instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_xdr_enc_readlink(struct rpc_rqst *req, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
const struct nfs4_readlink *args)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = nfs4_xdr_minorversion(&args->seq_args),
};
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->fh, &hdr);
encode_readlink(xdr, args, req, &hdr);
xdr_inline_pages(&req->rq_rcv_buf, hdr.replen << 2, args->pages,
args->pgbase, args->pglen);
encode_nops(&hdr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
{
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
struct key *keyring;
long ret, serial;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
old = current_cred();
/* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */
if (!name) {
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
serial = new->session_keyring->serial;
ret = commit_creds(new);
if (ret == 0)
ret = serial;
goto okay;
}
/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */
mutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);
/* look for an existing keyring of this name */
keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);
if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
/* not found - try and create a new one */
keyring = keyring_alloc(
name, old->uid, old->gid, old,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
}
} else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
} else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {
ret = 0;
goto error3;
}
/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error3;
commit_creds(new);
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
ret = keyring->serial;
key_put(keyring);
okay:
return ret;
error3:
key_put(keyring);
error2:
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
error:
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectBooleanAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::reflectBooleanAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OMX::getConfig(
node_id node, OMX_INDEXTYPE index,
void *params, size_t size) {
return findInstance(node)->getConfig(
index, params, size);
}
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 160,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int get_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
return __get_dumpable(mm->flags);
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 30,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SpdyProxyClientSocket::DoSendRequest() {
next_state_ = STATE_SEND_REQUEST_COMPLETE;
HttpRequestHeaders authorization_headers;
if (auth_->HaveAuth()) {
auth_->AddAuthorizationHeader(&authorization_headers);
}
std::string request_line;
HttpRequestHeaders request_headers;
BuildTunnelRequest(request_, authorization_headers, endpoint_, &request_line,
&request_headers);
net_log_.AddEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_HTTP_TRANSACTION_SEND_TUNNEL_HEADERS,
base::Bind(&HttpRequestHeaders::NetLogCallback,
base::Unretained(&request_headers),
&request_line));
request_.extra_headers.MergeFrom(request_headers);
scoped_ptr<SpdyHeaderBlock> headers(new SpdyHeaderBlock());
CreateSpdyHeadersFromHttpRequest(request_, request_headers,
spdy_stream_->GetProtocolVersion(), true,
headers.get());
if (spdy_stream_->GetProtocolVersion() > 2) {
(*headers)[":path"] = endpoint_.ToString();
headers->erase(":scheme");
} else {
(*headers)["url"] = endpoint_.ToString();
headers->erase("scheme");
}
return spdy_stream_->SendRequestHeaders(headers.Pass(), MORE_DATA_TO_SEND);
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Track::Info::CopyStr(char* Info::*str, Info& dst_) const
{
if (str == static_cast<char* Info::*>(NULL))
return -1;
char*& dst = dst_.*str;
if (dst) //should be NULL already
return -1;
const char* const src = this->*str;
if (src == NULL)
return 0;
const size_t len = strlen(src);
dst = new (std::nothrow) char[len+1];
if (dst == NULL)
return -1;
strcpy(dst, src);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: write_pid_file(const char *path)
{
FILE *file;
unsigned long pid;
file = fopen(path, "w");
if (file == NULL)
return errno;
pid = (unsigned long) getpid();
if (fprintf(file, "%ld\n", pid) < 0 || fclose(file) == EOF)
return errno;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Multi-realm KDC null deref [CVE-2013-1418]
If a KDC serves multiple realms, certain requests can cause
setup_server_realm() to dereference a null pointer, crashing the KDC.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
A related but more minor vulnerability requires authentication to
exploit, and is only present if a third-party KDC database module can
dereference a null pointer under certain conditions.
(back ported from commit 5d2d9a1abe46a2c1a8614d4672d08d9d30a5f8bf)
ticket: 7757 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.7
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::GenVertexArraysOESHelper(
GLsizei n, const GLuint* client_ids) {
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
if (GetVertexAttribManager(client_ids[ii])) {
return false;
}
}
if (!features().native_vertex_array_object) {
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
CreateVertexAttribManager(client_ids[ii], 0, true);
}
} else {
scoped_ptr<GLuint[]> service_ids(new GLuint[n]);
glGenVertexArraysOES(n, service_ids.get());
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
CreateVertexAttribManager(client_ids[ii], service_ids[ii], true);
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofproto_aa_mapping_register(struct ofproto *ofproto, void *aux,
const struct aa_mapping_settings *s)
{
if (!ofproto->ofproto_class->aa_mapping_set) {
return EOPNOTSUPP;
}
ofproto->ofproto_class->aa_mapping_set(ofproto, aux, s);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VOID NBLSetRSCInfo(PPARANDIS_ADAPTER pContext, PNET_BUFFER_LIST pNBL,
PNET_PACKET_INFO PacketInfo, UINT nCoalescedSegments)
{
NDIS_TCP_IP_CHECKSUM_NET_BUFFER_LIST_INFO qCSInfo;
qCSInfo.Value = NULL;
qCSInfo.Receive.IpChecksumSucceeded = TRUE;
qCSInfo.Receive.IpChecksumValueInvalid = TRUE;
qCSInfo.Receive.TcpChecksumSucceeded = TRUE;
qCSInfo.Receive.TcpChecksumValueInvalid = TRUE;
NET_BUFFER_LIST_INFO(pNBL, TcpIpChecksumNetBufferListInfo) = qCSInfo.Value;
NET_BUFFER_LIST_COALESCED_SEG_COUNT(pNBL) = (USHORT) nCoalescedSegments;
NET_BUFFER_LIST_DUP_ACK_COUNT(pNBL) = 0;
NdisInterlockedAddLargeStatistic(&pContext->RSC.Statistics.CoalescedOctets, PacketInfo->L2PayloadLen);
NdisInterlockedAddLargeStatistic(&pContext->RSC.Statistics.CoalesceEvents, 1);
NdisInterlockedAddLargeStatistic(&pContext->RSC.Statistics.CoalescedPkts, nCoalescedSegments);
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: format_SET_IPV4_DST(const struct ofpact_ipv4 *a, struct ds *s)
{
ds_put_format(s, "%smod_nw_dst:%s"IP_FMT,
colors.param, colors.end, IP_ARGS(a->ipv4));
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
{
struct sock *sk, *parent = chan->data;
/* Check for backlog size */
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(parent)) {
BT_DBG("backlog full %d", parent->sk_ack_backlog);
return NULL;
}
sk = l2cap_sock_alloc(sock_net(parent), NULL, BTPROTO_L2CAP,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sk)
return NULL;
bt_sock_reclassify_lock(sk, BTPROTO_L2CAP);
l2cap_sock_init(sk, parent);
return l2cap_pi(sk)->chan;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: L2CAP - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The L2CAP code fails to initialize the l2_bdaddr_type member of struct
sockaddr_l2 and the padding byte added for alignment. It that for leaks
two bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 94,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint8_t rfc_parse_data(tRFC_MCB* p_mcb, MX_FRAME* p_frame, BT_HDR* p_buf) {
uint8_t ead, eal, fcs;
uint8_t* p_data = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
uint8_t* p_start = p_data;
uint16_t len;
if (p_buf->len < RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Length1: %d", p_buf->len);
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
RFCOMM_PARSE_CTRL_FIELD(ead, p_frame->cr, p_frame->dlci, p_data);
if (!ead) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Address(EA must be 1)");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
RFCOMM_PARSE_TYPE_FIELD(p_frame->type, p_frame->pf, p_data);
RFCOMM_PARSE_LEN_FIELD(eal, len, p_data);
p_buf->len -= (3 + !ead + !eal + 1); /* Additional 1 for FCS */
p_buf->offset += (3 + !ead + !eal);
/* handle credit if credit based flow control */
if ((p_mcb->flow == PORT_FC_CREDIT) && (p_frame->type == RFCOMM_UIH) &&
(p_frame->dlci != RFCOMM_MX_DLCI) && (p_frame->pf == 1)) {
p_frame->credit = *p_data++;
p_buf->len--;
p_buf->offset++;
} else
p_frame->credit = 0;
if (p_buf->len != len) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Length2 %d %d", p_buf->len, len);
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
fcs = *(p_data + len);
/* All control frames that we are sending are sent with P=1, expect */
/* reply with F=1 */
/* According to TS 07.10 spec ivalid frames are discarded without */
/* notification to the sender */
switch (p_frame->type) {
case RFCOMM_SABME:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad SABME");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_SABME);
case RFCOMM_UA:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_CMD(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UA");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_UA);
case RFCOMM_DM:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_CMD(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) || len ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad DM");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_DM);
case RFCOMM_DISC:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad DISC");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_DISC);
case RFCOMM_UIH:
if (!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - invalid DLCI");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else if (!rfc_check_fcs(2, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - FCS");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr)) {
/* we assume that this is ok to allow bad implementations to work */
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - response");
return (RFC_EVENT_UIH);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_UIH);
}
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
Commit Message: Check remaining frame length in rfc_process_mx_message
Bug: 111936792
Bug: 80432928
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ie2c09f3d598fb230ce060c9043f5a88c241cdd79
(cherry picked from commit 0471355c8b035aaa2ce07a33eecad60ad49c5ad0)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::loadEventDelayTimerFired(Timer<Document>*)
{
if (frame())
frame()->loader()->checkCompleted();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_free_pages(struct page **pages, size_t size)
{
int i;
if (!pages)
return;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
if (!pages[i])
break;
__free_page(pages[i]);
}
kfree(pages);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport MagickBooleanType ReadPSDLayers(Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const MagickBooleanType skip_layers,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
type[4];
LayerInfo
*layer_info;
MagickSizeType
size;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
j,
number_layers;
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
if (size == 0)
{
/*
Skip layers & masks.
