context
stringlengths 58
1.13k
| citation_a
dict | citation_b
dict | case_id
int64 475
12.5M
| label
stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Also like Preiser, Heck addressed only the limited reach of SS 1983 with regard to prisoner suits. It did not set out any concomitant limitation on habeas jurisdiction or hold that the habeas and SS 1983 causes of action are mutually exclusive. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.\"",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner's confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser's ] core and may be brought pursuant to SS 1983 in the first instance.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | 9,174,041 | b |
Also like Preiser, Heck addressed only the limited reach of SS 1983 with regard to prisoner suits. It did not set out any concomitant limitation on habeas jurisdiction or hold that the habeas and SS 1983 causes of action are mutually exclusive. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.\"",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner's confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser's ] core and may be brought pursuant to SS 1983 in the first instance.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | 9,174,041 | b |
Also like Preiser, Heck addressed only the limited reach of SS 1983 with regard to prisoner suits. It did not set out any concomitant limitation on habeas jurisdiction or hold that the habeas and SS 1983 causes of action are mutually exclusive. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.\"",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner's confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser's ] core and may be brought pursuant to SS 1983 in the first instance.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“[Cjonstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [Preiser’s ] core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” (emphasis added)); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself.”)."
} | 9,174,041 | b |
This is certainly so in the case of an order that broadly precludes evidence, one we would expect to be accompanied by findings -- not present here -- of government misconduct and prejudice to the defendants. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "857 F.2d. 659, 659",
"parenthetical": "noting that the government had not violated any discovery orders or behaved duplicitously",
"sentence": "See Schwartz, 857 F.2d. at 659 (noting that the government had not violated any discovery orders or behaved duplicitously); see also United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285, 1292 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that “[i]n selecting a proper [discovery] sanction, a court should typically consider (1) the reasons the government delayed producing requested materials, including whether the government acted in bad faith; (2) the extent of prejudice to defendant as a result of the delay; and (3) the feasibility of curing the prejudice with a continuance”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "164 F.3d 1285, 1292",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[i]n selecting a proper [discovery] sanction, a court should typically consider (1",
"sentence": "See Schwartz, 857 F.2d. at 659 (noting that the government had not violated any discovery orders or behaved duplicitously); see also United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285, 1292 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that “[i]n selecting a proper [discovery] sanction, a court should typically consider (1) the reasons the government delayed producing requested materials, including whether the government acted in bad faith; (2) the extent of prejudice to defendant as a result of the delay; and (3) the feasibility of curing the prejudice with a continuance”)."
} | 3,512,666 | a |
(Tr. at 185-86, 214-15.) However, the court finds, as it did at trial (Tr. at 170, 172), that Defendant's arguments go to the weight, rather than to the admissibility, of Beasley's testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "161 F.3d 77, 85",
"parenthetical": "\"Daubert does not require that a party who proffers expert testimony carry the burden of proving to the judge that the expert's assessment of the situation is correct.\" Where the expert testimony \"rest[s] upon 'good grounds, based on what is known, it should be tested by the adversary process-competing expert testimony and active cross-examination-rather than excluded from jurors' scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.\"",
"sentence": "See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”); see also Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir.1998) (“Daubert does not require that a party who proffers expert testimony carry the burden of proving to the judge that the expert’s assessment of the situation is correct.” Where the expert testimony “rest[s] upon ‘good grounds, based on what is known, it should be tested by the adversary process-competing expert testimony and active cross-examination-rather than excluded from jurors’ scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "509 U.S. 596, 596",
"parenthetical": "\"Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”); see also Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir.1998) (“Daubert does not require that a party who proffers expert testimony carry the burden of proving to the judge that the expert’s assessment of the situation is correct.” Where the expert testimony “rest[s] upon ‘good grounds, based on what is known, it should be tested by the adversary process-competing expert testimony and active cross-examination-rather than excluded from jurors’ scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.”)."
} | 11,236,759 | b |
(Tr. at 185-86, 214-15.) However, the court finds, as it did at trial (Tr. at 170, 172), that Defendant's arguments go to the weight, rather than to the admissibility, of Beasley's testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”); see also Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir.1998) (“Daubert does not require that a party who proffers expert testimony carry the burden of proving to the judge that the expert’s assessment of the situation is correct.” Where the expert testimony “rest[s] upon ‘good grounds, based on what is known, it should be tested by the adversary process-competing expert testimony and active cross-examination-rather than excluded from jurors’ scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "161 F.3d 77, 85",
"parenthetical": "\"Daubert does not require that a party who proffers expert testimony carry the burden of proving to the judge that the expert's assessment of the situation is correct.\" Where the expert testimony \"rest[s] upon 'good grounds, based on what is known, it should be tested by the adversary process-competing expert testimony and active cross-examination-rather than excluded from jurors' scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.\"",
"sentence": "See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”); see also Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir.1998) (“Daubert does not require that a party who proffers expert testimony carry the burden of proving to the judge that the expert’s assessment of the situation is correct.” Where the expert testimony “rest[s] upon ‘good grounds, based on what is known, it should be tested by the adversary process-competing expert testimony and active cross-examination-rather than excluded from jurors’ scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.”)."
} | 11,236,759 | a |
E, CC.) The cited press releases in no manner whatsoever represent Astoria Financial as being directly involved in the lending activities, and all accurately represent the fact that the services are performed by its subsidiaries. These statements are no more probative of dominion or control than publicly consolidated financial statements, and are even less probative than statements affirmatively referring to a subsidiary as a "department" or "unit" of a parent, which has been found, in combination with the other factors present in this case, to be insufficient as a matter of law to justify piercing the corporate veil. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "342 F.Supp.2d 216, 216",
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims against parent corporation under alter ego theory of liability, where only evidence of control consisted of sole ownership of subsidiary, overlapping directors, consolidated financial statements and reference to the subsidiary as a unit",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Ski Train Fire, 342 F.Supp.2d at 216 (dismissing claims against parent corporation under alter ego theory of liability, where only evidence of control consisted of sole ownership of subsidiary, overlapping directors, consolidated financial statements and reference to the subsidiary as a unit); see also Colcord v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., No. 84-JM-912, 1985 WL 17481, at *3 (D.Colo. May 13, 1985) (finding corporate veil piercing not warranted as a matter of law, notwithstanding evidence that parent corporation owned 100 percent of subsidiary, had control over policy and large capital expenditures, used consolidated financial statements, and referred to subsidiaries as \"units or divisions” in reports and brochures)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1985 WL 17481, at *3",
"parenthetical": "finding corporate veil piercing not warranted as a matter of law, notwithstanding evidence that parent corporation owned 100 percent of subsidiary, had control over policy and large capital expenditures, used consolidated financial statements, and referred to subsidiaries as \"units or divisions\" in reports and brochures",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Ski Train Fire, 342 F.Supp.2d at 216 (dismissing claims against parent corporation under alter ego theory of liability, where only evidence of control consisted of sole ownership of subsidiary, overlapping directors, consolidated financial statements and reference to the subsidiary as a unit); see also Colcord v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., No. 84-JM-912, 1985 WL 17481, at *3 (D.Colo. May 13, 1985) (finding corporate veil piercing not warranted as a matter of law, notwithstanding evidence that parent corporation owned 100 percent of subsidiary, had control over policy and large capital expenditures, used consolidated financial statements, and referred to subsidiaries as \"units or divisions” in reports and brochures)."
} | 3,800,460 | a |
. We also note, as an alternative basis for holding that Abbas is not eligible for withholding of removal, that he failed to demonstrate that he would be subject to persecution by the government or with the government's acquiescence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "557 F.3d 429, 436",
"parenthetical": "petitioner not entitled to withholding of removal because he presented \"insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the government would be unwilling or unable to control\" the persons threatening harm",
"sentence": "See Raza v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir.2007) (\"When an asylum claim focuses on non-govemmental conduct, its fate depends on some showing either that the alleged persecutors are aligned with the government or that the government is unwilling or unable to control them.”); see also Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 436 (6th Cir.2009) (petitioner not entitled to withholding of removal because he presented \"insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the government would be unwilling or unable to control” the persons threatening harm)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 F.3d 125, 129",
"parenthetical": "\"When an asylum claim focuses on non-govemmental conduct, its fate depends on some showing either that the alleged persecutors are aligned with the government or that the government is unwilling or unable to control them.\"",
"sentence": "See Raza v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir.2007) (\"When an asylum claim focuses on non-govemmental conduct, its fate depends on some showing either that the alleged persecutors are aligned with the government or that the government is unwilling or unable to control them.”); see also Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 436 (6th Cir.2009) (petitioner not entitled to withholding of removal because he presented \"insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the government would be unwilling or unable to control” the persons threatening harm)."
