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Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationRequest::OnRedirectChecksComplete(
NavigationThrottle::ThrottleCheckResult result) {
DCHECK(result.action() != NavigationThrottle::DEFER);
DCHECK(result.action() != NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_RESPONSE);
bool collapse_frame =
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST_AND_COLLAPSE;
if (result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL_AND_IGNORE ||
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL) {
DCHECK(result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL ||
result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_ABORTED);
OnRequestFailedInternal(
network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus(result.net_error_code()),
true /* skip_throttles */, result.error_page_content(), collapse_frame);
return;
}
if (result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST ||
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST_AND_COLLAPSE) {
DCHECK(result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CLIENT ||
result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_ADMINISTRATOR);
OnRequestFailedInternal(
network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus(result.net_error_code()),
true /* skip_throttles */, result.error_page_content(), collapse_frame);
return;
}
devtools_instrumentation::OnNavigationRequestWillBeSent(*this);
net::HttpRequestHeaders modified_headers =
navigation_handle_->TakeModifiedRequestHeaders();
std::vector<std::string> removed_headers =
navigation_handle_->TakeRemovedRequestHeaders();
BrowserContext* browser_context =
frame_tree_node_->navigator()->GetController()->GetBrowserContext();
if (browser_context->GetClientHintsControllerDelegate()) {
net::HttpRequestHeaders client_hints_extra_headers;
browser_context->GetClientHintsControllerDelegate()
->GetAdditionalNavigationRequestClientHintsHeaders(
common_params_.url, &client_hints_extra_headers);
modified_headers.MergeFrom(client_hints_extra_headers);
}
loader_->FollowRedirect(std::move(removed_headers),
std::move(modified_headers),
common_params_.previews_state);
}
Commit Message: Show an error page if a URL redirects to a javascript: URL.
BUG=935175
Change-Id: Id4a9198d5dff823bc3d324b9de9bff2ee86dc499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1488152
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635848}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamDevicesController::NotifyUIRequestDenied() const {
if (!content_settings_)
return;
if (request_.audio_type == content::MEDIA_TAB_AUDIO_CAPTURE ||
request_.video_type == content::MEDIA_TAB_VIDEO_CAPTURE) {
return;
}
if (request_.audio_type == content::MEDIA_DEVICE_AUDIO_CAPTURE)
content_settings_->OnMicrophoneAccessBlocked();
if (request_.video_type == content::MEDIA_DEVICE_VIDEO_CAPTURE)
content_settings_->OnCameraAccessBlocked();
}
Commit Message: Make the content setting for webcam/mic sticky for Pepper requests.
This makes the content setting sticky for webcam/mic requests from Pepper from non-https origins.
BUG=249335
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/17060006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@206479 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool new_idmap_permitted(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
{
/* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */
if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) {
u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
if (uid_eq(uid, current_fsuid()))
return true;
}
else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
if (gid_eq(gid, current_fsgid()))
return true;
}
}
/* Allow anyone to set a mapping that doesn't require privilege */
if (!cap_valid(cap_setid))
return true;
/* Allow the specified ids if we have the appropriate capability
* (CAP_SETUID or CAP_SETGID) over the parent user namespace.
*/
if (ns_capable(ns->parent, cap_setid))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: userns: Don't let unprivileged users trick privileged users into setting the id_map
When we require privilege for setting /proc/<pid>/uid_map or
/proc/<pid>/gid_map no longer allow an unprivileged user to
open the file and pass it to a privileged program to write
to the file.
Instead when privilege is required require both the opener and the
writer to have the necessary capabilities.
I have tested this code and verified that setting /proc/<pid>/uid_map
fails when an unprivileged user opens the file and a privielged user
attempts to set the mapping, that unprivileged users can still map
their own id, and that a privileged users can still setup an arbitrary
mapping.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 166,092 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rose_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) {
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk);
rose->dest_ndigis = 0;
memset(&rose->dest_addr, 0, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
memset(&rose->dest_call, 0, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
memset(rose->dest_digis, 0, AX25_ADDR_LEN * ROSE_MAX_DIGIS);
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
sk->sk_state = TCP_LISTEN;
return 0;
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::ImportBufferForPicture(
int32_t picture_buffer_id,
const gfx::GpuMemoryBufferHandle& gpu_memory_buffer_handle) {
VLOGF(2) << "Importing picture id: " << picture_buffer_id;
DCHECK(task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (output_mode_ != Config::OutputMode::IMPORT) {
CloseGpuMemoryBufferHandle(gpu_memory_buffer_handle);
VLOGF(1) << "Cannot import in non-import mode";
NotifyError(INVALID_ARGUMENT);
return;
}
VaapiPicture* picture = PictureById(picture_buffer_id);
if (!picture) {
CloseGpuMemoryBufferHandle(gpu_memory_buffer_handle);
VLOGF(3) << "got picture id=" << picture_buffer_id
<< " not in use (anymore?).";
return;
}
if (!picture->ImportGpuMemoryBufferHandle(output_format_,
gpu_memory_buffer_handle)) {
VLOGF(1) << "Failed to import GpuMemoryBufferHandle";
NotifyError(PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
ReusePictureBuffer(picture_buffer_id);
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 148,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Debugger::unmuteScriptParsedEvents()
{
--m_ignoreScriptParsedEventsCounter;
DCHECK_GE(m_ignoreScriptParsedEventsCounter, 0);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DragStart(aura::Window* window) {
resizer_ = CreateWindowResizer(window, window->bounds().origin(), HTCAPTION,
::wm::WINDOW_MOVE_SOURCE_MOUSE);
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TT_Set_MM_Blend( TT_Face face,
FT_UInt num_coords,
FT_Fixed* coords )
{
FT_Error error = TT_Err_Ok;
GX_Blend blend;
FT_MM_Var* mmvar;
FT_UInt i;
FT_Memory memory = face->root.memory;
enum
{
mcvt_retain,
mcvt_modify,
mcvt_load
} manageCvt;
face->doblend = FALSE;
if ( face->blend == NULL )
{
