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Williamson and Assad both saw the defendant hand something to Kimball, and Williamson saw Kimball give the defendant money. Seconds later, Kimball dropped two pieces of crack cocaine. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "39 Mass. App. Ct. 931, 931-932",
"parenthetical": "similar testimony constituted reversible error because evidence of a drug transaction was \"decidedly weaker than in Woods, [supra]\"",
"sentence": "Contrast Commonwealth v. Lovejoy, 39 Mass. App. Ct. at 931-932 (similar testimony constituted reversible error because evidence of a drug transaction was “decidedly weaker than in Woods, [supra]\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "425 Mass. 633, 645",
"parenthetical": "in each case, improper opinion testimony that the defendant had engaged in a drug transaction was rendered harmless by strong evidence that a drug transaction had occurred",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Woods, 419 Mass. at 375-376; Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 421 Mass. 547, 554-555 (1995); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 425 Mass. 633, 645 (1997) (in each case, improper opinion testimony that the defendant had engaged in a drug transaction was rendered harmless by strong evidence that a drug transaction had occurred)."
} | 480,295 | b |
Indeed, it has been observed by one court that "in the ten months following Riegel, courts across the country have applied Section 360k broadly, preempting all manner of claims from strict products liability and negligence ... to failure to warn and manufacturing-and-design defect." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "698 F.Supp.2d 682, 682-83",
"parenthetical": "noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA",
"sentence": "Lemelle, 698 F.Supp.2d at 682-83 (noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 (D.Minn.2009) (collecting cases); see also Funk, 673 F.Supp.2d at 531 (dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA); Delaney, 2009 WL 564243, at *2-*7 (concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System); Horowitz v. Stryker, 613 F.Supp.2d 271 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below)); but see Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40 (S.D.Ind.2009) (holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "673 F.Supp.2d 531, 531",
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA",
"sentence": "Lemelle, 698 F.Supp.2d at 682-83 (noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 (D.Minn.2009) (collecting cases); see also Funk, 673 F.Supp.2d at 531 (dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA); Delaney, 2009 WL 564243, at *2-*7 (concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System); Horowitz v. Stryker, 613 F.Supp.2d 271 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below)); but see Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40 (S.D.Ind.2009) (holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA)."
} | 4,108,346 | a |
Indeed, it has been observed by one court that "in the ten months following Riegel, courts across the country have applied Section 360k broadly, preempting all manner of claims from strict products liability and negligence ... to failure to warn and manufacturing-and-design defect." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "698 F.Supp.2d 682, 682-83",
"parenthetical": "noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA",
"sentence": "Lemelle, 698 F.Supp.2d at 682-83 (noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 (D.Minn.2009) (collecting cases); see also Funk, 673 F.Supp.2d at 531 (dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA); Delaney, 2009 WL 564243, at *2-*7 (concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System); Horowitz v. Stryker, 613 F.Supp.2d 271 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below)); but see Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40 (S.D.Ind.2009) (holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System",
"sentence": "Lemelle, 698 F.Supp.2d at 682-83 (noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 (D.Minn.2009) (collecting cases); see also Funk, 673 F.Supp.2d at 531 (dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA); Delaney, 2009 WL 564243, at *2-*7 (concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System); Horowitz v. Stryker, 613 F.Supp.2d 271 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below)); but see Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40 (S.D.Ind.2009) (holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA)."
} | 4,108,346 | a |
Indeed, it has been observed by one court that "in the ten months following Riegel, courts across the country have applied Section 360k broadly, preempting all manner of claims from strict products liability and negligence ... to failure to warn and manufacturing-and-design defect." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "698 F.Supp.2d 682, 682-83",
"parenthetical": "noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA",
"sentence": "Lemelle, 698 F.Supp.2d at 682-83 (noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 (D.Minn.2009) (collecting cases); see also Funk, 673 F.Supp.2d at 531 (dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA); Delaney, 2009 WL 564243, at *2-*7 (concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System); Horowitz v. Stryker, 613 F.Supp.2d 271 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below)); but see Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40 (S.D.Ind.2009) (holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below",
"sentence": "Lemelle, 698 F.Supp.2d at 682-83 (noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 (D.Minn.2009) (collecting cases); see also Funk, 673 F.Supp.2d at 531 (dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA); Delaney, 2009 WL 564243, at *2-*7 (concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System); Horowitz v. Stryker, 613 F.Supp.2d 271 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below)); but see Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40 (S.D.Ind.2009) (holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA)."
} | 4,108,346 | a |
Indeed, it has been observed by one court that "in the ten months following Riegel, courts across the country have applied Section 360k broadly, preempting all manner of claims from strict products liability and negligence ... to failure to warn and manufacturing-and-design defect." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA",
"sentence": "Lemelle, 698 F.Supp.2d at 682-83 (noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 (D.Minn.2009) (collecting cases); see also Funk, 673 F.Supp.2d at 531 (dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA); Delaney, 2009 WL 564243, at *2-*7 (concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System); Horowitz v. Stryker, 613 F.Supp.2d 271 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below)); but see Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40 (S.D.Ind.2009) (holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "698 F.Supp.2d 682, 682-83",
"parenthetical": "noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA",
"sentence": "Lemelle, 698 F.Supp.2d at 682-83 (noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 (D.Minn.2009) (collecting cases); see also Funk, 673 F.Supp.2d at 531 (dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA); Delaney, 2009 WL 564243, at *2-*7 (concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System); Horowitz v. Stryker, 613 F.Supp.2d 271 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below)); but see Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40 (S.D.Ind.2009) (holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA)."
} | 4,108,346 | b |
Indeed, it has been observed by one court that "in the ten months following Riegel, courts across the country have applied Section 360k broadly, preempting all manner of claims from strict products liability and negligence ... to failure to warn and manufacturing-and-design defect." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "673 F.Supp.2d 531, 531",
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA",
"sentence": "Lemelle, 698 F.Supp.2d at 682-83 (noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 (D.Minn.2009) (collecting cases); see also Funk, 673 F.Supp.2d at 531 (dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA); Delaney, 2009 WL 564243, at *2-*7 (concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System); Horowitz v. Stryker, 613 F.Supp.2d 271 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below)); but see Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40 (S.D.Ind.2009) (holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA",
"sentence": "Lemelle, 698 F.Supp.2d at 682-83 (noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 (D.Minn.2009) (collecting cases); see also Funk, 673 F.Supp.2d at 531 (dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA); Delaney, 2009 WL 564243, at *2-*7 (concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System); Horowitz v. Stryker, 613 F.Supp.2d 271 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below)); but see Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40 (S.D.Ind.2009) (holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA)."
} | 4,108,346 | a |
Indeed, it has been observed by one court that "in the ten months following Riegel, courts across the country have applied Section 360k broadly, preempting all manner of claims from strict products liability and negligence ... to failure to warn and manufacturing-and-design defect." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA",
"sentence": "Lemelle, 698 F.Supp.2d at 682-83 (noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 (D.Minn.2009) (collecting cases); see also Funk, 673 F.Supp.2d at 531 (dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA); Delaney, 2009 WL 564243, at *2-*7 (concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System); Horowitz v. Stryker, 613 F.Supp.2d 271 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below)); but see Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40 (S.D.Ind.2009) (holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System",
"sentence": "Lemelle, 698 F.Supp.2d at 682-83 (noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 (D.Minn.2009) (collecting cases); see also Funk, 673 F.Supp.2d at 531 (dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA); Delaney, 2009 WL 564243, at *2-*7 (concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System); Horowitz v. Stryker, 613 F.Supp.2d 271 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below)); but see Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40 (S.D.Ind.2009) (holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA)."
