damages for a breach\"",
"sentence": "O’Dell v. Pine Ridge Investments, LLC, 293 Ga. App. 696, 700 (667 SE2d 912) (2008); see Gateway Family &c. v. H.O.P.E. Foundation Ministries, 244 Ga. App. 286, 288 (2) (535 SE2d 286) (2000) (buyer entitled to return of earnest money where property description in sales contract inadequate); see also Woodall v. Williams, 176 Ga. 343, 347 (167 SE 886) (1933) (“without a binding contract there can be no breach, ergo no damages for a breach”). As we have held in Division 1 that the real estate sales contract was unenforceable, the provision concerning the earnest money is also unenforceable."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "244 Ga. App. 286, 288",
"parenthetical": "buyer entitled to return of earnest money where property description in sales contract inadequate",
"sentence": "O’Dell v. Pine Ridge Investments, LLC, 293 Ga. App. 696, 700 (667 SE2d 912) (2008); see Gateway Family &c. v. H.O.P.E. Foundation Ministries, 244 Ga. App. 286, 288 (2) (535 SE2d 286) (2000) (buyer entitled to return of earnest money where property description in sales contract inadequate); see also Woodall v. Williams, 176 Ga. 343, 347 (167 SE 886) (1933) (“without a binding contract there can be no breach, ergo no damages for a breach”). As we have held in Division 1 that the real estate sales contract was unenforceable, the provision concerning the earnest money is also unenforceable."
} | 12,145,763 | b |
Even substantive rights based on foreign laws, however, have been given extraterritorial effect. Courts have also held that even a criminal statute may have extraterritorial effect. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "7 Mich. 161, 221",
"parenthetical": "\"every sovereignty has the right, subject to certain restrictions, to protect itself from, and to punish as crimes, certain acts which are peculiarly injurious to its rights or interests, or those of its citizens, wherever committed\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284, 31 S. Ct. 558, 55 L. Ed. 735 (1910) (upholding prosecution in Michigan for acts of bribery and obtaining public money under false pretenses by defendant in Illinois, offenses by their nature peculiarly injurious to the state of Michigan); see also People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161, 221 (1859) (“every sovereignty has the right, subject to certain restrictions, to protect itself from, and to punish as crimes, certain acts which are peculiarly injurious to its rights or interests, or those of its citizens, wherever committed”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "221 U.S. 280, 284",
"parenthetical": "upholding prosecution in Michigan for acts of bribery and obtaining public money under false pretenses by defendant in Illinois, offenses by their nature peculiarly injurious to the state of Michigan",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284, 31 S. Ct. 558, 55 L. Ed. 735 (1910) (upholding prosecution in Michigan for acts of bribery and obtaining public money under false pretenses by defendant in Illinois, offenses by their nature peculiarly injurious to the state of Michigan); see also People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161, 221 (1859) (“every sovereignty has the right, subject to certain restrictions, to protect itself from, and to punish as crimes, certain acts which are peculiarly injurious to its rights or interests, or those of its citizens, wherever committed”)."
} | 549,890 | b |
Even substantive rights based on foreign laws, however, have been given extraterritorial effect. Courts have also held that even a criminal statute may have extraterritorial effect. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding prosecution in Michigan for acts of bribery and obtaining public money under false pretenses by defendant in Illinois, offenses by their nature peculiarly injurious to the state of Michigan",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284, 31 S. Ct. 558, 55 L. Ed. 735 (1910) (upholding prosecution in Michigan for acts of bribery and obtaining public money under false pretenses by defendant in Illinois, offenses by their nature peculiarly injurious to the state of Michigan); see also People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161, 221 (1859) (“every sovereignty has the right, subject to certain restrictions, to protect itself from, and to punish as crimes, certain acts which are peculiarly injurious to its rights or interests, or those of its citizens, wherever committed”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "7 Mich. 161, 221",
"parenthetical": "\"every sovereignty has the right, subject to certain restrictions, to protect itself from, and to punish as crimes, certain acts which are peculiarly injurious to its rights or interests, or those of its citizens, wherever committed\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284, 31 S. Ct. 558, 55 L. Ed. 735 (1910) (upholding prosecution in Michigan for acts of bribery and obtaining public money under false pretenses by defendant in Illinois, offenses by their nature peculiarly injurious to the state of Michigan); see also People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161, 221 (1859) (“every sovereignty has the right, subject to certain restrictions, to protect itself from, and to punish as crimes, certain acts which are peculiarly injurious to its rights or interests, or those of its citizens, wherever committed”)."
} | 549,890 | a |
Even substantive rights based on foreign laws, however, have been given extraterritorial effect. Courts have also held that even a criminal statute may have extraterritorial effect. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding prosecution in Michigan for acts of bribery and obtaining public money under false pretenses by defendant in Illinois, offenses by their nature peculiarly injurious to the state of Michigan",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284, 31 S. Ct. 558, 55 L. Ed. 735 (1910) (upholding prosecution in Michigan for acts of bribery and obtaining public money under false pretenses by defendant in Illinois, offenses by their nature peculiarly injurious to the state of Michigan); see also People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161, 221 (1859) (“every sovereignty has the right, subject to certain restrictions, to protect itself from, and to punish as crimes, certain acts which are peculiarly injurious to its rights or interests, or those of its citizens, wherever committed”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "7 Mich. 161, 221",
"parenthetical": "\"every sovereignty has the right, subject to certain restrictions, to protect itself from, and to punish as crimes, certain acts which are peculiarly injurious to its rights or interests, or those of its citizens, wherever committed\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284, 31 S. Ct. 558, 55 L. Ed. 735 (1910) (upholding prosecution in Michigan for acts of bribery and obtaining public money under false pretenses by defendant in Illinois, offenses by their nature peculiarly injurious to the state of Michigan); see also People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161, 221 (1859) (“every sovereignty has the right, subject to certain restrictions, to protect itself from, and to punish as crimes, certain acts which are peculiarly injurious to its rights or interests, or those of its citizens, wherever committed”)."
} | 549,890 | a |
. Duncan argues that the district court erred in adopting the magistrate's credibility determinations because the court relied on impermissible factors in discrediting his testimony, including Duncan's self-interest and use of a translator at the suppression hearing. Even if the district court relied on impermissible factors, any error was harmless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "289 F.3d 744, 749",
"parenthetical": "we accept a credibility determination \"unless it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no reasonable factfinder could accept it\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir.2002) (we accept a credibility determination “unless it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no reasonable factfinder could accept it”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "835 F.2d 1406, 1411",
"parenthetical": "applying harmless error review in the context of the denial of a motion to suppress",
"sentence": "United States v. Alexander, 835 F.2d 1406, 1411 (11th Cir. 1988) (applying harmless error review in the context of the denial of a motion to suppress). Internal inconsistencies existed in Duncan's testimony and nothing compelled a rejection of the magistrate's credibility determination, given that Duncan's testimony corroborated the officer’s testimony in material respects."
} | 3,841,178 | b |
At the August 2009 hearing, the IJ explained to Kohwarien the necessity of waiving all appellate rights to be eligible for pre-conclusion voluntary departure, which Kohwarien did without reservation. We do not require a specific incantation to evidence a valid waiver of appellate rights, but leave that matter to the immigration judge's discretion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "22 I. & N. Dec. 1323, 1323",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the precise articulation of appeal rights required in any given case will necessarily depend on the circumstances of that case, we do not seek to alter any statement currently used by an Immigration Judge that satisfactorily communicates the right to appeal.\"",
"sentence": "See Ali, 525 F.3d at 171 (“We reaffirm the IJ’s authority to notify an alien of his right to appeal and to seek a waiver of the right in any method that sufficiently safeguards the alien’s right.”); see also Rodriguez-Diaz, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1323 (“Because the precise articulation of appeal rights required in any given case will necessarily depend on the circumstances of that case, we do not seek to alter any statement currently used by an Immigration Judge that satisfactorily communicates the right to appeal.”). The IJ’s colloquy here provides substantial evidence to support the BIA’s finding."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "525 F.3d 171, 171",
"parenthetical": "\"We reaffirm the IJ's authority to notify an alien of his right to appeal and to seek a waiver of the right in any method that sufficiently safeguards the alien's right.\"",
"sentence": "See Ali, 525 F.3d at 171 (“We reaffirm the IJ’s authority to notify an alien of his right to appeal and to seek a waiver of the right in any method that sufficiently safeguards the alien’s right.”); see also Rodriguez-Diaz, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1323 (“Because the precise articulation of appeal rights required in any given case will necessarily depend on the circumstances of that case, we do not seek to alter any statement currently used by an Immigration Judge that satisfactorily communicates the right to appeal.”). The IJ’s colloquy here provides substantial evidence to support the BIA’s finding."
} | 4,030,348 | b |
Nonetheless, under the authority of Chambers v. Mississippi, I conclude that Fornes's statements to Cohen are admissible. As the Supreme Court held in Chambers, even if the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible under the state's rules of evidence, a defendant in a criminal case may nonetheless be entitled to introduce the evidence if its exclusion would render his trial fundamentally unfair. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "410 U.S. 302, 302-03",
"parenthetical": "holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay); see also Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514, 409 N.E.2d 983 (1980) (“even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay); see also Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514, 409 N.E.2d 983 (1980) (“even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure”)."
} | 9,495,744 | a |
Nonetheless, under the authority of Chambers v. Mississippi, I conclude that Fornes's statements to Cohen are admissible. As the Supreme Court held in Chambers, even if the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible under the state's rules of evidence, a defendant in a criminal case may nonetheless be entitled to introduce the evidence if its exclusion would render his trial fundamentally unfair. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay); see also Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514, 409 N.E.2d 983 (1980) (“even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "410 U.S. 302, 302-03",
"parenthetical": "holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay); see also Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514, 409 N.E.2d 983 (1980) (“even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure”)."
} | 9,495,744 | b |
Nonetheless, under the authority of Chambers v. Mississippi, I conclude that Fornes's statements to Cohen are admissible. As the Supreme Court held in Chambers, even if the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible under the state's rules of evidence, a defendant in a criminal case may nonetheless be entitled to introduce the evidence if its exclusion would render his trial fundamentally unfair. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay); see also Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514, 409 N.E.2d 983 (1980) (“even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "410 U.S. 302, 302-03",
"parenthetical": "holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay); see also Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514, 409 N.E.2d 983 (1980) (“even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure”)."
} | 9,495,744 | b |
Nonetheless, under the authority of Chambers v. Mississippi, I conclude that Fornes's statements to Cohen are admissible. As the Supreme Court held in Chambers, even if the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible under the state's rules of evidence, a defendant in a criminal case may nonetheless be entitled to introduce the evidence if its exclusion would render his trial fundamentally unfair. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay); see also Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514, 409 N.E.2d 983 (1980) (“even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay); see also Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514, 409 N.E.2d 983 (1980) (“even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure”)."
} | 9,495,744 | b |
Nonetheless, under the authority of Chambers v. Mississippi, I conclude that Fornes's statements to Cohen are admissible. As the Supreme Court held in Chambers, even if the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible under the state's rules of evidence, a defendant in a criminal case may nonetheless be entitled to introduce the evidence if its exclusion would render his trial fundamentally unfair. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay); see also Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514, 409 N.E.2d 983 (1980) (“even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay); see also Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514, 409 N.E.2d 983 (1980) (“even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure”)."
} | 9,495,744 | a |
Nonetheless, under the authority of Chambers v. Mississippi, I conclude that Fornes's statements to Cohen are admissible. As the Supreme Court held in Chambers, even if the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible under the state's rules of evidence, a defendant in a criminal case may nonetheless be entitled to introduce the evidence if its exclusion would render his trial fundamentally unfair. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay); see also Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514, 409 N.E.2d 983 (1980) (“even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process, even though statements were not admissible under Mississippi law, which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay); see also Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514, 409 N.E.2d 983 (1980) (“even where the technical requirements of the [attorney-client] privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure”)."
