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The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "605 F.2d 1248, 1248",
"parenthetical": "defendant's liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | a |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "421 N.Y.2d 747, 747",
"parenthetical": "action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | a |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "554 F.Supp. 86, 86",
"parenthetical": "where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "605 F.2d 1248, 1248",
"parenthetical": "defendant's liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | a |
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that the agents instituted and continued a criminal prosecution against him, an innocent person. However, neither New York nor the common law imposes liability upon even a private person for mere negligence in instituting or continuing a criminal prosecution for a crime which has actually occurred. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "421 N.Y.2d 747, 747",
"parenthetical": "action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "554 F.Supp. 86, 86",
"parenthetical": "where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law",
"sentence": "Howell v. Davis, 58 A.D.2d 852, 396 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867-68 (1977) (requirements of malicious prosecution or abuse of process cannot be bypassed by pleading prima facie tort), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 874, 403 N.Y.S.2d 496, 374 N.E.2d 393 (1978); see Benjamin, 554 F.Supp. at 86 (where innocent person is arrested on valid warrant naming him, action for malicious prosecution is only remedy available under New York law); cf. Feinberg v. Sak’s & Co., 83 A.D.2d 952, 443 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981) (analysis limited to false arrest and malicious prosecution); Lawrence v. Police Dept. of the City of Syracuse, 81 A.D.2d 1006, 440 N.Y.S.2d 105, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 737, 431 N.Y.S.2d 639, 431 N.E.2d 639 (1981); Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1248 (defendant’s liability based on knowledge of lack of probable cause); Boose, 421 N.Y.2d at 747 (action for malicious prosecution available to test error of arresting officer); see generally Broughton, 335 N.E.2d at 310 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution or abuse of process)."
} | 4,065,769 | b |
Courts in this district have reduced fee awards when time entries do not refer to the specific matter worked on; while "preparation for hearing" is a permissible time entry not subject to reduction because it refers to a specific event and allows for a determination of the reasonableness of time spent, "work on various items" and "work on documents" are too vague for a court to determine the reasonableness of time spent. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "473 F.Supp.2d 305, 305-06",
"parenthetical": "reducing award because \"work on documents\" and \"work on various items\" was too vague for the court to determine the reasonableness of time spent",
"sentence": "Electro-Methods, 473 F.Supp.2d at 305-06 (reducing award because “work on documents” and “work on various items” was too vague for the court to determine the reasonableness of time spent); see also Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 425 F.Supp.2d 269, 272-73 (D.Conn.2006) (reducing the number of hours by five percent because the billing records contained entries such as “work on brief,” even though most of the time entries were sufficiently detailed); Mr. & Mrs. B. v. Weston Bd. of Educ., 34 F.Supp.2d 777, 781 (D.Conn.1999) (“Entries stating such vague references as ‘review of file,’ ‘review of correspondence,’ ‘research,’ ‘conference with client,’ and ‘preparation of brief do not provide an adequate basis upon which to evaluate the reasonableness of the services and hours expended on a given matter.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "425 F.Supp.2d 269, 272-73",
"parenthetical": "reducing the number of hours by five percent because the billing records contained entries such as \"work on brief,\" even though most of the time entries were sufficiently detailed",
"sentence": "Electro-Methods, 473 F.Supp.2d at 305-06 (reducing award because “work on documents” and “work on various items” was too vague for the court to determine the reasonableness of time spent); see also Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 425 F.Supp.2d 269, 272-73 (D.Conn.2006) (reducing the number of hours by five percent because the billing records contained entries such as “work on brief,” even though most of the time entries were sufficiently detailed); Mr. & Mrs. B. v. Weston Bd. of Educ., 34 F.Supp.2d 777, 781 (D.Conn.1999) (“Entries stating such vague references as ‘review of file,’ ‘review of correspondence,’ ‘research,’ ‘conference with client,’ and ‘preparation of brief do not provide an adequate basis upon which to evaluate the reasonableness of the services and hours expended on a given matter.”)."
} | 3,955,860 | a |
Courts in this district have reduced fee awards when time entries do not refer to the specific matter worked on; while "preparation for hearing" is a permissible time entry not subject to reduction because it refers to a specific event and allows for a determination of the reasonableness of time spent, "work on various items" and "work on documents" are too vague for a court to determine the reasonableness of time spent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "34 F.Supp.2d 777, 781",
"parenthetical": "\"Entries stating such vague references as 'review of file,' 'review of correspondence,' 'research,' 'conference with client,' and 'preparation of brief do not provide an adequate basis upon which to evaluate the reasonableness of the services and hours expended on a given matter.\"",
"sentence": "Electro-Methods, 473 F.Supp.2d at 305-06 (reducing award because “work on documents” and “work on various items” was too vague for the court to determine the reasonableness of time spent); see also Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 425 F.Supp.2d 269, 272-73 (D.Conn.2006) (reducing the number of hours by five percent because the billing records contained entries such as “work on brief,” even though most of the time entries were sufficiently detailed); Mr. & Mrs. B. v. Weston Bd. of Educ., 34 F.Supp.2d 777, 781 (D.Conn.1999) (“Entries stating such vague references as ‘review of file,’ ‘review of correspondence,’ ‘research,’ ‘conference with client,’ and ‘preparation of brief do not provide an adequate basis upon which to evaluate the reasonableness of the services and hours expended on a given matter.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "473 F.Supp.2d 305, 305-06",
"parenthetical": "reducing award because \"work on documents\" and \"work on various items\" was too vague for the court to determine the reasonableness of time spent",
"sentence": "Electro-Methods, 473 F.Supp.2d at 305-06 (reducing award because “work on documents” and “work on various items” was too vague for the court to determine the reasonableness of time spent); see also Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 425 F.Supp.2d 269, 272-73 (D.Conn.2006) (reducing the number of hours by five percent because the billing records contained entries such as “work on brief,” even though most of the time entries were sufficiently detailed); Mr. & Mrs. B. v. Weston Bd. of Educ., 34 F.Supp.2d 777, 781 (D.Conn.1999) (“Entries stating such vague references as ‘review of file,’ ‘review of correspondence,’ ‘research,’ ‘conference with client,’ and ‘preparation of brief do not provide an adequate basis upon which to evaluate the reasonableness of the services and hours expended on a given matter.”)."
} | 3,955,860 | b |
Nor does anything in the statute preclude the BIA from considering the effect that China's family planning policies may have on a couple's shared right to reproduce and raise children. Because Congress did not specifically address these issues, the statute is ambiguous. It therefore falls to the BIA to determine whether the harm an individual experiences when his or her spouse is subjected to a forced abortion or sterilization is sufficient to constitute persecution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "266 F.3d 102, 102",
"parenthetical": "granting \"Chevron deference to the Board's construction of the INA, which it ... administer[s]\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Kuhali, 266 F.3d at 102 (granting “Chevron deference to the Board’s construction of the INA, which it ... administer[s]”); cf. Sun Wen Chen, 491 F.3d at 107 (noting that the BIA “exercised its delegated gap-filling authority reasonably” when it recognized the harms an individual experiences as a result of the forced abortion or sterilization of his spouse)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "491 F.3d 107, 107",
"parenthetical": "noting that the BIA \"exercised its delegated gap-filling authority reasonably\" when it recognized the harms an individual experiences as a result of the forced abortion or sterilization of his spouse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Kuhali, 266 F.3d at 102 (granting “Chevron deference to the Board’s construction of the INA, which it ... administer[s]”); cf. Sun Wen Chen, 491 F.3d at 107 (noting that the BIA “exercised its delegated gap-filling authority reasonably” when it recognized the harms an individual experiences as a result of the forced abortion or sterilization of his spouse)."
} | 6,046,993 | a |
In sum, viewing as a whole the nature and effect of the suit, Plaintiff argues that the potential of the suit to impact the-Illinois populace writ large means that (1) Plaintiff is a real party in interest, (2) the Court thus need not look beyond the complaint to determine whether unnamed plaintiffs have a more significant stake in the outcome of the litigation, and (3) the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction under CAFA and should remand the case to state court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that injured consumers for whom the State sought restitution were not real parties in the State's parens patriae suit",
"sentence": "See Hunt Int’l, 481 F.Supp. at 74 (remanding an action in which the Attorney General sought injunctive and monetary relief despite the fact that unnamed defrauded residents also stood to benefit from the suit); see also Lann, 167 Ill.Dec. 252, 587 N.E.2d at 524 (holding that injured consumers for whom the State sought restitution were not real parties in the State’s parens patriae suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.Supp. 74, 74",
"parenthetical": "remanding an action in which the Attorney General sought injunctive and monetary relief despite the fact that unnamed defrauded residents also stood to benefit from the suit",
"sentence": "See Hunt Int’l, 481 F.Supp. at 74 (remanding an action in which the Attorney General sought injunctive and monetary relief despite the fact that unnamed defrauded residents also stood to benefit from the suit); see also Lann, 167 Ill.Dec. 252, 587 N.E.2d at 524 (holding that injured consumers for whom the State sought restitution were not real parties in the State’s parens patriae suit)."
} | 4,191,764 | b |
In sum, viewing as a whole the nature and effect of the suit, Plaintiff argues that the potential of the suit to impact the-Illinois populace writ large means that (1) Plaintiff is a real party in interest, (2) the Court thus need not look beyond the complaint to determine whether unnamed plaintiffs have a more significant stake in the outcome of the litigation, and (3) the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction under CAFA and should remand the case to state court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.Supp. 74, 74",
"parenthetical": "remanding an action in which the Attorney General sought injunctive and monetary relief despite the fact that unnamed defrauded residents also stood to benefit from the suit",
"sentence": "See Hunt Int’l, 481 F.Supp. at 74 (remanding an action in which the Attorney General sought injunctive and monetary relief despite the fact that unnamed defrauded residents also stood to benefit from the suit); see also Lann, 167 Ill.Dec. 252, 587 N.E.2d at 524 (holding that injured consumers for whom the State sought restitution were not real parties in the State’s parens patriae suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "587 N.E.2d 524, 524",
"parenthetical": "holding that injured consumers for whom the State sought restitution were not real parties in the State's parens patriae suit",
"sentence": "See Hunt Int’l, 481 F.Supp. at 74 (remanding an action in which the Attorney General sought injunctive and monetary relief despite the fact that unnamed defrauded residents also stood to benefit from the suit); see also Lann, 167 Ill.Dec. 252, 587 N.E.2d at 524 (holding that injured consumers for whom the State sought restitution were not real parties in the State’s parens patriae suit)."
