instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
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int64 0
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int64 0
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: megasas_host_device_list_query(struct megasas_instance *instance,
bool is_probe)
{
int ret, i, target_id;
struct megasas_cmd *cmd;
struct megasas_dcmd_frame *dcmd;
struct MR_HOST_DEVICE_LIST *ci;
u32 count;
dma_addr_t ci_h;
ci = instance->host_device_list_buf;
ci_h = instance->host_device_list_buf_h;
cmd = megasas_get_cmd(instance);
if (!cmd) {
dev_warn(&instance->pdev->dev,
"%s: failed to get cmd\n",
__func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
dcmd = &cmd->frame->dcmd;
memset(ci, 0, sizeof(*ci));
memset(dcmd->mbox.b, 0, MFI_MBOX_SIZE);
dcmd->mbox.b[0] = is_probe ? 0 : 1;
dcmd->cmd = MFI_CMD_DCMD;
dcmd->cmd_status = MFI_STAT_INVALID_STATUS;
dcmd->sge_count = 1;
dcmd->flags = MFI_FRAME_DIR_READ;
dcmd->timeout = 0;
dcmd->pad_0 = 0;
dcmd->data_xfer_len = cpu_to_le32(HOST_DEVICE_LIST_SZ);
dcmd->opcode = cpu_to_le32(MR_DCMD_CTRL_DEVICE_LIST_GET);
megasas_set_dma_settings(instance, dcmd, ci_h, HOST_DEVICE_LIST_SZ);
if (!instance->mask_interrupts) {
ret = megasas_issue_blocked_cmd(instance, cmd,
MFI_IO_TIMEOUT_SECS);
} else {
ret = megasas_issue_polled(instance, cmd);
cmd->flags |= DRV_DCMD_SKIP_REFIRE;
}
switch (ret) {
case DCMD_SUCCESS:
/* Fill the internal pd_list and ld_ids array based on
* targetIds returned by FW
*/
count = le32_to_cpu(ci->count);
memset(instance->local_pd_list, 0,
MEGASAS_MAX_PD * sizeof(struct megasas_pd_list));
memset(instance->ld_ids, 0xff, MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES_EXT);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
target_id = le16_to_cpu(ci->host_device_list[i].target_id);
if (ci->host_device_list[i].flags.u.bits.is_sys_pd) {
instance->local_pd_list[target_id].tid = target_id;
instance->local_pd_list[target_id].driveType =
ci->host_device_list[i].scsi_type;
instance->local_pd_list[target_id].driveState =
MR_PD_STATE_SYSTEM;
} else {
instance->ld_ids[target_id] = target_id;
}
}
memcpy(instance->pd_list, instance->local_pd_list,
sizeof(instance->pd_list));
break;
case DCMD_TIMEOUT:
switch (dcmd_timeout_ocr_possible(instance)) {
case INITIATE_OCR:
cmd->flags |= DRV_DCMD_SKIP_REFIRE;
megasas_reset_fusion(instance->host,
MFI_IO_TIMEOUT_OCR);
break;
case KILL_ADAPTER:
megaraid_sas_kill_hba(instance);
break;
case IGNORE_TIMEOUT:
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev, "Ignore DCMD timeout: %s %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__);
break;
}
break;
case DCMD_FAILED:
dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev,
"%s: MR_DCMD_CTRL_DEVICE_LIST_GET failed\n",
__func__);
break;
}
if (ret != DCMD_TIMEOUT)
megasas_return_cmd(instance, cmd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<WebUIImpl> WebContentsImpl::CreateWebUI(const GURL& url) {
std::unique_ptr<WebUIImpl> web_ui = std::make_unique<WebUIImpl>(this);
std::unique_ptr<WebUIController> controller(
WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()
->CreateWebUIControllerForURL(web_ui.get(), url));
if (controller) {
web_ui->AddMessageHandler(std::make_unique<GenericHandler>());
web_ui->SetController(std::move(controller));
return web_ui;
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 144,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DownloadURL(const blink::WebURLRequest& request,
const blink::WebString& suggested_name) {
FrameHostMsg_DownloadUrl_Params params;
params.render_view_id = render_view_->GetRoutingID();
params.render_frame_id = GetRoutingID();
params.url = request.Url();
params.referrer = RenderViewImpl::GetReferrerFromRequest(frame_, request);
params.initiator_origin = request.RequestorOrigin();
params.suggested_name = suggested_name.Utf16();
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DownloadUrl(params));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *Type_MPEclut_Read(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, cmsUInt32Number* nItems, cmsUInt32Number SizeOfTag)
{
cmsStage* mpe = NULL;
cmsUInt16Number InputChans, OutputChans;
cmsUInt8Number Dimensions8[16];
cmsUInt32Number i, nMaxGrids, GridPoints[MAX_INPUT_DIMENSIONS];
_cmsStageCLutData* clut;
if (!_cmsReadUInt16Number(io, &InputChans)) return NULL;
if (!_cmsReadUInt16Number(io, &OutputChans)) return NULL;
if (InputChans == 0) goto Error;
if (OutputChans == 0) goto Error;
if (io ->Read(io, Dimensions8, sizeof(cmsUInt8Number), 16) != 16)
goto Error;
nMaxGrids = InputChans > MAX_INPUT_DIMENSIONS ? MAX_INPUT_DIMENSIONS : InputChans;
for (i=0; i < nMaxGrids; i++) GridPoints[i] = (cmsUInt32Number) Dimensions8[i];
mpe = cmsStageAllocCLutFloatGranular(self ->ContextID, GridPoints, InputChans, OutputChans, NULL);
if (mpe == NULL) goto Error;
clut = (_cmsStageCLutData*) mpe ->Data;
for (i=0; i < clut ->nEntries; i++) {
if (!_cmsReadFloat32Number(io, &clut ->Tab.TFloat[i])) goto Error;
}
*nItems = 1;
return mpe;
Error:
*nItems = 0;
if (mpe != NULL) cmsStageFree(mpe);
return NULL;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(SizeOfTag);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 71,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_create_session(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
struct nfsd4_create_session *cr_ses)
{
struct sockaddr *sa = svc_addr(rqstp);
struct nfs4_client *conf, *unconf;
struct nfs4_client *old = NULL;
struct nfsd4_session *new;
struct nfsd4_conn *conn;
struct nfsd4_clid_slot *cs_slot = NULL;
__be32 status = 0;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), nfsd_net_id);
if (cr_ses->flags & ~SESSION4_FLAG_MASK_A)
return nfserr_inval;
status = nfsd4_check_cb_sec(&cr_ses->cb_sec);
if (status)
return status;
status = check_forechannel_attrs(&cr_ses->fore_channel, nn);
if (status)
return status;
status = check_backchannel_attrs(&cr_ses->back_channel);
if (status)
goto out_release_drc_mem;
status = nfserr_jukebox;
new = alloc_session(&cr_ses->fore_channel, &cr_ses->back_channel);
if (!new)
goto out_release_drc_mem;
conn = alloc_conn_from_crses(rqstp, cr_ses);
if (!conn)
goto out_free_session;
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
unconf = find_unconfirmed_client(&cr_ses->clientid, true, nn);
conf = find_confirmed_client(&cr_ses->clientid, true, nn);
WARN_ON_ONCE(conf && unconf);
if (conf) {
status = nfserr_wrong_cred;
if (!nfsd4_mach_creds_match(conf, rqstp))
goto out_free_conn;
cs_slot = &conf->cl_cs_slot;
status = check_slot_seqid(cr_ses->seqid, cs_slot->sl_seqid, 0);
if (status) {
if (status == nfserr_replay_cache)
status = nfsd4_replay_create_session(cr_ses, cs_slot);
goto out_free_conn;
}
} else if (unconf) {
if (!same_creds(&unconf->cl_cred, &rqstp->rq_cred) ||
!rpc_cmp_addr(sa, (struct sockaddr *) &unconf->cl_addr)) {
status = nfserr_clid_inuse;
goto out_free_conn;
}
status = nfserr_wrong_cred;
if (!nfsd4_mach_creds_match(unconf, rqstp))
goto out_free_conn;
cs_slot = &unconf->cl_cs_slot;
status = check_slot_seqid(cr_ses->seqid, cs_slot->sl_seqid, 0);
if (status) {
/* an unconfirmed replay returns misordered */
status = nfserr_seq_misordered;
goto out_free_conn;
}
old = find_confirmed_client_by_name(&unconf->cl_name, nn);
if (old) {
status = mark_client_expired_locked(old);
if (status) {
old = NULL;
goto out_free_conn;
}
}
move_to_confirmed(unconf);
conf = unconf;
} else {
status = nfserr_stale_clientid;
goto out_free_conn;
}
status = nfs_ok;
/* Persistent sessions are not supported */
cr_ses->flags &= ~SESSION4_PERSIST;
/* Upshifting from TCP to RDMA is not supported */
cr_ses->flags &= ~SESSION4_RDMA;
init_session(rqstp, new, conf, cr_ses);
nfsd4_get_session_locked(new);
memcpy(cr_ses->sessionid.data, new->se_sessionid.data,
NFS4_MAX_SESSIONID_LEN);
cs_slot->sl_seqid++;
cr_ses->seqid = cs_slot->sl_seqid;
/* cache solo and embedded create sessions under the client_lock */
nfsd4_cache_create_session(cr_ses, cs_slot, status);
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
/* init connection and backchannel */
nfsd4_init_conn(rqstp, conn, new);
nfsd4_put_session(new);
if (old)
expire_client(old);
return status;
out_free_conn:
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
free_conn(conn);
if (old)
expire_client(old);
out_free_session:
__free_session(new);
out_release_drc_mem:
nfsd4_put_drc_mem(&cr_ses->fore_channel);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __imlib_FreeUpdates(ImlibUpdate * u)
{
ImlibUpdate *uu;
uu = u;
while (uu)
{
u = uu;
uu = uu->next;
free(u);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf14_buf_free(pdf14_buf *buf, gs_memory_t *memory)
{
pdf14_parent_color_t *old_parent_color_info = buf->parent_color_info_procs;
if (buf->mask_stack && buf->mask_stack->rc_mask)
rc_decrement(buf->mask_stack->rc_mask, "pdf14_buf_free");
gs_free_object(memory, buf->mask_stack, "pdf14_buf_free");
gs_free_object(memory, buf->transfer_fn, "pdf14_buf_free");
gs_free_object(memory, buf->matte, "pdf14_buf_free");
gs_free_object(memory, buf->data, "pdf14_buf_free");
while (old_parent_color_info) {
if (old_parent_color_info->icc_profile != NULL) {
rc_decrement(old_parent_color_info->icc_profile, "pdf14_buf_free");
}
buf->parent_color_info_procs = old_parent_color_info->previous;
gs_free_object(memory, old_parent_color_info, "pdf14_buf_free");
old_parent_color_info = buf->parent_color_info_procs;
}
gs_free_object(memory, buf->backdrop, "pdf14_buf_free");
gs_free_object(memory, buf, "pdf14_buf_free");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FileTransfer::ExpandInputFileList( ClassAd *job, MyString &error_msg ) {
MyString input_files;
if( job->LookupString(ATTR_TRANSFER_INPUT_FILES,input_files) != 1 )
{
return true; // nothing to do
}
MyString iwd;
if( job->LookupString(ATTR_JOB_IWD,iwd) != 1 )
{
error_msg.sprintf("Failed to expand transfer input list because no IWD found in job ad.");
return false;
}
MyString expanded_list;
if( !FileTransfer::ExpandInputFileList(input_files.Value(),iwd.Value(),expanded_list,error_msg) )
{
return false;
}
if( expanded_list != input_files ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"Expanded input file list: %s\n",expanded_list.Value());
job->Assign(ATTR_TRANSFER_INPUT_FILES,expanded_list.Value());
