instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GURL Extension::GetFullLaunchURL() const {
if (!launch_local_path().empty())
return url().Resolve(launch_local_path());
else
return GURL(launch_web_url());
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SyncError ExtensionService::ProcessSyncChanges(
const tracked_objects::Location& from_here,
const SyncChangeList& change_list) {
for (SyncChangeList::const_iterator i = change_list.begin();
i != change_list.end();
++i) {
ExtensionSyncData extension_sync_data = ExtensionSyncData(*i);
SyncBundle* bundle = GetSyncBundleForExtensionSyncData(extension_sync_data);
CHECK(bundle);
if (extension_sync_data.uninstalled())
bundle->synced_extensions.erase(extension_sync_data.id());
else
bundle->synced_extensions.insert(extension_sync_data.id());
ProcessExtensionSyncData(extension_sync_data, *bundle);
}
return SyncError();
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_ptr<ResourceHandler> ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::CreateResourceHandler(
net::URLRequest* request,
const ResourceHostMsg_Request& request_data,
IPC::Message* sync_result,
int route_id,
int process_type,
int child_id,
ResourceContext* resource_context) {
tracked_objects::ScopedTracker tracking_profile(
FROM_HERE_WITH_EXPLICIT_FUNCTION(
"456331 ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::CreateResourceHandler"));
scoped_ptr<ResourceHandler> handler;
if (sync_result) {
if (request_data.download_to_file) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(filter_, bad_message::RDH_BAD_DOWNLOAD);
return scoped_ptr<ResourceHandler>();
}
handler.reset(new SyncResourceHandler(request, sync_result, this));
} else {
handler.reset(new AsyncResourceHandler(request, this));
if (request_data.download_to_file) {
handler.reset(
new RedirectToFileResourceHandler(std::move(handler), request));
}
}
if (!sync_result && IsDetachableResourceType(request_data.resource_type)) {
handler.reset(new DetachableResourceHandler(
request,
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kDefaultDetachableCancelDelayMs),
std::move(handler)));
}
if (!IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled()) {
bool is_swappable_navigation =
request_data.resource_type == RESOURCE_TYPE_MAIN_FRAME;
if (!is_swappable_navigation &&
SiteIsolationPolicy::AreCrossProcessFramesPossible()) {
is_swappable_navigation =
request_data.resource_type == RESOURCE_TYPE_SUB_FRAME;
}
if (is_swappable_navigation && process_type == PROCESS_TYPE_RENDERER)
handler.reset(new CrossSiteResourceHandler(std::move(handler), request));
}
return AddStandardHandlers(request, request_data.resource_type,
resource_context, filter_->appcache_service(),
child_id, route_id, std::move(handler));
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 132,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pnm_getuintstr(jas_stream_t *in, uint_fast32_t *val)
{
uint_fast32_t v;
int c;
/* Discard any leading whitespace. */
do {
if ((c = pnm_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
} while (isspace(c));
/* Parse the number. */
v = 0;
while (isdigit(c)) {
v = 10 * v + c - '0';
if ((c = pnm_getc(in)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
}
/* The number must be followed by whitespace. */
if (!isspace(c)) {
return -1;
}
if (val) {
*val = v;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rds_recv_incoming_exthdrs(struct rds_incoming *inc, struct rds_sock *rs)
{
struct rds_header *hdr = &inc->i_hdr;
unsigned int pos = 0, type, len;
union {
struct rds_ext_header_version version;
struct rds_ext_header_rdma rdma;
struct rds_ext_header_rdma_dest rdma_dest;
} buffer;
while (1) {
len = sizeof(buffer);
type = rds_message_next_extension(hdr, &pos, &buffer, &len);
if (type == RDS_EXTHDR_NONE)
break;
/* Process extension header here */
switch (type) {
case RDS_EXTHDR_RDMA:
rds_rdma_unuse(rs, be32_to_cpu(buffer.rdma.h_rdma_rkey), 0);
break;
case RDS_EXTHDR_RDMA_DEST:
/* We ignore the size for now. We could stash it
* somewhere and use it for error checking. */
inc->i_rdma_cookie = rds_rdma_make_cookie(
be32_to_cpu(buffer.rdma_dest.h_rdma_rkey),
be32_to_cpu(buffer.rdma_dest.h_rdma_offset));
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: rds: set correct msg_namelen
Jay Fenlason ([email protected]) found a bug,
that recvfrom() on an RDS socket can return the contents of random kernel
memory to userspace if it was called with a address length larger than
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in).
rds_recvmsg() also fails to set the addr_len paramater properly before
returning, but that's just a bug.
There are also a number of cases wher recvfrom() can return an entirely bogus
address. Anything in rds_recvmsg() that returns a non-negative value but does
not go through the "sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;" code path
at the end of the while(1) loop will return up to 128 bytes of kernel memory
to userspace.
And I write two test programs to reproduce this bug, you will see that in
rds_server, fromAddr will be overwritten and the following sock_fd will be
destroyed.
Yes, it is the programmer's fault to set msg_namelen incorrectly, but it is
better to make the kernel copy the real length of address to user space in
such case.
How to run the test programs ?
I test them on 32bit x86 system, 3.5.0-rc7.
1 compile
gcc -o rds_client rds_client.c
gcc -o rds_server rds_server.c
2 run ./rds_server on one console
3 run ./rds_client on another console
4 you will see something like:
server is waiting to receive data...
old socket fd=3
server received data from client:data from client
msg.msg_namelen=32
new socket fd=-1067277685
sendmsg()
: Bad file descriptor
/***************** rds_client.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
struct sockaddr_in toAddr;
char recvBuffer[128] = "data from client";
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if (sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(1);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4001);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
memset(&toAddr, 0, sizeof(toAddr));
toAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
toAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
toAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = strlen(recvBuffer) + 1;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendto() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("client send data:%s\n", recvBuffer);
memset(recvBuffer, '\0', 128);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("receive data from server:%s\n", recvBuffer);
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
/***************** rds_server.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
struct sockaddr_in fromAddr;
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
unsigned int addrLen;
char recvBuffer[128];
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if(sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(0);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server is waiting to receive data...\n");
msg.msg_name = &fromAddr;
/*
* I add 16 to sizeof(fromAddr), ie 32,
* and pay attention to the definition of fromAddr,
* recvmsg() will overwrite sock_fd,
* since kernel will copy 32 bytes to userspace.
*
* If you just use sizeof(fromAddr), it works fine.
* */
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr) + 16;
/* msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr); */
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
while (1) {
printf("old socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server received data from client:%s\n", recvBuffer);
printf("msg.msg_namelen=%d\n", msg.msg_namelen);
printf("new socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
strcat(recvBuffer, "--data from server");
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendmsg()\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
}
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Weiping Pan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 19,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int chainiv_init_common(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
tfm->crt_ablkcipher.reqsize = sizeof(struct ablkcipher_request);
return skcipher_geniv_init(tfm);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputMethodBase::SetFocusedTextInputClient(TextInputClient* client) {
TextInputClient* old = text_input_client_;
OnWillChangeFocusedClient(old, client);
text_input_client_ = client; // NULL allowed.
OnDidChangeFocusedClient(old, client);
}
Commit Message: cleanup: Use IsTextInputTypeNone() in OnInputMethodChanged().
BUG=None
TEST=None
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8986010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116461 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int red_peer_receive(RedsStream *stream, uint8_t *buf, uint32_t size)
{
uint8_t *pos = buf;
while (size) {
int now;
if (stream->shutdown) {
return -1;
}
now = reds_stream_read(stream, pos, size);
if (now <= 0) {
if (now == 0) {
return -1;
}
spice_assert(now == -1);
if (errno == EAGAIN) {
break;
} else if (errno == EINTR) {
continue;
} else if (errno == EPIPE) {
return -1;
} else {
spice_printerr("%s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
} else {
size -= now;
pos += now;
}
}
return pos - buf;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mb_ereg_search_regs)
{
_php_mb_regex_ereg_search_exec(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 2);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 51,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_ptr<base::MessagePump> CreateMessagePumpForUI() {
return scoped_ptr<base::MessagePump>(new content::NestedMessagePumpAndroid());
}
Commit Message: Content Shell: Move shell_layout_tests_android into layout_tests/.