} | 4,108,346 | b |
Indeed, it has been observed by one court that "in the ten months following Riegel, courts across the country have applied Section 360k broadly, preempting all manner of claims from strict products liability and negligence ... to failure to warn and manufacturing-and-design defect." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below",
"sentence": "Lemelle, 698 F.Supp.2d at 682-83 (noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 (D.Minn.2009) (collecting cases); see also Funk, 673 F.Supp.2d at 531 (dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA); Delaney, 2009 WL 564243, at *2-*7 (concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System); Horowitz v. Stryker, 613 F.Supp.2d 271 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below)); but see Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40 (S.D.Ind.2009) (holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA",
"sentence": "Lemelle, 698 F.Supp.2d at 682-83 (noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 (D.Minn.2009) (collecting cases); see also Funk, 673 F.Supp.2d at 531 (dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA); Delaney, 2009 WL 564243, at *2-*7 (concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System); Horowitz v. Stryker, 613 F.Supp.2d 271 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (holding that plaintiffs negligence, defective manufacturing, defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn claims were preempted by the MDA and FDCA (defined below)); but see Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 830, 839-40 (S.D.Ind.2009) (holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the FDA)."
} | 4,108,346 | a |
While Horton's actions in continuing to smoke might be characterized as evidence supporting a conclusion of assumption of the risk, that doctrine is subsumed in our comparative fault doctrine. Whether the context is an "open and obvious" hazard or assumption of a known risk we have tended to rely upon comparative fault principles. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Discussing the application of our comparative fault doctrine in the context of \"last clear chance\".",
"sentence": "See Tharp v. Bunge Corporation, 641 So.2d 20, 25 (Miss.1994) (Comparative fault applies where an unreasonably dangerous condition is open and obvious); See also Newman v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 421 F.Supp. 488 (S.D.Miss.1976) aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 545 F.2d 439, reh. den., 551 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.1977) (Discussing the application of our comparative fault doctrine in the context of “last clear chance”.)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "641 So.2d 20, 25",
"parenthetical": "Comparative fault applies where an unreasonably dangerous condition is open and obvious",
"sentence": "See Tharp v. Bunge Corporation, 641 So.2d 20, 25 (Miss.1994) (Comparative fault applies where an unreasonably dangerous condition is open and obvious); See also Newman v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 421 F.Supp. 488 (S.D.Miss.1976) aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 545 F.2d 439, reh. den., 551 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.1977) (Discussing the application of our comparative fault doctrine in the context of “last clear chance”.)."
} | 7,456,768 | b |
While Horton's actions in continuing to smoke might be characterized as evidence supporting a conclusion of assumption of the risk, that doctrine is subsumed in our comparative fault doctrine. Whether the context is an "open and obvious" hazard or assumption of a known risk we have tended to rely upon comparative fault principles. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Discussing the application of our comparative fault doctrine in the context of \"last clear chance\".",
"sentence": "See Tharp v. Bunge Corporation, 641 So.2d 20, 25 (Miss.1994) (Comparative fault applies where an unreasonably dangerous condition is open and obvious); See also Newman v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 421 F.Supp. 488 (S.D.Miss.1976) aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 545 F.2d 439, reh. den., 551 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.1977) (Discussing the application of our comparative fault doctrine in the context of “last clear chance”.)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "641 So.2d 20, 25",
"parenthetical": "Comparative fault applies where an unreasonably dangerous condition is open and obvious",
"sentence": "See Tharp v. Bunge Corporation, 641 So.2d 20, 25 (Miss.1994) (Comparative fault applies where an unreasonably dangerous condition is open and obvious); See also Newman v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 421 F.Supp. 488 (S.D.Miss.1976) aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 545 F.2d 439, reh. den., 551 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.1977) (Discussing the application of our comparative fault doctrine in the context of “last clear chance”.)."
} | 7,456,768 | b |
While Horton's actions in continuing to smoke might be characterized as evidence supporting a conclusion of assumption of the risk, that doctrine is subsumed in our comparative fault doctrine. Whether the context is an "open and obvious" hazard or assumption of a known risk we have tended to rely upon comparative fault principles. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "641 So.2d 20, 25",
"parenthetical": "Comparative fault applies where an unreasonably dangerous condition is open and obvious",
"sentence": "See Tharp v. Bunge Corporation, 641 So.2d 20, 25 (Miss.1994) (Comparative fault applies where an unreasonably dangerous condition is open and obvious); See also Newman v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 421 F.Supp. 488 (S.D.Miss.1976) aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 545 F.2d 439, reh. den., 551 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.1977) (Discussing the application of our comparative fault doctrine in the context of “last clear chance”.)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Discussing the application of our comparative fault doctrine in the context of \"last clear chance\".",
"sentence": "See Tharp v. Bunge Corporation, 641 So.2d 20, 25 (Miss.1994) (Comparative fault applies where an unreasonably dangerous condition is open and obvious); See also Newman v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 421 F.Supp. 488 (S.D.Miss.1976) aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 545 F.2d 439, reh. den., 551 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.1977) (Discussing the application of our comparative fault doctrine in the context of “last clear chance”.)."
} | 7,456,768 | a |
P 60. Other courts have reached similar conclusions in cases that involved alleged "parole interviews." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 A.3d 370, 379-80",
"parenthetical": "concluding that \"no mere parole interview\" occurred where parolee was immediately handcuffed after voluntarily appearing at parole office, accused of crimes for which he was not on parole, \"there was no 'interview' or dialogue related to the conditions of his parole or parole violations,\" he was not told that he was not under arrest or that he was being handcuffed pursuant to routine policy, but was instead informed that he was being investigated for new crimes, and agents' interrogation and search of parolee's home \"was unquestionably aimed at crimes for which he was not on parole\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370, 379-80 (Pa. 2015) (concluding that “no mere parole interview” occurred where parolee was immediately handcuffed after voluntarily appearing at parole office, accused of crimes for which he was not on parole, “there was no ‘interview’ or dialogue related to the conditions of his parole or parole violations,” he was not told that he was not under arrest or that he was being handcuffed pursuant to routine policy, but was instead informed that he was being investigated for new crimes, and agents’ interrogation and search of parolee’s home “was unquestionably aimed at crimes for which he was not on parole”); see also People v. Coleman, 2015 IL App (4th) 140730, 37 N.E.3d 360 (concluding that parolee was subject to custodial interrogation where parole officer was looking for parolee because of tips indicating parolee had committed new crime, parolee was separated from other people in house, parole agents were armed and parolee was required to cooperate, and parolee was handcuffed and then questioned about an independent crime)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that parolee was subject to custodial interrogation where parole officer was looking for parolee because of tips indicating parolee had committed new crime, parolee was separated from other people in house, parole agents were armed and parolee was required to cooperate, and parolee was handcuffed and then questioned about an independent crime",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370, 379-80 (Pa. 2015) (concluding that “no mere parole interview” occurred where parolee was immediately handcuffed after voluntarily appearing at parole office, accused of crimes for which he was not on parole, “there was no ‘interview’ or dialogue related to the conditions of his parole or parole violations,” he was not told that he was not under arrest or that he was being handcuffed pursuant to routine policy, but was instead informed that he was being investigated for new crimes, and agents’ interrogation and search of parolee’s home “was unquestionably aimed at crimes for which he was not on parole”); see also People v. Coleman, 2015 IL App (4th) 140730, 37 N.E.3d 360 (concluding that parolee was subject to custodial interrogation where parole officer was looking for parolee because of tips indicating parolee had committed new crime, parolee was separated from other people in house, parole agents were armed and parolee was required to cooperate, and parolee was handcuffed and then questioned about an independent crime)."