*/
(void) ReadBlobLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
status=MagickFalse;
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
return(MagickTrue);
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count != 0) && (LocaleNCompare(type,"Lr16",4) == 0))
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
else
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
status=MagickTrue;
if (size != 0)
{
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) NULL;
number_layers=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
if (number_layers < 0)
{
/*
The first alpha channel in the merged result contains the
transparency data for the merged result.
*/
number_layers=MagickAbsoluteValue(number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" negative layer count corrected for");
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
/*
We only need to know if the image has an alpha channel
*/
if (skip_layers != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image contains %.20g layers",(double) number_layers);
if (number_layers == 0)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidNumberOfLayers",
image->filename);
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) number_layers,
sizeof(*layer_info));
if (layer_info == (LayerInfo *) NULL)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of LayerInfo failed");
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(layer_info,0,(size_t) number_layers*
sizeof(*layer_info));
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
ssize_t
x,
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading layer #%.20g",(double) i+1);
layer_info[i].page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.width=(size_t) (x-layer_info[i].page.x);
layer_info[i].page.height=(size_t) (y-layer_info[i].page.y);
layer_info[i].channels=ReadBlobShort(image);
if (layer_info[i].channels > MaxPSDChannels)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded",
image->filename);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), channels=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].page.x,(double) layer_info[i].page.y,
(double) layer_info[i].page.height,(double)
layer_info[i].page.width,(double) layer_info[i].channels);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size=(size_t) GetPSDSize(psd_info,
image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" channel[%.20g]: type=%.20g, size=%.20g",(double) j,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer type was %.4s instead of 8BIM", type);
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader",
image->filename);
}
(void) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) layer_info[i].blendkey);
ReversePSDString(image,layer_info[i].blendkey,4);
layer_info[i].opacity=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
layer_info[i].clipping=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].visible=!(layer_info[i].flags & 0x02);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" blend=%.4s, opacity=%.20g, clipping=%s, flags=%d, visible=%s",
layer_info[i].blendkey,(double) layer_info[i].opacity,
layer_info[i].clipping ? "true" : "false",layer_info[i].flags,
layer_info[i].visible ? "true" : "false");
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /* filler */
size=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (size != 0)
{
MagickSizeType
combined_length,
length;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer contains additional info");
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer mask info.
*/
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.height=(size_t) (ReadBlobLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.y);
layer_info[i].mask.page.width=(size_t) (ReadBlobLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.x);
layer_info[i].mask.background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(
image);
layer_info[i].mask.flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (!(layer_info[i].mask.flags & 0x01))
{
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=layer_info[i].mask.page.y-
layer_info[i].page.y;
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=layer_info[i].mask.page.x-
layer_info[i].page.x;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer mask: offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), length=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.x,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.y,(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.width,
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.height,(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length)-18);
/*
Skip over the rest of the layer mask information.
*/
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType) (length-18)) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
}
}
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length+=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer blending ranges info.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer blending ranges: length=%.20g",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
/*
We read it, but don't use it...
*/
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j+=8)
{
size_t blend_source=ReadBlobLong(image);
size_t blend_dest=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" source(%x), dest(%x)",(unsigned int)
blend_source,(unsigned int) blend_dest);
}
}
/*
Layer name.
*/
length=(MagickSizeType) ReadBlobByte(image);
combined_length+=length+1;
if (length > 0)
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length++,layer_info[i].name);
layer_info[i].name[length]='\0';
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer name: %s",layer_info[i].name);
if ((length % 4) != 0)
{
length=4-(length % 4);
combined_length+=length;
/* Skip over the padding of the layer name */
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,length) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
length=(MagickSizeType) size-combined_length;
if (length > 0)
{
unsigned char
*info;
layer_info[i].info=AcquireStringInfo((const size_t) length);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(layer_info[i].info);
(void) ReadBlob(image,(const size_t) length,info);
}
}
}
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if ((layer_info[i].page.width == 0) ||
(layer_info[i].page.height == 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is empty");
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
continue;
}
/*
Allocate layered image.
*/
layer_info[i].image=CloneImage(image,layer_info[i].page.width,
layer_info[i].page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of image for layer %.20g failed",(double) i);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProfile(layer_info[i].image,"psd:additional-info",
layer_info[i].info);
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
}
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=0; j < layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType)
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
continue;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading data for layer %.20g",(double) i);
status=ReadPSDLayer(image,image_info,psd_info,&layer_info[i],
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,i,(MagickSizeType)
number_layers);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=i; j < number_layers - 1; j++)
layer_info[j] = layer_info[j+1];
number_layers--;
i--;
}
}
if (number_layers > 0)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (i > 0)
layer_info[i].image->previous=layer_info[i-1].image;
if (i < (number_layers-1))
layer_info[i].image->next=layer_info[i+1].image;
layer_info[i].image->page=layer_info[i].page;
}
image->next=layer_info[0].image;
layer_info[0].image->previous=image;
}
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(layer_info);
}
else
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
}
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Fix improper cast that could cause an overflow as demonstrated in #347.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void enableLogChannel(const char* name)
{
#if !LOG_DISABLED
WTFLogChannel* channel = getChannelFromName(name);
if (channel)
channel->state = WTFLogChannelOn;
#endif // !LOG_DISABLED
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Performance::AddResourceTiming(const WebResourceTimingInfo& info,
const AtomicString& initiator_type) {
if (IsResourceTimingBufferFull() &&
!HasObserverFor(PerformanceEntry::kResource))
return;
PerformanceEntry* entry =
PerformanceResourceTiming::Create(info, time_origin_, initiator_type);
NotifyObserversOfEntry(*entry);
if (!IsResourceTimingBufferFull())
AddResourceTimingBuffer(*entry);
}
Commit Message: Fix timing allow check algorithm for service workers
This CL uses the OriginalURLViaServiceWorker() in the timing allow check
algorithm if the response WasFetchedViaServiceWorker(). This way, if a
service worker changes a same origin request to become cross origin,
then the timing allow check algorithm will still fail.
resource-timing-worker.js is changed so it avoids an empty Response,
which is an odd case in terms of same origin checks.
Bug: 837275
Change-Id: I7e497a6fcc2ee14244121b915ca5f5cceded417a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1038229
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Timothy Dresser <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555476}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 153,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileSystemOperationRunner::DidGetMetadata(
const OperationID id,
GetMetadataCallback callback,
base::File::Error rv,
const base::File::Info& file_info) {
if (is_beginning_operation_) {
finished_operations_.insert(id);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&FileSystemOperationRunner::DidGetMetadata, weak_ptr_,
id, std::move(callback), rv, file_info));
return;
}
std::move(callback).Run(rv, file_info);
FinishOperation(id);
}
Commit Message: [FileSystem] Harden against overflows of OperationID a bit better.
Rather than having a UAF when OperationID overflows instead overwrite
the old operation with the new one. Can still cause weirdness, but at
least won't result in UAF. Also update OperationID to uint64_t to
make sure we don't overflow to begin with.
Bug: 925864
Change-Id: Ifdf3fa0935ab5ea8802d91bba39601f02b0dbdc9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1441498
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#627115}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LocalSiteCharacteristicsDatabaseTest()
: scoped_set_tick_clock_for_testing_(&test_clock_),
test_server_(net::test_server::EmbeddedTestServer::TYPE_HTTPS) {}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct rq *find_busiest_queue(struct lb_env *env,
struct sched_group *group)
{
struct rq *busiest = NULL, *rq;
unsigned long busiest_load = 0, busiest_capacity = 1;
int i;
for_each_cpu_and(i, sched_group_span(group), env->cpus) {
unsigned long capacity, wl;
enum fbq_type rt;
rq = cpu_rq(i);
rt = fbq_classify_rq(rq);
/*
* We classify groups/runqueues into three groups:
* - regular: there are !numa tasks
* - remote: there are numa tasks that run on the 'wrong' node
* - all: there is no distinction
*
* In order to avoid migrating ideally placed numa tasks,
* ignore those when there's better options.
*
* If we ignore the actual busiest queue to migrate another
* task, the next balance pass can still reduce the busiest
* queue by moving tasks around inside the node.
*
* If we cannot move enough load due to this classification
* the next pass will adjust the group classification and
* allow migration of more tasks.
*
* Both cases only affect the total convergence complexity.
*/
if (rt > env->fbq_type)
continue;
/*
* For ASYM_CPUCAPACITY domains with misfit tasks we simply
* seek the "biggest" misfit task.
*/
if (env->src_grp_type == group_misfit_task) {
if (rq->misfit_task_load > busiest_load) {
busiest_load = rq->misfit_task_load;
busiest = rq;
}
continue;
}
capacity = capacity_of(i);
/*
* For ASYM_CPUCAPACITY domains, don't pick a CPU that could
* eventually lead to active_balancing high->low capacity.
* Higher per-CPU capacity is considered better than balancing
* average load.
*/
if (env->sd->flags & SD_ASYM_CPUCAPACITY &&
capacity_of(env->dst_cpu) < capacity &&
rq->nr_running == 1)
continue;
wl = weighted_cpuload(rq);
/*
* When comparing with imbalance, use weighted_cpuload()
* which is not scaled with the CPU capacity.
*/
if (rq->nr_running == 1 && wl > env->imbalance &&
!check_cpu_capacity(rq, env->sd))
continue;
/*
* For the load comparisons with the other CPU's, consider
* the weighted_cpuload() scaled with the CPU capacity, so
* that the load can be moved away from the CPU that is
* potentially running at a lower capacity.
*
* Thus we're looking for max(wl_i / capacity_i), crosswise
* multiplication to rid ourselves of the division works out
* to: wl_i * capacity_j > wl_j * capacity_i; where j is
* our previous maximum.