} | 9,495,744 | a |
Pleener submits that the district court erred when, in employing McDonnell Douglas analysis to her claim of discriminatory removal as principal, it concluded that Pleener had failed to adduce evidence that defendant's proffered nondiseriminatory reason for her removal was pretextual and that the real reason for her removal was racial bias. We disagree. While Pleener disputes the merits of the Board's view of (1) the deteriorating state of affairs at Beach Channel High School, (2) Pleener's role in that deterioration, and (3) her inability to provide the leadership necessary to restore stability, she failed to adduce any evidence that the Board did not sincerely hold that view or that otherwise would permit a factfinder to conclude that the Board's real reason for removing her was her race. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "230 F.3d 34, 44",
"parenthetical": "holding that even if plaintiff could demonstrate that failed drug test proffered by defendant as ground for dismissal was in error, that showing would not demonstrate that reliance on test was pretext for discrimination",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 44 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that even if plaintiff could demonstrate that failed drug test proffered by defendant as ground for dismissal was in error, that showing would not demonstrate that reliance on test was pretext for discrimination); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 12 F.3d 326, 331 (3d Cir.1995) (“To discredit the employer’s proffered reason, the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether a discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Myers v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 684 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir.1982) (“Even if the Brotherhood’s factfinding was mistaken, that circumstance would not establish discrimination in the absence of facts indicating that some identifiable group within the Local was erroneously being branded as ‘contracting members’ as a pretext for accomplishing a discriminatory denial of their right to vote.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "684 F.2d 225, 227",
"parenthetical": "\"Even if the Brotherhood's factfinding was mistaken, that circumstance would not establish discrimination in the absence of facts indicating that some identifiable group within the Local was erroneously being branded as 'contracting members' as a pretext for accomplishing a discriminatory denial of their right to vote.\"",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 44 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that even if plaintiff could demonstrate that failed drug test proffered by defendant as ground for dismissal was in error, that showing would not demonstrate that reliance on test was pretext for discrimination); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 12 F.3d 326, 331 (3d Cir.1995) (“To discredit the employer’s proffered reason, the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether a discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Myers v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 684 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir.1982) (“Even if the Brotherhood’s factfinding was mistaken, that circumstance would not establish discrimination in the absence of facts indicating that some identifiable group within the Local was erroneously being branded as ‘contracting members’ as a pretext for accomplishing a discriminatory denial of their right to vote.”)."
} | 3,878,118 | a |
The Court disagrees. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that the reasons for Anthoine's dismissal (e.g., unsatisfactory performance, insubordination, and discourteous treatment of the public or other employees) were not sufficiently serious to "stigmatize" or otherwise burden Anthoine such that he is unable to take advantage of other employment opportunities. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "520 F.2d 803, 806",
"parenthetical": "charges of \"insubordination, incompetence, hostility toward authority, and aggressive behavior\" are insufficiently stigmatizing to implicate a constitutional liberty interest",
"sentence": "See Portman, 995 F.2d at 907 (“Charges that carry the stigma of moral turpitude such as dishonesty or immorality may implicate a liberty interest, but charges of incompetence or inability to get along with others do not.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir.1975) (charges of “insubordination, incompetence, hostility toward authority, and aggressive behavior” are insufficiently stigmatizing to implicate a constitutional liberty interest)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "995 F.2d 907, 907",
"parenthetical": "\"Charges that carry the stigma of moral turpitude such as dishonesty or immorality may implicate a liberty interest, but charges of incompetence or inability to get along with others do not.\"",
"sentence": "See Portman, 995 F.2d at 907 (“Charges that carry the stigma of moral turpitude such as dishonesty or immorality may implicate a liberty interest, but charges of incompetence or inability to get along with others do not.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir.1975) (charges of “insubordination, incompetence, hostility toward authority, and aggressive behavior” are insufficiently stigmatizing to implicate a constitutional liberty interest)."
} | 5,715,615 | b |
Several circuits also hold that plaintiffs claiming that an executive officer's conduct, grouped under the term "sexual assault," violated the substantive Due Process Clause must show the officer's conduct shocked the conscience as part of their claims. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "271 F.3d 341, 342-43, 344-45",
"parenthetical": "applying the conscience-shocking test when a plaintiff alleged an officer shoved him",
"sentence": "We agree. See Cummings v. Mclntire, 271 F.3d 341, 342-43, 344-45 (1st Cir.2001) (applying the conscience-shocking test when a plaintiff alleged an officer shoved him); see also Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 272-73 (opining though not holding that the conscience-shocking test likely applies to deprivations of property). In this case the jury was correctly instructed on the shocks-the-conscience element."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "568 F.3d 272, 272-73",
"parenthetical": "opining though not holding that the conscience-shocking test likely applies to deprivations of property",
"sentence": "We agree. See Cummings v. Mclntire, 271 F.3d 341, 342-43, 344-45 (1st Cir.2001) (applying the conscience-shocking test when a plaintiff alleged an officer shoved him); see also Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 272-73 (opining though not holding that the conscience-shocking test likely applies to deprivations of property). In this case the jury was correctly instructed on the shocks-the-conscience element."
} | 3,687,753 | a |
Ms. Liles specifically testified that she was upset by the fact that her mother's organs had been incinerated and that they had been mixed with trash. In light of this evidence regarding the Hospital's conduct, we cannot say that the trial court erred in submitting this limited issue to the jury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "136 So.3d 651, 651",
"parenthetical": "\" 'If there are conflicts in the evidence or different reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury.'\" (quoting Sims, 898 So.2d at 1005",
"sentence": "See Hoy, 136 So.3d at 651 (“ ‘If there are conflicts in the evidence or different reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury.’” (quoting Sims, 898 So.2d at 1005)); Smith v. Telophase Nat’l Cremation Soc’y, Inc., 471 So.2d 163, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (affirming denial of crematorium’s motion for directed verdict in case where jury found that crematorium committed tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress when it gave deceased’s widow another person’s ashes and scattered deceased’s ashes at sea against his wishes; “it [is] within the province of the jury to find that the facts, and the proper inferences from the facts, establish that [crematorium’s] conduct was extreme and outrageous”); see also Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So.2d 683, 691 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (recognizing that “our society ... shows a particular solicitude for the emotional vulnerability of survivors regarding improper behavior toward” their dead loved one and that in such cases, “behavior which in other circumstances might be merely insulting, frivolous, or careless becomes indecent, outrageous[,] and intolerable”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "575 So.2d 683, 691",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"our society ... shows a particular solicitude for the emotional vulnerability of survivors regarding improper behavior toward\" their dead loved one and that in such cases, \"behavior which in other circumstances might be merely insulting, frivolous, or careless becomes indecent, outrageous[,] and intolerable\"",
"sentence": "See Hoy, 136 So.3d at 651 (“ ‘If there are conflicts in the evidence or different reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury.’” (quoting Sims, 898 So.2d at 1005)); Smith v. Telophase Nat’l Cremation Soc’y, Inc., 471 So.2d 163, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (affirming denial of crematorium’s motion for directed verdict in case where jury found that crematorium committed tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress when it gave deceased’s widow another person’s ashes and scattered deceased’s ashes at sea against his wishes; “it [is] within the province of the jury to find that the facts, and the proper inferences from the facts, establish that [crematorium’s] conduct was extreme and outrageous”); see also Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So.2d 683, 691 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (recognizing that “our society ... shows a particular solicitude for the emotional vulnerability of survivors regarding improper behavior toward” their dead loved one and that in such cases, “behavior which in other circumstances might be merely insulting, frivolous, or careless becomes indecent, outrageous[,] and intolerable”)."
} | 6,912,963 | a |
Under these circumstances, we can only conclude that a reasonable officer in Bomar's position would not have stopped Hernandez absent a desire to investigate his suspicions of illegal drug activity. We therefore hold that the stop was pretextual. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "929 F.2d 500, 502",
"parenthetical": "stop was not pretextual because even though officers suspected defendant of drug trafficking, they would have made the stop anyway because defendant was carelessly speeding in violation of state law",
"sentence": "See United States v. Millan, 36 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that traffic stop for driving with a cracked windshield was pretextual because state law did not prohibit driving with a cracked windshield and government did not establish any other legitimate reason for the stop); cf. United States v. Lillard, 929 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir.1991) (stop was not pretextual because even though officers suspected defendant of drug trafficking, they would have made the stop anyway because defendant was carelessly speeding in violation of state law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 886, 889",
"parenthetical": "concluding that traffic stop for driving with a cracked windshield was pretextual because state law did not prohibit driving with a cracked windshield and government did not establish any other legitimate reason for the stop",
"sentence": "See United States v. Millan, 36 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that traffic stop for driving with a cracked windshield was pretextual because state law did not prohibit driving with a cracked windshield and government did not establish any other legitimate reason for the stop); cf. United States v. Lillard, 929 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir.1991) (stop was not pretextual because even though officers suspected defendant of drug trafficking, they would have made the stop anyway because defendant was carelessly speeding in violation of state law)."
} | 7,413,891 | b |
Article 37.07, section 3(a), entitled, "Evidence of Prior Criminal Record in all Criminal Cases After a Finding of Guilty," governs the admissibility of evidence at punishment in all non-capital cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "994 S.W.2d 180, 188",
"parenthetical": "\"non-capital cases are governed by Article 37.07, which requires that extraneous offenses be proven beyond a reasonable doubt\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (“[i]n addition to the Rules of Evidence, Article 37.07 Section 3(a) governs the admissibility of evidence during the punishment stage”); see also Kutzner v. State, 994 S.W.2d 180, 188 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (“non-capital cases are governed by Article 37.07, which requires that extraneous offenses be proven beyond a reasonable doubt”); Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 521 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (noting that Article 37.07 “governs the punishment charge in non-capital trials”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "991 S.W.2d 263, 265",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]n addition to the Rules of Evidence, Article 37.07 Section 3(a",
"sentence": "See Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (“[i]n addition to the Rules of Evidence, Article 37.07 Section 3(a) governs the admissibility of evidence during the punishment stage”); see also Kutzner v. State, 994 S.W.2d 180, 188 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (“non-capital cases are governed by Article 37.07, which requires that extraneous offenses be proven beyond a reasonable doubt”); Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 521 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (noting that Article 37.07 “governs the punishment charge in non-capital trials”)."
} | 8,897,601 | b |
Article 37.07, section 3(a), entitled, "Evidence of Prior Criminal Record in all Criminal Cases After a Finding of Guilty," governs the admissibility of evidence at punishment in all non-capital cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that Article 37.07 \"governs the punishment charge in non-capital trials\"",
"sentence": "See Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (“[i]n addition to the Rules of Evidence, Article 37.07 Section 3(a) governs the admissibility of evidence during the punishment stage”); see also Kutzner v. State, 994 S.W.2d 180, 188 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (“non-capital cases are governed by Article 37.07, which requires that extraneous offenses be proven beyond a reasonable doubt”); Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 521 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (noting that Article 37.07 “governs the punishment charge in non-capital trials”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "991 S.W.2d 263, 265",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]n addition to the Rules of Evidence, Article 37.07 Section 3(a",
"sentence": "See Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (“[i]n addition to the Rules of Evidence, Article 37.07 Section 3(a) governs the admissibility of evidence during the punishment stage”); see also Kutzner v. State, 994 S.W.2d 180, 188 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (“non-capital cases are governed by Article 37.07, which requires that extraneous offenses be proven beyond a reasonable doubt”); Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 521 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (noting that Article 37.07 “governs the punishment charge in non-capital trials”)."