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserCommandController::RemoveInterstitialObservers(
WebContents* contents) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < interstitial_observers_.size(); i++) {
if (interstitial_observers_[i]->web_contents() != contents)
continue;
delete interstitial_observers_[i];
interstitial_observers_.erase(interstitial_observers_.begin() + i);
return;
}
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 153,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *prot_text(enum protocol prot) {
char *rv = "unknown";
switch(prot) {
case ascii_prot:
rv = "ascii";
break;
case binary_prot:
rv = "binary";
break;
case negotiating_prot:
rv = "auto-negotiate";
break;
}
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::GetViewBounds() const {
return gfx::Rect(0, 0, size_.width(), size_.height());
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _sleep_response_timeout(modbus_t *ctx)
{
/* Response timeout is always positive */
#ifdef _WIN32
/* usleep doesn't exist on Windows */
Sleep((ctx->response_timeout.tv_sec * 1000) +
(ctx->response_timeout.tv_usec / 1000));
#else
/* usleep source code */
struct timespec request, remaining;
request.tv_sec = ctx->response_timeout.tv_sec;
request.tv_nsec = ((long int)ctx->response_timeout.tv_usec) * 1000;
while (nanosleep(&request, &remaining) == -1 && errno == EINTR) {
request = remaining;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 88,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_sidx_size(AVFormatContext *s)
{
int ret;
AVIOContext *buf;
MOVMuxContext *mov = s->priv_data;
if ((ret = ffio_open_null_buf(&buf)) < 0)
return ret;
mov_write_sidx_tags(buf, mov, -1, 0);
return ffio_close_null_buf(buf);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserWindowGtk::IsBookmarkBarAnimating() const {
if (IsBookmarkBarSupported() && bookmark_bar_->IsAnimating())
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *sco_get_sock_listen(bdaddr_t *src)
{
struct sock *sk = NULL, *sk1 = NULL;
read_lock(&sco_sk_list.lock);
sk_for_each(sk, &sco_sk_list.head) {
if (sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN)
continue;
/* Exact match. */
if (!bacmp(&sco_pi(sk)->src, src))
break;
/* Closest match */
if (!bacmp(&sco_pi(sk)->src, BDADDR_ANY))
sk1 = sk;
}
read_unlock(&sco_sk_list.lock);
return sk ? sk : sk1;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::LoadPageInfo(bool reload) {
if (!doc_loader_)
return;
if (pages_.empty() && reload)
return;
pending_pages_.clear();
pp::Size old_document_size = document_size_;
document_size_ = pp::Size();
std::vector<pp::Rect> page_rects;
int page_count = FPDF_GetPageCount(doc_);
bool doc_complete = doc_loader_->IsDocumentComplete();
bool is_linear = FPDFAvail_IsLinearized(fpdf_availability_) == PDF_LINEARIZED;
for (int i = 0; i < page_count; ++i) {
if (i != 0) {
document_size_.Enlarge(0, kPageSeparatorThickness);
}
bool page_available;
if (reload) {
page_available = pages_[i]->available();
} else if (is_linear) {
int linear_page_avail =
FPDFAvail_IsPageAvail(fpdf_availability_, i, &download_hints_);
page_available = linear_page_avail == PDF_DATA_AVAIL;
} else {
page_available = doc_complete;
}
pp::Size size = page_available ? GetPageSize(i) : default_page_size_;
size.Enlarge(kPageShadowLeft + kPageShadowRight,
kPageShadowTop + kPageShadowBottom);
pp::Rect rect(pp::Point(0, document_size_.height()), size);
page_rects.push_back(rect);
if (size.width() > document_size_.width())
document_size_.set_width(size.width());
document_size_.Enlarge(0, size.height());
}
for (int i = 0; i < page_count; ++i) {
page_rects[i].set_x((document_size_.width() - page_rects[i].width()) / 2);
pp::Rect page_rect(page_rects[i]);
page_rect.Inset(kPageShadowLeft, kPageShadowTop, kPageShadowRight,
kPageShadowBottom);
if (reload) {
pages_[i]->set_rect(page_rect);
} else {
pages_.push_back(std::make_unique<PDFiumPage>(this, i, page_rect, false));
}
}
CalculateVisiblePages();
if (document_size_ != old_document_size)
client_->DocumentSizeUpdated(document_size_);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: copy_opt_exact(OptStr* to, OptStr* from)
{
*to = *from;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::AttachToOuterWebContentsFrame(
WebContents* outer_web_contents,
RenderFrameHost* outer_contents_frame) {
CHECK(GuestMode::IsCrossProcessFrameGuest(this));
RenderFrameHostManager* render_manager = GetRenderManager();
render_manager->InitRenderView(GetRenderViewHost(), nullptr);
GetMainFrame()->Init();
if (!render_manager->GetRenderWidgetHostView())
CreateRenderWidgetHostViewForRenderManager(GetRenderViewHost());
auto* outer_web_contents_impl =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(outer_web_contents);
auto* outer_contents_frame_impl =
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(outer_contents_frame);
node_.ConnectToOuterWebContents(outer_web_contents_impl,
outer_contents_frame_impl);
DCHECK(outer_contents_frame);
render_manager->CreateOuterDelegateProxy(
outer_contents_frame->GetSiteInstance(), outer_contents_frame_impl);
render_manager->SetRWHViewForInnerContents(
render_manager->GetRenderWidgetHostView());
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame*>(
render_manager->GetRenderWidgetHostView())
->RegisterFrameSinkId();
if (outer_web_contents_impl->frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame() ==
outer_contents_frame_impl->frame_tree_node()) {
SetFocusedFrame(frame_tree_.root(), nullptr);
}
text_input_manager_.reset(nullptr);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PDFiumEngine::HandleEvent(const pp::InputEvent& event) {
DCHECK(!defer_page_unload_);
defer_page_unload_ = true;
bool rv = false;
switch (event.GetType()) {
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEDOWN:
rv = OnMouseDown(pp::MouseInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEUP:
rv = OnMouseUp(pp::MouseInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEMOVE:
rv = OnMouseMove(pp::MouseInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_KEYDOWN:
rv = OnKeyDown(pp::KeyboardInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_KEYUP:
rv = OnKeyUp(pp::KeyboardInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_CHAR:
rv = OnChar(pp::KeyboardInputEvent(event));
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_TOUCHSTART: {
KillTouchTimer(next_touch_timer_id_);
pp::TouchInputEvent touch_event(event);
if (touch_event.GetTouchCount(PP_TOUCHLIST_TYPE_TARGETTOUCHES) == 1)
ScheduleTouchTimer(touch_event);
break;
}
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_TOUCHEND:
KillTouchTimer(next_touch_timer_id_);
break;
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_TOUCHMOVE:
KillTouchTimer(next_touch_timer_id_);
default:
break;
}
DCHECK(defer_page_unload_);
defer_page_unload_ = false;
for (int page_index : deferred_page_unloads_)
pages_[page_index]->Unload();
deferred_page_unloads_.clear();
return rv;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 172,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::AddKeyPressEventCallback(
const KeyPressEventCallback& callback) {
key_press_event_callbacks_.push_back(callback);
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void check_lifetime(struct work_struct *work)
{
unsigned long now, next, next_sec, next_sched;
struct in_ifaddr *ifa;
struct hlist_node *n;
int i;
now = jiffies;
next = round_jiffies_up(now + ADDR_CHECK_FREQUENCY);
for (i = 0; i < IN4_ADDR_HSIZE; i++) {
bool change_needed = false;
rcu_read_lock();
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(ifa, &inet_addr_lst[i], hash) {
unsigned long age;
if (ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_PERMANENT)
continue;
/* We try to batch several events at once. */
age = (now - ifa->ifa_tstamp +
ADDRCONF_TIMER_FUZZ_MINUS) / HZ;
if (ifa->ifa_valid_lft != INFINITY_LIFE_TIME &&
age >= ifa->ifa_valid_lft) {
change_needed = true;
} else if (ifa->ifa_preferred_lft ==
INFINITY_LIFE_TIME) {
continue;
} else if (age >= ifa->ifa_preferred_lft) {
if (time_before(ifa->ifa_tstamp +
ifa->ifa_valid_lft * HZ, next))
next = ifa->ifa_tstamp +
ifa->ifa_valid_lft * HZ;
if (!(ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_DEPRECATED))
change_needed = true;
} else if (time_before(ifa->ifa_tstamp +
ifa->ifa_preferred_lft * HZ,
next)) {
next = ifa->ifa_tstamp +
ifa->ifa_preferred_lft * HZ;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!change_needed)
continue;
rtnl_lock();
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(ifa, n, &inet_addr_lst[i], hash) {
unsigned long age;
if (ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_PERMANENT)
continue;
/* We try to batch several events at once. */
age = (now - ifa->ifa_tstamp +
ADDRCONF_TIMER_FUZZ_MINUS) / HZ;
if (ifa->ifa_valid_lft != INFINITY_LIFE_TIME &&
age >= ifa->ifa_valid_lft) {
struct in_ifaddr **ifap;
for (ifap = &ifa->ifa_dev->ifa_list;
*ifap != NULL; ifap = &(*ifap)->ifa_next) {
if (*ifap == ifa) {
inet_del_ifa(ifa->ifa_dev,
ifap, 1);
break;
}
}
} else if (ifa->ifa_preferred_lft !=
INFINITY_LIFE_TIME &&
age >= ifa->ifa_preferred_lft &&
!(ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_DEPRECATED)) {
ifa->ifa_flags |= IFA_F_DEPRECATED;
rtmsg_ifa(RTM_NEWADDR, ifa, NULL, 0);
}
}
rtnl_unlock();
}
next_sec = round_jiffies_up(next);
next_sched = next;
/* If rounded timeout is accurate enough, accept it. */
if (time_before(next_sec, next + ADDRCONF_TIMER_FUZZ))
next_sched = next_sec;
now = jiffies;
/* And minimum interval is ADDRCONF_TIMER_FUZZ_MAX. */
if (time_before(next_sched, now + ADDRCONF_TIMER_FUZZ_MAX))
next_sched = now + ADDRCONF_TIMER_FUZZ_MAX;
queue_delayed_work(system_power_efficient_wq, &check_lifetime_work,
next_sched - now);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 54,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OobeUI::OnCurrentScreenChanged(const std::string& screen) {
previous_screen_ = current_screen_;
DCHECK(screen_ids_.count(screen))
<< "Screen should be registered in InitializeScreenMaps()";
Screen new_screen = screen_ids_[screen];
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer,
observer_list_,
OnCurrentScreenChanged(current_screen_, new_screen));
current_screen_ = new_screen;
}
Commit Message: One polymer_config.js to rule them all.
