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The bland "excessive bail" limitation historically defined as "no more than is necessary," is to be contrasted with the strong adjectives attached to "punishments" in the Eighth Amendment, viz. "cruel and unusual." See also, e.g., Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L.Rev. 839, 839-42 (1969) (noting that American framers understood "cruel and unusual" to mean "barbarous," as opposed to "merely excessive."); id. at 843-44 (arguing that, contrary to the interpretation of American framers, before the English Bill of Rights was adopted in 1689, Great Britain had "a general policy against excessive[ ] ... [but] not ... 'barbarous' punishments") (quotation marks omitted). | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649",
"parenthetical": "\"The [Eighth] Amendment proscribes ... cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (“The [Eighth] Amendment proscribes ... cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.”) (emphasis added; quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"cruel and unusual\" precedents in determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally \"excessive,\" in recognition of the fact that fines are necessarily punitive",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 321-27, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998) (applying “cruel and unusual” precedents in determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally “excessive,” in recognition of the fact that fines are necessarily punitive)."
} | 4,030,793 | a |
The bland "excessive bail" limitation historically defined as "no more than is necessary," is to be contrasted with the strong adjectives attached to "punishments" in the Eighth Amendment, viz. "cruel and unusual." See also, e.g., Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L.Rev. 839, 839-42 (1969) (noting that American framers understood "cruel and unusual" to mean "barbarous," as opposed to "merely excessive."); id. at 843-44 (arguing that, contrary to the interpretation of American framers, before the English Bill of Rights was adopted in 1689, Great Britain had "a general policy against excessive[ ] ... [but] not ... 'barbarous' punishments") (quotation marks omitted). | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649",
"parenthetical": "\"The [Eighth] Amendment proscribes ... cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (“The [Eighth] Amendment proscribes ... cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.”) (emphasis added; quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"cruel and unusual\" precedents in determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally \"excessive,\" in recognition of the fact that fines are necessarily punitive",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 321-27, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998) (applying “cruel and unusual” precedents in determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally “excessive,” in recognition of the fact that fines are necessarily punitive)."
} | 4,030,793 | a |
The bland "excessive bail" limitation historically defined as "no more than is necessary," is to be contrasted with the strong adjectives attached to "punishments" in the Eighth Amendment, viz. "cruel and unusual." See also, e.g., Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L.Rev. 839, 839-42 (1969) (noting that American framers understood "cruel and unusual" to mean "barbarous," as opposed to "merely excessive."); id. at 843-44 (arguing that, contrary to the interpretation of American framers, before the English Bill of Rights was adopted in 1689, Great Britain had "a general policy against excessive[ ] ... [but] not ... 'barbarous' punishments") (quotation marks omitted). | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The [Eighth] Amendment proscribes ... cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (“The [Eighth] Amendment proscribes ... cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.”) (emphasis added; quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "524 U.S. 321, 321-27",
"parenthetical": "applying \"cruel and unusual\" precedents in determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally \"excessive,\" in recognition of the fact that fines are necessarily punitive",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 321-27, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998) (applying “cruel and unusual” precedents in determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally “excessive,” in recognition of the fact that fines are necessarily punitive)."
} | 4,030,793 | a |
The bland "excessive bail" limitation historically defined as "no more than is necessary," is to be contrasted with the strong adjectives attached to "punishments" in the Eighth Amendment, viz. "cruel and unusual." See also, e.g., Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L.Rev. 839, 839-42 (1969) (noting that American framers understood "cruel and unusual" to mean "barbarous," as opposed to "merely excessive."); id. at 843-44 (arguing that, contrary to the interpretation of American framers, before the English Bill of Rights was adopted in 1689, Great Britain had "a general policy against excessive[ ] ... [but] not ... 'barbarous' punishments") (quotation marks omitted). | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"cruel and unusual\" precedents in determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally \"excessive,\" in recognition of the fact that fines are necessarily punitive",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 321-27, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998) (applying “cruel and unusual” precedents in determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally “excessive,” in recognition of the fact that fines are necessarily punitive)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The [Eighth] Amendment proscribes ... cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (“The [Eighth] Amendment proscribes ... cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.”) (emphasis added; quotation marks omitted)."
} | 4,030,793 | b |
The bland "excessive bail" limitation historically defined as "no more than is necessary," is to be contrasted with the strong adjectives attached to "punishments" in the Eighth Amendment, viz. "cruel and unusual." See also, e.g., Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L.Rev. 839, 839-42 (1969) (noting that American framers understood "cruel and unusual" to mean "barbarous," as opposed to "merely excessive."); id. at 843-44 (arguing that, contrary to the interpretation of American framers, before the English Bill of Rights was adopted in 1689, Great Britain had "a general policy against excessive[ ] ... [but] not ... 'barbarous' punishments") (quotation marks omitted). | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The [Eighth] Amendment proscribes ... cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (“The [Eighth] Amendment proscribes ... cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.”) (emphasis added; quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"cruel and unusual\" precedents in determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally \"excessive,\" in recognition of the fact that fines are necessarily punitive",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 321-27, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998) (applying “cruel and unusual” precedents in determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally “excessive,” in recognition of the fact that fines are necessarily punitive)."
} | 4,030,793 | a |
Courts interpreting Rodriguez also equate accuracy with a professional judgment standard. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "398 F.3d 183, 191",
"parenthetical": "overturning jury verdict rendered in favor of person involuntarily committed because jury was not competent to evaluate the professional propriety of the defendant doctors' actions without the assistance of expert testimony",
"sentence": "See Monaco v. Carpinello, 2004 WL 3090598, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jul.22, 2004) (“Monaco III”) (due process requires that involuntary commitment determinations be made in accordance with a standard that must not fall substantially below that which is generally accepted in the medical community) (citing Katzman v. Khan, 67 F.Supp.2d 103, 109-10 (E.D.N.Y.1999)); Fisk v. Letterman, 501 F.Supp.2d 505, 524 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (granting summary judgment on claim that commitment violated right to substantive due process where plaintiff presented no evidence that doctor’s determination that she presented a danger to herself or others fell below generally accepted medical standards); Dove v. City of New York, 2005 WL 2387587, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.28, 2005); see also Olivier v. Robert L. Yeager Mental Health Ctr., 398 F.3d 183, 191 (2d Cir.2005) (overturning jury verdict rendered in favor of person involuntarily committed because jury was not competent to evaluate the professional propriety of the defendant doctors’ actions without the assistance of expert testimony)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 F.Supp.2d 505, 524",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment on claim that commitment violated right to substantive due process where plaintiff presented no evidence that doctor's determination that she presented a danger to herself or others fell below generally accepted medical standards",
"sentence": "See Monaco v. Carpinello, 2004 WL 3090598, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jul.22, 2004) (“Monaco III”) (due process requires that involuntary commitment determinations be made in accordance with a standard that must not fall substantially below that which is generally accepted in the medical community) (citing Katzman v. Khan, 67 F.Supp.2d 103, 109-10 (E.D.N.Y.1999)); Fisk v. Letterman, 501 F.Supp.2d 505, 524 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (granting summary judgment on claim that commitment violated right to substantive due process where plaintiff presented no evidence that doctor’s determination that she presented a danger to herself or others fell below generally accepted medical standards); Dove v. City of New York, 2005 WL 2387587, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.28, 2005); see also Olivier v. Robert L. Yeager Mental Health Ctr., 398 F.3d 183, 191 (2d Cir.2005) (overturning jury verdict rendered in favor of person involuntarily committed because jury was not competent to evaluate the professional propriety of the defendant doctors’ actions without the assistance of expert testimony)."
} | 5,876,579 | b |
Under certain circumstances, a petitioner may be forced to proceed without counsel. This might be warranted if the petitioner were not a minor and had explicitly waived his right to counsel, or delayed the hearing in bad faith, or sat on his right to obtain counsel. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "783 F.2d 1463, 1470",
"parenthetical": "finding no due process violation where adult alien's \"failure to obtain counsel after four months and two continuances makes apparent that he simply was unable to secure counsel at his own expense.\"",
"sentence": "See Colindres-Aguilar v. INS, 819 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.1987) (finding due process violation where without questioning him IJ deemed alien who had received previous continuance to obtain counsel to be proceeding pro se when he showed up at reconvened hearing without his new counsel); Castro-Nuno v. INS, 577 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir.1978) (finding abuse of discretion and noting absence of indication that alien was delaying hearing in bad faith in not yet having obtained counsel); cf. Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir.1986) (finding no due process violation where adult alien’s “failure to obtain counsel after four months and two continuances makes apparent that he simply was unable to secure counsel at his own expense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding due process violation where without questioning him IJ deemed alien who had received previous continuance to obtain counsel to be proceeding pro se when he showed up at reconvened hearing without his new counsel",
"sentence": "See Colindres-Aguilar v. INS, 819 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.1987) (finding due process violation where without questioning him IJ deemed alien who had received previous continuance to obtain counsel to be proceeding pro se when he showed up at reconvened hearing without his new counsel); Castro-Nuno v. INS, 577 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir.1978) (finding abuse of discretion and noting absence of indication that alien was delaying hearing in bad faith in not yet having obtained counsel); cf. Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir.1986) (finding no due process violation where adult alien’s “failure to obtain counsel after four months and two continuances makes apparent that he simply was unable to secure counsel at his own expense.”)."