if ( (error = TT_Get_MM_Var( face, NULL)) != 0 )
goto Exit;
}
blend = face->blend;
mmvar = blend->mmvar;
if ( num_coords != mmvar->num_axis )
{
error = TT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
goto Exit;
}
for ( i = 0; i < num_coords; ++i )
if ( coords[i] < -0x00010000L || coords[i] > 0x00010000L )
{
error = TT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
goto Exit;
}
if ( blend->glyphoffsets == NULL )
if ( (error = ft_var_load_gvar( face )) != 0 )
goto Exit;
if ( blend->normalizedcoords == NULL )
{
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( blend->normalizedcoords, num_coords ) )
goto Exit;
manageCvt = mcvt_modify;
/* If we have not set the blend coordinates before this, then the */
/* cvt table will still be what we read from the `cvt ' table and */
/* we don't need to reload it. We may need to change it though... */
}
else
{
manageCvt = mcvt_retain;
for ( i = 0; i < num_coords; ++i )
{
if ( blend->normalizedcoords[i] != coords[i] )
{
manageCvt = mcvt_load;
break;
}
}
/* If we don't change the blend coords then we don't need to do */
/* anything to the cvt table. It will be correct. Otherwise we */
/* no longer have the original cvt (it was modified when we set */
/* the blend last time), so we must reload and then modify it. */
}
blend->num_axis = num_coords;
FT_MEM_COPY( blend->normalizedcoords,
coords,
num_coords * sizeof ( FT_Fixed ) );
face->doblend = TRUE;
if ( face->cvt != NULL )
{
switch ( manageCvt )
{
case mcvt_load:
/* The cvt table has been loaded already; every time we change the */
/* blend we may need to reload and remodify the cvt table. */
FT_FREE( face->cvt );
face->cvt = NULL;
tt_face_load_cvt( face, face->root.stream );
break;
case mcvt_modify:
/* The original cvt table is in memory. All we need to do is */
/* apply the `cvar' table (if any). */
tt_face_vary_cvt( face, face->root.stream );
break;
case mcvt_retain:
/* The cvt table is correct for this set of coordinates. */
break;
}
}
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadManagerImpl::GetDownloadFileFactoryForTesting() {
return in_progress_manager_->file_factory();
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Tags::Tag::Clear() {
while (m_simple_tags_count > 0) {
SimpleTag& d = m_simple_tags[--m_simple_tags_count];
d.Clear();
}
delete[] m_simple_tags;
m_simple_tags = NULL;
m_simple_tags_size = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 164,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_SHP( INS_ARG )
{
TGlyph_Zone zp;
Int refp;
TT_F26Dot6 dx,
dy;
Long point;
(void)args;
if ( CUR.top < CUR.GS.loop )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
if ( COMPUTE_Point_Displacement( &dx, &dy, &zp, &refp ) )
return;
while ( CUR.GS.loop > 0 )
{
CUR.args--;
point = CUR.stack[CUR.args];
if ( BOUNDS( point, CUR.zp2.n_points ) )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
/* undocumented: SHP touches the points */
MOVE_Zp2_Point( point, dx, dy, TRUE );
CUR.GS.loop--;
}
CUR.GS.loop = 1;
CUR.new_top = CUR.args;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void srpt_mad_recv_handler(struct ib_mad_agent *mad_agent,
struct ib_mad_send_buf *send_buf,
struct ib_mad_recv_wc *mad_wc)
{
struct srpt_port *sport = (struct srpt_port *)mad_agent->context;
struct ib_ah *ah;
struct ib_mad_send_buf *rsp;
struct ib_dm_mad *dm_mad;
if (!mad_wc || !mad_wc->recv_buf.mad)
return;
ah = ib_create_ah_from_wc(mad_agent->qp->pd, mad_wc->wc,
mad_wc->recv_buf.grh, mad_agent->port_num);
if (IS_ERR(ah))
goto err;
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct ib_dm_mad, data) != IB_MGMT_DEVICE_HDR);
rsp = ib_create_send_mad(mad_agent, mad_wc->wc->src_qp,
mad_wc->wc->pkey_index, 0,
IB_MGMT_DEVICE_HDR, IB_MGMT_DEVICE_DATA,
GFP_KERNEL,
IB_MGMT_BASE_VERSION);
if (IS_ERR(rsp))
goto err_rsp;
rsp->ah = ah;
dm_mad = rsp->mad;
memcpy(dm_mad, mad_wc->recv_buf.mad, sizeof *dm_mad);
dm_mad->mad_hdr.method = IB_MGMT_METHOD_GET_RESP;
dm_mad->mad_hdr.status = 0;
switch (mad_wc->recv_buf.mad->mad_hdr.method) {
case IB_MGMT_METHOD_GET:
srpt_mgmt_method_get(sport, mad_wc->recv_buf.mad, dm_mad);
break;
case IB_MGMT_METHOD_SET:
dm_mad->mad_hdr.status =
cpu_to_be16(DM_MAD_STATUS_UNSUP_METHOD_ATTR);
break;
default:
dm_mad->mad_hdr.status =
cpu_to_be16(DM_MAD_STATUS_UNSUP_METHOD);
break;
}
if (!ib_post_send_mad(rsp, NULL)) {
ib_free_recv_mad(mad_wc);
/* will destroy_ah & free_send_mad in send completion */
return;
}
ib_free_send_mad(rsp);
err_rsp:
ib_destroy_ah(ah);
err:
ib_free_recv_mad(mad_wc);
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 50,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: T2P* t2p_init()
{
T2P* t2p = (T2P*) _TIFFmalloc(sizeof(T2P));
if(t2p==NULL){
TIFFError(
TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_init",
(unsigned long) sizeof(T2P));
return( (T2P*) NULL );
}
_TIFFmemset(t2p, 0x00, sizeof(T2P));
t2p->pdf_majorversion=1;
t2p->pdf_minorversion=1;
t2p->pdf_defaultxres=300.0;
t2p->pdf_defaultyres=300.0;
t2p->pdf_defaultpagewidth=612.0;
t2p->pdf_defaultpagelength=792.0;
t2p->pdf_xrefcount=3; /* Catalog, Info, Pages */
return(t2p);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_INI_MH(OnUpdateHashFunc) /* {{{ */
{
long val;
char *endptr = NULL;
#if defined(HAVE_HASH_EXT) && !defined(COMPILE_DL_HASH)
PS(hash_ops) = NULL;
#endif
val = strtol(new_value, &endptr, 10);
if (endptr && (*endptr == '\0')) {
/* Numeric value */
PS(hash_func) = val ? 1 : 0;
return SUCCESS;
}
if (new_value_length == (sizeof("md5") - 1) &&
strncasecmp(new_value, "md5", sizeof("md5") - 1) == 0) {
PS(hash_func) = PS_HASH_FUNC_MD5;
return SUCCESS;
}
if (new_value_length == (sizeof("sha1") - 1) &&
strncasecmp(new_value, "sha1", sizeof("sha1") - 1) == 0) {
PS(hash_func) = PS_HASH_FUNC_SHA1;
return SUCCESS;
}
#if defined(HAVE_HASH_EXT) && !defined(COMPILE_DL_HASH) /* {{{ */
{
php_hash_ops *ops = (php_hash_ops*)php_hash_fetch_ops(new_value, new_value_length);
if (ops) {
PS(hash_func) = PS_HASH_FUNC_OTHER;
PS(hash_ops) = ops;
return SUCCESS;
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_HASH_EXT }}} */
return FAILURE;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<SendTabToSelfEntry> SendTabToSelfEntry::FromProto(
const sync_pb::SendTabToSelfSpecifics& pb_entry,
base::Time now) {
std::string guid(pb_entry.guid());
if (guid.empty()) {
return nullptr;
}
GURL url(pb_entry.url());
if (!url.is_valid()) {
return nullptr;
}
base::Time shared_time = ProtoTimeToTime(pb_entry.shared_time_usec());
if (shared_time > now) {
shared_time = now;
}
base::Time navigation_time;
if (pb_entry.has_navigation_time_usec()) {
navigation_time = ProtoTimeToTime(pb_entry.navigation_time_usec());
}
return std::make_unique<SendTabToSelfEntry>(
guid, url, pb_entry.title(), shared_time, navigation_time,
pb_entry.device_name(), pb_entry.target_device_sync_cache_guid());
}
Commit Message: [SendTabToSelf] Added logic to display an infobar for the feature.
This CL is one of many to come. It covers:
* Creation of the infobar from the SendTabToSelfInfoBarController
* Plumbed the call to create the infobar to the native code.