} | 4,191,764 | a |
Because those claims and the facts supporting them exceed the scope of the allegations Tunnicliff filed with the MCAD and EEOC, he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedy with respect thereto. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 F.3d 464, 464",
"parenthetical": "finding that, in order to meet the procedural requirement of exhausting administrative remedies, \"[e]ven a pro se complainant is required to describe the essential nature of the claim and to identify the core facts on which it rests\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. General Electric, 840 F.2d 132, 139 (1st Cir.1988) (dismissing retaliatory discharge claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedy); see also Lattimore, 99 F.3d at 464 (finding that, in order to meet the procedural requirement of exhausting administrative remedies, “[e]ven a pro se complainant is required to describe the essential nature of the claim and to identify the core facts on which it rests”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "840 F.2d 132, 139",
"parenthetical": "dismissing retaliatory discharge claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedy",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. General Electric, 840 F.2d 132, 139 (1st Cir.1988) (dismissing retaliatory discharge claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedy); see also Lattimore, 99 F.3d at 464 (finding that, in order to meet the procedural requirement of exhausting administrative remedies, “[e]ven a pro se complainant is required to describe the essential nature of the claim and to identify the core facts on which it rests”)."
} | 1,303,770 | b |
See Jury Instructions 9, 10 (Holseth's Answer Brief 4-5). "[A] party to a contract may not prevent performance of a condition and then claim the benefit of such condition." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "812 F.2d 1319, 1323",
"parenthetical": "party to contract may not deliberately prevent condition and then take advantage of failure of condition to avoid liability",
"sentence": "Townsend v. Melody Home Mfg. Co., 541 P.2d 1370, 1374-75 (Okla.Ct.App.1975) (holding manufacturer of mobile homes could not deny dealer incentive bonus based on late payment when manufacturer was involved with finance company in delaying payment); see also Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1987) (party to contract may not deliberately prevent condition and then take advantage of failure of condition to avoid liability)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "541 P.2d 1370, 1374-75",
"parenthetical": "holding manufacturer of mobile homes could not deny dealer incentive bonus based on late payment when manufacturer was involved with finance company in delaying payment",
"sentence": "Townsend v. Melody Home Mfg. Co., 541 P.2d 1370, 1374-75 (Okla.Ct.App.1975) (holding manufacturer of mobile homes could not deny dealer incentive bonus based on late payment when manufacturer was involved with finance company in delaying payment); see also Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1987) (party to contract may not deliberately prevent condition and then take advantage of failure of condition to avoid liability)."
} | 10,529,174 | b |
There is no caselaw in Minnesota holding that a suicide attempt constitutes a voluntary absence from trial. But the Eighth Circuit has held that a suicide attempt can constitute a voluntary absence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "61 F.3d 291, 302-03",
"parenthetical": "concluding defendant who was hospitalized after attempting suicide during trial was voluntarily absent and waived right to be present at trial",
"sentence": "United States v. St. James, 415 F.3d 800, 804-05 (8th Cir.2005) (holding that defendant who fled the state and then attempted suicide failed to show his absence from trial was involuntary); United States v. Crites, 176 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir.1999); see also United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 302-03 (5th Cir.1995) (concluding defendant who was hospitalized after attempting suicide during trial was voluntarily absent and waived right to be present at trial); but see United States v. Latham, 874 F.2d 852, 858-59 (1st Cir.1989) (concluding defendant did not voluntarily absent himself from trial after he ingested a potentially lethal overdose of cocaine to calm his nerves and without intent to commit suicide)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "415 F.3d 800, 804-05",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant who fled the state and then attempted suicide failed to show his absence from trial was involuntary",
"sentence": "United States v. St. James, 415 F.3d 800, 804-05 (8th Cir.2005) (holding that defendant who fled the state and then attempted suicide failed to show his absence from trial was involuntary); United States v. Crites, 176 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir.1999); see also United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 302-03 (5th Cir.1995) (concluding defendant who was hospitalized after attempting suicide during trial was voluntarily absent and waived right to be present at trial); but see United States v. Latham, 874 F.2d 852, 858-59 (1st Cir.1989) (concluding defendant did not voluntarily absent himself from trial after he ingested a potentially lethal overdose of cocaine to calm his nerves and without intent to commit suicide)."
} | 6,125,112 | b |
There is no caselaw in Minnesota holding that a suicide attempt constitutes a voluntary absence from trial. But the Eighth Circuit has held that a suicide attempt can constitute a voluntary absence. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "415 F.3d 800, 804-05",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant who fled the state and then attempted suicide failed to show his absence from trial was involuntary",
"sentence": "United States v. St. James, 415 F.3d 800, 804-05 (8th Cir.2005) (holding that defendant who fled the state and then attempted suicide failed to show his absence from trial was involuntary); United States v. Crites, 176 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir.1999); see also United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 302-03 (5th Cir.1995) (concluding defendant who was hospitalized after attempting suicide during trial was voluntarily absent and waived right to be present at trial); but see United States v. Latham, 874 F.2d 852, 858-59 (1st Cir.1989) (concluding defendant did not voluntarily absent himself from trial after he ingested a potentially lethal overdose of cocaine to calm his nerves and without intent to commit suicide)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 852, 858-59",
"parenthetical": "concluding defendant did not voluntarily absent himself from trial after he ingested a potentially lethal overdose of cocaine to calm his nerves and without intent to commit suicide",
"sentence": "United States v. St. James, 415 F.3d 800, 804-05 (8th Cir.2005) (holding that defendant who fled the state and then attempted suicide failed to show his absence from trial was involuntary); United States v. Crites, 176 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir.1999); see also United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 302-03 (5th Cir.1995) (concluding defendant who was hospitalized after attempting suicide during trial was voluntarily absent and waived right to be present at trial); but see United States v. Latham, 874 F.2d 852, 858-59 (1st Cir.1989) (concluding defendant did not voluntarily absent himself from trial after he ingested a potentially lethal overdose of cocaine to calm his nerves and without intent to commit suicide)."
} | 6,125,112 | a |
There is no caselaw in Minnesota holding that a suicide attempt constitutes a voluntary absence from trial. But the Eighth Circuit has held that a suicide attempt can constitute a voluntary absence. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 852, 858-59",
"parenthetical": "concluding defendant did not voluntarily absent himself from trial after he ingested a potentially lethal overdose of cocaine to calm his nerves and without intent to commit suicide",
"sentence": "United States v. St. James, 415 F.3d 800, 804-05 (8th Cir.2005) (holding that defendant who fled the state and then attempted suicide failed to show his absence from trial was involuntary); United States v. Crites, 176 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir.1999); see also United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 302-03 (5th Cir.1995) (concluding defendant who was hospitalized after attempting suicide during trial was voluntarily absent and waived right to be present at trial); but see United States v. Latham, 874 F.2d 852, 858-59 (1st Cir.1989) (concluding defendant did not voluntarily absent himself from trial after he ingested a potentially lethal overdose of cocaine to calm his nerves and without intent to commit suicide)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "61 F.3d 291, 302-03",
"parenthetical": "concluding defendant who was hospitalized after attempting suicide during trial was voluntarily absent and waived right to be present at trial",
"sentence": "United States v. St. James, 415 F.3d 800, 804-05 (8th Cir.2005) (holding that defendant who fled the state and then attempted suicide failed to show his absence from trial was involuntary); United States v. Crites, 176 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir.1999); see also United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 302-03 (5th Cir.1995) (concluding defendant who was hospitalized after attempting suicide during trial was voluntarily absent and waived right to be present at trial); but see United States v. Latham, 874 F.2d 852, 858-59 (1st Cir.1989) (concluding defendant did not voluntarily absent himself from trial after he ingested a potentially lethal overdose of cocaine to calm his nerves and without intent to commit suicide)."
} | 6,125,112 | b |
P36 Until now, no jurisdiction had found the lack of a specific statute authorizing its attorney general to make press releases to be an impediment to a claim of absolute immunity in such circumstances. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "420 P.2d 701, 701",
"parenthetical": "\"No statutory delineation of such responsibility is necessary, however, inasmuch as the Attorney General, as an elected officer of cabinet rank in state government, has an implicit duty by virtue of his position to inform the people of the state of Washington of actions taken in his official capacity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gold Seal Chinchillas, 420 P.2d at 701 (“No statutory delineation of such responsibility is necessary, however, inasmuch as the Attorney General, as an elected officer of cabinet rank in state government, has an implicit duty by virtue of his position to inform the people of the state of Washington of actions taken in his official capacity.”); see also Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 787 A.2d 666, 674 (2002) (“The defendant was informing the public of an investigation duly conducted by his office and was carrying out the government policy of reporting to the public those facts that the attorney general claimed supported the allegations of medicaid fraud.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The defendant was informing the public of an investigation duly conducted by his office and was carrying out the government policy of reporting to the public those facts that the attorney general claimed supported the allegations of medicaid fraud.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gold Seal Chinchillas, 420 P.2d at 701 (“No statutory delineation of such responsibility is necessary, however, inasmuch as the Attorney General, as an elected officer of cabinet rank in state government, has an implicit duty by virtue of his position to inform the people of the state of Washington of actions taken in his official capacity.”); see also Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 787 A.2d 666, 674 (2002) (“The defendant was informing the public of an investigation duly conducted by his office and was carrying out the government policy of reporting to the public those facts that the attorney general claimed supported the allegations of medicaid fraud.”)."
} | 4,000,158 | a |
P36 Until now, no jurisdiction had found the lack of a specific statute authorizing its attorney general to make press releases to be an impediment to a claim of absolute immunity in such circumstances. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "787 A.2d 666, 674",
"parenthetical": "\"The defendant was informing the public of an investigation duly conducted by his office and was carrying out the government policy of reporting to the public those facts that the attorney general claimed supported the allegations of medicaid fraud.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gold Seal Chinchillas, 420 P.2d at 701 (“No statutory delineation of such responsibility is necessary, however, inasmuch as the Attorney General, as an elected officer of cabinet rank in state government, has an implicit duty by virtue of his position to inform the people of the state of Washington of actions taken in his official capacity.”); see also Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 787 A.2d 666, 674 (2002) (“The defendant was informing the public of an investigation duly conducted by his office and was carrying out the government policy of reporting to the public those facts that the attorney general claimed supported the allegations of medicaid fraud.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "420 P.2d 701, 701",
"parenthetical": "\"No statutory delineation of such responsibility is necessary, however, inasmuch as the Attorney General, as an elected officer of cabinet rank in state government, has an implicit duty by virtue of his position to inform the people of the state of Washington of actions taken in his official capacity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gold Seal Chinchillas, 420 P.2d at 701 (“No statutory delineation of such responsibility is necessary, however, inasmuch as the Attorney General, as an elected officer of cabinet rank in state government, has an implicit duty by virtue of his position to inform the people of the state of Washington of actions taken in his official capacity.”); see also Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 787 A.2d 666, 674 (2002) (“The defendant was informing the public of an investigation duly conducted by his office and was carrying out the government policy of reporting to the public those facts that the attorney general claimed supported the allegations of medicaid fraud.”)."