} | 8,897,601 | b |
However, our supreme court has announced that a presumption that a quotient verdict exists is to be drawn when the figures used by the jury in its computations give rise to "a fair inference" that the jury determined the amount of their verdict by use of a quotient process. In doing so, I conclude that the focus should not be on the numerical difference between the quotient and the verdict but, instead, should be centered on whether the evidence gives rise to the fair inference that the jury's verdict was induced by the use of the quotient process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "184 Ala. 259, 259",
"parenthetical": "\"The evil effects of a quotient verdict cannot be cured by agreeing thereafter to a slightly different verdict, if it appears that the agreement made in advance entered into or induced the result.\"",
"sentence": "See Abercrombie, 184 Ala. at 259, 63 So. at 554 (“The evil effects of a quotient verdict cannot be cured by agreeing thereafter to a slightly different verdict, if it appears that the agreement made in advance entered into or induced the result.”); see also Benjamin v. Helena Light & Ry. Co., 79 Mont. 144, 255 P. 20, 24 (1927) (noting the lack of a “well-defined rule about what discrepancy is slight nor how much the discrepancy may be and the verdict still be invalid” and concluding that “[mjuch seems to rest on the basic facts that mathematical calculation was resorted to and led up to the fixing of the amount of the verdict, even though not the same as the quotient”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting the lack of a \"well-defined rule about what discrepancy is slight nor how much the discrepancy may be and the verdict still be invalid\" and concluding that \"[mjuch seems to rest on the basic facts that mathematical calculation was resorted to and led up to the fixing of the amount of the verdict, even though not the same as the quotient\"",
"sentence": "See Abercrombie, 184 Ala. at 259, 63 So. at 554 (“The evil effects of a quotient verdict cannot be cured by agreeing thereafter to a slightly different verdict, if it appears that the agreement made in advance entered into or induced the result.”); see also Benjamin v. Helena Light & Ry. Co., 79 Mont. 144, 255 P. 20, 24 (1927) (noting the lack of a “well-defined rule about what discrepancy is slight nor how much the discrepancy may be and the verdict still be invalid” and concluding that “[mjuch seems to rest on the basic facts that mathematical calculation was resorted to and led up to the fixing of the amount of the verdict, even though not the same as the quotient”)."
} | 6,924,109 | a |
However, our supreme court has announced that a presumption that a quotient verdict exists is to be drawn when the figures used by the jury in its computations give rise to "a fair inference" that the jury determined the amount of their verdict by use of a quotient process. In doing so, I conclude that the focus should not be on the numerical difference between the quotient and the verdict but, instead, should be centered on whether the evidence gives rise to the fair inference that the jury's verdict was induced by the use of the quotient process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "255 P. 20, 24",
"parenthetical": "noting the lack of a \"well-defined rule about what discrepancy is slight nor how much the discrepancy may be and the verdict still be invalid\" and concluding that \"[mjuch seems to rest on the basic facts that mathematical calculation was resorted to and led up to the fixing of the amount of the verdict, even though not the same as the quotient\"",
"sentence": "See Abercrombie, 184 Ala. at 259, 63 So. at 554 (“The evil effects of a quotient verdict cannot be cured by agreeing thereafter to a slightly different verdict, if it appears that the agreement made in advance entered into or induced the result.”); see also Benjamin v. Helena Light & Ry. Co., 79 Mont. 144, 255 P. 20, 24 (1927) (noting the lack of a “well-defined rule about what discrepancy is slight nor how much the discrepancy may be and the verdict still be invalid” and concluding that “[mjuch seems to rest on the basic facts that mathematical calculation was resorted to and led up to the fixing of the amount of the verdict, even though not the same as the quotient”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "184 Ala. 259, 259",
"parenthetical": "\"The evil effects of a quotient verdict cannot be cured by agreeing thereafter to a slightly different verdict, if it appears that the agreement made in advance entered into or induced the result.\"",
"sentence": "See Abercrombie, 184 Ala. at 259, 63 So. at 554 (“The evil effects of a quotient verdict cannot be cured by agreeing thereafter to a slightly different verdict, if it appears that the agreement made in advance entered into or induced the result.”); see also Benjamin v. Helena Light & Ry. Co., 79 Mont. 144, 255 P. 20, 24 (1927) (noting the lack of a “well-defined rule about what discrepancy is slight nor how much the discrepancy may be and the verdict still be invalid” and concluding that “[mjuch seems to rest on the basic facts that mathematical calculation was resorted to and led up to the fixing of the amount of the verdict, even though not the same as the quotient”)."
} | 6,924,109 | b |
However, our supreme court has announced that a presumption that a quotient verdict exists is to be drawn when the figures used by the jury in its computations give rise to "a fair inference" that the jury determined the amount of their verdict by use of a quotient process. In doing so, I conclude that the focus should not be on the numerical difference between the quotient and the verdict but, instead, should be centered on whether the evidence gives rise to the fair inference that the jury's verdict was induced by the use of the quotient process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting the lack of a \"well-defined rule about what discrepancy is slight nor how much the discrepancy may be and the verdict still be invalid\" and concluding that \"[mjuch seems to rest on the basic facts that mathematical calculation was resorted to and led up to the fixing of the amount of the verdict, even though not the same as the quotient\"",
"sentence": "See Abercrombie, 184 Ala. at 259, 63 So. at 554 (“The evil effects of a quotient verdict cannot be cured by agreeing thereafter to a slightly different verdict, if it appears that the agreement made in advance entered into or induced the result.”); see also Benjamin v. Helena Light & Ry. Co., 79 Mont. 144, 255 P. 20, 24 (1927) (noting the lack of a “well-defined rule about what discrepancy is slight nor how much the discrepancy may be and the verdict still be invalid” and concluding that “[mjuch seems to rest on the basic facts that mathematical calculation was resorted to and led up to the fixing of the amount of the verdict, even though not the same as the quotient”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "63 So. 554, 554",
"parenthetical": "\"The evil effects of a quotient verdict cannot be cured by agreeing thereafter to a slightly different verdict, if it appears that the agreement made in advance entered into or induced the result.\"",
"sentence": "See Abercrombie, 184 Ala. at 259, 63 So. at 554 (“The evil effects of a quotient verdict cannot be cured by agreeing thereafter to a slightly different verdict, if it appears that the agreement made in advance entered into or induced the result.”); see also Benjamin v. Helena Light & Ry. Co., 79 Mont. 144, 255 P. 20, 24 (1927) (noting the lack of a “well-defined rule about what discrepancy is slight nor how much the discrepancy may be and the verdict still be invalid” and concluding that “[mjuch seems to rest on the basic facts that mathematical calculation was resorted to and led up to the fixing of the amount of the verdict, even though not the same as the quotient”)."
} | 6,924,109 | b |
However, our supreme court has announced that a presumption that a quotient verdict exists is to be drawn when the figures used by the jury in its computations give rise to "a fair inference" that the jury determined the amount of their verdict by use of a quotient process. In doing so, I conclude that the focus should not be on the numerical difference between the quotient and the verdict but, instead, should be centered on whether the evidence gives rise to the fair inference that the jury's verdict was induced by the use of the quotient process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "63 So. 554, 554",
"parenthetical": "\"The evil effects of a quotient verdict cannot be cured by agreeing thereafter to a slightly different verdict, if it appears that the agreement made in advance entered into or induced the result.\"",
"sentence": "See Abercrombie, 184 Ala. at 259, 63 So. at 554 (“The evil effects of a quotient verdict cannot be cured by agreeing thereafter to a slightly different verdict, if it appears that the agreement made in advance entered into or induced the result.”); see also Benjamin v. Helena Light & Ry. Co., 79 Mont. 144, 255 P. 20, 24 (1927) (noting the lack of a “well-defined rule about what discrepancy is slight nor how much the discrepancy may be and the verdict still be invalid” and concluding that “[mjuch seems to rest on the basic facts that mathematical calculation was resorted to and led up to the fixing of the amount of the verdict, even though not the same as the quotient”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "255 P. 20, 24",
"parenthetical": "noting the lack of a \"well-defined rule about what discrepancy is slight nor how much the discrepancy may be and the verdict still be invalid\" and concluding that \"[mjuch seems to rest on the basic facts that mathematical calculation was resorted to and led up to the fixing of the amount of the verdict, even though not the same as the quotient\"",
"sentence": "See Abercrombie, 184 Ala. at 259, 63 So. at 554 (“The evil effects of a quotient verdict cannot be cured by agreeing thereafter to a slightly different verdict, if it appears that the agreement made in advance entered into or induced the result.”); see also Benjamin v. Helena Light & Ry. Co., 79 Mont. 144, 255 P. 20, 24 (1927) (noting the lack of a “well-defined rule about what discrepancy is slight nor how much the discrepancy may be and the verdict still be invalid” and concluding that “[mjuch seems to rest on the basic facts that mathematical calculation was resorted to and led up to the fixing of the amount of the verdict, even though not the same as the quotient”)."
} | 6,924,109 | a |
Nebraska ease law does not establish criteria to follow in determining whether substantial equity exists in a particular case. However, a review of Nebraska deci-sional law reveals that strict foreclosure has been allowed not only where there is no equity in property, but also where a purchaser has paid approximately 11% of the contract price. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity",
"sentence": "But see Ruhl v. Johnson, 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951) (equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "vendee has no equity where a debt of $38,000.00 is compared to the property valued at $24,-000.00",
"sentence": "See Swanson v. Madsen, 145 Neb. 815, 18 N.W.2d 217 (1945) (vendee has no equity where a debt of $38,000.00 is compared to the property valued at $24,-000.00); Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. at 122, 277 N.W.2d at 565-66 (equity of $1559.68 as compared to a purchase price of $13,500.00 is not substantial equity)."
} | 6,116,645 | b |
Nebraska ease law does not establish criteria to follow in determining whether substantial equity exists in a particular case. However, a review of Nebraska deci-sional law reveals that strict foreclosure has been allowed not only where there is no equity in property, but also where a purchaser has paid approximately 11% of the contract price. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "vendee has no equity where a debt of $38,000.00 is compared to the property valued at $24,-000.00",
"sentence": "See Swanson v. Madsen, 145 Neb. 815, 18 N.W.2d 217 (1945) (vendee has no equity where a debt of $38,000.00 is compared to the property valued at $24,-000.00); Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. at 122, 277 N.W.2d at 565-66 (equity of $1559.68 as compared to a purchase price of $13,500.00 is not substantial equity)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity",
"sentence": "But see Ruhl v. Johnson, 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951) (equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity)."
} | 6,116,645 | a |
Nebraska ease law does not establish criteria to follow in determining whether substantial equity exists in a particular case. However, a review of Nebraska deci-sional law reveals that strict foreclosure has been allowed not only where there is no equity in property, but also where a purchaser has paid approximately 11% of the contract price. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity",
"sentence": "But see Ruhl v. Johnson, 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951) (equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "vendee has no equity where a debt of $38,000.00 is compared to the property valued at $24,-000.00",
"sentence": "See Swanson v. Madsen, 145 Neb. 815, 18 N.W.2d 217 (1945) (vendee has no equity where a debt of $38,000.00 is compared to the property valued at $24,-000.00); Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. at 122, 277 N.W.2d at 565-66 (equity of $1559.68 as compared to a purchase price of $13,500.00 is not substantial equity)."
} | 6,116,645 | b |
Nebraska ease law does not establish criteria to follow in determining whether substantial equity exists in a particular case. However, a review of Nebraska deci-sional law reveals that strict foreclosure has been allowed not only where there is no equity in property, but also where a purchaser has paid approximately 11% of the contract price. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity",
"sentence": "But see Ruhl v. Johnson, 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951) (equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "vendee has no equity where a debt of $38,000.00 is compared to the property valued at $24,-000.00",
"sentence": "See Swanson v. Madsen, 145 Neb. 815, 18 N.W.2d 217 (1945) (vendee has no equity where a debt of $38,000.00 is compared to the property valued at $24,-000.00); Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. at 122, 277 N.W.2d at 565-66 (equity of $1559.68 as compared to a purchase price of $13,500.00 is not substantial equity)."
} | 6,116,645 | b |
Nebraska ease law does not establish criteria to follow in determining whether substantial equity exists in a particular case. However, a review of Nebraska deci-sional law reveals that strict foreclosure has been allowed not only where there is no equity in property, but also where a purchaser has paid approximately 11% of the contract price. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity",
"sentence": "But see Ruhl v. Johnson, 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951) (equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "203 Neb. 122, 122",
"parenthetical": "equity of $1559.68 as compared to a purchase price of $13,500.00 is not substantial equity",
"sentence": "See Swanson v. Madsen, 145 Neb. 815, 18 N.W.2d 217 (1945) (vendee has no equity where a debt of $38,000.00 is compared to the property valued at $24,-000.00); Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. at 122, 277 N.W.2d at 565-66 (equity of $1559.68 as compared to a purchase price of $13,500.00 is not substantial equity)."