} | 3,992,866 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Wilson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant's use of less-lethal force to disarm Wilson and effectuate his arrest violated Wilson's Fourth Amendment rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "673 F.3d 871, 871-72",
"parenthetical": "explaining circumstances under which a bean bag gun, which is a \" 'less-lethal' weapon,\" is permissible",
"sentence": "See Lal v. California, 746 F.3d 1112, 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth framework for analyzing an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment); see also Glenn, 673 F.3d at 871-72 (explaining circumstances under which a bean bag gun, which is a “ ‘less-lethal’ weapon,” is permissible)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "746 F.3d 1112, 1115, 1117",
"parenthetical": "setting forth framework for analyzing an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment",
"sentence": "See Lal v. California, 746 F.3d 1112, 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth framework for analyzing an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment); see also Glenn, 673 F.3d at 871-72 (explaining circumstances under which a bean bag gun, which is a “ ‘less-lethal’ weapon,” is permissible)."
} | 12,394,961 | b |
Concurrent jurisdiction between the state and federal courts exists where cocaine is involved. This Court has not yet addressed whether prosecuting a case in federal court when the state court has concurrent jurisdiction violates the defendant's due process rights. Several circuits have ruled that where a defendant violates both state and federal laws, either or both can prosecute the defendant. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "970 F.2d 692, 699",
"parenthetical": "holding their \"due process analysis places the responsibility for the ultimate charging decision\" on the state and federal prosecutors",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jacobs, 4 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir.1993) (prosecuting a federal crime in federal court that could have been prosecuted in state court does not violate a defendant’s due process rights); see also United States v. Langston, 970 F.2d 692, 699 (10th Cir.1992) (holding their “due process analysis places the responsibility for the ultimate charging decision” on the state and federal prosecutors)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "4 F.3d 603, 605",
"parenthetical": "prosecuting a federal crime in federal court that could have been prosecuted in state court does not violate a defendant's due process rights",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jacobs, 4 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir.1993) (prosecuting a federal crime in federal court that could have been prosecuted in state court does not violate a defendant’s due process rights); see also United States v. Langston, 970 F.2d 692, 699 (10th Cir.1992) (holding their “due process analysis places the responsibility for the ultimate charging decision” on the state and federal prosecutors)."
} | 10,526,258 | b |
[P20] The search warrant was issued for Utviek's hotel room. The layout of a hotel room may have made it particularly easy for a suspect to destroy evidence, given the probable location of the bathroom. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding exigent circumstances demonstrated because officers knew defendant stored drugs in room across from the bathroom, making destruction particularly easy",
"sentence": "See Michigan v. Hall, 1999 Mich. App. LEXIS 651, 4 unpublished (holding exigent circumstances existed because bathroom in hotel room was next to hallway door where the narcotics could have been particularly flushed, and the suspected drug was crack-cocaine, which makes it not impossible that drugs were easily disposable); see also Wisconsin v. Henderson, 245 Wis.2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 613, 623 (2001) (holding exigent circumstances demonstrated because officers knew defendant stored drugs in room across from the bathroom, making destruction particularly easy); United States v. Johnson, 267 F.3d 498, 501 (6th Cir.2001) (holding exigent circumstances found because detailed affidavit alleged drug transactions were conducted near the bathroom for quick disposal of the evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding exigent circumstances existed because bathroom in hotel room was next to hallway door where the narcotics could have been particularly flushed, and the suspected drug was crack-cocaine, which makes it not impossible that drugs were easily disposable",
"sentence": "See Michigan v. Hall, 1999 Mich. App. LEXIS 651, 4 unpublished (holding exigent circumstances existed because bathroom in hotel room was next to hallway door where the narcotics could have been particularly flushed, and the suspected drug was crack-cocaine, which makes it not impossible that drugs were easily disposable); see also Wisconsin v. Henderson, 245 Wis.2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 613, 623 (2001) (holding exigent circumstances demonstrated because officers knew defendant stored drugs in room across from the bathroom, making destruction particularly easy); United States v. Johnson, 267 F.3d 498, 501 (6th Cir.2001) (holding exigent circumstances found because detailed affidavit alleged drug transactions were conducted near the bathroom for quick disposal of the evidence)."
} | 9,286,671 | b |
[P20] The search warrant was issued for Utviek's hotel room. The layout of a hotel room may have made it particularly easy for a suspect to destroy evidence, given the probable location of the bathroom. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding exigent circumstances existed because bathroom in hotel room was next to hallway door where the narcotics could have been particularly flushed, and the suspected drug was crack-cocaine, which makes it not impossible that drugs were easily disposable",
"sentence": "See Michigan v. Hall, 1999 Mich. App. LEXIS 651, 4 unpublished (holding exigent circumstances existed because bathroom in hotel room was next to hallway door where the narcotics could have been particularly flushed, and the suspected drug was crack-cocaine, which makes it not impossible that drugs were easily disposable); see also Wisconsin v. Henderson, 245 Wis.2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 613, 623 (2001) (holding exigent circumstances demonstrated because officers knew defendant stored drugs in room across from the bathroom, making destruction particularly easy); United States v. Johnson, 267 F.3d 498, 501 (6th Cir.2001) (holding exigent circumstances found because detailed affidavit alleged drug transactions were conducted near the bathroom for quick disposal of the evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "629 N.W.2d 613, 623",
"parenthetical": "holding exigent circumstances demonstrated because officers knew defendant stored drugs in room across from the bathroom, making destruction particularly easy",
"sentence": "See Michigan v. Hall, 1999 Mich. App. LEXIS 651, 4 unpublished (holding exigent circumstances existed because bathroom in hotel room was next to hallway door where the narcotics could have been particularly flushed, and the suspected drug was crack-cocaine, which makes it not impossible that drugs were easily disposable); see also Wisconsin v. Henderson, 245 Wis.2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 613, 623 (2001) (holding exigent circumstances demonstrated because officers knew defendant stored drugs in room across from the bathroom, making destruction particularly easy); United States v. Johnson, 267 F.3d 498, 501 (6th Cir.2001) (holding exigent circumstances found because detailed affidavit alleged drug transactions were conducted near the bathroom for quick disposal of the evidence)."
} | 9,286,671 | a |
[P20] The search warrant was issued for Utviek's hotel room. The layout of a hotel room may have made it particularly easy for a suspect to destroy evidence, given the probable location of the bathroom. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding exigent circumstances existed because bathroom in hotel room was next to hallway door where the narcotics could have been particularly flushed, and the suspected drug was crack-cocaine, which makes it not impossible that drugs were easily disposable",
"sentence": "See Michigan v. Hall, 1999 Mich. App. LEXIS 651, 4 unpublished (holding exigent circumstances existed because bathroom in hotel room was next to hallway door where the narcotics could have been particularly flushed, and the suspected drug was crack-cocaine, which makes it not impossible that drugs were easily disposable); see also Wisconsin v. Henderson, 245 Wis.2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 613, 623 (2001) (holding exigent circumstances demonstrated because officers knew defendant stored drugs in room across from the bathroom, making destruction particularly easy); United States v. Johnson, 267 F.3d 498, 501 (6th Cir.2001) (holding exigent circumstances found because detailed affidavit alleged drug transactions were conducted near the bathroom for quick disposal of the evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "267 F.3d 498, 501",
"parenthetical": "holding exigent circumstances found because detailed affidavit alleged drug transactions were conducted near the bathroom for quick disposal of the evidence",
"sentence": "See Michigan v. Hall, 1999 Mich. App. LEXIS 651, 4 unpublished (holding exigent circumstances existed because bathroom in hotel room was next to hallway door where the narcotics could have been particularly flushed, and the suspected drug was crack-cocaine, which makes it not impossible that drugs were easily disposable); see also Wisconsin v. Henderson, 245 Wis.2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 613, 623 (2001) (holding exigent circumstances demonstrated because officers knew defendant stored drugs in room across from the bathroom, making destruction particularly easy); United States v. Johnson, 267 F.3d 498, 501 (6th Cir.2001) (holding exigent circumstances found because detailed affidavit alleged drug transactions were conducted near the bathroom for quick disposal of the evidence)."