BUG=420994
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/661743002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299892}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 110,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFUN(execsh, EXEC_SHELL SHELL, "Execute shell command and display output")
{
char *cmd;
CurrentKeyData = NULL; /* not allowed in w3m-control: */
cmd = searchKeyData();
if (cmd == NULL || *cmd == '\0') {
cmd = inputLineHist("(exec shell)!", "", IN_COMMAND, ShellHist);
}
if (cmd != NULL)
cmd = conv_to_system(cmd);
if (cmd != NULL && *cmd != '\0') {
fmTerm();
printf("\n");
system(cmd);
/* FIXME: gettextize? */
printf("\n[Hit any key]");
fflush(stdout);
fmInit();
getch();
}
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_FORCE_REDRAW);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 84,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::CreateFrame(
int routing_id,
service_manager::mojom::InterfaceProviderPtr interface_provider,
int proxy_routing_id,
int opener_routing_id,
int parent_routing_id,
int previous_sibling_routing_id,
const base::UnguessableToken& devtools_frame_token,
const FrameReplicationState& replicated_state,
CompositorDependencies* compositor_deps,
const mojom::CreateFrameWidgetParams& widget_params,
const FrameOwnerProperties& frame_owner_properties,
bool has_committed_real_load) {
RenderViewImpl* render_view = nullptr;
RenderFrameImpl* render_frame = nullptr;
blink::WebLocalFrame* web_frame = nullptr;
if (proxy_routing_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
RenderFrameProxy* parent_proxy =
RenderFrameProxy::FromRoutingID(parent_routing_id);
CHECK(parent_proxy);
blink::WebRemoteFrame* parent_web_frame = parent_proxy->web_frame();
blink::WebFrame* previous_sibling_web_frame = nullptr;
RenderFrameProxy* previous_sibling_proxy =
RenderFrameProxy::FromRoutingID(previous_sibling_routing_id);
if (previous_sibling_proxy)
previous_sibling_web_frame = previous_sibling_proxy->web_frame();
render_view = parent_proxy->render_view();
render_frame = RenderFrameImpl::Create(
parent_proxy->render_view(), routing_id, std::move(interface_provider),
devtools_frame_token);
render_frame->InitializeBlameContext(FromRoutingID(parent_routing_id));
render_frame->unique_name_helper_.set_propagated_name(
replicated_state.unique_name);
web_frame = parent_web_frame->CreateLocalChild(
replicated_state.scope, WebString::FromUTF8(replicated_state.name),
replicated_state.frame_policy.sandbox_flags, render_frame,
render_frame->blink_interface_registry_.get(),
previous_sibling_web_frame,
replicated_state.frame_policy.container_policy,
ConvertFrameOwnerPropertiesToWebFrameOwnerProperties(
frame_owner_properties),
replicated_state.frame_owner_element_type,
ResolveOpener(opener_routing_id));
render_frame->in_frame_tree_ = true;
} else {
RenderFrameProxy* proxy =
RenderFrameProxy::FromRoutingID(proxy_routing_id);
if (!proxy)
return;
const bool proxy_is_main_frame = !proxy->web_frame()->Parent();
render_view = proxy->render_view();
render_frame = RenderFrameImpl::Create(render_view, routing_id,
std::move(interface_provider),
devtools_frame_token);
render_frame->InitializeBlameContext(nullptr);
render_frame->proxy_routing_id_ = proxy_routing_id;
proxy->set_provisional_frame_routing_id(routing_id);
web_frame = blink::WebLocalFrame::CreateProvisional(
render_frame, render_frame->blink_interface_registry_.get(),
proxy->web_frame(), replicated_state.frame_policy.sandbox_flags,
replicated_state.frame_policy.container_policy);
DCHECK_EQ(proxy_is_main_frame, !web_frame->Parent());
}
DCHECK(render_view);
DCHECK(render_frame);
DCHECK(web_frame);
const bool is_main_frame = !web_frame->Parent();
if (!is_main_frame)
DCHECK_NE(parent_routing_id, MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
if (is_main_frame) {
DCHECK_NE(widget_params.routing_id, MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
RenderWidget* render_widget = render_view->GetWidget();
auto* web_frame_widget = blink::WebFrameWidget::CreateForMainFrame(
render_view->WidgetClient(), web_frame);
render_view->AttachWebFrameWidget(web_frame_widget);
render_widget->UpdateWebViewWithDeviceScaleFactor();
render_widget->WarmupCompositor();
render_frame->render_widget_ = render_widget;
} else if (widget_params.routing_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
const ScreenInfo& screen_info_from_main_frame =
render_view->GetWidget()->GetWebScreenInfo();
scoped_refptr<RenderWidget> render_widget;
if (g_create_render_widget) {
render_widget = g_create_render_widget(
widget_params.routing_id, compositor_deps,
screen_info_from_main_frame, blink::kWebDisplayModeUndefined,
/*is_frozen=*/false, widget_params.hidden,
/*never_visible=*/false);
} else {
render_widget = base::MakeRefCounted<RenderWidget>(
widget_params.routing_id, compositor_deps,
screen_info_from_main_frame, blink::kWebDisplayModeUndefined,
/*is_frozen=*/false, widget_params.hidden,
/*never_visible=*/false);
}
auto* web_frame_widget = blink::WebFrameWidget::CreateForChildLocalRoot(
render_widget.get(), web_frame);
render_widget->InitForChildLocalRoot(web_frame_widget);
render_widget->UpdateWebViewWithDeviceScaleFactor();
if (g_render_widget_initialized)
g_render_widget_initialized(render_widget.get());
render_frame->render_widget_ = std::move(render_widget);
}
if (has_committed_real_load)
render_frame->frame_->SetCommittedFirstRealLoad();
render_frame->Initialize();
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vrrp_garp_refresh_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
unsigned refresh;
if (!read_unsigned_strvec(strvec, 1, &refresh, 0, UINT_MAX, true)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s): Invalid garp_master_refresh '%s' - ignoring", vrrp->iname, FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
vrrp->garp_refresh.tv_sec = 0;
}
else
vrrp->garp_refresh.tv_sec = refresh;
vrrp->garp_refresh.tv_usec = 0;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 75,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TranslateInfoBarDelegate::TranslateInfoBarDelegate(
content::WebContents* web_contents,
translate::TranslateStep step,
TranslateInfoBarDelegate* old_delegate,
const std::string& original_language,
const std::string& target_language,
TranslateErrors::Type error_type,
PrefService* prefs,
bool triggered_from_menu)
: infobars::InfoBarDelegate(),
step_(step),
background_animation_(NONE),
ui_delegate_(TranslateTabHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents),
TranslateTabHelper::GetManagerFromWebContents(web_contents),
original_language,
target_language),
error_type_(error_type),
prefs_(TranslateTabHelper::CreateTranslatePrefs(prefs)),
triggered_from_menu_(triggered_from_menu) {
DCHECK_NE((step_ == translate::TRANSLATE_STEP_TRANSLATE_ERROR),
(error_type_ == TranslateErrors::NONE));
if (old_delegate && (old_delegate->is_error() != is_error()))
background_animation_ = is_error() ? NORMAL_TO_ERROR : ERROR_TO_NORMAL;
}
Commit Message: Remove dependency of TranslateInfobarDelegate on profile
This CL uses TranslateTabHelper instead of Profile and also cleans up
some unused code and irrelevant dependencies.