} | 9,216,106 | b |
Under certain circumstances, a petitioner may be forced to proceed without counsel. This might be warranted if the petitioner were not a minor and had explicitly waived his right to counsel, or delayed the hearing in bad faith, or sat on his right to obtain counsel. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "577 F.2d 577, 579",
"parenthetical": "finding abuse of discretion and noting absence of indication that alien was delaying hearing in bad faith in not yet having obtained counsel",
"sentence": "See Colindres-Aguilar v. INS, 819 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.1987) (finding due process violation where without questioning him IJ deemed alien who had received previous continuance to obtain counsel to be proceeding pro se when he showed up at reconvened hearing without his new counsel); Castro-Nuno v. INS, 577 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir.1978) (finding abuse of discretion and noting absence of indication that alien was delaying hearing in bad faith in not yet having obtained counsel); cf. Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir.1986) (finding no due process violation where adult alien’s “failure to obtain counsel after four months and two continuances makes apparent that he simply was unable to secure counsel at his own expense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "783 F.2d 1463, 1470",
"parenthetical": "finding no due process violation where adult alien's \"failure to obtain counsel after four months and two continuances makes apparent that he simply was unable to secure counsel at his own expense.\"",
"sentence": "See Colindres-Aguilar v. INS, 819 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.1987) (finding due process violation where without questioning him IJ deemed alien who had received previous continuance to obtain counsel to be proceeding pro se when he showed up at reconvened hearing without his new counsel); Castro-Nuno v. INS, 577 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir.1978) (finding abuse of discretion and noting absence of indication that alien was delaying hearing in bad faith in not yet having obtained counsel); cf. Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir.1986) (finding no due process violation where adult alien’s “failure to obtain counsel after four months and two continuances makes apparent that he simply was unable to secure counsel at his own expense.”)."
} | 9,216,106 | a |
This Court's earlier assertion that it retained habeas jurisdiction over Fierro's claim, however, did not address the fact that his claim is governed by the permanent, rather than the transitional, rules established by the AEDPA and the IIRI-RA. Under the transitional rules, certain categories of deportees were afforded no judicial review whatsoever, a legal scheme whose dubious constitutionality caused the First Circuit to rule that habeas jurisdiction still existed in the federal district court under the transitional rules. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "76 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1062",
"parenthetical": "\"Under the AEDPA and IIRIRA the appropriate forum for petitioner's challenge to his final deportation is not the district court but the court of appeals.\"",
"sentence": "See Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 122. Under the permanent rules, however, deportees such as Fierro may seek review of their claims in the Court of Appeals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A); Rosas-Paniaqua v. Reno, 76 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1062 (N.D.Cal.1999) (“Under the AEDPA and IIRIRA the appropriate forum for petitioner’s challenge to his final deportation is not the district court but the court of appeals.”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Whether that distinction between the transitional and permanent rules will satisfy the First Circuit’s constitutional concerns about withdrawal of habeas jurisdiction remains to be seen. See Prado v. Reno, 198 F.3d 286, 287 (1st Cir.1999) (noting that “[m]uch of the logic of our analysis” for jurisdictional issues under transitional rules applies under permanent rules as well). Neither party in this case has addressed the issue."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "198 F.3d 286, 287",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[m]uch of the logic of our analysis\" for jurisdictional issues under transitional rules applies under permanent rules as well",
"sentence": "See Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 122. Under the permanent rules, however, deportees such as Fierro may seek review of their claims in the Court of Appeals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A); Rosas-Paniaqua v. Reno, 76 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1062 (N.D.Cal.1999) (“Under the AEDPA and IIRIRA the appropriate forum for petitioner’s challenge to his final deportation is not the district court but the court of appeals.”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Whether that distinction between the transitional and permanent rules will satisfy the First Circuit’s constitutional concerns about withdrawal of habeas jurisdiction remains to be seen. See Prado v. Reno, 198 F.3d 286, 287 (1st Cir.1999) (noting that “[m]uch of the logic of our analysis” for jurisdictional issues under transitional rules applies under permanent rules as well). Neither party in this case has addressed the issue."
} | 11,478,679 | a |
We review the Commission's findings of fact for substantial evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court 'if supported by substantial evidence.' \"",
"sentence": "See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981) (“Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78y, 80a-42, and 80b-13); 15 U.S.C. § 77i (“The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.”); see also Steadman, 450 U.S. at 96, 101 S.Ct. 999 (securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "450 U.S. 96, 96",
"parenthetical": "securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings",
"sentence": "See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981) (“Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78y, 80a-42, and 80b-13); 15 U.S.C. § 77i (“The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.”); see also Steadman, 450 U.S. at 96, 101 S.Ct. 999 (securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings)."
} | 11,457,488 | a |
We review the Commission's findings of fact for substantial evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings",
"sentence": "See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981) (“Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78y, 80a-42, and 80b-13); 15 U.S.C. § 77i (“The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.”); see also Steadman, 450 U.S. at 96, 101 S.Ct. 999 (securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court 'if supported by substantial evidence.' \"",
"sentence": "See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981) (“Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78y, 80a-42, and 80b-13); 15 U.S.C. § 77i (“The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.”); see also Steadman, 450 U.S. at 96, 101 S.Ct. 999 (securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings)."
} | 11,457,488 | b |
We review the Commission's findings of fact for substantial evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court 'if supported by substantial evidence.' \"",
"sentence": "See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981) (“Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78y, 80a-42, and 80b-13); 15 U.S.C. § 77i (“The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.”); see also Steadman, 450 U.S. at 96, 101 S.Ct. 999 (securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "450 U.S. 96, 96",
"parenthetical": "securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings",
"sentence": "See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981) (“Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78y, 80a-42, and 80b-13); 15 U.S.C. § 77i (“The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.”); see also Steadman, 450 U.S. at 96, 101 S.Ct. 999 (securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings)."
} | 11,457,488 | a |
We review the Commission's findings of fact for substantial evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court 'if supported by substantial evidence.' \"",
"sentence": "See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981) (“Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78y, 80a-42, and 80b-13); 15 U.S.C. § 77i (“The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.”); see also Steadman, 450 U.S. at 96, 101 S.Ct. 999 (securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings",
"sentence": "See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981) (“Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78y, 80a-42, and 80b-13); 15 U.S.C. § 77i (“The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.”); see also Steadman, 450 U.S. at 96, 101 S.Ct. 999 (securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings)."
} | 11,457,488 | a |
We review the Commission's findings of fact for substantial evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court 'if supported by substantial evidence.' \"",
"sentence": "See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981) (“Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78y, 80a-42, and 80b-13); 15 U.S.C. § 77i (“The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.”); see also Steadman, 450 U.S. at 96, 101 S.Ct. 999 (securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "450 U.S. 96, 96",
"parenthetical": "securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings",
"sentence": "See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981) (“Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78y, 80a-42, and 80b-13); 15 U.S.C. § 77i (“The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.”); see also Steadman, 450 U.S. at 96, 101 S.Ct. 999 (securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings)."
} | 11,457,488 | a |
We review the Commission's findings of fact for substantial evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings",
"sentence": "See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981) (“Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78y, 80a-42, and 80b-13); 15 U.S.C. § 77i (“The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.”); see also Steadman, 450 U.S. at 96, 101 S.Ct. 999 (securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court 'if supported by substantial evidence.' \"",
"sentence": "See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981) (“Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78y, 80a-42, and 80b-13); 15 U.S.C. § 77i (“The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.”); see also Steadman, 450 U.S. at 96, 101 S.Ct. 999 (securities laws provide scope of judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings)."
} | 11,457,488 | b |
Jones acknowledges that the Veterans Court's interim orders are treated like remand orders and are generally not reviewable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "256 F.3d 1318, 1320",
"parenthetical": "\"In applying the statute that grants us jurisdiction over appeals from the Veterans Court, we have generally declined to review non-final orders of the Veterans Court.\"",
"sentence": "See Adams v. Principi, 256 F.3d 1318, 1320 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“In applying the statute that grants us jurisdiction over appeals from the Veterans Court, we have generally declined to review non-final orders of the Veterans Court.”); see also Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945) (finding that an “order is final only when it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute judgment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "324 U.S. 229, 233",
"parenthetical": "finding that an \"order is final only when it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute judgment\"",
"sentence": "See Adams v. Principi, 256 F.3d 1318, 1320 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“In applying the statute that grants us jurisdiction over appeals from the Veterans Court, we have generally declined to review non-final orders of the Veterans Court.”); see also Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945) (finding that an “order is final only when it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute judgment”)."