} | 9,286,671 | a |
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that this dispute is not governed by Article 2 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "repairs performed on tractor, which included the replacement of engine parts, constituted a service and not a \"sale\" under the UCC, as the primary purpose of the contract was to repair the vehicle as opposed to the sale of any component part of the engine",
"sentence": "Ann. §§ 2101 et seq. (West 1999) (“UCC”), since the agreement between CFU and ADT does not involve the sale of goods. Turney Media Fuel, Inc. v. Toll Bros., Inc., 725 A.2d 836, 840 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999) (“ ‘[w]hen the transaction involves predominantly the rendition of services, the fact that tangible, movable goods may be involved in the performance of a contract does not bring the contract under the [Uniform Commercial C]ode.’ ” (quoting Whitmer v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 361 Pa.Super. 282, 522 A.2d 584, 587 (1987) (other citation omitted))); Gee v. Chattahoochee Tractor Sales, Inc., 172 Ga.App. 351, 323 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1984) (repairs performed on tractor, which included the replacement of engine parts, constituted a service and not a “sale” under the UCC, as the primary purpose of the contract was to repair the vehicle as opposed to the sale of any component part of the engine); cf. Lobianco v. Prop. Prot., Inc., 292 Pa.Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417, 419 (1981) (holding that the installation of a burglar alarm system was a sale of goods within the meaning of the UCC, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 2105(a))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the installation of a burglar alarm system was a sale of goods within the meaning of the UCC, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. SS 2105(a",
"sentence": "Ann. §§ 2101 et seq. (West 1999) (“UCC”), since the agreement between CFU and ADT does not involve the sale of goods. Turney Media Fuel, Inc. v. Toll Bros., Inc., 725 A.2d 836, 840 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999) (“ ‘[w]hen the transaction involves predominantly the rendition of services, the fact that tangible, movable goods may be involved in the performance of a contract does not bring the contract under the [Uniform Commercial C]ode.’ ” (quoting Whitmer v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 361 Pa.Super. 282, 522 A.2d 584, 587 (1987) (other citation omitted))); Gee v. Chattahoochee Tractor Sales, Inc., 172 Ga.App. 351, 323 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1984) (repairs performed on tractor, which included the replacement of engine parts, constituted a service and not a “sale” under the UCC, as the primary purpose of the contract was to repair the vehicle as opposed to the sale of any component part of the engine); cf. Lobianco v. Prop. Prot., Inc., 292 Pa.Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417, 419 (1981) (holding that the installation of a burglar alarm system was a sale of goods within the meaning of the UCC, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 2105(a))."
} | 2,997,364 | a |
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that this dispute is not governed by Article 2 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "repairs performed on tractor, which included the replacement of engine parts, constituted a service and not a \"sale\" under the UCC, as the primary purpose of the contract was to repair the vehicle as opposed to the sale of any component part of the engine",
"sentence": "Ann. §§ 2101 et seq. (West 1999) (“UCC”), since the agreement between CFU and ADT does not involve the sale of goods. Turney Media Fuel, Inc. v. Toll Bros., Inc., 725 A.2d 836, 840 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999) (“ ‘[w]hen the transaction involves predominantly the rendition of services, the fact that tangible, movable goods may be involved in the performance of a contract does not bring the contract under the [Uniform Commercial C]ode.’ ” (quoting Whitmer v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 361 Pa.Super. 282, 522 A.2d 584, 587 (1987) (other citation omitted))); Gee v. Chattahoochee Tractor Sales, Inc., 172 Ga.App. 351, 323 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1984) (repairs performed on tractor, which included the replacement of engine parts, constituted a service and not a “sale” under the UCC, as the primary purpose of the contract was to repair the vehicle as opposed to the sale of any component part of the engine); cf. Lobianco v. Prop. Prot., Inc., 292 Pa.Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417, 419 (1981) (holding that the installation of a burglar alarm system was a sale of goods within the meaning of the UCC, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 2105(a))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "437 A.2d 417, 419",
"parenthetical": "holding that the installation of a burglar alarm system was a sale of goods within the meaning of the UCC, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. SS 2105(a",
"sentence": "Ann. §§ 2101 et seq. (West 1999) (“UCC”), since the agreement between CFU and ADT does not involve the sale of goods. Turney Media Fuel, Inc. v. Toll Bros., Inc., 725 A.2d 836, 840 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999) (“ ‘[w]hen the transaction involves predominantly the rendition of services, the fact that tangible, movable goods may be involved in the performance of a contract does not bring the contract under the [Uniform Commercial C]ode.’ ” (quoting Whitmer v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 361 Pa.Super. 282, 522 A.2d 584, 587 (1987) (other citation omitted))); Gee v. Chattahoochee Tractor Sales, Inc., 172 Ga.App. 351, 323 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1984) (repairs performed on tractor, which included the replacement of engine parts, constituted a service and not a “sale” under the UCC, as the primary purpose of the contract was to repair the vehicle as opposed to the sale of any component part of the engine); cf. Lobianco v. Prop. Prot., Inc., 292 Pa.Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417, 419 (1981) (holding that the installation of a burglar alarm system was a sale of goods within the meaning of the UCC, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 2105(a))."
} | 2,997,364 | a |
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that this dispute is not governed by Article 2 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the installation of a burglar alarm system was a sale of goods within the meaning of the UCC, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. SS 2105(a",
"sentence": "Ann. §§ 2101 et seq. (West 1999) (“UCC”), since the agreement between CFU and ADT does not involve the sale of goods. Turney Media Fuel, Inc. v. Toll Bros., Inc., 725 A.2d 836, 840 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999) (“ ‘[w]hen the transaction involves predominantly the rendition of services, the fact that tangible, movable goods may be involved in the performance of a contract does not bring the contract under the [Uniform Commercial C]ode.’ ” (quoting Whitmer v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 361 Pa.Super. 282, 522 A.2d 584, 587 (1987) (other citation omitted))); Gee v. Chattahoochee Tractor Sales, Inc., 172 Ga.App. 351, 323 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1984) (repairs performed on tractor, which included the replacement of engine parts, constituted a service and not a “sale” under the UCC, as the primary purpose of the contract was to repair the vehicle as opposed to the sale of any component part of the engine); cf. Lobianco v. Prop. Prot., Inc., 292 Pa.Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417, 419 (1981) (holding that the installation of a burglar alarm system was a sale of goods within the meaning of the UCC, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 2105(a))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "323 S.E.2d 176, 178",
"parenthetical": "repairs performed on tractor, which included the replacement of engine parts, constituted a service and not a \"sale\" under the UCC, as the primary purpose of the contract was to repair the vehicle as opposed to the sale of any component part of the engine",
"sentence": "Ann. §§ 2101 et seq. (West 1999) (“UCC”), since the agreement between CFU and ADT does not involve the sale of goods. Turney Media Fuel, Inc. v. Toll Bros., Inc., 725 A.2d 836, 840 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999) (“ ‘[w]hen the transaction involves predominantly the rendition of services, the fact that tangible, movable goods may be involved in the performance of a contract does not bring the contract under the [Uniform Commercial C]ode.’ ” (quoting Whitmer v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 361 Pa.Super. 282, 522 A.2d 584, 587 (1987) (other citation omitted))); Gee v. Chattahoochee Tractor Sales, Inc., 172 Ga.App. 351, 323 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1984) (repairs performed on tractor, which included the replacement of engine parts, constituted a service and not a “sale” under the UCC, as the primary purpose of the contract was to repair the vehicle as opposed to the sale of any component part of the engine); cf. Lobianco v. Prop. Prot., Inc., 292 Pa.Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417, 419 (1981) (holding that the installation of a burglar alarm system was a sale of goods within the meaning of the UCC, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 2105(a))."
} | 2,997,364 | b |
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that this dispute is not governed by Article 2 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "323 S.E.2d 176, 178",
"parenthetical": "repairs performed on tractor, which included the replacement of engine parts, constituted a service and not a \"sale\" under the UCC, as the primary purpose of the contract was to repair the vehicle as opposed to the sale of any component part of the engine",
"sentence": "Ann. §§ 2101 et seq. (West 1999) (“UCC”), since the agreement between CFU and ADT does not involve the sale of goods. Turney Media Fuel, Inc. v. Toll Bros., Inc., 725 A.2d 836, 840 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999) (“ ‘[w]hen the transaction involves predominantly the rendition of services, the fact that tangible, movable goods may be involved in the performance of a contract does not bring the contract under the [Uniform Commercial C]ode.’ ” (quoting Whitmer v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 361 Pa.Super. 282, 522 A.2d 584, 587 (1987) (other citation omitted))); Gee v. Chattahoochee Tractor Sales, Inc., 172 Ga.App. 351, 323 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1984) (repairs performed on tractor, which included the replacement of engine parts, constituted a service and not a “sale” under the UCC, as the primary purpose of the contract was to repair the vehicle as opposed to the sale of any component part of the engine); cf. Lobianco v. Prop. Prot., Inc., 292 Pa.Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417, 419 (1981) (holding that the installation of a burglar alarm system was a sale of goods within the meaning of the UCC, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 2105(a))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "437 A.2d 417, 419",
"parenthetical": "holding that the installation of a burglar alarm system was a sale of goods within the meaning of the UCC, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. SS 2105(a",
"sentence": "Ann. §§ 2101 et seq. (West 1999) (“UCC”), since the agreement between CFU and ADT does not involve the sale of goods. Turney Media Fuel, Inc. v. Toll Bros., Inc., 725 A.2d 836, 840 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999) (“ ‘[w]hen the transaction involves predominantly the rendition of services, the fact that tangible, movable goods may be involved in the performance of a contract does not bring the contract under the [Uniform Commercial C]ode.’ ” (quoting Whitmer v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 361 Pa.Super. 282, 522 A.2d 584, 587 (1987) (other citation omitted))); Gee v. Chattahoochee Tractor Sales, Inc., 172 Ga.App. 351, 323 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1984) (repairs performed on tractor, which included the replacement of engine parts, constituted a service and not a “sale” under the UCC, as the primary purpose of the contract was to repair the vehicle as opposed to the sale of any component part of the engine); cf. Lobianco v. Prop. Prot., Inc., 292 Pa.Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417, 419 (1981) (holding that the installation of a burglar alarm system was a sale of goods within the meaning of the UCC, 13 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 2105(a))."
