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Other courts have found such an error to be harmless where there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "66 Ill. 2d 269, 269",
"parenthetical": "Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant's conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating \"[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | 179,273 | a |
Other courts have found such an error to be harmless where there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "66 Ill. 2d 269, 269",
"parenthetical": "Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant's conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating \"[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | 179,273 | b |
Other courts have found such an error to be harmless where there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "66 Ill. 2d 269, 269",
"parenthetical": "Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant's conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating \"[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim's wife",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | 179,273 | b |
Other courts have found such an error to be harmless where there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "66 Ill. 2d 269, 269",
"parenthetical": "Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant's conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating \"[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim's wife",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | 179,273 | b |
Other courts have found such an error to be harmless where there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "66 Ill. 2d 269, 269",
"parenthetical": "Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant's conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating \"[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | 179,273 | b |
Other courts have found such an error to be harmless where there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "66 Ill. 2d 269, 269",
"parenthetical": "Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant's conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating \"[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Cockerham v. Butler, 515 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (error harmless where three victims identified the defendant and the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs for only a short period of time); State v. Johnson, 489 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (error was harmless in view of the five eyewitnesses and the substantial proof presented against the defendant); People v. Jacla, 77 Cal. App. 3d 878, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1978) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt although the defendant was shackled throughout the trial); Zygadlo v. State, 341 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court stated that although leg shackles were used on the accused during his trial, the record disclosed overwhelming evidence of his guilt); People v. Prado, 67 Cal. App. 3d 267, 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the compelling evidence against the defendant); Chandler v. State, 92 Nev. 299, 550 P.2d 159 (1976) (error harmless where the defendant confessed to the murder not only to an FBI agent but also in a letter written to the victim’s wife); People v. Thompson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 339, 72 P.2d 927 (1937) (although the defendant was placed in leg irons throughout the trial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and thus reversal was not warranted); but see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269 (Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s conviction, on a guilty plea of murder, where he was erroneously required to be handcuffed and shackled during his competency hearing stating “[hjowever strong the evidence against an accused may be, ... a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such a requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law”)."
} | 179,273 | a |
Here, however, the amended complaint did not charge any new, different, or additional offense not alleged in the original complaint. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deletion of words \"or drugs\" from the charge of driving a vehicle \"while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs\" held not to constitute a different offense than alleged in original complaint",
"sentence": "People v. Hertz, 196 Colo. 259, 586 P.2d 5 (1978) (deletion of words “or drugs” from the charge of driving a vehicle “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs” held not to constitute a different offense than alleged in original complaint); see People v. Dickinson, 197 Colo. 338, 592 P.2d 807 (1979) (complaint charging “driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs” defective in form only)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "complaint charging \"driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs\" defective in form only",
"sentence": "People v. Hertz, 196 Colo. 259, 586 P.2d 5 (1978) (deletion of words “or drugs” from the charge of driving a vehicle “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs” held not to constitute a different offense than alleged in original complaint); see People v. Dickinson, 197 Colo. 338, 592 P.2d 807 (1979) (complaint charging “driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs” defective in form only)."
} | 2,366,641 | a |
Here, however, the amended complaint did not charge any new, different, or additional offense not alleged in the original complaint. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deletion of words \"or drugs\" from the charge of driving a vehicle \"while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs\" held not to constitute a different offense than alleged in original complaint",
"sentence": "People v. Hertz, 196 Colo. 259, 586 P.2d 5 (1978) (deletion of words “or drugs” from the charge of driving a vehicle “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs” held not to constitute a different offense than alleged in original complaint); see People v. Dickinson, 197 Colo. 338, 592 P.2d 807 (1979) (complaint charging “driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs” defective in form only)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "complaint charging \"driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs\" defective in form only",
"sentence": "People v. Hertz, 196 Colo. 259, 586 P.2d 5 (1978) (deletion of words “or drugs” from the charge of driving a vehicle “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs” held not to constitute a different offense than alleged in original complaint); see People v. Dickinson, 197 Colo. 338, 592 P.2d 807 (1979) (complaint charging “driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs” defective in form only)."
} | 2,366,641 | a |
Here, however, the amended complaint did not charge any new, different, or additional offense not alleged in the original complaint. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "complaint charging \"driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs\" defective in form only",
"sentence": "People v. Hertz, 196 Colo. 259, 586 P.2d 5 (1978) (deletion of words “or drugs” from the charge of driving a vehicle “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs” held not to constitute a different offense than alleged in original complaint); see People v. Dickinson, 197 Colo. 338, 592 P.2d 807 (1979) (complaint charging “driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs” defective in form only)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deletion of words \"or drugs\" from the charge of driving a vehicle \"while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs\" held not to constitute a different offense than alleged in original complaint",
"sentence": "People v. Hertz, 196 Colo. 259, 586 P.2d 5 (1978) (deletion of words “or drugs” from the charge of driving a vehicle “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs” held not to constitute a different offense than alleged in original complaint); see People v. Dickinson, 197 Colo. 338, 592 P.2d 807 (1979) (complaint charging “driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs” defective in form only)."
} | 2,366,641 | b |
Here, however, the amended complaint did not charge any new, different, or additional offense not alleged in the original complaint. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "complaint charging \"driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs\" defective in form only",
"sentence": "People v. Hertz, 196 Colo. 259, 586 P.2d 5 (1978) (deletion of words “or drugs” from the charge of driving a vehicle “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs” held not to constitute a different offense than alleged in original complaint); see People v. Dickinson, 197 Colo. 338, 592 P.2d 807 (1979) (complaint charging “driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs” defective in form only)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deletion of words \"or drugs\" from the charge of driving a vehicle \"while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs\" held not to constitute a different offense than alleged in original complaint",
"sentence": "People v. Hertz, 196 Colo. 259, 586 P.2d 5 (1978) (deletion of words “or drugs” from the charge of driving a vehicle “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs” held not to constitute a different offense than alleged in original complaint); see People v. Dickinson, 197 Colo. 338, 592 P.2d 807 (1979) (complaint charging “driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs” defective in form only)."
} | 2,366,641 | b |
The USPS urges that this argument is not waivable because it is based on due process and the civil service statutes; thus, if upheld, this argument would render the CBA and the Joint Statement unenforceable on public policy grounds. Our precedent does not support this position, however. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "179 F.3d 140, 140",
"parenthetical": "finding waiver of First Amendment claim not raised during arbitration",
"sentence": "See Dist. 17, 179 F.3d at 140 (finding waiver of First Amendment claim not raised during arbitration); see also AAOT Foreign Econ. Ass’n (VO) Technostroyexport v. Int’l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 139 F.3d 980, 981-82 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that party waived public policy challenge by failing to raise it during arbitration)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "139 F.3d 980, 981-82",
"parenthetical": "holding that party waived public policy challenge by failing to raise it during arbitration",
"sentence": "See Dist. 17, 179 F.3d at 140 (finding waiver of First Amendment claim not raised during arbitration); see also AAOT Foreign Econ. Ass’n (VO) Technostroyexport v. Int’l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 139 F.3d 980, 981-82 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that party waived public policy challenge by failing to raise it during arbitration)."
} | 1,036,377 | a |
Although defendant argues that the decision to file a claim amounts to a misrepresentation of fact, the completion of that form at most represented plaintiffs assertion that he was legally entitled to workers' compensation benefits. That assertion was not one of fact; rather, it was a conclusion of law based on a factual context. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "314 Or 717, 717",
"parenthetical": "refusing to apply equitable estoppel when statements by county tax official were, at most, \"a conclusion from facts or a conclusion of law\"",
"sentence": "Coos County, 303 Or at 181; see also Welch, 314 Or at 717 (refusing to apply equitable estoppel when statements by county tax official were, at most, “a conclusion from facts or a conclusion of law”); Bennett, 192 Or at 541 (declining to apply estoppel when statements were “mere expressions of opinion”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "333 Or 614, 619",
"parenthetical": "determination of claimant's status as \"worker\" is conclusion of law, not finding of fact",
"sentence": "Rubalcaba v. Nagaki Farms, Inc., 333 Or 614, 619, 43 P3d 1106 (2002) (determination of claimant’s status as “worker” is conclusion of law, not finding of fact). That type of representation may not serve as the basis for equitable estoppel."
} | 60,631 | b |
Although defendant argues that the decision to file a claim amounts to a misrepresentation of fact, the completion of that form at most represented plaintiffs assertion that he was legally entitled to workers' compensation benefits. That assertion was not one of fact; rather, it was a conclusion of law based on a factual context. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "192 Or 541, 541",
"parenthetical": "declining to apply estoppel when statements were \"mere expressions of opinion\"",
"sentence": "Coos County, 303 Or at 181; see also Welch, 314 Or at 717 (refusing to apply equitable estoppel when statements by county tax official were, at most, “a conclusion from facts or a conclusion of law”); Bennett, 192 Or at 541 (declining to apply estoppel when statements were “mere expressions of opinion”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "333 Or 614, 619",
"parenthetical": "determination of claimant's status as \"worker\" is conclusion of law, not finding of fact",
"sentence": "Rubalcaba v. Nagaki Farms, Inc., 333 Or 614, 619, 43 P3d 1106 (2002) (determination of claimant’s status as “worker” is conclusion of law, not finding of fact). That type of representation may not serve as the basis for equitable estoppel."
} | 60,631 | b |
The court of appeals held that the confirmation statute "does not detract from the court's authority under AR.S. section 12-341.01(A) to award attorney's fees." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "134 Ariz. 133, 134",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.\"",
"sentence": "See Pima County v. Heinfeld, 134 Ariz. 133, 134, 654 P.2d 281, 282 (1982) (“[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "177 Ariz. 443, 443",
"parenthetical": "finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a \"civil action\" within the meaning of an attorney's fee statute",
"sentence": "Canon III, 177 Ariz. at 443, 868 P.2d at 1026. Assuming, as the court of appeals held, that arbitrations under the Act are contested contract actions for purposes of AR.S. § 12-341.01(A), but see City of Waterbury v. Waterbury Police Union, 176 Conn. 401, 408, 407 A.2d 1013, 1016 (1979) (finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a “civil action” within the meaning of an attorney’s fee statute), we find it unnecessary to consider attorney’s fees based on AR.S. § 12-341.01 because we find that fees for the confirmation can be awarded under the Uniform Act itself."
} | 1,464,169 | b |
The court of appeals held that the confirmation statute "does not detract from the court's authority under AR.S. section 12-341.01(A) to award attorney's fees." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "177 Ariz. 443, 443",
"parenthetical": "finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a \"civil action\" within the meaning of an attorney's fee statute",
"sentence": "Canon III, 177 Ariz. at 443, 868 P.2d at 1026. Assuming, as the court of appeals held, that arbitrations under the Act are contested contract actions for purposes of AR.S. § 12-341.01(A), but see City of Waterbury v. Waterbury Police Union, 176 Conn. 401, 408, 407 A.2d 1013, 1016 (1979) (finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a “civil action” within the meaning of an attorney’s fee statute), we find it unnecessary to consider attorney’s fees based on AR.S. § 12-341.01 because we find that fees for the confirmation can be awarded under the Uniform Act itself."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "654 P.2d 281, 282",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.\"",
"sentence": "See Pima County v. Heinfeld, 134 Ariz. 133, 134, 654 P.2d 281, 282 (1982) (“[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.”)."
} | 1,464,169 | a |
The court of appeals held that the confirmation statute "does not detract from the court's authority under AR.S. section 12-341.01(A) to award attorney's fees." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "868 P.2d 1026, 1026",
"parenthetical": "finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a \"civil action\" within the meaning of an attorney's fee statute",
"sentence": "Canon III, 177 Ariz. at 443, 868 P.2d at 1026. Assuming, as the court of appeals held, that arbitrations under the Act are contested contract actions for purposes of AR.S. § 12-341.01(A), but see City of Waterbury v. Waterbury Police Union, 176 Conn. 401, 408, 407 A.2d 1013, 1016 (1979) (finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a “civil action” within the meaning of an attorney’s fee statute), we find it unnecessary to consider attorney’s fees based on AR.S. § 12-341.01 because we find that fees for the confirmation can be awarded under the Uniform Act itself."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "134 Ariz. 133, 134",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.\"",
"sentence": "See Pima County v. Heinfeld, 134 Ariz. 133, 134, 654 P.2d 281, 282 (1982) (“[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.”)."
} | 1,464,169 | a |
The court of appeals held that the confirmation statute "does not detract from the court's authority under AR.S. section 12-341.01(A) to award attorney's fees." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "868 P.2d 1026, 1026",
"parenthetical": "finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a \"civil action\" within the meaning of an attorney's fee statute",
"sentence": "Canon III, 177 Ariz. at 443, 868 P.2d at 1026. Assuming, as the court of appeals held, that arbitrations under the Act are contested contract actions for purposes of AR.S. § 12-341.01(A), but see City of Waterbury v. Waterbury Police Union, 176 Conn. 401, 408, 407 A.2d 1013, 1016 (1979) (finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a “civil action” within the meaning of an attorney’s fee statute), we find it unnecessary to consider attorney’s fees based on AR.S. § 12-341.01 because we find that fees for the confirmation can be awarded under the Uniform Act itself."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "654 P.2d 281, 282",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.\"",
"sentence": "See Pima County v. Heinfeld, 134 Ariz. 133, 134, 654 P.2d 281, 282 (1982) (“[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.”)."
} | 1,464,169 | a |
The court of appeals held that the confirmation statute "does not detract from the court's authority under AR.S. section 12-341.01(A) to award attorney's fees." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "176 Conn. 401, 408",
"parenthetical": "finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a \"civil action\" within the meaning of an attorney's fee statute",
"sentence": "Canon III, 177 Ariz. at 443, 868 P.2d at 1026. Assuming, as the court of appeals held, that arbitrations under the Act are contested contract actions for purposes of AR.S. § 12-341.01(A), but see City of Waterbury v. Waterbury Police Union, 176 Conn. 401, 408, 407 A.2d 1013, 1016 (1979) (finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a “civil action” within the meaning of an attorney’s fee statute), we find it unnecessary to consider attorney’s fees based on AR.S. § 12-341.01 because we find that fees for the confirmation can be awarded under the Uniform Act itself."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "134 Ariz. 133, 134",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.\"",
"sentence": "See Pima County v. Heinfeld, 134 Ariz. 133, 134, 654 P.2d 281, 282 (1982) (“[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.”)."
} | 1,464,169 | a |
The court of appeals held that the confirmation statute "does not detract from the court's authority under AR.S. section 12-341.01(A) to award attorney's fees." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "654 P.2d 281, 282",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.\"",
"sentence": "See Pima County v. Heinfeld, 134 Ariz. 133, 134, 654 P.2d 281, 282 (1982) (“[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "176 Conn. 401, 408",
"parenthetical": "finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a \"civil action\" within the meaning of an attorney's fee statute",
"sentence": "Canon III, 177 Ariz. at 443, 868 P.2d at 1026. Assuming, as the court of appeals held, that arbitrations under the Act are contested contract actions for purposes of AR.S. § 12-341.01(A), but see City of Waterbury v. Waterbury Police Union, 176 Conn. 401, 408, 407 A.2d 1013, 1016 (1979) (finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a “civil action” within the meaning of an attorney’s fee statute), we find it unnecessary to consider attorney’s fees based on AR.S. § 12-341.01 because we find that fees for the confirmation can be awarded under the Uniform Act itself."