*/
if (wl * busiest_capacity > busiest_load * capacity) {
busiest_load = wl;
busiest_capacity = capacity;
busiest = rq;
}
}
return busiest;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FailedJobInterceptor() {}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void encode_openhdr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs_openargs *arg)
{
__be32 *p;
/*
* opcode 4, seqid 4, share_access 4, share_deny 4, clientid 8, ownerlen 4,
* owner 4 = 32
*/
p = reserve_space(xdr, 8);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(OP_OPEN);
*p = cpu_to_be32(arg->seqid->sequence->counter);
encode_share_access(xdr, arg->fmode);
p = reserve_space(xdr, 32);
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, arg->clientid);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(20);
p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, "open id:", 8);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(arg->server->s_dev);
xdr_encode_hyper(p, arg->id);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response PageHandler::SetWebLifecycleState(const std::string& state) {
WebContentsImpl* web_contents = GetWebContents();
if (!web_contents)
return Response::Error("Not attached to a page");
if (state == Page::SetWebLifecycleState::StateEnum::Frozen) {
web_contents->WasHidden();
web_contents->SetPageFrozen(true);
return Response::OK();
}
if (state == Page::SetWebLifecycleState::StateEnum::Active) {
web_contents->SetPageFrozen(false);
return Response::OK();
}
return Response::Error("Unidentified lifecycle state");
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *set_define(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dummy,
const char *name, const char *value)
{
if (cmd->parent && ap_cstr_casecmp(cmd->parent->directive, "<VirtualHost")) {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, cmd->cmd->name, " is not valid in ",
cmd->parent->directive, " context", NULL);
}
if (ap_strchr_c(name, ':') != NULL) {
return "Variable name must not contain ':'";
}
if (!saved_server_config_defines) {
init_config_defines(cmd->pool);
}
if (!ap_exists_config_define(name)) {
*(const char **)apr_array_push(ap_server_config_defines) = name;
}
if (value) {
if (!server_config_defined_vars) {
server_config_defined_vars = apr_table_make(cmd->pool, 5);
}
apr_table_setn(server_config_defined_vars, name, value);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fm10k_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
{
struct fm10k_q_vector *q_vector =
container_of(napi, struct fm10k_q_vector, napi);
struct fm10k_ring *ring;
int per_ring_budget, work_done = 0;
bool clean_complete = true;
fm10k_for_each_ring(ring, q_vector->tx) {
if (!fm10k_clean_tx_irq(q_vector, ring, budget))
clean_complete = false;
}
/* Handle case where we are called by netpoll with a budget of 0 */
if (budget <= 0)
return budget;
/* attempt to distribute budget to each queue fairly, but don't
* allow the budget to go below 1 because we'll exit polling
*/
if (q_vector->rx.count > 1)
per_ring_budget = max(budget / q_vector->rx.count, 1);
else
per_ring_budget = budget;
fm10k_for_each_ring(ring, q_vector->rx) {
int work = fm10k_clean_rx_irq(q_vector, ring, per_ring_budget);
work_done += work;
if (work >= per_ring_budget)
clean_complete = false;
}
/* If all work not completed, return budget and keep polling */
if (!clean_complete)
return budget;
/* Exit the polling mode, but don't re-enable interrupts if stack might
* poll us due to busy-polling
*/
if (likely(napi_complete_done(napi, work_done)))
fm10k_qv_enable(q_vector);
return min(work_done, budget - 1);
}
Commit Message: fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 87,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PPResultAndExceptionToNPResult::PPResultAndExceptionToNPResult(
NPObject* object_var,
NPVariant* np_result)
: object_var_(object_var),
np_result_(np_result),
exception_(PP_MakeUndefined()),
success_(false),
checked_exception_(false) {
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in ppapi code
BUG=77493
TEST=attached test
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6883059
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@82172 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutofillTest() {
EnableDOMAutomation();
}
Commit Message: Convert the autofill interactive browser test to a normal browser_test. I added testing methods to fake input events that don't depend on the OS and being at the front.
BUG=121574
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10368010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135432 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 103,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShouldHideActiveAppsFromShelf() {
return base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
kHideActiveAppsFromShelf);
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Fopen(char *file, char *type)
{
FILE *iop;
#ifndef HAS_SAVED_IDS_AND_SETEUID
struct pid *cur;
int pdes[2], pid;
if (file == NULL || type == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((*type != 'r' && *type != 'w') || type[1])
return NULL;
if ((cur = malloc(sizeof(struct pid))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (pipe(pdes) < 0) {
free(cur);
return NULL;
}
switch (pid = fork()) {
case -1: /* error */
close(pdes[0]);
close(pdes[1]);
free(cur);
return NULL;
case 0: /* child */
if (setgid(getgid()) == -1)
_exit(127);
if (setuid(getuid()) == -1)
_exit(127);
if (*type == 'r') {
if (pdes[1] != 1) {
/* stdout */
dup2(pdes[1], 1);
close(pdes[1]);
}
close(pdes[0]);
} else {
if (pdes[0] != 0) {
/* stdin */
dup2(pdes[0], 0);
close(pdes[0]);
}
close(pdes[1]);
}
execl("/bin/cat", "cat", file, (char *)NULL);
_exit(127);
}
/* Avoid EINTR during stdio calls */
OsBlockSignals ();
/* parent */
if (*type == 'r') {
iop = fdopen(pdes[0], type);
close(pdes[1]);
} else {
iop = fdopen(pdes[1], type);
close(pdes[0]);
}
cur->fp = iop;
cur->pid = pid;
cur->next = pidlist;
pidlist = cur;
DebugF("Fopen(%s), fp = %p\n", file, iop);
return iop;
#else
int ruid, euid;
ruid = getuid();
euid = geteuid();
if (seteuid(ruid) == -1) {
return NULL;
}
iop = fopen(file, type);
if (seteuid(euid) == -1) {
fclose(iop);
return NULL;
}
return iop;
#endif /* HAS_SAVED_IDS_AND_SETEUID */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 13,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_decode_ofp10_phy_port(struct ofputil_phy_port *pp,
const struct ofp10_phy_port *opp)
{
pp->port_no = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(opp->port_no));
pp->hw_addr = opp->hw_addr;
ovs_strlcpy(pp->name, opp->name, OFP_MAX_PORT_NAME_LEN);
pp->config = ntohl(opp->config) & OFPPC10_ALL;
pp->state = ntohl(opp->state) & OFPPS10_ALL;
pp->curr = netdev_port_features_from_ofp10(opp->curr);
pp->advertised = netdev_port_features_from_ofp10(opp->advertised);
pp->supported = netdev_port_features_from_ofp10(opp->supported);
pp->peer = netdev_port_features_from_ofp10(opp->peer);
pp->curr_speed = netdev_features_to_bps(pp->curr, 0) / 1000;
pp->max_speed = netdev_features_to_bps(pp->supported, 0) / 1000;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_close(AVFormatContext *s)
{
MOVContext *mov = s->priv_data;
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
AVStream *st = s->streams[i];
MOVStreamContext *sc = st->priv_data;
av_freep(&sc->ctts_data);
for (j = 0; j < sc->drefs_count; j++) {
av_freep(&sc->drefs[j].path);
av_freep(&sc->drefs[j].dir);
}
av_freep(&sc->drefs);
if (sc->pb && sc->pb != s->pb)
avio_close(sc->pb);
sc->pb = NULL;
av_freep(&sc->chunk_offsets);
av_freep(&sc->keyframes);
av_freep(&sc->sample_sizes);
av_freep(&sc->stps_data);
av_freep(&sc->stsc_data);
av_freep(&sc->stts_data);
}
if (mov->dv_demux) {
for (i = 0; i < mov->dv_fctx->nb_streams; i++) {
av_freep(&mov->dv_fctx->streams[i]->codec);
av_freep(&mov->dv_fctx->streams[i]);
}
av_freep(&mov->dv_fctx);
av_freep(&mov->dv_demux);
}
av_freep(&mov->trex_data);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nested_svm_check_exception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned nr,
bool has_error_code, u32 error_code)
{
int vmexit;
if (!is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu))
return 0;
svm->vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + nr;
svm->vmcb->control.exit_code_hi = 0;
svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = error_code;
svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = svm->vcpu.arch.cr2;
vmexit = nested_svm_intercept(svm);
if (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_DONE)
svm->nested.exit_required = true;
return vmexit;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void update_command_run_log(const char* message, struct analyze_event_data *evd)
{
const bool it_is_a_dot = (message[0] == '.' && message[1] == '\0');
if (!it_is_a_dot)
gtk_label_set_text(g_lbl_event_log, message);
/* Don't append new line behind single dot */
const char *log_msg = it_is_a_dot ? message : xasprintf("%s\n", message);
append_to_textview(g_tv_event_log, log_msg);
save_to_event_log(evd, log_msg);
/* Because of single dot, see lines above */
if (log_msg != message)
free((void *)log_msg);
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::AudioSourceProviderImpl::SetClient(
AudioSourceProviderClient* client) {
MutexLocker locker(provide_input_lock);
if (client)
client_ = new HTMLMediaElement::AudioClientImpl(client);
else
client_.Clear();
if (web_audio_source_provider_)
web_audio_source_provider_->SetClient(client_.Get());
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didChangeScrollOffset(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
render_view_->didChangeScrollOffset(frame);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderFrameObserver, observers_, DidChangeScrollOffset());
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct vhost_fdt_hash_table *mk_vhost_fdt_table_lookup(int id, struct host *host)
{
struct mk_list *head;
struct mk_list *vhost_list;
struct vhost_fdt_host *fdt_host;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_table *ht = NULL;
vhost_list = mk_vhost_fdt_key;
mk_list_foreach(head, vhost_list) {
fdt_host = mk_list_entry(head, struct vhost_fdt_host, _head);
if (fdt_host->host == host) {
ht = &fdt_host->hash_table[id];
return ht;
}
}
return ht;
}
Commit Message: Request: new request session flag to mark those files opened by FDT
This patch aims to fix a potential DDoS problem that can be caused
in the server quering repetitive non-existent resources.