} | 4,000,158 | b |
Moreover, even if somehow erroneous, admission of such evidence was harmless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "343 F.3d 935, 935",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Even where we find that the district court has abused its discretion with respect to an evidentia ry ruling, we will not reverse the conviction if the error was harmless.' \"",
"sentence": "See Mack, 343 F.3d at 935 (“ ‘Even where we find that the district court has abused its discretion with respect to an evidentia ry ruling, we will not reverse the conviction if the error was harmless.’ ”) (quoting Oleson, 310 F.3d at 1091); see also United States v. Womack, 191 F.3d 879, 883 (8th Cir.1999) (admission of evidence pursuant to the “co-conspirator hearsay” exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion). This is so, because, in light of the entire record, Johnson’s substantial rights were unaffected, and the error did not influehce or had at most only a slight influence on the verdicts."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "191 F.3d 879, 883",
"parenthetical": "admission of evidence pursuant to the \"co-conspirator hearsay\" exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "See Mack, 343 F.3d at 935 (“ ‘Even where we find that the district court has abused its discretion with respect to an evidentia ry ruling, we will not reverse the conviction if the error was harmless.’ ”) (quoting Oleson, 310 F.3d at 1091); see also United States v. Womack, 191 F.3d 879, 883 (8th Cir.1999) (admission of evidence pursuant to the “co-conspirator hearsay” exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion). This is so, because, in light of the entire record, Johnson’s substantial rights were unaffected, and the error did not influehce or had at most only a slight influence on the verdicts."
} | 884,580 | a |
Turning to more substantive issues, balancing the few isolated comments that Johnson challenges, including their nature and content, against the overall fairness of this very lengthy and complex trial, it is apparent that Johnson's rights were not adversely affected. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "209 F.3d 1081, 1081",
"parenthetical": "the court must balance the judge's comments against the overall fairness of the trial to determine whether the defendant's rights were adversely affect",
"sentence": "See Goolsby, 209 F.3d at 1081 (the court must balance the judge’s comments against the overall fairness of the trial to determine whether the defendant’s rights were adversely affect); Coon, 187 F.3d at 897 (same); Van Dyke, 14 F.3d at 417-18; see also Alidani, 365 F.3d at 640 (“a few isolated and arguably improper comments” from a lengthy trial will not warrant relief); Coon, 187 F.3d at 897 (“snippets” of comments from a lengthy trial will not demonstrate a fundamentally unfair proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "365 F.3d 640, 640",
"parenthetical": "\"a few isolated and arguably improper comments\" from a lengthy trial will not warrant relief",
"sentence": "See Goolsby, 209 F.3d at 1081 (the court must balance the judge’s comments against the overall fairness of the trial to determine whether the defendant’s rights were adversely affect); Coon, 187 F.3d at 897 (same); Van Dyke, 14 F.3d at 417-18; see also Alidani, 365 F.3d at 640 (“a few isolated and arguably improper comments” from a lengthy trial will not warrant relief); Coon, 187 F.3d at 897 (“snippets” of comments from a lengthy trial will not demonstrate a fundamentally unfair proceeding)."
} | 884,580 | a |
Turning to more substantive issues, balancing the few isolated comments that Johnson challenges, including their nature and content, against the overall fairness of this very lengthy and complex trial, it is apparent that Johnson's rights were not adversely affected. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "209 F.3d 1081, 1081",
"parenthetical": "the court must balance the judge's comments against the overall fairness of the trial to determine whether the defendant's rights were adversely affect",
"sentence": "See Goolsby, 209 F.3d at 1081 (the court must balance the judge’s comments against the overall fairness of the trial to determine whether the defendant’s rights were adversely affect); Coon, 187 F.3d at 897 (same); Van Dyke, 14 F.3d at 417-18; see also Alidani, 365 F.3d at 640 (“a few isolated and arguably improper comments” from a lengthy trial will not warrant relief); Coon, 187 F.3d at 897 (“snippets” of comments from a lengthy trial will not demonstrate a fundamentally unfair proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "187 F.3d 897, 897",
"parenthetical": "\"snippets\" of comments from a lengthy trial will not demonstrate a fundamentally unfair proceeding",
"sentence": "See Goolsby, 209 F.3d at 1081 (the court must balance the judge’s comments against the overall fairness of the trial to determine whether the defendant’s rights were adversely affect); Coon, 187 F.3d at 897 (same); Van Dyke, 14 F.3d at 417-18; see also Alidani, 365 F.3d at 640 (“a few isolated and arguably improper comments” from a lengthy trial will not warrant relief); Coon, 187 F.3d at 897 (“snippets” of comments from a lengthy trial will not demonstrate a fundamentally unfair proceeding)."
} | 884,580 | a |
When disputes have arisen regarding the division of authority among the three branches of government in the development and administration of the criminal laws, we have acted to prevent one branch from intruding upon the domain of another branch. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 81, 85",
"parenthetical": "\"[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "159 Ariz. 14, 17",
"parenthetical": "trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor's charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor's statutorily-required recommendation",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | 5,271,618 | b |
When disputes have arisen regarding the division of authority among the three branches of government in the development and administration of the criminal laws, we have acted to prevent one branch from intruding upon the domain of another branch. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 932, 936",
"parenthetical": "\"[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "159 Ariz. 14, 17",
"parenthetical": "trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor's charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor's statutorily-required recommendation",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | 5,271,618 | b |
When disputes have arisen regarding the division of authority among the three branches of government in the development and administration of the criminal laws, we have acted to prevent one branch from intruding upon the domain of another branch. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "764 P.2d 749, 752",
"parenthetical": "trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor's charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor's statutorily-required recommendation",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 81, 85",
"parenthetical": "\"[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | 5,271,618 | a |
When disputes have arisen regarding the division of authority among the three branches of government in the development and administration of the criminal laws, we have acted to prevent one branch from intruding upon the domain of another branch. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 932, 936",
"parenthetical": "\"[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "764 P.2d 749, 752",
"parenthetical": "trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor's charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor's statutorily-required recommendation",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | 5,271,618 | b |
When disputes have arisen regarding the division of authority among the three branches of government in the development and administration of the criminal laws, we have acted to prevent one branch from intruding upon the domain of another branch. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 81, 85",
"parenthetical": "\"[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "142 Ariz. 302, 305",
"parenthetical": "holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence \"based upon the prosecutor's recommendation\" was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because \"the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | 5,271,618 | b |
When disputes have arisen regarding the division of authority among the three branches of government in the development and administration of the criminal laws, we have acted to prevent one branch from intruding upon the domain of another branch. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 932, 936",
"parenthetical": "\"[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "142 Ariz. 302, 305",
"parenthetical": "holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence \"based upon the prosecutor's recommendation\" was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because \"the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | 5,271,618 | b |
When disputes have arisen regarding the division of authority among the three branches of government in the development and administration of the criminal laws, we have acted to prevent one branch from intruding upon the domain of another branch. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 81, 85",
"parenthetical": "\"[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "689 P.2d 561, 564",
"parenthetical": "holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence \"based upon the prosecutor's recommendation\" was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because \"the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | 5,271,618 | b |
When disputes have arisen regarding the division of authority among the three branches of government in the development and administration of the criminal laws, we have acted to prevent one branch from intruding upon the domain of another branch. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 932, 936",
"parenthetical": "\"[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "689 P.2d 561, 564",
"parenthetical": "holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence \"based upon the prosecutor's recommendation\" was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because \"the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”)."
} | 5,271,618 | b |
As the Trustee observes, the issue of rejection of the Epic Orange contract has been pending in this court since at least July 2004, and Epic was made party to the state foreclosure action in October 2004, yet Epic Orange did not raise the abstention issue until January 21, 2005, and did not make a separate motion until February 15, 2005. Under the circumstances, the Court agrees with the Trustee that the request for abstention is not timely. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "165 B.R. 450, 452",
"parenthetical": "denying motion to abstain as untimely when filed nearly four months after complaint",
"sentence": "See In re AHT Corp., 265 B.R. 379, 384 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2001) (defendants’ motion to abstain not timely when filed some 2-1/2 months after complaint and one day before defendants’ long-extended deadline to answer, and where defendants had already “utilized the substantive process” of court “on a matter going to the merits”); see also In re Waugh, 165 B.R. 450, 452 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1994) (denying motion to abstain as untimely when filed nearly four months after complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "265 B.R. 379, 384",
"parenthetical": "defendants' motion to abstain not timely when filed some 2-1/2 months after complaint and one day before defendants' long-extended deadline to answer, and where defendants had already \"utilized the substantive process\" of court \"on a matter going to the merits\"",
"sentence": "See In re AHT Corp., 265 B.R. 379, 384 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2001) (defendants’ motion to abstain not timely when filed some 2-1/2 months after complaint and one day before defendants’ long-extended deadline to answer, and where defendants had already “utilized the substantive process” of court “on a matter going to the merits”); see also In re Waugh, 165 B.R. 450, 452 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1994) (denying motion to abstain as untimely when filed nearly four months after complaint)."
} | 8,975,988 | b |
The response-time restrictions placed on plaintiff were not particularly severe; plaintiff received only between ten and twenty pages per year and the alarms sounded infrequently. Plaintiff also had a half hour to respond to notifications from the District. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "357 F.3d 938, 938",
"parenthetical": "finding that the Owens factors weighted narrowly in favor of the employees were they were subject to the constant pressures of being absolutely prepared to respond to emergencies where the safety of thousands was at stake",
"sentence": "Cf. Brigham, 357 F.3d at 938 (finding that the Owens factors weighted narrowly in favor of the employees were they were subject to the constant pressures of being absolutely prepared to respond to emergencies where the safety of thousands was at stake). Moreover, while plaintiff was required to live at the facility and was subject to geographic constraints, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that he engaged in a variety of personal pursuits including home improvement, construction projects, having visitors, watching television, and participating at the Masonic Lodge."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "30 F.3d 1184, 1184",
"parenthetical": "finding on-call time not compensable where employees required to remain in the county and to respond to calls within fifteen minutes",
"sentence": "See Berry, 30 F.3d at 1184 (finding on-call time not compensable where employees required to remain in the county and to respond to calls within fifteen minutes); Owens, 971 F.2d at 349 (finding on-call time not com-pensable where employees required to reply within ten minutes of receiving a call or page). Further, while release of water from the Dam was important to prevent flooding, there is no evidence that plaintiffs duties put him in the position of being responsible for the safety of thousands of people and thus, required him to be both immediate and absolutely prepared in his responses."
} | 3,605,114 | b |
The response-time restrictions placed on plaintiff were not particularly severe; plaintiff received only between ten and twenty pages per year and the alarms sounded infrequently. Plaintiff also had a half hour to respond to notifications from the District. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "357 F.3d 938, 938",
"parenthetical": "finding that the Owens factors weighted narrowly in favor of the employees were they were subject to the constant pressures of being absolutely prepared to respond to emergencies where the safety of thousands was at stake",
"sentence": "Cf. Brigham, 357 F.3d at 938 (finding that the Owens factors weighted narrowly in favor of the employees were they were subject to the constant pressures of being absolutely prepared to respond to emergencies where the safety of thousands was at stake). Moreover, while plaintiff was required to live at the facility and was subject to geographic constraints, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that he engaged in a variety of personal pursuits including home improvement, construction projects, having visitors, watching television, and participating at the Masonic Lodge."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "971 F.2d 349, 349",
"parenthetical": "finding on-call time not com-pensable where employees required to reply within ten minutes of receiving a call or page",
"sentence": "See Berry, 30 F.3d at 1184 (finding on-call time not compensable where employees required to remain in the county and to respond to calls within fifteen minutes); Owens, 971 F.2d at 349 (finding on-call time not com-pensable where employees required to reply within ten minutes of receiving a call or page). Further, while release of water from the Dam was important to prevent flooding, there is no evidence that plaintiffs duties put him in the position of being responsible for the safety of thousands of people and thus, required him to be both immediate and absolutely prepared in his responses."