} | 1,618,088 | a |
Jones acknowledges that the Veterans Court's interim orders are treated like remand orders and are generally not reviewable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "256 F.3d 1318, 1320",
"parenthetical": "\"In applying the statute that grants us jurisdiction over appeals from the Veterans Court, we have generally declined to review non-final orders of the Veterans Court.\"",
"sentence": "See Adams v. Principi, 256 F.3d 1318, 1320 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“In applying the statute that grants us jurisdiction over appeals from the Veterans Court, we have generally declined to review non-final orders of the Veterans Court.”); see also Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945) (finding that an “order is final only when it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute judgment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that an \"order is final only when it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute judgment\"",
"sentence": "See Adams v. Principi, 256 F.3d 1318, 1320 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“In applying the statute that grants us jurisdiction over appeals from the Veterans Court, we have generally declined to review non-final orders of the Veterans Court.”); see also Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945) (finding that an “order is final only when it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute judgment”)."
} | 1,618,088 | a |
Jones acknowledges that the Veterans Court's interim orders are treated like remand orders and are generally not reviewable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "256 F.3d 1318, 1320",
"parenthetical": "\"In applying the statute that grants us jurisdiction over appeals from the Veterans Court, we have generally declined to review non-final orders of the Veterans Court.\"",
"sentence": "See Adams v. Principi, 256 F.3d 1318, 1320 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“In applying the statute that grants us jurisdiction over appeals from the Veterans Court, we have generally declined to review non-final orders of the Veterans Court.”); see also Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945) (finding that an “order is final only when it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute judgment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that an \"order is final only when it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute judgment\"",
"sentence": "See Adams v. Principi, 256 F.3d 1318, 1320 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“In applying the statute that grants us jurisdiction over appeals from the Veterans Court, we have generally declined to review non-final orders of the Veterans Court.”); see also Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945) (finding that an “order is final only when it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute judgment”)."
} | 1,618,088 | a |
However, "we do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's business decisions"; rather, "our inquiry is limited to whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior." In light of Leveridge's lengthy employment history, including her time working as an accountant for the City of Philadelphia and in the accounting department for South western Bell, we see no basis for a reasonable juror to conclude that the defendants did not actually believe that Leveridge satisfied the experience requirement. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "496 F.3d 703, 708",
"parenthetical": "concluding that defendant was entitled to summary judgment when the plaintiffs \"evidence at most show[ed] that the evaluators could have given him somewhat higher scores and [his competitor] somewhat ' lower scores than they did\"",
"sentence": "See Jones, 198 F.3d at 414. (\"While Jones may quarrel with the school district’s conclusions regarding particular controversies, the bona fides of its determinations simply cannot be doubted.”); cf. Jackson v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 703, 708 (D.C.Cir.2007) (concluding that defendant was entitled to summary judgment when the plaintiffs “evidence at most show[ed] that the evaluators could have given him somewhat higher scores and [his competitor] somewhat ' lower scores than they did”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "198 F.3d 414, 414",
"parenthetical": "\"While Jones may quarrel with the school district's conclusions regarding particular controversies, the bona fides of its determinations simply cannot be doubted.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones, 198 F.3d at 414. (\"While Jones may quarrel with the school district’s conclusions regarding particular controversies, the bona fides of its determinations simply cannot be doubted.”); cf. Jackson v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 703, 708 (D.C.Cir.2007) (concluding that defendant was entitled to summary judgment when the plaintiffs “evidence at most show[ed] that the evaluators could have given him somewhat higher scores and [his competitor] somewhat ' lower scores than they did”)."
} | 4,354,919 | b |
Having established the basis of our jurisdiction, we turn to the three issues the Property Owners have raised on appeal. We first address whether the district court erred in concluding that the Easements have not terminated or been extinguished pursuant to the reversionary language contained in the right-of-way deeds. Our review of this issue is governed by Wyoming state law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "788 F.2d 1433, 1435",
"parenthetical": "\"Absent controlling federal legislation or rule of law, questions involving real property rights are determined under state law, even when the United States is a party.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dunn, 557 F.3d 1165, 1172 n. 5 (10th Cir.2009) (“Deeds are a type of contract, and this court presumptively applies state law when interpreting contracts.”); Rio Grande, 599 F.3d at 1177 (“[Questions involving ownership, transfer, and title to real estate have traditionally been resolved according to the laws of the state where the realty is located.” (quotations omitted)); see also United States v. O’Block, 788 F.2d 1433, 1435 (10th Cir.1986) (“Absent controlling federal legislation or rule of law, questions involving real property rights are determined under state law, even when the United States is a party.” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Deeds are a type of contract, and this court presumptively applies state law when interpreting contracts.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dunn, 557 F.3d 1165, 1172 n. 5 (10th Cir.2009) (“Deeds are a type of contract, and this court presumptively applies state law when interpreting contracts.”); Rio Grande, 599 F.3d at 1177 (“[Questions involving ownership, transfer, and title to real estate have traditionally been resolved according to the laws of the state where the realty is located.” (quotations omitted)); see also United States v. O’Block, 788 F.2d 1433, 1435 (10th Cir.1986) (“Absent controlling federal legislation or rule of law, questions involving real property rights are determined under state law, even when the United States is a party.” (emphasis added))."
} | 4,117,475 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state allowed to appeal from intermediate court's award of new trial to defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state allowed to appeal from intermediate court's award of new trial to defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state allowed to appeal from intermediate court's award of new trial to defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state allowed to appeal from intermediate court's award of new trial to defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state allowed to appeal from intermediate court's award of new trial to defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state allowed to appeal from intermediate court's award of new trial to defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state allowed to appeal from intermediate court's award of new trial to defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state allowed to appeal from intermediate court's award of new trial to defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state allowed to appeal from intermediate court's award of new trial to defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | 1,820,945 | a |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
I suggest, however, that the distinction between "mere modes of procedure" and substantial or vital procedural protections is a wobbly one under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. One other early case seems squarely to hold that a procedural change in state law violated the ex post facto clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant",
"sentence": "See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (change in role of Florida juries in death penalty cases); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (defendant forced to undergo joint rather than separate trial for crime); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 21 S.Ct. 730, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (state allowed to appeal from intermediate court’s award of new trial to defendant); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (prior to second trial, law was changed to make circumstantial evidence admissible against defendant and he was convicted); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) (change in juror qualifications); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (change to allow convicted felon to testify as a witness against defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause",
"sentence": "Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) (change in the law applicable to guilty pleas, which exposed defendant to conviction for a more serious crime, and operated retroactively, violated ex post facto clause), A number of other decisions have found no ex post facto violation in retroactive “procedural” changes."
} | 1,820,945 | b |
Count I. The first allegedly false representation is Cumberland's argument in the demurrer that the usury counterclaim was too vague to answer and failed to state a claim. Penn alleges that the usury claim was neither too vague to answer nor did it fail to state a claim, as demonstrated by the fact that the demurrer was overruled and that Cumberland knew or should have known what interest was charged on the debt and therefore had the necessary information. Although the demurrer was overruled, that alone does not make Cumberland's legal argument false. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 296, 296",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e do not see how the fact that a lawsuit turns out ultimately to be unsuccessful could, by itself, make the bringing of it an 'action that cannot legally be taken.' \"",
"sentence": "See also Heintz, 514 U.S. at 296, 115 S.Ct. 1489 (“[W]e do not see how the fact that a lawsuit turns out ultimately to be unsuccessful could, by itself, make the bringing of it an ‘action that cannot legally be taken.’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "674 F.3d 819, 819",
"parenthetical": "nothing false or misleading about attorney filing an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Hemmingsen, 674 F.3d at 819 (nothing false or misleading about attorney filing an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment)."
} | 4,313,211 | b |
Count I. The first allegedly false representation is Cumberland's argument in the demurrer that the usury counterclaim was too vague to answer and failed to state a claim. Penn alleges that the usury claim was neither too vague to answer nor did it fail to state a claim, as demonstrated by the fact that the demurrer was overruled and that Cumberland knew or should have known what interest was charged on the debt and therefore had the necessary information. Although the demurrer was overruled, that alone does not make Cumberland's legal argument false. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "674 F.3d 819, 819",
"parenthetical": "nothing false or misleading about attorney filing an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Hemmingsen, 674 F.3d at 819 (nothing false or misleading about attorney filing an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e do not see how the fact that a lawsuit turns out ultimately to be unsuccessful could, by itself, make the bringing of it an 'action that cannot legally be taken.' \"",
"sentence": "See also Heintz, 514 U.S. at 296, 115 S.Ct. 1489 (“[W]e do not see how the fact that a lawsuit turns out ultimately to be unsuccessful could, by itself, make the bringing of it an ‘action that cannot legally be taken.’ ”)."