When serving a static file, the core use Vhost FDT mechanism, but if
it sends a static error page it does a direct open(2). When closing
the resources for the same request it was just calling mk_vhost_close()
which did not clear properly the file descriptor.
This patch adds a new field on the struct session_request called 'fd_is_fdt',
which contains MK_TRUE or MK_FALSE depending of how fd_file was opened.
Thanks to Matthew Daley <[email protected]> for report and troubleshoot this
problem.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlinkTestRunner::ReportLeakDetectionResult(
const LeakDetectionResult& report) {
Send(new ShellViewHostMsg_LeakDetectionDone(routing_id(), report));
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GURL NetworkHandler::ClearUrlRef(const GURL& url) {
if (!url.has_ref())
return url;
GURL::Replacements replacements;
replacements.ClearRef();
return url.ReplaceComponents(replacements);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcctl_pre_down_nolock(struct ipc_namespace *ns,
struct ipc_ids *ids, int id, int cmd,
struct ipc64_perm *perm, int extra_perm)
{
kuid_t euid;
int err = -EPERM;
struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp;
ipcp = ipc_obtain_object_check(ids, id);
if (IS_ERR(ipcp)) {
err = PTR_ERR(ipcp);
goto err;
}
audit_ipc_obj(ipcp);
if (cmd == IPC_SET)
audit_ipc_set_perm(extra_perm, perm->uid,
perm->gid, perm->mode);
euid = current_euid();
if (uid_eq(euid, ipcp->cuid) || uid_eq(euid, ipcp->uid) ||
ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ipcp; /* successful lookup */
err:
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 42,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: btpan_interface_t *btif_pan_get_interface()
{
return &pan_if;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(statName)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *self = getThis();
zend_long flags = 0;
struct zip_stat sb;
zend_string *name;
if (!self) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, self);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "P|l", &name, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
PHP_ZIP_STAT_PATH(intern, ZSTR_VAL(name), ZSTR_LEN(name), flags, sb);
RETURN_SB(&sb);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 54,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ff_mpeg4_decode_studio_slice_header(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
GetBitContext *gb = &s->gb;
unsigned vlc_len;
uint16_t mb_num;
if (get_bits_left(gb) >= 32 && get_bits_long(gb, 32) == SLICE_START_CODE) {
vlc_len = av_log2(s->mb_width * s->mb_height) + 1;
mb_num = get_bits(gb, vlc_len);
if (mb_num >= s->mb_num)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
s->mb_x = mb_num % s->mb_width;
s->mb_y = mb_num / s->mb_width;
if (ctx->shape != BIN_ONLY_SHAPE)
s->qscale = mpeg_get_qscale(s);
if (get_bits1(gb)) { /* slice_extension_flag */
skip_bits1(gb); /* intra_slice */
skip_bits1(gb); /* slice_VOP_id_enable */
skip_bits(gb, 6); /* slice_VOP_id */
while (get_bits1(gb)) /* extra_bit_slice */
skip_bits(gb, 8); /* extra_information_slice */
}
reset_studio_dc_predictors(s);
}
else {
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 74,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleShaderBinary(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::ShaderBinary& c) {
#if 1 // No binary shader support.
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glShaderBinary", "not supported");
return error::kNoError;
#else
GLsizei n = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.n);
if (n < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glShaderBinary", "n < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLsizei length = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.length);
if (length < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glShaderBinary", "length < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
uint32 data_size;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(n, sizeof(GLuint), &data_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
const GLuint* shaders = GetSharedMemoryAs<const GLuint*>(
c.shaders_shm_id, c.shaders_shm_offset, data_size);
GLenum binaryformat = static_cast<GLenum>(c.binaryformat);
const void* binary = GetSharedMemoryAs<const void*>(
c.binary_shm_id, c.binary_shm_offset, length);
if (shaders == NULL || binary == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
scoped_ptr<GLuint[]> service_ids(new GLuint[n]);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
Shader* shader = GetShader(shaders[ii]);
if (!shader) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glShaderBinary", "unknown shader");
return error::kNoError;
}
service_ids[ii] = shader->service_id();
}
return error::kNoError;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: irc_server_msgq_flush ()
{
struct t_irc_message *next;
char *ptr_data, *new_msg, *ptr_msg, *pos;
char *nick, *host, *command, *channel, *arguments;
char *msg_decoded, *msg_decoded_without_color;
char str_modifier[64], modifier_data[256];
while (irc_recv_msgq)
{
if (irc_recv_msgq->data)
{
ptr_data = irc_recv_msgq->data;
while (ptr_data[0] == ' ')
{
ptr_data++;
}
if (ptr_data[0])
{
irc_raw_print (irc_recv_msgq->server, IRC_RAW_FLAG_RECV,
ptr_data);
irc_message_parse (ptr_data, NULL, NULL, &command, NULL, NULL);
snprintf (str_modifier, sizeof (str_modifier),
"irc_in_%s",
(command) ? command : "unknown");
new_msg = weechat_hook_modifier_exec (str_modifier,
irc_recv_msgq->server->name,
ptr_data);
if (command)
free (command);
/* no changes in new message */
if (new_msg && (strcmp (ptr_data, new_msg) == 0))
{
free (new_msg);
new_msg = NULL;
}
/* message not dropped? */
if (!new_msg || new_msg[0])
{
/* use new message (returned by plugin) */
ptr_msg = (new_msg) ? new_msg : ptr_data;
while (ptr_msg && ptr_msg[0])
{
pos = strchr (ptr_msg, '\n');
if (pos)
pos[0] = '\0';
if (new_msg)
{
irc_raw_print (irc_recv_msgq->server,
IRC_RAW_FLAG_RECV | IRC_RAW_FLAG_MODIFIED,
ptr_msg);
}
irc_message_parse (ptr_msg, &nick, &host, &command,
&channel, &arguments);
/* convert charset for message */
if (channel && irc_channel_is_channel (channel))
{
snprintf (modifier_data, sizeof (modifier_data),
"%s.%s.%s",
weechat_plugin->name,
irc_recv_msgq->server->name,
channel);
}
else
{
if (nick && (!host || (strcmp (nick, host) != 0)))
{
snprintf (modifier_data, sizeof (modifier_data),
"%s.%s.%s",
weechat_plugin->name,
irc_recv_msgq->server->name,
nick);
}
else
{
snprintf (modifier_data, sizeof (modifier_data),
"%s.%s",
weechat_plugin->name,
irc_recv_msgq->server->name);
}
}
msg_decoded = weechat_hook_modifier_exec ("charset_decode",
modifier_data,
ptr_msg);
/* replace WeeChat internal color codes by "?" */
msg_decoded_without_color =
weechat_string_remove_color ((msg_decoded) ? msg_decoded : ptr_msg,
"?");
/* parse and execute command */
if (irc_redirect_message (irc_recv_msgq->server,
(msg_decoded_without_color) ?
msg_decoded_without_color : ((msg_decoded) ? msg_decoded : ptr_msg),
command, arguments))
{
/* message redirected, we'll not display it! */
}
else
{
/* message not redirected, display it */
irc_protocol_recv_command (irc_recv_msgq->server,
(msg_decoded_without_color) ?