} | 1,464,169 | b |
The court of appeals held that the confirmation statute "does not detract from the court's authority under AR.S. section 12-341.01(A) to award attorney's fees." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "134 Ariz. 133, 134",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.\"",
"sentence": "See Pima County v. Heinfeld, 134 Ariz. 133, 134, 654 P.2d 281, 282 (1982) (“[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "407 A.2d 1013, 1016",
"parenthetical": "finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a \"civil action\" within the meaning of an attorney's fee statute",
"sentence": "Canon III, 177 Ariz. at 443, 868 P.2d at 1026. Assuming, as the court of appeals held, that arbitrations under the Act are contested contract actions for purposes of AR.S. § 12-341.01(A), but see City of Waterbury v. Waterbury Police Union, 176 Conn. 401, 408, 407 A.2d 1013, 1016 (1979) (finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a “civil action” within the meaning of an attorney’s fee statute), we find it unnecessary to consider attorney’s fees based on AR.S. § 12-341.01 because we find that fees for the confirmation can be awarded under the Uniform Act itself."
} | 1,464,169 | b |
The court of appeals held that the confirmation statute "does not detract from the court's authority under AR.S. section 12-341.01(A) to award attorney's fees." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "654 P.2d 281, 282",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.\"",
"sentence": "See Pima County v. Heinfeld, 134 Ariz. 133, 134, 654 P.2d 281, 282 (1982) (“[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific statute controls.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "407 A.2d 1013, 1016",
"parenthetical": "finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a \"civil action\" within the meaning of an attorney's fee statute",
"sentence": "Canon III, 177 Ariz. at 443, 868 P.2d at 1026. Assuming, as the court of appeals held, that arbitrations under the Act are contested contract actions for purposes of AR.S. § 12-341.01(A), but see City of Waterbury v. Waterbury Police Union, 176 Conn. 401, 408, 407 A.2d 1013, 1016 (1979) (finding that a proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a “civil action” within the meaning of an attorney’s fee statute), we find it unnecessary to consider attorney’s fees based on AR.S. § 12-341.01 because we find that fees for the confirmation can be awarded under the Uniform Act itself."
} | 1,464,169 | b |
Indeed, courts in this Circuit have found it appropriate to apply the doctrine to bar claims brought by litigants who had previously acted in bad faith in concealing those claims during prior bankruptcy proceedings. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "81 F.3d 362, 362-65",
"parenthetical": "rejecting application of judicial estoppel based on lack of evidence of plaintiffs bad faith in failing to disclose contingent claims in pri- or bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "But see Ryan, 81 F.3d at 362-65 (rejecting application of judicial estoppel based on lack of evidence of plaintiffs bad faith in failing to disclose contingent claims in pri- or bankruptcy proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "337 F.3d 319, 319-25",
"parenthetical": "applying judicial estoppel to bar debtor plaintiffs claim against defendant creditor for violation of the automatic stay imposed by the Bankruptcy Code because plaintiff knew about the claim during the prior bankruptcy proceeding and had a motive to conceal it in the face of an affirmative duty to disclose",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Krystal, 337 F.3d at 319-25 (applying judicial estoppel to bar debtor plaintiffs claim against defendant creditor for violation of the automatic stay imposed by the Bankruptcy Code because plaintiff knew about the claim during the prior bankruptcy proceeding and had a motive to conceal it in the face of an affirmative duty to disclose); Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419-420 (3d Cir.1988) (invoking judicial es-toppel against debtor plaintiff to bar claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith, and fraudulent misrepresentation against defendant creditor because plaintiff failed to disclose those claims in bankruptcy proceedings despite citing defendant’s improper activities as the catalyst for its bankruptcy filing); In re Okan’s Foods, Inc., 217 B.R. 739, 754-56 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1998) (barring plaintiffs civil rights claim against defendant because plaintiff represented the contingent claim to the bankruptcy court as having little value and later filed a claim for $750,000, an amount that would have satisfied all of plaintiffs outstanding debts)."
} | 9,277,240 | b |
Indeed, courts in this Circuit have found it appropriate to apply the doctrine to bar claims brought by litigants who had previously acted in bad faith in concealing those claims during prior bankruptcy proceedings. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "81 F.3d 362, 362-65",
"parenthetical": "rejecting application of judicial estoppel based on lack of evidence of plaintiffs bad faith in failing to disclose contingent claims in pri- or bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "But see Ryan, 81 F.3d at 362-65 (rejecting application of judicial estoppel based on lack of evidence of plaintiffs bad faith in failing to disclose contingent claims in pri- or bankruptcy proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "848 F.2d 414, 419-420",
"parenthetical": "invoking judicial es-toppel against debtor plaintiff to bar claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith, and fraudulent misrepresentation against defendant creditor because plaintiff failed to disclose those claims in bankruptcy proceedings despite citing defendant's improper activities as the catalyst for its bankruptcy filing",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Krystal, 337 F.3d at 319-25 (applying judicial estoppel to bar debtor plaintiffs claim against defendant creditor for violation of the automatic stay imposed by the Bankruptcy Code because plaintiff knew about the claim during the prior bankruptcy proceeding and had a motive to conceal it in the face of an affirmative duty to disclose); Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419-420 (3d Cir.1988) (invoking judicial es-toppel against debtor plaintiff to bar claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith, and fraudulent misrepresentation against defendant creditor because plaintiff failed to disclose those claims in bankruptcy proceedings despite citing defendant’s improper activities as the catalyst for its bankruptcy filing); In re Okan’s Foods, Inc., 217 B.R. 739, 754-56 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1998) (barring plaintiffs civil rights claim against defendant because plaintiff represented the contingent claim to the bankruptcy court as having little value and later filed a claim for $750,000, an amount that would have satisfied all of plaintiffs outstanding debts)."
} | 9,277,240 | b |
Indeed, courts in this Circuit have found it appropriate to apply the doctrine to bar claims brought by litigants who had previously acted in bad faith in concealing those claims during prior bankruptcy proceedings. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "81 F.3d 362, 362-65",
"parenthetical": "rejecting application of judicial estoppel based on lack of evidence of plaintiffs bad faith in failing to disclose contingent claims in pri- or bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "But see Ryan, 81 F.3d at 362-65 (rejecting application of judicial estoppel based on lack of evidence of plaintiffs bad faith in failing to disclose contingent claims in pri- or bankruptcy proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "217 B.R. 739, 754-56",
"parenthetical": "barring plaintiffs civil rights claim against defendant because plaintiff represented the contingent claim to the bankruptcy court as having little value and later filed a claim for $750,000, an amount that would have satisfied all of plaintiffs outstanding debts",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Krystal, 337 F.3d at 319-25 (applying judicial estoppel to bar debtor plaintiffs claim against defendant creditor for violation of the automatic stay imposed by the Bankruptcy Code because plaintiff knew about the claim during the prior bankruptcy proceeding and had a motive to conceal it in the face of an affirmative duty to disclose); Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419-420 (3d Cir.1988) (invoking judicial es-toppel against debtor plaintiff to bar claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith, and fraudulent misrepresentation against defendant creditor because plaintiff failed to disclose those claims in bankruptcy proceedings despite citing defendant’s improper activities as the catalyst for its bankruptcy filing); In re Okan’s Foods, Inc., 217 B.R. 739, 754-56 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1998) (barring plaintiffs civil rights claim against defendant because plaintiff represented the contingent claim to the bankruptcy court as having little value and later filed a claim for $750,000, an amount that would have satisfied all of plaintiffs outstanding debts)."
} | 9,277,240 | b |
The definitional framework set forth by the Seventh Circuit in Carey has been adopted to varying degrees by the majority of circuits that have confronted this issue. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "25 F.3d 376, 380",
"parenthetical": "\"Whether or not the Commission intended only a limited application of the [aberrant behavior] principle, we have no reason to doubt that a district court can give a first offender a prison sentence below the guideline range, as opposed to giving him probation, where the facts justify a finding that his crime truly was a single act of aberrant behavior.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Duerson, 25 F.3d 376, 380 (6th Cir.1994) (“Whether or not the Commission intended only a limited application of the [aberrant behavior] principle, we have no reason to doubt that a district court can give a first offender a prison sentence below the guideline range, as opposed to giving him probation, where the facts justify a finding that his crime truly was a single act of aberrant behavior.”); United States v. Premachandra, 32 F.3d 346, 349 (8th Cir.1994) (“Because the Sentencing Commission did not consider single acts of aberrant behavior when formulating the guidelines, we have recognized that a spontaneous and seemingly thoughtless act may be a basis for departure.”); United States v. Williams, 974 F.2d 25, 26 (5th Cir.1992) (“Although the Guidelines do not define ‘aberrant behavior,’ we are most certain that it requires more than an act which is merely a first offense or ‘out of character’ for the defendant ... [as] those considerations are taken into account in calculating the defendant’s criminal history category.”), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 934, 113 S.Ct. 1320, 122 L.Ed.2d 706 (1993) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "14 F.3d 1438, 1441",
"parenthetical": "expanding Carey to hold that \"[t]he totality of circumstances must be viewed to see whether the offense fits within [the defendant's] normal conduct or if it is a complete shock and out of character\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Tsosie, 14 F.3d 1438, 1441 (10th Cir.1994) (expanding Carey to hold that “[t]he totality of circumstances must be viewed to see whether the offense fits within [the defendant’s] normal conduct or if it is a complete shock and out of character”)."
} | 571,760 | a |
The definitional framework set forth by the Seventh Circuit in Carey has been adopted to varying degrees by the majority of circuits that have confronted this issue. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "14 F.3d 1438, 1441",
"parenthetical": "expanding Carey to hold that \"[t]he totality of circumstances must be viewed to see whether the offense fits within [the defendant's] normal conduct or if it is a complete shock and out of character\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Tsosie, 14 F.3d 1438, 1441 (10th Cir.1994) (expanding Carey to hold that “[t]he totality of circumstances must be viewed to see whether the offense fits within [the defendant’s] normal conduct or if it is a complete shock and out of character”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "32 F.3d 346, 349",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the Sentencing Commission did not consider single acts of aberrant behavior when formulating the guidelines, we have recognized that a spontaneous and seemingly thoughtless act may be a basis for departure.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Duerson, 25 F.3d 376, 380 (6th Cir.1994) (“Whether or not the Commission intended only a limited application of the [aberrant behavior] principle, we have no reason to doubt that a district court can give a first offender a prison sentence below the guideline range, as opposed to giving him probation, where the facts justify a finding that his crime truly was a single act of aberrant behavior.”); United States v. Premachandra, 32 F.3d 346, 349 (8th Cir.1994) (“Because the Sentencing Commission did not consider single acts of aberrant behavior when formulating the guidelines, we have recognized that a spontaneous and seemingly thoughtless act may be a basis for departure.”); United States v. Williams, 974 F.2d 25, 26 (5th Cir.1992) (“Although the Guidelines do not define ‘aberrant behavior,’ we are most certain that it requires more than an act which is merely a first offense or ‘out of character’ for the defendant ... [as] those considerations are taken into account in calculating the defendant’s criminal history category.”), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 934, 113 S.Ct. 1320, 122 L.Ed.2d 706 (1993) (citation omitted)."
} | 571,760 | b |
The definitional framework set forth by the Seventh Circuit in Carey has been adopted to varying degrees by the majority of circuits that have confronted this issue. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "974 F.2d 25, 26",
"parenthetical": "\"Although the Guidelines do not define 'aberrant behavior,' we are most certain that it requires more than an act which is merely a first offense or 'out of character' for the defendant ... [as] those considerations are taken into account in calculating the defendant's criminal history category.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Duerson, 25 F.3d 376, 380 (6th Cir.1994) (“Whether or not the Commission intended only a limited application of the [aberrant behavior] principle, we have no reason to doubt that a district court can give a first offender a prison sentence below the guideline range, as opposed to giving him probation, where the facts justify a finding that his crime truly was a single act of aberrant behavior.”); United States v. Premachandra, 32 F.3d 346, 349 (8th Cir.1994) (“Because the Sentencing Commission did not consider single acts of aberrant behavior when formulating the guidelines, we have recognized that a spontaneous and seemingly thoughtless act may be a basis for departure.”); United States v. Williams, 974 F.2d 25, 26 (5th Cir.1992) (“Although the Guidelines do not define ‘aberrant behavior,’ we are most certain that it requires more than an act which is merely a first offense or ‘out of character’ for the defendant ... [as] those considerations are taken into account in calculating the defendant’s criminal history category.”), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 934, 113 S.Ct. 1320, 122 L.Ed.2d 706 (1993) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "14 F.3d 1438, 1441",
"parenthetical": "expanding Carey to hold that \"[t]he totality of circumstances must be viewed to see whether the offense fits within [the defendant's] normal conduct or if it is a complete shock and out of character\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Tsosie, 14 F.3d 1438, 1441 (10th Cir.1994) (expanding Carey to hold that “[t]he totality of circumstances must be viewed to see whether the offense fits within [the defendant’s] normal conduct or if it is a complete shock and out of character”)."
} | 571,760 | a |
While the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not spoken to the issue, other Circuits have found exigent circumstances are a consideration when deciding whether reasonable modifications were in place. "Accommodations that might be expected when time is of no matter become unreasonable to expect when time is of the essence." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "556 F.3d 171, 175",
"parenthetical": "ADA did not require police to contact mentally ill suspect's family or mental health professionals during two-hour hostage standoff",
"sentence": "Waller v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir.2009) (ADA did not require police to contact mentally ill suspect’s family or mental health professionals during two-hour hostage standoff); see also Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 536 (6th Cir.2008) (ADA did not require police to obtain an interpreter before arresting deaf persons involved in assault); Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1086 (ADA did not require police to obtain an interpreter before administering roadside field sobriety tests)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "539 F.3d 526, 536",
"parenthetical": "ADA did not require police to obtain an interpreter before arresting deaf persons involved in assault",
"sentence": "Waller v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir.2009) (ADA did not require police to contact mentally ill suspect’s family or mental health professionals during two-hour hostage standoff); see also Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 536 (6th Cir.2008) (ADA did not require police to obtain an interpreter before arresting deaf persons involved in assault); Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1086 (ADA did not require police to obtain an interpreter before administering roadside field sobriety tests)."
} | 4,190,969 | a |
While the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not spoken to the issue, other Circuits have found exigent circumstances are a consideration when deciding whether reasonable modifications were in place. "Accommodations that might be expected when time is of no matter become unreasonable to expect when time is of the essence." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "556 F.3d 171, 175",
"parenthetical": "ADA did not require police to contact mentally ill suspect's family or mental health professionals during two-hour hostage standoff",
"sentence": "Waller v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir.2009) (ADA did not require police to contact mentally ill suspect’s family or mental health professionals during two-hour hostage standoff); see also Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 536 (6th Cir.2008) (ADA did not require police to obtain an interpreter before arresting deaf persons involved in assault); Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1086 (ADA did not require police to obtain an interpreter before administering roadside field sobriety tests)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "480 F.3d 1086, 1086",
"parenthetical": "ADA did not require police to obtain an interpreter before administering roadside field sobriety tests",
"sentence": "Waller v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir.2009) (ADA did not require police to contact mentally ill suspect’s family or mental health professionals during two-hour hostage standoff); see also Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 536 (6th Cir.2008) (ADA did not require police to obtain an interpreter before arresting deaf persons involved in assault); Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1086 (ADA did not require police to obtain an interpreter before administering roadside field sobriety tests)."
} | 4,190,969 | a |
. Moreover, the allegations may state a claim under a substantive due process analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that mere neglect for prisoner's safety does not amount to a substantive due process violation, implying that intent to do harm would be an abuse of government power and amount to a substantive due process violation",
"sentence": "See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986) (holding that mere neglect for prisoner’s safety does not amount to a substantive due process violation, implying that intent to do harm would be an abuse of government power and amount to a substantive due process violation)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 347, 347-49",
"parenthetical": "discussing Davidson and the required mental state of prison officials in prisoner assault cases",
"sentence": "See also McGill, 944 F.2d at 347-49 (discussing Davidson and the required mental state of prison officials in prisoner assault cases)."