} | 2,997,364 | a |
To make a successful estoppel claim, Miller must at least show affirmative misconduct on the part of the government. This Miller has failed to do. Without more, Miller's allegation that the consular officer rescheduled an interview to occur after his eighteenth birthday is not sufficient to show affirmative misconduct. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "366 U.S. 308, 314-15",
"parenthetical": "failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien's mother, which allegedly resulted in alien's birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "459 U.S. 14, 18-19",
"parenthetical": "INS's 18-month delay in processing alien's application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | 1,052,279 | b |
To make a successful estoppel claim, Miller must at least show affirmative misconduct on the part of the government. This Miller has failed to do. Without more, Miller's allegation that the consular officer rescheduled an interview to occur after his eighteenth birthday is not sufficient to show affirmative misconduct. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien's mother, which allegedly resulted in alien's birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "459 U.S. 14, 18-19",
"parenthetical": "INS's 18-month delay in processing alien's application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | 1,052,279 | b |
To make a successful estoppel claim, Miller must at least show affirmative misconduct on the part of the government. This Miller has failed to do. Without more, Miller's allegation that the consular officer rescheduled an interview to occur after his eighteenth birthday is not sufficient to show affirmative misconduct. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien's mother, which allegedly resulted in alien's birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "459 U.S. 14, 18-19",
"parenthetical": "INS's 18-month delay in processing alien's application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | 1,052,279 | b |
To make a successful estoppel claim, Miller must at least show affirmative misconduct on the part of the government. This Miller has failed to do. Without more, Miller's allegation that the consular officer rescheduled an interview to occur after his eighteenth birthday is not sufficient to show affirmative misconduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "INS's 18-month delay in processing alien's application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "366 U.S. 308, 314-15",
"parenthetical": "failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien's mother, which allegedly resulted in alien's birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | 1,052,279 | a |
To make a successful estoppel claim, Miller must at least show affirmative misconduct on the part of the government. This Miller has failed to do. Without more, Miller's allegation that the consular officer rescheduled an interview to occur after his eighteenth birthday is not sufficient to show affirmative misconduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "INS's 18-month delay in processing alien's application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien's mother, which allegedly resulted in alien's birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | 1,052,279 | a |
To make a successful estoppel claim, Miller must at least show affirmative misconduct on the part of the government. This Miller has failed to do. Without more, Miller's allegation that the consular officer rescheduled an interview to occur after his eighteenth birthday is not sufficient to show affirmative misconduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "INS's 18-month delay in processing alien's application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien's mother, which allegedly resulted in alien's birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | 1,052,279 | a |
To make a successful estoppel claim, Miller must at least show affirmative misconduct on the part of the government. This Miller has failed to do. Without more, Miller's allegation that the consular officer rescheduled an interview to occur after his eighteenth birthday is not sufficient to show affirmative misconduct. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "366 U.S. 308, 314-15",
"parenthetical": "failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien's mother, which allegedly resulted in alien's birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "INS's 18-month delay in processing alien's application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | 1,052,279 | b |
To make a successful estoppel claim, Miller must at least show affirmative misconduct on the part of the government. This Miller has failed to do. Without more, Miller's allegation that the consular officer rescheduled an interview to occur after his eighteenth birthday is not sufficient to show affirmative misconduct. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien's mother, which allegedly resulted in alien's birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "INS's 18-month delay in processing alien's application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | 1,052,279 | b |
To make a successful estoppel claim, Miller must at least show affirmative misconduct on the part of the government. This Miller has failed to do. Without more, Miller's allegation that the consular officer rescheduled an interview to occur after his eighteenth birthday is not sufficient to show affirmative misconduct. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien's mother, which allegedly resulted in alien's birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "INS's 18-month delay in processing alien's application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct",
"sentence": "See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18-19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (INS’s 18-month delay in processing alien’s application for permanent residency did not constitute affirmative misconduct); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (failure of American Consular Officer in Italy to issue passport to alien’s mother, which allegedly resulted in alien’s birth in Italy, did not constitute affirmative misconduct)."
} | 1,052,279 | b |
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court would not have abused its discretion to have decided that the relationship evidence was relevant for the noncharacter conformity purpose of rebutting appellant's various defensive theories including the defensive theory that the victim's death resulted from an accident due to improperly performed CPR efforts to save her life. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "800 S.W.2d 539, 543",
"parenthetical": "appellate court should uphold trial court's decision if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case and this principle holds true \"even when the trial [court] gives the wrong reason for his decision\" and \"is especially true with regard to admission of evidence\"",
"sentence": "See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 387-88 (extraneous offense evidence relevant to noncharacter conformity fact of consequence in the case when it is offered to rebut a defensive theory); see also Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) (appellate court should uphold trial court’s decision if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case and this principle holds true “even when the trial [court] gives the wrong reason for his decision” and “is especially true with regard to admission of evidence”). It too is subject to reasonable debate whether the relationship evidence made these defensive theories less probable."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "810 S.W.2d 387, 387-88",
"parenthetical": "extraneous offense evidence relevant to noncharacter conformity fact of consequence in the case when it is offered to rebut a defensive theory",
"sentence": "See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 387-88 (extraneous offense evidence relevant to noncharacter conformity fact of consequence in the case when it is offered to rebut a defensive theory); see also Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) (appellate court should uphold trial court’s decision if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case and this principle holds true “even when the trial [court] gives the wrong reason for his decision” and “is especially true with regard to admission of evidence”). It too is subject to reasonable debate whether the relationship evidence made these defensive theories less probable."
} | 9,306,551 | b |
This assumes, however, that our definition of "conduct" has not changed. With respect to the use of force, this seems to be a safe assumption. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 826, 826",
"parenthetical": "holding that 18 U.S.C. SS 241 and 42 U.S.C. SS 3631 fall within separate exception to R.A.V.",
"sentence": "Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 42 U.S.C. § 3631 fall within separate exception to R.A.V.); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1301-02 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc) (Gibson, J., concurring) (as applied to prosecution for cross burning, 18 U.S.C. § 241 does not fall within R.A.V. exception for laws directed at conduct), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S. Ct. 1550, 128 L.Ed.2d 199 (1994)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "6 F.3d 1297, 1301-02",
"parenthetical": "as applied to prosecution for cross burning, 18 U.S.C. SS 241 does not fall within R.A.V. exception for laws directed at conduct",
"sentence": "Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 42 U.S.C. § 3631 fall within separate exception to R.A.V.); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1301-02 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc) (Gibson, J., concurring) (as applied to prosecution for cross burning, 18 U.S.C. § 241 does not fall within R.A.V. exception for laws directed at conduct), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S. Ct. 1550, 128 L.Ed.2d 199 (1994)."
} | 7,849,541 | a |
This assumes, however, that our definition of "conduct" has not changed. With respect to the use of force, this seems to be a safe assumption. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 826, 826",
"parenthetical": "holding that 18 U.S.C. SS 241 and 42 U.S.C. SS 3631 fall within separate exception to R.A.V.",
"sentence": "Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 42 U.S.C. § 3631 fall within separate exception to R.A.V.); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1301-02 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc) (Gibson, J., concurring) (as applied to prosecution for cross burning, 18 U.S.C. § 241 does not fall within R.A.V. exception for laws directed at conduct), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S. Ct. 1550, 128 L.Ed.2d 199 (1994)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "as applied to prosecution for cross burning, 18 U.S.C. SS 241 does not fall within R.A.V. exception for laws directed at conduct",
"sentence": "Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 42 U.S.C. § 3631 fall within separate exception to R.A.V.); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1301-02 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc) (Gibson, J., concurring) (as applied to prosecution for cross burning, 18 U.S.C. § 241 does not fall within R.A.V. exception for laws directed at conduct), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S. Ct. 1550, 128 L.Ed.2d 199 (1994)."