} | 6,116,645 | b |
Nebraska ease law does not establish criteria to follow in determining whether substantial equity exists in a particular case. However, a review of Nebraska deci-sional law reveals that strict foreclosure has been allowed not only where there is no equity in property, but also where a purchaser has paid approximately 11% of the contract price. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity",
"sentence": "But see Ruhl v. Johnson, 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951) (equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "203 Neb. 122, 122",
"parenthetical": "equity of $1559.68 as compared to a purchase price of $13,500.00 is not substantial equity",
"sentence": "See Swanson v. Madsen, 145 Neb. 815, 18 N.W.2d 217 (1945) (vendee has no equity where a debt of $38,000.00 is compared to the property valued at $24,-000.00); Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. at 122, 277 N.W.2d at 565-66 (equity of $1559.68 as compared to a purchase price of $13,500.00 is not substantial equity)."
} | 6,116,645 | b |
Nebraska ease law does not establish criteria to follow in determining whether substantial equity exists in a particular case. However, a review of Nebraska deci-sional law reveals that strict foreclosure has been allowed not only where there is no equity in property, but also where a purchaser has paid approximately 11% of the contract price. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity",
"sentence": "But see Ruhl v. Johnson, 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951) (equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 N.W.2d 565, 565-66",
"parenthetical": "equity of $1559.68 as compared to a purchase price of $13,500.00 is not substantial equity",
"sentence": "See Swanson v. Madsen, 145 Neb. 815, 18 N.W.2d 217 (1945) (vendee has no equity where a debt of $38,000.00 is compared to the property valued at $24,-000.00); Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. at 122, 277 N.W.2d at 565-66 (equity of $1559.68 as compared to a purchase price of $13,500.00 is not substantial equity)."
} | 6,116,645 | b |
Nebraska ease law does not establish criteria to follow in determining whether substantial equity exists in a particular case. However, a review of Nebraska deci-sional law reveals that strict foreclosure has been allowed not only where there is no equity in property, but also where a purchaser has paid approximately 11% of the contract price. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity",
"sentence": "But see Ruhl v. Johnson, 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951) (equity of $16,000.00 as compared to a purchase price of $38,000.00 is substantial equity)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 N.W.2d 565, 565-66",
"parenthetical": "equity of $1559.68 as compared to a purchase price of $13,500.00 is not substantial equity",
"sentence": "See Swanson v. Madsen, 145 Neb. 815, 18 N.W.2d 217 (1945) (vendee has no equity where a debt of $38,000.00 is compared to the property valued at $24,-000.00); Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. at 122, 277 N.W.2d at 565-66 (equity of $1559.68 as compared to a purchase price of $13,500.00 is not substantial equity)."
} | 6,116,645 | b |
Because this case presents a situation in which six agencies with overlapping expertise were explicitly tasked by Congress to jointly draft and adopt regulations as part of a coordinated endeavor, this Court declines to conclude that Chevron is not applicable simply because more than one agency was involved in the rulemaking. See Individual Reference Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "753 F.Supp.2d 103, 122-23",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"where multiple agencies are charged with administering a statute, a single agency's interpretation is generally not entitled to Chevron deference,\" but concluding that \"there would be no comparable concern if all three agencies charged with administering the [statute in question] pressed the same interpretation before this Court\"",
"sentence": "Grp., Inc. v. FTC, 145 F.Supp.2d 6, 24 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that where “the subject matter of the statute falls squarely within the agencies’ areas of expertise, and the Regulations were issued as a result of a statutorily-coordinated effort among the agencies, Chevron is the governing standard”), aff'd sub nom. Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also New Life Evangelistic Ctr., Inc. v. Sebelius, 753 F.Supp.2d 103, 122-23 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that “where multiple agencies are charged with administering a statute, a single agency’s interpretation is generally not entitled to Chevron deference,” but concluding that “there would be no comparable concern if all three agencies charged with administering the [statute in question] pressed the same interpretation before this Court”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "145 F.Supp.2d 6, 24",
"parenthetical": "holding that where \"the subject matter of the statute falls squarely within the agencies' areas of expertise, and the Regulations were issued as a result of a statutorily-coordinated effort among the agencies, Chevron is the governing standard\"",
"sentence": "Grp., Inc. v. FTC, 145 F.Supp.2d 6, 24 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that where “the subject matter of the statute falls squarely within the agencies’ areas of expertise, and the Regulations were issued as a result of a statutorily-coordinated effort among the agencies, Chevron is the governing standard”), aff'd sub nom. Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also New Life Evangelistic Ctr., Inc. v. Sebelius, 753 F.Supp.2d 103, 122-23 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that “where multiple agencies are charged with administering a statute, a single agency’s interpretation is generally not entitled to Chevron deference,” but concluding that “there would be no comparable concern if all three agencies charged with administering the [statute in question] pressed the same interpretation before this Court”)."
} | 12,270,667 | b |
Because this case presents a situation in which six agencies with overlapping expertise were explicitly tasked by Congress to jointly draft and adopt regulations as part of a coordinated endeavor, this Court declines to conclude that Chevron is not applicable simply because more than one agency was involved in the rulemaking. See Individual Reference Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "753 F.Supp.2d 103, 122-23",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"where multiple agencies are charged with administering a statute, a single agency's interpretation is generally not entitled to Chevron deference,\" but concluding that \"there would be no comparable concern if all three agencies charged with administering the [statute in question] pressed the same interpretation before this Court\"",
"sentence": "Grp., Inc. v. FTC, 145 F.Supp.2d 6, 24 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that where “the subject matter of the statute falls squarely within the agencies’ areas of expertise, and the Regulations were issued as a result of a statutorily-coordinated effort among the agencies, Chevron is the governing standard”), aff'd sub nom. Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also New Life Evangelistic Ctr., Inc. v. Sebelius, 753 F.Supp.2d 103, 122-23 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that “where multiple agencies are charged with administering a statute, a single agency’s interpretation is generally not entitled to Chevron deference,” but concluding that “there would be no comparable concern if all three agencies charged with administering the [statute in question] pressed the same interpretation before this Court”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where \"the subject matter of the statute falls squarely within the agencies' areas of expertise, and the Regulations were issued as a result of a statutorily-coordinated effort among the agencies, Chevron is the governing standard\"",
"sentence": "Grp., Inc. v. FTC, 145 F.Supp.2d 6, 24 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that where “the subject matter of the statute falls squarely within the agencies’ areas of expertise, and the Regulations were issued as a result of a statutorily-coordinated effort among the agencies, Chevron is the governing standard”), aff'd sub nom. Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also New Life Evangelistic Ctr., Inc. v. Sebelius, 753 F.Supp.2d 103, 122-23 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that “where multiple agencies are charged with administering a statute, a single agency’s interpretation is generally not entitled to Chevron deference,” but concluding that “there would be no comparable concern if all three agencies charged with administering the [statute in question] pressed the same interpretation before this Court”)."
} | 12,270,667 | b |
He sent out boarding invoices for non-existent birds, collected the money, and spent it. He reassured customers that there were no problems, both by sending the boarding invoices and by addressing their complaints and concerns directly. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "414 U.S. 395, 403",
"parenthetical": "discussing the fraudulent nature of mails \"designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place\"",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1412 (9th Cir.1995) (discussing use of mails for “lulling scheme,” in which “the mailing reassures the victim that all is well, discouraging him from investigating and uncovering the fraud”); cf. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 403, 94 S.Ct. 645, 38 L.Ed.2d 603 (1974) (discussing the fraudulent nature of mails “designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "44 F.3d 1407, 1412",
"parenthetical": "discussing use of mails for \"lulling scheme,\" in which \"the mailing reassures the victim that all is well, discouraging him from investigating and uncovering the fraud\"",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1412 (9th Cir.1995) (discussing use of mails for “lulling scheme,” in which “the mailing reassures the victim that all is well, discouraging him from investigating and uncovering the fraud”); cf. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 403, 94 S.Ct. 645, 38 L.Ed.2d 603 (1974) (discussing the fraudulent nature of mails “designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place”)."
} | 3,410,935 | b |
He sent out boarding invoices for non-existent birds, collected the money, and spent it. He reassured customers that there were no problems, both by sending the boarding invoices and by addressing their complaints and concerns directly. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "44 F.3d 1407, 1412",
"parenthetical": "discussing use of mails for \"lulling scheme,\" in which \"the mailing reassures the victim that all is well, discouraging him from investigating and uncovering the fraud\"",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1412 (9th Cir.1995) (discussing use of mails for “lulling scheme,” in which “the mailing reassures the victim that all is well, discouraging him from investigating and uncovering the fraud”); cf. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 403, 94 S.Ct. 645, 38 L.Ed.2d 603 (1974) (discussing the fraudulent nature of mails “designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing the fraudulent nature of mails \"designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place\"",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1412 (9th Cir.1995) (discussing use of mails for “lulling scheme,” in which “the mailing reassures the victim that all is well, discouraging him from investigating and uncovering the fraud”); cf. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 403, 94 S.Ct. 645, 38 L.Ed.2d 603 (1974) (discussing the fraudulent nature of mails “designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place”)."
} | 3,410,935 | a |
He sent out boarding invoices for non-existent birds, collected the money, and spent it. He reassured customers that there were no problems, both by sending the boarding invoices and by addressing their complaints and concerns directly. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "44 F.3d 1407, 1412",
"parenthetical": "discussing use of mails for \"lulling scheme,\" in which \"the mailing reassures the victim that all is well, discouraging him from investigating and uncovering the fraud\"",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1412 (9th Cir.1995) (discussing use of mails for “lulling scheme,” in which “the mailing reassures the victim that all is well, discouraging him from investigating and uncovering the fraud”); cf. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 403, 94 S.Ct. 645, 38 L.Ed.2d 603 (1974) (discussing the fraudulent nature of mails “designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing the fraudulent nature of mails \"designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place\"",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1412 (9th Cir.1995) (discussing use of mails for “lulling scheme,” in which “the mailing reassures the victim that all is well, discouraging him from investigating and uncovering the fraud”); cf. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 403, 94 S.Ct. 645, 38 L.Ed.2d 603 (1974) (discussing the fraudulent nature of mails “designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place”)."
} | 3,410,935 | a |
Moreover, between the time of Jones and Powell's direct appeal, the Supreme Court's precedent has developed significantly in the field of state law affirmative defenses that fully satisfy the Winship baseline demand. This precedent on affirmative defenses provides ready support for concluding that the SJC's due process ruling in Powell's direct appeal is not objectively unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "432 U.S. 210, 210",
"parenthetical": "holding that due process does not create \"a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319 (holding that due process does not create “a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.”); see also Martin, 480 U.S. at 238-35, 107 S.Ct. 1098 (upholding state statute that placed on the accused the burdens of production and of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt for self-defense as an affirmative defense)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "480 U.S. 238, 238-35",
"parenthetical": "upholding state statute that placed on the accused the burdens of production and of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt for self-defense as an affirmative defense",
"sentence": "See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319 (holding that due process does not create “a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.”); see also Martin, 480 U.S. at 238-35, 107 S.Ct. 1098 (upholding state statute that placed on the accused the burdens of production and of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt for self-defense as an affirmative defense)."
} | 4,148,279 | a |
Moreover, between the time of Jones and Powell's direct appeal, the Supreme Court's precedent has developed significantly in the field of state law affirmative defenses that fully satisfy the Winship baseline demand. This precedent on affirmative defenses provides ready support for concluding that the SJC's due process ruling in Powell's direct appeal is not objectively unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "432 U.S. 210, 210",
"parenthetical": "holding that due process does not create \"a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319 (holding that due process does not create “a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.”); see also Martin, 480 U.S. at 238-35, 107 S.Ct. 1098 (upholding state statute that placed on the accused the burdens of production and of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt for self-defense as an affirmative defense)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding state statute that placed on the accused the burdens of production and of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt for self-defense as an affirmative defense",
"sentence": "See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319 (holding that due process does not create “a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.”); see also Martin, 480 U.S. at 238-35, 107 S.Ct. 1098 (upholding state statute that placed on the accused the burdens of production and of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt for self-defense as an affirmative defense)."