} | 4,313,211 | a |
Specifically, Fayemi alleges that Pucinski acted with "deliberate indifference in not allowing Plaintiff to seek redress in the state court because she was the one to file the claim herself and she refused to" file that claim. (Pl.'s Compl., Statement of Claim at P 3.) Further, while in general he refers to the "clerk" as the person he spoke with in conjunction with obtaining his refunded bail money, he does refer to the clerk as a "she" in his prayer for relief: "Plaintiff wants the defendant to pay him ... for the money she carelessly gave away without Plaintiffs authorization.... " (Pl.'s Cpmpl., Relief at P 1.) Thus, the court finds that Fayemi has sufficiently pleaded a SS 1983 claim against Pucinski in her individual capacity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "927 F.Supp. 1087, 1087-88",
"parenthetical": "finding that plaintiff properly pleaded an individual-capacity claim by alleging that defendant, Pucinski, knew for the problems but did nothing",
"sentence": "See McMurry, 927 F.Supp. at 1087-88 (finding that plaintiff properly pleaded an individual-capacity claim by alleging that defendant, Pucinski, knew for the problems but did nothing); Carroll v. Pucinski, No. 91 C 3210, 1992 WL 59126, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16, 1992) (finding that Pucinski’s official position as Clerk is sufficient to permit an inference of personal involvement until such time as she comes forward and identifies those persons who failed to process plaintiffs papers)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2000 WL 574682, at *4",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff did not properly plead an individual-capacity claim because she did not allege that defendant Pucinski entered the incorrect information herself",
"sentence": "Cf. Farrar, 2000 WL 574682, at *4 (holding that plaintiff did not properly plead an individual-capacity claim because she did not allege that defendant Pucinski entered the incorrect information herself)."
} | 9,496,267 | a |
Specifically, Fayemi alleges that Pucinski acted with "deliberate indifference in not allowing Plaintiff to seek redress in the state court because she was the one to file the claim herself and she refused to" file that claim. (Pl.'s Compl., Statement of Claim at P 3.) Further, while in general he refers to the "clerk" as the person he spoke with in conjunction with obtaining his refunded bail money, he does refer to the clerk as a "she" in his prayer for relief: "Plaintiff wants the defendant to pay him ... for the money she carelessly gave away without Plaintiffs authorization.... " (Pl.'s Cpmpl., Relief at P 1.) Thus, the court finds that Fayemi has sufficiently pleaded a SS 1983 claim against Pucinski in her individual capacity. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2000 WL 574682, at *4",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff did not properly plead an individual-capacity claim because she did not allege that defendant Pucinski entered the incorrect information herself",
"sentence": "Cf. Farrar, 2000 WL 574682, at *4 (holding that plaintiff did not properly plead an individual-capacity claim because she did not allege that defendant Pucinski entered the incorrect information herself)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1992 WL 59126, at *2",
"parenthetical": "finding that Pucinski's official position as Clerk is sufficient to permit an inference of personal involvement until such time as she comes forward and identifies those persons who failed to process plaintiffs papers",
"sentence": "See McMurry, 927 F.Supp. at 1087-88 (finding that plaintiff properly pleaded an individual-capacity claim by alleging that defendant, Pucinski, knew for the problems but did nothing); Carroll v. Pucinski, No. 91 C 3210, 1992 WL 59126, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16, 1992) (finding that Pucinski’s official position as Clerk is sufficient to permit an inference of personal involvement until such time as she comes forward and identifies those persons who failed to process plaintiffs papers)."
} | 9,496,267 | b |
Thirty-seven states have judges elected in some manner. Recusal for involvement in a judge's campaign has rarely been found to be required. In fact, the writer has found no case in which recusal was required solely for campaign activity other than where there was substantial involvement with a campaign then underway. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Recusal not required for reason that lawyers involved had contributed \"many thousands\" of dollars to the judges' campaigns.",
"sentence": "But see, Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 later proceeding 676 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.App.1983) (Recusal not required for reason that lawyers involved had contributed “many thousands” of dollars to the judges’ campaigns.); Keane v. Andrews, 555 So.2d 940 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal not required because of financial contribution to judge’s campaign.); Gluth Bros. Constr. Inc. v. Union Nat. Bank, 192 Ill.App.3d 649, 139 Ill.Dec. 650, 548 N.E.2d 1364 appl. den. 131 Ill.2d 559, 142 Ill.Dec. 881, 553 N.E.2d 395 (1989) (Counsel’s service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 105 Nev. 237, 774 P.2d 1003 (1989) (Attorney’s service as co-chairman of campaign in past insufficient grounds for recusal)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee",
"sentence": "See, Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla.App.1986) (Ongoing campaign, judge disqualified.); Barber v. MacKenzie, 562 So.2d 755 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee)."
} | 7,421,892 | b |
Thirty-seven states have judges elected in some manner. Recusal for involvement in a judge's campaign has rarely been found to be required. In fact, the writer has found no case in which recusal was required solely for campaign activity other than where there was substantial involvement with a campaign then underway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee",
"sentence": "See, Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla.App.1986) (Ongoing campaign, judge disqualified.); Barber v. MacKenzie, 562 So.2d 755 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Recusal not required for reason that lawyers involved had contributed \"many thousands\" of dollars to the judges' campaigns.",
"sentence": "But see, Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 later proceeding 676 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.App.1983) (Recusal not required for reason that lawyers involved had contributed “many thousands” of dollars to the judges’ campaigns.); Keane v. Andrews, 555 So.2d 940 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal not required because of financial contribution to judge’s campaign.); Gluth Bros. Constr. Inc. v. Union Nat. Bank, 192 Ill.App.3d 649, 139 Ill.Dec. 650, 548 N.E.2d 1364 appl. den. 131 Ill.2d 559, 142 Ill.Dec. 881, 553 N.E.2d 395 (1989) (Counsel’s service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 105 Nev. 237, 774 P.2d 1003 (1989) (Attorney’s service as co-chairman of campaign in past insufficient grounds for recusal)."
} | 7,421,892 | a |
Thirty-seven states have judges elected in some manner. Recusal for involvement in a judge's campaign has rarely been found to be required. In fact, the writer has found no case in which recusal was required solely for campaign activity other than where there was substantial involvement with a campaign then underway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee",
"sentence": "See, Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla.App.1986) (Ongoing campaign, judge disqualified.); Barber v. MacKenzie, 562 So.2d 755 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Recusal not required because of financial contribution to judge's campaign.",
"sentence": "But see, Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 later proceeding 676 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.App.1983) (Recusal not required for reason that lawyers involved had contributed “many thousands” of dollars to the judges’ campaigns.); Keane v. Andrews, 555 So.2d 940 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal not required because of financial contribution to judge’s campaign.); Gluth Bros. Constr. Inc. v. Union Nat. Bank, 192 Ill.App.3d 649, 139 Ill.Dec. 650, 548 N.E.2d 1364 appl. den. 131 Ill.2d 559, 142 Ill.Dec. 881, 553 N.E.2d 395 (1989) (Counsel’s service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 105 Nev. 237, 774 P.2d 1003 (1989) (Attorney’s service as co-chairman of campaign in past insufficient grounds for recusal)."
} | 7,421,892 | a |
Thirty-seven states have judges elected in some manner. Recusal for involvement in a judge's campaign has rarely been found to be required. In fact, the writer has found no case in which recusal was required solely for campaign activity other than where there was substantial involvement with a campaign then underway. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Counsel's service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.",
"sentence": "But see, Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 later proceeding 676 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.App.1983) (Recusal not required for reason that lawyers involved had contributed “many thousands” of dollars to the judges’ campaigns.); Keane v. Andrews, 555 So.2d 940 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal not required because of financial contribution to judge’s campaign.); Gluth Bros. Constr. Inc. v. Union Nat. Bank, 192 Ill.App.3d 649, 139 Ill.Dec. 650, 548 N.E.2d 1364 appl. den. 131 Ill.2d 559, 142 Ill.Dec. 881, 553 N.E.2d 395 (1989) (Counsel’s service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 105 Nev. 237, 774 P.2d 1003 (1989) (Attorney’s service as co-chairman of campaign in past insufficient grounds for recusal)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee",
"sentence": "See, Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla.App.1986) (Ongoing campaign, judge disqualified.); Barber v. MacKenzie, 562 So.2d 755 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee)."
} | 7,421,892 | b |
Thirty-seven states have judges elected in some manner. Recusal for involvement in a judge's campaign has rarely been found to be required. In fact, the writer has found no case in which recusal was required solely for campaign activity other than where there was substantial involvement with a campaign then underway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee",
"sentence": "See, Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla.App.1986) (Ongoing campaign, judge disqualified.); Barber v. MacKenzie, 562 So.2d 755 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Counsel's service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.",
"sentence": "But see, Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 later proceeding 676 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.App.1983) (Recusal not required for reason that lawyers involved had contributed “many thousands” of dollars to the judges’ campaigns.); Keane v. Andrews, 555 So.2d 940 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal not required because of financial contribution to judge’s campaign.); Gluth Bros. Constr. Inc. v. Union Nat. Bank, 192 Ill.App.3d 649, 139 Ill.Dec. 650, 548 N.E.2d 1364 appl. den. 131 Ill.2d 559, 142 Ill.Dec. 881, 553 N.E.2d 395 (1989) (Counsel’s service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 105 Nev. 237, 774 P.2d 1003 (1989) (Attorney’s service as co-chairman of campaign in past insufficient grounds for recusal)."