BUG=371845
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/286973003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@270758 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *__netdev_alloc_frag(unsigned int fragsz, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
struct page_frag_cache *nc;
unsigned long flags;
void *data;
local_irq_save(flags);
nc = this_cpu_ptr(&netdev_alloc_cache);
data = page_frag_alloc(nc, fragsz, gfp_mask);
local_irq_restore(flags);
return data;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 67,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int PageHuge(struct page *page)
{
compound_page_dtor *dtor;
if (!PageCompound(page))
return 0;
page = compound_head(page);
dtor = get_compound_page_dtor(page);
return dtor == free_huge_page;
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GranularityStrategyTest::SetupTextSpan(String str1,
String str2,
String str3,
size_t sel_begin,
size_t sel_end) {
Text* text1 = GetDocument().createTextNode(str1);
Text* text2 = GetDocument().createTextNode(str2);
Text* text3 = GetDocument().createTextNode(str3);
Element* span = HTMLSpanElement::Create(GetDocument());
Element* div = GetDocument().getElementById("mytext");
div->AppendChild(text1);
div->AppendChild(span);
span->AppendChild(text2);
div->AppendChild(text3);
GetDocument().View()->UpdateAllLifecyclePhases();
Vector<IntPoint> letter_pos;
Vector<IntPoint> word_middle_pos;
TextNodeVector text_nodes;
text_nodes.push_back(text1);
text_nodes.push_back(text2);
text_nodes.push_back(text3);
ParseText(text_nodes);
Position p1;
Position p2;
if (sel_begin < str1.length())
p1 = Position(text1, sel_begin);
else if (sel_begin < str1.length() + str2.length())
p1 = Position(text2, sel_begin - str1.length());
else
p1 = Position(text3, sel_begin - str1.length() - str2.length());
if (sel_end < str1.length())
p2 = Position(text1, sel_end);
else if (sel_end < str1.length() + str2.length())
p2 = Position(text2, sel_end - str1.length());
else
p2 = Position(text3, sel_end - str1.length() - str2.length());
Selection().SetSelection(
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder().SetBaseAndExtent(p1, p2).Build());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetManualFallbacksForFillingStandalone(bool enabled) {
if (enabled) {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksFillingStandalone);
} else {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndDisableFeature(
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksFillingStandalone);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __glXDisp_DestroyWindow(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
xGLXDestroyWindowReq *req = (xGLXDestroyWindowReq *) pc;
return DoDestroyDrawable(cl, req->glxwindow, GLX_DRAWABLE_WINDOW);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dispatchChildInsertionEvents(Node* child)
{
if (child->isInShadowTree())
return;
ASSERT(!eventDispatchForbidden());
RefPtr<Node> c = child;
RefPtr<Document> document = child->document();
if (c->parentNode() && document->hasListenerType(Document::DOMNODEINSERTED_LISTENER))
c->dispatchScopedEvent(MutationEvent::create(eventNames().DOMNodeInsertedEvent, true, c->parentNode()));
if (c->inDocument() && document->hasListenerType(Document::DOMNODEINSERTEDINTODOCUMENT_LISTENER)) {
for (; c; c = c->traverseNextNode(child))
c->dispatchScopedEvent(MutationEvent::create(eventNames().DOMNodeInsertedIntoDocumentEvent, false));
}
}
Commit Message: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 98,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int proxy_authentication(zval* this_ptr, smart_str* soap_headers TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval **login, **password;
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_proxy_login", sizeof("_proxy_login"), (void **)&login) == SUCCESS) {
unsigned char* buf;
int len;
smart_str auth = {0};
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(login), Z_STRLEN_PP(login));
smart_str_appendc(&auth, ':');
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_proxy_password", sizeof("_proxy_password"), (void **)&password) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(password), Z_STRLEN_PP(password));
}
smart_str_0(&auth);
smart_str_appendl(soap_headers, (char*)buf, len);
smart_str_append_const(soap_headers, "\r\n");
efree(buf);
smart_str_free(&auth);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 1 | 165,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool jsvIsString(const JsVar *v) { return v && (v->flags&JSV_VARTYPEMASK)>=_JSV_STRING_START && (v->flags&JSV_VARTYPEMASK)<=_JSV_STRING_END; } ///< String, or a NAME too
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfer_delete(struct xfer_header *xfer)
{
mbentry_t *newentry = NULL;
struct xfer_item *item;
int r;
syslog(LOG_INFO, "XFER: deleting mailboxes on source");
/* 7) local delete of mailbox
* & remove local "remote" mailboxlist entry */
for (item = xfer->items; item; item = item->next) {
/* Set mailbox as DELETED on local server
(need to also reset to local partition,
otherwise mailbox can not be opened for deletion) */
/* XXX - this code is awful... need a sane way to manage mbentries */
newentry = mboxlist_entry_create();
newentry->name = xstrdupnull(item->mbentry->name);
newentry->acl = xstrdupnull(item->mbentry->acl);
newentry->server = xstrdupnull(item->mbentry->server);
newentry->partition = xstrdupnull(item->mbentry->partition);
newentry->mbtype = item->mbentry->mbtype|MBTYPE_DELETED;
r = mboxlist_update(newentry, 1);
mboxlist_entry_free(&newentry);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"Could not move mailbox: %s, mboxlist_update failed (%s)",
item->mbentry->name, error_message(r));
}
/* Note that we do not check the ACL, and we don't update MUPDATE */
/* note also that we need to remember to let proxyadmins do this */
/* On a unified system, the subsequent MUPDATE PUSH on the remote
should repopulate the local mboxlist entry */
r = mboxlist_deletemailbox(item->mbentry->name,
imapd_userisadmin || imapd_userisproxyadmin,
imapd_userid, imapd_authstate, NULL, 0, 1, 0);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"Could not delete local mailbox during move of %s",
item->mbentry->name);
/* can't abort now! */
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::SetSize(const gfx::Size& size) {
int width = std::min(size.width(), kMaxWindowWidth);
int height = std::min(size.height(), kMaxWindowHeight);
if (IsPopup()) {
gtk_widget_set_size_request(view_.get(), width, height);
}
if (requested_size_.width() != width ||
requested_size_.height() != height) {
requested_size_ = gfx::Size(width, height);
host_->SendScreenRects();
host_->WasResized();
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FindFormInputElement(
const std::vector<blink::WebFormControlElement>& control_elements,
const FormFieldData& field,
bool ambiguous_or_empty_names,
FormInputElementMap* result) {
bool found_input = false;
bool is_password_field = IsPasswordField(field);
bool does_password_field_has_ambigous_or_empty_name =
ambiguous_or_empty_names && is_password_field;
bool ambiguous_and_multiple_password_fields_with_autocomplete =
does_password_field_has_ambigous_or_empty_name &&
HasPasswordWithAutocompleteAttribute(control_elements);
base::string16 field_name = FieldName(field, ambiguous_or_empty_names);
for (const blink::WebFormControlElement& control_element : control_elements) {
if (!ambiguous_or_empty_names &&
control_element.nameForAutofill() != field_name) {
continue;
}
if (!control_element.hasHTMLTagName("input"))
continue;
const blink::WebInputElement input_element =
control_element.toConst<blink::WebInputElement>();
if (input_element.isPasswordField() != is_password_field)
continue;
if (ambiguous_and_multiple_password_fields_with_autocomplete &&
!HasAutocompleteAttributeValue(input_element, "current-password")) {
continue;
}
if (found_input) {
if (does_password_field_has_ambigous_or_empty_name) {
if (!form_util::IsWebNodeVisible((*result)[field_name])) {
(*result)[field_name] = input_element;
}
continue;
}
found_input = false;
break;
}
(*result)[field_name] = input_element;
found_input = true;
}
if (!found_input) {
result->clear();
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Remove WeakPtrFactory from PasswordAutofillAgent
Unlike in AutofillAgent, the factory is no longer used in PAA.
[email protected]
BUG=609010,609007,608100,608101,433486
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1945723003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391475}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __xml_acl_free(void *data)
{
if(data) {
xml_acl_t *acl = data;
free(acl->xpath);
free(acl);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 43,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void zend_objects_proxy_free_storage(zend_proxy_object *object TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval_ptr_dtor(&object->object);
zval_ptr_dtor(&object->property);
efree(object);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vp8_decoder_create_threads(VP8D_COMP *pbi)
{
int core_count = 0;
unsigned int ithread;
pbi->b_multithreaded_rd = 0;
pbi->allocated_decoding_thread_count = 0;
/* limit decoding threads to the max number of token partitions */
core_count = (pbi->max_threads > 8) ? 8 : pbi->max_threads;
/* limit decoding threads to the available cores */
if (core_count > pbi->common.processor_core_count)
core_count = pbi->common.processor_core_count;
if (core_count > 1)
{
pbi->b_multithreaded_rd = 1;
pbi->decoding_thread_count = core_count - 1;
CALLOC_ARRAY(pbi->h_decoding_thread, pbi->decoding_thread_count);
CALLOC_ARRAY(pbi->h_event_start_decoding, pbi->decoding_thread_count);
CALLOC_ARRAY_ALIGNED(pbi->mb_row_di, pbi->decoding_thread_count, 32);
CALLOC_ARRAY(pbi->de_thread_data, pbi->decoding_thread_count);
for (ithread = 0; ithread < pbi->decoding_thread_count; ithread++)
{
sem_init(&pbi->h_event_start_decoding[ithread], 0, 0);
vp8_setup_block_dptrs(&pbi->mb_row_di[ithread].mbd);
pbi->de_thread_data[ithread].ithread = ithread;
pbi->de_thread_data[ithread].ptr1 = (void *)pbi;
pbi->de_thread_data[ithread].ptr2 = (void *) &pbi->mb_row_di[ithread];
pthread_create(&pbi->h_decoding_thread[ithread], 0, thread_decoding_proc, (&pbi->de_thread_data[ithread]));
}
sem_init(&pbi->h_event_end_decoding, 0, 0);
pbi->allocated_decoding_thread_count = pbi->decoding_thread_count;
}
}
Commit Message: vp8:fix threading issues
1 - stops de allocating before threads are closed.