} | 3,605,114 | b |
Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing he was: (1) a member of the protected class; (2) qualified for his current position; (3) subject to adverse employment action; and (4) treated less favorable than any younger, similarly situated employee. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "517 U.S. 308, 313",
"parenthetical": "holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination",
"sentence": "Zaben v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1457 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case); see also O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "129 F.3d 1453, 1457",
"parenthetical": "holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case",
"sentence": "Zaben v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1457 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case); see also O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case)."
} | 5,662,001 | b |
Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing he was: (1) a member of the protected class; (2) qualified for his current position; (3) subject to adverse employment action; and (4) treated less favorable than any younger, similarly situated employee. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310",
"parenthetical": "holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination",
"sentence": "Zaben v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1457 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case); see also O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "129 F.3d 1453, 1457",
"parenthetical": "holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case",
"sentence": "Zaben v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1457 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case); see also O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case)."
} | 5,662,001 | b |
Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing he was: (1) a member of the protected class; (2) qualified for his current position; (3) subject to adverse employment action; and (4) treated less favorable than any younger, similarly situated employee. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "129 F.3d 1453, 1457",
"parenthetical": "holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case",
"sentence": "Zaben v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1457 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case); see also O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination",
"sentence": "Zaben v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1457 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case); see also O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case)."
} | 5,662,001 | a |
Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing he was: (1) a member of the protected class; (2) qualified for his current position; (3) subject to adverse employment action; and (4) treated less favorable than any younger, similarly situated employee. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "330 F.3d 1313, 1316",
"parenthetical": "holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case",
"sentence": "Zaben v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1457 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case); see also O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "129 F.3d 1453, 1457",
"parenthetical": "holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case",
"sentence": "Zaben v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1457 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case); see also O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case)."
} | 5,662,001 | b |
Missouri inmate Neldon Neal appeals the district court's denial of his Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment in his 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 action. Notwithstanding Neal's argument that he failed to litigate his case because he did not receive court documents during a nine-month stay in federal custody, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of his Rule 60(b) motion because nothing in the record shows that Neal notified the court of his custody change or otherwise attempted to follow through with his case before he was returned to state custody. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "193 F.3d 987, 988-89",
"parenthetical": "applying abuse-of-diseretion review standard and noting that appeal of Rule 60(b",
"sentence": "See Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 506 F.3d 1111, 1117 (8th Cir.2007) (Rule 60(b)(6) relief is available only where exceptional circumstances have denied moving party full and fair opportunity to litigate claim and prevented moving party from receiving adequate redress); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig., 496 F.3d 863, 866 (8th Cir.2007) (setting forth relevant factors for finding excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)); see also Broadway v. Nonis, 193 F.3d 987, 988-89 (8th Cir.1999) (applying abuse-of-diseretion review standard and noting that appeal of Rule 60(b) motion does not bring up for review underlying judgment or order)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "496 F.3d 863, 866",
"parenthetical": "setting forth relevant factors for finding excusable neglect under Rule 60(b",
"sentence": "See Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 506 F.3d 1111, 1117 (8th Cir.2007) (Rule 60(b)(6) relief is available only where exceptional circumstances have denied moving party full and fair opportunity to litigate claim and prevented moving party from receiving adequate redress); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig., 496 F.3d 863, 866 (8th Cir.2007) (setting forth relevant factors for finding excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)); see also Broadway v. Nonis, 193 F.3d 987, 988-89 (8th Cir.1999) (applying abuse-of-diseretion review standard and noting that appeal of Rule 60(b) motion does not bring up for review underlying judgment or order)."
} | 3,861,953 | b |
In explaining the law, the trial court should avoid instructions that are reasonably capable of confusing or misleading the jury. Although the "mere error of judgment" instruction may be a correct statement of the law, a growing number of courts have criticized similar instructions in recent years. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "727 P.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "warning \"error of judgment\" instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution",
"sentence": "But see Watson v. Hockett, 727 P.2d 669, 673 (Wash. 1986) (warning “error of judgment” instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "772 P.2d 931, 931",
"parenthetical": "holding word \"error\" when used with \"exercise of judgment\" suggests substandard conduct permissible",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 772 P.2d at 931 (holding word “error” when used with “exercise of judgment” suggests substandard conduct permissible); DiFranco v. Klein, 657 A.2d 145, 148-49 (R.I. 1995) (holding “good faith” and “honest error in judgment” instructions erroneously imply only bad-faith and dishonest deviations actionable); Deyo v. Kinley, 565 A.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Vt. 1989) (noting “error in judgment” language is basically ambiguous and subjective); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 303 (Conn. 1983) (noting “bona fide error in Judgment” instruction confusing because it implies only an error in judgment made in bad faith actionable); Ouellette by Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Minn. 1986) (rejecting “honest error in judgment” instruction as inappropriately imposing subjective language when defining standard of care); Riggins v. Mauriello, 603 A.2d 827, 830-31 (Del. 1992) (holding “mere error of judgment” instruction permits jury to incorrectly conclude physician may not be liable even if negligent); Parodi v. Washoe Medical Ctr., 892 P.2d 588, 591 (Nev. 1995) (noting “error-in-judgment” instructions may improperly focus jury on subjective intentions rather than objective standard of care); Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 834-35 (Haw. 1998) (rejecting use of “error in judgment” because language inadequately explains law)."
} | 380,781 | b |
In explaining the law, the trial court should avoid instructions that are reasonably capable of confusing or misleading the jury. Although the "mere error of judgment" instruction may be a correct statement of the law, a growing number of courts have criticized similar instructions in recent years. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "657 A.2d 145, 148-49",
"parenthetical": "holding \"good faith\" and \"honest error in judgment\" instructions erroneously imply only bad-faith and dishonest deviations actionable",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 772 P.2d at 931 (holding word “error” when used with “exercise of judgment” suggests substandard conduct permissible); DiFranco v. Klein, 657 A.2d 145, 148-49 (R.I. 1995) (holding “good faith” and “honest error in judgment” instructions erroneously imply only bad-faith and dishonest deviations actionable); Deyo v. Kinley, 565 A.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Vt. 1989) (noting “error in judgment” language is basically ambiguous and subjective); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 303 (Conn. 1983) (noting “bona fide error in Judgment” instruction confusing because it implies only an error in judgment made in bad faith actionable); Ouellette by Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Minn. 1986) (rejecting “honest error in judgment” instruction as inappropriately imposing subjective language when defining standard of care); Riggins v. Mauriello, 603 A.2d 827, 830-31 (Del. 1992) (holding “mere error of judgment” instruction permits jury to incorrectly conclude physician may not be liable even if negligent); Parodi v. Washoe Medical Ctr., 892 P.2d 588, 591 (Nev. 1995) (noting “error-in-judgment” instructions may improperly focus jury on subjective intentions rather than objective standard of care); Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 834-35 (Haw. 1998) (rejecting use of “error in judgment” because language inadequately explains law)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "727 P.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "warning \"error of judgment\" instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution",
"sentence": "But see Watson v. Hockett, 727 P.2d 669, 673 (Wash. 1986) (warning “error of judgment” instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution)."
} | 380,781 | a |
In explaining the law, the trial court should avoid instructions that are reasonably capable of confusing or misleading the jury. Although the "mere error of judgment" instruction may be a correct statement of the law, a growing number of courts have criticized similar instructions in recent years. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "727 P.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "warning \"error of judgment\" instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution",
"sentence": "But see Watson v. Hockett, 727 P.2d 669, 673 (Wash. 1986) (warning “error of judgment” instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "565 A.2d 1286, 1292-93",
"parenthetical": "noting \"error in judgment\" language is basically ambiguous and subjective",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 772 P.2d at 931 (holding word “error” when used with “exercise of judgment” suggests substandard conduct permissible); DiFranco v. Klein, 657 A.2d 145, 148-49 (R.I. 1995) (holding “good faith” and “honest error in judgment” instructions erroneously imply only bad-faith and dishonest deviations actionable); Deyo v. Kinley, 565 A.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Vt. 1989) (noting “error in judgment” language is basically ambiguous and subjective); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 303 (Conn. 1983) (noting “bona fide error in Judgment” instruction confusing because it implies only an error in judgment made in bad faith actionable); Ouellette by Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Minn. 1986) (rejecting “honest error in judgment” instruction as inappropriately imposing subjective language when defining standard of care); Riggins v. Mauriello, 603 A.2d 827, 830-31 (Del. 1992) (holding “mere error of judgment” instruction permits jury to incorrectly conclude physician may not be liable even if negligent); Parodi v. Washoe Medical Ctr., 892 P.2d 588, 591 (Nev. 1995) (noting “error-in-judgment” instructions may improperly focus jury on subjective intentions rather than objective standard of care); Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 834-35 (Haw. 1998) (rejecting use of “error in judgment” because language inadequately explains law)."
} | 380,781 | b |
In explaining the law, the trial court should avoid instructions that are reasonably capable of confusing or misleading the jury. Although the "mere error of judgment" instruction may be a correct statement of the law, a growing number of courts have criticized similar instructions in recent years. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "727 P.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "warning \"error of judgment\" instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution",
"sentence": "But see Watson v. Hockett, 727 P.2d 669, 673 (Wash. 1986) (warning “error of judgment” instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "465 A.2d 294, 303",
"parenthetical": "noting \"bona fide error in Judgment\" instruction confusing because it implies only an error in judgment made in bad faith actionable",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 772 P.2d at 931 (holding word “error” when used with “exercise of judgment” suggests substandard conduct permissible); DiFranco v. Klein, 657 A.2d 145, 148-49 (R.I. 1995) (holding “good faith” and “honest error in judgment” instructions erroneously imply only bad-faith and dishonest deviations actionable); Deyo v. Kinley, 565 A.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Vt. 1989) (noting “error in judgment” language is basically ambiguous and subjective); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 303 (Conn. 1983) (noting “bona fide error in Judgment” instruction confusing because it implies only an error in judgment made in bad faith actionable); Ouellette by Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Minn. 1986) (rejecting “honest error in judgment” instruction as inappropriately imposing subjective language when defining standard of care); Riggins v. Mauriello, 603 A.2d 827, 830-31 (Del. 1992) (holding “mere error of judgment” instruction permits jury to incorrectly conclude physician may not be liable even if negligent); Parodi v. Washoe Medical Ctr., 892 P.2d 588, 591 (Nev. 1995) (noting “error-in-judgment” instructions may improperly focus jury on subjective intentions rather than objective standard of care); Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 834-35 (Haw. 1998) (rejecting use of “error in judgment” because language inadequately explains law)."