} | 7,849,541 | a |
This assumes, however, that our definition of "conduct" has not changed. With respect to the use of force, this seems to be a safe assumption. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 826, 826",
"parenthetical": "holding that 18 U.S.C. SS 241 and 42 U.S.C. SS 3631 fall within separate exception to R.A.V.",
"sentence": "Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 42 U.S.C. § 3631 fall within separate exception to R.A.V.); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1301-02 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc) (Gibson, J., concurring) (as applied to prosecution for cross burning, 18 U.S.C. § 241 does not fall within R.A.V. exception for laws directed at conduct), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S. Ct. 1550, 128 L.Ed.2d 199 (1994)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "as applied to prosecution for cross burning, 18 U.S.C. SS 241 does not fall within R.A.V. exception for laws directed at conduct",
"sentence": "Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 42 U.S.C. § 3631 fall within separate exception to R.A.V.); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1301-02 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc) (Gibson, J., concurring) (as applied to prosecution for cross burning, 18 U.S.C. § 241 does not fall within R.A.V. exception for laws directed at conduct), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S. Ct. 1550, 128 L.Ed.2d 199 (1994)."
} | 7,849,541 | a |
While the inadvertent, negligent opening of legal mail does not violate the Constitution, the courts have not hesitated to find a violation where the mail has been read or where a policy of opening mail outside inmates' presence has been shown. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment not appropriate where fact issue as to whether inmate's legal mail was actually read and whether action was retaliatory",
"sentence": "See Reneer v. Sewell, 975 F.2d 258 (6th Cir.1992) (summary judgment not appropriate where fact issue as to whether inmate’s legal mail was actually read and whether action was retaliatory); Proudfoot v. Williams, 803 F.Supp. 1048 (E.D.Pa.1992) (officer violated inmate’s right of access to the courts when he opened inmate’s legal mail and appeared to read it.)"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prison's practice of opening legal mail outside presence of inmate where envelopes marked and readily identifiable as legal mail violated inmates' rights",
"sentence": "See also, Burt v. Carlson, 752 F.Supp. 346 (C.D.Ca.1990) (prison’s practice of opening legal mail outside presence of inmate where envelopes marked and readily identifiable as legal mail violated inmates’ rights)."
} | 7,403,509 | a |
While the inadvertent, negligent opening of legal mail does not violate the Constitution, the courts have not hesitated to find a violation where the mail has been read or where a policy of opening mail outside inmates' presence has been shown. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prison's practice of opening legal mail outside presence of inmate where envelopes marked and readily identifiable as legal mail violated inmates' rights",
"sentence": "See also, Burt v. Carlson, 752 F.Supp. 346 (C.D.Ca.1990) (prison’s practice of opening legal mail outside presence of inmate where envelopes marked and readily identifiable as legal mail violated inmates’ rights)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "officer violated inmate's right of access to the courts when he opened inmate's legal mail and appeared to read it.",
"sentence": "See Reneer v. Sewell, 975 F.2d 258 (6th Cir.1992) (summary judgment not appropriate where fact issue as to whether inmate’s legal mail was actually read and whether action was retaliatory); Proudfoot v. Williams, 803 F.Supp. 1048 (E.D.Pa.1992) (officer violated inmate’s right of access to the courts when he opened inmate’s legal mail and appeared to read it.)"
} | 7,403,509 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim-- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "719 A.2d 778, 785-86",
"parenthetical": "defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 A.2d 1176, 1178",
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim-- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "719 A.2d 778, 785-86",
"parenthetical": "defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "719 A.2d 778, 785-86",
"parenthetical": "defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "833 A.2d 792, 795-96",
"parenthetical": "because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim-- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 A.2d 1176, 1178",
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim-- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "833 A.2d 792, 795-96",
"parenthetical": "because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim-- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "640 A.2d 1336, 1345",
"parenthetical": "if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "640 A.2d 1336, 1345",
"parenthetical": "if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 A.2d 1176, 1178",
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim-- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "833 A.2d 792, 795-96",
"parenthetical": "because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "640 A.2d 1336, 1345",
"parenthetical": "if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim's death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim-- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim's death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 A.2d 1176, 1178",
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim-- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "833 A.2d 792, 795-96",
"parenthetical": "because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim's death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "611 A.2d 301, 304",
"parenthetical": "defendant's participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim's death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim-- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "611 A.2d 301, 304",
"parenthetical": "defendant's participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim's death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 A.2d 1176, 1178",
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim-- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "611 A.2d 301, 304",
"parenthetical": "defendant's participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim's death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "833 A.2d 792, 795-96",
"parenthetical": "because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim-- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "833 A.2d 792, 795-96",
"parenthetical": "because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "833 A.2d 792, 795-96",
"parenthetical": "because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 A.2d 1176, 1178",
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim-- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim— manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 4,195,690 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "719 A.2d 778, 785-86",
"parenthetical": "defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim -- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 A.2d 1176, 1178",
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim -- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "719 A.2d 778, 785-86",
"parenthetical": "defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "833 A.2d 792, 795-96",
"parenthetical": "because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "719 A.2d 778, 785-86",
"parenthetical": "defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim -- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 A.2d 1176, 1178",
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim -- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "833 A.2d 792, 795-96",
"parenthetical": "because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim -- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "640 A.2d 1336, 1345",
"parenthetical": "if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 A.2d 1176, 1178",
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim -- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "640 A.2d 1336, 1345",
"parenthetical": "if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "833 A.2d 792, 795-96",
"parenthetical": "because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "640 A.2d 1336, 1345",
"parenthetical": "if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim's death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim -- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim's death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 A.2d 1176, 1178",
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim -- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim's death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "833 A.2d 792, 795-96",
"parenthetical": "because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim -- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "611 A.2d 301, 304",
"parenthetical": "defendant's participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim's death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 A.2d 1176, 1178",
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim -- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "611 A.2d 301, 304",
"parenthetical": "defendant's participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim's death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "611 A.2d 301, 304",
"parenthetical": "defendant's participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim's death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator's conduct",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "833 A.2d 792, 795-96",
"parenthetical": "because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | a |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "833 A.2d 792, 795-96",
"parenthetical": "because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim -- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | b |
Our Superior Court has dealt with various cases involving conspiracy and third degree murder. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "833 A.2d 792, 795-96",
"parenthetical": "because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 A.2d 1176, 1178",
"parenthetical": "defendant's conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim -- manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785-86 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (defendant can be charged with conspiracy to commit third degree murder because death was natural and probable consequence of such attack, even if defendant did not personally participate in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345 (1994) (if killing is natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct, murder is not beyond scope of conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301, 304 (1992) (defendant’s participation in conspiracy supported third degree murder conviction as victim’s death was natural and probable consequence of co-conspirator’s conduct); see also Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 298 Pa.Super. 283, 444 A.2d 1176, 1178 (1982) (defendant’s conduct revealed conscious disregard of great risk of inflicting death or serious bodily harm upon victim — manifested malice constituted criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder); but see Commonwealth v. Clinger, 833 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Pa.Super.2003) (because it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act, it is impossible to commit crime of conspiracy to commit third degree murder)."
} | 7,297,266 | b |
First, the Court finds nothing in the text of the statute or in case law that supports Defendant's interpretation of SS 3344 as requiring a plaintiff pleading economic injury to provide proof of preexisting commercial value and efforts to capitalize on such value in order to survive a motion to dismiss. The plain text of SS 3344 provides simply that "[a]ny person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner ... for purposes of advertising or selling ... without such person's consent ... shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof." Consistent with this reading, at least one court has suggested, after surveying California court decisions, that "courts generally presume that the fourth element of the applicable test has been established if there is sufficient evidence to prove the first three elements." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "157 F.3d 686, 693",
"parenthetical": "holding that former major-league baseball player \"was injured because he was not compensated for the use of his likeness\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1090 (2002) (holding that actor who was featured on the cover of an adult magazine without his consent could assert injury because “the measure of damages available for misappropriation claims includes the economic value of the use of an individual’s name and likeness,” and “[sjection 3344 specifically provides that a plaintiff may recover ‘any profits from the unauthorized use’ in addition to actual damages or the $750 minimum statutory damage amount and punitive damages” (internal citations omitted)); Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 693 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that former major-league baseball player “was injured because he was not compensated for the use of his likeness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2008 WL 4414514, at *6",
"parenthetical": "presuming that injury was satisfied for purposes of a SS 3344 claim seeking only minimum statutory damages, where plaintiff established use of non-celebrity models' identity, appropriation of their name or likeness to defendant's advantage, and lack of consent",
"sentence": "Del Amo v. Baccash, No. CV 07-663-PSG, 2008 WL 4414514, at *6 (C.D.Cal. Sept. 16, 2008) (presuming that injury was satisfied for purposes of a § 3344 claim seeking only minimum statutory damages, where plaintiff established use of non-celebrity models’ identity, appropriation of their name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, and lack of consent). Indeed, in cases involving celebrity plaintiffs, the mere allegation that the plaintiff was not compensated has been deemed sufficient to satisfy the injury prong."