2 - limits threads to mb_rows when mb_rows < partitions
BUG=webm:851
Bug: 30436808
Change-Id: Ie017818ed28103ca9d26d57087f31361b642e09b
(cherry picked from commit 70cca742efa20617c70c3209aa614a70f282f90e)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int STBV_CDECL point_compare(const void *p, const void *q)
{
stbv__floor_ordering *a = (stbv__floor_ordering *) p;
stbv__floor_ordering *b = (stbv__floor_ordering *) q;
return a->x < b->x ? -1 : a->x > b->x;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 75,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cancel_loading_attributes (NautilusDirectory *directory,
NautilusFileAttributes file_attributes)
{
Request request;
request = nautilus_directory_set_up_request (file_attributes);
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_DIRECTORY_COUNT))
{
directory_count_cancel (directory);
}
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_DEEP_COUNT))
{
deep_count_cancel (directory);
}
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_MIME_LIST))
{
mime_list_cancel (directory);
}
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_FILE_INFO))
{
file_info_cancel (directory);
}
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_FILESYSTEM_INFO))
{
filesystem_info_cancel (directory);
}
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_LINK_INFO))
{
link_info_cancel (directory);
}
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_EXTENSION_INFO))
{
extension_info_cancel (directory);
}
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_THUMBNAIL))
{
thumbnail_cancel (directory);
}
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_MOUNT))
{
mount_cancel (directory);
}
nautilus_directory_async_state_changed (directory);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _server_handle_z(libgdbr_t *g, int (*cmd_cb) (void*, const char*, char*, size_t), void *core_ptr) {
if (send_ack (g) < 0) {
return -1;
}
char set; // Z = set, z = remove
int type;
ut64 addr;
char cmd[64];
sscanf (g->data, "%c%d,%"PFMT64x, &set, &type, &addr);
if (type != 0) {
return send_msg (g, "E01");
}
switch (set) {
case 'Z':
snprintf (cmd, sizeof (cmd) - 1, "db 0x%"PFMT64x, addr);
break;
case 'z':
snprintf (cmd, sizeof (cmd) - 1, "db- 0x%"PFMT64x, addr);
break;
default:
return send_msg (g, "E01");
}
if (cmd_cb (core_ptr, cmd, NULL, 0) < 0) {
send_msg (g, "E01");
return -1;
}
return send_msg (g, "OK");
}
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int32_t out_blocks;
/* XXX client can't cope with rekeying pre-auth */
if (!state->after_authentication)
return 0;
/* Haven't keyed yet or KEX in progress. */
if (ssh->kex == NULL || ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
return 0;
/* Peer can't rekey */
if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
return 0;
/*
* Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to
* make progress when rekey limits are very small.
*/
if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
return 0;
/* Time-based rekeying */
if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
return 1;
/* Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction */
if (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS ||
state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS)
return 1;
/* Rekey after (cipher-specific) maxiumum blocks */
out_blocks = ROUNDUP(outbound_packet_len,
state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc.block_size);
return (state->max_blocks_out &&
(state->p_send.blocks + out_blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) ||
(state->max_blocks_in &&
(state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 17,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebLayer* DrawingBuffer::PlatformLayer() {
if (!layer_) {
layer_ =
Platform::Current()->CompositorSupport()->CreateExternalTextureLayer(
this);
layer_->SetOpaque(!want_alpha_channel_);
layer_->SetBlendBackgroundColor(want_alpha_channel_);
layer_->SetPremultipliedAlpha(premultiplied_alpha_);
layer_->SetNearestNeighbor(filter_quality_ == kNone_SkFilterQuality);
GraphicsLayer::RegisterContentsLayer(layer_->Layer());
}
return layer_->Layer();
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: net::StaticCookiePolicy::Type BrowserContextIOData::GetCookiePolicy() const {
const BrowserContextSharedIOData& data = GetSharedData();
base::AutoLock lock(data.lock);
return data.cookie_policy;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NuPlayer::GenericSource::fetchTextData(
uint32_t sendWhat,
media_track_type type,
int32_t curGen,
sp<AnotherPacketSource> packets,
sp<AMessage> msg) {
int32_t msgGeneration;
CHECK(msg->findInt32("generation", &msgGeneration));
if (msgGeneration != curGen) {
return;
}
int32_t avail;
if (packets->hasBufferAvailable(&avail)) {
return;
}
int64_t timeUs;
CHECK(msg->findInt64("timeUs", &timeUs));
int64_t subTimeUs;
readBuffer(type, timeUs, &subTimeUs);
int64_t delayUs = subTimeUs - timeUs;
if (msg->what() == kWhatFetchSubtitleData) {
const int64_t oneSecUs = 1000000ll;
delayUs -= oneSecUs;
}
sp<AMessage> msg2 = new AMessage(sendWhat, this);
msg2->setInt32("generation", msgGeneration);
msg2->post(delayUs < 0 ? 0 : delayUs);
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_pngdec_get_type (void)
{
static GType pngdec_type = 0;
if (!pngdec_type) {
static const GTypeInfo pngdec_info = {
sizeof (GstPngDecClass),
gst_pngdec_base_init,
NULL,
(GClassInitFunc) gst_pngdec_class_init,
NULL,
NULL,
sizeof (GstPngDec),
0,
(GInstanceInitFunc) gst_pngdec_init,
};
pngdec_type = g_type_register_static (GST_TYPE_ELEMENT, "GstPngDec",
&pngdec_info, 0);
}
return pngdec_type;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 2,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline COMPS_HSList* __comps_objrtree_all(COMPS_ObjRTree * rt, char keyvalpair) {
COMPS_HSList *to_process, *ret;
COMPS_HSListItem *hsit, *oldit;
size_t x;
struct Pair {
char *key;
void *data;
COMPS_HSList *subnodes;
} *pair, *current_pair=NULL;//, *oldpair=NULL;
COMPS_ObjRTreePair *rtpair;
to_process = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(to_process, NULL, NULL, &free);
ret = comps_hslist_create();
if (keyvalpair == 0)
comps_hslist_init(ret, NULL, NULL, &free);
else if (keyvalpair == 1)
comps_hslist_init(ret, NULL, NULL, NULL);
else
comps_hslist_init(ret, NULL, NULL, &comps_objrtree_pair_destroy_v);
for (hsit = rt->subnodes->first; hsit != NULL; hsit = hsit->next) {
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->key = __comps_strcpy(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)hsit->data)->key);
pair->data = ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)hsit->data)->data;
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)hsit->data)->subnodes;
comps_hslist_append(to_process, pair, 0);
}
while (to_process->first) {
current_pair = to_process->first->data;
oldit = to_process->first;
comps_hslist_remove(to_process, to_process->first);
if (current_pair->data) {
if (keyvalpair == 0) {
comps_hslist_append(ret, __comps_strcpy(current_pair->key), 0);
} else if (keyvalpair == 1) {
comps_hslist_append(ret, current_pair->data, 0);
} else {
rtpair = malloc(sizeof(COMPS_ObjRTreePair));
rtpair->key = __comps_strcpy(current_pair->key);
rtpair->data = current_pair->data;
comps_hslist_append(ret, rtpair, 0);
}
}
for (hsit = current_pair->subnodes->first, x = 0;
hsit != NULL; hsit = hsit->next, x++) {
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->key = __comps_strcat(current_pair->key,
((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)hsit->data)->key);
pair->data = ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)hsit->data)->data;
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)hsit->data)->subnodes;
comps_hslist_insert_at(to_process, x, pair, 0);
}
free(current_pair->key);
free(current_pair);
free(oldit);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&to_process);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::~ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl() {
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID: | 0 | 143,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int uio_mmap(struct file *filep, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct uio_listener *listener = filep->private_data;
struct uio_device *idev = listener->dev;
int mi;
unsigned long requested_pages, actual_pages;
int ret = 0;
if (vma->vm_end < vma->vm_start)
return -EINVAL;
vma->vm_private_data = idev;
mi = uio_find_mem_index(vma);
if (mi < 0)
return -EINVAL;
requested_pages = vma_pages(vma);
actual_pages = ((idev->info->mem[mi].addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
+ idev->info->mem[mi].size + PAGE_SIZE -1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (requested_pages > actual_pages)
return -EINVAL;
if (idev->info->mmap) {
ret = idev->info->mmap(idev->info, vma);
return ret;
}
switch (idev->info->mem[mi].memtype) {
case UIO_MEM_PHYS:
return uio_mmap_physical(vma);
case UIO_MEM_LOGICAL:
case UIO_MEM_VIRTUAL:
return uio_mmap_logical(vma);
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected].
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
{
const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
/* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
return 0;
cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
if (pflags)
*pflags = cinfo->flags;
return cinfo->nid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 162,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TaskService::PostBoundTask(RunnerId runner_id, base::OnceClosure task) {
InstanceId instance_id;
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (bound_instance_id_ == kInvalidInstanceId)
return;
instance_id = bound_instance_id_;
}
GetTaskRunner(runner_id)->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&TaskService::RunTask, base::Unretained(this),
instance_id, runner_id, std::move(task)));
}
Commit Message: Change ReadWriteLock to Lock+ConditionVariable in TaskService
There are non-trivial performance implications of using shared
SRWLocking on Windows as more state has to be checked.