} | 12,454,562 | a |
P 60. Other courts have reached similar conclusions in cases that involved alleged "parole interviews." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 A.3d 370, 379-80",
"parenthetical": "concluding that \"no mere parole interview\" occurred where parolee was immediately handcuffed after voluntarily appearing at parole office, accused of crimes for which he was not on parole, \"there was no 'interview' or dialogue related to the conditions of his parole or parole violations,\" he was not told that he was not under arrest or that he was being handcuffed pursuant to routine policy, but was instead informed that he was being investigated for new crimes, and agents' interrogation and search of parolee's home \"was unquestionably aimed at crimes for which he was not on parole\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370, 379-80 (Pa. 2015) (concluding that “no mere parole interview” occurred where parolee was immediately handcuffed after voluntarily appearing at parole office, accused of crimes for which he was not on parole, “there was no ‘interview’ or dialogue related to the conditions of his parole or parole violations,” he was not told that he was not under arrest or that he was being handcuffed pursuant to routine policy, but was instead informed that he was being investigated for new crimes, and agents’ interrogation and search of parolee’s home “was unquestionably aimed at crimes for which he was not on parole”); see also People v. Coleman, 2015 IL App (4th) 140730, 37 N.E.3d 360 (concluding that parolee was subject to custodial interrogation where parole officer was looking for parolee because of tips indicating parolee had committed new crime, parolee was separated from other people in house, parole agents were armed and parolee was required to cooperate, and parolee was handcuffed and then questioned about an independent crime)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that parolee was subject to custodial interrogation where parole officer was looking for parolee because of tips indicating parolee had committed new crime, parolee was separated from other people in house, parole agents were armed and parolee was required to cooperate, and parolee was handcuffed and then questioned about an independent crime",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370, 379-80 (Pa. 2015) (concluding that “no mere parole interview” occurred where parolee was immediately handcuffed after voluntarily appearing at parole office, accused of crimes for which he was not on parole, “there was no ‘interview’ or dialogue related to the conditions of his parole or parole violations,” he was not told that he was not under arrest or that he was being handcuffed pursuant to routine policy, but was instead informed that he was being investigated for new crimes, and agents’ interrogation and search of parolee’s home “was unquestionably aimed at crimes for which he was not on parole”); see also People v. Coleman, 2015 IL App (4th) 140730, 37 N.E.3d 360 (concluding that parolee was subject to custodial interrogation where parole officer was looking for parolee because of tips indicating parolee had committed new crime, parolee was separated from other people in house, parole agents were armed and parolee was required to cooperate, and parolee was handcuffed and then questioned about an independent crime)."
} | 12,454,562 | a |
"Allowing a plaintiff to abandon the administrative remedies he has initiated would tend to frustrate the ability of the agency to deal with complaints. All participants would know that at any moment an impatient complainant could take his claim to court and abort the administrative proceedings." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2006 WL 2051730, at *3",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff was not allowed to voluntarily withdraw her complaint after electing to have her complaint heard before an administrative law judge",
"sentence": "Gagnon v. Potter, No. 3:05-CV-324RM, 2006 WL 2051730, at *3 (N.D.Ind. July 19, 2006) (holding that plaintiff was not allowed to voluntarily withdraw her complaint after electing to have her complaint heard before an administrative law judge); see also Mackay v. USPS, 607 F.Supp. 271, 276 (E.D.Pa.1985) (“The exhaustion requirement is not met by plaintiffs taking the initial administrative steps and then abandoning the process.”)"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "607 F.Supp. 271, 276",
"parenthetical": "\"The exhaustion requirement is not met by plaintiffs taking the initial administrative steps and then abandoning the process.\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon v. Potter, No. 3:05-CV-324RM, 2006 WL 2051730, at *3 (N.D.Ind. July 19, 2006) (holding that plaintiff was not allowed to voluntarily withdraw her complaint after electing to have her complaint heard before an administrative law judge); see also Mackay v. USPS, 607 F.Supp. 271, 276 (E.D.Pa.1985) (“The exhaustion requirement is not met by plaintiffs taking the initial administrative steps and then abandoning the process.”)"
} | 4,016,857 | a |
While the parties have not cited any opinion addressing the particular bylaw at issue here, and we have found none, other courts have held that the NCAA's "no-draft" and "no-agent" rules, which disqualify a-student-athlete from further intercollegiate competition if the student-athlete enters a professional draft or contacts an agent, are reasonable because they are procompetitive. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "977 F.2d 1081, 1087-94",
"parenthetical": "holding that NCAA's \"no-draft\" and \"no-agent\" rules do not have an anticompetitive impact on a discernable market",
"sentence": "See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343; Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1087-94 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that NCAA’s “no-draft” and “no-agent” rules do not have an anticompetitive impact on a discernable market); Gaines, 746 F.Supp. at 746; Jones, 392 F.Supp. at 304 (noting in dicta that “any limitation on access to intercollegiate sports is merely the incidental result of the organization’s pursuit of its legitimate goals”); see also Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 577 F.Supp. 356, 379 (D.Ariz.1983) (holding that NCAA sanctions such as rendering a college team ineligible for post-season play and for television appearances imposed for violations of rule against providing compensation to student-athletes did not violate antitrust law because sanctions were reasonably related to the NCAA’s goals of preserving amateurism and promoting fair competition)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "577 F.Supp. 356, 379",
"parenthetical": "holding that NCAA sanctions such as rendering a college team ineligible for post-season play and for television appearances imposed for violations of rule against providing compensation to student-athletes did not violate antitrust law because sanctions were reasonably related to the NCAA's goals of preserving amateurism and promoting fair competition",
"sentence": "See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343; Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1087-94 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that NCAA’s “no-draft” and “no-agent” rules do not have an anticompetitive impact on a discernable market); Gaines, 746 F.Supp. at 746; Jones, 392 F.Supp. at 304 (noting in dicta that “any limitation on access to intercollegiate sports is merely the incidental result of the organization’s pursuit of its legitimate goals”); see also Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 577 F.Supp. 356, 379 (D.Ariz.1983) (holding that NCAA sanctions such as rendering a college team ineligible for post-season play and for television appearances imposed for violations of rule against providing compensation to student-athletes did not violate antitrust law because sanctions were reasonably related to the NCAA’s goals of preserving amateurism and promoting fair competition)."
} | 11,833,197 | a |
While the parties have not cited any opinion addressing the particular bylaw at issue here, and we have found none, other courts have held that the NCAA's "no-draft" and "no-agent" rules, which disqualify a-student-athlete from further intercollegiate competition if the student-athlete enters a professional draft or contacts an agent, are reasonable because they are procompetitive. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "392 F.Supp. 304, 304",
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that \"any limitation on access to intercollegiate sports is merely the incidental result of the organization's pursuit of its legitimate goals\"",
"sentence": "See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343; Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1087-94 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that NCAA’s “no-draft” and “no-agent” rules do not have an anticompetitive impact on a discernable market); Gaines, 746 F.Supp. at 746; Jones, 392 F.Supp. at 304 (noting in dicta that “any limitation on access to intercollegiate sports is merely the incidental result of the organization’s pursuit of its legitimate goals”); see also Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 577 F.Supp. 356, 379 (D.Ariz.1983) (holding that NCAA sanctions such as rendering a college team ineligible for post-season play and for television appearances imposed for violations of rule against providing compensation to student-athletes did not violate antitrust law because sanctions were reasonably related to the NCAA’s goals of preserving amateurism and promoting fair competition)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "577 F.Supp. 356, 379",
"parenthetical": "holding that NCAA sanctions such as rendering a college team ineligible for post-season play and for television appearances imposed for violations of rule against providing compensation to student-athletes did not violate antitrust law because sanctions were reasonably related to the NCAA's goals of preserving amateurism and promoting fair competition",
"sentence": "See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343; Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1087-94 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that NCAA’s “no-draft” and “no-agent” rules do not have an anticompetitive impact on a discernable market); Gaines, 746 F.Supp. at 746; Jones, 392 F.Supp. at 304 (noting in dicta that “any limitation on access to intercollegiate sports is merely the incidental result of the organization’s pursuit of its legitimate goals”); see also Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 577 F.Supp. 356, 379 (D.Ariz.1983) (holding that NCAA sanctions such as rendering a college team ineligible for post-season play and for television appearances imposed for violations of rule against providing compensation to student-athletes did not violate antitrust law because sanctions were reasonably related to the NCAA’s goals of preserving amateurism and promoting fair competition)."