} | 10,519,515 | a |
. Moreover, the allegations may state a claim under a substantive due process analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that mere neglect for prisoner's safety does not amount to a substantive due process violation, implying that intent to do harm would be an abuse of government power and amount to a substantive due process violation",
"sentence": "See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986) (holding that mere neglect for prisoner’s safety does not amount to a substantive due process violation, implying that intent to do harm would be an abuse of government power and amount to a substantive due process violation)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 347, 347-49",
"parenthetical": "discussing Davidson and the required mental state of prison officials in prisoner assault cases",
"sentence": "See also McGill, 944 F.2d at 347-49 (discussing Davidson and the required mental state of prison officials in prisoner assault cases)."
} | 10,519,515 | a |
. Moreover, the allegations may state a claim under a substantive due process analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that mere neglect for prisoner's safety does not amount to a substantive due process violation, implying that intent to do harm would be an abuse of government power and amount to a substantive due process violation",
"sentence": "See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986) (holding that mere neglect for prisoner’s safety does not amount to a substantive due process violation, implying that intent to do harm would be an abuse of government power and amount to a substantive due process violation)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 347, 347-49",
"parenthetical": "discussing Davidson and the required mental state of prison officials in prisoner assault cases",
"sentence": "See also McGill, 944 F.2d at 347-49 (discussing Davidson and the required mental state of prison officials in prisoner assault cases)."
} | 10,519,515 | a |
. We have consistently required that any warrantless search, pursuant to either the community caretaker exception or the emergency exception, must be factually unrelated to an intent to search for evidence of illegal activity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "9 Va.App. 438, 438",
"parenthetical": "applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers'] entry into appellants' house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,\" and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "42 Va.App. 731, 731",
"parenthetical": "noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | 1,167,986 | a |
. We have consistently required that any warrantless search, pursuant to either the community caretaker exception or the emergency exception, must be factually unrelated to an intent to search for evidence of illegal activity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "9 Va.App. 438, 438",
"parenthetical": "applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers'] entry into appellants' house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,\" and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "594 S.E.2d 309, 309",
"parenthetical": "noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | 1,167,986 | a |
. We have consistently required that any warrantless search, pursuant to either the community caretaker exception or the emergency exception, must be factually unrelated to an intent to search for evidence of illegal activity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "20 Va.App. 290, 290",
"parenthetical": "applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,\" among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "9 Va.App. 438, 438",
"parenthetical": "applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers'] entry into appellants' house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,\" and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | 1,167,986 | b |
. We have consistently required that any warrantless search, pursuant to either the community caretaker exception or the emergency exception, must be factually unrelated to an intent to search for evidence of illegal activity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "456 S.E.2d 530, 530",
"parenthetical": "applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,\" among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "9 Va.App. 438, 438",
"parenthetical": "applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers'] entry into appellants' house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,\" and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | 1,167,986 | b |
. We have consistently required that any warrantless search, pursuant to either the community caretaker exception or the emergency exception, must be factually unrelated to an intent to search for evidence of illegal activity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "42 Va.App. 731, 731",
"parenthetical": "noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "388 S.E.2d 664, 664",
"parenthetical": "applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers'] entry into appellants' house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,\" and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | 1,167,986 | b |
. We have consistently required that any warrantless search, pursuant to either the community caretaker exception or the emergency exception, must be factually unrelated to an intent to search for evidence of illegal activity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "388 S.E.2d 664, 664",
"parenthetical": "applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers'] entry into appellants' house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,\" and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "594 S.E.2d 309, 309",
"parenthetical": "noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | 1,167,986 | a |
. We have consistently required that any warrantless search, pursuant to either the community caretaker exception or the emergency exception, must be factually unrelated to an intent to search for evidence of illegal activity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "388 S.E.2d 664, 664",
"parenthetical": "applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers'] entry into appellants' house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,\" and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "20 Va.App. 290, 290",
"parenthetical": "applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,\" among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | 1,167,986 | a |
. We have consistently required that any warrantless search, pursuant to either the community caretaker exception or the emergency exception, must be factually unrelated to an intent to search for evidence of illegal activity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "388 S.E.2d 664, 664",
"parenthetical": "applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers'] entry into appellants' house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,\" and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "456 S.E.2d 530, 530",
"parenthetical": "applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,\" among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 9 Va.App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that \"[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house ... was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers \"act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va.App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, \"must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va.App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that \"[t]he appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other things, \"whether ... the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”)."
} | 1,167,986 | a |
Judge Marrero of this Court has recently upheld the use of ballistics as reliable under Rule 702. The Supreme Court has likewise cited ballistics as a proper subject of expert testimony because it aids the jury in understanding the evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, \"[i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification,\" and collecting cases",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-313 [118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413] (1998) (“unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror’s knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth”); see also United States v. Foster, 300 F.Supp.2d 375, 376 n. 1 (D.Md.2004) (stating that, “[i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification,” and collecting cases); [United States v. O'Driscoll, No. 4:CR-10-277, 2003 WL 1402040, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Feb.10, 2003)] (“the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.”)...."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 303, 312-313",
"parenthetical": "\"unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror's knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-313 [118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413] (1998) (“unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror’s knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth”); see also United States v. Foster, 300 F.Supp.2d 375, 376 n. 1 (D.Md.2004) (stating that, “[i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification,” and collecting cases); [United States v. O'Driscoll, No. 4:CR-10-277, 2003 WL 1402040, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Feb.10, 2003)] (“the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.”)...."
} | 6,046,570 | b |
Judge Marrero of this Court has recently upheld the use of ballistics as reliable under Rule 702. The Supreme Court has likewise cited ballistics as a proper subject of expert testimony because it aids the jury in understanding the evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2003 WL 1402040, at *2",
"parenthetical": "\"the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-313 [118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413] (1998) (“unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror’s knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth”); see also United States v. Foster, 300 F.Supp.2d 375, 376 n. 1 (D.Md.2004) (stating that, “[i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification,” and collecting cases); [United States v. O'Driscoll, No. 4:CR-10-277, 2003 WL 1402040, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Feb.10, 2003)] (“the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.”)...."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 303, 312-313",
"parenthetical": "\"unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror's knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-313 [118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413] (1998) (“unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror’s knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth”); see also United States v. Foster, 300 F.Supp.2d 375, 376 n. 1 (D.Md.2004) (stating that, “[i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification,” and collecting cases); [United States v. O'Driscoll, No. 4:CR-10-277, 2003 WL 1402040, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Feb.10, 2003)] (“the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.”)...."
} | 6,046,570 | b |
Judge Marrero of this Court has recently upheld the use of ballistics as reliable under Rule 702. The Supreme Court has likewise cited ballistics as a proper subject of expert testimony because it aids the jury in understanding the evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, \"[i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification,\" and collecting cases",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-313 [118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413] (1998) (“unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror’s knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth”); see also United States v. Foster, 300 F.Supp.2d 375, 376 n. 1 (D.Md.2004) (stating that, “[i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification,” and collecting cases); [United States v. O'Driscoll, No. 4:CR-10-277, 2003 WL 1402040, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Feb.10, 2003)] (“the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.”)...."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror's knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-313 [118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413] (1998) (“unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror’s knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth”); see also United States v. Foster, 300 F.Supp.2d 375, 376 n. 1 (D.Md.2004) (stating that, “[i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification,” and collecting cases); [United States v. O'Driscoll, No. 4:CR-10-277, 2003 WL 1402040, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Feb.10, 2003)] (“the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.”)...."
} | 6,046,570 | b |
Judge Marrero of this Court has recently upheld the use of ballistics as reliable under Rule 702. The Supreme Court has likewise cited ballistics as a proper subject of expert testimony because it aids the jury in understanding the evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2003 WL 1402040, at *2",
"parenthetical": "\"the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-313 [118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413] (1998) (“unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror’s knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth”); see also United States v. Foster, 300 F.Supp.2d 375, 376 n. 1 (D.Md.2004) (stating that, “[i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification,” and collecting cases); [United States v. O'Driscoll, No. 4:CR-10-277, 2003 WL 1402040, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Feb.10, 2003)] (“the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.”)...."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror's knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-313 [118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413] (1998) (“unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror’s knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth”); see also United States v. Foster, 300 F.Supp.2d 375, 376 n. 1 (D.Md.2004) (stating that, “[i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification,” and collecting cases); [United States v. O'Driscoll, No. 4:CR-10-277, 2003 WL 1402040, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Feb.10, 2003)] (“the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.”)...."
} | 6,046,570 | b |
Judge Marrero of this Court has recently upheld the use of ballistics as reliable under Rule 702. The Supreme Court has likewise cited ballistics as a proper subject of expert testimony because it aids the jury in understanding the evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror's knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-313 [118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413] (1998) (“unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror’s knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth”); see also United States v. Foster, 300 F.Supp.2d 375, 376 n. 1 (D.Md.2004) (stating that, “[i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification,” and collecting cases); [United States v. O'Driscoll, No. 4:CR-10-277, 2003 WL 1402040, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Feb.10, 2003)] (“the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.”)...."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, \"[i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification,\" and collecting cases",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-313 [118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413] (1998) (“unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror’s knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth”); see also United States v. Foster, 300 F.Supp.2d 375, 376 n. 1 (D.Md.2004) (stating that, “[i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification,” and collecting cases); [United States v. O'Driscoll, No. 4:CR-10-277, 2003 WL 1402040, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Feb.10, 2003)] (“the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.”)...."
} | 6,046,570 | a |
Judge Marrero of this Court has recently upheld the use of ballistics as reliable under Rule 702. The Supreme Court has likewise cited ballistics as a proper subject of expert testimony because it aids the jury in understanding the evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2003 WL 1402040, at *2",
"parenthetical": "\"the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-313 [118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413] (1998) (“unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror’s knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth”); see also United States v. Foster, 300 F.Supp.2d 375, 376 n. 1 (D.Md.2004) (stating that, “[i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification,” and collecting cases); [United States v. O'Driscoll, No. 4:CR-10-277, 2003 WL 1402040, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Feb.10, 2003)] (“the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.”)...."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror's knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-313 [118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413] (1998) (“unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror’s knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth”); see also United States v. Foster, 300 F.Supp.2d 375, 376 n. 1 (D.Md.2004) (stating that, “[i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification,” and collecting cases); [United States v. O'Driscoll, No. 4:CR-10-277, 2003 WL 1402040, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Feb.10, 2003)] (“the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.”)...."
} | 6,046,570 | b |
In many cases, including the three just cited, the Commonwealth alleges the victim is both the target of the communicated threat and the target of the threatened crime. The Appeals Court has concluded in several cases that a threat may be communicated to an intended target by way of a third-party intermediary, but only where it is shown that the defendant intended the threat to reach the target. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "61 Mass. App. Ct. 433, 434",
"parenthetical": "although bystander rather than defendant relayed threat to target, evidence showed defendant intended it to be heard by target, or reasonably should have known it would be conveyed to her",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Maiden, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 433, 434 (2004) (although bystander rather than defendant relayed threat to target, evidence showed defendant intended it to be heard by target, or reasonably should have known it would be conveyed to her); Commonwealth v. Meier, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 278, 282 (2002) (defendant inferrably intended that intermediary communicate threat)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "56 Mass. App. Ct. 283, 284-285",
"parenthetical": "evidence of threatening to commit crime insufficient where defendant intended that third-party intermediary assist in murder plans, not that he communicate murder threat to intended victim",
"sentence": "Contrast Commonwealth v. Furst, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 283, 284-285 (2002) (evidence of threatening to commit crime insufficient where defendant intended that third-party intermediary assist in murder plans, not that he communicate murder threat to intended victim); Commonwealth v. Troy T., 54 Mass. App. Ct. 520, 524-528 (2002) (no intent to communicate threat where intermediary merely overheard statements not intended for alleged victim)."
} | 4,271,239 | a |
In many cases, including the three just cited, the Commonwealth alleges the victim is both the target of the communicated threat and the target of the threatened crime. The Appeals Court has concluded in several cases that a threat may be communicated to an intended target by way of a third-party intermediary, but only where it is shown that the defendant intended the threat to reach the target. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "61 Mass. App. Ct. 433, 434",
"parenthetical": "although bystander rather than defendant relayed threat to target, evidence showed defendant intended it to be heard by target, or reasonably should have known it would be conveyed to her",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Maiden, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 433, 434 (2004) (although bystander rather than defendant relayed threat to target, evidence showed defendant intended it to be heard by target, or reasonably should have known it would be conveyed to her); Commonwealth v. Meier, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 278, 282 (2002) (defendant inferrably intended that intermediary communicate threat)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "54 Mass. App. Ct. 520, 524-528",
"parenthetical": "no intent to communicate threat where intermediary merely overheard statements not intended for alleged victim",
"sentence": "Contrast Commonwealth v. Furst, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 283, 284-285 (2002) (evidence of threatening to commit crime insufficient where defendant intended that third-party intermediary assist in murder plans, not that he communicate murder threat to intended victim); Commonwealth v. Troy T., 54 Mass. App. Ct. 520, 524-528 (2002) (no intent to communicate threat where intermediary merely overheard statements not intended for alleged victim)."
} | 4,271,239 | a |
Therefore, Fuller controls the disposition of this case. Appellant lacks standing to complain about the seizure of the cocaine because Cox did not obtain the cocaine in violation of appellant's rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "829 S.W.2d 201, 201-02",
"parenthetical": "one who has not suffered invasion of a legal right does not have standing to bring suit",
"sentence": "See Fuller, 829 S.W.2d at 201-02 (one who has not suffered invasion of a legal right does not have standing to bring suit); cf. House v. State, 947 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex.Cr.App.1997) (defendant has no standing to complain about prosecutor’s alleged ethical rule violation that does not violate or prejudice the defendant’s rights)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "947 S.W.2d 251, 253",
"parenthetical": "defendant has no standing to complain about prosecutor's alleged ethical rule violation that does not violate or prejudice the defendant's rights",
"sentence": "See Fuller, 829 S.W.2d at 201-02 (one who has not suffered invasion of a legal right does not have standing to bring suit); cf. House v. State, 947 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex.Cr.App.1997) (defendant has no standing to complain about prosecutor’s alleged ethical rule violation that does not violate or prejudice the defendant’s rights)."
} | 11,495,664 | a |
We emphasize, however, that the doctrine of good faith is to be applied in a manner that will "effectuate the reasonable contractual expectations of the parties." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "312 Or 493, 493-94",
"parenthetical": "where parties' contract provides for unilateral exercise of discretion, reasonable expectations are met when that discretion is exercised after notice",
"sentence": "See Best v. U.S. National Bank, supra, 303 Or at 563 (stating that as the purpose of the good faith doctrine); see also Tolbert v. First National Bank, supra, 312 Or at 493-94 (where parties’ contract provides for unilateral exercise of discretion, reasonable expectations are met when that discretion is exercised after notice); Restatement (Second) of Property § 15.2(2) (1977 & 1993 Supp) (“[a] restraint on alienation without the consent of the landlord of the tenant’s interest in the leased property is valid, but the landlord’s consent * * * cannot be withheld unreasonably, unless a freely negotiated provision in the lease gives the landlord an absolute right to withhold consent” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "303 Or 563, 563",
"parenthetical": "stating that as the purpose of the good faith doctrine",
"sentence": "See Best v. U.S. National Bank, supra, 303 Or at 563 (stating that as the purpose of the good faith doctrine); see also Tolbert v. First National Bank, supra, 312 Or at 493-94 (where parties’ contract provides for unilateral exercise of discretion, reasonable expectations are met when that discretion is exercised after notice); Restatement (Second) of Property § 15.2(2) (1977 & 1993 Supp) (“[a] restraint on alienation without the consent of the landlord of the tenant’s interest in the leased property is valid, but the landlord’s consent * * * cannot be withheld unreasonably, unless a freely negotiated provision in the lease gives the landlord an absolute right to withhold consent” (emphasis added))."