Since there are only two uses of the ReadWriteLock in Chromium after
over 1 year, the decision is to remove it.
BUG=758721
Change-Id: I84d1987d7b624a89e896eb37184ee50845c39d80
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/634423
Commit-Queue: Robert Liao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Toyoshima <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Francois Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#497632}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 132,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static double outlog(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* The command line parameters are either 8 bit (0..255) or 16 bit (0..65535)
* and so must be adjusted for low bit depth grayscale:
*/
if (out_depth <= 8)
{
if (pm->log8 == 0) /* switched off */
return 256;
if (out_depth < 8)
return pm->log8 / 255 * ((1<<out_depth)-1);
return pm->log8;
}
if ((pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
{
if (pm->log16 == 0)
return 65536;
return pm->log16;
}
/* This is the case where the value was calculated at 8-bit precision then
* scaled to 16 bits.
*/
if (pm->log8 == 0)
return 65536;
return pm->log8 * 257;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 173,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::ApplyWebPreferencesInternal(const WebPreferences& prefs,
blink::WebView* web_view) {
ApplyWebPreferences(prefs, web_view);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bmexec (kwset_t kwset, char const *text, size_t size)
{
/* Help the compiler inline bmexec_trans in two ways, depending on
whether kwset->trans is null. */
return (kwset->trans
? bmexec_trans (kwset, text, size)
: bmexec_trans (kwset, text, size));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnShowWidget(int routing_id, const gfx::Rect& initial_rect) {
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(
content::BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&PendingWidgetMessageFilter::OnReceivedRoutingIDOnUI,
this, routing_id));
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool update_event(conn *c, const int new_flags) {
assert(c != NULL);
struct event_base *base = c->event.ev_base;
if (c->ev_flags == new_flags)
return true;
if (event_del(&c->event) == -1) return false;
event_set(&c->event, c->sfd, new_flags, event_handler, (void *)c);
event_base_set(base, &c->event);
c->ev_flags = new_flags;
if (event_add(&c->event, 0) == -1) return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: h2_stream *h2_session_open_stream(h2_session *session, int stream_id,
int initiated_on, const h2_request *req)
{
h2_stream * stream;
apr_pool_t *stream_pool;
apr_pool_create(&stream_pool, session->pool);
apr_pool_tag(stream_pool, "h2_stream");
stream = h2_stream_open(stream_id, stream_pool, session,
initiated_on);
nghttp2_session_set_stream_user_data(session->ngh2, stream_id, stream);
if (req) {
h2_stream_set_request(stream, req);
}
if (H2_STREAM_CLIENT_INITIATED(stream_id)) {
if (stream_id > session->remote.emitted_max) {
++session->remote.emitted_count;
session->remote.emitted_max = stream->id;
session->local.accepted_max = stream->id;
}
}
else {
if (stream_id > session->local.emitted_max) {
++session->local.emitted_count;
session->remote.emitted_max = stream->id;
}
}
dispatch_event(session, H2_SESSION_EV_STREAM_OPEN, 0, NULL);
return stream;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <[email protected]> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int burl_is_unreserved (const int c)
{
return (light_isalnum(c) || c == '-' || c == '.' || c == '_' || c == '~');
}
Commit Message: [core] fix abort in http-parseopts (fixes #2945)
fix abort in server.http-parseopts with url-path-2f-decode enabled
(thx stze)
x-ref:
"Security - SIGABRT during GET request handling with url-path-2f-decode enabled"
https://redmine.lighttpd.net/issues/2945
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 90,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gs_lib_ctx_fin(gs_memory_t *mem)
{
gs_lib_ctx_t *ctx;
gs_memory_t *ctx_mem;
if (!mem || !mem->gs_lib_ctx)
return;
ctx = mem->gs_lib_ctx;
ctx_mem = ctx->memory;
sjpxd_destroy(mem);
gscms_destroy(ctx_mem);
gs_free_object(ctx_mem, ctx->profiledir,
"gs_lib_ctx_fin");
gs_free_object(ctx_mem, ctx->default_device_list,
"gs_lib_ctx_fin");
#ifndef GS_THREADSAFE
mem_err_print = NULL;
#endif
remove_ctx_pointers(ctx_mem);
gs_free_object(ctx_mem, ctx, "gs_lib_ctx_init");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int crypto_init_spawn2(struct crypto_spawn *spawn, struct crypto_alg *alg,
struct crypto_instance *inst,
const struct crypto_type *frontend)
{
int err = -EINVAL;
if ((alg->cra_flags ^ frontend->type) & frontend->maskset)
goto out;
spawn->frontend = frontend;
err = crypto_init_spawn(spawn, alg, inst, frontend->maskset);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SVGDocumentExtensions::addTimeContainer(SVGSVGElement* element)
{
m_timeContainers.add(element);
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EditorClientBlackBerry::pageDestroyed()
{
delete this;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OneClickSigninHelper::SetDoNotClearPendingEmailForTesting() {
do_not_clear_pending_email_ = true;
}
Commit Message: During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 109,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcRenderTriangles (ClientPtr client)
{
int rc, ntris;
PicturePtr pSrc, pDst;
PictFormatPtr pFormat;
REQUEST(xRenderTrianglesReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderTrianglesReq);
if (!PictOpValid (stuff->op))
{
client->errorValue = stuff->op;
return BadValue;
}
VERIFY_PICTURE (pSrc, stuff->src, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_PICTURE (pDst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (!pDst->pDrawable)
return BadDrawable;
if (pSrc->pDrawable && pSrc->pDrawable->pScreen != pDst->pDrawable->pScreen)
return BadMatch;
if (stuff->maskFormat)
{
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((pointer *)&pFormat, stuff->maskFormat,
PictFormatType, client, DixReadAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
}
else
pFormat = 0;
ntris = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof (xRenderTrianglesReq);
if (ntris % sizeof (xTriangle))
return BadLength;
ntris /= sizeof (xTriangle);
if (ntris)
CompositeTriangles (stuff->op, pSrc, pDst, pFormat,
stuff->xSrc, stuff->ySrc,
ntris, (xTriangle *) &stuff[1]);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cryptd_blkcipher_setkey(struct crypto_ablkcipher *parent,
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
struct cryptd_blkcipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(parent);
struct crypto_blkcipher *child = ctx->child;
int err;
crypto_blkcipher_clear_flags(child, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(child, crypto_ablkcipher_get_flags(parent) &
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(child, key, keylen);
crypto_ablkcipher_set_flags(parent, crypto_blkcipher_get_flags(child) &
CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_write_set_bytes_per_block(struct archive *_a, int bytes_per_block)
{
struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_NEW, "archive_write_set_bytes_per_block");
a->bytes_per_block = bytes_per_block;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Limit write requests to at most INT_MAX.
This prevents a certain common programming error (passing -1 to write)
from leading to other problems deeper in the library.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 34,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcm_loop_queuecommand(
struct Scsi_Host *sh,
struct scsi_cmnd *sc)
{
struct se_cmd *se_cmd;
struct se_portal_group *se_tpg;
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba;
struct tcm_loop_tpg *tl_tpg;
TL_CDB_DEBUG("tcm_loop_queuecommand() %d:%d:%d:%d got CDB: 0x%02x"
" scsi_buf_len: %u\n", sc->device->host->host_no,
sc->device->id, sc->device->channel, sc->device->lun,
sc->cmnd[0], scsi_bufflen(sc));
/*
* Locate the tcm_loop_hba_t pointer
*/
tl_hba = *(struct tcm_loop_hba **)shost_priv(sc->device->host);
tl_tpg = &tl_hba->tl_hba_tpgs[sc->device->id];
se_tpg = &tl_tpg->tl_se_tpg;
/*
* Determine the SAM Task Attribute and allocate tl_cmd and
* tl_cmd->tl_se_cmd from TCM infrastructure
*/
se_cmd = tcm_loop_allocate_core_cmd(tl_hba, se_tpg, sc);
if (!se_cmd) {
sc->scsi_done(sc);
return 0;
}
/*
* Queue up the newly allocated to be processed in TCM thread context.