} | 4,148,279 | a |
Moreover, between the time of Jones and Powell's direct appeal, the Supreme Court's precedent has developed significantly in the field of state law affirmative defenses that fully satisfy the Winship baseline demand. This precedent on affirmative defenses provides ready support for concluding that the SJC's due process ruling in Powell's direct appeal is not objectively unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "480 U.S. 238, 238-35",
"parenthetical": "upholding state statute that placed on the accused the burdens of production and of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt for self-defense as an affirmative defense",
"sentence": "See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319 (holding that due process does not create “a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.”); see also Martin, 480 U.S. at 238-35, 107 S.Ct. 1098 (upholding state statute that placed on the accused the burdens of production and of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt for self-defense as an affirmative defense)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that due process does not create \"a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319 (holding that due process does not create “a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.”); see also Martin, 480 U.S. at 238-35, 107 S.Ct. 1098 (upholding state statute that placed on the accused the burdens of production and of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt for self-defense as an affirmative defense)."
} | 4,148,279 | b |
Moreover, between the time of Jones and Powell's direct appeal, the Supreme Court's precedent has developed significantly in the field of state law affirmative defenses that fully satisfy the Winship baseline demand. This precedent on affirmative defenses provides ready support for concluding that the SJC's due process ruling in Powell's direct appeal is not objectively unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that due process does not create \"a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319 (holding that due process does not create “a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.”); see also Martin, 480 U.S. at 238-35, 107 S.Ct. 1098 (upholding state statute that placed on the accused the burdens of production and of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt for self-defense as an affirmative defense)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding state statute that placed on the accused the burdens of production and of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt for self-defense as an affirmative defense",
"sentence": "See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319 (holding that due process does not create “a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.”); see also Martin, 480 U.S. at 238-35, 107 S.Ct. 1098 (upholding state statute that placed on the accused the burdens of production and of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt for self-defense as an affirmative defense)."
} | 4,148,279 | a |
Dose asserts in his brief that his physical impairments substantially limit him in the major life activity of breathing. Defendant BVU does not contest, nor can it, that breathing is a major life activity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "249 F.3d 557, 562",
"parenthetical": "\"A person is 'disabled' under the Act if his or her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more life activities, including breathing and self-care.\"",
"sentence": "See Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir.1999) (“Major life activities do include functions such as ‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.’”) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104); Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423, 424 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA); see also E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 249 F.3d 557, 562 (6th Cir.2001) (“A person is ‘disabled’ under the Act if his or her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more life activities, including breathing and self-care.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1203, 152 L.Ed.2d 141 (2002); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir.2000) (“Major life activities include such functions as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working.”); Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that plaintiffs claim that she was “disabled” because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ADA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "164 F.3d 423, 424",
"parenthetical": "holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA",
"sentence": "See Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir.1999) (“Major life activities do include functions such as ‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.’”) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104); Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423, 424 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA); see also E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 249 F.3d 557, 562 (6th Cir.2001) (“A person is ‘disabled’ under the Act if his or her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more life activities, including breathing and self-care.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1203, 152 L.Ed.2d 141 (2002); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir.2000) (“Major life activities include such functions as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working.”); Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that plaintiffs claim that she was “disabled” because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ADA)."
} | 9,324,054 | b |
Dose asserts in his brief that his physical impairments substantially limit him in the major life activity of breathing. Defendant BVU does not contest, nor can it, that breathing is a major life activity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person is 'disabled' under the Act if his or her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more life activities, including breathing and self-care.\"",
"sentence": "See Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir.1999) (“Major life activities do include functions such as ‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.’”) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104); Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423, 424 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA); see also E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 249 F.3d 557, 562 (6th Cir.2001) (“A person is ‘disabled’ under the Act if his or her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more life activities, including breathing and self-care.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1203, 152 L.Ed.2d 141 (2002); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir.2000) (“Major life activities include such functions as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working.”); Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that plaintiffs claim that she was “disabled” because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ADA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "164 F.3d 423, 424",
"parenthetical": "holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA",
"sentence": "See Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir.1999) (“Major life activities do include functions such as ‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.’”) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104); Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423, 424 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA); see also E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 249 F.3d 557, 562 (6th Cir.2001) (“A person is ‘disabled’ under the Act if his or her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more life activities, including breathing and self-care.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1203, 152 L.Ed.2d 141 (2002); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir.2000) (“Major life activities include such functions as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working.”); Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that plaintiffs claim that she was “disabled” because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ADA)."
} | 9,324,054 | b |
Dose asserts in his brief that his physical impairments substantially limit him in the major life activity of breathing. Defendant BVU does not contest, nor can it, that breathing is a major life activity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person is 'disabled' under the Act if his or her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more life activities, including breathing and self-care.\"",
"sentence": "See Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir.1999) (“Major life activities do include functions such as ‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.’”) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104); Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423, 424 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA); see also E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 249 F.3d 557, 562 (6th Cir.2001) (“A person is ‘disabled’ under the Act if his or her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more life activities, including breathing and self-care.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1203, 152 L.Ed.2d 141 (2002); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir.2000) (“Major life activities include such functions as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working.”); Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that plaintiffs claim that she was “disabled” because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ADA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "164 F.3d 423, 424",
"parenthetical": "holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA",
"sentence": "See Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir.1999) (“Major life activities do include functions such as ‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.’”) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104); Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423, 424 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA); see also E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 249 F.3d 557, 562 (6th Cir.2001) (“A person is ‘disabled’ under the Act if his or her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more life activities, including breathing and self-care.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1203, 152 L.Ed.2d 141 (2002); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir.2000) (“Major life activities include such functions as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working.”); Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that plaintiffs claim that she was “disabled” because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ADA)."
} | 9,324,054 | b |
Dose asserts in his brief that his physical impairments substantially limit him in the major life activity of breathing. Defendant BVU does not contest, nor can it, that breathing is a major life activity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.3d 492, 495-96",
"parenthetical": "\"Major life activities include such functions as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working.\"",
"sentence": "See Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir.1999) (“Major life activities do include functions such as ‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.’”) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104); Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423, 424 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA); see also E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 249 F.3d 557, 562 (6th Cir.2001) (“A person is ‘disabled’ under the Act if his or her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more life activities, including breathing and self-care.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1203, 152 L.Ed.2d 141 (2002); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir.2000) (“Major life activities include such functions as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working.”); Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that plaintiffs claim that she was “disabled” because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ADA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "164 F.3d 423, 424",
"parenthetical": "holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA",
"sentence": "See Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir.1999) (“Major life activities do include functions such as ‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.’”) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104); Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423, 424 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA); see also E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 249 F.3d 557, 562 (6th Cir.2001) (“A person is ‘disabled’ under the Act if his or her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more life activities, including breathing and self-care.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1203, 152 L.Ed.2d 141 (2002); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir.2000) (“Major life activities include such functions as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working.”); Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that plaintiffs claim that she was “disabled” because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ADA)."
} | 9,324,054 | b |
Dose asserts in his brief that his physical impairments substantially limit him in the major life activity of breathing. Defendant BVU does not contest, nor can it, that breathing is a major life activity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "164 F.3d 423, 424",
"parenthetical": "holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA",
"sentence": "See Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir.1999) (“Major life activities do include functions such as ‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.’”) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104); Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423, 424 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA); see also E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 249 F.3d 557, 562 (6th Cir.2001) (“A person is ‘disabled’ under the Act if his or her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more life activities, including breathing and self-care.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1203, 152 L.Ed.2d 141 (2002); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir.2000) (“Major life activities include such functions as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working.”); Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that plaintiffs claim that she was “disabled” because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ADA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "91 F.3d 959, 961",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs claim that she was \"disabled\" because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ADA",
"sentence": "See Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir.1999) (“Major life activities do include functions such as ‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.’”) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104); Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423, 424 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA); see also E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 249 F.3d 557, 562 (6th Cir.2001) (“A person is ‘disabled’ under the Act if his or her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more life activities, including breathing and self-care.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1203, 152 L.Ed.2d 141 (2002); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir.2000) (“Major life activities include such functions as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working.”); Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that plaintiffs claim that she was “disabled” because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ADA)."
} | 9,324,054 | a |
Accordingly, this Court agrees with other district courts that have recently reviewed this issue and concludes that there is no rational connection between Defendants' assertion and the legitimate interest of successful childrearing. To the contrary, this Court finds that far from encouraging a stable environment for childrearing, Section 32 denies children of same-sex parents the protections and stability they would enjoy if their parents could marry. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "962 F.Supp.2d 993, 993-95",
"parenthetical": "noting the only effect the marriage recognition bans have on children's well-being is harming the children of same-sex couples who are denied the protection and stability of having parents who are legally married",
"sentence": "See Obergefell, 962 F.Supp.2d at 993-95, 2013 WL 7869139, at *20 (noting the only effect the marriage recognition bans have on children’s well-being is harming the children of same-sex couples who are denied the protection and stability of having parents who are legally married); see also Golinski, 824 F.Supp.2d at 992 (“The denial of recognition and withholding of marital benefits to same-sex couples does nothing to support opposite-sex parents, but rather merely serves to endanger children of same-sex parents.”); Pedersen, 881 F.Supp.2d at 336-37 (finding that the denial of marriage to same-sex parents “in fact leads to a significant unintended and untoward consequence by limiting the resources, protections, and benefits available to children of same-sex parents.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "824 F.Supp.2d 992, 992",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of recognition and withholding of marital benefits to same-sex couples does nothing to support opposite-sex parents, but rather merely serves to endanger children of same-sex parents.\"",
"sentence": "See Obergefell, 962 F.Supp.2d at 993-95, 2013 WL 7869139, at *20 (noting the only effect the marriage recognition bans have on children’s well-being is harming the children of same-sex couples who are denied the protection and stability of having parents who are legally married); see also Golinski, 824 F.Supp.2d at 992 (“The denial of recognition and withholding of marital benefits to same-sex couples does nothing to support opposite-sex parents, but rather merely serves to endanger children of same-sex parents.”); Pedersen, 881 F.Supp.2d at 336-37 (finding that the denial of marriage to same-sex parents “in fact leads to a significant unintended and untoward consequence by limiting the resources, protections, and benefits available to children of same-sex parents.”)."
} | 4,233,804 | a |
Accordingly, this Court agrees with other district courts that have recently reviewed this issue and concludes that there is no rational connection between Defendants' assertion and the legitimate interest of successful childrearing. To the contrary, this Court finds that far from encouraging a stable environment for childrearing, Section 32 denies children of same-sex parents the protections and stability they would enjoy if their parents could marry. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "962 F.Supp.2d 993, 993-95",
"parenthetical": "noting the only effect the marriage recognition bans have on children's well-being is harming the children of same-sex couples who are denied the protection and stability of having parents who are legally married",
"sentence": "See Obergefell, 962 F.Supp.2d at 993-95, 2013 WL 7869139, at *20 (noting the only effect the marriage recognition bans have on children’s well-being is harming the children of same-sex couples who are denied the protection and stability of having parents who are legally married); see also Golinski, 824 F.Supp.2d at 992 (“The denial of recognition and withholding of marital benefits to same-sex couples does nothing to support opposite-sex parents, but rather merely serves to endanger children of same-sex parents.”); Pedersen, 881 F.Supp.2d at 336-37 (finding that the denial of marriage to same-sex parents “in fact leads to a significant unintended and untoward consequence by limiting the resources, protections, and benefits available to children of same-sex parents.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "881 F.Supp.2d 336, 336-37",
"parenthetical": "finding that the denial of marriage to same-sex parents \"in fact leads to a significant unintended and untoward consequence by limiting the resources, protections, and benefits available to children of same-sex parents.\"",
"sentence": "See Obergefell, 962 F.Supp.2d at 993-95, 2013 WL 7869139, at *20 (noting the only effect the marriage recognition bans have on children’s well-being is harming the children of same-sex couples who are denied the protection and stability of having parents who are legally married); see also Golinski, 824 F.Supp.2d at 992 (“The denial of recognition and withholding of marital benefits to same-sex couples does nothing to support opposite-sex parents, but rather merely serves to endanger children of same-sex parents.”); Pedersen, 881 F.Supp.2d at 336-37 (finding that the denial of marriage to same-sex parents “in fact leads to a significant unintended and untoward consequence by limiting the resources, protections, and benefits available to children of same-sex parents.”)."