} | 2,212,248 | b |
Indication that the treaty drafters likely intended to invoke the broader of these meanings may be found in the accompanying language of the "bad men" clause, which talks not in terms of "reim-bursLingj" the injured person for amounts paid or costs incurred, but rather for the "loss sustained." The latter phrase, which in no way refers to out-of-pocket expenditures, seemingly clashes with the notion that the operative verb -- "reimburse"--ought to be construed in the crabbed fashion defendant argues. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "499 U.S. 530, 534",
"parenthetical": "courts should consider the treaty's language in the \"context in which the written words are used\"",
"sentence": "See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113 L.Ed.2d 569 (1991) (courts should consider the treaty’s language in the “context in which the written words are used”); see also United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1163-64 (9th Cir.2006) (construing the word “reimburse,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, broadly to include future income lost by a decedent based on the surrounding statutory language)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "462 F.3d 1160, 1163-64",
"parenthetical": "construing the word \"reimburse,\" as used in 18 U.S.C. SS 3663A, broadly to include future income lost by a decedent based on the surrounding statutory language",
"sentence": "See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113 L.Ed.2d 569 (1991) (courts should consider the treaty’s language in the “context in which the written words are used”); see also United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1163-64 (9th Cir.2006) (construing the word “reimburse,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, broadly to include future income lost by a decedent based on the surrounding statutory language)."
} | 4,262,521 | a |
Indication that the treaty drafters likely intended to invoke the broader of these meanings may be found in the accompanying language of the "bad men" clause, which talks not in terms of "reim-bursLingj" the injured person for amounts paid or costs incurred, but rather for the "loss sustained." The latter phrase, which in no way refers to out-of-pocket expenditures, seemingly clashes with the notion that the operative verb -- "reimburse"--ought to be construed in the crabbed fashion defendant argues. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "courts should consider the treaty's language in the \"context in which the written words are used\"",
"sentence": "See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113 L.Ed.2d 569 (1991) (courts should consider the treaty’s language in the “context in which the written words are used”); see also United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1163-64 (9th Cir.2006) (construing the word “reimburse,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, broadly to include future income lost by a decedent based on the surrounding statutory language)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "462 F.3d 1160, 1163-64",
"parenthetical": "construing the word \"reimburse,\" as used in 18 U.S.C. SS 3663A, broadly to include future income lost by a decedent based on the surrounding statutory language",
"sentence": "See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113 L.Ed.2d 569 (1991) (courts should consider the treaty’s language in the “context in which the written words are used”); see also United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1163-64 (9th Cir.2006) (construing the word “reimburse,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, broadly to include future income lost by a decedent based on the surrounding statutory language)."
} | 4,262,521 | a |
Indication that the treaty drafters likely intended to invoke the broader of these meanings may be found in the accompanying language of the "bad men" clause, which talks not in terms of "reim-bursLingj" the injured person for amounts paid or costs incurred, but rather for the "loss sustained." The latter phrase, which in no way refers to out-of-pocket expenditures, seemingly clashes with the notion that the operative verb -- "reimburse"--ought to be construed in the crabbed fashion defendant argues. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "462 F.3d 1160, 1163-64",
"parenthetical": "construing the word \"reimburse,\" as used in 18 U.S.C. SS 3663A, broadly to include future income lost by a decedent based on the surrounding statutory language",
"sentence": "See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113 L.Ed.2d 569 (1991) (courts should consider the treaty’s language in the “context in which the written words are used”); see also United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1163-64 (9th Cir.2006) (construing the word “reimburse,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, broadly to include future income lost by a decedent based on the surrounding statutory language)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "courts should consider the treaty's language in the \"context in which the written words are used\"",
"sentence": "See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113 L.Ed.2d 569 (1991) (courts should consider the treaty’s language in the “context in which the written words are used”); see also United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1163-64 (9th Cir.2006) (construing the word “reimburse,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, broadly to include future income lost by a decedent based on the surrounding statutory language)."
} | 4,262,521 | b |
Extending the time period for avoiding or altering a judgment is inherently antagonistic to the systemic need for finality of judgments, which we have observed with particularity in the probate context. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "550 S.W.2d 18, 20",
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that a meritorious claim might thereby be rendered no-nassertible is an unfortunate, occasional by-product of the operation of limitations.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Little, 943 S.W.2d at 417 (“The need for finality of probate proceedings is well-recognized by this and other courts.”); see also Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1977) (“The fact that a meritorious claim might thereby be rendered no-nassertible is an unfortunate, occasional by-product of the operation of limitations.”). Bills of review are intrinsically incongruous with finality, and thus, are not lightly granted."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "943 S.W.2d 417, 417",
"parenthetical": "\"The need for finality of probate proceedings is well-recognized by this and other courts.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Little, 943 S.W.2d at 417 (“The need for finality of probate proceedings is well-recognized by this and other courts.”); see also Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1977) (“The fact that a meritorious claim might thereby be rendered no-nassertible is an unfortunate, occasional by-product of the operation of limitations.”). Bills of review are intrinsically incongruous with finality, and thus, are not lightly granted."
} | 6,857,138 | b |
(R. Doc. 580 at 28). Plaintiffs', however, attempt to reconcile these conflicting positions by arguing that although individual plaintiffs will ultimately seek monetary relief, such relief is not being sought on a class-wide basis and thus is incidental to the declaratory judgment and injunctive relief sought. (R. Doc. 580 at 30). However, given that the declaratory judgment and in-junctive relief sought will not provide relief to any member of the class -- whose claims include "physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, emotional distress, disability, economic loss, and loss of life's pleasures" (R. Doc. 94) -- Plaintiffs' claims can only be redressed through individual damage awards, which are not available in a Rule 23(b)(2) class. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "131 S.Ct. 2557, 2557",
"parenthetical": "\"[23(b)(2) ] does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages.\"",
"sentence": "See Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2557 (“[23(b)(2) ] does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages.”); see also Allison, 151 F.3d at 415 (“[Ijncidental damage should not require additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each individual’s case.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "151 F.3d 415, 415",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ijncidental damage should not require additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each individual's case.\"",
"sentence": "See Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2557 (“[23(b)(2) ] does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages.”); see also Allison, 151 F.3d at 415 (“[Ijncidental damage should not require additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each individual’s case.”)."
} | 4,349,933 | a |
Accordingly, whatever might be true in other circumstances as to the appealability upon its entry of an order making a priority determination, the Trust could not have appealed as of right from the August 26, 1999 order until after the entry of the order in Adversary Nos. 99-0231 and 99-0524 concluding the adversary proceedings on January 31, 2000, as the August 26, 1999 order did not conclude Adversary No. 99-0231. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "81 F.3d 376, 381",
"parenthetical": "\"With limited exceptions, we will not entertain an appeal unless the district court's order ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Professional Ins. Mgmt., 285 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir.2002) (“[A] bankruptcy court order ending a separate adversary proceeding is appealable as a final order even though that order does not conclude the entire bankruptcy case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Durability, Inc., 893 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (holding that a bankruptcy court’s partial summary judgment order that established the priority of one creditor relative to another but did not completely resolve the particular adversary proceeding was interlocutory in nature, and therefore not directly appeal-able); In re Compton Corp., 889 F.2d 1104, 1106 (Em.App.1989) (“[U]ntil all of the significant elements of a claim are determined in the adversary proceeding between the trustee and the [claimant], the final disposition of the priority issue alone is insufficient for a final order to exist.”); cf. Bethel v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir.1996) (“With limited exceptions, we will not entertain an appeal unless the district court’s order ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "285 F.3d 268, 281",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] bankruptcy court order ending a separate adversary proceeding is appealable as a final order even though that order does not conclude the entire bankruptcy case.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Professional Ins. Mgmt., 285 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir.2002) (“[A] bankruptcy court order ending a separate adversary proceeding is appealable as a final order even though that order does not conclude the entire bankruptcy case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Durability, Inc., 893 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (holding that a bankruptcy court’s partial summary judgment order that established the priority of one creditor relative to another but did not completely resolve the particular adversary proceeding was interlocutory in nature, and therefore not directly appeal-able); In re Compton Corp., 889 F.2d 1104, 1106 (Em.App.1989) (“[U]ntil all of the significant elements of a claim are determined in the adversary proceeding between the trustee and the [claimant], the final disposition of the priority issue alone is insufficient for a final order to exist.”); cf. Bethel v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir.1996) (“With limited exceptions, we will not entertain an appeal unless the district court’s order ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)."
} | 11,452,383 | b |
Accordingly, whatever might be true in other circumstances as to the appealability upon its entry of an order making a priority determination, the Trust could not have appealed as of right from the August 26, 1999 order until after the entry of the order in Adversary Nos. 99-0231 and 99-0524 concluding the adversary proceedings on January 31, 2000, as the August 26, 1999 order did not conclude Adversary No. 99-0231. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "81 F.3d 376, 381",
"parenthetical": "\"With limited exceptions, we will not entertain an appeal unless the district court's order ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Professional Ins. Mgmt., 285 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir.2002) (“[A] bankruptcy court order ending a separate adversary proceeding is appealable as a final order even though that order does not conclude the entire bankruptcy case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Durability, Inc., 893 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (holding that a bankruptcy court’s partial summary judgment order that established the priority of one creditor relative to another but did not completely resolve the particular adversary proceeding was interlocutory in nature, and therefore not directly appeal-able); In re Compton Corp., 889 F.2d 1104, 1106 (Em.App.1989) (“[U]ntil all of the significant elements of a claim are determined in the adversary proceeding between the trustee and the [claimant], the final disposition of the priority issue alone is insufficient for a final order to exist.”); cf. Bethel v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir.1996) (“With limited exceptions, we will not entertain an appeal unless the district court’s order ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "893 F.2d 264, 266",
"parenthetical": "holding that a bankruptcy court's partial summary judgment order that established the priority of one creditor relative to another but did not completely resolve the particular adversary proceeding was interlocutory in nature, and therefore not directly appeal-able",
"sentence": "See In re Professional Ins. Mgmt., 285 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir.2002) (“[A] bankruptcy court order ending a separate adversary proceeding is appealable as a final order even though that order does not conclude the entire bankruptcy case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Durability, Inc., 893 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (holding that a bankruptcy court’s partial summary judgment order that established the priority of one creditor relative to another but did not completely resolve the particular adversary proceeding was interlocutory in nature, and therefore not directly appeal-able); In re Compton Corp., 889 F.2d 1104, 1106 (Em.App.1989) (“[U]ntil all of the significant elements of a claim are determined in the adversary proceeding between the trustee and the [claimant], the final disposition of the priority issue alone is insufficient for a final order to exist.”); cf. Bethel v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir.1996) (“With limited exceptions, we will not entertain an appeal unless the district court’s order ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)."
} | 11,452,383 | b |
Accordingly, whatever might be true in other circumstances as to the appealability upon its entry of an order making a priority determination, the Trust could not have appealed as of right from the August 26, 1999 order until after the entry of the order in Adversary Nos. 99-0231 and 99-0524 concluding the adversary proceedings on January 31, 2000, as the August 26, 1999 order did not conclude Adversary No. 99-0231. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "889 F.2d 1104, 1106",
"parenthetical": "\"[U]ntil all of the significant elements of a claim are determined in the adversary proceeding between the trustee and the [claimant], the final disposition of the priority issue alone is insufficient for a final order to exist.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Professional Ins. Mgmt., 285 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir.2002) (“[A] bankruptcy court order ending a separate adversary proceeding is appealable as a final order even though that order does not conclude the entire bankruptcy case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Durability, Inc., 893 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (holding that a bankruptcy court’s partial summary judgment order that established the priority of one creditor relative to another but did not completely resolve the particular adversary proceeding was interlocutory in nature, and therefore not directly appeal-able); In re Compton Corp., 889 F.2d 1104, 1106 (Em.App.1989) (“[U]ntil all of the significant elements of a claim are determined in the adversary proceeding between the trustee and the [claimant], the final disposition of the priority issue alone is insufficient for a final order to exist.”); cf. Bethel v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir.1996) (“With limited exceptions, we will not entertain an appeal unless the district court’s order ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "81 F.3d 376, 381",
"parenthetical": "\"With limited exceptions, we will not entertain an appeal unless the district court's order ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Professional Ins. Mgmt., 285 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir.2002) (“[A] bankruptcy court order ending a separate adversary proceeding is appealable as a final order even though that order does not conclude the entire bankruptcy case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Durability, Inc., 893 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (holding that a bankruptcy court’s partial summary judgment order that established the priority of one creditor relative to another but did not completely resolve the particular adversary proceeding was interlocutory in nature, and therefore not directly appeal-able); In re Compton Corp., 889 F.2d 1104, 1106 (Em.App.1989) (“[U]ntil all of the significant elements of a claim are determined in the adversary proceeding between the trustee and the [claimant], the final disposition of the priority issue alone is insufficient for a final order to exist.”); cf. Bethel v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir.1996) (“With limited exceptions, we will not entertain an appeal unless the district court’s order ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)."
} | 11,452,383 | a |
In light of the double jeopardy violation, the additional $100 special assessment subjects Robertson to multiple punishments for the same offense. We conclude that this additional punishment prejudiced Robertson. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "403 F.3d 604, 607",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he $100 statutory special assessment that [the defendant] received for his second conviction is a collateral consequence of his conviction that constitutes actual prejudice.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jones, 403 F.3d 604, 607 (8th Cir.2005) (“[T]he $100 statutory special assessment that [the defendant] received for his second conviction is a collateral consequence of his conviction that constitutes actual prejudice.”); see also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“The separate conviction, apart from [a purportedly] concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "470 U.S. 856, 865",
"parenthetical": "\"The separate conviction, apart from [a purportedly] concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jones, 403 F.3d 604, 607 (8th Cir.2005) (“[T]he $100 statutory special assessment that [the defendant] received for his second conviction is a collateral consequence of his conviction that constitutes actual prejudice.”); see also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“The separate conviction, apart from [a purportedly] concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”)."
} | 3,679,518 | a |
In light of the double jeopardy violation, the additional $100 special assessment subjects Robertson to multiple punishments for the same offense. We conclude that this additional punishment prejudiced Robertson. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The separate conviction, apart from [a purportedly] concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jones, 403 F.3d 604, 607 (8th Cir.2005) (“[T]he $100 statutory special assessment that [the defendant] received for his second conviction is a collateral consequence of his conviction that constitutes actual prejudice.”); see also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“The separate conviction, apart from [a purportedly] concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "403 F.3d 604, 607",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he $100 statutory special assessment that [the defendant] received for his second conviction is a collateral consequence of his conviction that constitutes actual prejudice.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jones, 403 F.3d 604, 607 (8th Cir.2005) (“[T]he $100 statutory special assessment that [the defendant] received for his second conviction is a collateral consequence of his conviction that constitutes actual prejudice.”); see also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“The separate conviction, apart from [a purportedly] concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”)."