*/
transport_generic_handle_cdb_map(se_cmd);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long ext4_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
handle_t *handle;
loff_t new_size;
unsigned int max_blocks;
int ret = 0;
int ret2 = 0;
int retries = 0;
int flags;
struct ext4_map_blocks map;
unsigned int credits, blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
/*
* currently supporting (pre)allocate mode for extent-based
* files _only_
*/
if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Return error if mode is not supported */
if (mode & ~(FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE | FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE)
return ext4_punch_hole(file, offset, len);
trace_ext4_fallocate_enter(inode, offset, len, mode);
map.m_lblk = offset >> blkbits;
/*
* We can't just convert len to max_blocks because
* If blocksize = 4096 offset = 3072 and len = 2048
*/
max_blocks = (EXT4_BLOCK_ALIGN(len + offset, blkbits) >> blkbits)
- map.m_lblk;
/*
* credits to insert 1 extent into extent tree
*/
credits = ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode, max_blocks);
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
ret = inode_newsize_ok(inode, (len + offset));
if (ret) {
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
trace_ext4_fallocate_exit(inode, offset, max_blocks, ret);
return ret;
}
flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE_UNINIT_EXT;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)
flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_KEEP_SIZE;
/*
* Don't normalize the request if it can fit in one extent so
* that it doesn't get unnecessarily split into multiple
* extents.
*/
if (len <= EXT_UNINIT_MAX_LEN << blkbits)
flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_NO_NORMALIZE;
/* Prevent race condition between unwritten */
ext4_flush_unwritten_io(inode);
retry:
while (ret >= 0 && ret < max_blocks) {
map.m_lblk = map.m_lblk + ret;
map.m_len = max_blocks = max_blocks - ret;
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
break;
}
ret = ext4_map_blocks(handle, inode, &map, flags);
if (ret <= 0) {
#ifdef EXT4FS_DEBUG
WARN_ON(ret <= 0);
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ext4_ext_map_blocks "
"returned error inode#%lu, block=%u, "
"max_blocks=%u", __func__,
inode->i_ino, map.m_lblk, max_blocks);
#endif
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ret2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
break;
}
if ((map.m_lblk + ret) >= (EXT4_BLOCK_ALIGN(offset + len,
blkbits) >> blkbits))
new_size = offset + len;
else
new_size = ((loff_t) map.m_lblk + ret) << blkbits;
ext4_falloc_update_inode(inode, mode, new_size,
(map.m_flags & EXT4_MAP_NEW));
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
if ((file->f_flags & O_SYNC) && ret >= max_blocks)
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
ret2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (ret2)
break;
}
if (ret == -ENOSPC &&
ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries)) {
ret = 0;
goto retry;
}
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
trace_ext4_fallocate_exit(inode, offset, max_blocks,
ret > 0 ? ret2 : ret);
return ret > 0 ? ret2 : ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void printMAPOpcodeVersion1(const uint8_t *buf)
{
char map_addr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "PCP MAP: v1 Opcode specific information. \n");
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "MAP protocol: \t\t %d\n", (int)buf[0] );
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "MAP int port: \t\t %d\n", (int)READNU16(buf+4));
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "MAP ext port: \t\t %d\n", (int)READNU16(buf+6));
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "MAP Ext IP: \t\t %s\n", inet_ntop(AF_INET6,
buf+8, map_addr, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN));
}
Commit Message: pcpserver.c: copyIPv6IfDifferent() check for NULL src argument
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameSelection::MoveCaretSelection(const IntPoint& point) {
DCHECK(!GetDocument().NeedsLayoutTreeUpdate());
Element* const editable =
ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().RootEditableElement();
if (!editable)
return;
const VisiblePosition position =
VisiblePositionForContentsPoint(point, GetFrame());
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder builder;
if (position.IsNotNull())
builder.Collapse(position.ToPositionWithAffinity());
SetSelection(builder.Build(), SetSelectionOptions::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.SetSetSelectionBy(SetSelectionBy::kUser)
.SetShouldShowHandle(true)
.SetIsDirectional(IsDirectional())
.Build());
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::Paste() {
gtk_window_util::DoPaste(
window_, chrome::GetActiveWebContents(browser_.get()));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long unix_inq_len(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
long amount = 0;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM ||
sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
skb_queue_walk(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb)
amount += skb->len;
} else {
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (skb)
amount = skb->len;
}
spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
return amount;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Florian Weimer <[email protected]>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HttpNetworkTransactionTest::ConnectStatusHelperWithExpectedStatus(
const MockRead& status, int expected_status) {
HttpRequestInfo request;
request.method = "GET";
request.url = GURL("https://www.google.com/");
request.load_flags = 0;
session_deps_.proxy_service.reset(ProxyService::CreateFixed("myproxy:70"));
scoped_refptr<HttpNetworkSession> session(CreateSession(&session_deps_));
MockWrite data_writes[] = {
MockWrite("CONNECT www.google.com:443 HTTP/1.1\r\n"
"Host: www.google.com\r\n"
"Proxy-Connection: keep-alive\r\n\r\n"),
};
MockRead data_reads[] = {
status,
MockRead("Content-Length: 10\r\n\r\n"),
MockRead(SYNCHRONOUS, ERR_UNEXPECTED), // Should not be reached.
};
StaticSocketDataProvider data(data_reads, arraysize(data_reads),
data_writes, arraysize(data_writes));
session_deps_.socket_factory->AddSocketDataProvider(&data);
TestCompletionCallback callback;
scoped_ptr<HttpTransaction> trans(
new HttpNetworkTransaction(DEFAULT_PRIORITY, session.get()));
int rv = trans->Start(&request, callback.callback(), BoundNetLog());
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_IO_PENDING, rv);
rv = callback.WaitForResult();
EXPECT_EQ(expected_status, rv);
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_poc_putparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jpc_poc_t *poc = &ms->parms.poc;
jpc_pocpchg_t *pchg;
int pchgno;
for (pchgno = 0, pchg = poc->pchgs; pchgno < poc->numpchgs; ++pchgno,
++pchg) {
if (jpc_putuint8(out, pchg->rlvlnostart) ||
((cstate->numcomps > 256) ?
jpc_putuint16(out, pchg->compnostart) :
jpc_putuint8(out, pchg->compnostart)) ||
jpc_putuint16(out, pchg->lyrnoend) ||
jpc_putuint8(out, pchg->rlvlnoend) ||
((cstate->numcomps > 256) ?
jpc_putuint16(out, pchg->compnoend) :
jpc_putuint8(out, pchg->compnoend)) ||
jpc_putuint8(out, pchg->prgord)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tg3_enable_ints(struct tg3 *tp)
{
int i;
tp->irq_sync = 0;
wmb();
tw32(TG3PCI_MISC_HOST_CTRL,
(tp->misc_host_ctrl & ~MISC_HOST_CTRL_MASK_PCI_INT));
tp->coal_now = tp->coalesce_mode | HOSTCC_MODE_ENABLE;
for (i = 0; i < tp->irq_cnt; i++) {
struct tg3_napi *tnapi = &tp->napi[i];
tw32_mailbox_f(tnapi->int_mbox, tnapi->last_tag << 24);
if (tg3_flag(tp, 1SHOT_MSI))
tw32_mailbox_f(tnapi->int_mbox, tnapi->last_tag << 24);
tp->coal_now |= tnapi->coal_now;
}
/* Force an initial interrupt */
if (!tg3_flag(tp, TAGGED_STATUS) &&
(tp->napi[0].hw_status->status & SD_STATUS_UPDATED))
tw32(GRC_LOCAL_CTRL, tp->grc_local_ctrl | GRC_LCLCTRL_SETINT);
else
tw32(HOSTCC_MODE, tp->coal_now);
tp->coal_now &= ~(tp->napi[0].coal_now | tp->napi[1].coal_now);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Matt Carlson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_decode_port_mod(const struct ofp_header *oh,
struct ofputil_port_mod *pm, bool loose)
{
struct ofpbuf b = ofpbuf_const_initializer(oh, ntohs(oh->length));
enum ofpraw raw = ofpraw_pull_assert(&b);
if (raw == OFPRAW_OFPT10_PORT_MOD) {
const struct ofp10_port_mod *opm = b.data;
pm->port_no = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(opm->port_no));
pm->hw_addr = opm->hw_addr;
pm->config = ntohl(opm->config) & OFPPC10_ALL;
pm->mask = ntohl(opm->mask) & OFPPC10_ALL;
pm->advertise = netdev_port_features_from_ofp10(opm->advertise);
} else if (raw == OFPRAW_OFPT11_PORT_MOD) {
const struct ofp11_port_mod *opm = b.data;
enum ofperr error;
error = ofputil_port_from_ofp11(opm->port_no, &pm->port_no);
if (error) {
return error;
}
pm->hw_addr = opm->hw_addr;
pm->config = ntohl(opm->config) & OFPPC11_ALL;
pm->mask = ntohl(opm->mask) & OFPPC11_ALL;
pm->advertise = netdev_port_features_from_ofp11(opm->advertise);
} else if (raw == OFPRAW_OFPT14_PORT_MOD) {
const struct ofp14_port_mod *opm = ofpbuf_pull(&b, sizeof *opm);