* Open the link when user taps on the link
In follow-up CLs, the following will be done:
* Instantiate the InfobarController in the ChromeActivity
* Listen for Model changes in the Controller
Bug: 949233,963193
Change-Id: I5df1359debb5f0f35c32c2df3b691bf9129cdeb8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1604406
Reviewed-by: Tommy Nyquist <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: sebsg <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Cohen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Jones <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Tanya Gupta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660854}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 142,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PP_CursorType_Dev Instance::CalculateAutoscroll(const pp::Point& mouse_pos) {
if (autoscroll_rect_.Contains(mouse_pos)) {
autoscroll_x_ = 0;
autoscroll_y_ = 0;
return PP_CURSORTYPE_MIDDLEPANNING;
}
pp::Point rel_pos = mouse_pos - autoscroll_rect_.CenterPoint();
double angle = atan2(static_cast<double>(rel_pos.y()),
static_cast<double>(rel_pos.x()));
autoscroll_x_ = rel_pos.x() * kAutoScrollFactor;
autoscroll_y_ = rel_pos.y() * kAutoScrollFactor;
if (angle < - (M_PI * 7.0 / 8.0)) {
return PP_CURSORTYPE_WESTPANNING;
} else if (angle < - (M_PI * 5.0 / 8.0)) {
return PP_CURSORTYPE_NORTHWESTPANNING;
} else if (angle < - (M_PI * 3.0 / 8.0)) {
return PP_CURSORTYPE_NORTHPANNING;
} else if (angle < - (M_PI * 1.0 / 8.0)) {
return PP_CURSORTYPE_NORTHEASTPANNING;
} else if (angle < M_PI * 1.0 / 8.0) {
return PP_CURSORTYPE_EASTPANNING;
} else if (angle < M_PI * 3.0 / 8.0) {
return PP_CURSORTYPE_SOUTHEASTPANNING;
} else if (angle < M_PI * 5.0 / 8.0) {
return PP_CURSORTYPE_SOUTHPANNING;
} else if (angle < M_PI * 7.0 / 8.0) {
return PP_CURSORTYPE_SOUTHWESTPANNING;
}
return PP_CURSORTYPE_WESTPANNING;
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tt_cmap14_get_def_chars( TT_CMap cmap,
FT_Byte* p,
FT_Memory memory )
{
TT_CMap14 cmap14 = (TT_CMap14) cmap;
FT_UInt32 numRanges;
FT_UInt cnt;
FT_UInt32* q;
cnt = tt_cmap14_def_char_count( p );
numRanges = (FT_UInt32)TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( tt_cmap14_ensure( cmap14, ( cnt + 1 ), memory ) )
return NULL;
for ( q = cmap14->results; numRanges > 0; --numRanges )
{
FT_UInt32 uni = (FT_UInt32)TT_NEXT_UINT24( p );
cnt = FT_NEXT_BYTE( p ) + 1;
do
{
q[0] = uni;
uni += 1;
q += 1;
} while ( --cnt != 0 );
}
q[0] = 0;
return cmap14->results;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int del_dac(struct task_struct *child, int slot)
{
if (slot == 1) {
if ((dbcr_dac(child) & (DBCR_DAC1R | DBCR_DAC1W)) == 0)
return -ENOENT;
child->thread.dac1 = 0;
dbcr_dac(child) &= ~(DBCR_DAC1R | DBCR_DAC1W);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DAC_RANGE
if (child->thread.dbcr2 & DBCR2_DAC12MODE) {
child->thread.dac2 = 0;
child->thread.dbcr2 &= ~DBCR2_DAC12MODE;
}
child->thread.dbcr2 &= ~(DBCR2_DVC1M | DBCR2_DVC1BE);
#endif
#if CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DVCS > 0
child->thread.dvc1 = 0;
#endif
} else if (slot == 2) {
if ((dbcr_dac(child) & (DBCR_DAC2R | DBCR_DAC2W)) == 0)
return -ENOENT;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DAC_RANGE
if (child->thread.dbcr2 & DBCR2_DAC12MODE)
/* Part of a range */
return -EINVAL;
child->thread.dbcr2 &= ~(DBCR2_DVC2M | DBCR2_DVC2BE);
#endif
#if CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DVCS > 0
child->thread.dvc2 = 0;
#endif
child->thread.dac2 = 0;
dbcr_dac(child) &= ~(DBCR_DAC2R | DBCR_DAC2W);
} else
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aspath_confed_check (struct aspath *aspath)
{
struct assegment *seg;
if ( !(aspath && aspath->segments) )
return 0;
seg = aspath->segments;
while (seg)
{
if (seg->type == AS_CONFED_SET || seg->type == AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE)
return 1;
seg = seg->next;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __ipv6_try_regen_rndid(struct inet6_dev *idev, struct in6_addr *tmpaddr)
{
if (tmpaddr && memcmp(idev->rndid, &tmpaddr->s6_addr[8], 8) == 0)
__ipv6_regen_rndid(idev);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void port_cleanup(struct si_sm_io *io)
{
unsigned int addr = io->addr_data;
int idx;
if (addr) {
for (idx = 0; idx < io->io_size; idx++)
release_region(addr + idx * io->regspacing,
io->regsize);
}
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 90,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AuthenticatorTransportSelectorSheetModel::IsBackButtonVisible() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageLoader::ImageChanged(ImageResourceContent* content,
CanDeferInvalidation,
const IntRect*) {
DCHECK_EQ(content, image_content_.Get());
if (image_complete_ || !content->IsLoading() ||
delay_until_image_notify_finished_)
return;
Document& document = element_->GetDocument();
if (!document.IsActive())
return;
delay_until_image_notify_finished_ =
IncrementLoadEventDelayCount::Create(document);
}
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: reject_slave_controller(struct ofconn *ofconn)
{
if (ofconn_get_type(ofconn) == OFCONN_PRIMARY
&& ofconn_get_role(ofconn) == OFPCR12_ROLE_SLAVE) {
return OFPERR_OFPBRC_IS_SLAVE;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_dec_cp_setfrompoc(jpc_dec_cp_t *cp, jpc_poc_t *poc, int reset)
{
int pchgno;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
if (reset) {
while (jpc_pchglist_numpchgs(cp->pchglist) > 0) {
pchg = jpc_pchglist_remove(cp->pchglist, 0);
jpc_pchg_destroy(pchg);
}
}
for (pchgno = 0; pchgno < poc->numpchgs; ++pchgno) {
if (!(pchg = jpc_pchg_copy(&poc->pchgs[pchgno]))) {
return -1;
}
if (jpc_pchglist_insert(cp->pchglist, -1, pchg)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: next_cache_entry(struct archive_read *a, struct iso9660 *iso9660,
struct file_info **pfile)
{
struct file_info *file;
struct {
struct file_info *first;
struct file_info **last;
} empty_files;
int64_t number;
int count;
file = cache_get_entry(iso9660);
if (file != NULL) {
*pfile = file;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
for (;;) {
struct file_info *re, *d;
*pfile = file = next_entry(iso9660);
if (file == NULL) {
/*
* If directory entries all which are descendant of
* rr_moved are stil remaning, expose their.