msg_decoded_without_color : ((msg_decoded) ? msg_decoded : ptr_msg),
command,
channel);
}
if (nick)
free (nick);
if (host)
free (host);
if (command)
free (command);
if (channel)
free (channel);
if (arguments)
free (arguments);
if (msg_decoded)
free (msg_decoded);
if (msg_decoded_without_color)
free (msg_decoded_without_color);
if (pos)
{
pos[0] = '\n';
ptr_msg = pos + 1;
}
else
ptr_msg = NULL;
}
}
else
{
irc_raw_print (irc_recv_msgq->server,
IRC_RAW_FLAG_RECV | IRC_RAW_FLAG_MODIFIED,
_("(message dropped)"));
}
if (new_msg)
free (new_msg);
}
free (irc_recv_msgq->data);
}
next = irc_recv_msgq->next_message;
free (irc_recv_msgq);
irc_recv_msgq = next;
if (!irc_recv_msgq)
irc_msgq_last_msg = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TEE_Result syscall_get_property(unsigned long prop_set,
unsigned long index,
void *name, uint32_t *name_len,
void *buf, uint32_t *blen,
uint32_t *prop_type)
{
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
TEE_Result res;
TEE_Result res2;
const struct tee_props *prop;
uint32_t klen;
size_t klen_size;
uint32_t elen;
prop = get_prop_struct(prop_set, index);
if (!prop)
return TEE_ERROR_ITEM_NOT_FOUND;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
/* Get the property type */
if (prop_type) {
res = tee_svc_copy_to_user(prop_type, &prop->prop_type,
sizeof(*prop_type));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
}
/* Get the property */
if (buf && blen) {
res = tee_svc_copy_from_user(&klen, blen, sizeof(klen));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
if (prop->get_prop_func) {
klen_size = klen;
res = prop->get_prop_func(sess, buf, &klen_size);
klen = klen_size;
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(blen, &klen, sizeof(*blen));
} else {
if (klen < prop->len)
res = TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
else
res = tee_svc_copy_to_user(buf, prop->data,
prop->len);
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(blen, &prop->len,
sizeof(*blen));
}
if (res2 != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res2;
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
}
/* Get the property name */
if (name && name_len) {
res = tee_svc_copy_from_user(&klen, name_len, sizeof(klen));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
elen = strlen(prop->name) + 1;
if (klen < elen)
res = TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
else
res = tee_svc_copy_to_user(name, prop->name, elen);
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(name_len, &elen, sizeof(*name_len));
if (res2 != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res2;
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AwContents::OnDraw(JNIEnv* env,
jobject obj,
jobject canvas,
jboolean is_hardware_accelerated,
jint scroll_x,
jint scroll_y,
jint visible_left,
jint visible_top,
jint visible_right,
jint visible_bottom) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
gfx::Vector2d scroll(scroll_x, scroll_y);
browser_view_renderer_.PrepareToDraw(
scroll, gfx::Rect(visible_left, visible_top, visible_right - visible_left,
visible_bottom - visible_top));
if (is_hardware_accelerated && browser_view_renderer_.attached_to_window() &&
!g_force_auxiliary_bitmap_rendering) {
return browser_view_renderer_.OnDrawHardware();
}
gfx::Size view_size = browser_view_renderer_.size();
if (view_size.IsEmpty()) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("android_webview", "EarlyOut_EmptySize",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
return false;
}
scoped_ptr<SoftwareCanvasHolder> canvas_holder = SoftwareCanvasHolder::Create(
canvas, scroll, view_size, g_force_auxiliary_bitmap_rendering);
if (!canvas_holder || !canvas_holder->GetCanvas()) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("android_webview", "EarlyOut_NoSoftwareCanvas",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
return false;
}
return browser_view_renderer_.OnDrawSoftware(canvas_holder->GetCanvas());
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Com_RunAndTimeServerPacket( netadr_t *evFrom, msg_t *buf ) {
int t1, t2, msec;
t1 = 0;
if ( com_speeds->integer ) {
t1 = Sys_Milliseconds ();
}
SV_PacketEvent( *evFrom, buf );
if ( com_speeds->integer ) {
t2 = Sys_Milliseconds ();
msec = t2 - t1;
if ( com_speeds->integer == 3 ) {
Com_Printf( "SV_PacketEvent time: %i\n", msec );
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static AVIndexEntry *mov_find_next_sample(AVFormatContext *s, AVStream **st)
{
AVIndexEntry *sample = NULL;
int64_t best_dts = INT64_MAX;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
AVStream *avst = s->streams[i];
MOVStreamContext *msc = avst->priv_data;
if (msc->pb && msc->current_sample < avst->nb_index_entries) {
AVIndexEntry *current_sample = &avst->index_entries[msc->current_sample];
int64_t dts = av_rescale(current_sample->timestamp, AV_TIME_BASE, msc->time_scale);
av_dlog(s, "stream %d, sample %d, dts %"PRId64"\n", i, msc->current_sample, dts);
if (!sample || (!s->pb->seekable && current_sample->pos < sample->pos) ||
(s->pb->seekable &&
((msc->pb != s->pb && dts < best_dts) || (msc->pb == s->pb &&
((FFABS(best_dts - dts) <= AV_TIME_BASE && current_sample->pos < sample->pos) ||
(FFABS(best_dts - dts) > AV_TIME_BASE && dts < best_dts)))))) {
sample = current_sample;
best_dts = dts;
*st = avst;
}
}
}
return sample;
}
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Size WebContentsImpl::GetPreferredSize() const {
return preferred_size_;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShowTaskManager() {
TaskManagerView::Show(false);
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 106,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AccessControlStatus ScriptResource::CalculateAccessControlStatus() const {
if (GetCORSStatus() == CORSStatus::kServiceWorkerOpaque)
return kOpaqueResource;
if (IsSameOriginOrCORSSuccessful())
return kSharableCrossOrigin;
return kNotSharableCrossOrigin;
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 172,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintingMessageFilter::OnDuplicateSection(
base::SharedMemoryHandle renderer_handle,
base::SharedMemoryHandle* browser_handle) {
base::SharedMemory shared_buf(renderer_handle, true, peer_handle());
shared_buf.GiveToProcess(base::GetCurrentProcessHandle(), browser_handle);
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,483 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderBox::backgroundHasOpaqueTopLayer() const
{
const FillLayer* fillLayer = style()->backgroundLayers();
if (!fillLayer || fillLayer->clip() != BorderFillBox)
return false;
if (hasOverflowClip() && fillLayer->attachment() == LocalBackgroundAttachment)
return false;
if (fillLayer->hasOpaqueImage(this) && fillLayer->hasRepeatXY() && fillLayer->image()->canRender(*this, style()->effectiveZoom()))
return true;
if (!fillLayer->next() && !fillLayer->hasImage()) {
Color bgColor = resolveColor(CSSPropertyBackgroundColor);
if (bgColor.alpha() == 255)
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void prb_setup_retire_blk_timer(struct packet_sock *po)
{
struct tpacket_kbdq_core *pkc;
pkc = GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring);
prb_init_blk_timer(po, pkc, prb_retire_rx_blk_timer_expired);
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void H264SwDecRelease(H264SwDecInst decInst)
{
decContainer_t *pDecCont;
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecRelease#");
if (decInst == NULL)
{
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecRelease# ERROR: decInst == NULL");
return;
}
pDecCont = (decContainer_t*)decInst;
#ifdef H264DEC_TRACE
sprintf(pDecCont->str, "H264SwDecRelease# decInst %p",decInst);
DEC_API_TRC(pDecCont->str);
#endif
h264bsdShutdown(&pDecCont->storage);
H264SwDecFree(pDecCont);
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileReaderLoader::failed(int errorCode)
{
m_errorCode = errorCode;
cleanup();
if (m_client)
m_client->didFail(m_errorCode);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Dispatcher::OnDeliverMessage(int target_port_id, const Message& message) {
scoped_ptr<RequestSender::ScopedTabID> scoped_tab_id;
std::map<int, int>::const_iterator it =
port_to_tab_id_map_.find(target_port_id);
if (it != port_to_tab_id_map_.end()) {
scoped_tab_id.reset(
new RequestSender::ScopedTabID(request_sender(), it->second));
}
MessagingBindings::DeliverMessage(*script_context_set_, target_port_id,
message,
NULL); // All render frames.
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __sum16 __skb_checksum_complete_head(struct sk_buff *skb, int len)
{
__sum16 sum;
sum = csum_fold(skb_checksum(skb, 0, len, skb->csum));
if (likely(!sum)) {
if (unlikely(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE))
netdev_rx_csum_fault(skb->dev);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
}
return sum;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infinite loop in __skb_recv_datagram()
Tommi was fuzzing with trinity and reported the following problem :
commit 3f518bf745 (datagram: Add offset argument to __skb_recv_datagram)
missed that a raw socket receive queue can contain skbs with no payload.
We can loop in __skb_recv_datagram() with MSG_PEEK mode, because
wait_for_packet() is not prepared to skip these skbs.
[ 83.541011] INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: {}
(detected by 0, t=26002 jiffies, g=27673, c=27672, q=75)
[ 83.541011] INFO: Stall ended before state dump start
[ 108.067010] BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [trinity-child31:2847]
...
[ 108.067010] Call Trace:
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc103>] __skb_recv_datagram+0x1a3/0x3b0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc33d>] skb_recv_datagram+0x2d/0x30
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff819ed43d>] rawv6_recvmsg+0xad/0x240
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818c4b04>] sock_common_recvmsg+0x34/0x50
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bc8ec>] sock_recvmsg+0xbc/0xf0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bf31e>] sys_recvfrom+0xde/0x150
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff81ca4329>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ArthurOutputDev::updateFillColor(GfxState *state)
{
GfxRGB rgb;
QColor brushColour = m_currentBrush.color();
state->getFillRGB(&rgb);
brushColour.setRgbF(colToDbl(rgb.r), colToDbl(rgb.g), colToDbl(rgb.b), brushColour.alphaF());
m_currentBrush.setColor(brushColour);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gather_hugetbl_stats(pte_t *pte, unsigned long hmask,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, struct mm_walk *walk)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> withScriptExecutionContextAndScriptStateWithSpacesCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.withScriptExecutionContextAndScriptStateWithSpaces");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EmptyScriptState state;
ScriptExecutionContext* scriptContext = getScriptExecutionContext();
if (!scriptContext)
return v8::Undefined();
RefPtr<TestObj> result = imp->withScriptExecutionContextAndScriptStateWithSpaces(&state, scriptContext);
if (state.hadException())
return throwError(state.exception(), args.GetIsolate());
return toV8(result.release(), args.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsNonBrowserProcess() {
assert(g_process_type != ProcessType::UNINITIALIZED);
return g_process_type != ProcessType::BROWSER_PROCESS;
}
Commit Message: Ignore switches following "--" when parsing a command line.
BUG=933004
[email protected]
Change-Id: I911be4cbfc38a4d41dec85d85f7fe0f50ddca392
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481210
Auto-Submit: Greg Thompson <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634604}
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 152,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int verify_vc_kbmode(int fd) {
int curr_mode;
/*
* Make sure we only adjust consoles in K_XLATE or K_UNICODE mode.
* Otherwise we would (likely) interfere with X11's processing of the
* key events.