} | 380,781 | b |
In explaining the law, the trial court should avoid instructions that are reasonably capable of confusing or misleading the jury. Although the "mere error of judgment" instruction may be a correct statement of the law, a growing number of courts have criticized similar instructions in recent years. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "391 N.W.2d 810, 816",
"parenthetical": "rejecting \"honest error in judgment\" instruction as inappropriately imposing subjective language when defining standard of care",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 772 P.2d at 931 (holding word “error” when used with “exercise of judgment” suggests substandard conduct permissible); DiFranco v. Klein, 657 A.2d 145, 148-49 (R.I. 1995) (holding “good faith” and “honest error in judgment” instructions erroneously imply only bad-faith and dishonest deviations actionable); Deyo v. Kinley, 565 A.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Vt. 1989) (noting “error in judgment” language is basically ambiguous and subjective); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 303 (Conn. 1983) (noting “bona fide error in Judgment” instruction confusing because it implies only an error in judgment made in bad faith actionable); Ouellette by Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Minn. 1986) (rejecting “honest error in judgment” instruction as inappropriately imposing subjective language when defining standard of care); Riggins v. Mauriello, 603 A.2d 827, 830-31 (Del. 1992) (holding “mere error of judgment” instruction permits jury to incorrectly conclude physician may not be liable even if negligent); Parodi v. Washoe Medical Ctr., 892 P.2d 588, 591 (Nev. 1995) (noting “error-in-judgment” instructions may improperly focus jury on subjective intentions rather than objective standard of care); Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 834-35 (Haw. 1998) (rejecting use of “error in judgment” because language inadequately explains law)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "727 P.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "warning \"error of judgment\" instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution",
"sentence": "But see Watson v. Hockett, 727 P.2d 669, 673 (Wash. 1986) (warning “error of judgment” instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution)."
} | 380,781 | a |
In explaining the law, the trial court should avoid instructions that are reasonably capable of confusing or misleading the jury. Although the "mere error of judgment" instruction may be a correct statement of the law, a growing number of courts have criticized similar instructions in recent years. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "727 P.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "warning \"error of judgment\" instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution",
"sentence": "But see Watson v. Hockett, 727 P.2d 669, 673 (Wash. 1986) (warning “error of judgment” instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "603 A.2d 827, 830-31",
"parenthetical": "holding \"mere error of judgment\" instruction permits jury to incorrectly conclude physician may not be liable even if negligent",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 772 P.2d at 931 (holding word “error” when used with “exercise of judgment” suggests substandard conduct permissible); DiFranco v. Klein, 657 A.2d 145, 148-49 (R.I. 1995) (holding “good faith” and “honest error in judgment” instructions erroneously imply only bad-faith and dishonest deviations actionable); Deyo v. Kinley, 565 A.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Vt. 1989) (noting “error in judgment” language is basically ambiguous and subjective); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 303 (Conn. 1983) (noting “bona fide error in Judgment” instruction confusing because it implies only an error in judgment made in bad faith actionable); Ouellette by Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Minn. 1986) (rejecting “honest error in judgment” instruction as inappropriately imposing subjective language when defining standard of care); Riggins v. Mauriello, 603 A.2d 827, 830-31 (Del. 1992) (holding “mere error of judgment” instruction permits jury to incorrectly conclude physician may not be liable even if negligent); Parodi v. Washoe Medical Ctr., 892 P.2d 588, 591 (Nev. 1995) (noting “error-in-judgment” instructions may improperly focus jury on subjective intentions rather than objective standard of care); Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 834-35 (Haw. 1998) (rejecting use of “error in judgment” because language inadequately explains law)."
} | 380,781 | b |
In explaining the law, the trial court should avoid instructions that are reasonably capable of confusing or misleading the jury. Although the "mere error of judgment" instruction may be a correct statement of the law, a growing number of courts have criticized similar instructions in recent years. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "727 P.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "warning \"error of judgment\" instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution",
"sentence": "But see Watson v. Hockett, 727 P.2d 669, 673 (Wash. 1986) (warning “error of judgment” instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "892 P.2d 588, 591",
"parenthetical": "noting \"error-in-judgment\" instructions may improperly focus jury on subjective intentions rather than objective standard of care",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 772 P.2d at 931 (holding word “error” when used with “exercise of judgment” suggests substandard conduct permissible); DiFranco v. Klein, 657 A.2d 145, 148-49 (R.I. 1995) (holding “good faith” and “honest error in judgment” instructions erroneously imply only bad-faith and dishonest deviations actionable); Deyo v. Kinley, 565 A.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Vt. 1989) (noting “error in judgment” language is basically ambiguous and subjective); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 303 (Conn. 1983) (noting “bona fide error in Judgment” instruction confusing because it implies only an error in judgment made in bad faith actionable); Ouellette by Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Minn. 1986) (rejecting “honest error in judgment” instruction as inappropriately imposing subjective language when defining standard of care); Riggins v. Mauriello, 603 A.2d 827, 830-31 (Del. 1992) (holding “mere error of judgment” instruction permits jury to incorrectly conclude physician may not be liable even if negligent); Parodi v. Washoe Medical Ctr., 892 P.2d 588, 591 (Nev. 1995) (noting “error-in-judgment” instructions may improperly focus jury on subjective intentions rather than objective standard of care); Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 834-35 (Haw. 1998) (rejecting use of “error in judgment” because language inadequately explains law)."
} | 380,781 | b |
In explaining the law, the trial court should avoid instructions that are reasonably capable of confusing or misleading the jury. Although the "mere error of judgment" instruction may be a correct statement of the law, a growing number of courts have criticized similar instructions in recent years. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "727 P.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "warning \"error of judgment\" instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution",
"sentence": "But see Watson v. Hockett, 727 P.2d 669, 673 (Wash. 1986) (warning “error of judgment” instruction should be given in limited circumstances with caution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "959 P.2d 830, 834-35",
"parenthetical": "rejecting use of \"error in judgment\" because language inadequately explains law",
"sentence": "See Rogers, 772 P.2d at 931 (holding word “error” when used with “exercise of judgment” suggests substandard conduct permissible); DiFranco v. Klein, 657 A.2d 145, 148-49 (R.I. 1995) (holding “good faith” and “honest error in judgment” instructions erroneously imply only bad-faith and dishonest deviations actionable); Deyo v. Kinley, 565 A.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Vt. 1989) (noting “error in judgment” language is basically ambiguous and subjective); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 303 (Conn. 1983) (noting “bona fide error in Judgment” instruction confusing because it implies only an error in judgment made in bad faith actionable); Ouellette by Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Minn. 1986) (rejecting “honest error in judgment” instruction as inappropriately imposing subjective language when defining standard of care); Riggins v. Mauriello, 603 A.2d 827, 830-31 (Del. 1992) (holding “mere error of judgment” instruction permits jury to incorrectly conclude physician may not be liable even if negligent); Parodi v. Washoe Medical Ctr., 892 P.2d 588, 591 (Nev. 1995) (noting “error-in-judgment” instructions may improperly focus jury on subjective intentions rather than objective standard of care); Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 834-35 (Haw. 1998) (rejecting use of “error in judgment” because language inadequately explains law)."
} | 380,781 | b |
Plaintiff here contends that strict scrutiny applies because Defendants' actions infringe on First Amendment rights. However, because the Court has already determined that Plaintiff does not have a meritorious Free Speech or Establishment Clause claim, his Equal Protection claim is subject only to rational basis scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Since we hold that the Act does not violate appellee's right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test\"",
"sentence": "See Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F.Supp.2d 827, 841 (W.D.Mich.2005), aff'd 479 F.3d 403 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1039, 128 S.Ct. 653, 169 L.Ed.2d 510 (2007); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir.1996) (where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1170 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (“Since we hold that the Act does not violate appellee’s right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test”); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1313 n. 3, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (where a plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, only rational basis scrutiny applies in subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts); Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282-83 (1st Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1150, 126 S.Ct. 1165, 163 L.Ed.2d 1128 (2006) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "95 F.3d 224, 231",
"parenthetical": "where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review",
"sentence": "See Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F.Supp.2d 827, 841 (W.D.Mich.2005), aff'd 479 F.3d 403 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1039, 128 S.Ct. 653, 169 L.Ed.2d 510 (2007); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir.1996) (where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1170 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (“Since we hold that the Act does not violate appellee’s right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test”); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1313 n. 3, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (where a plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, only rational basis scrutiny applies in subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts); Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282-83 (1st Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1150, 126 S.Ct. 1165, 163 L.Ed.2d 1128 (2006) (same)."
} | 4,178,053 | b |
Plaintiff here contends that strict scrutiny applies because Defendants' actions infringe on First Amendment rights. However, because the Court has already determined that Plaintiff does not have a meritorious Free Speech or Establishment Clause claim, his Equal Protection claim is subject only to rational basis scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Since we hold that the Act does not violate appellee's right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test\"",
"sentence": "See Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F.Supp.2d 827, 841 (W.D.Mich.2005), aff'd 479 F.3d 403 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1039, 128 S.Ct. 653, 169 L.Ed.2d 510 (2007); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir.1996) (where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1170 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (“Since we hold that the Act does not violate appellee’s right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test”); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1313 n. 3, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (where a plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, only rational basis scrutiny applies in subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts); Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282-83 (1st Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1150, 126 S.Ct. 1165, 163 L.Ed.2d 1128 (2006) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "95 F.3d 224, 231",
"parenthetical": "where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review",
"sentence": "See Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F.Supp.2d 827, 841 (W.D.Mich.2005), aff'd 479 F.3d 403 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1039, 128 S.Ct. 653, 169 L.Ed.2d 510 (2007); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir.1996) (where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1170 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (“Since we hold that the Act does not violate appellee’s right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test”); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1313 n. 3, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (where a plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, only rational basis scrutiny applies in subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts); Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282-83 (1st Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1150, 126 S.Ct. 1165, 163 L.Ed.2d 1128 (2006) (same)."
} | 4,178,053 | b |
Plaintiff here contends that strict scrutiny applies because Defendants' actions infringe on First Amendment rights. However, because the Court has already determined that Plaintiff does not have a meritorious Free Speech or Establishment Clause claim, his Equal Protection claim is subject only to rational basis scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Since we hold that the Act does not violate appellee's right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test\"",
"sentence": "See Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F.Supp.2d 827, 841 (W.D.Mich.2005), aff'd 479 F.3d 403 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1039, 128 S.Ct. 653, 169 L.Ed.2d 510 (2007); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir.1996) (where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1170 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (“Since we hold that the Act does not violate appellee’s right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test”); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1313 n. 3, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (where a plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, only rational basis scrutiny applies in subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts); Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282-83 (1st Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1150, 126 S.Ct. 1165, 163 L.Ed.2d 1128 (2006) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "95 F.3d 224, 231",
"parenthetical": "where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review",
"sentence": "See Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F.Supp.2d 827, 841 (W.D.Mich.2005), aff'd 479 F.3d 403 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1039, 128 S.Ct. 653, 169 L.Ed.2d 510 (2007); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir.1996) (where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1170 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (“Since we hold that the Act does not violate appellee’s right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test”); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1313 n. 3, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (where a plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, only rational basis scrutiny applies in subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts); Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282-83 (1st Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1150, 126 S.Ct. 1165, 163 L.Ed.2d 1128 (2006) (same)."