*/
if (iso9660->re_files.first != NULL &&
iso9660->rr_moved != NULL &&
iso9660->rr_moved->rr_moved_has_re_only)
/* Expose "rr_moved" entry. */
cache_add_entry(iso9660, iso9660->rr_moved);
while ((re = re_get_entry(iso9660)) != NULL) {
/* Expose its descendant dirs. */
while ((d = rede_get_entry(re)) != NULL)
cache_add_entry(iso9660, d);
}
if (iso9660->cache_files.first != NULL)
return (next_cache_entry(a, iso9660, pfile));
return (ARCHIVE_EOF);
}
if (file->cl_offset) {
struct file_info *first_re = NULL;
int nexted_re = 0;
/*
* Find "RE" dir for the current file, which
* has "CL" flag.
*/
while ((re = re_get_entry(iso9660))
!= first_re) {
if (first_re == NULL)
first_re = re;
if (re->offset == file->cl_offset) {
re->parent->subdirs--;
re->parent = file->parent;
re->re = 0;
if (re->parent->re_descendant) {
nexted_re = 1;
re->re_descendant = 1;
if (rede_add_entry(re) < 0)
goto fatal_rr;
/* Move a list of descendants
* to a new ancestor. */
while ((d = rede_get_entry(
re)) != NULL)
if (rede_add_entry(d)
< 0)
goto fatal_rr;
break;
}
/* Replace the current file
* with "RE" dir */
*pfile = file = re;
/* Expose its descendant */
while ((d = rede_get_entry(
file)) != NULL)
cache_add_entry(
iso9660, d);
break;
} else
re_add_entry(iso9660, re);
}
if (nexted_re) {
/*
* Do not expose this at this time
* because we have not gotten its full-path
* name yet.
*/
continue;
}
} else if ((file->mode & AE_IFMT) == AE_IFDIR) {
int r;
/* Read file entries in this dir. */
r = read_children(a, file);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
/*
* Handle a special dir of Rockridge extensions,
* "rr_moved".
*/
if (file->rr_moved) {
/*
* If this has only the subdirectories which
* have "RE" flags, do not expose at this time.
*/
if (file->rr_moved_has_re_only)
continue;
/* Otherwise expose "rr_moved" entry. */
} else if (file->re) {
/*
* Do not expose this at this time
* because we have not gotten its full-path
* name yet.
*/
re_add_entry(iso9660, file);
continue;
} else if (file->re_descendant) {
/*
* If the top level "RE" entry of this entry
* is not exposed, we, accordingly, should not
* expose this entry at this time because
* we cannot make its proper full-path name.
*/
if (rede_add_entry(file) == 0)
continue;
/* Otherwise we can expose this entry because
* it seems its top level "RE" has already been
* exposed. */
}
}
break;
}
if ((file->mode & AE_IFMT) != AE_IFREG || file->number == -1)
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
count = 0;
number = file->number;
iso9660->cache_files.first = NULL;
iso9660->cache_files.last = &(iso9660->cache_files.first);
empty_files.first = NULL;
empty_files.last = &empty_files.first;
/* Collect files which has the same file serial number.
* Peek pending_files so that file which number is different
* is not put bak. */
while (iso9660->pending_files.used > 0 &&
(iso9660->pending_files.files[0]->number == -1 ||
iso9660->pending_files.files[0]->number == number)) {
if (file->number == -1) {
/* This file has the same offset
* but it's wrong offset which empty files
* and symlink files have.
* NOTE: This wrong offse was recorded by
* old mkisofs utility. If ISO images is
* created by latest mkisofs, this does not
* happen.
*/
file->next = NULL;
*empty_files.last = file;
empty_files.last = &(file->next);
} else {
count++;
cache_add_entry(iso9660, file);
}
file = next_entry(iso9660);
}
if (count == 0) {
*pfile = file;
return ((file == NULL)?ARCHIVE_EOF:ARCHIVE_OK);
}
if (file->number == -1) {
file->next = NULL;
*empty_files.last = file;
empty_files.last = &(file->next);
} else {
count++;
cache_add_entry(iso9660, file);
}
if (count > 1) {
/* The count is the same as number of hardlink,
* so much so that each nlinks of files in cache_file
* is overwritten by value of the count.
*/
for (file = iso9660->cache_files.first;
file != NULL; file = file->next)
file->nlinks = count;
}
/* If there are empty files, that files are added
* to the tail of the cache_files. */
if (empty_files.first != NULL) {
*iso9660->cache_files.last = empty_files.first;
iso9660->cache_files.last = empty_files.last;
}
*pfile = cache_get_entry(iso9660);
return ((*pfile == NULL)?ARCHIVE_EOF:ARCHIVE_OK);
fatal_rr:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Failed to connect 'CL' pointer to 'RE' rr_moved pointer of "
"Rockridge extensions: current position = %jd, CL offset = %jd",
(intmax_t)iso9660->current_position, (intmax_t)file->cl_offset);
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
Commit Message: Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::clearBufferuiv(GLenum buffer,
GLint drawbuffer,
const Vector<GLuint>& value,
GLuint src_offset) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateClearBuffer("clearBufferuiv", buffer, value.size(), src_offset))
return;
ScopedRGBEmulationColorMask emulation_color_mask(this, color_mask_,
drawing_buffer_.get());
ContextGL()->ClearBufferuiv(buffer, drawbuffer, value.data() + src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TemplateURL::SupportsReplacement(
const SearchTermsData& search_terms_data) const {
return url_ref_->SupportsReplacement(search_terms_data);
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::RequestConfirmation(
DownloadItem* download,
const base::FilePath& suggested_path,
DownloadConfirmationReason reason,
const DownloadTargetDeterminerDelegate::ConfirmationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(!download->IsTransient());
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
switch (reason) {
case DownloadConfirmationReason::NONE:
NOTREACHED();
return;
case DownloadConfirmationReason::TARGET_PATH_NOT_WRITEABLE:
DownloadManagerService::OnDownloadCanceled(
download, DownloadController::CANCEL_REASON_NO_EXTERNAL_STORAGE);
callback.Run(DownloadConfirmationResult::CANCELED, base::FilePath());
return;
case DownloadConfirmationReason::NAME_TOO_LONG:
case DownloadConfirmationReason::TARGET_NO_SPACE:
case DownloadConfirmationReason::SAVE_AS:
case DownloadConfirmationReason::PREFERENCE:
callback.Run(DownloadConfirmationResult::CONTINUE_WITHOUT_CONFIRMATION,
suggested_path);
return;
case DownloadConfirmationReason::TARGET_CONFLICT:
if (download->GetWebContents()) {
android::ChromeDuplicateDownloadInfoBarDelegate::Create(
InfoBarService::FromWebContents(download->GetWebContents()),
download, suggested_path, callback);
return;
}
case DownloadConfirmationReason::UNEXPECTED:
DownloadManagerService::OnDownloadCanceled(
download,
DownloadController::CANCEL_REASON_CANNOT_DETERMINE_DOWNLOAD_TARGET);
callback.Run(DownloadConfirmationResult::CANCELED, base::FilePath());
return;
}
#else // !OS_ANDROID
DownloadFilePicker::ShowFilePicker(download, suggested_path, callback);
#endif // !OS_ANDROID
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageScale(const gdImagePtr src, const unsigned int new_width, const unsigned int new_height)
{
gdImagePtr im_scaled = NULL;
if (src == NULL || src->interpolation_id < 0 || src->interpolation_id > GD_METHOD_COUNT) {
return 0;
}
switch (src->interpolation_id) {
/*Special cases, optimized implementations */
case GD_NEAREST_NEIGHBOUR:
im_scaled = gdImageScaleNearestNeighbour(src, new_width, new_height);
break;
case GD_BILINEAR_FIXED:
im_scaled = gdImageScaleBilinear(src, new_width, new_height);
break;
case GD_BICUBIC_FIXED:
im_scaled = gdImageScaleBicubicFixed(src, new_width, new_height);
break;
/* generic */
default:
if (src->interpolation == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
im_scaled = gdImageScaleTwoPass(src, new_width, new_height);
break;
}
return im_scaled;
}
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 56,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(snmp, walk)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_WALK, (-1));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sg_idr_max_id(int id, void *p, void *data)
{
int *k = data;
if (*k < id)
*k = id;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of
overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() -
we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the
first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating
too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in
the second loop.