} | 11,833,197 | a |
. Courts that fail to discern a profit motive often specify an alternative explanation for a party's actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "893 F.2d 656, 660",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that the court does not need to pinpoint the likely motivation, as long as it determines on the basis of the Treasury Regulation factors that the activity was not engaged in for profit",
"sentence": "But see Antonides v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 656, 660 (4th Cir.1990) (suggesting that the court does not need to pinpoint the likely motivation, as long as it determines on the basis of the Treasury Regulation factors that the activity was not engaged in for profit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "820 F.2d 324, 324",
"parenthetical": "limited partnership that bought film properties was motivated by a desire to create tax shelters rather than to profit",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Polakof, 820 F.2d at 324 (limited partnership that bought film properties was motivated by a desire to create tax shelters rather than to profit); Thomas, 792 F.2d at 1258 (primary objective of coal mining program was to secure tax benefits rather than to earn an economic profit); Estate of Power v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 826, 831 (1st Cir.1984) (taxpayer’s horse-breeding activity was engaged in for personal satisfaction, not profit); Eastman, 635 F.2d at 841 (family engaged in horse-breeding in order to utilize the losses from that operation to offset other income)."
} | 11,935,606 | b |
. Courts that fail to discern a profit motive often specify an alternative explanation for a party's actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "893 F.2d 656, 660",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that the court does not need to pinpoint the likely motivation, as long as it determines on the basis of the Treasury Regulation factors that the activity was not engaged in for profit",
"sentence": "But see Antonides v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 656, 660 (4th Cir.1990) (suggesting that the court does not need to pinpoint the likely motivation, as long as it determines on the basis of the Treasury Regulation factors that the activity was not engaged in for profit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "792 F.2d 1258, 1258",
"parenthetical": "primary objective of coal mining program was to secure tax benefits rather than to earn an economic profit",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Polakof, 820 F.2d at 324 (limited partnership that bought film properties was motivated by a desire to create tax shelters rather than to profit); Thomas, 792 F.2d at 1258 (primary objective of coal mining program was to secure tax benefits rather than to earn an economic profit); Estate of Power v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 826, 831 (1st Cir.1984) (taxpayer’s horse-breeding activity was engaged in for personal satisfaction, not profit); Eastman, 635 F.2d at 841 (family engaged in horse-breeding in order to utilize the losses from that operation to offset other income)."
} | 11,935,606 | b |
. Courts that fail to discern a profit motive often specify an alternative explanation for a party's actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "893 F.2d 656, 660",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that the court does not need to pinpoint the likely motivation, as long as it determines on the basis of the Treasury Regulation factors that the activity was not engaged in for profit",
"sentence": "But see Antonides v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 656, 660 (4th Cir.1990) (suggesting that the court does not need to pinpoint the likely motivation, as long as it determines on the basis of the Treasury Regulation factors that the activity was not engaged in for profit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "736 F.2d 826, 831",
"parenthetical": "taxpayer's horse-breeding activity was engaged in for personal satisfaction, not profit",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Polakof, 820 F.2d at 324 (limited partnership that bought film properties was motivated by a desire to create tax shelters rather than to profit); Thomas, 792 F.2d at 1258 (primary objective of coal mining program was to secure tax benefits rather than to earn an economic profit); Estate of Power v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 826, 831 (1st Cir.1984) (taxpayer’s horse-breeding activity was engaged in for personal satisfaction, not profit); Eastman, 635 F.2d at 841 (family engaged in horse-breeding in order to utilize the losses from that operation to offset other income)."
} | 11,935,606 | b |
. Courts that fail to discern a profit motive often specify an alternative explanation for a party's actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "893 F.2d 656, 660",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that the court does not need to pinpoint the likely motivation, as long as it determines on the basis of the Treasury Regulation factors that the activity was not engaged in for profit",
"sentence": "But see Antonides v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 656, 660 (4th Cir.1990) (suggesting that the court does not need to pinpoint the likely motivation, as long as it determines on the basis of the Treasury Regulation factors that the activity was not engaged in for profit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "635 F.2d 841, 841",
"parenthetical": "family engaged in horse-breeding in order to utilize the losses from that operation to offset other income",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Polakof, 820 F.2d at 324 (limited partnership that bought film properties was motivated by a desire to create tax shelters rather than to profit); Thomas, 792 F.2d at 1258 (primary objective of coal mining program was to secure tax benefits rather than to earn an economic profit); Estate of Power v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 826, 831 (1st Cir.1984) (taxpayer’s horse-breeding activity was engaged in for personal satisfaction, not profit); Eastman, 635 F.2d at 841 (family engaged in horse-breeding in order to utilize the losses from that operation to offset other income)."
} | 11,935,606 | b |
This statement does not negate the court's earlier recognition of its ability to depart based on certain factors that it did not find present in this case. Instead, the court acknowledged that it could not depart simply because it thinks the guidelines, as a whole, are too harsh. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "914 F.2d 959, 964",
"parenthetical": "general dissatisfaction with the guidelines does not constitute a reasonable basis for departure",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 914 F.2d 959, 964 (7th Cir.1990) (general dissatisfaction with the guidelines does not constitute a reasonable basis for departure); see also United States v. Nguyen, 1 F.3d 972, 974 (10th Cir.1993) (no error in court’s recognition that it could not depart downward simply because it thought the guidelines were unfair and it would have imposed a lighter sentence pre-guidelines); Beckham, 968 F.2d at 54 (“[Sjentences established for various crimes under the guidelines cannot be set aside based merely on their perceived severity.”); United States v. Norflett, 922 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir.1990) (court could not depart from career offender sentence simply because it thought it incommensurate with the crime)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1 F.3d 972, 974",
"parenthetical": "no error in court's recognition that it could not depart downward simply because it thought the guidelines were unfair and it would have imposed a lighter sentence pre-guidelines",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 914 F.2d 959, 964 (7th Cir.1990) (general dissatisfaction with the guidelines does not constitute a reasonable basis for departure); see also United States v. Nguyen, 1 F.3d 972, 974 (10th Cir.1993) (no error in court’s recognition that it could not depart downward simply because it thought the guidelines were unfair and it would have imposed a lighter sentence pre-guidelines); Beckham, 968 F.2d at 54 (“[Sjentences established for various crimes under the guidelines cannot be set aside based merely on their perceived severity.”); United States v. Norflett, 922 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir.1990) (court could not depart from career offender sentence simply because it thought it incommensurate with the crime)."
} | 7,413,178 | a |
This statement does not negate the court's earlier recognition of its ability to depart based on certain factors that it did not find present in this case. Instead, the court acknowledged that it could not depart simply because it thinks the guidelines, as a whole, are too harsh. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "968 F.2d 54, 54",
"parenthetical": "\"[Sjentences established for various crimes under the guidelines cannot be set aside based merely on their perceived severity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 914 F.2d 959, 964 (7th Cir.1990) (general dissatisfaction with the guidelines does not constitute a reasonable basis for departure); see also United States v. Nguyen, 1 F.3d 972, 974 (10th Cir.1993) (no error in court’s recognition that it could not depart downward simply because it thought the guidelines were unfair and it would have imposed a lighter sentence pre-guidelines); Beckham, 968 F.2d at 54 (“[Sjentences established for various crimes under the guidelines cannot be set aside based merely on their perceived severity.”); United States v. Norflett, 922 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir.1990) (court could not depart from career offender sentence simply because it thought it incommensurate with the crime)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "914 F.2d 959, 964",
"parenthetical": "general dissatisfaction with the guidelines does not constitute a reasonable basis for departure",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 914 F.2d 959, 964 (7th Cir.1990) (general dissatisfaction with the guidelines does not constitute a reasonable basis for departure); see also United States v. Nguyen, 1 F.3d 972, 974 (10th Cir.1993) (no error in court’s recognition that it could not depart downward simply because it thought the guidelines were unfair and it would have imposed a lighter sentence pre-guidelines); Beckham, 968 F.2d at 54 (“[Sjentences established for various crimes under the guidelines cannot be set aside based merely on their perceived severity.”); United States v. Norflett, 922 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir.1990) (court could not depart from career offender sentence simply because it thought it incommensurate with the crime)."