} | 4,123,713 | b |
The district court properly dismissed the RICO claim because the plain tiffs did not allege injury to their business or property. See 18 U.S.C. SS 1964(c) (allowing recovery to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property")- The plaintiffs' allegations that Ms. Santamaria suffered personal injury&emdash;i.e., physical symptoms and emotional distress&emdash;are legally insufficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "835 F.2d 844, 847",
"parenthetical": "\"In our view, the ordinary meaning of the phrase 'injured in his business or property* excludes personal injuries, including pecuniary losses therefrom.\"",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Mohawk Ind., 465 F.3d 1277, 1286-87 (11th Cir.2006) (“The terms ‘business or property’ are, of course, words of limitation which preclude [certain forms of] recovery.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 847 (11th Cir.1988) (“In our view, the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘injured in his business or property* excludes personal injuries, including pecuniary losses therefrom.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "442 U.S. 330, 339",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the phrase \"business or property\" in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 15, \"retains restrictive significance\" and \"would ... exclude personal injuries suffered\"",
"sentence": "See also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (explaining that the phrase “business or property” in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, “retains restrictive significance” and “would ... exclude personal injuries suffered”)."
} | 4,158,229 | a |
The district court properly dismissed the RICO claim because the plain tiffs did not allege injury to their business or property. See 18 U.S.C. SS 1964(c) (allowing recovery to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property")- The plaintiffs' allegations that Ms. Santamaria suffered personal injury&emdash;i.e., physical symptoms and emotional distress&emdash;are legally insufficient. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that the phrase \"business or property\" in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 15, \"retains restrictive significance\" and \"would ... exclude personal injuries suffered\"",
"sentence": "See also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (explaining that the phrase “business or property” in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, “retains restrictive significance” and “would ... exclude personal injuries suffered”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "835 F.2d 844, 847",
"parenthetical": "\"In our view, the ordinary meaning of the phrase 'injured in his business or property* excludes personal injuries, including pecuniary losses therefrom.\"",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Mohawk Ind., 465 F.3d 1277, 1286-87 (11th Cir.2006) (“The terms ‘business or property’ are, of course, words of limitation which preclude [certain forms of] recovery.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 847 (11th Cir.1988) (“In our view, the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘injured in his business or property* excludes personal injuries, including pecuniary losses therefrom.”)."
} | 4,158,229 | b |
The district court properly dismissed the RICO claim because the plain tiffs did not allege injury to their business or property. See 18 U.S.C. SS 1964(c) (allowing recovery to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property")- The plaintiffs' allegations that Ms. Santamaria suffered personal injury&emdash;i.e., physical symptoms and emotional distress&emdash;are legally insufficient. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that the phrase \"business or property\" in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 15, \"retains restrictive significance\" and \"would ... exclude personal injuries suffered\"",
"sentence": "See also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (explaining that the phrase “business or property” in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, “retains restrictive significance” and “would ... exclude personal injuries suffered”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "835 F.2d 844, 847",
"parenthetical": "\"In our view, the ordinary meaning of the phrase 'injured in his business or property* excludes personal injuries, including pecuniary losses therefrom.\"",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Mohawk Ind., 465 F.3d 1277, 1286-87 (11th Cir.2006) (“The terms ‘business or property’ are, of course, words of limitation which preclude [certain forms of] recovery.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 847 (11th Cir.1988) (“In our view, the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘injured in his business or property* excludes personal injuries, including pecuniary losses therefrom.”)."
} | 4,158,229 | b |
. The Explanatory Notes constitute the World Customs Organization's official interpretation of the HTSUS. While not legally binding on the parties, the Notes provide a commentary on the scope of each heading and interpretive rule of the HTSUS and are useful in ascertaining the classification of merchandise under the HTSUS. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "46 F.3d 1098, 1109",
"parenthetical": "\"While the Explanatory Notes do not constitute controlling legislative history, they do offer guidance in interpreting HTS[US] subheadings.\"",
"sentence": "See Lonza, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed.Cir.1995) (\"While the Explanatory Notes do not constitute controlling legislative history, they do offer guidance in interpreting HTS[US] subheadings.”); see also Rollerblade, Inc., 112 F.3d at 486 n. 3 (although the Explanatory Notes are not controlling legislative history, \"they are nonetheless intended to clarify the scope of HTSUS subheadings and to offer guidance in interpreting its subheadings”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although the Explanatory Notes are not controlling legislative history, \"they are nonetheless intended to clarify the scope of HTSUS subheadings and to offer guidance in interpreting its subheadings\"",
"sentence": "See Lonza, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed.Cir.1995) (\"While the Explanatory Notes do not constitute controlling legislative history, they do offer guidance in interpreting HTS[US] subheadings.”); see also Rollerblade, Inc., 112 F.3d at 486 n. 3 (although the Explanatory Notes are not controlling legislative history, \"they are nonetheless intended to clarify the scope of HTSUS subheadings and to offer guidance in interpreting its subheadings”)."
} | 1,286,361 | a |
CarMax has also adduced evidence that Hernandez's job directly involved interstate commerce in that management assistants (1) hire employees who engage in interstate activity; (2) correspond with CarMax's corporate offices in Virginia; and (3) make out-of-state travel arrangements. Courts have concluded that similar employment relationships have a sufficient connection in interstate commerce that they are subject to the FAA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees -- a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician -- involved interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "513 U.S. 282, 282",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | 4,335,365 | a |
CarMax has also adduced evidence that Hernandez's job directly involved interstate commerce in that management assistants (1) hire employees who engage in interstate activity; (2) correspond with CarMax's corporate offices in Virginia; and (3) make out-of-state travel arrangements. Courts have concluded that similar employment relationships have a sufficient connection in interstate commerce that they are subject to the FAA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees -- a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician -- involved interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | 4,335,365 | b |
CarMax has also adduced evidence that Hernandez's job directly involved interstate commerce in that management assistants (1) hire employees who engage in interstate activity; (2) correspond with CarMax's corporate offices in Virginia; and (3) make out-of-state travel arrangements. Courts have concluded that similar employment relationships have a sufficient connection in interstate commerce that they are subject to the FAA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "513 U.S. 282, 282",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2014 WL 334912, *5",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital's activities were involved interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | 4,335,365 | b |
CarMax has also adduced evidence that Hernandez's job directly involved interstate commerce in that management assistants (1) hire employees who engage in interstate activity; (2) correspond with CarMax's corporate offices in Virginia; and (3) make out-of-state travel arrangements. Courts have concluded that similar employment relationships have a sufficient connection in interstate commerce that they are subject to the FAA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2014 WL 334912, *5",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital's activities were involved interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | 4,335,365 | b |
CarMax has also adduced evidence that Hernandez's job directly involved interstate commerce in that management assistants (1) hire employees who engage in interstate activity; (2) correspond with CarMax's corporate offices in Virginia; and (3) make out-of-state travel arrangements. Courts have concluded that similar employment relationships have a sufficient connection in interstate commerce that they are subject to the FAA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "513 U.S. 282, 282",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1971622, *3",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff \"involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | 4,335,365 | b |
CarMax has also adduced evidence that Hernandez's job directly involved interstate commerce in that management assistants (1) hire employees who engage in interstate activity; (2) correspond with CarMax's corporate offices in Virginia; and (3) make out-of-state travel arrangements. Courts have concluded that similar employment relationships have a sufficient connection in interstate commerce that they are subject to the FAA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1971622, *3",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff \"involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | 4,335,365 | a |
CarMax has also adduced evidence that Hernandez's job directly involved interstate commerce in that management assistants (1) hire employees who engage in interstate activity; (2) correspond with CarMax's corporate offices in Virginia; and (3) make out-of-state travel arrangements. Courts have concluded that similar employment relationships have a sufficient connection in interstate commerce that they are subject to the FAA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that plaintiffs employment contract \"involve[d] commerce\" and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a \"national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,\" rejecting a contention that the \"employment contract allegedly did not 'actually involv[e] interstate commerce,\" and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, \"corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.'s [out-of-state] office\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "513 U.S. 282, 282",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | 4,335,365 | a |
CarMax has also adduced evidence that Hernandez's job directly involved interstate commerce in that management assistants (1) hire employees who engage in interstate activity; (2) correspond with CarMax's corporate offices in Virginia; and (3) make out-of-state travel arrangements. Courts have concluded that similar employment relationships have a sufficient connection in interstate commerce that they are subject to the FAA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that plaintiffs employment contract \"involve[d] commerce\" and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a \"national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,\" rejecting a contention that the \"employment contract allegedly did not 'actually involv[e] interstate commerce,\" and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, \"corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.'s [out-of-state] office\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Herrera, 2014 WL 3398363, at *2-3 (concluding that an employment contract between CarMax and three former employees — a painter, service mechanic, and automotive service technician — involved interstate commerce); Montes v. San Joaquin Community Hospital, No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 334912, *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (concluding that an employment contract between plaintiff and a hospital was governed by the FAA because the hospital’s activities were involved interstate commerce); Abdullah v. Duke University Health System, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-8-FL, 2009 WL 1971622, *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2009) (concluding that an employment contract between a hospital and the plaintiff “involve[d] interstate commerce because DUHS treats patients from all over the country and the world, it receives payments from individuals and entities other than North Carolina residents, and its employees travel outside of North Carolina”); Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 555, 561 & n. 2, 3 (M.D.N.C.2004) (concluding that plaintiffs employment contract “involve[d] commerce” and thus was governed by the FAA because his employer, National Hearing Centers, Inc., was a “national corporation! ] involved in interstate commerce,” rejecting a contention that the “employment contract allegedly did not ‘actually involv[e] interstate commerce,” and observing that, although plaintiffs job duties had a limited relationship to interstate commerce, he had engaged interstate commerce when he, inter alia, “corresponded with National Hearing Centers, Inc.’s [out-of-state] office”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 834 (concluding that a relationship involved interstate commerce where, inter alia, defendant was a national corporation that was engaged in business in multiple states)."