} | 4,233,804 | a |
Accordingly, this Court agrees with other district courts that have recently reviewed this issue and concludes that there is no rational connection between Defendants' assertion and the legitimate interest of successful childrearing. To the contrary, this Court finds that far from encouraging a stable environment for childrearing, Section 32 denies children of same-sex parents the protections and stability they would enjoy if their parents could marry. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2013 WL 7869139, at *20",
"parenthetical": "noting the only effect the marriage recognition bans have on children's well-being is harming the children of same-sex couples who are denied the protection and stability of having parents who are legally married",
"sentence": "See Obergefell, 962 F.Supp.2d at 993-95, 2013 WL 7869139, at *20 (noting the only effect the marriage recognition bans have on children’s well-being is harming the children of same-sex couples who are denied the protection and stability of having parents who are legally married); see also Golinski, 824 F.Supp.2d at 992 (“The denial of recognition and withholding of marital benefits to same-sex couples does nothing to support opposite-sex parents, but rather merely serves to endanger children of same-sex parents.”); Pedersen, 881 F.Supp.2d at 336-37 (finding that the denial of marriage to same-sex parents “in fact leads to a significant unintended and untoward consequence by limiting the resources, protections, and benefits available to children of same-sex parents.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "824 F.Supp.2d 992, 992",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of recognition and withholding of marital benefits to same-sex couples does nothing to support opposite-sex parents, but rather merely serves to endanger children of same-sex parents.\"",
"sentence": "See Obergefell, 962 F.Supp.2d at 993-95, 2013 WL 7869139, at *20 (noting the only effect the marriage recognition bans have on children’s well-being is harming the children of same-sex couples who are denied the protection and stability of having parents who are legally married); see also Golinski, 824 F.Supp.2d at 992 (“The denial of recognition and withholding of marital benefits to same-sex couples does nothing to support opposite-sex parents, but rather merely serves to endanger children of same-sex parents.”); Pedersen, 881 F.Supp.2d at 336-37 (finding that the denial of marriage to same-sex parents “in fact leads to a significant unintended and untoward consequence by limiting the resources, protections, and benefits available to children of same-sex parents.”)."
} | 4,233,804 | a |
Accordingly, this Court agrees with other district courts that have recently reviewed this issue and concludes that there is no rational connection between Defendants' assertion and the legitimate interest of successful childrearing. To the contrary, this Court finds that far from encouraging a stable environment for childrearing, Section 32 denies children of same-sex parents the protections and stability they would enjoy if their parents could marry. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2013 WL 7869139, at *20",
"parenthetical": "noting the only effect the marriage recognition bans have on children's well-being is harming the children of same-sex couples who are denied the protection and stability of having parents who are legally married",
"sentence": "See Obergefell, 962 F.Supp.2d at 993-95, 2013 WL 7869139, at *20 (noting the only effect the marriage recognition bans have on children’s well-being is harming the children of same-sex couples who are denied the protection and stability of having parents who are legally married); see also Golinski, 824 F.Supp.2d at 992 (“The denial of recognition and withholding of marital benefits to same-sex couples does nothing to support opposite-sex parents, but rather merely serves to endanger children of same-sex parents.”); Pedersen, 881 F.Supp.2d at 336-37 (finding that the denial of marriage to same-sex parents “in fact leads to a significant unintended and untoward consequence by limiting the resources, protections, and benefits available to children of same-sex parents.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "881 F.Supp.2d 336, 336-37",
"parenthetical": "finding that the denial of marriage to same-sex parents \"in fact leads to a significant unintended and untoward consequence by limiting the resources, protections, and benefits available to children of same-sex parents.\"",
"sentence": "See Obergefell, 962 F.Supp.2d at 993-95, 2013 WL 7869139, at *20 (noting the only effect the marriage recognition bans have on children’s well-being is harming the children of same-sex couples who are denied the protection and stability of having parents who are legally married); see also Golinski, 824 F.Supp.2d at 992 (“The denial of recognition and withholding of marital benefits to same-sex couples does nothing to support opposite-sex parents, but rather merely serves to endanger children of same-sex parents.”); Pedersen, 881 F.Supp.2d at 336-37 (finding that the denial of marriage to same-sex parents “in fact leads to a significant unintended and untoward consequence by limiting the resources, protections, and benefits available to children of same-sex parents.”)."
} | 4,233,804 | a |
Notwithstanding this contention, which refers only to Roe and not the other Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their declaratory judgment claim because an actual controversy exists between the parties as to the proper interpretation of the laws governing needle exchange, and because Plaintiffs are likely to suffer future harm as a result of Defendants' interpretation of Section 80.135. As this Court determined, Plaintiffs have satisfied the burden of pleading likelihood of future harm in this case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "151 F.Supp.2d 495, 502-504",
"parenthetical": "no per se rule requiring any prior act as basis for finding future likelihood of future injury where ongoing pattern and practice of arresting and detaining needle exchange participants in the vicinity of needle exchange participants in the vicinity of needle exchange centers pled",
"sentence": "See Roe v. City of New York, 151 F.Supp.2d 495, 502-504 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (no per se rule requiring any prior act as basis for finding future likelihood of future injury where ongoing pattern and practice of arresting and detaining needle exchange participants in the vicinity of needle exchange participants in the vicinity of needle exchange centers pled); see also Deshawn v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir.1998) (likelihood of future harm requirement applies to claim for either injunctive or declaratory relief).'"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "156 F.3d 340, 344",
"parenthetical": "likelihood of future harm requirement applies to claim for either injunctive or declaratory relief",
"sentence": "See Roe v. City of New York, 151 F.Supp.2d 495, 502-504 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (no per se rule requiring any prior act as basis for finding future likelihood of future injury where ongoing pattern and practice of arresting and detaining needle exchange participants in the vicinity of needle exchange participants in the vicinity of needle exchange centers pled); see also Deshawn v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir.1998) (likelihood of future harm requirement applies to claim for either injunctive or declaratory relief).'"
} | 11,357,610 | a |
Briggs's appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, which by its terms applies in a direct criminal appeal unless the sentence imposed was above the court-determined Guidelines range. Further, the record reflects that Briggs entered into both the waiver and the plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily, and we find that no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver in this ease. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "571 F.3d 769, 772",
"parenthetical": "de novo review of whether defendant waived right to appeal sentence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jennings, 662 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir.2011) (court should enforce appeal waiver if both waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, appeal is within scope of waiver, and no miscarriage of justice would result), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2407, 182 L.Ed.2d 1043 (2012); see also United States v. Azure, 571 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir.2009) (de novo review of whether defendant waived right to appeal sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "662 F.3d 988, 990",
"parenthetical": "court should enforce appeal waiver if both waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, appeal is within scope of waiver, and no miscarriage of justice would result",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jennings, 662 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir.2011) (court should enforce appeal waiver if both waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, appeal is within scope of waiver, and no miscarriage of justice would result), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2407, 182 L.Ed.2d 1043 (2012); see also United States v. Azure, 571 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir.2009) (de novo review of whether defendant waived right to appeal sentence)."
} | 3,602,824 | b |
Briggs's appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, which by its terms applies in a direct criminal appeal unless the sentence imposed was above the court-determined Guidelines range. Further, the record reflects that Briggs entered into both the waiver and the plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily, and we find that no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver in this ease. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "571 F.3d 769, 772",
"parenthetical": "de novo review of whether defendant waived right to appeal sentence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jennings, 662 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir.2011) (court should enforce appeal waiver if both waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, appeal is within scope of waiver, and no miscarriage of justice would result), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2407, 182 L.Ed.2d 1043 (2012); see also United States v. Azure, 571 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir.2009) (de novo review of whether defendant waived right to appeal sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court should enforce appeal waiver if both waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, appeal is within scope of waiver, and no miscarriage of justice would result",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jennings, 662 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir.2011) (court should enforce appeal waiver if both waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, appeal is within scope of waiver, and no miscarriage of justice would result), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2407, 182 L.Ed.2d 1043 (2012); see also United States v. Azure, 571 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir.2009) (de novo review of whether defendant waived right to appeal sentence)."
} | 3,602,824 | b |
Briggs's appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, which by its terms applies in a direct criminal appeal unless the sentence imposed was above the court-determined Guidelines range. Further, the record reflects that Briggs entered into both the waiver and the plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily, and we find that no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver in this ease. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court should enforce appeal waiver if both waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, appeal is within scope of waiver, and no miscarriage of justice would result",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jennings, 662 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir.2011) (court should enforce appeal waiver if both waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, appeal is within scope of waiver, and no miscarriage of justice would result), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2407, 182 L.Ed.2d 1043 (2012); see also United States v. Azure, 571 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir.2009) (de novo review of whether defendant waived right to appeal sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "571 F.3d 769, 772",
"parenthetical": "de novo review of whether defendant waived right to appeal sentence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jennings, 662 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir.2011) (court should enforce appeal waiver if both waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, appeal is within scope of waiver, and no miscarriage of justice would result), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2407, 182 L.Ed.2d 1043 (2012); see also United States v. Azure, 571 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir.2009) (de novo review of whether defendant waived right to appeal sentence)."
} | 3,602,824 | a |
in most circumstances a lawyer may rely on his client's decision against presenting mitigating evidence only after completing an appropriate investigation and only where the client's decision is "informed and knowing." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "306 F.3d 665, 720",
"parenthetical": "\"A defendant's insistence that counsel not call witnesses at the penalty phase does not eliminate counsel's duty to investigate mitigating evidence or to advise the defendant of the potential consequences of failing to introduce mitigating evidence, thereby assuring that the defendant's decision regarding such evidence is informed and knowing.\"",
"sentence": "Williams v. Woodford, 306 F.3d 665, 720 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A defendant’s insistence that counsel not call witnesses at the penalty phase does not eliminate counsel’s duty to investigate mitigating evidence or to advise the defendant of the potential consequences of failing to introduce mitigating evidence, thereby assuring that the defendant’s decision regarding such evidence is informed and knowing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "529 U.S. 362, 396",
"parenthetical": "\"Trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background.\" (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed.1980)",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.” (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed.1980))); Silva, 279 F.3d at 840 (“While not directly addressing a situation where a client purportedly seeks to prohibit an attorney from investigating his background, these guidelines suggest that a lawyer’s duty to investigate is virtually absolute, regardless of a Ghent’s expressed wishes.” (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed.1980)))."
} | 5,428,764 | a |
in most circumstances a lawyer may rely on his client's decision against presenting mitigating evidence only after completing an appropriate investigation and only where the client's decision is "informed and knowing." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "306 F.3d 665, 720",
"parenthetical": "\"A defendant's insistence that counsel not call witnesses at the penalty phase does not eliminate counsel's duty to investigate mitigating evidence or to advise the defendant of the potential consequences of failing to introduce mitigating evidence, thereby assuring that the defendant's decision regarding such evidence is informed and knowing.\"",
"sentence": "Williams v. Woodford, 306 F.3d 665, 720 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A defendant’s insistence that counsel not call witnesses at the penalty phase does not eliminate counsel’s duty to investigate mitigating evidence or to advise the defendant of the potential consequences of failing to introduce mitigating evidence, thereby assuring that the defendant’s decision regarding such evidence is informed and knowing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background.\" (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed.1980)",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.” (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed.1980))); Silva, 279 F.3d at 840 (“While not directly addressing a situation where a client purportedly seeks to prohibit an attorney from investigating his background, these guidelines suggest that a lawyer’s duty to investigate is virtually absolute, regardless of a Ghent’s expressed wishes.” (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed.1980)))."