} | 3,679,518 | b |
In light of the double jeopardy violation, the additional $100 special assessment subjects Robertson to multiple punishments for the same offense. We conclude that this additional punishment prejudiced Robertson. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The separate conviction, apart from [a purportedly] concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jones, 403 F.3d 604, 607 (8th Cir.2005) (“[T]he $100 statutory special assessment that [the defendant] received for his second conviction is a collateral consequence of his conviction that constitutes actual prejudice.”); see also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“The separate conviction, apart from [a purportedly] concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "403 F.3d 604, 607",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he $100 statutory special assessment that [the defendant] received for his second conviction is a collateral consequence of his conviction that constitutes actual prejudice.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jones, 403 F.3d 604, 607 (8th Cir.2005) (“[T]he $100 statutory special assessment that [the defendant] received for his second conviction is a collateral consequence of his conviction that constitutes actual prejudice.”); see also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“The separate conviction, apart from [a purportedly] concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”)."
} | 3,679,518 | b |
More importantly, Farmer simply did not want to sue Dinee-ga, and Dineega was certain that it wanted no part of the suit and informed the court it had absolutely no interest in the litigation. The state may not assert that Dinee-ga's interests are threatened when Dineega has expressly disavowed any interest in the litigation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "705 F.2d 1030, 1044",
"parenthetical": "the government was not a necessary or indispensable party in a contract dispute where the government's assessment of its own interests indicated it considered the action between the parties a \"private dispute\" and \"meticulously observed a neutral and disinterested posture\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Padgett v. Theus, 484 P.2d 697, 703-05 (Alaska 1971) (interpret ing former Civil Rule 19, the court held that a party is estopped from raising an indispensable party issue where the absent party, “with full knowledge of the scope and potential impact of [the] litigation upon his interests, chose not to intervene as a party”); see also Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849, 104 S.Ct. 156, 78 L.Ed.2d 144 (1983) (the government was not a necessary or indispensable party in a contract dispute where the government’s assessment of its own interests indicated it considered the action between the parties a “private dispute” and “meticulously observed a neutral and disinterested posture”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 P.2d 697, 703-05",
"parenthetical": "interpret ing former Civil Rule 19, the court held that a party is estopped from raising an indispensable party issue where the absent party, \"with full knowledge of the scope and potential impact of [the] litigation upon his interests, chose not to intervene as a party\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Padgett v. Theus, 484 P.2d 697, 703-05 (Alaska 1971) (interpret ing former Civil Rule 19, the court held that a party is estopped from raising an indispensable party issue where the absent party, “with full knowledge of the scope and potential impact of [the] litigation upon his interests, chose not to intervene as a party”); see also Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849, 104 S.Ct. 156, 78 L.Ed.2d 144 (1983) (the government was not a necessary or indispensable party in a contract dispute where the government’s assessment of its own interests indicated it considered the action between the parties a “private dispute” and “meticulously observed a neutral and disinterested posture”)."
} | 10,380,023 | b |
More importantly, Farmer simply did not want to sue Dinee-ga, and Dineega was certain that it wanted no part of the suit and informed the court it had absolutely no interest in the litigation. The state may not assert that Dinee-ga's interests are threatened when Dineega has expressly disavowed any interest in the litigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 P.2d 697, 703-05",
"parenthetical": "interpret ing former Civil Rule 19, the court held that a party is estopped from raising an indispensable party issue where the absent party, \"with full knowledge of the scope and potential impact of [the] litigation upon his interests, chose not to intervene as a party\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Padgett v. Theus, 484 P.2d 697, 703-05 (Alaska 1971) (interpret ing former Civil Rule 19, the court held that a party is estopped from raising an indispensable party issue where the absent party, “with full knowledge of the scope and potential impact of [the] litigation upon his interests, chose not to intervene as a party”); see also Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849, 104 S.Ct. 156, 78 L.Ed.2d 144 (1983) (the government was not a necessary or indispensable party in a contract dispute where the government’s assessment of its own interests indicated it considered the action between the parties a “private dispute” and “meticulously observed a neutral and disinterested posture”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the government was not a necessary or indispensable party in a contract dispute where the government's assessment of its own interests indicated it considered the action between the parties a \"private dispute\" and \"meticulously observed a neutral and disinterested posture\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Padgett v. Theus, 484 P.2d 697, 703-05 (Alaska 1971) (interpret ing former Civil Rule 19, the court held that a party is estopped from raising an indispensable party issue where the absent party, “with full knowledge of the scope and potential impact of [the] litigation upon his interests, chose not to intervene as a party”); see also Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849, 104 S.Ct. 156, 78 L.Ed.2d 144 (1983) (the government was not a necessary or indispensable party in a contract dispute where the government’s assessment of its own interests indicated it considered the action between the parties a “private dispute” and “meticulously observed a neutral and disinterested posture”)."
} | 10,380,023 | a |
More importantly, Farmer simply did not want to sue Dinee-ga, and Dineega was certain that it wanted no part of the suit and informed the court it had absolutely no interest in the litigation. The state may not assert that Dinee-ga's interests are threatened when Dineega has expressly disavowed any interest in the litigation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the government was not a necessary or indispensable party in a contract dispute where the government's assessment of its own interests indicated it considered the action between the parties a \"private dispute\" and \"meticulously observed a neutral and disinterested posture\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Padgett v. Theus, 484 P.2d 697, 703-05 (Alaska 1971) (interpret ing former Civil Rule 19, the court held that a party is estopped from raising an indispensable party issue where the absent party, “with full knowledge of the scope and potential impact of [the] litigation upon his interests, chose not to intervene as a party”); see also Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849, 104 S.Ct. 156, 78 L.Ed.2d 144 (1983) (the government was not a necessary or indispensable party in a contract dispute where the government’s assessment of its own interests indicated it considered the action between the parties a “private dispute” and “meticulously observed a neutral and disinterested posture”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 P.2d 697, 703-05",
"parenthetical": "interpret ing former Civil Rule 19, the court held that a party is estopped from raising an indispensable party issue where the absent party, \"with full knowledge of the scope and potential impact of [the] litigation upon his interests, chose not to intervene as a party\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Padgett v. Theus, 484 P.2d 697, 703-05 (Alaska 1971) (interpret ing former Civil Rule 19, the court held that a party is estopped from raising an indispensable party issue where the absent party, “with full knowledge of the scope and potential impact of [the] litigation upon his interests, chose not to intervene as a party”); see also Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849, 104 S.Ct. 156, 78 L.Ed.2d 144 (1983) (the government was not a necessary or indispensable party in a contract dispute where the government’s assessment of its own interests indicated it considered the action between the parties a “private dispute” and “meticulously observed a neutral and disinterested posture”)."
} | 10,380,023 | b |
More importantly, Farmer simply did not want to sue Dinee-ga, and Dineega was certain that it wanted no part of the suit and informed the court it had absolutely no interest in the litigation. The state may not assert that Dinee-ga's interests are threatened when Dineega has expressly disavowed any interest in the litigation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the government was not a necessary or indispensable party in a contract dispute where the government's assessment of its own interests indicated it considered the action between the parties a \"private dispute\" and \"meticulously observed a neutral and disinterested posture\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Padgett v. Theus, 484 P.2d 697, 703-05 (Alaska 1971) (interpret ing former Civil Rule 19, the court held that a party is estopped from raising an indispensable party issue where the absent party, “with full knowledge of the scope and potential impact of [the] litigation upon his interests, chose not to intervene as a party”); see also Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849, 104 S.Ct. 156, 78 L.Ed.2d 144 (1983) (the government was not a necessary or indispensable party in a contract dispute where the government’s assessment of its own interests indicated it considered the action between the parties a “private dispute” and “meticulously observed a neutral and disinterested posture”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 P.2d 697, 703-05",
"parenthetical": "interpret ing former Civil Rule 19, the court held that a party is estopped from raising an indispensable party issue where the absent party, \"with full knowledge of the scope and potential impact of [the] litigation upon his interests, chose not to intervene as a party\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Padgett v. Theus, 484 P.2d 697, 703-05 (Alaska 1971) (interpret ing former Civil Rule 19, the court held that a party is estopped from raising an indispensable party issue where the absent party, “with full knowledge of the scope and potential impact of [the] litigation upon his interests, chose not to intervene as a party”); see also Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849, 104 S.Ct. 156, 78 L.Ed.2d 144 (1983) (the government was not a necessary or indispensable party in a contract dispute where the government’s assessment of its own interests indicated it considered the action between the parties a “private dispute” and “meticulously observed a neutral and disinterested posture”)."
} | 10,380,023 | b |
However, contrary to the District's contention, such failure to obtain proper service, although relevant to whether there is personal jurisdiction over a particular party, does not require the dismissal of the action itself for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to effect service on defendant did not divest appellate court of jurisdiction which attached upon filing of petition for review",
"sentence": "Fletcher v. District Court, 137 Colo. 143, 322 P.2d 96 (1958); see also Samsonite Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 665 P.2d 1037 (Colo.App.1983) (failure to effect service on defendant did not divest appellate court of jurisdiction which attached upon filing of petition for review); cf. MacMillan v. Bruce, 900 P.2d 131 (Colo.App.1995) (court notes that plaintiff could have commenced suit by timely filing complaint without service on defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court notes that plaintiff could have commenced suit by timely filing complaint without service on defendant",
"sentence": "Fletcher v. District Court, 137 Colo. 143, 322 P.2d 96 (1958); see also Samsonite Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 665 P.2d 1037 (Colo.App.1983) (failure to effect service on defendant did not divest appellate court of jurisdiction which attached upon filing of petition for review); cf. MacMillan v. Bruce, 900 P.2d 131 (Colo.App.1995) (court notes that plaintiff could have commenced suit by timely filing complaint without service on defendant)."
} | 11,235,618 | a |
It is insufficient for the administrative law judge to consider "most" of the Avery factors. All six must be given consideration. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "26 F.Supp.2d 303, 308",
"parenthetical": "holding that a determination of residual functional capacity \"must 'includ[e] a discussion of why reported daily activity restrictions are or are not reasonably consistent with the medical evidence' \" [quoting Avery, 797 F.2d at 29]",
"sentence": "See Aguiar v. Apfel, 99 F.Supp.2d 130, 137 (D.Mass.2000) (Tauro, J.) (holding that consideration of “most” of Avery factors is insufficient where administrative law judge failed to consider claimant’s daily living activities); see also Rohrberg v. Apfel, 26 F.Supp.2d 303, 308 (D.Mass.1998) (Freedman, J.) (holding that a determination of residual functional capacity “must ‘includ[e] a discussion of why reported daily activity restrictions are or are not reasonably consistent with the medical evidence’ ” [quoting Avery, 797 F.2d at 29]). The Rohrberg court discussed the importance of a thorough examination of a claimant’s description of her daily living activities:"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "99 F.Supp.2d 130, 137",
"parenthetical": "holding that consideration of \"most\" of Avery factors is insufficient where administrative law judge failed to consider claimant's daily living activities",
"sentence": "See Aguiar v. Apfel, 99 F.Supp.2d 130, 137 (D.Mass.2000) (Tauro, J.) (holding that consideration of “most” of Avery factors is insufficient where administrative law judge failed to consider claimant’s daily living activities); see also Rohrberg v. Apfel, 26 F.Supp.2d 303, 308 (D.Mass.1998) (Freedman, J.) (holding that a determination of residual functional capacity “must ‘includ[e] a discussion of why reported daily activity restrictions are or are not reasonably consistent with the medical evidence’ ” [quoting Avery, 797 F.2d at 29]). The Rohrberg court discussed the importance of a thorough examination of a claimant’s description of her daily living activities:"
} | 11,232,326 | b |
It is insufficient for the administrative law judge to consider "most" of the Avery factors. All six must be given consideration. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "797 F.2d 29, 29",
"parenthetical": "holding that a determination of residual functional capacity \"must 'includ[e] a discussion of why reported daily activity restrictions are or are not reasonably consistent with the medical evidence' \" [quoting Avery, 797 F.2d at 29]",
"sentence": "See Aguiar v. Apfel, 99 F.Supp.2d 130, 137 (D.Mass.2000) (Tauro, J.) (holding that consideration of “most” of Avery factors is insufficient where administrative law judge failed to consider claimant’s daily living activities); see also Rohrberg v. Apfel, 26 F.Supp.2d 303, 308 (D.Mass.1998) (Freedman, J.) (holding that a determination of residual functional capacity “must ‘includ[e] a discussion of why reported daily activity restrictions are or are not reasonably consistent with the medical evidence’ ” [quoting Avery, 797 F.2d at 29]). The Rohrberg court discussed the importance of a thorough examination of a claimant’s description of her daily living activities:"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "99 F.Supp.2d 130, 137",
"parenthetical": "holding that consideration of \"most\" of Avery factors is insufficient where administrative law judge failed to consider claimant's daily living activities",
"sentence": "See Aguiar v. Apfel, 99 F.Supp.2d 130, 137 (D.Mass.2000) (Tauro, J.) (holding that consideration of “most” of Avery factors is insufficient where administrative law judge failed to consider claimant’s daily living activities); see also Rohrberg v. Apfel, 26 F.Supp.2d 303, 308 (D.Mass.1998) (Freedman, J.) (holding that a determination of residual functional capacity “must ‘includ[e] a discussion of why reported daily activity restrictions are or are not reasonably consistent with the medical evidence’ ” [quoting Avery, 797 F.2d at 29]). The Rohrberg court discussed the importance of a thorough examination of a claimant’s description of her daily living activities:"
} | 11,232,326 | b |
Nonetheless, if the complaint alleges essentially one cause of action, pendent venue may extend to Counts III and IV. In determining whether a case can be described as a single cause of action, courts examine whether the plaintiff has asserted essentially one wrong, whether the grounds for relief are the same as to the parties and proof, and whether there will be "great commonality as to witnesses and evidence." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "725 F.Supp. 606, 606",
"parenthetical": "refusing to extend pendent venue because, although plaintiffs discrimination claims were based on the conduct of a single supervisor, each claim alleged discriminatory conduct against a different protected class, the evidence to support each discrimination claim would of necessity be different, and the suit included nondiscrimination claims based on administrative law issues",
"sentence": "Cf. Archuleta, 725 F.Supp. at 606 (refusing to extend pendent venue because, although plaintiffs discrimination claims were based on the conduct of a single supervisor, each claim alleged discriminatory conduct against a different protected class, the evidence to support each discrimination claim would of necessity be different, and the suit included nondiscrimination claims based on administrative law issues)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying pendent venue in a ease involving both the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 and federal antitrust law because it would be \"senseless ... to bifurcate these two exceedingly complex antitrust cases by dismissing or transferring the antidumping counts while retaining the antitrust counts since the facts underlying both sets of issues are essentially the same\"",
"sentence": "Beattie, 756 F.2d at 101 (describing the litigation “as a single cause of action with separate grounds for relief’ because the plaintiffs seek damages for “ ‘an essentially single wrong,’ i.e., wrongful death” (footnote omitted)); see, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F.Supp. 262, 328 n. 38 (E.D.Pa.1975) (applying pendent venue in a ease involving both the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 and federal antitrust law because it would be “senseless ... to bifurcate these two exceedingly complex antitrust cases by dismissing or transferring the antidumping counts while retaining the antitrust counts since the facts underlying both sets of issues are essentially the same”); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 321 F.Supp. 1041, 1042 (D.D.C.1971) (extending pendent venue to the plaintiffs Civil Rights Act claim because venue was proper under the Equal Pay Act claim and the two separate causes of action arose out of common allegations of employment discrimination against female flight attendants)."