*
* http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-February/008573.html
*/
if (ioctl(fd, KDGKBMODE, &curr_mode) < 0)
return -errno;
return IN_SET(curr_mode, K_XLATE, K_UNICODE) ? 0 : -EBUSY;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | 1 | 169,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::AddExperimentalTypes() {
CHECK(initialized());
Experiments experiments;
if (core_->sync_manager()->ReceivedExperiment(&experiments))
frontend_->OnExperimentsChanged(experiments);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool StartupBrowserCreator::ProcessLastOpenedProfiles(
const base::CommandLine& command_line,
const base::FilePath& cur_dir,
chrome::startup::IsProcessStartup is_process_startup,
chrome::startup::IsFirstRun is_first_run,
Profile* last_used_profile,
const Profiles& last_opened_profiles) {
base::CommandLine command_line_without_urls(command_line.GetProgram());
for (auto& switch_pair : command_line.GetSwitches()) {
command_line_without_urls.AppendSwitchNative(switch_pair.first,
switch_pair.second);
}
size_t DEBUG_num_profiles_on_entry = last_opened_profiles.size();
base::debug::Alias(&DEBUG_num_profiles_on_entry);
int DEBUG_loop_counter = 0;
base::debug::Alias(&DEBUG_loop_counter);
base::debug::Alias(&last_opened_profiles);
const Profile* DEBUG_profile_0 = nullptr;
const Profile* DEBUG_profile_1 = nullptr;
if (!last_opened_profiles.empty())
DEBUG_profile_0 = last_opened_profiles[0];
if (last_opened_profiles.size() > 1)
DEBUG_profile_1 = last_opened_profiles[1];
base::debug::Alias(&DEBUG_profile_0);
base::debug::Alias(&DEBUG_profile_1);
size_t DEBUG_num_profiles_at_loop_start = std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max();
base::debug::Alias(&DEBUG_num_profiles_at_loop_start);
auto DEBUG_it_begin = last_opened_profiles.begin();
base::debug::Alias(&DEBUG_it_begin);
auto DEBUG_it_end = last_opened_profiles.end();
base::debug::Alias(&DEBUG_it_end);
for (auto it = last_opened_profiles.begin(); it != last_opened_profiles.end();
++it, ++DEBUG_loop_counter) {
DEBUG_num_profiles_at_loop_start = last_opened_profiles.size();
DCHECK(!(*it)->IsGuestSession());
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (!CanOpenProfileOnStartup(*it))
continue;
if (last_used_profile->IsGuestSession())
last_used_profile = *it;
#endif
SessionStartupPref startup_pref = GetSessionStartupPref(command_line, *it);
if (*it != last_used_profile &&
startup_pref.type == SessionStartupPref::DEFAULT &&
!HasPendingUncleanExit(*it)) {
continue;
}
if (!LaunchBrowser((*it == last_used_profile) ? command_line
: command_line_without_urls,
*it, cur_dir, is_process_startup, is_first_run)) {
return false;
}
is_process_startup = chrome::startup::IS_NOT_PROCESS_STARTUP;
}
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (is_process_startup == chrome::startup::IS_PROCESS_STARTUP)
ShowUserManagerOnStartup(command_line);
else
#endif
profile_launch_observer.Get().set_profile_to_activate(last_used_profile);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Prevent regular mode session startup pref type turning to default.
When user loses past session tabs of regular mode after
invoking a new window from the incognito mode.
This was happening because the SessionStartUpPref type was being set
to default, from last, for regular user mode. This was happening in
the RestoreIfNecessary method where the restoration was taking place
for users whose SessionStartUpPref type was set to last.
The fix was to make the protocol of changing the pref type to
default more explicit to incognito users and not regular users
of pref type last.
Bug: 481373
Change-Id: I96efb4cf196949312181c83c6dcd45986ddded13
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1774441
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rohit Agarwal <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691726}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 137,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void apic_set_spiv(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 val)
{
if ((kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_SPIV) ^ val) & APIC_SPIV_APIC_ENABLED) {
if (val & APIC_SPIV_APIC_ENABLED)
static_key_slow_dec_deferred(&apic_sw_disabled);
else
static_key_slow_inc(&apic_sw_disabled.key);
}
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_SPIV, val);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __poll_t ib_uverbs_comp_event_poll(struct file *filp,
struct poll_table_struct *wait)
{
struct ib_uverbs_completion_event_file *comp_ev_file =
filp->private_data;
return ib_uverbs_event_poll(&comp_ev_file->ev_queue, filp, wait);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xml_parse_file_flags(struct xar *xar, const char *name)
{
const char *flag = NULL;
if (strcmp(name, "UserNoDump") == 0) {
xar->xmlsts = FILE_FLAGS_USER_NODUMP;
flag = "nodump";
}
else if (strcmp(name, "UserImmutable") == 0) {
xar->xmlsts = FILE_FLAGS_USER_IMMUTABLE;
flag = "uimmutable";
}
else if (strcmp(name, "UserAppend") == 0) {
xar->xmlsts = FILE_FLAGS_USER_APPEND;
flag = "uappend";
}
else if (strcmp(name, "UserOpaque") == 0) {
xar->xmlsts = FILE_FLAGS_USER_OPAQUE;
flag = "opaque";
}
else if (strcmp(name, "UserNoUnlink") == 0) {
xar->xmlsts = FILE_FLAGS_USER_NOUNLINK;
flag = "nouunlink";
}
else if (strcmp(name, "SystemArchived") == 0) {
xar->xmlsts = FILE_FLAGS_SYS_ARCHIVED;
flag = "archived";
}
else if (strcmp(name, "SystemImmutable") == 0) {
xar->xmlsts = FILE_FLAGS_SYS_IMMUTABLE;
flag = "simmutable";
}
else if (strcmp(name, "SystemAppend") == 0) {
xar->xmlsts = FILE_FLAGS_SYS_APPEND;
flag = "sappend";
}
else if (strcmp(name, "SystemNoUnlink") == 0) {
xar->xmlsts = FILE_FLAGS_SYS_NOUNLINK;
flag = "nosunlink";
}
else if (strcmp(name, "SystemSnapshot") == 0) {
xar->xmlsts = FILE_FLAGS_SYS_SNAPSHOT;
flag = "snapshot";
}
if (flag == NULL)
return (0);
xar->file->has |= HAS_FFLAGS;
if (archive_strlen(&(xar->file->fflags_text)) > 0)
archive_strappend_char(&(xar->file->fflags_text), ',');
archive_strcat(&(xar->file->fflags_text), flag);
return (1);
}
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 61,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pch_timestr (bool which)
{
return p_timestr[which];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 2,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::ClearAllPowerSaveBlockers() {
for (PowerSaveBlockerMap::iterator i(power_save_blockers_.begin());
i != power_save_blockers_.end(); ++i)
STLDeleteValues(&power_save_blockers_[i->first]);
power_save_blockers_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct list_head *rb_list_head(struct list_head *list)
{
unsigned long val = (unsigned long)list;
return (struct list_head *)(val & ~RB_FLAG_MASK);
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: [email protected] # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DiscardableMemoryImpl(ClientDiscardableSharedMemoryManager* manager,
std::unique_ptr<DiscardableSharedMemoryHeap::Span> span)
: manager_(manager), span_(std::move(span)), is_locked_(true) {}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetUpEnvironment() {
ImageTransportFactory::SetFactory(
std::make_unique<TestImageTransportFactory>());
aura_test_helper_.reset(new aura::test::AuraTestHelper());
aura_test_helper_->SetUp(
ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance()->GetContextFactory(),
ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance()->GetContextFactoryPrivate());
new wm::DefaultActivationClient(aura_test_helper_->root_window());
browser_context_.reset(new TestBrowserContext);
process_host_ = new MockRenderProcessHost(browser_context_.get());
process_host_->Init();
sink_ = &process_host_->sink();
int32_t routing_id = process_host_->GetNextRoutingID();
delegates_.push_back(base::WrapUnique(new MockRenderWidgetHostDelegate));
parent_host_ = MockRenderWidgetHostImpl::Create(delegates_.back().get(),
process_host_, routing_id);
delegates_.back()->set_widget_host(parent_host_);
const bool is_mus_browser_plugin_guest = false;
parent_view_ = new RenderWidgetHostViewAura(
parent_host_, is_guest_view_hack_, is_mus_browser_plugin_guest);
parent_view_->InitAsChild(nullptr);
aura::client::ParentWindowWithContext(parent_view_->GetNativeView(),
aura_test_helper_->root_window(),
gfx::Rect());
view_ = CreateView(is_guest_view_hack_);
widget_host_ = static_cast<MockRenderWidgetHostImpl*>(view_->host());
view_->event_handler()->set_mouse_wheel_wheel_phase_handler_timeout(
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(100));
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int DCTStream::readHuffSym(DCTHuffTable *table) {
Gushort code;
int bit;
int codeBits;
code = 0;
codeBits = 0;
do {
if ((bit = readBit()) == EOF) {
return 9999;
}
code = (code << 1) + bit;
++codeBits;
if (code < table->firstCode[codeBits]) {
break;
}
if (code - table->firstCode[codeBits] < table->numCodes[codeBits]) {
code -= table->firstCode[codeBits];
return table->sym[table->firstSym[codeBits] + code];
}
} while (codeBits < 16);
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(), "Bad Huffman code in DCT stream");
return 9999;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lua_ap_requestbody(lua_State *L)
{
const char *filename;
request_rec *r;
apr_off_t maxSize;
r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
filename = luaL_optstring(L, 2, 0);
maxSize = luaL_optint(L, 3, 0);
if (r) {
apr_off_t size;
if (maxSize > 0 && r->remaining > maxSize) {
lua_pushnil(L);
lua_pushliteral(L, "Request body was larger than the permitted size.");
return 2;
}
if (r->method_number != M_POST && r->method_number != M_PUT)
return (0);
if (!filename) {
const char *data;
if (lua_read_body(r, &data, &size, maxSize) != OK)
return (0);
lua_pushlstring(L, data, (size_t) size);
lua_pushinteger(L, (lua_Integer) size);
return (2);
} else {
apr_status_t rc;
apr_file_t *file;
rc = apr_file_open(&file, filename, APR_CREATE | APR_FOPEN_WRITE,
APR_FPROT_OS_DEFAULT, r->pool);
lua_settop(L, 0);
if (rc == APR_SUCCESS) {
rc = lua_write_body(r, file, &size);
apr_file_close(file);
if (rc != OK) {
lua_pushboolean(L, 0);
return 1;
}
lua_pushinteger(L, (lua_Integer) size);
return (1);
} else
lua_pushboolean(L, 0);
return (1);
}
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 45,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::AccessibilityLocationChangesReceived(
const std::vector<AXLocationChangeNotificationDetails>& details) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.AccessibilityLocationChangesReceived(details);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Debugger::clearBreakpoints()
{
v8::HandleScope scope(m_isolate);
v8::Context::Scope contextScope(debuggerContext());
v8::Local<v8::Function> clearBreakpoints = v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(m_debuggerScript.Get(m_isolate)->Get(toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "clearBreakpoints")));
v8::Debug::Call(debuggerContext(), clearBreakpoints).ToLocalChecked();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayerTreeHostTestContinuousDrawWhenCreatingVisibleTiles()
: playback_allowed_event_(base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::MANUAL,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::SIGNALED) {}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wifi_error wifi_set_nodfs_flag(wifi_interface_handle handle, u32 nodfs)
{
SetNodfsCommand command(handle, nodfs);
return (wifi_error) command.requestResponse();
}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in wifi_cleanup()
Release reference to cmd only after possibly calling getType().