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
BUG=425626
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1224783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#337882}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Shell::PlatformSetAddressBarURL(const GURL& url) {
}
Commit Message: shell_aura: Set child to root window size, not host size
The host size is in pixels and the root window size is in scaled pixels.
So, using the pixel size may make the child window much larger than the
root window (and screen). Fix this by matching the root window size.
BUG=335713
TEST=ozone content_shell with --force-device-scale-factor=2
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/141853003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@246389 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 113,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void auth_exit_ev(const void *event_data, void *user_data) {
/* Close the scoreboard descriptor that we opened. */
(void) pr_close_scoreboard(FALSE);
}
Commit Message: Backporting recursive handling of DefaultRoot path, when AllowChrootSymlinks
is off, to 1.3.5 branch.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 95,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool vmci_transport_stream_is_active(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
{
return !vmci_handle_is_invalid(vmci_trans(vsk)->qp_handle);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Cc: George Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ip4ip6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
u8 type, u8 code, int offset, __be32 info)
{
int rel_msg = 0;
u8 rel_type = type;
u8 rel_code = code;
__u32 rel_info = ntohl(info);
int err;
struct sk_buff *skb2;
struct iphdr *eiph;
struct flowi fl;
struct rtable *rt;
err = ip6_tnl_err(skb, IPPROTO_IPIP, opt, &rel_type, &rel_code,
&rel_msg, &rel_info, offset);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (rel_msg == 0)
return 0;
switch (rel_type) {
case ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH:
if (rel_code != ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH)
return 0;
rel_type = ICMP_DEST_UNREACH;
rel_code = ICMP_HOST_UNREACH;
break;
case ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG:
if (rel_code != 0)
return 0;
rel_type = ICMP_DEST_UNREACH;
rel_code = ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED;
break;
default:
return 0;
}
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, offset + sizeof(struct iphdr)))
return 0;
skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb2)
return 0;
skb_dst_drop(skb2);
skb_pull(skb2, offset);
skb_reset_network_header(skb2);
eiph = ip_hdr(skb2);
/* Try to guess incoming interface */
memset(&fl, 0, sizeof(fl));
fl.fl4_dst = eiph->saddr;
fl.fl4_tos = RT_TOS(eiph->tos);
fl.proto = IPPROTO_IPIP;
if (ip_route_output_key(dev_net(skb->dev), &rt, &fl))
goto out;
skb2->dev = rt->u.dst.dev;
/* route "incoming" packet */
if (rt->rt_flags & RTCF_LOCAL) {
ip_rt_put(rt);
rt = NULL;
fl.fl4_dst = eiph->daddr;
fl.fl4_src = eiph->saddr;
fl.fl4_tos = eiph->tos;
if (ip_route_output_key(dev_net(skb->dev), &rt, &fl) ||
rt->u.dst.dev->type != ARPHRD_TUNNEL) {
ip_rt_put(rt);
goto out;
}
skb_dst_set(skb2, (struct dst_entry *)rt);
} else {
ip_rt_put(rt);
if (ip_route_input(skb2, eiph->daddr, eiph->saddr, eiph->tos,
skb2->dev) ||
skb_dst(skb2)->dev->type != ARPHRD_TUNNEL)
goto out;
}
/* change mtu on this route */
if (rel_type == ICMP_DEST_UNREACH && rel_code == ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED) {
if (rel_info > dst_mtu(skb_dst(skb2)))
goto out;
skb_dst(skb2)->ops->update_pmtu(skb_dst(skb2), rel_info);
}
icmp_send(skb2, rel_type, rel_code, htonl(rel_info));
out:
kfree_skb(skb2);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestLoadTimingReused(const LoadTimingInfo& load_timing_info) {
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.socket_reused);
EXPECT_NE(NetLogSource::kInvalidId, load_timing_info.socket_log_id);
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.proxy_resolve_start.is_null());
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.proxy_resolve_end.is_null());
ExpectConnectTimingHasNoTimes(load_timing_info.connect_timing);
EXPECT_FALSE(load_timing_info.send_start.is_null());
EXPECT_LE(load_timing_info.send_start, load_timing_info.send_end);
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.request_start_time.is_null());
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.request_start.is_null());
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.receive_headers_end.is_null());
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: loop_info64_from_compat(const struct compat_loop_info __user *arg,
struct loop_info64 *info64)
{
struct compat_loop_info info;
if (copy_from_user(&info, arg, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
memset(info64, 0, sizeof(*info64));
info64->lo_number = info.lo_number;
info64->lo_device = info.lo_device;
info64->lo_inode = info.lo_inode;
info64->lo_rdevice = info.lo_rdevice;
info64->lo_offset = info.lo_offset;
info64->lo_sizelimit = 0;
info64->lo_encrypt_type = info.lo_encrypt_type;
info64->lo_encrypt_key_size = info.lo_encrypt_key_size;
info64->lo_flags = info.lo_flags;
info64->lo_init[0] = info.lo_init[0];
info64->lo_init[1] = info.lo_init[1];
if (info.lo_encrypt_type == LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI)
memcpy(info64->lo_crypt_name, info.lo_name, LO_NAME_SIZE);
else
memcpy(info64->lo_file_name, info.lo_name, LO_NAME_SIZE);
memcpy(info64->lo_encrypt_key, info.lo_encrypt_key, LO_KEY_SIZE);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 84,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void btpan_jni_cleanup()
{
pan_disable();
jni_initialized = false;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_OpenedPK3List_f( void ) {
Com_Printf("Opened PK3 Names: %s\n", FS_LoadedPakNames());
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void zend_ts_hash_display_pListTail(TsHashTable *ht)
{
begin_read(ht);
zend_hash_display_pListTail(TS_HASH(ht));
end_read(ht);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t wdm_read
(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
int rv, cntr;
int i = 0;
struct wdm_device *desc = file->private_data;
rv = mutex_lock_interruptible(&desc->rlock); /*concurrent reads */
if (rv < 0)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
cntr = ACCESS_ONCE(desc->length);
if (cntr == 0) {
desc->read = 0;
retry:
if (test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags)) {
rv = -ENODEV;
goto err;
}
i++;
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
if (!test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags)) {
rv = cntr ? cntr : -EAGAIN;
goto err;
}
rv = 0;
} else {
rv = wait_event_interruptible(desc->wait,
test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags));
}
/* may have happened while we slept */
if (test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags)) {
rv = -ENODEV;
goto err;
}
if (test_bit(WDM_RESETTING, &desc->flags)) {
rv = -EIO;
goto err;
}
usb_mark_last_busy(interface_to_usbdev(desc->intf));
if (rv < 0) {
rv = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto err;
}
spin_lock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
if (desc->rerr) { /* read completed, error happened */
desc->rerr = 0;
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
rv = -EIO;
goto err;
}
/*
* recheck whether we've lost the race
* against the completion handler
*/
if (!test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags)) { /* lost race */
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
goto retry;
}
if (!desc->reslength) { /* zero length read */
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev, "%s: zero length - clearing WDM_READ\n", __func__);
clear_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
goto retry;
}
cntr = desc->length;
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
}
if (cntr > count)
cntr = count;
rv = copy_to_user(buffer, desc->ubuf, cntr);
if (rv > 0) {
rv = -EFAULT;
goto err;
}
spin_lock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
for (i = 0; i < desc->length - cntr; i++)
desc->ubuf[i] = desc->ubuf[i + cntr];
desc->length -= cntr;
/* in case we had outstanding data */
if (!desc->length)
clear_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
rv = cntr;
err:
mutex_unlock(&desc->rlock);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 166,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLLabelElement* AXNodeObject::labelElementContainer() const {
if (!getNode())
return 0;
if (isControl())
return 0;
if (isLink())
return 0;
return Traversal<HTMLLabelElement>::firstAncestorOrSelf(*getNode());
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_pcm_lib_ioctl_fifo_size(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
void *arg)
{
struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params = arg;
snd_pcm_format_t format;
int channels;
ssize_t frame_size;
params->fifo_size = substream->runtime->hw.fifo_size;
if (!(substream->runtime->hw.info & SNDRV_PCM_INFO_FIFO_IN_FRAMES)) {
format = params_format(params);
channels = params_channels(params);
frame_size = snd_pcm_format_size(format, channels);
if (frame_size > 0)
params->fifo_size /= (unsigned)frame_size;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 47,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aiptek_set_report(struct aiptek *aiptek,
unsigned char report_type,
unsigned char report_id, void *buffer, int size)
{
return usb_control_msg(aiptek->usbdev,
usb_sndctrlpipe(aiptek->usbdev, 0),
USB_REQ_SET_REPORT,
USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE |
USB_DIR_OUT, (report_type << 8) + report_id,
aiptek->ifnum, buffer, size, 5000);
}
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<StyleRuleList> StyleResolver::styleRulesForElement(Element* element, unsigned rulesToInclude)
{
ASSERT(element);
StyleResolverState state(document(), element);
ElementRuleCollector collector(state.elementContext(), m_selectorFilter, state.style());
collector.setMode(SelectorChecker::CollectingStyleRules);
collectPseudoRulesForElement(element, collector, NOPSEUDO, rulesToInclude);
return collector.matchedStyleRuleList();
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,000 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int msPostGISParseData(layerObj *layer)
{
char *pos_opt, *pos_scn, *tmp, *pos_srid, *pos_uid, *pos_geom, *data;
int slength;
msPostGISLayerInfo *layerinfo;
assert(layer != NULL);
assert(layer->layerinfo != NULL);
layerinfo = (msPostGISLayerInfo*)(layer->layerinfo);
if (layer->debug) {
msDebug("msPostGISParseData called.\n");
}
if (!layer->data) {
msSetError(MS_QUERYERR, "Missing DATA clause. DATA statement must contain 'geometry_column from table_name' or 'geometry_column from (sub-query) as sub'.", "msPostGISParseData()");
return MS_FAILURE;
}
data = layer->data;