} | 7,421,892 | a |
Thirty-seven states have judges elected in some manner. Recusal for involvement in a judge's campaign has rarely been found to be required. In fact, the writer has found no case in which recusal was required solely for campaign activity other than where there was substantial involvement with a campaign then underway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee",
"sentence": "See, Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla.App.1986) (Ongoing campaign, judge disqualified.); Barber v. MacKenzie, 562 So.2d 755 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Counsel's service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.",
"sentence": "But see, Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 later proceeding 676 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.App.1983) (Recusal not required for reason that lawyers involved had contributed “many thousands” of dollars to the judges’ campaigns.); Keane v. Andrews, 555 So.2d 940 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal not required because of financial contribution to judge’s campaign.); Gluth Bros. Constr. Inc. v. Union Nat. Bank, 192 Ill.App.3d 649, 139 Ill.Dec. 650, 548 N.E.2d 1364 appl. den. 131 Ill.2d 559, 142 Ill.Dec. 881, 553 N.E.2d 395 (1989) (Counsel’s service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 105 Nev. 237, 774 P.2d 1003 (1989) (Attorney’s service as co-chairman of campaign in past insufficient grounds for recusal)."
} | 7,421,892 | a |
Thirty-seven states have judges elected in some manner. Recusal for involvement in a judge's campaign has rarely been found to be required. In fact, the writer has found no case in which recusal was required solely for campaign activity other than where there was substantial involvement with a campaign then underway. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Counsel's service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.",
"sentence": "But see, Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 later proceeding 676 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.App.1983) (Recusal not required for reason that lawyers involved had contributed “many thousands” of dollars to the judges’ campaigns.); Keane v. Andrews, 555 So.2d 940 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal not required because of financial contribution to judge’s campaign.); Gluth Bros. Constr. Inc. v. Union Nat. Bank, 192 Ill.App.3d 649, 139 Ill.Dec. 650, 548 N.E.2d 1364 appl. den. 131 Ill.2d 559, 142 Ill.Dec. 881, 553 N.E.2d 395 (1989) (Counsel’s service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 105 Nev. 237, 774 P.2d 1003 (1989) (Attorney’s service as co-chairman of campaign in past insufficient grounds for recusal)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee",
"sentence": "See, Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla.App.1986) (Ongoing campaign, judge disqualified.); Barber v. MacKenzie, 562 So.2d 755 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee)."
} | 7,421,892 | b |
Thirty-seven states have judges elected in some manner. Recusal for involvement in a judge's campaign has rarely been found to be required. In fact, the writer has found no case in which recusal was required solely for campaign activity other than where there was substantial involvement with a campaign then underway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee",
"sentence": "See, Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla.App.1986) (Ongoing campaign, judge disqualified.); Barber v. MacKenzie, 562 So.2d 755 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Counsel's service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.",
"sentence": "But see, Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 later proceeding 676 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.App.1983) (Recusal not required for reason that lawyers involved had contributed “many thousands” of dollars to the judges’ campaigns.); Keane v. Andrews, 555 So.2d 940 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal not required because of financial contribution to judge’s campaign.); Gluth Bros. Constr. Inc. v. Union Nat. Bank, 192 Ill.App.3d 649, 139 Ill.Dec. 650, 548 N.E.2d 1364 appl. den. 131 Ill.2d 559, 142 Ill.Dec. 881, 553 N.E.2d 395 (1989) (Counsel’s service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 105 Nev. 237, 774 P.2d 1003 (1989) (Attorney’s service as co-chairman of campaign in past insufficient grounds for recusal)."
} | 7,421,892 | a |
Thirty-seven states have judges elected in some manner. Recusal for involvement in a judge's campaign has rarely been found to be required. In fact, the writer has found no case in which recusal was required solely for campaign activity other than where there was substantial involvement with a campaign then underway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee",
"sentence": "See, Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla.App.1986) (Ongoing campaign, judge disqualified.); Barber v. MacKenzie, 562 So.2d 755 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Counsel's service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.",
"sentence": "But see, Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 later proceeding 676 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.App.1983) (Recusal not required for reason that lawyers involved had contributed “many thousands” of dollars to the judges’ campaigns.); Keane v. Andrews, 555 So.2d 940 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal not required because of financial contribution to judge’s campaign.); Gluth Bros. Constr. Inc. v. Union Nat. Bank, 192 Ill.App.3d 649, 139 Ill.Dec. 650, 548 N.E.2d 1364 appl. den. 131 Ill.2d 559, 142 Ill.Dec. 881, 553 N.E.2d 395 (1989) (Counsel’s service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 105 Nev. 237, 774 P.2d 1003 (1989) (Attorney’s service as co-chairman of campaign in past insufficient grounds for recusal)."
} | 7,421,892 | a |
Thirty-seven states have judges elected in some manner. Recusal for involvement in a judge's campaign has rarely been found to be required. In fact, the writer has found no case in which recusal was required solely for campaign activity other than where there was substantial involvement with a campaign then underway. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Attorney's service as co-chairman of campaign in past insufficient grounds for recusal",
"sentence": "But see, Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 later proceeding 676 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.App.1983) (Recusal not required for reason that lawyers involved had contributed “many thousands” of dollars to the judges’ campaigns.); Keane v. Andrews, 555 So.2d 940 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal not required because of financial contribution to judge’s campaign.); Gluth Bros. Constr. Inc. v. Union Nat. Bank, 192 Ill.App.3d 649, 139 Ill.Dec. 650, 548 N.E.2d 1364 appl. den. 131 Ill.2d 559, 142 Ill.Dec. 881, 553 N.E.2d 395 (1989) (Counsel’s service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 105 Nev. 237, 774 P.2d 1003 (1989) (Attorney’s service as co-chairman of campaign in past insufficient grounds for recusal)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee",
"sentence": "See, Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla.App.1986) (Ongoing campaign, judge disqualified.); Barber v. MacKenzie, 562 So.2d 755 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee)."
} | 7,421,892 | b |
Thirty-seven states have judges elected in some manner. Recusal for involvement in a judge's campaign has rarely been found to be required. In fact, the writer has found no case in which recusal was required solely for campaign activity other than where there was substantial involvement with a campaign then underway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee",
"sentence": "See, Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla.App.1986) (Ongoing campaign, judge disqualified.); Barber v. MacKenzie, 562 So.2d 755 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal required where lawyers were on an ongoing campaign committee)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Attorney's service as co-chairman of campaign in past insufficient grounds for recusal",
"sentence": "But see, Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 later proceeding 676 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.App.1983) (Recusal not required for reason that lawyers involved had contributed “many thousands” of dollars to the judges’ campaigns.); Keane v. Andrews, 555 So.2d 940 (Fla.App.1990) (Recusal not required because of financial contribution to judge’s campaign.); Gluth Bros. Constr. Inc. v. Union Nat. Bank, 192 Ill.App.3d 649, 139 Ill.Dec. 650, 548 N.E.2d 1364 appl. den. 131 Ill.2d 559, 142 Ill.Dec. 881, 553 N.E.2d 395 (1989) (Counsel’s service as campaign manager six years before not grounds for recusal of judge.); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 105 Nev. 237, 774 P.2d 1003 (1989) (Attorney’s service as co-chairman of campaign in past insufficient grounds for recusal)."
} | 7,421,892 | a |
We note that this case does not require us to decide whether the possession of a pipe bomb, silencer, sawed off shotgun, or other instrumentality that is generally associated with violence and has little socially useful value constitutes a predicate offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "846 F. Supp. 181, 184",
"parenthetical": "silencer and pipe bomb inherently dangerous weapons for which there is no peaceful use, and thus, their possession is predicate offense under Federal pretrial detention statute",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dodge, 846 F. Supp. 181, 184 (D. Conn. 1994) (silencer and pipe bomb inherently dangerous weapons for which there is no peaceful use, and thus, their possession is predicate offense under Federal pretrial detention statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "252 F.3d 905, 907",
"parenthetical": "\"Some firearms, it is true -- for- example sawed-off shotguns -- have no significant lawful use, and so their possession by felons may well constitute a crime of violence . . .\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Some firearms, it is true — for- example sawed-off shotguns — have no significant lawful use, and so their possession by felons may well constitute a crime of violence . . .”). Cf. Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 497-498 (1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 931 (1982) (sentence of from forty to fifty years for unlawful possession of machine gun not unconstitutionally disproportionate because Legislature could infer from “common knowledge that the unlicensed possession of machine guns is almost always associated with the commission of violent crimes with the potential for mass killing”)."
} | 3,657,138 | a |
Based on the Court's finding that venue is proper for the securities fraud claims, the Court also finds that this District is an appropriate venue for the RICO claims asserted against the Non-Mick Defendants. This is because the RICO claims are an alternative avenue of relief to remedy the same wrongs asserted in Plaintiffs securities fraud claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "756 F.2d 91, 100",
"parenthetical": "stating where two separate claims \"amount to only one cause of action with two grounds for relief, proper venue as to one federal ground will support adjudication of both grounds\"",
"sentence": "See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 100 (D.C.Cir.1984) (stating where two separate claims “amount to only one cause of action with two grounds for relief, proper venue as to one federal ground will support adjudication of both grounds”), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 113 S.Ct. 1178, 122 L.Ed.2d 548 (1993); see also High River Ltd. P’ship v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F.Supp.2d 487, 493 (M.D.Pa.2005) (stating that, under doctrine of pendent venue, “where claims arise out of the same operative facts” venue exists over both claims, “even if venue over the pendent claim would not otherwise be proper”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "353 F.Supp.2d 487, 493",
"parenthetical": "stating that, under doctrine of pendent venue, \"where claims arise out of the same operative facts\" venue exists over both claims, \"even if venue over the pendent claim would not otherwise be proper\"",
"sentence": "See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 100 (D.C.Cir.1984) (stating where two separate claims “amount to only one cause of action with two grounds for relief, proper venue as to one federal ground will support adjudication of both grounds”), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 113 S.Ct. 1178, 122 L.Ed.2d 548 (1993); see also High River Ltd. P’ship v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F.Supp.2d 487, 493 (M.D.Pa.2005) (stating that, under doctrine of pendent venue, “where claims arise out of the same operative facts” venue exists over both claims, “even if venue over the pendent claim would not otherwise be proper”)."