} | 7,413,178 | b |
This statement does not negate the court's earlier recognition of its ability to depart based on certain factors that it did not find present in this case. Instead, the court acknowledged that it could not depart simply because it thinks the guidelines, as a whole, are too harsh. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "914 F.2d 959, 964",
"parenthetical": "general dissatisfaction with the guidelines does not constitute a reasonable basis for departure",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 914 F.2d 959, 964 (7th Cir.1990) (general dissatisfaction with the guidelines does not constitute a reasonable basis for departure); see also United States v. Nguyen, 1 F.3d 972, 974 (10th Cir.1993) (no error in court’s recognition that it could not depart downward simply because it thought the guidelines were unfair and it would have imposed a lighter sentence pre-guidelines); Beckham, 968 F.2d at 54 (“[Sjentences established for various crimes under the guidelines cannot be set aside based merely on their perceived severity.”); United States v. Norflett, 922 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir.1990) (court could not depart from career offender sentence simply because it thought it incommensurate with the crime)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "922 F.2d 50, 53",
"parenthetical": "court could not depart from career offender sentence simply because it thought it incommensurate with the crime",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 914 F.2d 959, 964 (7th Cir.1990) (general dissatisfaction with the guidelines does not constitute a reasonable basis for departure); see also United States v. Nguyen, 1 F.3d 972, 974 (10th Cir.1993) (no error in court’s recognition that it could not depart downward simply because it thought the guidelines were unfair and it would have imposed a lighter sentence pre-guidelines); Beckham, 968 F.2d at 54 (“[Sjentences established for various crimes under the guidelines cannot be set aside based merely on their perceived severity.”); United States v. Norflett, 922 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir.1990) (court could not depart from career offender sentence simply because it thought it incommensurate with the crime)."
} | 7,413,178 | a |
Conversely, offenses which are of the same nature, but which do not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and are not provable by the same evidence may not properly be tried together. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Woomer, 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696 (1981) (proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding although prison escapee committed two murders within a few miles of each other and attempted an armed robbery, the trial judge erred in consolidating the charges for one trial where the crimes did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and they required different evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986) (holding although prison escapee committed two murders within a few miles of each other and attempted an armed robbery, the trial judge erred in consolidating the charges for one trial where the crimes did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and they required different evidence); State v. Tate, 286 S.C. 462, 334 S.E.2d 289 (Ct.App.1985) (finding that joint trial on identical but unrelated forgeries violated defendant’s right to a fair trial)."
} | 954,086 | b |
Conversely, offenses which are of the same nature, but which do not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and are not provable by the same evidence may not properly be tried together. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding although prison escapee committed two murders within a few miles of each other and attempted an armed robbery, the trial judge erred in consolidating the charges for one trial where the crimes did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and they required different evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986) (holding although prison escapee committed two murders within a few miles of each other and attempted an armed robbery, the trial judge erred in consolidating the charges for one trial where the crimes did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and they required different evidence); State v. Tate, 286 S.C. 462, 334 S.E.2d 289 (Ct.App.1985) (finding that joint trial on identical but unrelated forgeries violated defendant’s right to a fair trial)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Woomer, 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696 (1981) (proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree)."
} | 954,086 | a |
Conversely, offenses which are of the same nature, but which do not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and are not provable by the same evidence may not properly be tried together. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding although prison escapee committed two murders within a few miles of each other and attempted an armed robbery, the trial judge erred in consolidating the charges for one trial where the crimes did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and they required different evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986) (holding although prison escapee committed two murders within a few miles of each other and attempted an armed robbery, the trial judge erred in consolidating the charges for one trial where the crimes did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and they required different evidence); State v. Tate, 286 S.C. 462, 334 S.E.2d 289 (Ct.App.1985) (finding that joint trial on identical but unrelated forgeries violated defendant’s right to a fair trial)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Woomer, 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696 (1981) (proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree)."
} | 954,086 | a |
Conversely, offenses which are of the same nature, but which do not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and are not provable by the same evidence may not properly be tried together. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Woomer, 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696 (1981) (proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding although prison escapee committed two murders within a few miles of each other and attempted an armed robbery, the trial judge erred in consolidating the charges for one trial where the crimes did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and they required different evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986) (holding although prison escapee committed two murders within a few miles of each other and attempted an armed robbery, the trial judge erred in consolidating the charges for one trial where the crimes did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and they required different evidence); State v. Tate, 286 S.C. 462, 334 S.E.2d 289 (Ct.App.1985) (finding that joint trial on identical but unrelated forgeries violated defendant’s right to a fair trial)."
} | 954,086 | b |
Conversely, offenses which are of the same nature, but which do not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and are not provable by the same evidence may not properly be tried together. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that joint trial on identical but unrelated forgeries violated defendant's right to a fair trial",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986) (holding although prison escapee committed two murders within a few miles of each other and attempted an armed robbery, the trial judge erred in consolidating the charges for one trial where the crimes did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and they required different evidence); State v. Tate, 286 S.C. 462, 334 S.E.2d 289 (Ct.App.1985) (finding that joint trial on identical but unrelated forgeries violated defendant’s right to a fair trial)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Woomer, 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696 (1981) (proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree)."
} | 954,086 | a |
Conversely, offenses which are of the same nature, but which do not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and are not provable by the same evidence may not properly be tried together. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Woomer, 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696 (1981) (proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that joint trial on identical but unrelated forgeries violated defendant's right to a fair trial",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986) (holding although prison escapee committed two murders within a few miles of each other and attempted an armed robbery, the trial judge erred in consolidating the charges for one trial where the crimes did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and they required different evidence); State v. Tate, 286 S.C. 462, 334 S.E.2d 289 (Ct.App.1985) (finding that joint trial on identical but unrelated forgeries violated defendant’s right to a fair trial)."
} | 954,086 | b |
Conversely, offenses which are of the same nature, but which do not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and are not provable by the same evidence may not properly be tried together. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that joint trial on identical but unrelated forgeries violated defendant's right to a fair trial",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986) (holding although prison escapee committed two murders within a few miles of each other and attempted an armed robbery, the trial judge erred in consolidating the charges for one trial where the crimes did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and they required different evidence); State v. Tate, 286 S.C. 462, 334 S.E.2d 289 (Ct.App.1985) (finding that joint trial on identical but unrelated forgeries violated defendant’s right to a fair trial)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Woomer, 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696 (1981) (proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree)."
} | 954,086 | a |
Conversely, offenses which are of the same nature, but which do not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and are not provable by the same evidence may not properly be tried together. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Woomer, 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696 (1981) (proper to try together all crimes arising from a single uninterrupted crime spree)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that joint trial on identical but unrelated forgeries violated defendant's right to a fair trial",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986) (holding although prison escapee committed two murders within a few miles of each other and attempted an armed robbery, the trial judge erred in consolidating the charges for one trial where the crimes did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and they required different evidence); State v. Tate, 286 S.C. 462, 334 S.E.2d 289 (Ct.App.1985) (finding that joint trial on identical but unrelated forgeries violated defendant’s right to a fair trial)."
} | 954,086 | b |
Addressing his sentence, Spratt argues that the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by fashioning a Guidelines sentence based on the drug quantity it found, rather than the drug quantity the jury found. His argument is meritless because the court treated the Guidelines as advisory, rather than mandatory. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "446 F.3d 1348, 1355",
"parenthetical": "holding that there is no Fifth Amendment right to have all facts used to enhance a defendant's Guidelines range charged in the indictment",
"sentence": "United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir.2005); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1304-05 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that the district court was permitted to find conduct that had been acquitted by the jury when determining the defendant’s sentence); see also United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that there is no Fifth Amendment right to have all facts used to enhance a defendant’s Guidelines range charged in the indictment)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "400 F.3d 1297, 1304-05",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court was permitted to find conduct that had been acquitted by the jury when determining the defendant's sentence",
"sentence": "United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir.2005); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1304-05 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that the district court was permitted to find conduct that had been acquitted by the jury when determining the defendant’s sentence); see also United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that there is no Fifth Amendment right to have all facts used to enhance a defendant’s Guidelines range charged in the indictment)."