} | 4,178,053 | b |
Plaintiff here contends that strict scrutiny applies because Defendants' actions infringe on First Amendment rights. However, because the Court has already determined that Plaintiff does not have a meritorious Free Speech or Establishment Clause claim, his Equal Protection claim is subject only to rational basis scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "95 F.3d 224, 231",
"parenthetical": "where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review",
"sentence": "See Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F.Supp.2d 827, 841 (W.D.Mich.2005), aff'd 479 F.3d 403 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1039, 128 S.Ct. 653, 169 L.Ed.2d 510 (2007); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir.1996) (where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1170 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (“Since we hold that the Act does not violate appellee’s right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test”); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1313 n. 3, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (where a plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, only rational basis scrutiny applies in subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts); Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282-83 (1st Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1150, 126 S.Ct. 1165, 163 L.Ed.2d 1128 (2006) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where a plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, only rational basis scrutiny applies in subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts",
"sentence": "See Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F.Supp.2d 827, 841 (W.D.Mich.2005), aff'd 479 F.3d 403 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1039, 128 S.Ct. 653, 169 L.Ed.2d 510 (2007); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir.1996) (where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1170 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (“Since we hold that the Act does not violate appellee’s right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test”); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1313 n. 3, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (where a plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, only rational basis scrutiny applies in subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts); Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282-83 (1st Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1150, 126 S.Ct. 1165, 163 L.Ed.2d 1128 (2006) (same)."
} | 4,178,053 | a |
Plaintiff here contends that strict scrutiny applies because Defendants' actions infringe on First Amendment rights. However, because the Court has already determined that Plaintiff does not have a meritorious Free Speech or Establishment Clause claim, his Equal Protection claim is subject only to rational basis scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where a plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, only rational basis scrutiny applies in subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts",
"sentence": "See Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F.Supp.2d 827, 841 (W.D.Mich.2005), aff'd 479 F.3d 403 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1039, 128 S.Ct. 653, 169 L.Ed.2d 510 (2007); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir.1996) (where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1170 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (“Since we hold that the Act does not violate appellee’s right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test”); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1313 n. 3, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (where a plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, only rational basis scrutiny applies in subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts); Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282-83 (1st Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1150, 126 S.Ct. 1165, 163 L.Ed.2d 1128 (2006) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "95 F.3d 224, 231",
"parenthetical": "where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review",
"sentence": "See Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F.Supp.2d 827, 841 (W.D.Mich.2005), aff'd 479 F.3d 403 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1039, 128 S.Ct. 653, 169 L.Ed.2d 510 (2007); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir.1996) (where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1170 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (“Since we hold that the Act does not violate appellee’s right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test”); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1313 n. 3, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (where a plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, only rational basis scrutiny applies in subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts); Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282-83 (1st Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1150, 126 S.Ct. 1165, 163 L.Ed.2d 1128 (2006) (same)."
} | 4,178,053 | b |
Plaintiff here contends that strict scrutiny applies because Defendants' actions infringe on First Amendment rights. However, because the Court has already determined that Plaintiff does not have a meritorious Free Speech or Establishment Clause claim, his Equal Protection claim is subject only to rational basis scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where a plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, only rational basis scrutiny applies in subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts",
"sentence": "See Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F.Supp.2d 827, 841 (W.D.Mich.2005), aff'd 479 F.3d 403 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1039, 128 S.Ct. 653, 169 L.Ed.2d 510 (2007); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir.1996) (where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1170 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (“Since we hold that the Act does not violate appellee’s right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test”); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1313 n. 3, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (where a plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, only rational basis scrutiny applies in subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts); Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282-83 (1st Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1150, 126 S.Ct. 1165, 163 L.Ed.2d 1128 (2006) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "95 F.3d 224, 231",
"parenthetical": "where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review",
"sentence": "See Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F.Supp.2d 827, 841 (W.D.Mich.2005), aff'd 479 F.3d 403 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1039, 128 S.Ct. 653, 169 L.Ed.2d 510 (2007); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir.1996) (where the plaintiffs have failed to show a violation of the First Amendment, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the challenged statute is evaluated under rational basis review); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1170 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (“Since we hold that the Act does not violate appellee’s right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test”); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1313 n. 3, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (where a plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, only rational basis scrutiny applies in subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts); Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282-83 (1st Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1150, 126 S.Ct. 1165, 163 L.Ed.2d 1128 (2006) (same)."
} | 4,178,053 | b |
[P 11] In North Dakota the doctrine of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has only been applied to insurance contracts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1999 ND 204, ¶ 10",
"parenthetical": "affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2001 ND 48, ¶ 12",
"parenthetical": "\"An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.\"",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | 9,512,008 | b |
[P 11] In North Dakota the doctrine of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has only been applied to insurance contracts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2001 ND 48, ¶ 12",
"parenthetical": "\"An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.\"",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | 9,512,008 | a |
[P 11] In North Dakota the doctrine of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has only been applied to insurance contracts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1999 ND 175, ¶ 14",
"parenthetical": "declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2001 ND 48, ¶ 12",
"parenthetical": "\"An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.\"",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | 9,512,008 | b |
[P 11] In North Dakota the doctrine of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has only been applied to insurance contracts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2001 ND 48, ¶ 12",
"parenthetical": "\"An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.\"",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | 9,512,008 | b |
[P 11] In North Dakota the doctrine of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has only been applied to insurance contracts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "511 N.W.2d 244, 247",
"parenthetical": "declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2001 ND 48, ¶ 12",
"parenthetical": "\"An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.\"",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | 9,512,008 | b |
[P 11] In North Dakota the doctrine of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has only been applied to insurance contracts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15",
"parenthetical": "rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2001 ND 48, ¶ 12",
"parenthetical": "\"An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.\"",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | 9,512,008 | b |
[P 11] In North Dakota the doctrine of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has only been applied to insurance contracts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1999 ND 204, ¶ 10",
"parenthetical": "affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.\"",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | 9,512,008 | b |
[P 11] In North Dakota the doctrine of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has only been applied to insurance contracts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.\"",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | 9,512,008 | b |
[P 11] In North Dakota the doctrine of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has only been applied to insurance contracts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.\"",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1999 ND 175, ¶ 14",
"parenthetical": "declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | 9,512,008 | a |
[P 11] In North Dakota the doctrine of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has only been applied to insurance contracts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.\"",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | 9,512,008 | a |
[P 11] In North Dakota the doctrine of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has only been applied to insurance contracts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.\"",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "511 N.W.2d 244, 247",
"parenthetical": "declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | 9,512,008 | a |
[P 11] In North Dakota the doctrine of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has only been applied to insurance contracts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15",
"parenthetical": "rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.\"",
"sentence": "See Fetch v. Quam, 2001 ND 48, ¶ 12, 623 N.W.2d 357 (“An insurer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith in its contractual relationship with its policyholders.”); see also Barnes v. St Joseph’s Hospital, 1999 ND 204, ¶ 10, 601 N.W.2d 587 (affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in connection with a commercial contract because the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact that the defendant acted in bad faith); Jose v. Norwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 14, 599 N.W.2d 293 (declined the invitation to apply an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment context); Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Coop., 511 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D.1994) (declined to recognize a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D.1987) (rejected a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an at-will employment contract)."
} | 9,512,008 | b |
A preemption decision would shield Blue Cross from liability and leave the Hospice without recourse. We are aware that preemption normally is not dependent upon the availability of ERISA remedies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "890 F.2d 941, 946",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.\"",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "872 F.2d 157, 162",
"parenthetical": "preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | 10,524,385 | a |
A preemption decision would shield Blue Cross from liability and leave the Hospice without recourse. We are aware that preemption normally is not dependent upon the availability of ERISA remedies. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "890 F.2d 941, 946",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.\"",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | 10,524,385 | b |
A preemption decision would shield Blue Cross from liability and leave the Hospice without recourse. We are aware that preemption normally is not dependent upon the availability of ERISA remedies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "890 F.2d 941, 946",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.\"",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | 10,524,385 | a |
A preemption decision would shield Blue Cross from liability and leave the Hospice without recourse. We are aware that preemption normally is not dependent upon the availability of ERISA remedies. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "890 F.2d 941, 946",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.\"",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | 10,524,385 | b |
A preemption decision would shield Blue Cross from liability and leave the Hospice without recourse. We are aware that preemption normally is not dependent upon the availability of ERISA remedies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.\"",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "872 F.2d 157, 162",
"parenthetical": "preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | 10,524,385 | a |
A preemption decision would shield Blue Cross from liability and leave the Hospice without recourse. We are aware that preemption normally is not dependent upon the availability of ERISA remedies. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.\"",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | 10,524,385 | b |
A preemption decision would shield Blue Cross from liability and leave the Hospice without recourse. We are aware that preemption normally is not dependent upon the availability of ERISA remedies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.\"",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | 10,524,385 | a |
A preemption decision would shield Blue Cross from liability and leave the Hospice without recourse. We are aware that preemption normally is not dependent upon the availability of ERISA remedies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.\"",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | 10,524,385 | a |
A preemption decision would shield Blue Cross from liability and leave the Hospice without recourse. We are aware that preemption normally is not dependent upon the availability of ERISA remedies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.\"",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "872 F.2d 157, 162",
"parenthetical": "preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | 10,524,385 | a |
A preemption decision would shield Blue Cross from liability and leave the Hospice without recourse. We are aware that preemption normally is not dependent upon the availability of ERISA remedies. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.\"",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | 10,524,385 | b |
A preemption decision would shield Blue Cross from liability and leave the Hospice without recourse. We are aware that preemption normally is not dependent upon the availability of ERISA remedies. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.\"",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | 10,524,385 | b |
A preemption decision would shield Blue Cross from liability and leave the Hospice without recourse. We are aware that preemption normally is not dependent upon the availability of ERISA remedies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.\"",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556; Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for federal preemption.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 579, 112 L.Ed.2d 584 (1990); but see Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1989) (preemption only applies where Congress has provided an adequate remedy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990)."