} | 3,553,482 | a |
Based on the Court's finding that venue is proper for the securities fraud claims, the Court also finds that this District is an appropriate venue for the RICO claims asserted against the Non-Mick Defendants. This is because the RICO claims are an alternative avenue of relief to remedy the same wrongs asserted in Plaintiffs securities fraud claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating where two separate claims \"amount to only one cause of action with two grounds for relief, proper venue as to one federal ground will support adjudication of both grounds\"",
"sentence": "See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 100 (D.C.Cir.1984) (stating where two separate claims “amount to only one cause of action with two grounds for relief, proper venue as to one federal ground will support adjudication of both grounds”), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 113 S.Ct. 1178, 122 L.Ed.2d 548 (1993); see also High River Ltd. P’ship v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F.Supp.2d 487, 493 (M.D.Pa.2005) (stating that, under doctrine of pendent venue, “where claims arise out of the same operative facts” venue exists over both claims, “even if venue over the pendent claim would not otherwise be proper”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "353 F.Supp.2d 487, 493",
"parenthetical": "stating that, under doctrine of pendent venue, \"where claims arise out of the same operative facts\" venue exists over both claims, \"even if venue over the pendent claim would not otherwise be proper\"",
"sentence": "See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 100 (D.C.Cir.1984) (stating where two separate claims “amount to only one cause of action with two grounds for relief, proper venue as to one federal ground will support adjudication of both grounds”), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 113 S.Ct. 1178, 122 L.Ed.2d 548 (1993); see also High River Ltd. P’ship v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F.Supp.2d 487, 493 (M.D.Pa.2005) (stating that, under doctrine of pendent venue, “where claims arise out of the same operative facts” venue exists over both claims, “even if venue over the pendent claim would not otherwise be proper”)."
} | 3,553,482 | a |
Based on the Court's finding that venue is proper for the securities fraud claims, the Court also finds that this District is an appropriate venue for the RICO claims asserted against the Non-Mick Defendants. This is because the RICO claims are an alternative avenue of relief to remedy the same wrongs asserted in Plaintiffs securities fraud claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating where two separate claims \"amount to only one cause of action with two grounds for relief, proper venue as to one federal ground will support adjudication of both grounds\"",
"sentence": "See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 100 (D.C.Cir.1984) (stating where two separate claims “amount to only one cause of action with two grounds for relief, proper venue as to one federal ground will support adjudication of both grounds”), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 113 S.Ct. 1178, 122 L.Ed.2d 548 (1993); see also High River Ltd. P’ship v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F.Supp.2d 487, 493 (M.D.Pa.2005) (stating that, under doctrine of pendent venue, “where claims arise out of the same operative facts” venue exists over both claims, “even if venue over the pendent claim would not otherwise be proper”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "353 F.Supp.2d 487, 493",
"parenthetical": "stating that, under doctrine of pendent venue, \"where claims arise out of the same operative facts\" venue exists over both claims, \"even if venue over the pendent claim would not otherwise be proper\"",
"sentence": "See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 100 (D.C.Cir.1984) (stating where two separate claims “amount to only one cause of action with two grounds for relief, proper venue as to one federal ground will support adjudication of both grounds”), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 113 S.Ct. 1178, 122 L.Ed.2d 548 (1993); see also High River Ltd. P’ship v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F.Supp.2d 487, 493 (M.D.Pa.2005) (stating that, under doctrine of pendent venue, “where claims arise out of the same operative facts” venue exists over both claims, “even if venue over the pendent claim would not otherwise be proper”)."
} | 3,553,482 | a |
Based on the Court's finding that venue is proper for the securities fraud claims, the Court also finds that this District is an appropriate venue for the RICO claims asserted against the Non-Mick Defendants. This is because the RICO claims are an alternative avenue of relief to remedy the same wrongs asserted in Plaintiffs securities fraud claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating where two separate claims \"amount to only one cause of action with two grounds for relief, proper venue as to one federal ground will support adjudication of both grounds\"",
"sentence": "See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 100 (D.C.Cir.1984) (stating where two separate claims “amount to only one cause of action with two grounds for relief, proper venue as to one federal ground will support adjudication of both grounds”), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 113 S.Ct. 1178, 122 L.Ed.2d 548 (1993); see also High River Ltd. P’ship v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F.Supp.2d 487, 493 (M.D.Pa.2005) (stating that, under doctrine of pendent venue, “where claims arise out of the same operative facts” venue exists over both claims, “even if venue over the pendent claim would not otherwise be proper”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "353 F.Supp.2d 487, 493",
"parenthetical": "stating that, under doctrine of pendent venue, \"where claims arise out of the same operative facts\" venue exists over both claims, \"even if venue over the pendent claim would not otherwise be proper\"",
"sentence": "See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 100 (D.C.Cir.1984) (stating where two separate claims “amount to only one cause of action with two grounds for relief, proper venue as to one federal ground will support adjudication of both grounds”), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 113 S.Ct. 1178, 122 L.Ed.2d 548 (1993); see also High River Ltd. P’ship v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F.Supp.2d 487, 493 (M.D.Pa.2005) (stating that, under doctrine of pendent venue, “where claims arise out of the same operative facts” venue exists over both claims, “even if venue over the pendent claim would not otherwise be proper”)."
} | 3,553,482 | a |
In this case debtors did not post the bond for the stay, and the project has since been sold to a good faith purchaser. This does not conclude our inquiry, however, because the reorganization plan governed more than just the sale of the project, and an appeal is not moot if the court can still order some effective relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although court could not reverse title if the debtor failed to obtain a stay pending appeal, the appeal was not moot where the debtor could obtain an award of damages from the trustee",
"sentence": "See In re Matos, 790 F.2d at 865 n. 3 (although court could not reverse title if the debtor failed to obtain a stay pending appeal, the appeal was not moot where the debtor could obtain an award of damages from the trustee); see also In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1146 (D.C.Cir.1986) (“[Fjailure to obtain a stay is not per se dispositive of all the issues before [the appellate court].”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "792 F.2d 1140, 1146",
"parenthetical": "\"[Fjailure to obtain a stay is not per se dispositive of all the issues before [the appellate court].\"",
"sentence": "See In re Matos, 790 F.2d at 865 n. 3 (although court could not reverse title if the debtor failed to obtain a stay pending appeal, the appeal was not moot where the debtor could obtain an award of damages from the trustee); see also In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1146 (D.C.Cir.1986) (“[Fjailure to obtain a stay is not per se dispositive of all the issues before [the appellate court].”)."
} | 6,123,845 | a |
McGuire argued in his venue motion that the pretrial publicity was pervasive and unfairly prejudicial. He attached to his venue motion several articles concerning the accident and his criminal prosecution that had been published online and in print. However, he offered no evidence regarding the circulation of these materials. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "619 F.2d 1124, 1132",
"parenthetical": "failure to produce newspaper circulation statistics instrumental in court's rejection of appellant's pretrial publicity claims",
"sentence": "See Ryser, 453 S.W.3d at 35 (considering readership of newspapers containing relevant articles and viewership of news programs in evaluating pervasiveness of pretrial publicity); see also U.S. v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1132 (5th Cir.1980) (failure to produce newspaper circulation statistics instrumental in court’s rejection of appellant’s pretrial publicity claims)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "453 S.W.3d 35, 35",
"parenthetical": "considering readership of newspapers containing relevant articles and viewership of news programs in evaluating pervasiveness of pretrial publicity",
"sentence": "See Ryser, 453 S.W.3d at 35 (considering readership of newspapers containing relevant articles and viewership of news programs in evaluating pervasiveness of pretrial publicity); see also U.S. v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1132 (5th Cir.1980) (failure to produce newspaper circulation statistics instrumental in court’s rejection of appellant’s pretrial publicity claims)."