/*
** Clean up any existing strings first, as we will be populating these fields.
*/
if( layerinfo->srid ) {
free(layerinfo->srid);
layerinfo->srid = NULL;
}
if( layerinfo->uid ) {
free(layerinfo->uid);
layerinfo->uid = NULL;
}
if( layerinfo->geomcolumn ) {
free(layerinfo->geomcolumn);
layerinfo->geomcolumn = NULL;
}
if( layerinfo->fromsource ) {
free(layerinfo->fromsource);
layerinfo->fromsource = NULL;
}
/*
** Look for the optional ' using unique ID' string first.
*/
pos_uid = strcasestr(data, " using unique ");
if (pos_uid) {
/* Find the end of this case 'using unique ftab_id using srid=33' */
tmp = strstr(pos_uid + 14, " ");
/* Find the end of this case 'using srid=33 using unique ftab_id' */
if (!tmp) {
tmp = pos_uid + strlen(pos_uid);
}
layerinfo->uid = (char*) msSmallMalloc((tmp - (pos_uid + 14)) + 1);
strlcpy(layerinfo->uid, pos_uid + 14, tmp - (pos_uid + 14)+1);
msStringTrim(layerinfo->uid);
}
/*
** Look for the optional ' using srid=333 ' string next.
*/
pos_srid = strcasestr(data, " using srid=");
if (!pos_srid) {
layerinfo->srid = (char*) msSmallMalloc(1);
(layerinfo->srid)[0] = '\0'; /* no SRID, so return just null terminator*/
} else {
slength = strspn(pos_srid + 12, "-0123456789");
if (!slength) {
msSetError(MS_QUERYERR, "Error parsing PostGIS DATA variable. You specified 'USING SRID' but didnt have any numbers! %s", "msPostGISParseData()", data);
return MS_FAILURE;
} else {
layerinfo->srid = (char*) msSmallMalloc(slength + 1);
strlcpy(layerinfo->srid, pos_srid + 12, slength+1);
msStringTrim(layerinfo->srid);
}
}
/*
** This is a little hack so the rest of the code works.
** pos_opt should point to the start of the optional blocks.
**
** If they are both set, return the smaller one.
*/
if (pos_srid && pos_uid) {
pos_opt = (pos_srid > pos_uid) ? pos_uid : pos_srid;
}
/* If one or none is set, return the larger one. */
else {
pos_opt = (pos_srid > pos_uid) ? pos_srid : pos_uid;
}
/* No pos_opt? Move it to the end of the string. */
if (!pos_opt) {
pos_opt = data + strlen(data);
}
/*
** Scan for the 'geometry from table' or 'geometry from () as foo' clause.
*/
/* Find the first non-white character to start from */
pos_geom = data;
while( *pos_geom == ' ' || *pos_geom == '\t' || *pos_geom == '\n' || *pos_geom == '\r' )
pos_geom++;
/* Find the end of the geom column name */
pos_scn = strcasestr(data, " from ");
if (!pos_scn) {
msSetError(MS_QUERYERR, "Error parsing PostGIS DATA variable. Must contain 'geometry from table' or 'geometry from (subselect) as foo'. %s", "msPostGISParseData()", data);
return MS_FAILURE;
}
/* Copy the geometry column name */
layerinfo->geomcolumn = (char*) msSmallMalloc((pos_scn - pos_geom) + 1);
strlcpy(layerinfo->geomcolumn, pos_geom, pos_scn - pos_geom+1);
msStringTrim(layerinfo->geomcolumn);
/* Copy the table name or sub-select clause */
layerinfo->fromsource = (char*) msSmallMalloc((pos_opt - (pos_scn + 6)) + 1);
strlcpy(layerinfo->fromsource, pos_scn + 6, pos_opt - (pos_scn + 6)+1);
msStringTrim(layerinfo->fromsource);
/* Something is wrong, our goemetry column and table references are not there. */
if (strlen(layerinfo->fromsource) < 1 || strlen(layerinfo->geomcolumn) < 1) {
msSetError(MS_QUERYERR, "Error parsing PostGIS DATA variable. Must contain 'geometry from table' or 'geometry from (subselect) as foo'. %s", "msPostGISParseData()", data);
return MS_FAILURE;
}
/*
** We didn't find a ' using unique ' in the DATA string so try and find a
** primary key on the table.
*/
if ( ! (layerinfo->uid) ) {
if ( strstr(layerinfo->fromsource, " ") ) {
msSetError(MS_QUERYERR, "Error parsing PostGIS DATA variable. You must specify 'using unique' when supplying a subselect in the data definition.", "msPostGISParseData()");
return MS_FAILURE;
}
if ( msPostGISRetrievePK(layer) != MS_SUCCESS ) {
/* No user specified unique id so we will use the PostgreSQL oid */
/* TODO: Deprecate this, oids are deprecated in PostgreSQL */
layerinfo->uid = msStrdup("oid");
}
}
if (layer->debug) {
msDebug("msPostGISParseData: unique_column=%s, srid=%s, geom_column_name=%s, table_name=%s\n", layerinfo->uid, layerinfo->srid, layerinfo->geomcolumn, layerinfo->fromsource);
}
return MS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential SQL Injection with postgis TIME filters (#4834)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 40,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
{
mm_free(mm, address);
}
Commit Message: set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free
Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised.
Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 42,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(MultipleIterator, attachIterator)
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern;
zval *iterator = NULL, *info = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "O|z!", &iterator, zend_ce_iterator, &info) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = Z_SPLOBJSTORAGE_P(getThis());
if (info != NULL) {
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element;
if (Z_TYPE_P(info) != IS_LONG && Z_TYPE_P(info) != IS_STRING) {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_InvalidArgumentException, "Info must be NULL, integer or string", 0);
return;
}
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(&intern->storage, &intern->pos);
while ((element = zend_hash_get_current_data_ptr_ex(&intern->storage, &intern->pos)) != NULL) {
if (fast_is_identical_function(info, &element->inf)) {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_InvalidArgumentException, "Key duplication error", 0);
return;
}
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(&intern->storage, &intern->pos);
}
}
spl_object_storage_attach(intern, getThis(), iterator, info);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ucma_context *ucma_get_ctx(struct ucma_file *file, int id)
{
struct ucma_context *ctx;
mutex_lock(&mut);
ctx = _ucma_find_context(id, file);
if (!IS_ERR(ctx)) {
if (ctx->closing)
ctx = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
else
atomic_inc(&ctx->ref);
}
mutex_unlock(&mut);
return ctx;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SoftAACEncoder2::initEncoder() {
if (AACENC_OK != aacEncOpen(&mAACEncoder, 0, 0)) {
ALOGE("Failed to init AAC encoder");
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bt_status_t btif_hh_execute_service(BOOLEAN b_enable)
{
if (b_enable)
{
/* Enable and register with BTA-HH */
BTA_HhEnable(BTUI_HH_SECURITY, bte_hh_evt);
}
else {
/* Disable HH */
BTA_HhDisable();
}
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ctrl_alt_del(void)
{
static DECLARE_WORK(cad_work, deferred_cad);
if (C_A_D)
schedule_work(&cad_work);
else
kill_cad_pid(SIGINT, 1);
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 162,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t TestURLLoader::PrepareFileForPost(
const pp::FileRef& file_ref,
const std::string& data,
std::string* message) {
TestCompletionCallback callback(instance_->pp_instance(), callback_type());
pp::FileIO file_io(instance_);
callback.WaitForResult(file_io.Open(file_ref,
PP_FILEOPENFLAG_CREATE |
PP_FILEOPENFLAG_TRUNCATE |
PP_FILEOPENFLAG_WRITE,
callback.GetCallback()));
if (callback.failed()) {
message->assign(callback.errors());
return callback.result();
}
if (callback.result() != PP_OK) {
message->assign("FileIO::Open failed.");
return callback.result();
}
int32_t rv = WriteEntireBuffer(instance_->pp_instance(), &file_io, 0, data,
callback_type());
if (rv != PP_OK) {
message->assign("FileIO::Write failed.");
return rv;
}
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 156,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool kvm_require_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int required_cpl)
{
if (kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) <= required_cpl)
return true;
kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, 0);
return false;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jas_set_max_mem_usage(size_t max_mem)
{
jas_max_mem = max_mem;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 70,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crc32_pclmul_setkey(struct crypto_shash *hash, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
u32 *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(hash);
if (keylen != sizeof(u32)) {
crypto_shash_set_flags(hash, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
return -EINVAL;
}
*mctx = le32_to_cpup((__le32 *)key);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ip_vs_dest *ip_vs_find_dest(struct net *net, int af,
const union nf_inet_addr *daddr,
__be16 dport,
const union nf_inet_addr *vaddr,
__be16 vport, __u16 protocol, __u32 fwmark,
__u32 flags)
{
struct ip_vs_dest *dest;
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
__be16 port = dport;
svc = ip_vs_service_get(net, af, fwmark, protocol, vaddr, vport);
if (!svc)
return NULL;
if (fwmark && (flags & IP_VS_CONN_F_FWD_MASK) != IP_VS_CONN_F_MASQ)
port = 0;
dest = ip_vs_lookup_dest(svc, daddr, port);
if (!dest)
dest = ip_vs_lookup_dest(svc, daddr, port ^ dport);
if (dest)
atomic_inc(&dest->refcnt);