} | 4,016,857 | b |
Nonetheless, if the complaint alleges essentially one cause of action, pendent venue may extend to Counts III and IV. In determining whether a case can be described as a single cause of action, courts examine whether the plaintiff has asserted essentially one wrong, whether the grounds for relief are the same as to the parties and proof, and whether there will be "great commonality as to witnesses and evidence." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "321 F.Supp. 1041, 1042",
"parenthetical": "extending pendent venue to the plaintiffs Civil Rights Act claim because venue was proper under the Equal Pay Act claim and the two separate causes of action arose out of common allegations of employment discrimination against female flight attendants",
"sentence": "Beattie, 756 F.2d at 101 (describing the litigation “as a single cause of action with separate grounds for relief’ because the plaintiffs seek damages for “ ‘an essentially single wrong,’ i.e., wrongful death” (footnote omitted)); see, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F.Supp. 262, 328 n. 38 (E.D.Pa.1975) (applying pendent venue in a ease involving both the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 and federal antitrust law because it would be “senseless ... to bifurcate these two exceedingly complex antitrust cases by dismissing or transferring the antidumping counts while retaining the antitrust counts since the facts underlying both sets of issues are essentially the same”); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 321 F.Supp. 1041, 1042 (D.D.C.1971) (extending pendent venue to the plaintiffs Civil Rights Act claim because venue was proper under the Equal Pay Act claim and the two separate causes of action arose out of common allegations of employment discrimination against female flight attendants)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "725 F.Supp. 606, 606",
"parenthetical": "refusing to extend pendent venue because, although plaintiffs discrimination claims were based on the conduct of a single supervisor, each claim alleged discriminatory conduct against a different protected class, the evidence to support each discrimination claim would of necessity be different, and the suit included nondiscrimination claims based on administrative law issues",
"sentence": "Cf. Archuleta, 725 F.Supp. at 606 (refusing to extend pendent venue because, although plaintiffs discrimination claims were based on the conduct of a single supervisor, each claim alleged discriminatory conduct against a different protected class, the evidence to support each discrimination claim would of necessity be different, and the suit included nondiscrimination claims based on administrative law issues)."
} | 4,016,857 | a |
Notably, in all of but one of the cases cited by the majority for the position that a challenge propter affectum provides no ground for plea in abatement, the challenge was filed post indictment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding any error by the grand jury to be harmless because a trial jury had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See Black v. State, 264 Ga. 550 (2) (448 SE2d 357) (1994) (where the defendant filed a motion for new trial alleging a defective indictment, disqualification of a grand juror pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-70 was not viable); Fisher v. State, 93 Ga. 309 (1) (20 SE 329) (1893) (no challenge propter affectum where the defendant “had warning to challenge the juror before the bill was found” but failed to do so); Lascelles, 90 Ga. at 372-375 (discussed supra); Simpson v. State, 100 Ga. App. 726 (1) (112 SE2d 314) (1959) (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement because the defendant failed to make a timely challenge and filed his plea in abatement “some time after the indictment had been returned”); Garnett, 10 Ga. App. at 111 (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement where it was filed before “pleading to the merits”); see also Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506 (14) (578 SE2d 444) (2003) (finding any error by the grand jury to be harmless because a trial jury had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the defendant filed a motion for new trial alleging a defective indictment, disqualification of a grand juror pursuant to OCGA SS 15-12-70 was not viable",
"sentence": "See Black v. State, 264 Ga. 550 (2) (448 SE2d 357) (1994) (where the defendant filed a motion for new trial alleging a defective indictment, disqualification of a grand juror pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-70 was not viable); Fisher v. State, 93 Ga. 309 (1) (20 SE 329) (1893) (no challenge propter affectum where the defendant “had warning to challenge the juror before the bill was found” but failed to do so); Lascelles, 90 Ga. at 372-375 (discussed supra); Simpson v. State, 100 Ga. App. 726 (1) (112 SE2d 314) (1959) (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement because the defendant failed to make a timely challenge and filed his plea in abatement “some time after the indictment had been returned”); Garnett, 10 Ga. App. at 111 (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement where it was filed before “pleading to the merits”); see also Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506 (14) (578 SE2d 444) (2003) (finding any error by the grand jury to be harmless because a trial jury had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 4,108,271 | b |
Notably, in all of but one of the cases cited by the majority for the position that a challenge propter affectum provides no ground for plea in abatement, the challenge was filed post indictment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding any error by the grand jury to be harmless because a trial jury had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See Black v. State, 264 Ga. 550 (2) (448 SE2d 357) (1994) (where the defendant filed a motion for new trial alleging a defective indictment, disqualification of a grand juror pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-70 was not viable); Fisher v. State, 93 Ga. 309 (1) (20 SE 329) (1893) (no challenge propter affectum where the defendant “had warning to challenge the juror before the bill was found” but failed to do so); Lascelles, 90 Ga. at 372-375 (discussed supra); Simpson v. State, 100 Ga. App. 726 (1) (112 SE2d 314) (1959) (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement because the defendant failed to make a timely challenge and filed his plea in abatement “some time after the indictment had been returned”); Garnett, 10 Ga. App. at 111 (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement where it was filed before “pleading to the merits”); see also Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506 (14) (578 SE2d 444) (2003) (finding any error by the grand jury to be harmless because a trial jury had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no challenge propter affectum where the defendant \"had warning to challenge the juror before the bill was found\" but failed to do so",
"sentence": "See Black v. State, 264 Ga. 550 (2) (448 SE2d 357) (1994) (where the defendant filed a motion for new trial alleging a defective indictment, disqualification of a grand juror pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-70 was not viable); Fisher v. State, 93 Ga. 309 (1) (20 SE 329) (1893) (no challenge propter affectum where the defendant “had warning to challenge the juror before the bill was found” but failed to do so); Lascelles, 90 Ga. at 372-375 (discussed supra); Simpson v. State, 100 Ga. App. 726 (1) (112 SE2d 314) (1959) (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement because the defendant failed to make a timely challenge and filed his plea in abatement “some time after the indictment had been returned”); Garnett, 10 Ga. App. at 111 (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement where it was filed before “pleading to the merits”); see also Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506 (14) (578 SE2d 444) (2003) (finding any error by the grand jury to be harmless because a trial jury had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 4,108,271 | b |
Notably, in all of but one of the cases cited by the majority for the position that a challenge propter affectum provides no ground for plea in abatement, the challenge was filed post indictment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding any error by the grand jury to be harmless because a trial jury had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See Black v. State, 264 Ga. 550 (2) (448 SE2d 357) (1994) (where the defendant filed a motion for new trial alleging a defective indictment, disqualification of a grand juror pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-70 was not viable); Fisher v. State, 93 Ga. 309 (1) (20 SE 329) (1893) (no challenge propter affectum where the defendant “had warning to challenge the juror before the bill was found” but failed to do so); Lascelles, 90 Ga. at 372-375 (discussed supra); Simpson v. State, 100 Ga. App. 726 (1) (112 SE2d 314) (1959) (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement because the defendant failed to make a timely challenge and filed his plea in abatement “some time after the indictment had been returned”); Garnett, 10 Ga. App. at 111 (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement where it was filed before “pleading to the merits”); see also Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506 (14) (578 SE2d 444) (2003) (finding any error by the grand jury to be harmless because a trial jury had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no challenge propter affectum where the defendant \"had warning to challenge the juror before the bill was found\" but failed to do so",
"sentence": "See Black v. State, 264 Ga. 550 (2) (448 SE2d 357) (1994) (where the defendant filed a motion for new trial alleging a defective indictment, disqualification of a grand juror pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-70 was not viable); Fisher v. State, 93 Ga. 309 (1) (20 SE 329) (1893) (no challenge propter affectum where the defendant “had warning to challenge the juror before the bill was found” but failed to do so); Lascelles, 90 Ga. at 372-375 (discussed supra); Simpson v. State, 100 Ga. App. 726 (1) (112 SE2d 314) (1959) (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement because the defendant failed to make a timely challenge and filed his plea in abatement “some time after the indictment had been returned”); Garnett, 10 Ga. App. at 111 (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement where it was filed before “pleading to the merits”); see also Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506 (14) (578 SE2d 444) (2003) (finding any error by the grand jury to be harmless because a trial jury had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 4,108,271 | b |
Notably, in all of but one of the cases cited by the majority for the position that a challenge propter affectum provides no ground for plea in abatement, the challenge was filed post indictment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding any error by the grand jury to be harmless because a trial jury had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See Black v. State, 264 Ga. 550 (2) (448 SE2d 357) (1994) (where the defendant filed a motion for new trial alleging a defective indictment, disqualification of a grand juror pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-70 was not viable); Fisher v. State, 93 Ga. 309 (1) (20 SE 329) (1893) (no challenge propter affectum where the defendant “had warning to challenge the juror before the bill was found” but failed to do so); Lascelles, 90 Ga. at 372-375 (discussed supra); Simpson v. State, 100 Ga. App. 726 (1) (112 SE2d 314) (1959) (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement because the defendant failed to make a timely challenge and filed his plea in abatement “some time after the indictment had been returned”); Garnett, 10 Ga. App. at 111 (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement where it was filed before “pleading to the merits”); see also Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506 (14) (578 SE2d 444) (2003) (finding any error by the grand jury to be harmless because a trial jury had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming dismissal of plea in abatement because the defendant failed to make a timely challenge and filed his plea in abatement \"some time after the indictment had been returned\"",
"sentence": "See Black v. State, 264 Ga. 550 (2) (448 SE2d 357) (1994) (where the defendant filed a motion for new trial alleging a defective indictment, disqualification of a grand juror pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-70 was not viable); Fisher v. State, 93 Ga. 309 (1) (20 SE 329) (1893) (no challenge propter affectum where the defendant “had warning to challenge the juror before the bill was found” but failed to do so); Lascelles, 90 Ga. at 372-375 (discussed supra); Simpson v. State, 100 Ga. App. 726 (1) (112 SE2d 314) (1959) (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement because the defendant failed to make a timely challenge and filed his plea in abatement “some time after the indictment had been returned”); Garnett, 10 Ga. App. at 111 (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement where it was filed before “pleading to the merits”); see also Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506 (14) (578 SE2d 444) (2003) (finding any error by the grand jury to be harmless because a trial jury had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 4,108,271 | b |
Notably, in all of but one of the cases cited by the majority for the position that a challenge propter affectum provides no ground for plea in abatement, the challenge was filed post indictment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "10 Ga. App. 111, 111",
"parenthetical": "affirming dismissal of plea in abatement where it was filed before \"pleading to the merits\"",
"sentence": "See Black v. State, 264 Ga. 550 (2) (448 SE2d 357) (1994) (where the defendant filed a motion for new trial alleging a defective indictment, disqualification of a grand juror pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-70 was not viable); Fisher v. State, 93 Ga. 309 (1) (20 SE 329) (1893) (no challenge propter affectum where the defendant “had warning to challenge the juror before the bill was found” but failed to do so); Lascelles, 90 Ga. at 372-375 (discussed supra); Simpson v. State, 100 Ga. App. 726 (1) (112 SE2d 314) (1959) (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement because the defendant failed to make a timely challenge and filed his plea in abatement “some time after the indictment had been returned”); Garnett, 10 Ga. App. at 111 (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement where it was filed before “pleading to the merits”); see also Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506 (14) (578 SE2d 444) (2003) (finding any error by the grand jury to be harmless because a trial jury had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding any error by the grand jury to be harmless because a trial jury had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See Black v. State, 264 Ga. 550 (2) (448 SE2d 357) (1994) (where the defendant filed a motion for new trial alleging a defective indictment, disqualification of a grand juror pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-70 was not viable); Fisher v. State, 93 Ga. 309 (1) (20 SE 329) (1893) (no challenge propter affectum where the defendant “had warning to challenge the juror before the bill was found” but failed to do so); Lascelles, 90 Ga. at 372-375 (discussed supra); Simpson v. State, 100 Ga. App. 726 (1) (112 SE2d 314) (1959) (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement because the defendant failed to make a timely challenge and filed his plea in abatement “some time after the indictment had been returned”); Garnett, 10 Ga. App. at 111 (affirming dismissal of plea in abatement where it was filed before “pleading to the merits”); see also Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506 (14) (578 SE2d 444) (2003) (finding any error by the grand jury to be harmless because a trial jury had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 4,108,271 | a |
P10 Historically, we have attempted to maintain congruence in our retroactivity analysis with the standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "103 Wn.2d 322, 328",
"parenthetical": "holding that the balancing test established by the United States Supreme Court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision",
"sentence": "See In re Pers. Restraint of Sauve, 103 Wn.2d 322, 328, 692 P.2d 818 (1985) (holding that the balancing test established by the United States Supreme Court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision); In re Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 324-26, 823 P.2d 492 (1992) (stating that “we have attempted from the outset to stay in step with the federal retroactivity analysis,” and discussing a recent change in the federal retroactivity analysis); In re Pers. Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 940, 952 P.2d 116 (1998) (citing the federal analysis discussed by this court in St. Pierre as the current retroactivity analysis in Washington State)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 Wn.2d 783, 789",
"parenthetical": "stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hanson, 151 Wn.2d 783, 789, 91 P.3d 888 (2004) (stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre)."
} | 5,629,141 | a |
P10 Historically, we have attempted to maintain congruence in our retroactivity analysis with the standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "103 Wn.2d 322, 328",
"parenthetical": "holding that the balancing test established by the United States Supreme Court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision",
"sentence": "See In re Pers. Restraint of Sauve, 103 Wn.2d 322, 328, 692 P.2d 818 (1985) (holding that the balancing test established by the United States Supreme Court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision); In re Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 324-26, 823 P.2d 492 (1992) (stating that “we have attempted from the outset to stay in step with the federal retroactivity analysis,” and discussing a recent change in the federal retroactivity analysis); In re Pers. Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 940, 952 P.2d 116 (1998) (citing the federal analysis discussed by this court in St. Pierre as the current retroactivity analysis in Washington State)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hanson, 151 Wn.2d 783, 789, 91 P.3d 888 (2004) (stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre)."
} | 5,629,141 | a |
P10 Historically, we have attempted to maintain congruence in our retroactivity analysis with the standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the balancing test established by the United States Supreme Court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision",
"sentence": "See In re Pers. Restraint of Sauve, 103 Wn.2d 322, 328, 692 P.2d 818 (1985) (holding that the balancing test established by the United States Supreme Court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision); In re Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 324-26, 823 P.2d 492 (1992) (stating that “we have attempted from the outset to stay in step with the federal retroactivity analysis,” and discussing a recent change in the federal retroactivity analysis); In re Pers. Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 940, 952 P.2d 116 (1998) (citing the federal analysis discussed by this court in St. Pierre as the current retroactivity analysis in Washington State)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 Wn.2d 783, 789",
"parenthetical": "stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hanson, 151 Wn.2d 783, 789, 91 P.3d 888 (2004) (stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre)."
} | 5,629,141 | a |
P10 Historically, we have attempted to maintain congruence in our retroactivity analysis with the standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hanson, 151 Wn.2d 783, 789, 91 P.3d 888 (2004) (stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the balancing test established by the United States Supreme Court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision",
"sentence": "See In re Pers. Restraint of Sauve, 103 Wn.2d 322, 328, 692 P.2d 818 (1985) (holding that the balancing test established by the United States Supreme Court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision); In re Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 324-26, 823 P.2d 492 (1992) (stating that “we have attempted from the outset to stay in step with the federal retroactivity analysis,” and discussing a recent change in the federal retroactivity analysis); In re Pers. Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 940, 952 P.2d 116 (1998) (citing the federal analysis discussed by this court in St. Pierre as the current retroactivity analysis in Washington State)."