} | 4,335,365 | a |
In cases that have not been heard on the merits, the determination of whether neglect is excusable takes into account the length and reasons for the delay, the impact on the case and judicial proceedings, and whether the movant requesting relief has acted in good faith. See Burnley v. Bosch Ams. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "75 Fed.Appx. 329, 333",
"parenthetical": "considering the reasons for the delay and the impact on the nonmoving party in determining that the moving party did not meet the test of excusable neglect",
"sentence": "Corp., 75 Fed.Appx. 329, 333 (6th Cir.2003) (unpublished) (considering the reasons for the delay and the impact on the nonmoving party in determining that the moving party did not meet the test of excusable neglect); see also Jinks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 250 F.3d 381, 386 (6th Cir.2001) (defining a more lenient standard for excusable neglect in cases of default than in cases when a party neglects to raise a certain argument)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "250 F.3d 381, 386",
"parenthetical": "defining a more lenient standard for excusable neglect in cases of default than in cases when a party neglects to raise a certain argument",
"sentence": "Corp., 75 Fed.Appx. 329, 333 (6th Cir.2003) (unpublished) (considering the reasons for the delay and the impact on the nonmoving party in determining that the moving party did not meet the test of excusable neglect); see also Jinks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 250 F.3d 381, 386 (6th Cir.2001) (defining a more lenient standard for excusable neglect in cases of default than in cases when a party neglects to raise a certain argument)."
} | 931,883 | a |
Courts have identified specific liberty interests of inmates upon which a state cannot impinge without due process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 369, 377-78",
"parenthetical": "liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (liberty interest in freedom from unwanted administration of medication); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870-71, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (liberty interest in inmate’s right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in prisoner’s good-time credits); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 655 (1994) (imposition of restrictive confinement for disciplinary reasons implicates a liberty interest); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1991) (good time); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 938-39 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978) (disciplinary keeplock); see also Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1063-64 (liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "859 F.2d 1063, 1063-64",
"parenthetical": "liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (liberty interest in freedom from unwanted administration of medication); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870-71, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (liberty interest in inmate’s right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in prisoner’s good-time credits); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 655 (1994) (imposition of restrictive confinement for disciplinary reasons implicates a liberty interest); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1991) (good time); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 938-39 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978) (disciplinary keeplock); see also Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1063-64 (liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates)."
} | 7,839,703 | a |
Courts have identified specific liberty interests of inmates upon which a state cannot impinge without due process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "859 F.2d 1063, 1063-64",
"parenthetical": "liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (liberty interest in freedom from unwanted administration of medication); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870-71, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (liberty interest in inmate’s right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in prisoner’s good-time credits); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 655 (1994) (imposition of restrictive confinement for disciplinary reasons implicates a liberty interest); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1991) (good time); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 938-39 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978) (disciplinary keeplock); see also Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1063-64 (liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420-21",
"parenthetical": "liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (liberty interest in freedom from unwanted administration of medication); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870-71, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (liberty interest in inmate’s right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in prisoner’s good-time credits); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 655 (1994) (imposition of restrictive confinement for disciplinary reasons implicates a liberty interest); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1991) (good time); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 938-39 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978) (disciplinary keeplock); see also Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1063-64 (liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates)."
} | 7,839,703 | b |
Courts have identified specific liberty interests of inmates upon which a state cannot impinge without due process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "859 F.2d 1063, 1063-64",
"parenthetical": "liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (liberty interest in freedom from unwanted administration of medication); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870-71, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (liberty interest in inmate’s right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in prisoner’s good-time credits); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 655 (1994) (imposition of restrictive confinement for disciplinary reasons implicates a liberty interest); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1991) (good time); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 938-39 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978) (disciplinary keeplock); see also Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1063-64 (liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (liberty interest in freedom from unwanted administration of medication); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870-71, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (liberty interest in inmate’s right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in prisoner’s good-time credits); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 655 (1994) (imposition of restrictive confinement for disciplinary reasons implicates a liberty interest); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1991) (good time); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 938-39 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978) (disciplinary keeplock); see also Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1063-64 (liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates)."
} | 7,839,703 | b |
Courts have identified specific liberty interests of inmates upon which a state cannot impinge without due process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "859 F.2d 1063, 1063-64",
"parenthetical": "liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (liberty interest in freedom from unwanted administration of medication); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870-71, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (liberty interest in inmate’s right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in prisoner’s good-time credits); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 655 (1994) (imposition of restrictive confinement for disciplinary reasons implicates a liberty interest); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1991) (good time); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 938-39 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978) (disciplinary keeplock); see also Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1063-64 (liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "459 U.S. 460, 470-71",
"parenthetical": "liberty interest in inmate's right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (liberty interest in freedom from unwanted administration of medication); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870-71, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (liberty interest in inmate’s right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in prisoner’s good-time credits); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 655 (1994) (imposition of restrictive confinement for disciplinary reasons implicates a liberty interest); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1991) (good time); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 938-39 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978) (disciplinary keeplock); see also Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1063-64 (liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates)."
} | 7,839,703 | b |
Courts have identified specific liberty interests of inmates upon which a state cannot impinge without due process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "859 F.2d 1063, 1063-64",
"parenthetical": "liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (liberty interest in freedom from unwanted administration of medication); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870-71, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (liberty interest in inmate’s right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in prisoner’s good-time credits); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 655 (1994) (imposition of restrictive confinement for disciplinary reasons implicates a liberty interest); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1991) (good time); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 938-39 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978) (disciplinary keeplock); see also Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1063-64 (liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "103 S.Ct. 864, 870-71",
"parenthetical": "liberty interest in inmate's right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (liberty interest in freedom from unwanted administration of medication); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870-71, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (liberty interest in inmate’s right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in prisoner’s good-time credits); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 655 (1994) (imposition of restrictive confinement for disciplinary reasons implicates a liberty interest); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1991) (good time); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 938-39 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978) (disciplinary keeplock); see also Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1063-64 (liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates)."
} | 7,839,703 | b |
Courts have identified specific liberty interests of inmates upon which a state cannot impinge without due process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "859 F.2d 1063, 1063-64",
"parenthetical": "liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (liberty interest in freedom from unwanted administration of medication); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870-71, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (liberty interest in inmate’s right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in prisoner’s good-time credits); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 655 (1994) (imposition of restrictive confinement for disciplinary reasons implicates a liberty interest); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1991) (good time); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 938-39 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978) (disciplinary keeplock); see also Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1063-64 (liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "liberty interest in inmate's right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (liberty interest in freedom from unwanted administration of medication); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870-71, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (liberty interest in inmate’s right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in prisoner’s good-time credits); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 655 (1994) (imposition of restrictive confinement for disciplinary reasons implicates a liberty interest); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1991) (good time); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 938-39 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978) (disciplinary keeplock); see also Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1063-64 (liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates)."