ip_vs_service_put(svc);
return dest;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <[email protected]>
Cc: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaInterfaceProxy::CreateAudioDecoder(
media::mojom::AudioDecoderRequest request) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
GetMediaInterfaceFactory()->CreateAudioDecoder(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 127,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long netdev_increment_features(unsigned long all, unsigned long one,
unsigned long mask)
{
/* If device needs checksumming, downgrade to it. */
if (all & NETIF_F_NO_CSUM && !(one & NETIF_F_NO_CSUM))
all ^= NETIF_F_NO_CSUM | (one & NETIF_F_ALL_CSUM);
else if (mask & NETIF_F_ALL_CSUM) {
/* If one device supports v4/v6 checksumming, set for all. */
if (one & (NETIF_F_IP_CSUM | NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM) &&
!(all & NETIF_F_GEN_CSUM)) {
all &= ~NETIF_F_ALL_CSUM;
all |= one & (NETIF_F_IP_CSUM | NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM);
}
/* If one device supports hw checksumming, set for all. */
if (one & NETIF_F_GEN_CSUM && !(all & NETIF_F_GEN_CSUM)) {
all &= ~NETIF_F_ALL_CSUM;
all |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM;
}
}
one |= NETIF_F_ALL_CSUM;
one |= all & NETIF_F_ONE_FOR_ALL;
all &= one | NETIF_F_LLTX | NETIF_F_GSO | NETIF_F_UFO;
all |= one & mask & NETIF_F_ONE_FOR_ALL;
return all;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoResult DataPipeConsumerDispatcher::Close() {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
DVLOG(1) << "Closing data pipe consumer " << pipe_id_;
return CloseNoLock();
}
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 154,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GenerateInfoSpec(const std::string& values, int* result) {
base::ListValue list_value;
for (const std::string& cur :
base::SplitString(values, ",", base::KEEP_WHITESPACE,
base::SPLIT_WANT_NONEMPTY))
list_value.AppendString(cur);
return ExtraInfoSpec::InitFromValue(list_value, result);
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 119,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void skb_coalesce_rx_frag(struct sk_buff *skb, int i, int size,
unsigned int truesize)
{
skb_frag_t *frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
skb_frag_size_add(frag, size);
skb->len += size;
skb->data_len += size;
skb->truesize += truesize;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 39,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification;
gpa_t bitmap, last_bitmap;
unsigned int port;
int size;
u8 b;
if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS))
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING);
exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
port = exit_qualification >> 16;
size = (exit_qualification & 7) + 1;
last_bitmap = (gpa_t)-1;
b = -1;
while (size > 0) {
if (port < 0x8000)
bitmap = vmcs12->io_bitmap_a;
else if (port < 0x10000)
bitmap = vmcs12->io_bitmap_b;
else
return 1;
bitmap += (port & 0x7fff) / 8;
if (last_bitmap != bitmap)
if (kvm_read_guest(vcpu->kvm, bitmap, &b, 1))
return 1;
if (b & (1 << (port & 7)))
return 1;
port++;
size--;
last_bitmap = bitmap;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void d_walk(struct dentry *parent, void *data,
enum d_walk_ret (*enter)(void *, struct dentry *),
void (*finish)(void *))
{
struct dentry *this_parent;
struct list_head *next;
unsigned seq = 0;
enum d_walk_ret ret;
bool retry = true;
again:
read_seqbegin_or_lock(&rename_lock, &seq);
this_parent = parent;
spin_lock(&this_parent->d_lock);
ret = enter(data, this_parent);
switch (ret) {
case D_WALK_CONTINUE:
break;
case D_WALK_QUIT:
case D_WALK_SKIP:
goto out_unlock;
case D_WALK_NORETRY:
retry = false;
break;
}
repeat:
next = this_parent->d_subdirs.next;
resume:
while (next != &this_parent->d_subdirs) {
struct list_head *tmp = next;
struct dentry *dentry = list_entry(tmp, struct dentry, d_child);
next = tmp->next;
if (unlikely(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_DENTRY_CURSOR))
continue;
spin_lock_nested(&dentry->d_lock, DENTRY_D_LOCK_NESTED);
ret = enter(data, dentry);
switch (ret) {
case D_WALK_CONTINUE:
break;
case D_WALK_QUIT:
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
goto out_unlock;
case D_WALK_NORETRY:
retry = false;
break;
case D_WALK_SKIP:
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
continue;
}
if (!list_empty(&dentry->d_subdirs)) {
spin_unlock(&this_parent->d_lock);
spin_release(&dentry->d_lock.dep_map, 1, _RET_IP_);
this_parent = dentry;
spin_acquire(&this_parent->d_lock.dep_map, 0, 1, _RET_IP_);
goto repeat;
}
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
}
/*
* All done at this level ... ascend and resume the search.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
ascend:
if (this_parent != parent) {
struct dentry *child = this_parent;
this_parent = child->d_parent;
spin_unlock(&child->d_lock);
spin_lock(&this_parent->d_lock);
/* might go back up the wrong parent if we have had a rename. */
if (need_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq))
goto rename_retry;
/* go into the first sibling still alive */
do {
next = child->d_child.next;
if (next == &this_parent->d_subdirs)
goto ascend;
child = list_entry(next, struct dentry, d_child);
} while (unlikely(child->d_flags & DCACHE_DENTRY_KILLED));
rcu_read_unlock();
goto resume;
}
if (need_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq))
goto rename_retry;
rcu_read_unlock();
if (finish)
finish(data);
out_unlock:
spin_unlock(&this_parent->d_lock);
done_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq);
return;
rename_retry:
spin_unlock(&this_parent->d_lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
BUG_ON(seq & 1);
if (!retry)
return;
seq = 1;
goto again;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_reply_key(krb5_context context,
const krb5_data *content,
const krb5_data *req_buffer,
krb5_keyblock **key)
{
ReplyKeyPack key_pack;
krb5_error_code ret;
size_t size;
ret = decode_ReplyKeyPack(content->data,
content->length,
&key_pack,
&size);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("PKINIT decoding reply key failed", ""));
free_ReplyKeyPack(&key_pack);
return ret;
}
{
krb5_crypto crypto;
/*
* XXX Verify kp.replyKey is a allowed enctype in the
* configuration file
*/
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &key_pack.replyKey, 0, &crypto);
if (ret) {
free_ReplyKeyPack(&key_pack);
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context, crypto, 6,
req_buffer->data, req_buffer->length,
&key_pack.asChecksum);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if (ret) {
free_ReplyKeyPack(&key_pack);
return ret;
}
}
*key = malloc (sizeof (**key));
if (*key == NULL) {
free_ReplyKeyPack(&key_pack);
return krb5_enomem(context);
}
ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&key_pack.replyKey, *key);
free_ReplyKeyPack(&key_pack);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("PKINIT failed copying reply key", ""));
free(*key);
*key = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320 | 0 | 89,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionRegistry::ExtensionRegistry(content::BrowserContext* browser_context)
: browser_context_(browser_context) {}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(signal, int, sig, __sighandler_t, handler)
{
struct k_sigaction new_sa, old_sa;
int ret;
new_sa.sa.sa_handler = handler;
new_sa.sa.sa_flags = SA_ONESHOT | SA_NOMASK;
sigemptyset(&new_sa.sa.sa_mask);
ret = do_sigaction(sig, &new_sa, &old_sa);
return ret ? ret : (unsigned long)old_sa.sa.sa_handler;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RTCVoidRequestTask(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler* object, const WebKit::WebRTCVoidRequest& request, bool succeeded)
: MethodTask<MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler>(object)
, m_request(request)
, m_succeeded(succeeded)
{
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_call_sync_sequence(struct rpc_clnt *clnt,
struct nfs_server *server,
struct rpc_message *msg,
struct nfs4_sequence_args *args,
struct nfs4_sequence_res *res,
int privileged)
{
int ret;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct nfs41_call_sync_data data = {
.seq_server = server,
.seq_args = args,
.seq_res = res,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup = {
.rpc_client = clnt,
.rpc_message = msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs41_call_sync_ops,
.callback_data = &data
};
if (privileged)
task_setup.callback_ops = &nfs41_call_priv_sync_ops;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup);
if (IS_ERR(task))
ret = PTR_ERR(task);
else {
ret = task->tk_status;
rpc_put_task(task);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t f_hid_opts_dev_show(struct config_item *item, char *page)
{
struct f_hid_opts *opts = to_f_hid_opts(item);
return sprintf(page, "%d:%d\n", major, opts->minor);
}
Commit Message: USB: gadget: f_hid: fix deadlock in f_hidg_write()
In f_hidg_write() the write_spinlock is acquired before calling
usb_ep_queue() which causes a deadlock when dummy_hcd is being used.