} | 6,782,717 | b |
The trial court told the jury, in essence, to continue deliberating. Given the short period of time the jury had been deliberating, that response was reasonable and not inherently coercive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "instruction to \"go back there and deliberate on this case\" not reversible error",
"sentence": "State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 126, 529 N.E.2d 913 (noting that that judge’s response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a “reasonable response”); see also State v. Gulertekin (Dec. 3, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APA12-1607, 1998 WL 831463 (instruction to “go back there and deliberate on this case” not reversible error); State v. Long (Oct. 12, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77272, 2000 WL 1514330 (response that jury .should “continue to deliberate” after only a few hours of deliberations was not coercive); State v. Boose (Mar. 25, 1994), Lucas App. No. L-93-095, 1994 WL 101961 (same); United States v. Kramer (C.A.7, 1992), 955 F.2d 479, 489 (an instruction to continue to deliberate was content-neutral and not in error). Therefore, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "39 Ohio St.3d 122, 126",
"parenthetical": "noting that that judge's response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a \"reasonable response\"",
"sentence": "State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 126, 529 N.E.2d 913 (noting that that judge’s response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a “reasonable response”); see also State v. Gulertekin (Dec. 3, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APA12-1607, 1998 WL 831463 (instruction to “go back there and deliberate on this case” not reversible error); State v. Long (Oct. 12, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77272, 2000 WL 1514330 (response that jury .should “continue to deliberate” after only a few hours of deliberations was not coercive); State v. Boose (Mar. 25, 1994), Lucas App. No. L-93-095, 1994 WL 101961 (same); United States v. Kramer (C.A.7, 1992), 955 F.2d 479, 489 (an instruction to continue to deliberate was content-neutral and not in error). Therefore, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error."
} | 3,876,853 | b |
The trial court told the jury, in essence, to continue deliberating. Given the short period of time the jury had been deliberating, that response was reasonable and not inherently coercive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "response that jury .should \"continue to deliberate\" after only a few hours of deliberations was not coercive",
"sentence": "State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 126, 529 N.E.2d 913 (noting that that judge’s response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a “reasonable response”); see also State v. Gulertekin (Dec. 3, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APA12-1607, 1998 WL 831463 (instruction to “go back there and deliberate on this case” not reversible error); State v. Long (Oct. 12, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77272, 2000 WL 1514330 (response that jury .should “continue to deliberate” after only a few hours of deliberations was not coercive); State v. Boose (Mar. 25, 1994), Lucas App. No. L-93-095, 1994 WL 101961 (same); United States v. Kramer (C.A.7, 1992), 955 F.2d 479, 489 (an instruction to continue to deliberate was content-neutral and not in error). Therefore, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "39 Ohio St.3d 122, 126",
"parenthetical": "noting that that judge's response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a \"reasonable response\"",
"sentence": "State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 126, 529 N.E.2d 913 (noting that that judge’s response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a “reasonable response”); see also State v. Gulertekin (Dec. 3, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APA12-1607, 1998 WL 831463 (instruction to “go back there and deliberate on this case” not reversible error); State v. Long (Oct. 12, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77272, 2000 WL 1514330 (response that jury .should “continue to deliberate” after only a few hours of deliberations was not coercive); State v. Boose (Mar. 25, 1994), Lucas App. No. L-93-095, 1994 WL 101961 (same); United States v. Kramer (C.A.7, 1992), 955 F.2d 479, 489 (an instruction to continue to deliberate was content-neutral and not in error). Therefore, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error."
} | 3,876,853 | b |
The trial court told the jury, in essence, to continue deliberating. Given the short period of time the jury had been deliberating, that response was reasonable and not inherently coercive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "39 Ohio St.3d 122, 126",
"parenthetical": "noting that that judge's response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a \"reasonable response\"",
"sentence": "State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 126, 529 N.E.2d 913 (noting that that judge’s response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a “reasonable response”); see also State v. Gulertekin (Dec. 3, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APA12-1607, 1998 WL 831463 (instruction to “go back there and deliberate on this case” not reversible error); State v. Long (Oct. 12, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77272, 2000 WL 1514330 (response that jury .should “continue to deliberate” after only a few hours of deliberations was not coercive); State v. Boose (Mar. 25, 1994), Lucas App. No. L-93-095, 1994 WL 101961 (same); United States v. Kramer (C.A.7, 1992), 955 F.2d 479, 489 (an instruction to continue to deliberate was content-neutral and not in error). Therefore, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "955 F.2d 479, 489",
"parenthetical": "an instruction to continue to deliberate was content-neutral and not in error",
"sentence": "State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 126, 529 N.E.2d 913 (noting that that judge’s response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a “reasonable response”); see also State v. Gulertekin (Dec. 3, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APA12-1607, 1998 WL 831463 (instruction to “go back there and deliberate on this case” not reversible error); State v. Long (Oct. 12, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77272, 2000 WL 1514330 (response that jury .should “continue to deliberate” after only a few hours of deliberations was not coercive); State v. Boose (Mar. 25, 1994), Lucas App. No. L-93-095, 1994 WL 101961 (same); United States v. Kramer (C.A.7, 1992), 955 F.2d 479, 489 (an instruction to continue to deliberate was content-neutral and not in error). Therefore, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error."
} | 3,876,853 | a |
The trial court told the jury, in essence, to continue deliberating. Given the short period of time the jury had been deliberating, that response was reasonable and not inherently coercive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that that judge's response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a \"reasonable response\"",
"sentence": "State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 126, 529 N.E.2d 913 (noting that that judge’s response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a “reasonable response”); see also State v. Gulertekin (Dec. 3, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APA12-1607, 1998 WL 831463 (instruction to “go back there and deliberate on this case” not reversible error); State v. Long (Oct. 12, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77272, 2000 WL 1514330 (response that jury .should “continue to deliberate” after only a few hours of deliberations was not coercive); State v. Boose (Mar. 25, 1994), Lucas App. No. L-93-095, 1994 WL 101961 (same); United States v. Kramer (C.A.7, 1992), 955 F.2d 479, 489 (an instruction to continue to deliberate was content-neutral and not in error). Therefore, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "instruction to \"go back there and deliberate on this case\" not reversible error",
"sentence": "State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 126, 529 N.E.2d 913 (noting that that judge’s response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a “reasonable response”); see also State v. Gulertekin (Dec. 3, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APA12-1607, 1998 WL 831463 (instruction to “go back there and deliberate on this case” not reversible error); State v. Long (Oct. 12, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77272, 2000 WL 1514330 (response that jury .should “continue to deliberate” after only a few hours of deliberations was not coercive); State v. Boose (Mar. 25, 1994), Lucas App. No. L-93-095, 1994 WL 101961 (same); United States v. Kramer (C.A.7, 1992), 955 F.2d 479, 489 (an instruction to continue to deliberate was content-neutral and not in error). Therefore, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error."
} | 3,876,853 | a |
The trial court told the jury, in essence, to continue deliberating. Given the short period of time the jury had been deliberating, that response was reasonable and not inherently coercive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that that judge's response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a \"reasonable response\"",
"sentence": "State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 126, 529 N.E.2d 913 (noting that that judge’s response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a “reasonable response”); see also State v. Gulertekin (Dec. 3, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APA12-1607, 1998 WL 831463 (instruction to “go back there and deliberate on this case” not reversible error); State v. Long (Oct. 12, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77272, 2000 WL 1514330 (response that jury .should “continue to deliberate” after only a few hours of deliberations was not coercive); State v. Boose (Mar. 25, 1994), Lucas App. No. L-93-095, 1994 WL 101961 (same); United States v. Kramer (C.A.7, 1992), 955 F.2d 479, 489 (an instruction to continue to deliberate was content-neutral and not in error). Therefore, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "response that jury .should \"continue to deliberate\" after only a few hours of deliberations was not coercive",
"sentence": "State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 126, 529 N.E.2d 913 (noting that that judge’s response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a “reasonable response”); see also State v. Gulertekin (Dec. 3, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APA12-1607, 1998 WL 831463 (instruction to “go back there and deliberate on this case” not reversible error); State v. Long (Oct. 12, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77272, 2000 WL 1514330 (response that jury .should “continue to deliberate” after only a few hours of deliberations was not coercive); State v. Boose (Mar. 25, 1994), Lucas App. No. L-93-095, 1994 WL 101961 (same); United States v. Kramer (C.A.7, 1992), 955 F.2d 479, 489 (an instruction to continue to deliberate was content-neutral and not in error). Therefore, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error."
} | 3,876,853 | a |
The trial court told the jury, in essence, to continue deliberating. Given the short period of time the jury had been deliberating, that response was reasonable and not inherently coercive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that that judge's response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a \"reasonable response\"",
"sentence": "State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 126, 529 N.E.2d 913 (noting that that judge’s response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a “reasonable response”); see also State v. Gulertekin (Dec. 3, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APA12-1607, 1998 WL 831463 (instruction to “go back there and deliberate on this case” not reversible error); State v. Long (Oct. 12, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77272, 2000 WL 1514330 (response that jury .should “continue to deliberate” after only a few hours of deliberations was not coercive); State v. Boose (Mar. 25, 1994), Lucas App. No. L-93-095, 1994 WL 101961 (same); United States v. Kramer (C.A.7, 1992), 955 F.2d 479, 489 (an instruction to continue to deliberate was content-neutral and not in error). Therefore, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "955 F.2d 479, 489",
"parenthetical": "an instruction to continue to deliberate was content-neutral and not in error",
"sentence": "State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 126, 529 N.E.2d 913 (noting that that judge’s response to a question about a possible deadlock situation that instructed the jury to continue deliberating was a “reasonable response”); see also State v. Gulertekin (Dec. 3, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APA12-1607, 1998 WL 831463 (instruction to “go back there and deliberate on this case” not reversible error); State v. Long (Oct. 12, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77272, 2000 WL 1514330 (response that jury .should “continue to deliberate” after only a few hours of deliberations was not coercive); State v. Boose (Mar. 25, 1994), Lucas App. No. L-93-095, 1994 WL 101961 (same); United States v. Kramer (C.A.7, 1992), 955 F.2d 479, 489 (an instruction to continue to deliberate was content-neutral and not in error). Therefore, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error."