BUG: 25753768
Change-Id: Id2156ce51acec04e8364706cf7eafc7d4adae9eb
(cherry picked from commit d7f3cb9915d9ac514393d0ad7767662958054b8f https://googleplex-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/815223)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CL_Cache_MapChange_f( void ) {
cacheIndex++;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* async_message_thread (void *input)
{
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *buffer;
struct v4l2_plane plane[VIDEO_MAX_PLANES];
struct pollfd pfd;
struct v4l2_buffer v4l2_buf;
memset((void *)&v4l2_buf,0,sizeof(v4l2_buf));
struct v4l2_event dqevent;
omx_vdec *omx = reinterpret_cast<omx_vdec*>(input);
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLRDBAND | POLLPRI;
pfd.fd = omx->drv_ctx.video_driver_fd;
int error_code = 0,rc=0,bytes_read = 0,bytes_written = 0;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("omx_vdec: Async thread start");
prctl(PR_SET_NAME, (unsigned long)"VideoDecCallBackThread", 0, 0, 0);
while (1) {
rc = poll(&pfd, 1, POLL_TIMEOUT);
if (!rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Poll timedout");
break;
} else if (rc < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error while polling: %d", rc);
break;
}
if ((pfd.revents & POLLIN) || (pfd.revents & POLLRDNORM)) {
struct vdec_msginfo vdec_msg;
memset(&vdec_msg, 0, sizeof(vdec_msg));
v4l2_buf.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
v4l2_buf.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_USERPTR;
v4l2_buf.length = omx->drv_ctx.num_planes;
v4l2_buf.m.planes = plane;
while (!ioctl(pfd.fd, VIDIOC_DQBUF, &v4l2_buf)) {
vdec_msg.msgcode=VDEC_MSG_RESP_OUTPUT_BUFFER_DONE;
vdec_msg.status_code=VDEC_S_SUCCESS;
vdec_msg.msgdata.output_frame.client_data=(void*)&v4l2_buf;
vdec_msg.msgdata.output_frame.len=plane[0].bytesused;
vdec_msg.msgdata.output_frame.bufferaddr=(void*)plane[0].m.userptr;
vdec_msg.msgdata.output_frame.time_stamp= ((uint64_t)v4l2_buf.timestamp.tv_sec * (uint64_t)1000000) +
(uint64_t)v4l2_buf.timestamp.tv_usec;
if (vdec_msg.msgdata.output_frame.len) {
vdec_msg.msgdata.output_frame.framesize.left = plane[0].reserved[2];
vdec_msg.msgdata.output_frame.framesize.top = plane[0].reserved[3];
vdec_msg.msgdata.output_frame.framesize.right = plane[0].reserved[4];
vdec_msg.msgdata.output_frame.framesize.bottom = plane[0].reserved[5];
vdec_msg.msgdata.output_frame.picsize.frame_width = plane[0].reserved[6];
vdec_msg.msgdata.output_frame.picsize.frame_height = plane[0].reserved[7];
}
if (omx->async_message_process(input,&vdec_msg) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("async_message_thread Exited");
break;
}
}
}
if ((pfd.revents & POLLOUT) || (pfd.revents & POLLWRNORM)) {
struct vdec_msginfo vdec_msg;
v4l2_buf.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
v4l2_buf.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_USERPTR;
v4l2_buf.length = 1;
v4l2_buf.m.planes = plane;
while (!ioctl(pfd.fd, VIDIOC_DQBUF, &v4l2_buf)) {
vdec_msg.msgcode=VDEC_MSG_RESP_INPUT_BUFFER_DONE;
vdec_msg.status_code=VDEC_S_SUCCESS;
vdec_msg.msgdata.input_frame_clientdata=(void*)&v4l2_buf;
if (omx->async_message_process(input,&vdec_msg) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("async_message_thread Exited");
break;
}
}
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLPRI) {
rc = ioctl(pfd.fd, VIDIOC_DQEVENT, &dqevent);
if (dqevent.type == V4L2_EVENT_MSM_VIDC_PORT_SETTINGS_CHANGED_INSUFFICIENT ) {
struct vdec_msginfo vdec_msg;
vdec_msg.msgcode=VDEC_MSG_EVT_CONFIG_CHANGED;
vdec_msg.status_code=VDEC_S_SUCCESS;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("VIDC Port Reconfig recieved insufficient");
if (omx->async_message_process(input,&vdec_msg) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("async_message_thread Exited");
break;
}
} else if (dqevent.type == V4L2_EVENT_MSM_VIDC_FLUSH_DONE) {
struct vdec_msginfo vdec_msg;
vdec_msg.msgcode=VDEC_MSG_RESP_FLUSH_INPUT_DONE;
vdec_msg.status_code=VDEC_S_SUCCESS;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("VIDC Input Flush Done Recieved");
if (omx->async_message_process(input,&vdec_msg) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("async_message_thread Exited");
break;
}
vdec_msg.msgcode=VDEC_MSG_RESP_FLUSH_OUTPUT_DONE;
vdec_msg.status_code=VDEC_S_SUCCESS;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("VIDC Output Flush Done Recieved");
if (omx->async_message_process(input,&vdec_msg) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("async_message_thread Exited");
break;
}
} else if (dqevent.type == V4L2_EVENT_MSM_VIDC_CLOSE_DONE) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("VIDC Close Done Recieved and async_message_thread Exited");
break;
} else if (dqevent.type == V4L2_EVENT_MSM_VIDC_HW_OVERLOAD) {
struct vdec_msginfo vdec_msg;
vdec_msg.msgcode=VDEC_MSG_EVT_HW_OVERLOAD;
vdec_msg.status_code=VDEC_S_SUCCESS;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("HW Overload received");
if (omx->async_message_process(input,&vdec_msg) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("async_message_thread Exited");
break;
}
} else if (dqevent.type == V4L2_EVENT_MSM_VIDC_HW_UNSUPPORTED) {
struct vdec_msginfo vdec_msg;
vdec_msg.msgcode=VDEC_MSG_EVT_HW_UNSUPPORTED;
vdec_msg.status_code=VDEC_S_SUCCESS;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("HW Unsupported received");
if (omx->async_message_process(input,&vdec_msg) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("async_message_thread Exited");
break;
}
} else if (dqevent.type == V4L2_EVENT_MSM_VIDC_SYS_ERROR) {
struct vdec_msginfo vdec_msg;
vdec_msg.msgcode=VDEC_MSG_EVT_HW_ERROR;
vdec_msg.status_code=VDEC_S_SUCCESS;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("SYS Error Recieved");
if (omx->async_message_process(input,&vdec_msg) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("async_message_thread Exited");
break;
}
} else if (dqevent.type == V4L2_EVENT_MSM_VIDC_RELEASE_BUFFER_REFERENCE) {
unsigned int *ptr = (unsigned int *)(void *)dqevent.u.data;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("REFERENCE RELEASE EVENT RECVD fd = %d offset = %d", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
omx->buf_ref_remove(ptr[0], ptr[1]);
} else if (dqevent.type == V4L2_EVENT_MSM_VIDC_RELEASE_UNQUEUED_BUFFER) {
unsigned int *ptr = (unsigned int *)(void *)dqevent.u.data;
struct vdec_msginfo vdec_msg;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Release unqueued buffer event recvd fd = %d offset = %d", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
v4l2_buf.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
v4l2_buf.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_USERPTR;
v4l2_buf.length = omx->drv_ctx.num_planes;
v4l2_buf.m.planes = plane;
v4l2_buf.index = ptr[5];
v4l2_buf.flags = 0;
vdec_msg.msgcode=VDEC_MSG_RESP_OUTPUT_BUFFER_DONE;
vdec_msg.status_code=VDEC_S_SUCCESS;
vdec_msg.msgdata.output_frame.client_data = (void*)&v4l2_buf;
vdec_msg.msgdata.output_frame.len = 0;
vdec_msg.msgdata.output_frame.bufferaddr = (void*)(intptr_t)ptr[2];
vdec_msg.msgdata.output_frame.time_stamp = ((uint64_t)ptr[3] * (uint64_t)1000000) +
(uint64_t)ptr[4];
if (omx->async_message_process(input,&vdec_msg) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("async_message_thread Exitedn");
break;
}
}
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("VIDC Some Event recieved");
continue;
}
}
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("omx_vdec: Async thread stop");
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t RenderView::GetRenderViewCount() {
return g_view_map.Get().size();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ftp_mkdir(ftpbuf_t *ftp, const char *dir)
{
char *mkd, *end;
if (ftp == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (!ftp_putcmd(ftp, "MKD", dir)) {
return NULL;
}
if (!ftp_getresp(ftp) || ftp->resp != 257) {
return NULL;
}
/* copy out the dir from response */
if ((mkd = strchr(ftp->inbuf, '"')) == NULL) {
mkd = estrdup(dir);
return mkd;
}
if ((end = strrchr(++mkd, '"')) == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
*end = 0;
mkd = estrdup(mkd);
*end = '"';
return mkd;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFINE_TRACE(HTMLMediaElement::AudioClientImpl) {
visitor->trace(m_client);
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline ssize_t RandomX(RandomInfo *random_info,const size_t columns)
{
return((ssize_t) (columns*GetPseudoRandomValue(random_info)));
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 73,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: P2PQuicStreamImpl::P2PQuicStreamImpl(quic::QuicStreamId id,
quic::QuicSession* session)
: quic::QuicStream(id, session, /*is_static=*/false, quic::BIDIRECTIONAL) {}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 172,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document* DocumentLoader::document() const
{
if (m_frame && m_frame->loader()->documentLoader() == this)
return m_frame->document();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String AXObject::name(AXNameFrom& nameFrom,
AXObject::AXObjectVector* nameObjects) const {
HeapHashSet<Member<const AXObject>> visited;
AXRelatedObjectVector relatedObjects;