This is because dummy_queue() callbacks into f_hidg_req_complete() which
tries to acquire the same spinlock. This is (part of) the backtrace when
the deadlock occurs:
0xffffffffc06b1410 in f_hidg_req_complete
0xffffffffc06a590a in usb_gadget_giveback_request
0xffffffffc06cfff2 in dummy_queue
0xffffffffc06a4b96 in usb_ep_queue
0xffffffffc06b1eb6 in f_hidg_write
0xffffffff8127730b in __vfs_write
0xffffffff812774d1 in vfs_write
0xffffffff81277725 in SYSC_write
Fix this by releasing the write_spinlock before calling usb_ep_queue()
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 4.11+
Fixes: 749494b6bdbb ("usb: gadget: f_hid: fix: Move IN request allocation to set_alt()")
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Gerganov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 96,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const OriginAccessEntry& Document::AccessEntryFromURL() {
if (!access_entry_from_url_) {
access_entry_from_url_ = std::make_unique<OriginAccessEntry>(
Url().Protocol(), Url().Host(),
OriginAccessEntry::kAllowRegisterableDomains);
}
return *access_entry_from_url_;
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool vmci_transport_allow_dgram(struct vsock_sock *vsock, u32 peer_cid)
{
if (vsock->cached_peer != peer_cid) {
vsock->cached_peer = peer_cid;
if (!vmci_transport_is_trusted(vsock, peer_cid) &&
(vmci_context_get_priv_flags(peer_cid) &
VMCI_PRIVILEGE_FLAG_RESTRICTED)) {
vsock->cached_peer_allow_dgram = false;
} else {
vsock->cached_peer_allow_dgram = true;
}
}
return vsock->cached_peer_allow_dgram;
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Cc: George Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GBool GfxShading::init(Dict *dict) {
Object obj1, obj2;
int i;
dict->lookup("ColorSpace", &obj1);
if (!(colorSpace = GfxColorSpace::parse(&obj1))) {
error(-1, "Bad color space in shading dictionary");
obj1.free();
return gFalse;
}
obj1.free();
for (i = 0; i < gfxColorMaxComps; ++i) {
background.c[i] = 0;
}
hasBackground = gFalse;
if (dict->lookup("Background", &obj1)->isArray()) {
if (obj1.arrayGetLength() == colorSpace->getNComps()) {
hasBackground = gTrue;
for (i = 0; i < colorSpace->getNComps(); ++i) {
background.c[i] = dblToCol(obj1.arrayGet(i, &obj2)->getNum());
obj2.free();
}
} else {
error(-1, "Bad Background in shading dictionary");
}
}
obj1.free();
xMin = yMin = xMax = yMax = 0;
hasBBox = gFalse;
if (dict->lookup("BBox", &obj1)->isArray()) {
if (obj1.arrayGetLength() == 4) {
hasBBox = gTrue;
xMin = obj1.arrayGet(0, &obj2)->getNum();
obj2.free();
yMin = obj1.arrayGet(1, &obj2)->getNum();
obj2.free();
xMax = obj1.arrayGet(2, &obj2)->getNum();
obj2.free();
yMax = obj1.arrayGet(3, &obj2)->getNum();
obj2.free();
} else {
error(-1, "Bad BBox in shading dictionary");
}
}
obj1.free();
return gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void perf_event_enable(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct task_struct *task = ctx->task;
if (!task) {
/*
* Enable the event on the cpu that it's on
*/
cpu_function_call(event->cpu, __perf_event_enable, event);
return;
}
raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
if (event->state >= PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE)
goto out;
/*
* If the event is in error state, clear that first.
* That way, if we see the event in error state below, we
* know that it has gone back into error state, as distinct
* from the task having been scheduled away before the
* cross-call arrived.
*/
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_ERROR)
event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF;
retry:
if (!ctx->is_active) {
__perf_event_mark_enabled(event);
goto out;
}
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
if (!task_function_call(task, __perf_event_enable, event))
return;
raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
/*
* If the context is active and the event is still off,
* we need to retry the cross-call.
*/
if (ctx->is_active && event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF) {
/*
* task could have been flipped by a concurrent
* perf_event_context_sched_out()
*/
task = ctx->task;
goto retry;
}
out:
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: drop_capabilities(int parent)
{
capng_setpid(getpid());
capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
if (parent) {
if (capng_updatev(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_PERMITTED, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, -1)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to update capability set.\n");
return EX_SYSERR;
}
if (capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_PERMITTED|CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to update capability set.\n");
return EX_SYSERR;
}
} else {
if (capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_PERMITTED, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to update capability set.\n");
return EX_SYSERR;
}
}
if (capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to apply new capability set.\n");
return EX_SYSERR;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned dm_get_numa_node(void)
{
return __dm_get_module_param_int(&dm_numa_node,
DM_NUMA_NODE, num_online_nodes() - 1);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_process_local_nonce(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
switch (p_cb->selected_association_model) {
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS:
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP:
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) {
/* slave calculates and sends local commitment */
smp_calculate_local_commitment(p_cb);
smp_send_commitment(p_cb, NULL);
/* slave has to wait for peer nonce */
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_NONCE);
} else /* i.e. master */
{
if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM) {
/* slave commitment is already received, send local nonce, wait for
* remote nonce*/
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG(
"master in assoc mode = %d "
"already rcvd slave commitment - race condition",
p_cb->selected_association_model);
p_cb->flags &= ~SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM;
smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL);
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_NONCE);
}
}
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT:
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP:
smp_calculate_local_commitment(p_cb);
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
smp_send_commitment(p_cb, NULL);
} else /* slave */
{
if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM) {
/* master commitment is already received */
smp_send_commitment(p_cb, NULL);
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_NONCE);
}
}
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB:
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL);
}
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_NONCE);
break;
default:
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("Association Model = %d is not used in LE SC",
p_cb->selected_association_model);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rdp_out_bmpcache_caps(STREAM s)
{
int Bpp;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "%s()", __func__);
out_uint16_le(s, RDP_CAPSET_BMPCACHE);
out_uint16_le(s, RDP_CAPLEN_BMPCACHE);
Bpp = (g_server_depth + 7) / 8; /* bytes per pixel */
out_uint8s(s, 24); /* unused */
out_uint16_le(s, 0x258); /* entries */
out_uint16_le(s, 0x100 * Bpp); /* max cell size */
out_uint16_le(s, 0x12c); /* entries */
out_uint16_le(s, 0x400 * Bpp); /* max cell size */
out_uint16_le(s, 0x106); /* entries */
out_uint16_le(s, 0x1000 * Bpp); /* max cell size */
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parse_audio_feature_unit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
void *_ftr)
{
int channels, i, j;
struct usb_audio_term iterm;
unsigned int master_bits, first_ch_bits;
int err, csize;
struct uac_feature_unit_descriptor *hdr = _ftr;
__u8 *bmaControls;
if (state->mixer->protocol == UAC_VERSION_1) {
csize = hdr->bControlSize;
if (!csize) {
usb_audio_dbg(state->chip,
"unit %u: invalid bControlSize == 0\n",
unitid);
return -EINVAL;
}
channels = (hdr->bLength - 7) / csize - 1;
bmaControls = hdr->bmaControls;
if (hdr->bLength < 7 + csize) {
usb_audio_err(state->chip,
"unit %u: invalid UAC_FEATURE_UNIT descriptor\n",
unitid);
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
struct uac2_feature_unit_descriptor *ftr = _ftr;
csize = 4;
channels = (hdr->bLength - 6) / 4 - 1;
bmaControls = ftr->bmaControls;
if (hdr->bLength < 6 + csize) {
usb_audio_err(state->chip,
"unit %u: invalid UAC_FEATURE_UNIT descriptor\n",
unitid);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* parse the source unit */
if ((err = parse_audio_unit(state, hdr->bSourceID)) < 0)
return err;
/* determine the input source type and name */
err = check_input_term(state, hdr->bSourceID, &iterm);
if (err < 0)
return err;
master_bits = snd_usb_combine_bytes(bmaControls, csize);
/* master configuration quirks */
switch (state->chip->usb_id) {
case USB_ID(0x08bb, 0x2702):
usb_audio_info(state->chip,
"usbmixer: master volume quirk for PCM2702 chip\n");
/* disable non-functional volume control */
master_bits &= ~UAC_CONTROL_BIT(UAC_FU_VOLUME);
break;
case USB_ID(0x1130, 0xf211):
usb_audio_info(state->chip,
"usbmixer: volume control quirk for Tenx TP6911 Audio Headset\n");
/* disable non-functional volume control */
channels = 0;
break;
}
if (channels > 0)
first_ch_bits = snd_usb_combine_bytes(bmaControls + csize, csize);
else
first_ch_bits = 0;
if (state->mixer->protocol == UAC_VERSION_1) {
/* check all control types */
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
unsigned int ch_bits = 0;
for (j = 0; j < channels; j++) {
unsigned int mask;
mask = snd_usb_combine_bytes(bmaControls +
csize * (j+1), csize);
if (mask & (1 << i))
ch_bits |= (1 << j);
}
/* audio class v1 controls are never read-only */
/*
* The first channel must be set
* (for ease of programming).
*/
if (ch_bits & 1)
build_feature_ctl(state, _ftr, ch_bits, i,
&iterm, unitid, 0);
if (master_bits & (1 << i))
build_feature_ctl(state, _ftr, 0, i, &iterm,
unitid, 0);
}
} else { /* UAC_VERSION_2 */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(audio_feature_info); i++) {
unsigned int ch_bits = 0;
unsigned int ch_read_only = 0;
for (j = 0; j < channels; j++) {
unsigned int mask;
mask = snd_usb_combine_bytes(bmaControls +
csize * (j+1), csize);
if (uac2_control_is_readable(mask, i)) {
ch_bits |= (1 << j);
if (!uac2_control_is_writeable(mask, i))
ch_read_only |= (1 << j);
}
}
/*
* NOTE: build_feature_ctl() will mark the control
* read-only if all channels are marked read-only in
* the descriptors. Otherwise, the control will be
* reported as writeable, but the driver will not
* actually issue a write command for read-only
* channels.
*/
/*
* The first channel must be set
* (for ease of programming).