} | 3,876,853 | a |
See, e.g. Graham v. Children's Servs. In fact, the Oregon courts have gone so far as to hold that even a custodial grandparent lacks a protected interest in the adoption of her grandchildren. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "591 P.2d 377, 377-78",
"parenthetical": "considering appeal by grandmother who had temporary custody of children for 14 months prior the filing of the adoption petition",
"sentence": "Graham, 591 P.2d at 377-78 (considering appeal by grandmother who had temporary custody of children for 14 months prior the filing of the adoption petition); see also Browder v. Harmeyer, 453 N.E.2d 301, 308-09 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (similar); but cf. In re P.C., 842 P.2d 364, 367 (Ok.Ct.App.1992) (holding that grandmother in loco “parentis of her three grandchildren had protected liberty interest in their future care and custody)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "842 P.2d 364, 367",
"parenthetical": "holding that grandmother in loco \"parentis of her three grandchildren had protected liberty interest in their future care and custody",
"sentence": "Graham, 591 P.2d at 377-78 (considering appeal by grandmother who had temporary custody of children for 14 months prior the filing of the adoption petition); see also Browder v. Harmeyer, 453 N.E.2d 301, 308-09 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (similar); but cf. In re P.C., 842 P.2d 364, 367 (Ok.Ct.App.1992) (holding that grandmother in loco “parentis of her three grandchildren had protected liberty interest in their future care and custody)."
} | 7,413,336 | a |
Furthermore, the driveway was clearly delineated, uniformly covered in crushed stone and plainly visible from the defendant's front yard. The court reasonably considered these physical attributes, together with the nature and character of the right-of-way, to be persuasive evidence supporting the plaintiffs testimony that she had used the right-of-way in the manner and for the very purpose depicted in the site plan, that is, for ingress to and egress from her residence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 Conn. 722, 727-28",
"parenthetical": "design and construction of building so as to facilitate access to disputed yard supported trial court's finding that plaintiffs' use of yard was adverse to owners' interests",
"sentence": "See Phillips v. Bonadies, 105 Conn. 722, 727-28, 136 A. 684 (1927) (design and construction of building so as to facilitate access to disputed yard supported trial court’s finding that plaintiffs’ use of yard was adverse to owners’ interests); see also Klein v. DeRosa, supra, 137 Conn. 588-89 (physical conditions in existence when defendants acquired their land were sufficient to put them on notice that plaintiffs use of right-of-way was adverse and under claim of right)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "physical conditions in existence when defendants acquired their land were sufficient to put them on notice that plaintiffs use of right-of-way was adverse and under claim of right",
"sentence": "See Phillips v. Bonadies, 105 Conn. 722, 727-28, 136 A. 684 (1927) (design and construction of building so as to facilitate access to disputed yard supported trial court’s finding that plaintiffs’ use of yard was adverse to owners’ interests); see also Klein v. DeRosa, supra, 137 Conn. 588-89 (physical conditions in existence when defendants acquired their land were sufficient to put them on notice that plaintiffs use of right-of-way was adverse and under claim of right)."
} | 5,767,752 | a |
Furthermore, the driveway was clearly delineated, uniformly covered in crushed stone and plainly visible from the defendant's front yard. The court reasonably considered these physical attributes, together with the nature and character of the right-of-way, to be persuasive evidence supporting the plaintiffs testimony that she had used the right-of-way in the manner and for the very purpose depicted in the site plan, that is, for ingress to and egress from her residence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "physical conditions in existence when defendants acquired their land were sufficient to put them on notice that plaintiffs use of right-of-way was adverse and under claim of right",
"sentence": "See Phillips v. Bonadies, 105 Conn. 722, 727-28, 136 A. 684 (1927) (design and construction of building so as to facilitate access to disputed yard supported trial court’s finding that plaintiffs’ use of yard was adverse to owners’ interests); see also Klein v. DeRosa, supra, 137 Conn. 588-89 (physical conditions in existence when defendants acquired their land were sufficient to put them on notice that plaintiffs use of right-of-way was adverse and under claim of right)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "design and construction of building so as to facilitate access to disputed yard supported trial court's finding that plaintiffs' use of yard was adverse to owners' interests",
"sentence": "See Phillips v. Bonadies, 105 Conn. 722, 727-28, 136 A. 684 (1927) (design and construction of building so as to facilitate access to disputed yard supported trial court’s finding that plaintiffs’ use of yard was adverse to owners’ interests); see also Klein v. DeRosa, supra, 137 Conn. 588-89 (physical conditions in existence when defendants acquired their land were sufficient to put them on notice that plaintiffs use of right-of-way was adverse and under claim of right)."
} | 5,767,752 | b |
As stated, the girlfriend owned the home and shared the bedroom with defendant. We can reasonably conclude that the cosmetic table and dresser were under the common authority of both defendant and his girlfriend and that the police reasonably believed that the girlfriend, as owner of the home, had the authority to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"official reliance on the consent may validate the search if it was reasonable for the officers to believe the third party had the requisite relationship\"",
"sentence": "See Canaan, 683 N.E.2d at 231 (citing Illinois v, Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (“official reliance on the consent may validate the search if it was reasonable for the officers to believe the third party had the requisite relationship”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "593 N.E.2d 1199, 1199",
"parenthetical": "upholding the admissibility of a knife after a roommate's consent permitted officers to search lawfully the common areas of the residence from which the knife could be seen in plain view on a dresser in defendant's room",
"sentence": "See also Perry, 638 N.E.2d at 1241; Wright, 593 N.E.2d at 1199 (upholding the admissibility of a knife after a roommate’s consent permitted officers to search lawfully the common areas of the residence from which the knife could be seen in plain view on a dresser in defendant’s room)."
} | 11,850,541 | a |
As stated, the girlfriend owned the home and shared the bedroom with defendant. We can reasonably conclude that the cosmetic table and dresser were under the common authority of both defendant and his girlfriend and that the police reasonably believed that the girlfriend, as owner of the home, had the authority to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"official reliance on the consent may validate the search if it was reasonable for the officers to believe the third party had the requisite relationship\"",
"sentence": "See Canaan, 683 N.E.2d at 231 (citing Illinois v, Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (“official reliance on the consent may validate the search if it was reasonable for the officers to believe the third party had the requisite relationship”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "593 N.E.2d 1199, 1199",
"parenthetical": "upholding the admissibility of a knife after a roommate's consent permitted officers to search lawfully the common areas of the residence from which the knife could be seen in plain view on a dresser in defendant's room",
"sentence": "See also Perry, 638 N.E.2d at 1241; Wright, 593 N.E.2d at 1199 (upholding the admissibility of a knife after a roommate’s consent permitted officers to search lawfully the common areas of the residence from which the knife could be seen in plain view on a dresser in defendant’s room)."
} | 11,850,541 | a |
As stated, the girlfriend owned the home and shared the bedroom with defendant. We can reasonably conclude that the cosmetic table and dresser were under the common authority of both defendant and his girlfriend and that the police reasonably believed that the girlfriend, as owner of the home, had the authority to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "593 N.E.2d 1199, 1199",
"parenthetical": "upholding the admissibility of a knife after a roommate's consent permitted officers to search lawfully the common areas of the residence from which the knife could be seen in plain view on a dresser in defendant's room",
"sentence": "See also Perry, 638 N.E.2d at 1241; Wright, 593 N.E.2d at 1199 (upholding the admissibility of a knife after a roommate’s consent permitted officers to search lawfully the common areas of the residence from which the knife could be seen in plain view on a dresser in defendant’s room)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"official reliance on the consent may validate the search if it was reasonable for the officers to believe the third party had the requisite relationship\"",
"sentence": "See Canaan, 683 N.E.2d at 231 (citing Illinois v, Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (“official reliance on the consent may validate the search if it was reasonable for the officers to believe the third party had the requisite relationship”)."
} | 11,850,541 | b |
The line between computer-centric problems and commonplace business problems is often blurred in the context of Internet commerce. Nonetheless, courts have definitively stated that an otherwise abstract idea is not rendered patent-eligible by reciting general purpose technological components. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "772 F.3d 709, 715-16",
"parenthetical": "finding that claims which merely recited the abstract idea of using advertising as a currency as applied to the particular technological environment of the Internet were not patent-eligible",
"sentence": "Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2357 (holding that the introduction of a computer into the claims does not render the idea patent-eligible); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715-16 (Fed.Cir. 2014) (finding that claims which merely recited the abstract idea of using advertising as a currency as applied to the particular technological environment of the Internet were not patent-eligible)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "134 S.Ct. 2357, 2357",
"parenthetical": "holding that the introduction of a computer into the claims does not render the idea patent-eligible",
"sentence": "Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2357 (holding that the introduction of a computer into the claims does not render the idea patent-eligible); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715-16 (Fed.Cir. 2014) (finding that claims which merely recited the abstract idea of using advertising as a currency as applied to the particular technological environment of the Internet were not patent-eligible)."
} | 12,269,891 | b |
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