X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either)
Cc: [email protected] # way, way back
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 42,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int filter_pred_comm(struct filter_pred *pred, void *event)
{
int cmp;
cmp = pred->regex.match(current->comm, &pred->regex,
TASK_COMM_LEN);
return cmp ^ pred->not;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHostImpl* RenderFrameHostManager::Navigate(
const GURL& dest_url,
const FrameNavigationEntry& frame_entry,
const NavigationEntryImpl& entry,
bool is_reload) {
TRACE_EVENT1("navigation", "RenderFrameHostManager:Navigate",
"FrameTreeNode id", frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id());
RenderFrameHostImpl* dest_render_frame_host = UpdateStateForNavigate(
dest_url, frame_entry.source_site_instance(), frame_entry.site_instance(),
entry.GetTransitionType(), entry.restore_type() != RestoreType::NONE,
entry.IsViewSourceMode(), entry.transferred_global_request_id(),
entry.bindings(), is_reload);
if (!dest_render_frame_host)
return nullptr; // We weren't able to create a pending render frame host.
if (!dest_render_frame_host->IsRenderFrameLive()) {
dest_render_frame_host->SetUpMojoIfNeeded();
if (!ReinitializeRenderFrame(dest_render_frame_host))
return nullptr;
if (GetNavigatingWebUI()) {
GetNavigatingWebUI()->RenderFrameCreated(dest_render_frame_host);
}
if (dest_render_frame_host != render_frame_host_.get()) {
if (dest_render_frame_host->GetView())
dest_render_frame_host->GetView()->Hide();
} else {
EnsureRenderFrameHostVisibilityConsistent();
delegate_->NotifyMainFrameSwappedFromRenderManager(
nullptr, render_frame_host_->render_view_host());
}
}
if (transfer_navigation_handle_.get() &&
transfer_navigation_handle_->GetGlobalRequestID() ==
entry.transferred_global_request_id()) {
dest_render_frame_host->SetNavigationHandle(
std::move(transfer_navigation_handle_));
dest_render_frame_host->navigation_handle()->set_render_frame_host(
dest_render_frame_host);
}
return dest_render_frame_host;
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlBufContent(const xmlBuf *buf)
{
if ((!buf) || (buf->error))
return NULL;
return(buf->content);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionApiTest::ExtensionSubtestsAreSkipped() {
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(NDEBUG)
LOG(WARNING) << "Workaround for 177163, prematurely returning";
return true;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::BindFramebufferHelper(GLenum target,
GLuint framebuffer) {
bool changed = false;
switch (target) {
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER:
if (bound_framebuffer_ != framebuffer ||
bound_read_framebuffer_ != framebuffer) {
bound_framebuffer_ = framebuffer;
bound_read_framebuffer_ = framebuffer;
changed = true;
}
break;
case GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER:
DCHECK(capabilities_.major_version >= 3 ||
IsChromiumFramebufferMultisampleAvailable());
if (bound_read_framebuffer_ != framebuffer) {
bound_read_framebuffer_ = framebuffer;
changed = true;
}
break;
case GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER:
DCHECK(capabilities_.major_version >= 3 ||
IsChromiumFramebufferMultisampleAvailable());
if (bound_framebuffer_ != framebuffer) {
bound_framebuffer_ = framebuffer;
changed = true;
}
break;
default:
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glBindFramebuffer", target, "target");
return;
}
if (changed) {
if (framebuffer != 0)
GetIdAllocator(IdNamespaces::kFramebuffers)->MarkAsUsed(framebuffer);
helper_->BindFramebuffer(target, framebuffer);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServiceURLRequest(const std::string& response) {
net::TestURLFetcher* url_fetcher =
test_url_fetcher_factory_.GetFetcherByID(0);
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, url_fetcher);
url_fetcher->set_response_code(200);
url_fetcher->SetResponseString(response);
url_fetcher->delegate()->OnURLFetchComplete(url_fetcher);
}
Commit Message: Update AffiliationFetcher to use new Affiliation API wire format.
The new format is not backward compatible with the old one, therefore this CL updates the client side protobuf definitions to be in line with the API definition. However, this CL does not yet make use of any additional fields introduced in the new wire format.
BUG=437865
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/996613002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#319860}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 110,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
struct connection_info *connectinfo)
{
char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p;
int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port;
SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
ServerOpCodes opcode;
u_int i, flags = 0;
size_t len;
long long val64;
const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
cp = line;
if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
return 0;
/* Ignore leading whitespace */
if (*arg == '\0')
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#')
return 0;
intptr = NULL;
charptr = NULL;
opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum, &flags);
if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
cmdline = 1;
activep = &cmdline;
}
if (*activep && opcode != sMatch)
debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp);
if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) {
if (connectinfo == NULL) {
fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed "
"within a Match block", filename, linenum, arg);
} else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */
while (arg)
arg = strdelim(&cp);
return 0;
}
}
switch (opcode) {
case sBadOption:
return -1;
case sPort:
/* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
return 0;
if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.",
filename, linenum);
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.",
filename, linenum);
options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg);
if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0)
fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
filename, linenum);
break;
case sLoginGraceTime:
intptr = &options->login_grace_time;
parse_time:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
filename, linenum);
if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sListenAddress:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing address",
filename, linenum);
/* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */
if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL
&& strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) {
queue_listen_addr(options, arg, 0);
break;
}
p = hpdelim(&arg);
if (p == NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage",
filename, linenum);
p = cleanhostname(p);
if (arg == NULL)
port = 0;
else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0)
fatal("%s line %d: bad port number", filename, linenum);
queue_listen_addr(options, p, port);
break;
case sAddressFamily:
intptr = &options->address_family;
multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily;
parse_multistate:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
value = -1;
for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) {
value = multistate_ptr[i].value;
break;
}
}
if (value == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sHostKeyFile:
intptr = &options->num_host_key_files;
if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many host keys specified (max %d).",
filename, linenum, MAX_HOSTKEYS);
charptr = &options->host_key_files[*intptr];
parse_filename:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
*charptr = derelativise_path(arg);
/* increase optional counter */
if (intptr != NULL)
*intptr = *intptr + 1;
}
break;
case sHostKeyAgent:
charptr = &options->host_key_agent;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing socket name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = !strcmp(arg, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) ?
xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg);
break;
case sHostCertificate:
intptr = &options->num_host_cert_files;
if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many host certificates "
"specified (max %d).", filename, linenum,
MAX_HOSTCERTS);
charptr = &options->host_cert_files[*intptr];
goto parse_filename;
break;
case sPidFile:
charptr = &options->pid_file;
goto parse_filename;
case sPermitRootLogin:
intptr = &options->permit_root_login;
multistate_ptr = multistate_permitrootlogin;
goto parse_multistate;
case sIgnoreRhosts:
intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts;
parse_flag:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/no argument.",
filename, linenum);
value = 0; /* silence compiler */
if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
value = 1;
else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
value = 0;
else
fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no argument: %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts:
intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
goto parse_flag;
case sHostbasedAuthentication:
intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly:
intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only;
goto parse_flag;
case sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes:
charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types;
parse_keytypes:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sHostKeyAlgorithms:
charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
goto parse_keytypes;
case sPubkeyAuthentication:
intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes:
charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types;
goto parse_keytypes;
case sKerberosAuthentication:
intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd:
intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd;
goto parse_flag;
case sKerberosTicketCleanup:
intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup;
goto parse_flag;
case sKerberosGetAFSToken:
intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
goto parse_flag;
case sGssAuthentication:
intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sGssCleanupCreds:
intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
goto parse_flag;
case sGssStrictAcceptor:
intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
goto parse_flag;
case sPasswordAuthentication:
intptr = &options->password_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sChallengeResponseAuthentication:
intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sPrintMotd:
intptr = &options->print_motd;
goto parse_flag;
case sPrintLastLog:
intptr = &options->print_lastlog;
goto parse_flag;
case sX11Forwarding:
intptr = &options->x11_forwarding;
goto parse_flag;
case sX11DisplayOffset:
intptr = &options->x11_display_offset;
parse_int:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing integer value.",
filename, linenum);
value = atoi(arg);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sX11UseLocalhost:
intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
goto parse_flag;
case sXAuthLocation:
charptr = &options->xauth_location;
goto parse_filename;
case sPermitTTY:
intptr = &options->permit_tty;
goto parse_flag;
case sPermitUserRC:
intptr = &options->permit_user_rc;
goto parse_flag;
case sStrictModes:
intptr = &options->strict_modes;
goto parse_flag;
case sTCPKeepAlive:
intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
goto parse_flag;
case sEmptyPasswd:
intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd;
goto parse_flag;
case sPermitUserEnvironment:
intptr = &options->permit_user_env;
goto parse_flag;
case sCompression:
intptr = &options->compression;
multistate_ptr = multistate_compression;
goto parse_multistate;
case sRekeyLimit:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) {
val64 = 0;
} else {
if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s",
filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno));
if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16)
fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
filename, linenum);
}
if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1)
options->rekey_limit = val64;
if (cp != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */
if (strcmp(cp, "none") == 0) {
(void)strdelim(&cp); /* discard */
break;
}
intptr = &options->rekey_interval;
goto parse_time;
}
break;
case sGatewayPorts:
intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports;
multistate_ptr = multistate_gatewayports;
goto parse_multistate;
case sUseDNS:
intptr = &options->use_dns;
goto parse_flag;
case sLogFacility:
log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
value = log_facility_number(arg);
if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*log_facility_ptr == -1)
*log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value;
break;
case sLogLevel:
log_level_ptr = &options->log_level;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
value = log_level_number(arg);
if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*log_level_ptr == -1)
*log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value;
break;
case sAllowTcpForwarding:
intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding;
multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd;
goto parse_multistate;
case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding:
intptr = &options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding;
multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd;
goto parse_multistate;
case sAllowAgentForwarding:
intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding;
goto parse_flag;
case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
intptr = &use_privsep;
multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
goto parse_multistate;
case sAllowUsers:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many allow users.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep)
continue;
options->allow_users[options->num_allow_users++] =
xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
case sDenyUsers:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many deny users.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep)
continue;
options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] =
xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
case sAllowGroups:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (options->num_allow_groups >= MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many allow groups.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep)
continue;
options->allow_groups[options->num_allow_groups++] =
xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
case sDenyGroups:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (options->num_deny_groups >= MAX_DENY_GROUPS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many deny groups.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep)
continue;
options->deny_groups[options->num_deny_groups++] =
xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
case sCiphers:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->ciphers == NULL)
options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sMacs:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->macs == NULL)
options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sKexAlgorithms:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sSubsystem:
if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) {
fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.",
filename, linenum);
}
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep) {
arg = strdelim(&cp);
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0)
fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.",
filename, linenum, arg);
options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.",
filename, linenum);
options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
/* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */
p = xstrdup(arg);
len = strlen(p) + 1;
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
len += 1 + strlen(arg);
p = xreallocarray(p, 1, len);
strlcat(p, " ", len);
strlcat(p, arg, len);
}
options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p;
options->num_subsystems++;
break;
case sMaxStartups:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing MaxStartups spec.",
filename, linenum);
if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d",
&options->max_startups_begin,
&options->max_startups_rate,
&options->max_startups)) == 3) {
if (options->max_startups_begin >
options->max_startups ||
options->max_startups_rate > 100 ||
options->max_startups_rate < 1)
fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
filename, linenum);
} else if (n != 1)
fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
filename, linenum);
else
options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin;
break;
case sMaxAuthTries:
intptr = &options->max_authtries;
goto parse_int;
case sMaxSessions:
intptr = &options->max_sessions;
goto parse_int;
case sBanner:
charptr = &options->banner;
goto parse_filename;
/*
* These options can contain %X options expanded at
* connect time, so that you can specify paths like:
*
* AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u
*/
case sAuthorizedKeysFile:
if (*activep && options->num_authkeys_files == 0) {
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (options->num_authkeys_files >=
MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES)
fatal("%s line %d: "
"too many authorized keys files.",
filename, linenum);
options->authorized_keys_files[
options->num_authkeys_files++] =
tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
}
}
return 0;
case sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile:
charptr = &options->authorized_principals_file;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
/* increase optional counter */
if (intptr != NULL)
*intptr = *intptr + 1;
}
break;
case sClientAliveInterval:
intptr = &options->client_alive_interval;
goto parse_time;
case sClientAliveCountMax:
intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max;
goto parse_int;
case sAcceptEnv:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
filename, linenum);
if (options->num_accept_env >= MAX_ACCEPT_ENV)
fatal("%s line %d: too many allow env.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep)
continue;
options->accept_env[options->num_accept_env++] =
xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
case sPermitTunnel:
intptr = &options->permit_tun;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing yes/point-to-point/"
"ethernet/no argument.", filename, linenum);
value = -1;
for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++)
if (strcmp(tunmode_desc[i].text, arg) == 0) {
value = tunmode_desc[i].val;
break;
}
if (value == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/point-to-point/ethernet/"
"no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sMatch:
if (cmdline)
fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
"option");
value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo);
if (value < 0)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
linenum);
*activep = value;
break;
case sPermitOpen:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing PermitOpen specification",
filename, linenum);
n = options->num_permitted_opens; /* modified later */
if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
if (*activep && n == -1) {
channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
options->num_permitted_opens = 0;
}
break;
}
if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
if (*activep && n == -1) {
options->num_permitted_opens = 1;
channel_disable_adm_local_opens();
}
break;
}
if (*activep && n == -1)
channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = strdelim(&cp)) {
p = hpdelim(&arg);
if (p == NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: missing host in PermitOpen",
filename, linenum);
p = cleanhostname(p);
if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0))
fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in "
"PermitOpen", filename, linenum);
if (*activep && n == -1)
options->num_permitted_opens =
channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(p, port);
}
break;
case sForceCommand:
if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL)
options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
return 0;
case sChrootDirectory:
charptr = &options->chroot_directory;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sTrustedUserCAKeys:
charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys;
goto parse_filename;
case sRevokedKeys:
charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file;
goto parse_filename;
case sIPQoS:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (arg == NULL)
value2 = value;
else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep) {
options->ip_qos_interactive = value;
options->ip_qos_bulk = value2;
}
break;
case sVersionAddendum:
if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) {
if (strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") == 0)
options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
else if (strchr(cp + len, '\r') != NULL)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid argument",
filename, linenum);
else
options->version_addendum = xstrdup(cp + len);
}
return 0;
case sAuthorizedKeysCommand:
if (cp == NULL)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) {
if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand "
"must be an absolute path",
filename, linenum);
options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
}
return 0;
case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser:
charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing AuthorizedKeysCommandUser "
"argument.", filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand:
if (cp == NULL)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
if (*activep &&
options->authorized_principals_command == NULL) {
if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: "
"AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand must be "
"an absolute path", filename, linenum);
options->authorized_principals_command =
xstrdup(cp + len);
}
return 0;
case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser:
charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing "
"AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sAuthenticationMethods:
if (options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
value = 0; /* seen "any" pseudo-method */
value2 = 0; /* sucessfully parsed any method */
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (options->num_auth_methods >=
MAX_AUTH_METHODS)
fatal("%s line %d: "
"too many authentication methods.",
filename, linenum);
if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
if (options->num_auth_methods > 0) {
fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" "
"must appear alone in "
"AuthenticationMethods",
filename, linenum);
}
value = 1;
} else if (value) {
fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must appear "
"alone in AuthenticationMethods",
filename, linenum);
} else if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0) {
fatal("%s line %d: invalid "
"authentication method list.",
filename, linenum);
}
value2 = 1;
if (!*activep)
continue;
options->auth_methods[
options->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(arg);
}
if (value2 == 0) {
fatal("%s line %d: no AuthenticationMethods "
"specified", filename, linenum);
}
}
return 0;
case sStreamLocalBindMask:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing StreamLocalBindMask "
"argument.", filename, linenum);
/* Parse mode in octal format */
value = strtol(arg, &p, 8);
if (arg == p || value < 0 || value > 0777)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum);
if (*activep)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value;
break;
case sStreamLocalBindUnlink:
intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink;
goto parse_flag;
case sFingerprintHash:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep)
options->fingerprint_hash = value;
break;
case sDeprecated:
case sIgnore:
case sUnsupported:
do_log2(opcode == sIgnore ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
"%s line %d: %s option %s", filename, linenum,
opcode == sUnsupported ? "Unsupported" : "Deprecated", arg);
while (arg)
arg = strdelim(&cp);
break;
default:
fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)",
filename, linenum, arg, opcode);
}
if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 72,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: simple_error (void)
{
DBusMessage *message;
message = dbus_message_new (DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_ERROR);
if (message == NULL)
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
if (!dbus_message_set_error_name (message, "foo.bar"))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
set_reply_serial (message);
return message;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebGLRenderingContextBase::~WebGLRenderingContextBase() {
destruction_in_progress_ = true;
DestroyContext();
RestoreEvictedContext(this);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 172,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int gdTransformAffineCopy(gdImagePtr dst,
int dst_x, int dst_y,
const gdImagePtr src,
gdRectPtr src_region,
const double affine[6])
{
int c1x,c1y,c2x,c2y;
int backclip = 0;
int backup_clipx1, backup_clipy1, backup_clipx2, backup_clipy2;
register int x, y, src_offset_x, src_offset_y;
double inv[6];
int *dst_p;
gdPointF pt, src_pt;
gdRect bbox;
int end_x, end_y;
gdInterpolationMethod interpolation_id_bak = GD_DEFAULT;
interpolation_method interpolation_bak;
/* These methods use special implementations */
if (src->interpolation_id == GD_BILINEAR_FIXED || src->interpolation_id == GD_BICUBIC_FIXED || src->interpolation_id == GD_NEAREST_NEIGHBOUR) {
interpolation_id_bak = src->interpolation_id;
interpolation_bak = src->interpolation;
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(src, GD_BICUBIC);
}
gdImageClipRectangle(src, src_region);
if (src_region->x > 0 || src_region->y > 0
|| src_region->width < gdImageSX(src)
|| src_region->height < gdImageSY(src)) {
backclip = 1;
gdImageGetClip(src, &backup_clipx1, &backup_clipy1,
&backup_clipx2, &backup_clipy2);
gdImageSetClip(src, src_region->x, src_region->y,
src_region->x + src_region->width - 1,
src_region->y + src_region->height - 1);
}
if (!gdTransformAffineBoundingBox(src_region, affine, &bbox)) {
if (backclip) {
gdImageSetClip(src, backup_clipx1, backup_clipy1,
backup_clipx2, backup_clipy2);
}
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(src, interpolation_id_bak);
return GD_FALSE;
}
gdImageGetClip(dst, &c1x, &c1y, &c2x, &c2y);
end_x = bbox.width + (int) fabs(bbox.x);
end_y = bbox.height + (int) fabs(bbox.y);
/* Get inverse affine to let us work with destination -> source */
gdAffineInvert(inv, affine);
src_offset_x = src_region->x;
src_offset_y = src_region->y;
if (dst->alphaBlendingFlag) {
for (y = bbox.y; y <= end_y; y++) {
pt.y = y + 0.5;
for (x = 0; x <= end_x; x++) {
pt.x = x + 0.5;
gdAffineApplyToPointF(&src_pt, &pt, inv);
gdImageSetPixel(dst, dst_x + x, dst_y + y, getPixelInterpolated(src, src_offset_x + src_pt.x, src_offset_y + src_pt.y, 0));
}
}
} else {
for (y = 0; y <= end_y; y++) {
pt.y = y + 0.5 + bbox.y;
if ((dst_y + y) < 0 || ((dst_y + y) > gdImageSY(dst) -1)) {
continue;
}
dst_p = dst->tpixels[dst_y + y] + dst_x;
for (x = 0; x <= end_x; x++) {
pt.x = x + 0.5 + bbox.x;
gdAffineApplyToPointF(&src_pt, &pt, inv);
if ((dst_x + x) < 0 || (dst_x + x) > (gdImageSX(dst) - 1)) {
break;
}
*(dst_p++) = getPixelInterpolated(src, src_offset_x + src_pt.x, src_offset_y + src_pt.y, -1);
}
}
}
/* Restore clip if required */
if (backclip) {
gdImageSetClip(src, backup_clipx1, backup_clipy1,
backup_clipx2, backup_clipy2);
}
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(src, interpolation_id_bak);
return GD_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #72227: imagescale out-of-bounds read
Ported from https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 170,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void LodePNGText_cleanup(LodePNGInfo* info)
{
size_t i;
for(i = 0; i < info->text_num; i++)
{
string_cleanup(&info->text_keys[i]);
string_cleanup(&info->text_strings[i]);
}
free(info->text_keys);
free(info->text_strings);
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _cdf_tole2(uint16_t sv)
{
uint16_t rv;
uint8_t *s = (uint8_t *)(void *)&sv;
uint8_t *d = (uint8_t *)(void *)&rv;
d[0] = s[1];
d[1] = s[0];
return rv;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_ptr<base::Value> PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::StateAsValue() const {
scoped_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> state(new base::DictionaryValue);
state->SetInteger("completed_count", completed_tasks_.size());
state->SetInteger("pending_count", pixel_buffer_tasks_.size());
state->SetInteger("pending_upload_count", tasks_with_pending_upload_.size());
state->SetInteger("required_for_activation_count",
tasks_required_for_activation_.size());
state->Set("scheduled_state", ScheduledStateAsValue().release());
state->Set("throttle_state", ThrottleStateAsValue().release());
return state.PassAs<base::Value>();
}
Commit Message: cc: Simplify raster task completion notification logic
(Relanding after missing activation bug fixed in https://codereview.chromium.org/131763003/)
Previously the pixel buffer raster worker pool used a combination of
polling and explicit notifications from the raster worker pool to decide
when to tell the client about the completion of 1) all tasks or 2) the
subset of tasks required for activation. This patch simplifies the logic
by only triggering the notification based on the OnRasterTasksFinished
and OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished calls from the worker
pool.