} | 10,524,385 | a |
This court recently declined to extend the ADA to encompass failure to train liability in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "207 F.3d 795, 801",
"parenthetical": "\"Title II [of the ADA] does not apply to an officer's on-the-street responses to reported disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those calls involve subjects with mental disabilities, prior to the officer's securing the scene and ensuring that there is no threat to human life.\"",
"sentence": "See Sanders v. City of Minneapolis, 474 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir.2007) (“It was not the City’s failure to train its officers, but [the deceased’s] apparent attempt to run over the officers that precipitated the shooting.”); see also Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir.2000) (“Title II [of the ADA] does not apply to an officer’s on-the-street responses to reported disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those calls involve subjects with mental disabilities, prior to the officer’s securing the scene and ensuring that there is no threat to human life.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "474 F.3d 523, 527",
"parenthetical": "\"It was not the City's failure to train its officers, but [the deceased's] apparent attempt to run over the officers that precipitated the shooting.\"",
"sentence": "See Sanders v. City of Minneapolis, 474 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir.2007) (“It was not the City’s failure to train its officers, but [the deceased’s] apparent attempt to run over the officers that precipitated the shooting.”); see also Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir.2000) (“Title II [of the ADA] does not apply to an officer’s on-the-street responses to reported disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those calls involve subjects with mental disabilities, prior to the officer’s securing the scene and ensuring that there is no threat to human life.”)."
} | 3,869,515 | b |
This court recently declined to extend the ADA to encompass failure to train liability in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "474 F.3d 523, 527",
"parenthetical": "\"It was not the City's failure to train its officers, but [the deceased's] apparent attempt to run over the officers that precipitated the shooting.\"",
"sentence": "See Sanders v. City of Minneapolis, 474 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir.2007) (“It was not the City’s failure to train its officers, but [the deceased’s] apparent attempt to run over the officers that precipitated the shooting.”); see also Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir.2000) (“Title II [of the ADA] does not apply to an officer’s on-the-street responses to reported disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those calls involve subjects with mental disabilities, prior to the officer’s securing the scene and ensuring that there is no threat to human life.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on the statutory history and remedial nature of the ADA to permit plaintiff to state claim under the ADA for failure to train police and modify police practices to accommodate for mentally ill subjects of involuntary commitment warrants",
"sentence": "But see Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F.Supp.2d 232 (M.D.Pa.2003) (relying on the statutory history and remedial nature of the ADA to permit plaintiff to state claim under the ADA for failure to train police and modify police practices to accommodate for mentally ill subjects of involuntary commitment warrants)."
} | 3,869,515 | a |
This court recently declined to extend the ADA to encompass failure to train liability in similar circumstances. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "207 F.3d 795, 801",
"parenthetical": "\"Title II [of the ADA] does not apply to an officer's on-the-street responses to reported disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those calls involve subjects with mental disabilities, prior to the officer's securing the scene and ensuring that there is no threat to human life.\"",
"sentence": "See Sanders v. City of Minneapolis, 474 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir.2007) (“It was not the City’s failure to train its officers, but [the deceased’s] apparent attempt to run over the officers that precipitated the shooting.”); see also Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir.2000) (“Title II [of the ADA] does not apply to an officer’s on-the-street responses to reported disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those calls involve subjects with mental disabilities, prior to the officer’s securing the scene and ensuring that there is no threat to human life.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on the statutory history and remedial nature of the ADA to permit plaintiff to state claim under the ADA for failure to train police and modify police practices to accommodate for mentally ill subjects of involuntary commitment warrants",
"sentence": "But see Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F.Supp.2d 232 (M.D.Pa.2003) (relying on the statutory history and remedial nature of the ADA to permit plaintiff to state claim under the ADA for failure to train police and modify police practices to accommodate for mentally ill subjects of involuntary commitment warrants)."
} | 3,869,515 | a |
On a motion to dismiss, courts may take judicial notice .of docket sheets and filings in other cases in determining when a claim accrued. See, e.g., Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "471 F.3d 391, 398",
"parenthetical": "\"docket sheets are public records of which the court could take judicial notice\"",
"sentence": "Grp., 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir.2008) (stating that, on a motion to dismiss, “it is proper to take judicial notice of the fact that press coverage, prior lawsuits, or regulatory filings contained certain information, without regard to the truth of their contents” to determine when “inquiry notice” was triggered for statute of limitations purposes in a securities case); see also Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir.2006) (“docket sheets are public records of which the court could take judicial notice”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "547 F.3d 406, 425",
"parenthetical": "stating that, on a motion to dismiss, \"it is proper to take judicial notice of the fact that press coverage, prior lawsuits, or regulatory filings contained certain information, without regard to the truth of their contents\" to determine when \"inquiry notice\" was triggered for statute of limitations purposes in a securities case",
"sentence": "Grp., 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir.2008) (stating that, on a motion to dismiss, “it is proper to take judicial notice of the fact that press coverage, prior lawsuits, or regulatory filings contained certain information, without regard to the truth of their contents” to determine when “inquiry notice” was triggered for statute of limitations purposes in a securities case); see also Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir.2006) (“docket sheets are public records of which the court could take judicial notice”)."
} | 4,359,074 | b |
Although we have never addressed the precise question of the cap's applicability to an award of nominal damages, several other circuits have. The First and Eighth Circuits have both concluded that the fee cap applies to nominal damage awards. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "225 F.3d 36, 40-41",
"parenthetical": "nominal damage award is \"a monetary judgment\" under SS 1997e(d",
"sentence": "See Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 40-41 (1st Cir.2000) (nominal damage award is “a monetary judgment” under § 1997e(d) and fee cap applies); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 703-04 (8th Cir.2001) (same); see also Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 667 (6th Cir.2001) (limiting attorney’s fees to 150% of money judgment that included nominal and punitive damages)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "257 F.3d 660, 667",
"parenthetical": "limiting attorney's fees to 150% of money judgment that included nominal and punitive damages",
"sentence": "See Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 40-41 (1st Cir.2000) (nominal damage award is “a monetary judgment” under § 1997e(d) and fee cap applies); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 703-04 (8th Cir.2001) (same); see also Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 667 (6th Cir.2001) (limiting attorney’s fees to 150% of money judgment that included nominal and punitive damages)."
} | 6,045,519 | a |
Slander, which is defamation by spoken words, also may be actionable per se under certain circumstances. For instance, spoken words that injure a plaintiff in his or her profession or trade may constitute slander per se. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 Or 242, 244-45",
"parenthetical": "discussing classes of spoken words that are actionable per se",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or 99,124, 593 P2d 777 (1979) (where defendant accuses plaintiff of misconduct or dishonesty in performance of plaintiffs profession or employment, matter is “actionable without proof of specific harm”); see also Barnett v. Phelps, 97 Or 242, 244-45, 191 P 502 (1920) (discussing classes of spoken words that are actionable per se)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "286 Or 99, 124",
"parenthetical": "where defendant accuses plaintiff of misconduct or dishonesty in performance of plaintiffs profession or employment, matter is \"actionable without proof of specific harm\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or 99,124, 593 P2d 777 (1979) (where defendant accuses plaintiff of misconduct or dishonesty in performance of plaintiffs profession or employment, matter is “actionable without proof of specific harm”); see also Barnett v. Phelps, 97 Or 242, 244-45, 191 P 502 (1920) (discussing classes of spoken words that are actionable per se)."
} | 6,802,436 | b |
Slander, which is defamation by spoken words, also may be actionable per se under certain circumstances. For instance, spoken words that injure a plaintiff in his or her profession or trade may constitute slander per se. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "286 Or 99, 124",
"parenthetical": "where defendant accuses plaintiff of misconduct or dishonesty in performance of plaintiffs profession or employment, matter is \"actionable without proof of specific harm\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or 99,124, 593 P2d 777 (1979) (where defendant accuses plaintiff of misconduct or dishonesty in performance of plaintiffs profession or employment, matter is “actionable without proof of specific harm”); see also Barnett v. Phelps, 97 Or 242, 244-45, 191 P 502 (1920) (discussing classes of spoken words that are actionable per se)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing classes of spoken words that are actionable per se",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or 99,124, 593 P2d 777 (1979) (where defendant accuses plaintiff of misconduct or dishonesty in performance of plaintiffs profession or employment, matter is “actionable without proof of specific harm”); see also Barnett v. Phelps, 97 Or 242, 244-45, 191 P 502 (1920) (discussing classes of spoken words that are actionable per se)."
} | 6,802,436 | a |
. A number of jurisdictions have held that the failure by the court to advise a person who pleads guilty to a sexual offense that is specified in a sex offender registration statute does not provide grounds for allowing withdrawal of the plea. On the other hand, other jurisdictions either judicially or legislatively require pre-plea advisement in all sex offender registration cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court must advise person pleading to sex offense of registration requirement",
"sentence": "See also State v. Bremer, 562 N.W.2d 565 (N.D.1997) (trial court must advise person pleading to sex offense of registration requirement), overruled on other grounds, State v. Burr, 598 N.W.2d 147 (N.D.1999)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure require judges to advise defendants about sex offender registration before accepting a guilty plea to a sex offense",
"sentence": "See Whitehead v. State, 985 P.2d 1019 (Alaska App. 1999) (Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure require judges to advise defendants about sex offender registration before accepting a guilty plea to a sex offense)."
} | 9,287,503 | b |
. A number of jurisdictions have held that the failure by the court to advise a person who pleads guilty to a sexual offense that is specified in a sex offender registration statute does not provide grounds for allowing withdrawal of the plea. On the other hand, other jurisdictions either judicially or legislatively require pre-plea advisement in all sex offender registration cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court must advise person pleading to sex offense of registration requirement",
"sentence": "See also State v. Bremer, 562 N.W.2d 565 (N.D.1997) (trial court must advise person pleading to sex offense of registration requirement), overruled on other grounds, State v. Burr, 598 N.W.2d 147 (N.D.1999)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure require judges to advise defendants about sex offender registration before accepting a guilty plea to a sex offense",
"sentence": "See Whitehead v. State, 985 P.2d 1019 (Alaska App. 1999) (Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure require judges to advise defendants about sex offender registration before accepting a guilty plea to a sex offense)."
} | 9,287,503 | b |
. A number of jurisdictions have held that the failure by the court to advise a person who pleads guilty to a sexual offense that is specified in a sex offender registration statute does not provide grounds for allowing withdrawal of the plea. On the other hand, other jurisdictions either judicially or legislatively require pre-plea advisement in all sex offender registration cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Tex.Code of Criminal Procedure requires court before accepting guilty plea to advise defendant of sex offender registration requirement",
"sentence": "See also Ducker v. State, 45 S.W.3d 791 (Ct.App.2001) (Tex.Code of Criminal Procedure requires court before accepting guilty plea to advise defendant of sex offender registration requirement); Shankle v. State, 59 S.W.3d 756 (Ct.App.2001) (sex offender registration was a collateral and not direct consequence of guilty plea to a specific sexual offense; however, it is a serious consequence, and failure of trial court to follow statutory advisement directive entitled defendant to withdraw plea)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure require judges to advise defendants about sex offender registration before accepting a guilty plea to a sex offense",
"sentence": "See Whitehead v. State, 985 P.2d 1019 (Alaska App. 1999) (Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure require judges to advise defendants about sex offender registration before accepting a guilty plea to a sex offense)."