} | 5,428,764 | a |
in most circumstances a lawyer may rely on his client's decision against presenting mitigating evidence only after completing an appropriate investigation and only where the client's decision is "informed and knowing." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background.\" (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed.1980)",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.” (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed.1980))); Silva, 279 F.3d at 840 (“While not directly addressing a situation where a client purportedly seeks to prohibit an attorney from investigating his background, these guidelines suggest that a lawyer’s duty to investigate is virtually absolute, regardless of a Ghent’s expressed wishes.” (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed.1980)))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "306 F.3d 665, 720",
"parenthetical": "\"A defendant's insistence that counsel not call witnesses at the penalty phase does not eliminate counsel's duty to investigate mitigating evidence or to advise the defendant of the potential consequences of failing to introduce mitigating evidence, thereby assuring that the defendant's decision regarding such evidence is informed and knowing.\"",
"sentence": "Williams v. Woodford, 306 F.3d 665, 720 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A defendant’s insistence that counsel not call witnesses at the penalty phase does not eliminate counsel’s duty to investigate mitigating evidence or to advise the defendant of the potential consequences of failing to introduce mitigating evidence, thereby assuring that the defendant’s decision regarding such evidence is informed and knowing.”)."
} | 5,428,764 | b |
in most circumstances a lawyer may rely on his client's decision against presenting mitigating evidence only after completing an appropriate investigation and only where the client's decision is "informed and knowing." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "279 F.3d 840, 840",
"parenthetical": "\"While not directly addressing a situation where a client purportedly seeks to prohibit an attorney from investigating his background, these guidelines suggest that a lawyer's duty to investigate is virtually absolute, regardless of a Ghent's expressed wishes.\" (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed.1980",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.” (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed.1980))); Silva, 279 F.3d at 840 (“While not directly addressing a situation where a client purportedly seeks to prohibit an attorney from investigating his background, these guidelines suggest that a lawyer’s duty to investigate is virtually absolute, regardless of a Ghent’s expressed wishes.” (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed.1980)))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "306 F.3d 665, 720",
"parenthetical": "\"A defendant's insistence that counsel not call witnesses at the penalty phase does not eliminate counsel's duty to investigate mitigating evidence or to advise the defendant of the potential consequences of failing to introduce mitigating evidence, thereby assuring that the defendant's decision regarding such evidence is informed and knowing.\"",
"sentence": "Williams v. Woodford, 306 F.3d 665, 720 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A defendant’s insistence that counsel not call witnesses at the penalty phase does not eliminate counsel’s duty to investigate mitigating evidence or to advise the defendant of the potential consequences of failing to introduce mitigating evidence, thereby assuring that the defendant’s decision regarding such evidence is informed and knowing.”)."
} | 5,428,764 | b |
Although we have not previously addressed the issue of the duration of a bankruptcy fraud for the purpose of setting loss under the Guidelines, other circuits have held that bankruptcy fraud is a continuing offense which lasts until it is detected or its consequences are purged. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 481, 487-88",
"parenthetical": "in bankruptcy concealment action, calculation of fraud loss should take into account relevant conduct under Guideline SS 1B1.3 that occurred after defendant's initial bankruptcy filing where it was linked to the bankrupt estate",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stein, 233 F.3d 6, 18-19 (1st Cir.2000) (“concealment by its nature is an act which goes on until detected or its consequences are purged ... [h]ence it was proper for the court to base its intended loss findings on the value of the property at the time of the sale,” not at the time of concealment); cf. United States v. Butner, 277 F.3d 481, 487-88 (4th Cir.2002) (in bankruptcy concealment action, calculation of fraud loss should take into account relevant conduct under Guideline § 1B1.3 that occurred after defendant’s initial bankruptcy filing where it was linked to the bankrupt estate); United States v. Moody, 923 F.2d 341, 351 (5th Cir.1991) (noting that concealment of bankruptcy assets is a “continuing offense”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "233 F.3d 6, 18-19",
"parenthetical": "\"concealment by its nature is an act which goes on until detected or its consequences are purged ... [h]ence it was proper for the court to base its intended loss findings on the value of the property at the time of the sale,\" not at the time of concealment",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stein, 233 F.3d 6, 18-19 (1st Cir.2000) (“concealment by its nature is an act which goes on until detected or its consequences are purged ... [h]ence it was proper for the court to base its intended loss findings on the value of the property at the time of the sale,” not at the time of concealment); cf. United States v. Butner, 277 F.3d 481, 487-88 (4th Cir.2002) (in bankruptcy concealment action, calculation of fraud loss should take into account relevant conduct under Guideline § 1B1.3 that occurred after defendant’s initial bankruptcy filing where it was linked to the bankrupt estate); United States v. Moody, 923 F.2d 341, 351 (5th Cir.1991) (noting that concealment of bankruptcy assets is a “continuing offense”)."
} | 9,311,813 | b |
Although we have not previously addressed the issue of the duration of a bankruptcy fraud for the purpose of setting loss under the Guidelines, other circuits have held that bankruptcy fraud is a continuing offense which lasts until it is detected or its consequences are purged. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "923 F.2d 341, 351",
"parenthetical": "noting that concealment of bankruptcy assets is a \"continuing offense\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stein, 233 F.3d 6, 18-19 (1st Cir.2000) (“concealment by its nature is an act which goes on until detected or its consequences are purged ... [h]ence it was proper for the court to base its intended loss findings on the value of the property at the time of the sale,” not at the time of concealment); cf. United States v. Butner, 277 F.3d 481, 487-88 (4th Cir.2002) (in bankruptcy concealment action, calculation of fraud loss should take into account relevant conduct under Guideline § 1B1.3 that occurred after defendant’s initial bankruptcy filing where it was linked to the bankrupt estate); United States v. Moody, 923 F.2d 341, 351 (5th Cir.1991) (noting that concealment of bankruptcy assets is a “continuing offense”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "233 F.3d 6, 18-19",
"parenthetical": "\"concealment by its nature is an act which goes on until detected or its consequences are purged ... [h]ence it was proper for the court to base its intended loss findings on the value of the property at the time of the sale,\" not at the time of concealment",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stein, 233 F.3d 6, 18-19 (1st Cir.2000) (“concealment by its nature is an act which goes on until detected or its consequences are purged ... [h]ence it was proper for the court to base its intended loss findings on the value of the property at the time of the sale,” not at the time of concealment); cf. United States v. Butner, 277 F.3d 481, 487-88 (4th Cir.2002) (in bankruptcy concealment action, calculation of fraud loss should take into account relevant conduct under Guideline § 1B1.3 that occurred after defendant’s initial bankruptcy filing where it was linked to the bankrupt estate); United States v. Moody, 923 F.2d 341, 351 (5th Cir.1991) (noting that concealment of bankruptcy assets is a “continuing offense”)."
} | 9,311,813 | b |
Based on the foregoing evidence and the law in Tennessee regarding mutual mistake, it would appear that but for the debtors' current bankruptcy filing, a court of equity would reform the deed in question to preserve First American's secured position. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case",
"sentence": "See also Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266 S.W. 110, 120 (1924) (court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold",
"sentence": "See Alston v. Porter, 31 Tenn.App. 628, 219 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1949) (court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold); Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. Duncan, 23 Tenn.App. 329, 132 S.W.2d 353, 354 (1939) (absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake); Anderson, 74 S.W.2d at 390 (court set aside deed reserving life estate based upon evidence that there was no real meeting of the minds of the parties); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Webb, 1997 WL 44391 at *2 (Tenn.App. Feb.5, 1997) (court of appeals affirmed setting aside of foreclosure sale by chancery court where through mutual mistake bank had foreclosed on wrong lot)."
} | 1,113,505 | b |
Based on the foregoing evidence and the law in Tennessee regarding mutual mistake, it would appear that but for the debtors' current bankruptcy filing, a court of equity would reform the deed in question to preserve First American's secured position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold",
"sentence": "See Alston v. Porter, 31 Tenn.App. 628, 219 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1949) (court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold); Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. Duncan, 23 Tenn.App. 329, 132 S.W.2d 353, 354 (1939) (absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake); Anderson, 74 S.W.2d at 390 (court set aside deed reserving life estate based upon evidence that there was no real meeting of the minds of the parties); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Webb, 1997 WL 44391 at *2 (Tenn.App. Feb.5, 1997) (court of appeals affirmed setting aside of foreclosure sale by chancery court where through mutual mistake bank had foreclosed on wrong lot)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "266 S.W. 110, 120",
"parenthetical": "court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case",
"sentence": "See also Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266 S.W. 110, 120 (1924) (court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case)."
} | 1,113,505 | a |
Based on the foregoing evidence and the law in Tennessee regarding mutual mistake, it would appear that but for the debtors' current bankruptcy filing, a court of equity would reform the deed in question to preserve First American's secured position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "219 S.W.2d 745, 747",
"parenthetical": "court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold",
"sentence": "See Alston v. Porter, 31 Tenn.App. 628, 219 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1949) (court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold); Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. Duncan, 23 Tenn.App. 329, 132 S.W.2d 353, 354 (1939) (absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake); Anderson, 74 S.W.2d at 390 (court set aside deed reserving life estate based upon evidence that there was no real meeting of the minds of the parties); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Webb, 1997 WL 44391 at *2 (Tenn.App. Feb.5, 1997) (court of appeals affirmed setting aside of foreclosure sale by chancery court where through mutual mistake bank had foreclosed on wrong lot)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case",
"sentence": "See also Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266 S.W. 110, 120 (1924) (court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case)."
} | 1,113,505 | a |
Based on the foregoing evidence and the law in Tennessee regarding mutual mistake, it would appear that but for the debtors' current bankruptcy filing, a court of equity would reform the deed in question to preserve First American's secured position. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "266 S.W. 110, 120",
"parenthetical": "court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case",
"sentence": "See also Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266 S.W. 110, 120 (1924) (court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "219 S.W.2d 745, 747",
"parenthetical": "court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold",
"sentence": "See Alston v. Porter, 31 Tenn.App. 628, 219 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1949) (court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold); Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. Duncan, 23 Tenn.App. 329, 132 S.W.2d 353, 354 (1939) (absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake); Anderson, 74 S.W.2d at 390 (court set aside deed reserving life estate based upon evidence that there was no real meeting of the minds of the parties); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Webb, 1997 WL 44391 at *2 (Tenn.App. Feb.5, 1997) (court of appeals affirmed setting aside of foreclosure sale by chancery court where through mutual mistake bank had foreclosed on wrong lot)."
} | 1,113,505 | b |
Based on the foregoing evidence and the law in Tennessee regarding mutual mistake, it would appear that but for the debtors' current bankruptcy filing, a court of equity would reform the deed in question to preserve First American's secured position. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case",
"sentence": "See also Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266 S.W. 110, 120 (1924) (court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake",
"sentence": "See Alston v. Porter, 31 Tenn.App. 628, 219 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1949) (court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold); Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. Duncan, 23 Tenn.App. 329, 132 S.W.2d 353, 354 (1939) (absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake); Anderson, 74 S.W.2d at 390 (court set aside deed reserving life estate based upon evidence that there was no real meeting of the minds of the parties); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Webb, 1997 WL 44391 at *2 (Tenn.App. Feb.5, 1997) (court of appeals affirmed setting aside of foreclosure sale by chancery court where through mutual mistake bank had foreclosed on wrong lot)."
} | 1,113,505 | b |
Based on the foregoing evidence and the law in Tennessee regarding mutual mistake, it would appear that but for the debtors' current bankruptcy filing, a court of equity would reform the deed in question to preserve First American's secured position. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "266 S.W. 110, 120",
"parenthetical": "court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case",
"sentence": "See also Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266 S.W. 110, 120 (1924) (court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake",
"sentence": "See Alston v. Porter, 31 Tenn.App. 628, 219 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1949) (court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold); Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. Duncan, 23 Tenn.App. 329, 132 S.W.2d 353, 354 (1939) (absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake); Anderson, 74 S.W.2d at 390 (court set aside deed reserving life estate based upon evidence that there was no real meeting of the minds of the parties); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Webb, 1997 WL 44391 at *2 (Tenn.App. Feb.5, 1997) (court of appeals affirmed setting aside of foreclosure sale by chancery court where through mutual mistake bank had foreclosed on wrong lot)."