enum ofperr error;
memset(pm, 0, sizeof *pm);
error = ofputil_port_from_ofp11(opm->port_no, &pm->port_no);
if (error) {
return error;
}
pm->hw_addr = opm->hw_addr;
pm->config = ntohl(opm->config) & OFPPC11_ALL;
pm->mask = ntohl(opm->mask) & OFPPC11_ALL;
while (b.size > 0) {
struct ofpbuf property;
enum ofperr error;
uint64_t type;
error = ofpprop_pull(&b, &property, &type);
if (error) {
return error;
}
switch (type) {
case OFPPMPT14_ETHERNET:
error = parse_port_mod_ethernet_property(&property, pm);
break;
default:
error = OFPPROP_UNKNOWN(loose, "port_mod", type);
break;
}
if (error) {
return error;
}
}
} else {
return OFPERR_OFPBRC_BAD_TYPE;
}
pm->config &= pm->mask;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: qtdemux_parse_theora_extension (GstQTDemux * qtdemux, QtDemuxStream * stream,
GNode * xdxt)
{
int len = QT_UINT32 (xdxt->data);
guint8 *buf = xdxt->data;
guint8 *end = buf + len;
GstBuffer *buffer;
/* skip size and type */
buf += 8;
end -= 8;
while (buf < end) {
gint size;
guint32 type;
size = QT_UINT32 (buf);
type = QT_FOURCC (buf + 4);
GST_LOG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "%p %p", buf, end);
if (buf + size > end || size <= 0)
break;
buf += 8;
size -= 8;
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (qtdemux, "have cookie %" GST_FOURCC_FORMAT,
GST_FOURCC_ARGS (type));
switch (type) {
case FOURCC_tCtH:
buffer = gst_buffer_new_and_alloc (size);
memcpy (GST_BUFFER_DATA (buffer), buf, size);
stream->buffers = g_slist_append (stream->buffers, buffer);
GST_LOG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "parsing theora header");
break;
case FOURCC_tCt_:
buffer = gst_buffer_new_and_alloc (size);
memcpy (GST_BUFFER_DATA (buffer), buf, size);
stream->buffers = g_slist_append (stream->buffers, buffer);
GST_LOG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "parsing theora comment");
break;
case FOURCC_tCtC:
buffer = gst_buffer_new_and_alloc (size);
memcpy (GST_BUFFER_DATA (buffer), buf, size);
stream->buffers = g_slist_append (stream->buffers, buffer);
GST_LOG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "parsing theora codebook");
break;
default:
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (qtdemux,
"unknown theora cookie %" GST_FOURCC_FORMAT,
GST_FOURCC_ARGS (type));
break;
}
buf += size;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool tcp_need_reset(int state)
{
return (1 << state) &
(TCPF_ESTABLISHED | TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT | TCPF_FIN_WAIT1 |
TCPF_FIN_WAIT2 | TCPF_SYN_RECV);
}
Commit Message: tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 61,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::PurgePluginListCache(bool reload_pages) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
blink_platform_impl_->set_plugin_refresh_allowed(false);
blink::ResetPluginCache(reload_pages);
blink_platform_impl_->set_plugin_refresh_allowed(true);
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.PluginListChanged();
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataFileSystem::RemoveObserver(
GDataFileSystemInterface::Observer* observer) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::RestartInputEventAckTimeoutIfNecessary() {
if (input_event_ack_timeout_ && in_flight_event_count_ > 0 && !is_hidden_)
input_event_ack_timeout_->Restart(hung_renderer_delay_);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long usecs_to_jiffies(const unsigned int u)
{
if (u > jiffies_to_usecs(MAX_JIFFY_OFFSET))
return MAX_JIFFY_OFFSET;
#if HZ <= USEC_PER_SEC && !(USEC_PER_SEC % HZ)
return (u + (USEC_PER_SEC / HZ) - 1) / (USEC_PER_SEC / HZ);
#elif HZ > USEC_PER_SEC && !(HZ % USEC_PER_SEC)
return u * (HZ / USEC_PER_SEC);
#else
return ((u64)USEC_TO_HZ_MUL32 * u + USEC_TO_HZ_ADJ32)
>> USEC_TO_HZ_SHR32;
#endif
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int checkMutexInit(void){
pGlobalMutexMethods = sqlite3DefaultMutex();
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 151,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t getGraphicBufferUsage(
node_id node, OMX_U32 port_index, OMX_U32* usage) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32(port_index);
remote()->transact(GET_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_USAGE, data, &reply);
status_t err = reply.readInt32();
*usage = reply.readInt32();
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix size check for OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits
since it doesn't follow the OMX convention. And remove support
for the kClientNeedsFrameBuffer flag.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: Ia2c119e2456ebf9e2f4e1de5104ef9032a212255
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_csr_free(zend_rsrc_list_entry *rsrc TSRMLS_DC)
{
X509_REQ * csr = (X509_REQ*)rsrc->ptr;
X509_REQ_free(csr);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cachedAttributeAnyAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Handle<v8::String> propertyName = v8AtomicString(info.GetIsolate(), "cachedAttributeAnyAttribute");
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
if (!imp->isValueDirty()) {
v8::Handle<v8::Value> jsValue = V8HiddenValue::getHiddenValue(info.GetIsolate(), info.Holder(), propertyName);
if (!jsValue.IsEmpty()) {
v8SetReturnValue(info, jsValue);
return;
}
}
ScriptValue jsValue = imp->cachedAttributeAnyAttribute();
V8HiddenValue::setHiddenValue(info.GetIsolate(), info.Holder(), propertyName, jsValue.v8Value());
v8SetReturnValue(info, jsValue.v8Value());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DECLAREcpFunc(cpContigTiles2SeparateStrips)
{
return cpImage(in, out,
readContigTilesIntoBuffer,
writeBufferToSeparateStrips,
imagelength, imagewidth, spp);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd
tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103
by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TEE_Result syscall_get_time(unsigned long cat, TEE_Time *mytime)
{
TEE_Result res, res2;
struct tee_ta_session *s = NULL;
TEE_Time t;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&s);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
switch (cat) {
case UTEE_TIME_CAT_SYSTEM:
res = tee_time_get_sys_time(&t);
break;
case UTEE_TIME_CAT_TA_PERSISTENT:
res = tee_time_get_ta_time((const void *)&s->ctx->uuid, &t);
break;
case UTEE_TIME_CAT_REE:
res = tee_time_get_ree_time(&t);
break;
default:
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS || res == TEE_ERROR_OVERFLOW) {
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(mytime, &t, sizeof(t));
if (res2 != TEE_SUCCESS)
res = res2;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void get_fs_root_rcu(struct fs_struct *fs, struct path *root)
{
unsigned seq;
do {
seq = read_seqcount_begin(&fs->seq);
*root = fs->root;
} while (read_seqcount_retry(&fs->seq, seq));
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_SZP2( INS_ARG )
{
switch ( args[0] )
{
case 0:
CUR.zp2 = CUR.twilight;
break;
case 1:
CUR.zp2 = CUR.pts;
break;
default:
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
CUR.GS.gep2 = (Int)(args[0]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Eina_Bool ewk_frame_feed_key_up(Evas_Object* ewkFrame, const Evas_Event_Key_Up* upEvent)
{
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData, false);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame, false);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(upEvent, false);
DBG("ewkFrame=%p keyname=%s (key=%s, string=%s)",
ewkFrame, upEvent->keyname, upEvent->key ? upEvent->key : "", upEvent->string ? upEvent->string : "");
WebCore::PlatformKeyboardEvent event(upEvent);
return smartData->frame->eventHandler()->keyEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <[email protected]> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebPage::findNextString(const char* text, bool forward, bool caseSensitive, bool wrap, bool highlightAllMatches)
{
WebCore::FindOptions findOptions = WebCore::StartInSelection;
if (!forward)
findOptions |= WebCore::Backwards;
if (!caseSensitive)
findOptions |= WebCore::CaseInsensitive;
return d->m_inPageSearchManager->findNextString(String::fromUTF8(text), findOptions, wrap, highlightAllMatches);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int out_standby(struct audio_stream *stream)
{
struct a2dp_stream_out *out = (struct a2dp_stream_out *)stream;
int retVal = 0;
FNLOG();
pthread_mutex_lock(&out->common.lock);
if (out->common.state != AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_SUSPENDED)
retVal = suspend_audio_datapath(&out->common, true);
out->frames_rendered = 0; // rendered is reset, presented is not
pthread_mutex_unlock (&out->common.lock);
return retVal;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_mtup_probe_failed(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
icsk->icsk_mtup.search_high = icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_size - 1;
icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_size = 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 41,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputHandler::clearField()
{
if (!isActiveTextEdit())
return;
ASSERT(m_currentFocusElement->document() && m_currentFocusElement->document()->frame() && m_currentFocusElement->document()->frame()->editor());