} | 9,287,503 | b |
The circuit court correctly noted that sliding is an integral and well known part of softball and baseball. Though there is no direct Maryland authority recognizing that fielders and base runners assume some risk of being injured in a tag-out and slide, there is ample persuasive authority for this common sense proposition. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "minor plaintiff who was aware that \"[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball\" assumed the risk of sliding injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him \"assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | b |
The circuit court correctly noted that sliding is an integral and well known part of softball and baseball. Though there is no direct Maryland authority recognizing that fielders and base runners assume some risk of being injured in a tag-out and slide, there is ample persuasive authority for this common sense proposition. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him \"assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52",
"parenthetical": "minor plaintiff who was aware that \"[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball\" assumed the risk of sliding injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | a |
The circuit court correctly noted that sliding is an integral and well known part of softball and baseball. Though there is no direct Maryland authority recognizing that fielders and base runners assume some risk of being injured in a tag-out and slide, there is ample persuasive authority for this common sense proposition. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "minor plaintiff who was aware that \"[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball\" assumed the risk of sliding injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him \"assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | b |
The circuit court correctly noted that sliding is an integral and well known part of softball and baseball. Though there is no direct Maryland authority recognizing that fielders and base runners assume some risk of being injured in a tag-out and slide, there is ample persuasive authority for this common sense proposition. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "minor plaintiff who was aware that \"[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball\" assumed the risk of sliding injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him \"assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | b |
The circuit court correctly noted that sliding is an integral and well known part of softball and baseball. Though there is no direct Maryland authority recognizing that fielders and base runners assume some risk of being injured in a tag-out and slide, there is ample persuasive authority for this common sense proposition. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him \"assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "minor plaintiff who was aware that \"[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball\" assumed the risk of sliding injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | a |
The circuit court correctly noted that sliding is an integral and well known part of softball and baseball. Though there is no direct Maryland authority recognizing that fielders and base runners assume some risk of being injured in a tag-out and slide, there is ample persuasive authority for this common sense proposition. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him \"assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "minor plaintiff who was aware that \"[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball\" assumed the risk of sliding injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | a |
The circuit court correctly noted that sliding is an integral and well known part of softball and baseball. Though there is no direct Maryland authority recognizing that fielders and base runners assume some risk of being injured in a tag-out and slide, there is ample persuasive authority for this common sense proposition. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52",
"parenthetical": "minor plaintiff who was aware that \"[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball\" assumed the risk of sliding injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him \"assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | b |
The circuit court correctly noted that sliding is an integral and well known part of softball and baseball. Though there is no direct Maryland authority recognizing that fielders and base runners assume some risk of being injured in a tag-out and slide, there is ample persuasive authority for this common sense proposition. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him \"assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "minor plaintiff who was aware that \"[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball\" assumed the risk of sliding injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | a |
The circuit court correctly noted that sliding is an integral and well known part of softball and baseball. Though there is no direct Maryland authority recognizing that fielders and base runners assume some risk of being injured in a tag-out and slide, there is ample persuasive authority for this common sense proposition. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him \"assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "minor plaintiff who was aware that \"[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball\" assumed the risk of sliding injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | a |
The circuit court correctly noted that sliding is an integral and well known part of softball and baseball. Though there is no direct Maryland authority recognizing that fielders and base runners assume some risk of being injured in a tag-out and slide, there is ample persuasive authority for this common sense proposition. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him \"assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "minor plaintiff who was aware that \"[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball\" assumed the risk of sliding injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505, 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710, 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52, cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 442, 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | a |
The courts have recognized the importance of a preference reduction in section 58(h). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "842 F.2d 181, 181",
"parenthetical": "\"Standing alone -- that is, without section 58(h) -- section 56(a) would impose minimum tax on tax-preference items even though the items never conferred a tax benefit on the taxpayer.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 669 (section 58(h) “reflected a congressional concern to avoid imposition of the minimum tax on preferences in situations where the preferences did not produce tax benefits”), aff'd. 842 F.2d at 181 (“Standing alone — that is, without section 58(h) — section 56(a) would impose minimum tax on tax-preference items even though the items never conferred a tax benefit on the taxpayer.”); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. at 824 (“Plainly, in enacting section 58(h), Congress was concerned about not imposing the minimum tax on tax preferences where such tax preferences did not result in a tax benefit.”); see also Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 334, 685 F.2d 1346 (1982) (taxpayer liable for minimum tax for years in which nonbeneficial preferences arose, which preceded enactment of section 58(h))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "taxpayer liable for minimum tax for years in which nonbeneficial preferences arose, which preceded enactment of section 58(h",
"sentence": "See id. at 669 (section 58(h) “reflected a congressional concern to avoid imposition of the minimum tax on preferences in situations where the preferences did not produce tax benefits”), aff'd. 842 F.2d at 181 (“Standing alone — that is, without section 58(h) — section 56(a) would impose minimum tax on tax-preference items even though the items never conferred a tax benefit on the taxpayer.”); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. at 824 (“Plainly, in enacting section 58(h), Congress was concerned about not imposing the minimum tax on tax preferences where such tax preferences did not result in a tax benefit.”); see also Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 334, 685 F.2d 1346 (1982) (taxpayer liable for minimum tax for years in which nonbeneficial preferences arose, which preceded enactment of section 58(h))."
} | 6,084,782 | a |
The courts have recognized the importance of a preference reduction in section 58(h). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "842 F.2d 181, 181",
"parenthetical": "\"Standing alone -- that is, without section 58(h) -- section 56(a) would impose minimum tax on tax-preference items even though the items never conferred a tax benefit on the taxpayer.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 669 (section 58(h) “reflected a congressional concern to avoid imposition of the minimum tax on preferences in situations where the preferences did not produce tax benefits”), aff'd. 842 F.2d at 181 (“Standing alone — that is, without section 58(h) — section 56(a) would impose minimum tax on tax-preference items even though the items never conferred a tax benefit on the taxpayer.”); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. at 824 (“Plainly, in enacting section 58(h), Congress was concerned about not imposing the minimum tax on tax preferences where such tax preferences did not result in a tax benefit.”); see also Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 334, 685 F.2d 1346 (1982) (taxpayer liable for minimum tax for years in which nonbeneficial preferences arose, which preceded enactment of section 58(h))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "taxpayer liable for minimum tax for years in which nonbeneficial preferences arose, which preceded enactment of section 58(h",
"sentence": "See id. at 669 (section 58(h) “reflected a congressional concern to avoid imposition of the minimum tax on preferences in situations where the preferences did not produce tax benefits”), aff'd. 842 F.2d at 181 (“Standing alone — that is, without section 58(h) — section 56(a) would impose minimum tax on tax-preference items even though the items never conferred a tax benefit on the taxpayer.”); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. at 824 (“Plainly, in enacting section 58(h), Congress was concerned about not imposing the minimum tax on tax preferences where such tax preferences did not result in a tax benefit.”); see also Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 334, 685 F.2d 1346 (1982) (taxpayer liable for minimum tax for years in which nonbeneficial preferences arose, which preceded enactment of section 58(h))."
} | 6,084,782 | a |
Under Title VII, contractual administrative remedies do not have to be exhausted in order to bring a judicial action. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "415 U.S. 36, 49",
"parenthetical": "individual does not forfeit his private cause of action under Title VII if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement",
"sentence": "See Donaldson, 620 F.2d at 158; Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 517 F.2d 387, 390 (7th Cir.1975) (plaintiff may forego settlement agreement between her bargaining representative and her former employer to file Title VII action); Waters, 502 F.2d at 1316; see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1020, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) (individual does not forfeit his private cause of action under Title VII if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "517 F.2d 387, 390",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff may forego settlement agreement between her bargaining representative and her former employer to file Title VII action",
"sentence": "See Donaldson, 620 F.2d at 158; Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 517 F.2d 387, 390 (7th Cir.1975) (plaintiff may forego settlement agreement between her bargaining representative and her former employer to file Title VII action); Waters, 502 F.2d at 1316; see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1020, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) (individual does not forfeit his private cause of action under Title VII if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement)."
} | 1,569,419 | b |
Under Title VII, contractual administrative remedies do not have to be exhausted in order to bring a judicial action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "517 F.2d 387, 390",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff may forego settlement agreement between her bargaining representative and her former employer to file Title VII action",
"sentence": "See Donaldson, 620 F.2d at 158; Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 517 F.2d 387, 390 (7th Cir.1975) (plaintiff may forego settlement agreement between her bargaining representative and her former employer to file Title VII action); Waters, 502 F.2d at 1316; see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1020, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) (individual does not forfeit his private cause of action under Title VII if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 1011, 1020",
"parenthetical": "individual does not forfeit his private cause of action under Title VII if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement",
"sentence": "See Donaldson, 620 F.2d at 158; Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 517 F.2d 387, 390 (7th Cir.1975) (plaintiff may forego settlement agreement between her bargaining representative and her former employer to file Title VII action); Waters, 502 F.2d at 1316; see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1020, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) (individual does not forfeit his private cause of action under Title VII if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement)."
} | 1,569,419 | a |
Under Title VII, contractual administrative remedies do not have to be exhausted in order to bring a judicial action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "517 F.2d 387, 390",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff may forego settlement agreement between her bargaining representative and her former employer to file Title VII action",
"sentence": "See Donaldson, 620 F.2d at 158; Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 517 F.2d 387, 390 (7th Cir.1975) (plaintiff may forego settlement agreement between her bargaining representative and her former employer to file Title VII action); Waters, 502 F.2d at 1316; see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1020, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) (individual does not forfeit his private cause of action under Title VII if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "individual does not forfeit his private cause of action under Title VII if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement",
"sentence": "See Donaldson, 620 F.2d at 158; Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 517 F.2d 387, 390 (7th Cir.1975) (plaintiff may forego settlement agreement between her bargaining representative and her former employer to file Title VII action); Waters, 502 F.2d at 1316; see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1020, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) (individual does not forfeit his private cause of action under Title VII if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement)."
} | 1,569,419 | a |
An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without independently evaluating the aggrieved employee's situation, the imposition of liability may be appropriate. If such claims are accepted at face value, the subordinate's discriminatory statements and actions may then be fairly imputed to the formal decisionmak-ers and, by virtue of them, to the employer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "252 F.3d 382, 382",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker's action is merely a 'rubber stamp' for the subordinate's recommendation\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "524 U.S. 742, 762",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | 9,383,808 | a |
An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without independently evaluating the aggrieved employee's situation, the imposition of liability may be appropriate. If such claims are accepted at face value, the subordinate's discriminatory statements and actions may then be fairly imputed to the formal decisionmak-ers and, by virtue of them, to the employer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "252 F.3d 382, 382",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker's action is merely a 'rubber stamp' for the subordinate's recommendation\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw\" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers)."
} | 9,383,808 | b |
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