} | 7,839,703 | b |
Courts have identified specific liberty interests of inmates upon which a state cannot impinge without due process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "859 F.2d 1063, 1063-64",
"parenthetical": "liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (liberty interest in freedom from unwanted administration of medication); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870-71, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (liberty interest in inmate’s right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in prisoner’s good-time credits); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 655 (1994) (imposition of restrictive confinement for disciplinary reasons implicates a liberty interest); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1991) (good time); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 938-39 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978) (disciplinary keeplock); see also Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1063-64 (liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "23 F.3d 652, 655",
"parenthetical": "imposition of restrictive confinement for disciplinary reasons implicates a liberty interest",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (liberty interest in freedom from unwanted administration of medication); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (liberty interest in parole where state statute makes parole mandatory under enumerated conditions); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870-71, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (liberty interest in inmate’s right to remain free of administrative restrictive confinement when state statute and regulations create the right with mandatory language and substantive reasons for confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in prisoner’s good-time credits); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 655 (1994) (imposition of restrictive confinement for disciplinary reasons implicates a liberty interest); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1991) (good time); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 938-39 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978) (disciplinary keeplock); see also Domegan, 859 F.2d at 1063-64 (liberty interest found in rules requiring regular meals, electricity and water for segregation inmates)."
} | 7,839,703 | b |
In the right-to-counsel context, the Supreme Court has countenanced clarifying questions only to ascertain whether a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal statement is actually an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "469 U.S. 91, 95",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance\"",
"sentence": "See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused “indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated” when deciding whether police had honored the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (holding that “[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 445, 445",
"parenthetical": "focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused \"indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated\" when deciding whether police had honored the accused's Fifth Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused “indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated” when deciding whether police had honored the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (holding that “[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance”)."
} | 3,641,105 | b |
In the right-to-counsel context, the Supreme Court has countenanced clarifying questions only to ascertain whether a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal statement is actually an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance\"",
"sentence": "See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused “indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated” when deciding whether police had honored the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (holding that “[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 445, 445",
"parenthetical": "focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused \"indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated\" when deciding whether police had honored the accused's Fifth Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused “indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated” when deciding whether police had honored the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (holding that “[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance”)."
} | 3,641,105 | b |
In the right-to-counsel context, the Supreme Court has countenanced clarifying questions only to ascertain whether a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal statement is actually an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance\"",
"sentence": "See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused “indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated” when deciding whether police had honored the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (holding that “[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 445, 445",
"parenthetical": "focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused \"indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated\" when deciding whether police had honored the accused's Fifth Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused “indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated” when deciding whether police had honored the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (holding that “[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance”)."
} | 3,641,105 | b |
In the right-to-counsel context, the Supreme Court has countenanced clarifying questions only to ascertain whether a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal statement is actually an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused \"indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated\" when deciding whether police had honored the accused's Fifth Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused “indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated” when deciding whether police had honored the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (holding that “[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "469 U.S. 91, 95",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance\"",
"sentence": "See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused “indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated” when deciding whether police had honored the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (holding that “[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance”)."
} | 3,641,105 | a |
In the right-to-counsel context, the Supreme Court has countenanced clarifying questions only to ascertain whether a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal statement is actually an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance\"",
"sentence": "See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused “indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated” when deciding whether police had honored the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (holding that “[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused \"indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated\" when deciding whether police had honored the accused's Fifth Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused “indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated” when deciding whether police had honored the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (holding that “[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance”)."
} | 3,641,105 | b |
In the right-to-counsel context, the Supreme Court has countenanced clarifying questions only to ascertain whether a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal statement is actually an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused \"indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated\" when deciding whether police had honored the accused's Fifth Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused “indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated” when deciding whether police had honored the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (holding that “[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance\"",
"sentence": "See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused “indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated” when deciding whether police had honored the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (holding that “[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance”)."
} | 3,641,105 | a |
"C. The Board's wrongful termination of Harbert's contracts constitutes a material breach of the contracts that excuses Harbert's future performance, and bars the Board's Counterclaim for completion costs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "548 So.2d 1329, 1334",
"parenthetical": "'Once a party to a contract repudiates the agreement, the other party is excused from further performance.'",
"sentence": "Federal Ins. Co. v. I. Kruger, Inc., 829 So.2d 732 (Ala.2002) (where contractor prevented subcontractor from performing under subcontract, subcontractor was excused from performance); see also Shirley v. Lin, 548 So.2d 1329, 1334 (Ala.1989) (‘Once a party to a contract repudiates the agreement, the other party is excused from further performance.’); Health Care Mgmt. Corp. v. Rubenstein, 540 So.2d 77, 78 (Ala.Civ.App.1989) (‘Because of the defendant’s material breach of the contract, the plaintiffs future performance of the contract was excused and the plaintiff had an immediate cause of action for that breach.’); Ex parte A.B./Wildwood Ltd. P’ship, 793 So.2d 784, 790 (Ala.2000) (Lyons, J., concurring in the result) (‘Once a party has committed an anticipatory breach, the other party is excused from further performance.’)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where contractor prevented subcontractor from performing under subcontract, subcontractor was excused from performance",
"sentence": "Federal Ins. Co. v. I. Kruger, Inc., 829 So.2d 732 (Ala.2002) (where contractor prevented subcontractor from performing under subcontract, subcontractor was excused from performance); see also Shirley v. Lin, 548 So.2d 1329, 1334 (Ala.1989) (‘Once a party to a contract repudiates the agreement, the other party is excused from further performance.’); Health Care Mgmt. Corp. v. Rubenstein, 540 So.2d 77, 78 (Ala.Civ.App.1989) (‘Because of the defendant’s material breach of the contract, the plaintiffs future performance of the contract was excused and the plaintiff had an immediate cause of action for that breach.’); Ex parte A.B./Wildwood Ltd. P’ship, 793 So.2d 784, 790 (Ala.2000) (Lyons, J., concurring in the result) (‘Once a party has committed an anticipatory breach, the other party is excused from further performance.’)."
} | 7,060,290 | b |
"C. The Board's wrongful termination of Harbert's contracts constitutes a material breach of the contracts that excuses Harbert's future performance, and bars the Board's Counterclaim for completion costs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "540 So.2d 77, 78",
"parenthetical": "'Because of the defendant's material breach of the contract, the plaintiffs future performance of the contract was excused and the plaintiff had an immediate cause of action for that breach.'",
"sentence": "Federal Ins. Co. v. I. Kruger, Inc., 829 So.2d 732 (Ala.2002) (where contractor prevented subcontractor from performing under subcontract, subcontractor was excused from performance); see also Shirley v. Lin, 548 So.2d 1329, 1334 (Ala.1989) (‘Once a party to a contract repudiates the agreement, the other party is excused from further performance.’); Health Care Mgmt. Corp. v. Rubenstein, 540 So.2d 77, 78 (Ala.Civ.App.1989) (‘Because of the defendant’s material breach of the contract, the plaintiffs future performance of the contract was excused and the plaintiff had an immediate cause of action for that breach.’); Ex parte A.B./Wildwood Ltd. P’ship, 793 So.2d 784, 790 (Ala.2000) (Lyons, J., concurring in the result) (‘Once a party has committed an anticipatory breach, the other party is excused from further performance.’)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where contractor prevented subcontractor from performing under subcontract, subcontractor was excused from performance",
"sentence": "Federal Ins. Co. v. I. Kruger, Inc., 829 So.2d 732 (Ala.2002) (where contractor prevented subcontractor from performing under subcontract, subcontractor was excused from performance); see also Shirley v. Lin, 548 So.2d 1329, 1334 (Ala.1989) (‘Once a party to a contract repudiates the agreement, the other party is excused from further performance.’); Health Care Mgmt. Corp. v. Rubenstein, 540 So.2d 77, 78 (Ala.Civ.App.1989) (‘Because of the defendant’s material breach of the contract, the plaintiffs future performance of the contract was excused and the plaintiff had an immediate cause of action for that breach.’); Ex parte A.B./Wildwood Ltd. P’ship, 793 So.2d 784, 790 (Ala.2000) (Lyons, J., concurring in the result) (‘Once a party has committed an anticipatory breach, the other party is excused from further performance.’)."
} | 7,060,290 | b |
Other courts have found such an error to be harmless where there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "66 Ill. 2d 269, 269",
"parenthetical": "Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant's conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating \"[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | 179,273 | b |
Other courts have found such an error to be harmless where there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "66 Ill. 2d 269, 269",
"parenthetical": "Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant's conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating \"[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | 179,273 | b |
Other courts have found such an error to be harmless where there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "66 Ill. 2d 269, 269",
"parenthetical": "Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant's conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating \"[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | 179,273 | a |
Other courts have found such an error to be harmless where there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "66 Ill. 2d 269, 269",
"parenthetical": "Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant's conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating \"[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | 179,273 | b |
Other courts have found such an error to be harmless where there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "66 Ill. 2d 269, 269",
"parenthetical": "Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant's conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating \"[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | 179,273 | b |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.