} | 5,629,141 | b |
P10 Historically, we have attempted to maintain congruence in our retroactivity analysis with the standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 Wn.2d 321, 324-26",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"we have attempted from the outset to stay in step with the federal retroactivity analysis,\" and discussing a recent change in the federal retroactivity analysis",
"sentence": "See In re Pers. Restraint of Sauve, 103 Wn.2d 322, 328, 692 P.2d 818 (1985) (holding that the balancing test established by the United States Supreme Court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision); In re Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 324-26, 823 P.2d 492 (1992) (stating that “we have attempted from the outset to stay in step with the federal retroactivity analysis,” and discussing a recent change in the federal retroactivity analysis); In re Pers. Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 940, 952 P.2d 116 (1998) (citing the federal analysis discussed by this court in St. Pierre as the current retroactivity analysis in Washington State)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 Wn.2d 783, 789",
"parenthetical": "stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hanson, 151 Wn.2d 783, 789, 91 P.3d 888 (2004) (stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre)."
} | 5,629,141 | a |
P10 Historically, we have attempted to maintain congruence in our retroactivity analysis with the standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hanson, 151 Wn.2d 783, 789, 91 P.3d 888 (2004) (stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 Wn.2d 321, 324-26",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"we have attempted from the outset to stay in step with the federal retroactivity analysis,\" and discussing a recent change in the federal retroactivity analysis",
"sentence": "See In re Pers. Restraint of Sauve, 103 Wn.2d 322, 328, 692 P.2d 818 (1985) (holding that the balancing test established by the United States Supreme Court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision); In re Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 324-26, 823 P.2d 492 (1992) (stating that “we have attempted from the outset to stay in step with the federal retroactivity analysis,” and discussing a recent change in the federal retroactivity analysis); In re Pers. Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 940, 952 P.2d 116 (1998) (citing the federal analysis discussed by this court in St. Pierre as the current retroactivity analysis in Washington State)."
} | 5,629,141 | b |
P10 Historically, we have attempted to maintain congruence in our retroactivity analysis with the standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 Wn.2d 783, 789",
"parenthetical": "stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hanson, 151 Wn.2d 783, 789, 91 P.3d 888 (2004) (stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"we have attempted from the outset to stay in step with the federal retroactivity analysis,\" and discussing a recent change in the federal retroactivity analysis",
"sentence": "See In re Pers. Restraint of Sauve, 103 Wn.2d 322, 328, 692 P.2d 818 (1985) (holding that the balancing test established by the United States Supreme Court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision); In re Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 324-26, 823 P.2d 492 (1992) (stating that “we have attempted from the outset to stay in step with the federal retroactivity analysis,” and discussing a recent change in the federal retroactivity analysis); In re Pers. Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 940, 952 P.2d 116 (1998) (citing the federal analysis discussed by this court in St. Pierre as the current retroactivity analysis in Washington State)."
} | 5,629,141 | b |
P10 Historically, we have attempted to maintain congruence in our retroactivity analysis with the standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"we have attempted from the outset to stay in step with the federal retroactivity analysis,\" and discussing a recent change in the federal retroactivity analysis",
"sentence": "See In re Pers. Restraint of Sauve, 103 Wn.2d 322, 328, 692 P.2d 818 (1985) (holding that the balancing test established by the United States Supreme Court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision); In re Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 324-26, 823 P.2d 492 (1992) (stating that “we have attempted from the outset to stay in step with the federal retroactivity analysis,” and discussing a recent change in the federal retroactivity analysis); In re Pers. Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 940, 952 P.2d 116 (1998) (citing the federal analysis discussed by this court in St. Pierre as the current retroactivity analysis in Washington State)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hanson, 151 Wn.2d 783, 789, 91 P.3d 888 (2004) (stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre)."
} | 5,629,141 | a |
Rather, it corrected his sentenced based upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of the law as it existed at the time of his offense, and so the Ex Post Facto Clause is not implicated. Likewise, because the court was merely correcting his sentence to restore the term of supervised release it had initially imposed under the applicable version of 21 U.S.C. SS 841(b), he had no right to be present when the court did so. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 F.3d 527, 528",
"parenthetical": "defendant has no right to be present for nondiscretionary correction of sentence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Parker, 101 F.3d 527, 528 (7th Cir.1996) (defendant has no right to be present for nondiscretionary correction of sentence); see also United States v. De Los Santos Himitola, 924 F.2d 380, 382-83 (1st Cir.1991) (defendant who committed drug crime before effective date of sentencing reforms had no right to be present when district court restored term of supervised release originally imposed but changed on remand to special parole)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "924 F.2d 380, 382-83",
"parenthetical": "defendant who committed drug crime before effective date of sentencing reforms had no right to be present when district court restored term of supervised release originally imposed but changed on remand to special parole",
"sentence": "See United States v. Parker, 101 F.3d 527, 528 (7th Cir.1996) (defendant has no right to be present for nondiscretionary correction of sentence); see also United States v. De Los Santos Himitola, 924 F.2d 380, 382-83 (1st Cir.1991) (defendant who committed drug crime before effective date of sentencing reforms had no right to be present when district court restored term of supervised release originally imposed but changed on remand to special parole)."
} | 1,222,066 | a |
We examine only whether the remand order is color-ably characterized as based on lack of unanimity, not whether lack of unanimity was colorably established. In so doing, we follow our own precedent in Moody as well as that of other circuits. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "652 F.3d 767, 775-76",
"parenthetical": "concluding that colorability exists when \"the district judge's ground for dismissal was indeed absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, no matter how great a mistake the judge had made in thinking so,\" and further observing that \"it usually is easier to determine what the district court's ... ground for dismissing a case was than whether it was not merely an erroneous ground but a frivolous one\"",
"sentence": "See Townsquare Media, Inc. v. Brill, 652 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that colorability exists when “the district judge’s ground for dismissal was indeed absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, no matter how great a mistake the judge had made in thinking so,” and further observing that “it usually is easier to determine what the district court’s ... ground for dismissing a case was than whether it was not merely an erroneous ground but a frivolous one”); Price v. J & H Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 493 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir.2007) (“Regardless of whether the subject matter jurisdiction determination was correct on the merits ... the District Court’s characterization of its remand order as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was certainly ‘colorable.’ ”); cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 641, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (noting that “even if it is permissible to look beyond the court’s own label” in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "547 U.S. 633, 641",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"even if it is permissible to look beyond the court's own label\" in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable",
"sentence": "See Townsquare Media, Inc. v. Brill, 652 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that colorability exists when “the district judge’s ground for dismissal was indeed absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, no matter how great a mistake the judge had made in thinking so,” and further observing that “it usually is easier to determine what the district court’s ... ground for dismissing a case was than whether it was not merely an erroneous ground but a frivolous one”); Price v. J & H Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 493 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir.2007) (“Regardless of whether the subject matter jurisdiction determination was correct on the merits ... the District Court’s characterization of its remand order as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was certainly ‘colorable.’ ”); cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 641, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (noting that “even if it is permissible to look beyond the court’s own label” in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable)."
} | 4,331,398 | a |
We examine only whether the remand order is color-ably characterized as based on lack of unanimity, not whether lack of unanimity was colorably established. In so doing, we follow our own precedent in Moody as well as that of other circuits. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "652 F.3d 767, 775-76",
"parenthetical": "concluding that colorability exists when \"the district judge's ground for dismissal was indeed absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, no matter how great a mistake the judge had made in thinking so,\" and further observing that \"it usually is easier to determine what the district court's ... ground for dismissing a case was than whether it was not merely an erroneous ground but a frivolous one\"",
"sentence": "See Townsquare Media, Inc. v. Brill, 652 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that colorability exists when “the district judge’s ground for dismissal was indeed absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, no matter how great a mistake the judge had made in thinking so,” and further observing that “it usually is easier to determine what the district court’s ... ground for dismissing a case was than whether it was not merely an erroneous ground but a frivolous one”); Price v. J & H Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 493 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir.2007) (“Regardless of whether the subject matter jurisdiction determination was correct on the merits ... the District Court’s characterization of its remand order as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was certainly ‘colorable.’ ”); cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 641, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (noting that “even if it is permissible to look beyond the court’s own label” in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"even if it is permissible to look beyond the court's own label\" in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable",
"sentence": "See Townsquare Media, Inc. v. Brill, 652 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that colorability exists when “the district judge’s ground for dismissal was indeed absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, no matter how great a mistake the judge had made in thinking so,” and further observing that “it usually is easier to determine what the district court’s ... ground for dismissing a case was than whether it was not merely an erroneous ground but a frivolous one”); Price v. J & H Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 493 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir.2007) (“Regardless of whether the subject matter jurisdiction determination was correct on the merits ... the District Court’s characterization of its remand order as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was certainly ‘colorable.’ ”); cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 641, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (noting that “even if it is permissible to look beyond the court’s own label” in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable)."
} | 4,331,398 | a |
We examine only whether the remand order is color-ably characterized as based on lack of unanimity, not whether lack of unanimity was colorably established. In so doing, we follow our own precedent in Moody as well as that of other circuits. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"even if it is permissible to look beyond the court's own label\" in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable",
"sentence": "See Townsquare Media, Inc. v. Brill, 652 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that colorability exists when “the district judge’s ground for dismissal was indeed absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, no matter how great a mistake the judge had made in thinking so,” and further observing that “it usually is easier to determine what the district court’s ... ground for dismissing a case was than whether it was not merely an erroneous ground but a frivolous one”); Price v. J & H Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 493 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir.2007) (“Regardless of whether the subject matter jurisdiction determination was correct on the merits ... the District Court’s characterization of its remand order as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was certainly ‘colorable.’ ”); cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 641, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (noting that “even if it is permissible to look beyond the court’s own label” in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "652 F.3d 767, 775-76",
"parenthetical": "concluding that colorability exists when \"the district judge's ground for dismissal was indeed absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, no matter how great a mistake the judge had made in thinking so,\" and further observing that \"it usually is easier to determine what the district court's ... ground for dismissing a case was than whether it was not merely an erroneous ground but a frivolous one\"",
"sentence": "See Townsquare Media, Inc. v. Brill, 652 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that colorability exists when “the district judge’s ground for dismissal was indeed absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, no matter how great a mistake the judge had made in thinking so,” and further observing that “it usually is easier to determine what the district court’s ... ground for dismissing a case was than whether it was not merely an erroneous ground but a frivolous one”); Price v. J & H Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 493 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir.2007) (“Regardless of whether the subject matter jurisdiction determination was correct on the merits ... the District Court’s characterization of its remand order as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was certainly ‘colorable.’ ”); cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 641, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (noting that “even if it is permissible to look beyond the court’s own label” in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable)."
} | 4,331,398 | b |
We examine only whether the remand order is color-ably characterized as based on lack of unanimity, not whether lack of unanimity was colorably established. In so doing, we follow our own precedent in Moody as well as that of other circuits. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "493 F.3d 55, 61",
"parenthetical": "\"Regardless of whether the subject matter jurisdiction determination was correct on the merits ... the District Court's characterization of its remand order as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was certainly 'colorable.' \"",
"sentence": "See Townsquare Media, Inc. v. Brill, 652 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that colorability exists when “the district judge’s ground for dismissal was indeed absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, no matter how great a mistake the judge had made in thinking so,” and further observing that “it usually is easier to determine what the district court’s ... ground for dismissing a case was than whether it was not merely an erroneous ground but a frivolous one”); Price v. J & H Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 493 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir.2007) (“Regardless of whether the subject matter jurisdiction determination was correct on the merits ... the District Court’s characterization of its remand order as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was certainly ‘colorable.’ ”); cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 641, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (noting that “even if it is permissible to look beyond the court’s own label” in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "547 U.S. 633, 641",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"even if it is permissible to look beyond the court's own label\" in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable",
"sentence": "See Townsquare Media, Inc. v. Brill, 652 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that colorability exists when “the district judge’s ground for dismissal was indeed absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, no matter how great a mistake the judge had made in thinking so,” and further observing that “it usually is easier to determine what the district court’s ... ground for dismissing a case was than whether it was not merely an erroneous ground but a frivolous one”); Price v. J & H Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 493 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir.2007) (“Regardless of whether the subject matter jurisdiction determination was correct on the merits ... the District Court’s characterization of its remand order as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was certainly ‘colorable.’ ”); cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 641, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (noting that “even if it is permissible to look beyond the court’s own label” in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable)."
} | 4,331,398 | a |
We examine only whether the remand order is color-ably characterized as based on lack of unanimity, not whether lack of unanimity was colorably established. In so doing, we follow our own precedent in Moody as well as that of other circuits. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"even if it is permissible to look beyond the court's own label\" in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable",
"sentence": "See Townsquare Media, Inc. v. Brill, 652 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that colorability exists when “the district judge’s ground for dismissal was indeed absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, no matter how great a mistake the judge had made in thinking so,” and further observing that “it usually is easier to determine what the district court’s ... ground for dismissing a case was than whether it was not merely an erroneous ground but a frivolous one”); Price v. J & H Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 493 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir.2007) (“Regardless of whether the subject matter jurisdiction determination was correct on the merits ... the District Court’s characterization of its remand order as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was certainly ‘colorable.’ ”); cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 641, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (noting that “even if it is permissible to look beyond the court’s own label” in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "493 F.3d 55, 61",
"parenthetical": "\"Regardless of whether the subject matter jurisdiction determination was correct on the merits ... the District Court's characterization of its remand order as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was certainly 'colorable.' \"",
"sentence": "See Townsquare Media, Inc. v. Brill, 652 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that colorability exists when “the district judge’s ground for dismissal was indeed absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, no matter how great a mistake the judge had made in thinking so,” and further observing that “it usually is easier to determine what the district court’s ... ground for dismissing a case was than whether it was not merely an erroneous ground but a frivolous one”); Price v. J & H Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 493 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir.2007) (“Regardless of whether the subject matter jurisdiction determination was correct on the merits ... the District Court’s characterization of its remand order as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was certainly ‘colorable.’ ”); cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 641, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (noting that “even if it is permissible to look beyond the court’s own label” in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable)."
} | 4,331,398 | b |
We examine only whether the remand order is color-ably characterized as based on lack of unanimity, not whether lack of unanimity was colorably established. In so doing, we follow our own precedent in Moody as well as that of other circuits. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"even if it is permissible to look beyond the court's own label\" in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable",
"sentence": "See Townsquare Media, Inc. v. Brill, 652 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that colorability exists when “the district judge’s ground for dismissal was indeed absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, no matter how great a mistake the judge had made in thinking so,” and further observing that “it usually is easier to determine what the district court’s ... ground for dismissing a case was than whether it was not merely an erroneous ground but a frivolous one”); Price v. J & H Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 493 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir.2007) (“Regardless of whether the subject matter jurisdiction determination was correct on the merits ... the District Court’s characterization of its remand order as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was certainly ‘colorable.’ ”); cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 641, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (noting that “even if it is permissible to look beyond the court’s own label” in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "493 F.3d 55, 61",
"parenthetical": "\"Regardless of whether the subject matter jurisdiction determination was correct on the merits ... the District Court's characterization of its remand order as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was certainly 'colorable.' \"",
"sentence": "See Townsquare Media, Inc. v. Brill, 652 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that colorability exists when “the district judge’s ground for dismissal was indeed absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, no matter how great a mistake the judge had made in thinking so,” and further observing that “it usually is easier to determine what the district court’s ... ground for dismissing a case was than whether it was not merely an erroneous ground but a frivolous one”); Price v. J & H Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 493 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir.2007) (“Regardless of whether the subject matter jurisdiction determination was correct on the merits ... the District Court’s characterization of its remand order as being based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was certainly ‘colorable.’ ”); cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 641, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (noting that “even if it is permissible to look beyond the court’s own label” in order to identify the basis of a remand order, the adequacy of that basis is not reviewable)."