} | 3,733,567 | b |
This is surely not what the statute intended, and we don't understand the Tax Court or the IRS to say otherwise. Quite to the contrary, both acknowledge that the parentheticals' lower limits apply per spouse -- which is just another way of saying per taxpayer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interpreting the married-person par-entheticals to mean that \"married taxpayers who file separate returns are limited to acquisition indebtedness of $500,000 each \" and \"to home equity indebtedness of $50,000 each \" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Sophy, 138 T.C. at 212 (interpreting the married-person par-entheticals to mean that “married taxpayers who file separate returns are limited to acquisition indebtedness of $500,000 each ” and “to home equity indebtedness of $50,000 each ” (emphasis added)); see also Bronstein v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 382, 386 (2012) (“[T]he parenthetical indebtedness limitations of section 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) and (C)(ii) are $550,000 for each spouse filing a separate return.” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "138 T.C. 382, 386",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he parenthetical indebtedness limitations of section 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) and (C)(ii) are $550,000 for each spouse filing a separate return.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Sophy, 138 T.C. at 212 (interpreting the married-person par-entheticals to mean that “married taxpayers who file separate returns are limited to acquisition indebtedness of $500,000 each ” and “to home equity indebtedness of $50,000 each ” (emphasis added)); see also Bronstein v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 382, 386 (2012) (“[T]he parenthetical indebtedness limitations of section 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) and (C)(ii) are $550,000 for each spouse filing a separate return.” (emphasis added))."
} | 5,768,917 | a |
Given the explicitness Congress has employed with respect to other statutes, Petitioner has not shown that Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in the IRCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because \"person\" is defined to include \"governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions\" and \"employee\" includes individuals \"subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 230, 230-32",
"parenthetical": "no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | 1,852,524 | a |
Given the explicitness Congress has employed with respect to other statutes, Petitioner has not shown that Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in the IRCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because \"person\" is defined to include \"governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions\" and \"employee\" includes individuals \"subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "109 S.Ct. 2401, 2401-03",
"parenthetical": "no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | 1,852,524 | a |
Given the explicitness Congress has employed with respect to other statutes, Petitioner has not shown that Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in the IRCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because \"person\" is defined to include \"governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions\" and \"employee\" includes individuals \"subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "109 S.Ct. 2401, 2401-02",
"parenthetical": "no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | 1,852,524 | a |
Given the explicitness Congress has employed with respect to other statutes, Petitioner has not shown that Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in the IRCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because \"person\" is defined to include \"governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions\" and \"employee\" includes individuals \"subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 230, 230-32",
"parenthetical": "no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | 1,852,524 | a |
Given the explicitness Congress has employed with respect to other statutes, Petitioner has not shown that Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in the IRCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because \"person\" is defined to include \"governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions\" and \"employee\" includes individuals \"subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "109 S.Ct. 2401, 2401-03",
"parenthetical": "no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | 1,852,524 | a |
Given the explicitness Congress has employed with respect to other statutes, Petitioner has not shown that Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in the IRCA. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "109 S.Ct. 2401, 2401-02",
"parenthetical": "no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because \"person\" is defined to include \"governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions\" and \"employee\" includes individuals \"subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | 1,852,524 | b |
Given the explicitness Congress has employed with respect to other statutes, Petitioner has not shown that Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in the IRCA. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 230, 230-32",
"parenthetical": "no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because \"person\" is defined to include \"governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions\" and \"employee\" includes individuals \"subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | 1,852,524 | b |
Given the explicitness Congress has employed with respect to other statutes, Petitioner has not shown that Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in the IRCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because \"person\" is defined to include \"governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions\" and \"employee\" includes individuals \"subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "109 S.Ct. 2401, 2401-03",
"parenthetical": "no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | 1,852,524 | a |
Given the explicitness Congress has employed with respect to other statutes, Petitioner has not shown that Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in the IRCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because \"person\" is defined to include \"governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions\" and \"employee\" includes individuals \"subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "109 S.Ct. 2401, 2401-02",
"parenthetical": "no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 2, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 n. 2, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (Eleventh Amendment abrogated in Title VII cases because “person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions” and “employee” includes individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision”); cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-03 (no abrogation evident in the Education of the Handicapped Act even though it contains frequent references to states). The Court in Dellmuth, at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. at 2401-02, said: “We find it difficult to believe that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.”"
} | 1,852,524 | a |
In light of these legitimate reasons supporting the IJ's findings that Singh testimony was not wholly credible, and that he did not produce sufficient evidence to meet his burden to show past persecution, we cannot conclude that any reasonable adjudicator would find contrary to the IJ's determination concerning Singh's credibility and refugee status. On that same basis, Singh's other claims fail. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "569 F.3d 250, 256-57",
"parenthetical": "IJ's finding, under stricter review of REAL ID Act, that petitioner did not testify credibly \"precludes her from meeting any of these burdens of proof'",
"sentence": "See Bah, 462 F.3d at 643 (“Because Bah cannot show that she qualifies for asylum, she cannot meet the more stringent standards required to qualify for the protections of withholding of removal or under CAT.”); see also El-Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250, 256-57 (6th Cir.2009) (IJ’s finding, under stricter review of REAL ID Act, that petitioner did not testify credibly “precludes her from meeting any of these burdens of proof’)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "462 F.3d 643, 643",
"parenthetical": "\"Because Bah cannot show that she qualifies for asylum, she cannot meet the more stringent standards required to qualify for the protections of withholding of removal or under CAT.\"",
"sentence": "See Bah, 462 F.3d at 643 (“Because Bah cannot show that she qualifies for asylum, she cannot meet the more stringent standards required to qualify for the protections of withholding of removal or under CAT.”); see also El-Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250, 256-57 (6th Cir.2009) (IJ’s finding, under stricter review of REAL ID Act, that petitioner did not testify credibly “precludes her from meeting any of these burdens of proof’)."
} | 5,740,553 | b |
The focus of this analysis is on the relief actually obtained rather than on the success of the legal theories. Thus, as one would deduce from this approach, a plaintiff is a prevailing party to the extent extrajudicial relief makes legal claims moot. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "684 F.2d 1375, 1379",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] party may be considered to be 'prevailing' if the litigation successfully terminates by a consent de cree, an out-of-court-settlement, a voluntary cessation of the unlawful practice by the defendant, or other mooting of the case when the plaintiff has vindicated his right.\"",
"sentence": "See Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312, 1322 (3d Cir.1979) (plaintiffs were prevailing parties because changes in the law had mooted their claims), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 3048, 65 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1980); see also Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1379 (11th Cir.1982) (“[A] party may be considered to be ‘prevailing’ if the litigation successfully terminates by a consent de cree, an out-of-court-settlement, a voluntary cessation of the unlawful practice by the defendant, or other mooting of the case when the plaintiff has vindicated his right.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "598 F.2d 1312, 1322",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs were prevailing parties because changes in the law had mooted their claims",
"sentence": "See Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312, 1322 (3d Cir.1979) (plaintiffs were prevailing parties because changes in the law had mooted their claims), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 3048, 65 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1980); see also Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1379 (11th Cir.1982) (“[A] party may be considered to be ‘prevailing’ if the litigation successfully terminates by a consent de cree, an out-of-court-settlement, a voluntary cessation of the unlawful practice by the defendant, or other mooting of the case when the plaintiff has vindicated his right.”)."