*/
if (ch_bits & 1)
build_feature_ctl(state, _ftr, ch_bits, i,
&iterm, unitid, ch_read_only);
if (uac2_control_is_readable(master_bits, i))
build_feature_ctl(state, _ftr, 0, i, &iterm, unitid,
!uac2_control_is_writeable(master_bits, i));
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport QuantizeInfo *DestroyQuantizeInfo(QuantizeInfo *quantize_info)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(quantize_info != (QuantizeInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantize_info->signature == MagickSignature);
quantize_info->signature=(~MagickSignature);
quantize_info=(QuantizeInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(quantize_info);
return(quantize_info);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/574
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Console::monitorFunctionCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ConsoleHelper helper(info);
v8::Local<v8::Function> function;
if (!helper.firstArgAsFunction().ToLocal(&function))
return;
v8::Local<v8::Value> name = function->GetName();
if (!name->IsString() || !v8::Local<v8::String>::Cast(name)->Length())
name = function->GetInferredName();
String16 functionName = toProtocolStringWithTypeCheck(name);
String16Builder builder;
builder.append("console.log(\"function ");
if (functionName.isEmpty())
builder.append("(anonymous function)");
else
builder.append(functionName);
builder.append(" called\" + (arguments.length > 0 ? \" with arguments: \" + Array.prototype.join.call(arguments, \", \") : \"\")) && false");
setFunctionBreakpoint(helper, function, V8DebuggerAgentImpl::MonitorCommandBreakpointSource, builder.toString(), true);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::evaluateInWebInspector(long callId, const WebString& script)
{
InspectorController* ic = inspectorController();
ic->evaluateForTestInFrontend(callId, script);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator::OnDestroy() {
DCHECK(video_decode_accelerator_.get());
video_decode_accelerator_->Destroy();
}
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DECLAREreadFunc(readSeparateTilesIntoBuffer)
{
int status = 1;
uint32 imagew = TIFFRasterScanlineSize(in);
uint32 tilew = TIFFTileRowSize(in);
int iskew = imagew - tilew*spp;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(in);
tdata_t tilebuf;
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
uint32 tw, tl;
uint32 row;
uint16 bps, bytes_per_sample;
tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tilesize);
if (tilebuf == 0)
return 0;
_TIFFmemset(tilebuf, 0, tilesize);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps);
assert( bps % 8 == 0 );
bytes_per_sample = bps/8;
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl) {
uint32 nrow = (row+tl > imagelength) ? imagelength-row : tl;
uint32 colb = 0;
uint32 col;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw) {
tsample_t s;
for (s = 0; s < spp; s++) {
if (TIFFReadTile(in, tilebuf, col, row, 0, s) < 0
&& !ignore) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read tile at %lu %lu, "
"sample %lu",
(unsigned long) col,
(unsigned long) row,
(unsigned long) s);
status = 0;
goto done;
}
/*
* Tile is clipped horizontally. Calculate
* visible portion and skewing factors.
*/
if (colb + tilew*spp > imagew) {
uint32 width = imagew - colb;
int oskew = tilew*spp - width;
cpSeparateBufToContigBuf(
bufp+colb+s*bytes_per_sample,
tilebuf, nrow,
width/(spp*bytes_per_sample),
oskew + iskew,
oskew/spp, spp,
bytes_per_sample);
} else
cpSeparateBufToContigBuf(
bufp+colb+s*bytes_per_sample,
tilebuf, nrow, tw,
iskew, 0, spp,
bytes_per_sample);
}
colb += tilew*spp;
}
bufp += imagew * nrow;
}
done:
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd
tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103
by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void release_hash_device(struct hash_device_data *device_data)
{
spin_lock(&device_data->ctx_lock);
device_data->current_ctx->device = NULL;
device_data->current_ctx = NULL;
spin_unlock(&device_data->ctx_lock);
/*
* The down_interruptible part for this semaphore is called in
* cryp_get_device_data.
*/
up(&driver_data.device_allocation);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *nested_svm_map(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 gpa, struct page **_page)
{
struct page *page;
might_sleep();
page = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_page(&svm->vcpu, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (is_error_page(page))
goto error;
*_page = page;
return kmap(page);
error:
kvm_inject_gp(&svm->vcpu, 0);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 41,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftGSM::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = 8000;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (gsm|g711)dec
Bug: 27793163
Bug: 27793367
Change-Id: Iec3de8a237ee2379d87a8371c13e543878c6652c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: htmlParseCharData(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
htmlParseCharDataInternal(ctxt, 0);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void writeNumberObject(double number)
{
append(NumberObjectTag);
doWriteNumber(number);
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void DetectFlow(ThreadVars *tv,
DetectEngineCtx *de_ctx, DetectEngineThreadCtx *det_ctx,
Packet *p)
{
/* No need to perform any detection on this packet, if the the given flag is set.*/
if ((p->flags & PKT_NOPACKET_INSPECTION) ||
(PACKET_TEST_ACTION(p, ACTION_DROP)))
{
/* hack: if we are in pass the entire flow mode, we need to still
* update the inspect_id forward. So test for the condition here,
* and call the update code if necessary. */
const int pass = ((p->flow->flags & FLOW_NOPACKET_INSPECTION));
const AppProto alproto = FlowGetAppProtocol(p->flow);
if (pass && AppLayerParserProtocolSupportsTxs(p->proto, alproto)) {
uint8_t flags;
if (p->flowflags & FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER) {
flags = STREAM_TOSERVER;
} else {
flags = STREAM_TOCLIENT;
}
flags = FlowGetDisruptionFlags(p->flow, flags);
DeStateUpdateInspectTransactionId(p->flow, flags, true);
}
return;
}
/* see if the packet matches one or more of the sigs */
(void)DetectRun(tv, de_ctx, det_ctx, p);
}
Commit Message: stream: still inspect packets dropped by stream
The detect engine would bypass packets that are set as dropped. This
seems sane, as these packets are going to be dropped anyway.
However, it lead to the following corner case: stream events that
triggered the drop could not be matched on the rules. The packet
with the event wouldn't make it to the detect engine due to the bypass.
This patch changes the logic to not bypass DROP packets anymore.
Packets that are dropped by the stream engine will set the no payload
inspection flag, so avoid needless cost.
CWE ID: CWE-693 | 1 | 169,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dcb_setapp(struct net_device *dev, struct dcb_app *new)
{
struct dcb_app_type *itr;
struct dcb_app_type event;
int err = 0;
event.ifindex = dev->ifindex;
memcpy(&event.app, new, sizeof(event.app));
if (dev->dcbnl_ops->getdcbx)
event.dcbx = dev->dcbnl_ops->getdcbx(dev);
spin_lock(&dcb_lock);
/* Search for existing match and replace */
if ((itr = dcb_app_lookup(new, dev->ifindex, 0))) {
if (new->priority)
itr->app.priority = new->priority;
else {
list_del(&itr->list);
kfree(itr);
}
goto out;
}
/* App type does not exist add new application type */
if (new->priority)
err = dcb_app_add(new, dev->ifindex);
out:
spin_unlock(&dcb_lock);
if (!err)
call_dcbevent_notifiers(DCB_APP_EVENT, &event);
return err;
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Editor::ReplaceSelectionWithFragment(DocumentFragment* fragment,
bool select_replacement,
bool smart_replace,
bool match_style,
InputEvent::InputType input_type) {
DCHECK(!GetFrame().GetDocument()->NeedsLayoutTreeUpdate());
const VisibleSelection& selection =
GetFrame().Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree();
if (selection.IsNone() || !selection.IsContentEditable() || !fragment)
return;
ReplaceSelectionCommand::CommandOptions options =
ReplaceSelectionCommand::kPreventNesting |
ReplaceSelectionCommand::kSanitizeFragment;
if (select_replacement)
options |= ReplaceSelectionCommand::kSelectReplacement;
if (smart_replace)
options |= ReplaceSelectionCommand::kSmartReplace;
if (match_style)
options |= ReplaceSelectionCommand::kMatchStyle;
DCHECK(GetFrame().GetDocument());
ReplaceSelectionCommand::Create(*GetFrame().GetDocument(), fragment, options,
input_type)
->Apply();
RevealSelectionAfterEditingOperation();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XML_SetParamEntityParsing(XML_Parser parser,
enum XML_ParamEntityParsing peParsing)
{
if (parser == NULL)
return 0;
/* block after XML_Parse()/XML_ParseBuffer() has been called */
if (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_PARSING || parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED)
return 0;
#ifdef XML_DTD
parser->m_paramEntityParsing = peParsing;
return 1;
#else
return peParsing == XML_PARAM_ENTITY_PARSING_NEVER;
#endif
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 92,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
struct file *file;
u8 *enckey;
u8 *data = NULL;
ssize_t written;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data)
goto error;
/* Set an arbitrary quota */
prep->quotalen = 16;
prep->payload.data[big_key_len] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen;
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
/* Create a shmem file to store the data in. This will permit the data
* to be swapped out if needed.
*
* File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key.
*/
size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_skcipher_blocksize(big_key_skcipher));
/* prepare aligned data to encrypt */
data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(data, prep->data, datalen);
memset(data + datalen, 0x00, enclen - datalen);
/* generate random key */
enckey = kmalloc(ENC_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!enckey) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
ret = big_key_gen_enckey(enckey);
if (ret)
goto err_enckey;
/* encrypt aligned data */
ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, data, enclen, enckey);
if (ret)
goto err_enckey;
/* save aligned data to file */
file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", enclen, 0);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(file);
goto err_enckey;
}
written = kernel_write(file, data, enclen, 0);
if (written != enclen) {
ret = written;
if (written >= 0)
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_fput;
}
/* Pin the mount and dentry to the key so that we can open it again
* later
*/
prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = enckey;
*path = file->f_path;
path_get(path);
fput(file);
kfree(data);
} else {
/* Just store the data in a buffer */
void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = data;
memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
}
return 0;
err_fput:
fput(file);
err_enckey:
kfree(enckey);
error:
kfree(data);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation
big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the
key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to
register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because
there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type.
However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not,
big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code
neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type.
Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is
theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the
crypto is set up, leading to the same effect.
Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling
the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we
shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the
encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the
crypto initialisation.
The fix also includes message printing on failure.
If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing:
dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s
ought to cause an oops.
Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted')
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: Peter Hlavaty <[email protected]>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <[email protected]>
cc: Artem Savkov <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 48,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void conditionalOrLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::conditionalOrLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LoadEntryPointsFromLibrary(const base::NativeLibrary& library,
PluginModule::EntryPoints* entry_points) {
entry_points->get_interface =
reinterpret_cast<PluginModule::GetInterfaceFunc>(
base::GetFunctionPointerFromNativeLibrary(library,
"PPP_GetInterface"));
if (!entry_points->get_interface) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No PPP_GetInterface in plugin library";
return false;
}
entry_points->initialize_module =
reinterpret_cast<PluginModule::PPP_InitializeModuleFunc>(
base::GetFunctionPointerFromNativeLibrary(library,
"PPP_InitializeModule"));
if (!entry_points->initialize_module) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No PPP_InitializeModule in plugin library";
return false;
}
entry_points->shutdown_module =
reinterpret_cast<PluginModule::PPP_ShutdownModuleFunc>(
base::GetFunctionPointerFromNativeLibrary(library,
"PPP_ShutdownModule"));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void FillHuffmanTable(const JpegHuffmanTable* dc_table,
const JpegHuffmanTable* ac_table,
VAHuffmanTableBufferJPEGBaseline* huffman_table) {
bool has_huffman_table = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < kJpegMaxHuffmanTableNumBaseline; i++) {
if (dc_table[i].valid || ac_table[i].valid) {
has_huffman_table = true;
break;
}
}
if (!has_huffman_table) {
dc_table = kDefaultDcTable;
ac_table = kDefaultAcTable;
}
static_assert(kJpegMaxHuffmanTableNumBaseline ==
std::extent<decltype(huffman_table->load_huffman_table)>(),
"max number of huffman table mismatched");
static_assert(sizeof(huffman_table->huffman_table[0].num_dc_codes) ==
sizeof(dc_table[0].code_length),
"size of huffman table code length mismatch");
static_assert(sizeof(huffman_table->huffman_table[0].dc_values[0]) ==
sizeof(dc_table[0].code_value[0]),
"size of huffman table code value mismatch");
for (size_t i = 0; i < kJpegMaxHuffmanTableNumBaseline; i++) {
if (!dc_table[i].valid || !ac_table[i].valid)
continue;
huffman_table->load_huffman_table[i] = 1;
memcpy(huffman_table->huffman_table[i].num_dc_codes,
dc_table[i].code_length,
sizeof(huffman_table->huffman_table[i].num_dc_codes));
memcpy(huffman_table->huffman_table[i].dc_values, dc_table[i].code_value,
sizeof(huffman_table->huffman_table[i].dc_values));
memcpy(huffman_table->huffman_table[i].num_ac_codes,
ac_table[i].code_length,
sizeof(huffman_table->huffman_table[i].num_ac_codes));
memcpy(huffman_table->huffman_table[i].ac_values, ac_table[i].code_value,
sizeof(huffman_table->huffman_table[i].ac_values));
}
}
Commit Message: Move Initialize() to VaapiImageDecoder parent class.
This CL moves the implementation of Initialize() to VaapiImageDecoder,
since it is common to all implementing classes.
Bug: 877694
Test: jpeg_decode_accelerator_unittest
Change-Id: Ic99601953ae1c7a572ba8a0b0bf43675b2b0969d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1654249
Commit-Queue: Gil Dekel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andres Calderon Jaramillo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668645}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 149,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf) {}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 80,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _XcursorBuildFullname (const char *dir, const char *subdir, const char *file)
{
char *full;
if (!dir || !subdir || !file)
return NULL;
full = malloc (strlen (dir) + 1 + strlen (subdir) + 1 + strlen (file) + 1);
if (!full)
return NULL;
full[0] = '\0';
_XcursorAddPathElt (full, dir, -1);
_XcursorAddPathElt (full, subdir, -1);
_XcursorAddPathElt (full, file, -1);
return full;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 1,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void usbhid_stop(struct hid_device *hid)
{
struct usbhid_device *usbhid = hid->driver_data;
if (WARN_ON(!usbhid))
return;
if (hid->quirks & HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL) {
clear_bit(HID_IN_POLLING, &usbhid->iofl);
usbhid->intf->needs_remote_wakeup = 0;
}
clear_bit(HID_STARTED, &usbhid->iofl);
spin_lock_irq(&usbhid->lock); /* Sync with error and led handlers */
set_bit(HID_DISCONNECTED, &usbhid->iofl);
spin_unlock_irq(&usbhid->lock);
usb_kill_urb(usbhid->urbin);
usb_kill_urb(usbhid->urbout);
usb_kill_urb(usbhid->urbctrl);
hid_cancel_delayed_stuff(usbhid);
hid->claimed = 0;
usb_free_urb(usbhid->urbin);
usb_free_urb(usbhid->urbctrl);
usb_free_urb(usbhid->urbout);
usbhid->urbin = NULL; /* don't mess up next start */
usbhid->urbctrl = NULL;
usbhid->urbout = NULL;
hid_free_buffers(hid_to_usb_dev(hid), hid);
}
Commit Message: HID: usbhid: fix out-of-bounds bug
The hid descriptor identifies the length and type of subordinate
descriptors for a device. If the received hid descriptor is smaller than
the size of the struct hid_descriptor, it is possible to cause
out-of-bounds.
In addition, if bNumDescriptors of the hid descriptor have an incorrect
value, this can also cause out-of-bounds while approaching hdesc->desc[n].
So check the size of hid descriptor and bNumDescriptors.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006c5f8edf by task kworker/1:2/1261
CPU: 1 PID: 1261 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted
4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #169
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1004
hid_add_device+0x16b/0xb30 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2944
usbhid_probe+0xc28/0x1100 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1369
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaejoong Kim <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void proc_self_put_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd,
void *cookie)
{
char *s = nd_get_link(nd);
if (!IS_ERR(s))
__putname(s);
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_dirty_log(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_dirty_log *log)
{
int r;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
unsigned long n, i;
unsigned long *dirty_bitmap;
unsigned long *dirty_bitmap_buffer;
bool is_dirty = false;
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
r = -EINVAL;
if (log->slot >= KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS)
goto out;
memslot = id_to_memslot(kvm->memslots, log->slot);
dirty_bitmap = memslot->dirty_bitmap;
r = -ENOENT;
if (!dirty_bitmap)
goto out;
n = kvm_dirty_bitmap_bytes(memslot);
dirty_bitmap_buffer = dirty_bitmap + n / sizeof(long);
memset(dirty_bitmap_buffer, 0, n);
spin_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
for (i = 0; i < n / sizeof(long); i++) {
unsigned long mask;
gfn_t offset;
if (!dirty_bitmap[i])
continue;
is_dirty = true;
mask = xchg(&dirty_bitmap[i], 0);
dirty_bitmap_buffer[i] = mask;
offset = i * BITS_PER_LONG;
kvm_mmu_write_protect_pt_masked(kvm, memslot, offset, mask);
}
spin_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
/* See the comments in kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(). */
lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->slots_lock);
/*
* All the TLBs can be flushed out of mmu lock, see the comments in
* kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access().
*/
if (is_dirty)
kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(log->dirty_bitmap, dirty_bitmap_buffer, n))
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 35,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetDroppableFrames(int num, unsigned int *list) {
if (num > kMaxDroppableFrames)
num = kMaxDroppableFrames;
else if (num < 0)
num = 0;
droppable_nframes_ = num;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < droppable_nframes_; ++i)
droppable_frames_[i] = list[i];
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static handle_t *new_handle(int nblocks)
{
handle_t *handle = jbd2_alloc_handle(GFP_NOFS);
if (!handle)
return NULL;
memset(handle, 0, sizeof(*handle));
handle->h_buffer_credits = nblocks;
handle->h_ref = 1;
lockdep_init_map(&handle->h_lockdep_map, "jbd2_handle",
&jbd2_handle_key, 0);
return handle;
}
Commit Message: jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a buffer marked unwritten or delay, then it's
a live one. Perhaps those spots should check whether it is mapped
as well, but if jbd2 is going to tear down a buffer, let's really
tear it down completely.
Without this I get some fsx failures on sub-page-block filesystems
up until v3.2, at which point 4e96b2dbbf1d7e81f22047a50f862555a6cb87cb
and 189e868fa8fdca702eb9db9d8afc46b5cb9144c9 make the failures go
away, because buried within that large change is some more flag
clearing. I still think it's worth doing in jbd2, since
->invalidatepage leads here directly, and it's the right place
to clear away these flags.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool is_memcg_oom(struct oom_control *oc)
{
return oc->memcg != NULL;
}
Commit Message: mm, oom_reaper: gather each vma to prevent leaking TLB entry
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0, -1) means gathering the whole virtual memory
space. In this case, tlb->fullmm is true. Some archs like arm64
doesn't flush TLB when tlb->fullmm is true:
commit 5a7862e83000 ("arm64: tlbflush: avoid flushing when fullmm == 1").
Which causes leaking of tlb entries.
Will clarifies his patch:
"Basically, we tag each address space with an ASID (PCID on x86) which
is resident in the TLB. This means we can elide TLB invalidation when
pulling down a full mm because we won't ever assign that ASID to
another mm without doing TLB invalidation elsewhere (which actually
just nukes the whole TLB).
I think that means that we could potentially not fault on a kernel
uaccess, because we could hit in the TLB"
There could be a window between complete_signal() sending IPI to other
cores and all threads sharing this mm are really kicked off from cores.
In this window, the oom reaper may calls tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly() to
flush TLB then frees pages. However, due to the above problem, the TLB
entries are not really flushed on arm64. Other threads are possible to
access these pages through TLB entries. Moreover, a copy_to_user() can
also write to these pages without generating page fault, causes
use-after-free bugs.
This patch gathers each vma instead of gathering full vm space. In this
case tlb->fullmm is not true. The behavior of oom reaper become similar
to munmapping before do_exit, which should be safe for all archs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: aac453635549 ("mm, oom: introduce oom reaper")
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Bob Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 85,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err lsrc_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_LASERConfigurationBox *ptr = (GF_LASERConfigurationBox *)s;
ptr->size += ptr->hdr_size;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PlatformSensorAmbientLightMac::IOServiceCallback(void* context,
io_service_t service,
natural_t message_type,
void* message_argument) {
PlatformSensorAmbientLightMac* sensor =
static_cast<PlatformSensorAmbientLightMac*>(context);
if (!sensor->ReadAndUpdate()) {
sensor->NotifySensorError();
sensor->StopSensor();
}
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 148,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sp<MetaData> NuPlayer::GenericSource::getFormatMeta(bool audio) {
sp<AMessage> msg = new AMessage(kWhatGetFormat, id());
msg->setInt32("audio", audio);
sp<AMessage> response;
void *format;
status_t err = msg->postAndAwaitResponse(&response);
if (err == OK && response != NULL) {
CHECK(response->findPointer("format", &format));
return (MetaData *)format;
} else {
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: GenericSource: reset mDrmManagerClient when mDataSource is cleared.
Bug: 25070434
Change-Id: Iade3472c496ac42456e42db35e402f7b66416f5b
(cherry picked from commit b41fd0d4929f0a89811bafcc4fd944b128f00ce2)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int posix_get_monotonic_raw(clockid_t which_clock, struct timespec64 *tp)
{
getrawmonotonic64(tp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).
The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.
This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.
Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 85,141 |
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