Editor* editor = m_currentFocusElement->document()->frame()->editor();
editor->command("SelectAll").execute();
editor->command("DeleteBackward").execute();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cifs_lock_add(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile, struct cifsLockInfo *lock)
{
struct cifsInodeInfo *cinode = CIFS_I(cfile->dentry->d_inode);
down_write(&cinode->lock_sem);
list_add_tail(&lock->llist, &cfile->llist->locks);
up_write(&cinode->lock_sem);
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 39,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit UrlRecordingHttpAuthHandlerMock(GURL* url) : url_(url) {}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
int size)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno];
off += reg->off;
if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || off + size > reg->range) {
verbose("invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
off, size, regno, reg->id, reg->off, reg->range);
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
The patch fixes two things at once:
1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 65,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs4_proc_lock(struct file *filp, int cmd, struct file_lock *request)
{
struct nfs_open_context *ctx;
struct nfs4_state *state;
unsigned long timeout = NFS4_LOCK_MINTIMEOUT;
int status;
/* verify open state */
ctx = nfs_file_open_context(filp);
state = ctx->state;
if (request->fl_start < 0 || request->fl_end < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (IS_GETLK(cmd)) {
if (state != NULL)
return nfs4_proc_getlk(state, F_GETLK, request);
return 0;
}
if (!(IS_SETLK(cmd) || IS_SETLKW(cmd)))
return -EINVAL;
if (request->fl_type == F_UNLCK) {
if (state != NULL)
return nfs4_proc_unlck(state, cmd, request);
return 0;
}
if (state == NULL)
return -ENOLCK;
do {
status = nfs4_proc_setlk(state, cmd, request);
if ((status != -EAGAIN) || IS_SETLK(cmd))
break;
timeout = nfs4_set_lock_task_retry(timeout);
status = -ERESTARTSYS;
if (signalled())
break;
} while(status < 0);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SocketStream::ResponseHeaders::~ResponseHeaders() { data_ = NULL; }
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnContextMenuClosed(
const CustomContextMenuContext& custom_context) {
if (custom_context.request_id) {
ContextMenuClient* client =
pending_context_menus_.Lookup(custom_context.request_id);
if (client) {
client->OnMenuClosed(custom_context.request_id);
pending_context_menus_.Remove(custom_context.request_id);
}
} else {
if (custom_context.link_followed.is_valid())
frame_->SendPings(custom_context.link_followed);
}
render_view()->webview()->DidCloseContextMenu();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rb_simple_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf,
size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct trace_array *tr = filp->private_data;
struct ring_buffer *buffer = tr->trace_buffer.buffer;
unsigned long val;
int ret;
ret = kstrtoul_from_user(ubuf, cnt, 10, &val);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (buffer) {
mutex_lock(&trace_types_lock);
if (val) {
tracer_tracing_on(tr);
if (tr->current_trace->start)
tr->current_trace->start(tr);
} else {
tracer_tracing_off(tr);
if (tr->current_trace->stop)
tr->current_trace->stop(tr);
}
mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock);
}
(*ppos)++;
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xen_netbk_rx_action(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
{
struct xenvif *vif = NULL, *tmp;
s8 status;
u16 irq, flags;
struct xen_netif_rx_response *resp;
struct sk_buff_head rxq;
struct sk_buff *skb;
LIST_HEAD(notify);
int ret;
int nr_frags;
int count;
unsigned long offset;
struct skb_cb_overlay *sco;
struct netrx_pending_operations npo = {
.copy = netbk->grant_copy_op,
.meta = netbk->meta,
};
skb_queue_head_init(&rxq);
count = 0;
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&netbk->rx_queue)) != NULL) {
vif = netdev_priv(skb->dev);
nr_frags = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
sco = (struct skb_cb_overlay *)skb->cb;
sco->meta_slots_used = netbk_gop_skb(skb, &npo);
count += nr_frags + 1;
__skb_queue_tail(&rxq, skb);
/* Filled the batch queue? */
if (count + MAX_SKB_FRAGS >= XEN_NETIF_RX_RING_SIZE)
break;
}
BUG_ON(npo.meta_prod > ARRAY_SIZE(netbk->meta));
if (!npo.copy_prod)
return;
BUG_ON(npo.copy_prod > ARRAY_SIZE(netbk->grant_copy_op));
gnttab_batch_copy(netbk->grant_copy_op, npo.copy_prod);
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&rxq)) != NULL) {
sco = (struct skb_cb_overlay *)skb->cb;
vif = netdev_priv(skb->dev);
if (netbk->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_size && vif->gso_prefix) {
resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&vif->rx,
vif->rx.rsp_prod_pvt++);
resp->flags = XEN_NETRXF_gso_prefix | XEN_NETRXF_more_data;
resp->offset = netbk->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_size;
resp->id = netbk->meta[npo.meta_cons].id;
resp->status = sco->meta_slots_used;
npo.meta_cons++;
sco->meta_slots_used--;
}
vif->dev->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len;
vif->dev->stats.tx_packets++;
status = netbk_check_gop(vif, sco->meta_slots_used, &npo);
if (sco->meta_slots_used == 1)
flags = 0;
else
flags = XEN_NETRXF_more_data;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) /* local packet? */
flags |= XEN_NETRXF_csum_blank | XEN_NETRXF_data_validated;
else if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY)
/* remote but checksummed. */
flags |= XEN_NETRXF_data_validated;
offset = 0;
resp = make_rx_response(vif, netbk->meta[npo.meta_cons].id,
status, offset,
netbk->meta[npo.meta_cons].size,
flags);
if (netbk->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_size && !vif->gso_prefix) {
struct xen_netif_extra_info *gso =
(struct xen_netif_extra_info *)
RING_GET_RESPONSE(&vif->rx,
vif->rx.rsp_prod_pvt++);
resp->flags |= XEN_NETRXF_extra_info;
gso->u.gso.size = netbk->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_size;
gso->u.gso.type = XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4;
gso->u.gso.pad = 0;
gso->u.gso.features = 0;
gso->type = XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_TYPE_GSO;
gso->flags = 0;
}
netbk_add_frag_responses(vif, status,
netbk->meta + npo.meta_cons + 1,
sco->meta_slots_used);
RING_PUSH_RESPONSES_AND_CHECK_NOTIFY(&vif->rx, ret);
irq = vif->irq;
if (ret && list_empty(&vif->notify_list))
list_add_tail(&vif->notify_list, ¬ify);
xenvif_notify_tx_completion(vif);
xenvif_put(vif);
npo.meta_cons += sco->meta_slots_used;
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(vif, tmp, ¬ify, notify_list) {
notify_remote_via_irq(vif->irq);
list_del_init(&vif->notify_list);
}
/* More work to do? */
if (!skb_queue_empty(&netbk->rx_queue) &&
!timer_pending(&netbk->net_timer))
xen_netbk_kick_thread(netbk);
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~SingleDriveEntryPropertiesGetter() {}
Commit Message: Reland r286968: The CL borrows ShareDialog from Files.app and add it to Gallery.
Previous Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/431293002
BUG=374667
TEST=manually
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/433733004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286975 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int create_lockd_listener(struct svc_serv *serv, const char *name,
struct net *net, const int family,
const unsigned short port)
{
struct svc_xprt *xprt;
xprt = svc_find_xprt(serv, name, net, family, 0);
if (xprt == NULL)
return svc_create_xprt(serv, name, net, family, port,
SVC_SOCK_DEFAULTS);
svc_xprt_put(xprt);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::didFailLoad(WebFrame* frame, const WebURLError& error) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_, DidFailLoad(frame, error));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sock_diag_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
mutex_lock(&sock_diag_mutex);
netlink_rcv_skb(skb, &sock_diag_rcv_msg);
mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_mutex);
}
Commit Message: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *__llc_lookup(struct llc_sap *sap,
struct llc_addr *daddr,
struct llc_addr *laddr)
{
struct sock *sk = __llc_lookup_established(sap, daddr, laddr);
return sk ? : llc_lookup_listener(sap, laddr);
}
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 68,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::SwapTabContents(content::WebContents* old_contents,
content::WebContents* new_contents,
bool did_start_load,
bool did_finish_load) {
if (old_contents && new_contents) {
RenderWidgetHostView* old_view = old_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetView();
RenderWidgetHostView* new_view = new_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetView();
if (old_view && new_view)
new_view->SetBackgroundColor(old_view->background_color());
}
int index = tab_strip_model_->GetIndexOfWebContents(old_contents);
DCHECK_NE(TabStripModel::kNoTab, index);
tab_strip_model_->ReplaceWebContentsAt(index, new_contents);
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID: | 0 | 139,069 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.