} | 311,702 | b |
The focus of this analysis is on the relief actually obtained rather than on the success of the legal theories. Thus, as one would deduce from this approach, a plaintiff is a prevailing party to the extent extrajudicial relief makes legal claims moot. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs were prevailing parties because changes in the law had mooted their claims",
"sentence": "See Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312, 1322 (3d Cir.1979) (plaintiffs were prevailing parties because changes in the law had mooted their claims), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 3048, 65 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1980); see also Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1379 (11th Cir.1982) (“[A] party may be considered to be ‘prevailing’ if the litigation successfully terminates by a consent de cree, an out-of-court-settlement, a voluntary cessation of the unlawful practice by the defendant, or other mooting of the case when the plaintiff has vindicated his right.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "684 F.2d 1375, 1379",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] party may be considered to be 'prevailing' if the litigation successfully terminates by a consent de cree, an out-of-court-settlement, a voluntary cessation of the unlawful practice by the defendant, or other mooting of the case when the plaintiff has vindicated his right.\"",
"sentence": "See Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312, 1322 (3d Cir.1979) (plaintiffs were prevailing parties because changes in the law had mooted their claims), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 3048, 65 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1980); see also Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1379 (11th Cir.1982) (“[A] party may be considered to be ‘prevailing’ if the litigation successfully terminates by a consent de cree, an out-of-court-settlement, a voluntary cessation of the unlawful practice by the defendant, or other mooting of the case when the plaintiff has vindicated his right.”)."
} | 311,702 | a |
The focus of this analysis is on the relief actually obtained rather than on the success of the legal theories. Thus, as one would deduce from this approach, a plaintiff is a prevailing party to the extent extrajudicial relief makes legal claims moot. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs were prevailing parties because changes in the law had mooted their claims",
"sentence": "See Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312, 1322 (3d Cir.1979) (plaintiffs were prevailing parties because changes in the law had mooted their claims), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 3048, 65 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1980); see also Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1379 (11th Cir.1982) (“[A] party may be considered to be ‘prevailing’ if the litigation successfully terminates by a consent de cree, an out-of-court-settlement, a voluntary cessation of the unlawful practice by the defendant, or other mooting of the case when the plaintiff has vindicated his right.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "684 F.2d 1375, 1379",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] party may be considered to be 'prevailing' if the litigation successfully terminates by a consent de cree, an out-of-court-settlement, a voluntary cessation of the unlawful practice by the defendant, or other mooting of the case when the plaintiff has vindicated his right.\"",
"sentence": "See Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312, 1322 (3d Cir.1979) (plaintiffs were prevailing parties because changes in the law had mooted their claims), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 3048, 65 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1980); see also Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1379 (11th Cir.1982) (“[A] party may be considered to be ‘prevailing’ if the litigation successfully terminates by a consent de cree, an out-of-court-settlement, a voluntary cessation of the unlawful practice by the defendant, or other mooting of the case when the plaintiff has vindicated his right.”)."
} | 311,702 | a |
The focus of this analysis is on the relief actually obtained rather than on the success of the legal theories. Thus, as one would deduce from this approach, a plaintiff is a prevailing party to the extent extrajudicial relief makes legal claims moot. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "684 F.2d 1375, 1379",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] party may be considered to be 'prevailing' if the litigation successfully terminates by a consent de cree, an out-of-court-settlement, a voluntary cessation of the unlawful practice by the defendant, or other mooting of the case when the plaintiff has vindicated his right.\"",
"sentence": "See Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312, 1322 (3d Cir.1979) (plaintiffs were prevailing parties because changes in the law had mooted their claims), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 3048, 65 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1980); see also Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1379 (11th Cir.1982) (“[A] party may be considered to be ‘prevailing’ if the litigation successfully terminates by a consent de cree, an out-of-court-settlement, a voluntary cessation of the unlawful practice by the defendant, or other mooting of the case when the plaintiff has vindicated his right.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs were prevailing parties because changes in the law had mooted their claims",
"sentence": "See Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312, 1322 (3d Cir.1979) (plaintiffs were prevailing parties because changes in the law had mooted their claims), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 3048, 65 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1980); see also Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1379 (11th Cir.1982) (“[A] party may be considered to be ‘prevailing’ if the litigation successfully terminates by a consent de cree, an out-of-court-settlement, a voluntary cessation of the unlawful practice by the defendant, or other mooting of the case when the plaintiff has vindicated his right.”)."
} | 311,702 | b |
Moreover, the January/February, 2000 Confession Date first was articulated here by the Plaintiffs own witness, Denise. Accordingly, this court is not persuaded that the Debtor is playing "fast and loose" with the courts by using the January/February, 2000 Confession Date here. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "563 F.Supp.2d 332, 339",
"parenthetical": "\"Judicial estoppel ... is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.\"",
"sentence": "See also Galin v. I.R.S., 563 F.Supp.2d 332, 339 (D.Conn.2008) (“Judicial estoppel ... is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "219 F.3d 79, 89",
"parenthetical": "\"Judicial estoppel is designed to prevent a party who plays fast and loose with the courts from gaining unfair advantage through the deliberate adoption of inconsistent positions in successive suits.\"",
"sentence": "See Wight v. BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir.2000) (“Judicial estoppel is designed to prevent a party who plays fast and loose with the courts from gaining unfair advantage through the deliberate adoption of inconsistent positions in successive suits.”)."
} | 3,953,175 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "9 Cal.3d 185, 194",
"parenthetical": "holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "9 Cal.3d 185, 194",
"parenthetical": "holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62",
"parenthetical": "holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62",
"parenthetical": "holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891",
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891",
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841",
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841",
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148",
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148",
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "257 N.W.2d 619, 626",
"parenthetical": "holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "257 N.W.2d 619, 626",
"parenthetical": "holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "220 Kan. 341, 345",
"parenthetical": "holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "220 Kan. 341, 345",
"parenthetical": "holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "552 P.2d 931, 936",
"parenthetical": "holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "552 P.2d 931, 936",
"parenthetical": "holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "335 Mass. 555, 565-68",
"parenthetical": "holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "335 Mass. 555, 565-68",
"parenthetical": "holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76",
"parenthetical": "holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76",
"parenthetical": "holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "70 Mich.App. 382, 384",
"parenthetical": "holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "70 Mich.App. 382, 384",
"parenthetical": "holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "246 N.W.2d 6, 7",
"parenthetical": "holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "246 N.W.2d 6, 7",
"parenthetical": "holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "237 Neb. 936, 942",
"parenthetical": "holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "237 Neb. 936, 942",
"parenthetical": "holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "468 N.W.2d 589, 593",
"parenthetical": "holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "468 N.W.2d 589, 593",
"parenthetical": "holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | a |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "750 P.2d 546, 563-65",
"parenthetical": "holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
The rationale of Schad has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "750 P.2d 546, 563-65",
"parenthetical": "holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory",
"sentence": "See People v. Milan, 9 Cal.3d 185, 194, 507 P.2d 956, 959, 961-62 (1973) (holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed first-degree murder); People v. Travis, 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 891, 121 Ill.Dec. 830, 841, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1148 (stating that the jury must be unanimous on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, not on the theory applied), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 590, 125 Ill.Dec. 232, 530 N.E.2d 260 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Iowa 1977) (holding that first-degree murder is one crime, although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976) (holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict .on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of first-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 565-68, 141 N.E.2d 269, 274-76 (1957) (holding that a homicide conviction is acceptable even if the jury does not specify a theory); People v. Embree, 70 Mich.App. 382, 384, 246 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1976) (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder, a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant); State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 942, 468 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1991) (holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed first-degree murder, not on the theory by which it reached the verdict); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 563-65 (Utah 1987) (holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 P.2d 157 (1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder)."