} | 1,113,505 | b |
Based on the foregoing evidence and the law in Tennessee regarding mutual mistake, it would appear that but for the debtors' current bankruptcy filing, a court of equity would reform the deed in question to preserve First American's secured position. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case",
"sentence": "See also Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266 S.W. 110, 120 (1924) (court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "132 S.W.2d 353, 354",
"parenthetical": "absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake",
"sentence": "See Alston v. Porter, 31 Tenn.App. 628, 219 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1949) (court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold); Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. Duncan, 23 Tenn.App. 329, 132 S.W.2d 353, 354 (1939) (absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake); Anderson, 74 S.W.2d at 390 (court set aside deed reserving life estate based upon evidence that there was no real meeting of the minds of the parties); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Webb, 1997 WL 44391 at *2 (Tenn.App. Feb.5, 1997) (court of appeals affirmed setting aside of foreclosure sale by chancery court where through mutual mistake bank had foreclosed on wrong lot)."
} | 1,113,505 | b |
Based on the foregoing evidence and the law in Tennessee regarding mutual mistake, it would appear that but for the debtors' current bankruptcy filing, a court of equity would reform the deed in question to preserve First American's secured position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "132 S.W.2d 353, 354",
"parenthetical": "absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake",
"sentence": "See Alston v. Porter, 31 Tenn.App. 628, 219 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1949) (court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold); Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. Duncan, 23 Tenn.App. 329, 132 S.W.2d 353, 354 (1939) (absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake); Anderson, 74 S.W.2d at 390 (court set aside deed reserving life estate based upon evidence that there was no real meeting of the minds of the parties); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Webb, 1997 WL 44391 at *2 (Tenn.App. Feb.5, 1997) (court of appeals affirmed setting aside of foreclosure sale by chancery court where through mutual mistake bank had foreclosed on wrong lot)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "266 S.W. 110, 120",
"parenthetical": "court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case",
"sentence": "See also Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266 S.W. 110, 120 (1924) (court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case)."
} | 1,113,505 | a |
Based on the foregoing evidence and the law in Tennessee regarding mutual mistake, it would appear that but for the debtors' current bankruptcy filing, a court of equity would reform the deed in question to preserve First American's secured position. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case",
"sentence": "See also Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266 S.W. 110, 120 (1924) (court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "74 S.W.2d 390, 390",
"parenthetical": "court set aside deed reserving life estate based upon evidence that there was no real meeting of the minds of the parties",
"sentence": "See Alston v. Porter, 31 Tenn.App. 628, 219 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1949) (court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold); Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. Duncan, 23 Tenn.App. 329, 132 S.W.2d 353, 354 (1939) (absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake); Anderson, 74 S.W.2d at 390 (court set aside deed reserving life estate based upon evidence that there was no real meeting of the minds of the parties); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Webb, 1997 WL 44391 at *2 (Tenn.App. Feb.5, 1997) (court of appeals affirmed setting aside of foreclosure sale by chancery court where through mutual mistake bank had foreclosed on wrong lot)."
} | 1,113,505 | b |
Based on the foregoing evidence and the law in Tennessee regarding mutual mistake, it would appear that but for the debtors' current bankruptcy filing, a court of equity would reform the deed in question to preserve First American's secured position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "74 S.W.2d 390, 390",
"parenthetical": "court set aside deed reserving life estate based upon evidence that there was no real meeting of the minds of the parties",
"sentence": "See Alston v. Porter, 31 Tenn.App. 628, 219 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1949) (court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold); Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. Duncan, 23 Tenn.App. 329, 132 S.W.2d 353, 354 (1939) (absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake); Anderson, 74 S.W.2d at 390 (court set aside deed reserving life estate based upon evidence that there was no real meeting of the minds of the parties); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Webb, 1997 WL 44391 at *2 (Tenn.App. Feb.5, 1997) (court of appeals affirmed setting aside of foreclosure sale by chancery court where through mutual mistake bank had foreclosed on wrong lot)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "266 S.W. 110, 120",
"parenthetical": "court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case",
"sentence": "See also Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266 S.W. 110, 120 (1924) (court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case)."
} | 1,113,505 | a |
Based on the foregoing evidence and the law in Tennessee regarding mutual mistake, it would appear that but for the debtors' current bankruptcy filing, a court of equity would reform the deed in question to preserve First American's secured position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1997 WL 44391, at *2",
"parenthetical": "court of appeals affirmed setting aside of foreclosure sale by chancery court where through mutual mistake bank had foreclosed on wrong lot",
"sentence": "See Alston v. Porter, 31 Tenn.App. 628, 219 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1949) (court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold); Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. Duncan, 23 Tenn.App. 329, 132 S.W.2d 353, 354 (1939) (absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake); Anderson, 74 S.W.2d at 390 (court set aside deed reserving life estate based upon evidence that there was no real meeting of the minds of the parties); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Webb, 1997 WL 44391 at *2 (Tenn.App. Feb.5, 1997) (court of appeals affirmed setting aside of foreclosure sale by chancery court where through mutual mistake bank had foreclosed on wrong lot)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case",
"sentence": "See also Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266 S.W. 110, 120 (1924) (court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case)."
} | 1,113,505 | a |
Based on the foregoing evidence and the law in Tennessee regarding mutual mistake, it would appear that but for the debtors' current bankruptcy filing, a court of equity would reform the deed in question to preserve First American's secured position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1997 WL 44391, at *2",
"parenthetical": "court of appeals affirmed setting aside of foreclosure sale by chancery court where through mutual mistake bank had foreclosed on wrong lot",
"sentence": "See Alston v. Porter, 31 Tenn.App. 628, 219 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1949) (court reformed deed which set forth descriptions of two tracts of property since understanding of parties was that only one tract was to be sold); Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Chattanooga v. Duncan, 23 Tenn.App. 329, 132 S.W.2d 353, 354 (1939) (absent intervening rights of innocent third parties, reformation permitted where creditor had executed release of note by mistake); Anderson, 74 S.W.2d at 390 (court set aside deed reserving life estate based upon evidence that there was no real meeting of the minds of the parties); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Webb, 1997 WL 44391 at *2 (Tenn.App. Feb.5, 1997) (court of appeals affirmed setting aside of foreclosure sale by chancery court where through mutual mistake bank had foreclosed on wrong lot)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "266 S.W. 110, 120",
"parenthetical": "court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case",
"sentence": "See also Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266 S.W. 110, 120 (1924) (court stated that it was well-settled that a court of equity may reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, but held no showing of mutual mistake in the case)."
} | 1,113,505 | a |
Detective Collins testified that Hodge's drug business in Virginia was related to the New York sales in that Collins "had received information that .... Hodge was selling cocaine on the Eastern Seaboard from Upstate New York to Virginia, as well as North Carolina, transporting cocaine." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "975 F.2d 1016, 1019",
"parenthetical": "explaining that at sentencing district court may consider reliable hearsay in determining drug quantity",
"sentence": "Id. at 433. This evidence, taken together, constituted a strong showing of regularity. Cf. United States v. Uwaeme, 975 F.2d 1016, 1019 (4th Cir.1992) (explaining that at sentencing district court may consider reliable hearsay in determining drug quantity)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "960 F.2d 903, 911",
"parenthetical": "stating without explanation that \"[w]hen regularity is to provide most of the foundation for temporally remote, relevant conduct, specific repeated events outside the offense of conviction must be identified\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Hahn, 960 F.2d 903, 911 (9th Cir.1992) (stating without explanation that “[w]hen regularity is to provide most of the foundation for temporally remote, relevant conduct, specific repeated events outside the offense of conviction must be identified”)."
} | 9,294,864 | a |
Assuming this distribution arrangement required a license for the Composition, there may be an issue of fact about whether Plaintiff knew, in light of the Album's release, that Defendant licensed the Composition to Montage Records without his permission. However, this lack of clarity does not defeat summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "279 F.2d 100, 104-05",
"parenthetical": "affirming dismissal of estoppel defense in copyright action where trial court assumed that Plaintiff knew of infringing conduct and Defendant was ignorant of the true facts, but found no holding out or reliance",
"sentence": "See Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust, 456 F.Supp. at 535 (granting summary judgment for plaintiff on defendant’s estoppel defense “[ejven assuming that plaintiff was aware of the ... assignment from its inception”); see also Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104-05 (9th Cir.1960) (affirming dismissal of estoppel defense in copyright action where trial court assumed that Plaintiff knew of infringing conduct and Defendant was ignorant of the true facts, but found no holding out or reliance)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "456 F.Supp. 535, 535",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment for plaintiff on defendant's estoppel defense \"[ejven assuming that plaintiff was aware of the ... assignment from its inception\"",
"sentence": "See Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust, 456 F.Supp. at 535 (granting summary judgment for plaintiff on defendant’s estoppel defense “[ejven assuming that plaintiff was aware of the ... assignment from its inception”); see also Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104-05 (9th Cir.1960) (affirming dismissal of estoppel defense in copyright action where trial court assumed that Plaintiff knew of infringing conduct and Defendant was ignorant of the true facts, but found no holding out or reliance)."
} | 3,605,406 | b |
First, it is neither uncommon nor improper for district courts to grant applications made pursuant to SS 1782 ex parte. The respondent's due process rights are not violated because he can later challenge any discovery request by moving to quash pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(3). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "673 F.3d 78, 78",
"parenthetical": "reviewing district court's grant of motion to quash subsequent to ex parte grant of SS 1782 petition",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Brandi-Dohrn, 673 F.3d at 78 (reviewing district court’s grant of motion to quash subsequent to ex parte grant of § 1782 petition); In re Edelman, 295 F.3d 171, 173-75 (2d Cir.2002) (same); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 186 (2d Cir.1999) (same); see also In re Letters Rogatory from Tokyo Dist., 539 F.2d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir.1976) (“Letters Rogatory are customarily received and appropriate action taken with respect thereto ex parte.”). Accordingly, Gushlak’s contention that he “was entitled to respond to the [§ 1782] [application both factually and legally and have his response considered by the district court as part of its plenary consideration of the [application” (Gushlak Reply Br. 11) is without merit."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "539 F.2d 1216, 1220",
"parenthetical": "\"Letters Rogatory are customarily received and appropriate action taken with respect thereto ex parte.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Brandi-Dohrn, 673 F.3d at 78 (reviewing district court’s grant of motion to quash subsequent to ex parte grant of § 1782 petition); In re Edelman, 295 F.3d 171, 173-75 (2d Cir.2002) (same); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 186 (2d Cir.1999) (same); see also In re Letters Rogatory from Tokyo Dist., 539 F.2d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir.1976) (“Letters Rogatory are customarily received and appropriate action taken with respect thereto ex parte.”). Accordingly, Gushlak’s contention that he “was entitled to respond to the [§ 1782] [application both factually and legally and have his response considered by the district court as part of its plenary consideration of the [application” (Gushlak Reply Br. 11) is without merit."
} | 5,907,623 | a |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84",
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "869 F.2d 142, 146-47",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | b |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "869 F.2d 142, 146-47",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | b |
PLI's preemption argument rests entirely on the broad interpretation given to the jurisdictional terms "relate to." 29 U.S.C. SS 1144(a). According to PLI, the mere reference to the Martin Oil pension plan in the instant ease requires preemption. Yet, this is far from true, as the mere incidental reference or effect of state laws on an ERISA plan does not provide the requisite basis for preemption. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "869 F.2d 142, 146-47",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that preemption was not required because Michigan's Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions",
"sentence": "See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989) (stating that “[w]hat triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit”); see also Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 858 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (W.D.Mich.1994), aff'd, 76 F.3d 751 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Div’n, Dep’t of Treasury, 520 U.S. 1271, 117 S.Ct. 2448, 138 L.Ed.2d 206 (1997) (holding that preemption was not required because Michigan’s Single Business Tax had only an incidental effect on ERISA plans despite fact that tax was calculated based on plan contributions); accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.Cal.1981) (holding that “where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern, the court should find there has been no preemption”)."
} | 11,623,474 | a |
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