} | 4,331,398 | b |
P 9 We conclude, then, that Henry's factual allegations in her complaint supporting her claim that Mar had been negligent are evidentiary admissions, albeit that they are disputed and are not, in and of themselves, conclusive evidence of Mar's fault. "The time has passed when allegations in a pleading will be treated as mere fictions, rather than 'as statements of the real issues in the cause and hence as admissions of the parties.'" | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversible error not to admit into evidence party's previous complaint against third party whom plaintiff alleged had been responsible for its injuries",
"sentence": "Cf. Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir.1990) (inconsistent allegations in prior pleadings admissible); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Stone, 293 Ala. 726, 310 So.2d 206 (1975) (reversible error not to admit into evidence party’s previous complaint against third party whom plaintiff alleged had been responsible for its injuries); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shuman, 175 Ind.App. 186, 370 N.E.2d 941 (1977); McWilliams v. Szymanski 101 Or.App. 617, 792 P.2d 457 (1990); but see Lytle v. Stearns, 250 Kan. 783, 830 P.2d 1197 (1992) (acknowledging split of authority in comparative negligence cases on admissibility of pleadings alleging negligence against defendants who have been dismissed and finding error in admitting statements in prior pleading)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging split of authority in comparative negligence cases on admissibility of pleadings alleging negligence against defendants who have been dismissed and finding error in admitting statements in prior pleading",
"sentence": "Cf. Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir.1990) (inconsistent allegations in prior pleadings admissible); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Stone, 293 Ala. 726, 310 So.2d 206 (1975) (reversible error not to admit into evidence party’s previous complaint against third party whom plaintiff alleged had been responsible for its injuries); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shuman, 175 Ind.App. 186, 370 N.E.2d 941 (1977); McWilliams v. Szymanski 101 Or.App. 617, 792 P.2d 457 (1990); but see Lytle v. Stearns, 250 Kan. 783, 830 P.2d 1197 (1992) (acknowledging split of authority in comparative negligence cases on admissibility of pleadings alleging negligence against defendants who have been dismissed and finding error in admitting statements in prior pleading)."
} | 550,546 | a |
P 9 We conclude, then, that Henry's factual allegations in her complaint supporting her claim that Mar had been negligent are evidentiary admissions, albeit that they are disputed and are not, in and of themselves, conclusive evidence of Mar's fault. "The time has passed when allegations in a pleading will be treated as mere fictions, rather than 'as statements of the real issues in the cause and hence as admissions of the parties.'" | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversible error not to admit into evidence party's previous complaint against third party whom plaintiff alleged had been responsible for its injuries",
"sentence": "Cf. Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir.1990) (inconsistent allegations in prior pleadings admissible); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Stone, 293 Ala. 726, 310 So.2d 206 (1975) (reversible error not to admit into evidence party’s previous complaint against third party whom plaintiff alleged had been responsible for its injuries); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shuman, 175 Ind.App. 186, 370 N.E.2d 941 (1977); McWilliams v. Szymanski 101 Or.App. 617, 792 P.2d 457 (1990); but see Lytle v. Stearns, 250 Kan. 783, 830 P.2d 1197 (1992) (acknowledging split of authority in comparative negligence cases on admissibility of pleadings alleging negligence against defendants who have been dismissed and finding error in admitting statements in prior pleading)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging split of authority in comparative negligence cases on admissibility of pleadings alleging negligence against defendants who have been dismissed and finding error in admitting statements in prior pleading",
"sentence": "Cf. Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir.1990) (inconsistent allegations in prior pleadings admissible); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Stone, 293 Ala. 726, 310 So.2d 206 (1975) (reversible error not to admit into evidence party’s previous complaint against third party whom plaintiff alleged had been responsible for its injuries); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shuman, 175 Ind.App. 186, 370 N.E.2d 941 (1977); McWilliams v. Szymanski 101 Or.App. 617, 792 P.2d 457 (1990); but see Lytle v. Stearns, 250 Kan. 783, 830 P.2d 1197 (1992) (acknowledging split of authority in comparative negligence cases on admissibility of pleadings alleging negligence against defendants who have been dismissed and finding error in admitting statements in prior pleading)."
} | 550,546 | a |
P 9 We conclude, then, that Henry's factual allegations in her complaint supporting her claim that Mar had been negligent are evidentiary admissions, albeit that they are disputed and are not, in and of themselves, conclusive evidence of Mar's fault. "The time has passed when allegations in a pleading will be treated as mere fictions, rather than 'as statements of the real issues in the cause and hence as admissions of the parties.'" | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversible error not to admit into evidence party's previous complaint against third party whom plaintiff alleged had been responsible for its injuries",
"sentence": "Cf. Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir.1990) (inconsistent allegations in prior pleadings admissible); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Stone, 293 Ala. 726, 310 So.2d 206 (1975) (reversible error not to admit into evidence party’s previous complaint against third party whom plaintiff alleged had been responsible for its injuries); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shuman, 175 Ind.App. 186, 370 N.E.2d 941 (1977); McWilliams v. Szymanski 101 Or.App. 617, 792 P.2d 457 (1990); but see Lytle v. Stearns, 250 Kan. 783, 830 P.2d 1197 (1992) (acknowledging split of authority in comparative negligence cases on admissibility of pleadings alleging negligence against defendants who have been dismissed and finding error in admitting statements in prior pleading)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging split of authority in comparative negligence cases on admissibility of pleadings alleging negligence against defendants who have been dismissed and finding error in admitting statements in prior pleading",
"sentence": "Cf. Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir.1990) (inconsistent allegations in prior pleadings admissible); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Stone, 293 Ala. 726, 310 So.2d 206 (1975) (reversible error not to admit into evidence party’s previous complaint against third party whom plaintiff alleged had been responsible for its injuries); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shuman, 175 Ind.App. 186, 370 N.E.2d 941 (1977); McWilliams v. Szymanski 101 Or.App. 617, 792 P.2d 457 (1990); but see Lytle v. Stearns, 250 Kan. 783, 830 P.2d 1197 (1992) (acknowledging split of authority in comparative negligence cases on admissibility of pleadings alleging negligence against defendants who have been dismissed and finding error in admitting statements in prior pleading)."
} | 550,546 | a |
P 9 We conclude, then, that Henry's factual allegations in her complaint supporting her claim that Mar had been negligent are evidentiary admissions, albeit that they are disputed and are not, in and of themselves, conclusive evidence of Mar's fault. "The time has passed when allegations in a pleading will be treated as mere fictions, rather than 'as statements of the real issues in the cause and hence as admissions of the parties.'" | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversible error not to admit into evidence party's previous complaint against third party whom plaintiff alleged had been responsible for its injuries",
"sentence": "Cf. Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir.1990) (inconsistent allegations in prior pleadings admissible); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Stone, 293 Ala. 726, 310 So.2d 206 (1975) (reversible error not to admit into evidence party’s previous complaint against third party whom plaintiff alleged had been responsible for its injuries); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shuman, 175 Ind.App. 186, 370 N.E.2d 941 (1977); McWilliams v. Szymanski 101 Or.App. 617, 792 P.2d 457 (1990); but see Lytle v. Stearns, 250 Kan. 783, 830 P.2d 1197 (1992) (acknowledging split of authority in comparative negligence cases on admissibility of pleadings alleging negligence against defendants who have been dismissed and finding error in admitting statements in prior pleading)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging split of authority in comparative negligence cases on admissibility of pleadings alleging negligence against defendants who have been dismissed and finding error in admitting statements in prior pleading",
"sentence": "Cf. Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir.1990) (inconsistent allegations in prior pleadings admissible); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Stone, 293 Ala. 726, 310 So.2d 206 (1975) (reversible error not to admit into evidence party’s previous complaint against third party whom plaintiff alleged had been responsible for its injuries); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shuman, 175 Ind.App. 186, 370 N.E.2d 941 (1977); McWilliams v. Szymanski 101 Or.App. 617, 792 P.2d 457 (1990); but see Lytle v. Stearns, 250 Kan. 783, 830 P.2d 1197 (1992) (acknowledging split of authority in comparative negligence cases on admissibility of pleadings alleging negligence against defendants who have been dismissed and finding error in admitting statements in prior pleading)."
} | 550,546 | a |
However, "[i]t is hornbook law that the waiver [of the privilege] is limited to the particular proceeding in which the witness appears." The majority rule preserves a witness's right to assert the privilege in subsequent, distinct stages of a single proceeding. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "119 N.H. 207, 210",
"parenthetical": "finding that witness could assert privilege to avoid testifying at trial on matters she addressed during probable cause hearing, despite her prior admission to court that she had perjured herself during probable cause hearing",
"sentence": "See United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1210 (1st Cir. 1973) (noting that testimony before grand jury or other “preliminary and separate proceeding” does not waive right to assert privilege at trial) (quotation omitted); 1 McCormick on Evidence, supra § 140, at 528; cf. State v. Lavallee, 119 N.H. 207, 210, 400 A.2d 480, 482 (1979) (finding that witness could assert privilege to avoid testifying at trial on matters she addressed during probable cause hearing, despite her prior admission to court that she had perjured herself during probable cause hearing)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "488 F.2d 1206, 1210",
"parenthetical": "noting that testimony before grand jury or other \"preliminary and separate proceeding\" does not waive right to assert privilege at trial",
"sentence": "See United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1210 (1st Cir. 1973) (noting that testimony before grand jury or other “preliminary and separate proceeding” does not waive right to assert privilege at trial) (quotation omitted); 1 McCormick on Evidence, supra § 140, at 528; cf. State v. Lavallee, 119 N.H. 207, 210, 400 A.2d 480, 482 (1979) (finding that witness could assert privilege to avoid testifying at trial on matters she addressed during probable cause hearing, despite her prior admission to court that she had perjured herself during probable cause hearing)."
} | 2,298,415 | b |
However, "[i]t is hornbook law that the waiver [of the privilege] is limited to the particular proceeding in which the witness appears." The majority rule preserves a witness's right to assert the privilege in subsequent, distinct stages of a single proceeding. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "488 F.2d 1206, 1210",
"parenthetical": "noting that testimony before grand jury or other \"preliminary and separate proceeding\" does not waive right to assert privilege at trial",
"sentence": "See United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1210 (1st Cir. 1973) (noting that testimony before grand jury or other “preliminary and separate proceeding” does not waive right to assert privilege at trial) (quotation omitted); 1 McCormick on Evidence, supra § 140, at 528; cf. State v. Lavallee, 119 N.H. 207, 210, 400 A.2d 480, 482 (1979) (finding that witness could assert privilege to avoid testifying at trial on matters she addressed during probable cause hearing, despite her prior admission to court that she had perjured herself during probable cause hearing)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "400 A.2d 480, 482",
"parenthetical": "finding that witness could assert privilege to avoid testifying at trial on matters she addressed during probable cause hearing, despite her prior admission to court that she had perjured herself during probable cause hearing",
"sentence": "See United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1210 (1st Cir. 1973) (noting that testimony before grand jury or other “preliminary and separate proceeding” does not waive right to assert privilege at trial) (quotation omitted); 1 McCormick on Evidence, supra § 140, at 528; cf. State v. Lavallee, 119 N.H. 207, 210, 400 A.2d 480, 482 (1979) (finding that witness could assert privilege to avoid testifying at trial on matters she addressed during probable cause hearing, despite her prior admission to court that she had perjured herself during probable cause hearing)."
} | 2,298,415 | a |
If a probationer is sentenced to an illegal term of probation that exceeds the statutory maximum due to the failure to credit him with prior probation served, and is serving the illegal portion of that term when an affidavit of violation is filed, the affidavit should be dismissed because the trial court's jurisdiction over the probation expired when the maximum probationary term had been served. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing denial of rule 3.850 motion on facts essentially same as the instant case",
"sentence": "See Fellman v. State, 673 So.2d 155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (reversing denial of rule 3.850 motion on facts essentially same as the instant case)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "654 So.2d 234, 236",
"parenthetical": "reversing order revoking community control because revocation occurred while appellant was serving illegal portion of illegal sentence",
"sentence": "See also Jackson v. State, 654 So.2d 234, 236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (reversing order revoking community control because revocation occurred while appellant was serving illegal portion of illegal sentence)."
} | 11,921,907 | a |
Since both experts disfavor use of the rule of thumb, we must determine whether the statistics they have presented are reliable and determinative of whether or not the Commission Plan provides sufficient districts with effective electoral opportunities for African-Americans. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "478 U.S. 45, 45-46",
"parenthetical": "applying \"flexible, fact-intensive test,\" including a \"practical evaluation of the past and present reality\" and a \"functional view of the political process\"",
"sentence": "See Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1414-15 (stating that district courts have discretion “to determine what an appropriate corrective should be based upon analysis of election data, if such data can yield a meaningful and persuasive result”); see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45-46, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (applying “flexible, fact-intensive test,” including a “practical evaluation of the past and present reality” and a “functional view of the political process”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "740 F.2d 1414, 1414-15",
"parenthetical": "stating that district courts have discretion \"to determine what an appropriate corrective should be based upon analysis of election data, if such data can yield a meaningful and persuasive result\"",
"sentence": "See Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1414-15 (stating that district courts have discretion “to determine what an appropriate corrective should be based upon analysis of election data, if such data can yield a meaningful and persuasive result”); see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45-46, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (applying “flexible, fact-intensive test,” including a “practical evaluation of the past and present reality” and a “functional view of the political process”)."
} | 9,435,357 | b |
Since both experts disfavor use of the rule of thumb, we must determine whether the statistics they have presented are reliable and determinative of whether or not the Commission Plan provides sufficient districts with effective electoral opportunities for African-Americans. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "740 F.2d 1414, 1414-15",
"parenthetical": "stating that district courts have discretion \"to determine what an appropriate corrective should be based upon analysis of election data, if such data can yield a meaningful and persuasive result\"",
"sentence": "See Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1414-15 (stating that district courts have discretion “to determine what an appropriate corrective should be based upon analysis of election data, if such data can yield a meaningful and persuasive result”); see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45-46, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (applying “flexible, fact-intensive test,” including a “practical evaluation of the past and present reality” and a “functional view of the political process”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"flexible, fact-intensive test,\" including a \"practical evaluation of the past and present reality\" and a \"functional view of the political process\"",
"sentence": "See Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1414-15 (stating that district courts have discretion “to determine what an appropriate corrective should be based upon analysis of election data, if such data can yield a meaningful and persuasive result”); see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45-46, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (applying “flexible, fact-intensive test,” including a “practical evaluation of the past and present reality” and a “functional view of the political process”)."
} | 9,435,357 | a |
Under the Blum test, even heavily-regulated private entities generally are held not to be state actors. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "191 F.3d 206, 206",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fact that a business entity is subject to 'extensive and detailed' state regulation does not convert that organization's actions into those of the state.\"",
"sentence": "Desiderio, 191 F.3d, at 206 (“[T]he fact that a business entity is subject to ‘extensive and detailed’ state regulation does not convert that organization’s actions into those of the state.”); see also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350, 95 S.Ct. 449 (holding that extensively regulated public utilities are not state actors)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "419 U.S. 350, 350",
"parenthetical": "holding that extensively regulated public utilities are not state actors",
"sentence": "Desiderio, 191 F.3d, at 206 (“[T]he fact that a business entity is subject to ‘extensive and detailed’ state regulation does not convert that organization’s actions into those of the state.”); see also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350, 95 S.Ct. 449 (holding that extensively regulated public utilities are not state actors)."
} | 9,393,599 | a |
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