} | 11,680,683 | b |
This provision, by granting the IRS assessment authority, must simultaneously grant the IRS power to decide how to make that assessment -- at least within certain limits. And the courts have consistently held that those limits are not exceeded when the IRS estimates an individual's tax liability -- as long as the method used to make the estimate is a "reasonable" one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "786 F. 2d 1063, 1066",
"parenthetical": "upholding estimate using statistical tables reflecting cost of living where taxpayer lived",
"sentence": "See also Janis, supra, at 437 (upholding estimate of tax liability over 77-day period made by extrapolating information based on gross proceeds from 5-day period); Dodge v. Commissioner, 981 F. 2d 350, 353-354 (CA8 1992) (upholding estimate using bank deposits by taxpayer); Pollard v. Commissioner, 786 F. 2d 1063, 1066 (CA11 1986) (upholding estimate using statistical tables reflecting cost of living where taxpayer lived); Gerardo v. Commissioner, 552 F. 2d 549, 551-552 (CA3 1977) (upholding estimate using extrapolation of income over 1-year period based on gross receipts from two days); Mendelson v. Commissioner, 305 F. 2d 519, 521-522 (CA7 1962) (upholding estimate of waitress’ tip income based on restaurant’s gross receipts and average tips earned by all wait resses employed by restaurant); McQuatters v. Commissioner, 32 TCM 1122 (1973), ¶ 73,240 P-H Memo TC (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "937 F. 2d 1548, 1551",
"parenthetical": "estimate made with reference to taxpayer's purchasing record was \"presumptively correct\" when based on \"reasonable foundation\"",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Erickson v. Commissioner, 937 F. 2d 1548, 1551 (CA10 1991) (estimate made with reference to taxpayer’s purchasing record was “presumptively correct” when based on “reasonable foundation”)."
} | 1,255,073 | b |
This provision, by granting the IRS assessment authority, must simultaneously grant the IRS power to decide how to make that assessment -- at least within certain limits. And the courts have consistently held that those limits are not exceeded when the IRS estimates an individual's tax liability -- as long as the method used to make the estimate is a "reasonable" one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "552 F. 2d 549, 551-552",
"parenthetical": "upholding estimate using extrapolation of income over 1-year period based on gross receipts from two days",
"sentence": "See also Janis, supra, at 437 (upholding estimate of tax liability over 77-day period made by extrapolating information based on gross proceeds from 5-day period); Dodge v. Commissioner, 981 F. 2d 350, 353-354 (CA8 1992) (upholding estimate using bank deposits by taxpayer); Pollard v. Commissioner, 786 F. 2d 1063, 1066 (CA11 1986) (upholding estimate using statistical tables reflecting cost of living where taxpayer lived); Gerardo v. Commissioner, 552 F. 2d 549, 551-552 (CA3 1977) (upholding estimate using extrapolation of income over 1-year period based on gross receipts from two days); Mendelson v. Commissioner, 305 F. 2d 519, 521-522 (CA7 1962) (upholding estimate of waitress’ tip income based on restaurant’s gross receipts and average tips earned by all wait resses employed by restaurant); McQuatters v. Commissioner, 32 TCM 1122 (1973), ¶ 73,240 P-H Memo TC (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "937 F. 2d 1548, 1551",
"parenthetical": "estimate made with reference to taxpayer's purchasing record was \"presumptively correct\" when based on \"reasonable foundation\"",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Erickson v. Commissioner, 937 F. 2d 1548, 1551 (CA10 1991) (estimate made with reference to taxpayer’s purchasing record was “presumptively correct” when based on “reasonable foundation”)."
} | 1,255,073 | b |
This provision, by granting the IRS assessment authority, must simultaneously grant the IRS power to decide how to make that assessment -- at least within certain limits. And the courts have consistently held that those limits are not exceeded when the IRS estimates an individual's tax liability -- as long as the method used to make the estimate is a "reasonable" one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "937 F. 2d 1548, 1551",
"parenthetical": "estimate made with reference to taxpayer's purchasing record was \"presumptively correct\" when based on \"reasonable foundation\"",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Erickson v. Commissioner, 937 F. 2d 1548, 1551 (CA10 1991) (estimate made with reference to taxpayer’s purchasing record was “presumptively correct” when based on “reasonable foundation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "305 F. 2d 519, 521-522",
"parenthetical": "upholding estimate of waitress' tip income based on restaurant's gross receipts and average tips earned by all wait resses employed by restaurant",
"sentence": "See also Janis, supra, at 437 (upholding estimate of tax liability over 77-day period made by extrapolating information based on gross proceeds from 5-day period); Dodge v. Commissioner, 981 F. 2d 350, 353-354 (CA8 1992) (upholding estimate using bank deposits by taxpayer); Pollard v. Commissioner, 786 F. 2d 1063, 1066 (CA11 1986) (upholding estimate using statistical tables reflecting cost of living where taxpayer lived); Gerardo v. Commissioner, 552 F. 2d 549, 551-552 (CA3 1977) (upholding estimate using extrapolation of income over 1-year period based on gross receipts from two days); Mendelson v. Commissioner, 305 F. 2d 519, 521-522 (CA7 1962) (upholding estimate of waitress’ tip income based on restaurant’s gross receipts and average tips earned by all wait resses employed by restaurant); McQuatters v. Commissioner, 32 TCM 1122 (1973), ¶ 73,240 P-H Memo TC (same)."
} | 1,255,073 | a |
Under the last specific factor, the time between the shooting incident and the various pretrial identifications was in no case greater than two months, which is not enough by itself to raise serious questions about reliability. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "797 F.2d 471, 471",
"parenthetical": "two months from incident to identification at suggestive pretrial proceeding and five months from incident to identification at trial did not in the circumstances of the case make the identification inadmissible",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Goodman, 797 F.2d at 471 (two months from incident to identification at suggestive pretrial proceeding and five months from incident to identification at trial did not in the circumstances of the case make the identification inadmissible); cf. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 201, 93 S.Ct. at 383 (lapse of seven months between view of individual at crime and first identification of defendant did not make identification inadmissible)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "409 U.S. 201, 201",
"parenthetical": "lapse of seven months between view of individual at crime and first identification of defendant did not make identification inadmissible",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Goodman, 797 F.2d at 471 (two months from incident to identification at suggestive pretrial proceeding and five months from incident to identification at trial did not in the circumstances of the case make the identification inadmissible); cf. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 201, 93 S.Ct. at 383 (lapse of seven months between view of individual at crime and first identification of defendant did not make identification inadmissible)."
} | 1,684,171 | a |
Under the last specific factor, the time between the shooting incident and the various pretrial identifications was in no case greater than two months, which is not enough by itself to raise serious questions about reliability. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 383, 383",
"parenthetical": "lapse of seven months between view of individual at crime and first identification of defendant did not make identification inadmissible",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Goodman, 797 F.2d at 471 (two months from incident to identification at suggestive pretrial proceeding and five months from incident to identification at trial did not in the circumstances of the case make the identification inadmissible); cf. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 201, 93 S.Ct. at 383 (lapse of seven months between view of individual at crime and first identification of defendant did not make identification inadmissible)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "797 F.2d 471, 471",
"parenthetical": "two months from incident to identification at suggestive pretrial proceeding and five months from incident to identification at trial did not in the circumstances of the case make the identification inadmissible",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Goodman, 797 F.2d at 471 (two months from incident to identification at suggestive pretrial proceeding and five months from incident to identification at trial did not in the circumstances of the case make the identification inadmissible); cf. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 201, 93 S.Ct. at 383 (lapse of seven months between view of individual at crime and first identification of defendant did not make identification inadmissible)."
} | 1,684,171 | b |
The bland "excessive bail" limitation historically defined as "no more than is necessary," is to be contrasted with the strong adjectives attached to "punishments" in the Eighth Amendment, viz. "cruel and unusual." See also, e.g., Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L.Rev. 839, 839-42 (1969) (noting that American framers understood "cruel and unusual" to mean "barbarous," as opposed to "merely excessive."); id. at 843-44 (arguing that, contrary to the interpretation of American framers, before the English Bill of Rights was adopted in 1689, Great Britain had "a general policy against excessive[ ] ... [but] not ... 'barbarous' punishments") (quotation marks omitted). | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "524 U.S. 321, 321-27",
"parenthetical": "applying \"cruel and unusual\" precedents in determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally \"excessive,\" in recognition of the fact that fines are necessarily punitive",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 321-27, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998) (applying “cruel and unusual” precedents in determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally “excessive,” in recognition of the fact that fines are necessarily punitive)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649",
"parenthetical": "\"The [Eighth] Amendment proscribes ... cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (“The [Eighth] Amendment proscribes ... cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.”) (emphasis added; quotation marks omitted)."
} | 4,030,793 | b |
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