String text = textAlternative(false, false, visited, nameFrom,
&relatedObjects, nullptr);
AccessibilityRole role = roleValue();
if (!getNode() || (!isHTMLBRElement(getNode()) && role != StaticTextRole &&
role != InlineTextBoxRole))
text = collapseWhitespace(text);
if (nameObjects) {
nameObjects->clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < relatedObjects.size(); i++)
nameObjects->push_back(relatedObjects[i]->object);
}
return text;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: enum nss_status _nss_mymachines_gethostbyname3_r(
const char *name,
int af,
struct hostent *result,
char *buffer, size_t buflen,
int *errnop, int *h_errnop,
int32_t *ttlp,
char **canonp) {
_cleanup_bus_message_unref_ sd_bus_message* reply = NULL;
_cleanup_bus_flush_close_unref_ sd_bus *bus = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *class = NULL;
unsigned c = 0, i = 0;
char *r_name, *r_aliases, *r_addr, *r_addr_list;
size_t l, idx, ms, alen;
int r;
assert(name);
assert(result);
assert(buffer);
assert(errnop);
assert(h_errnop);
if (af == AF_UNSPEC)
af = AF_INET;
if (af != AF_INET && af != AF_INET6) {
r = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
goto fail;
}
r = sd_machine_get_class(name, &class);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
if (!streq(class, "container")) {
r = -ENOTTY;
goto fail;
}
r = sd_bus_open_system(&bus);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_call_method(bus,
"org.freedesktop.machine1",
"/org/freedesktop/machine1",
"org.freedesktop.machine1.Manager",
"GetMachineAddresses",
NULL,
&reply,
"s", name);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_message_enter_container(reply, 'a', "(iay)");
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = count_addresses(reply, af, &c);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
if (c <= 0) {
*errnop = ENOENT;
*h_errnop = HOST_NOT_FOUND;
return NSS_STATUS_NOTFOUND;
}
alen = FAMILY_ADDRESS_SIZE(af);
l = strlen(name);
ms = ALIGN(l+1) + c * ALIGN(alen) + (c+2) * sizeof(char*);
if (buflen < ms) {
*errnop = ENOMEM;
*h_errnop = NO_RECOVERY;
return NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN;
}
/* First, append name */
r_name = buffer;
memcpy(r_name, name, l+1);
idx = ALIGN(l+1);
/* Second, create aliases array */
r_aliases = buffer + idx;
((char**) r_aliases)[0] = NULL;
idx += sizeof(char*);
/* Third, append addresses */
r_addr = buffer + idx;
while ((r = sd_bus_message_enter_container(reply, 'r', "iay")) > 0) {
int family;
const void *a;
size_t sz;
r = sd_bus_message_read(reply, "i", &family);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_message_read_array(reply, 'y', &a, &sz);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_message_exit_container(reply);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
if (family != af)
continue;
if (sz != alen) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
memcpy(r_addr + i*ALIGN(alen), a, alen);
i++;
}
assert(i == c);
idx += c * ALIGN(alen);
r = sd_bus_message_exit_container(reply);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
/* Third, append address pointer array */
r_addr_list = buffer + idx;
for (i = 0; i < c; i++)
((char**) r_addr_list)[i] = r_addr + i*ALIGN(alen);
((char**) r_addr_list)[i] = NULL;
idx += (c+1) * sizeof(char*);
assert(idx == ms);
result->h_name = r_name;
result->h_aliases = (char**) r_aliases;
result->h_addrtype = af;
result->h_length = alen;
result->h_addr_list = (char**) r_addr_list;
if (ttlp)
*ttlp = 0;
if (canonp)
*canonp = r_name;
/* Explicitly reset all error variables */
*errnop = 0;
*h_errnop = NETDB_SUCCESS;
h_errno = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
fail:
*errnop = -r;
*h_errnop = NO_DATA;
return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
}
Commit Message: nss-mymachines: do not allow overlong machine names
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/2002
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 74,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClientControlledShellSurface::OnSetFrame(SurfaceFrameType type) {
if (container_ == ash::kShellWindowId_SystemModalContainer &&
type != SurfaceFrameType::NONE) {
LOG(WARNING)
<< "A surface in system modal container should not have a frame:"
<< static_cast<int>(type);
return;
}
EventTargetingBlocker blocker;
bool suppress_mouse_event = frame_type_ != type && widget_;
if (suppress_mouse_event)
blocker.Block(widget_->GetNativeWindow());
ShellSurfaceBase::OnSetFrame(type);
UpdateAutoHideFrame();
if (suppress_mouse_event)
UpdateSurfaceBounds();
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 137,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnRenderAutoResized(const gfx::Size& new_size) {
delegate_->ResizeDueToAutoResize(new_size);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,253 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltChooseComp(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemChoosePtr comp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp;
#endif
if ((style == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp = (xsltStyleItemChoosePtr)
xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_CHOOSE);
#else
comp = xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_CHOOSE);
#endif
if (comp == NULL)
return;
inst->psvi = comp;
comp->inst = inst;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ImportTIFF_CFATable ( const TIFF_Manager::TagInfo & tagInfo, bool nativeEndian,
SXMPMeta * xmp, const char * xmpNS, const char * xmpProp )
{
try { // Don't let errors with one stop the others.
const XMP_Uns8 * bytePtr = (XMP_Uns8*)tagInfo.dataPtr;
const XMP_Uns8 * byteEnd = bytePtr + tagInfo.dataLen;
XMP_Uns16 columns = *((XMP_Uns16*)bytePtr);
XMP_Uns16 rows = *((XMP_Uns16*)(bytePtr+2));
if ( ! nativeEndian ) {
columns = Flip2 ( columns );
rows = Flip2 ( rows );
}
char buffer[20];
std::string arrayPath;
snprintf ( buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%d", columns ); // AUDIT: Use of sizeof(buffer) is safe.
xmp->SetStructField ( xmpNS, xmpProp, kXMP_NS_EXIF, "Columns", buffer );
snprintf ( buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%d", rows ); // AUDIT: Use of sizeof(buffer) is safe.
xmp->SetStructField ( xmpNS, xmpProp, kXMP_NS_EXIF, "Rows", buffer );
bytePtr += 4; // Move to the matrix of values.
if ( (byteEnd - bytePtr) != (columns * rows) ) goto BadExif; // Make sure the values are present.
SXMPUtils::ComposeStructFieldPath ( xmpNS, xmpProp, kXMP_NS_EXIF, "Values", &arrayPath );
for ( size_t i = (columns * rows); i > 0; --i, ++bytePtr ) {
snprintf ( buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%hu", (XMP_Uns16)(*bytePtr) ); // AUDIT: Use of sizeof(buffer) is safe.
xmp->AppendArrayItem ( xmpNS, arrayPath.c_str(), kXMP_PropArrayIsOrdered, buffer );
}
return;
BadExif: // Ignore the tag if the table is ill-formed.
xmp->DeleteProperty ( xmpNS, xmpProp );
return;
} catch ( ... ) {
}
} // ImportTIFF_CFATable
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOLEAN check_cached_remote_name(tBTA_DM_SEARCH *p_search_data,
UINT8 *p_remote_name, UINT8 *p_remote_name_len)
{
bt_bdname_t bdname;
bt_bdaddr_t remote_bdaddr;
bt_property_t prop_name;
/* check if we already have it in our btif_storage cache */
bdcpy(remote_bdaddr.address, p_search_data->inq_res.bd_addr);
BTIF_STORAGE_FILL_PROPERTY(&prop_name, BT_PROPERTY_BDNAME,
sizeof(bt_bdname_t), &bdname);
if (btif_storage_get_remote_device_property(
&remote_bdaddr, &prop_name) == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS)
{
if (p_remote_name && p_remote_name_len)
{
strcpy((char *)p_remote_name, (char *)bdname.name);
*p_remote_name_len = strlen((char *)p_remote_name);
}
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::PrepareToShow() {
actor_->PrepareToShow();
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void http_txn_reset_res(struct http_txn *txn)
{
txn->rsp.flags = 0;
txn->rsp.sol = txn->rsp.eol = txn->rsp.eoh = 0; /* relative to the buffer */
txn->rsp.next = 0;
txn->rsp.chunk_len = 0LL;
txn->rsp.body_len = 0LL;
txn->rsp.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_RPBEFORE; /* at the very beginning of the response */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_freq(RangeCoder *rc, unsigned total_freq, unsigned *freq)
{
if (total_freq == 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
rc->range = rc->range / total_freq;
if (rc->range == 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
*freq = rc->code / rc->range;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/scpr: Check y in first line loop in decompress_i()
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1478/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5285486908145664
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init regulator_init(void)
{
int ret;
ret = class_register(®ulator_class);
debugfs_root = debugfs_create_dir("regulator", NULL);
if (!debugfs_root)
pr_warn("regulator: Failed to create debugfs directory\n");
debugfs_create_file("supply_map", 0444, debugfs_root, NULL,
&supply_map_fops);
regulator_dummy_init();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,514 |
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