BUG=307841,331534
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/99873007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@243991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SimulateFreezeSignal(content::WebContents* contents) {
TabLifecycleUnitSource::GetInstance()
->GetTabLifecycleUnit(contents)
->UpdateLifecycleState(mojom::LifecycleState::kFrozen);
}
Commit Message: Allow origin lock for WebUI pages.
Returning true for WebUI pages in DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess helps
to keep enforcing a SiteInstance swap during chrome://foo ->
chrome://bar navigation, even after relaxing
BrowsingInstance::GetSiteInstanceForURL to consider RPH::IsSuitableHost
(see https://crrev.com/c/783470 for that fixes process sharing in
isolated(b(c),d(c)) scenario).
I've manually tested this CL by visiting the following URLs:
- chrome://welcome/
- chrome://settings
- chrome://extensions
- chrome://history
- chrome://help and chrome://chrome (both redirect to chrome://settings/help)
Bug: 510588, 847127
Change-Id: I55073bce00f32cb8bc5c1c91034438ff9a3f8971
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1237392
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595259}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UDPSocketWin::DidCompleteRead() {
DWORD num_bytes, flags;
BOOL ok = WSAGetOverlappedResult(socket_, &core_->read_overlapped_,
&num_bytes, FALSE, &flags);
WSAResetEvent(core_->read_overlapped_.hEvent);
int result = ok ? num_bytes : MapSystemError(WSAGetLastError());
if (recv_from_address_ && result >= 0) {
if (!ReceiveAddressToIPEndpoint(recv_from_address_))
result = ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
}
LogRead(result, core_->read_iobuffer_->data());
core_->read_iobuffer_ = NULL;
recv_from_address_ = NULL;
DoReadCallback(result);
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CanGetFilesId() {
return SystemSaltGetter::Get()->GetRawSalt();
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 127,971 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: apprentice_1(struct magic_set *ms, const char *fn, int action)
{
struct mlist *ml;
struct magic_map *map;
size_t i;
if (magicsize != FILE_MAGICSIZE) {
file_error(ms, 0, "magic element size %lu != %lu",
(unsigned long)sizeof(*map->magic[0]),
(unsigned long)FILE_MAGICSIZE);
return -1;
}
if (action == FILE_COMPILE) {
map = apprentice_load(ms, fn, action);
if (map == NULL)
return -1;
return apprentice_compile(ms, map, fn);
}
map = apprentice_map(ms, fn);
if (map == NULL) {
if (fn) {
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms, "using regular magic file `%s'", fn);
map = apprentice_load(ms, fn, action);
}
if (map == NULL)
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++) {
if (add_mlist(ms->mlist[i], map, i) == -1) {
file_oomem(ms, sizeof(*ml));
apprentice_unmap(map);
return -1;
}
}
if (action == FILE_LIST) {
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++) {
printf("Set %zu:\nBinary patterns:\n", i);
apprentice_list(ms->mlist[i], BINTEST);
printf("Text patterns:\n");
apprentice_list(ms->mlist[i], TEXTTEST);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 7,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: reportComment(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc,
const char *start, const char *end)
{
XML_Char *data;
if (!parser->m_commentHandler) {
if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, start, end);
return 1;
}
data = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool,
enc,
start + enc->minBytesPerChar * 4,
end - enc->minBytesPerChar * 3);
if (!data)
return 0;
normalizeLines(data);
parser->m_commentHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, data);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 92,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_system_pointer_pdu(STREAM s)
{
uint32 system_pointer_type;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "%s()", __func__);
in_uint32_le(s, system_pointer_type);
set_system_pointer(system_pointer_type);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: layer_get_visible(int layer)
{
return s_map->layers[layer].is_visible;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseEntityDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name = NULL;
xmlChar *value = NULL;
xmlChar *URI = NULL, *literal = NULL;
const xmlChar *ndata = NULL;
int isParameter = 0;
xmlChar *orig = NULL;
int skipped;
/* GROW; done in the caller */
if (CMP8(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', 'E', 'N', 'T', 'I', 'T', 'Y')) {
xmlParserInputPtr input = ctxt->input;
SHRINK;
SKIP(8);
skipped = SKIP_BLANKS;
if (skipped == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after '<!ENTITY'\n");
}
if (RAW == '%') {
NEXT;
skipped = SKIP_BLANKS;
if (skipped == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after '%'\n");
}
isParameter = 1;
}
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseEntityDecl: no name\n");
return;
}
if (xmlStrchr(name, ':') != NULL) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_COLON,
"colon are forbidden from entities names '%s'\n",
name, NULL, NULL);
}
skipped = SKIP_BLANKS;
if (skipped == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after the entity name\n");
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ENTITY_DECL;
/*
* handle the various case of definitions...
*/
if (isParameter) {
if ((RAW == '"') || (RAW == '\'')) {
value = xmlParseEntityValue(ctxt, &orig);
if (value) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX) && (ctxt->sax->entityDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->entityDecl(ctxt->userData, name,
XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY,
NULL, NULL, value);
}
} else {
URI = xmlParseExternalID(ctxt, &literal, 1);
if ((URI == NULL) && (literal == NULL)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_VALUE_REQUIRED, NULL);
}
if (URI) {
xmlURIPtr uri;
uri = xmlParseURI((const char *) URI);
if (uri == NULL) {
xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_URI,
"Invalid URI: %s\n", URI);
/*
* This really ought to be a well formedness error
* but the XML Core WG decided otherwise c.f. issue
* E26 of the XML erratas.
*/
} else {
if (uri->fragment != NULL) {
/*
* Okay this is foolish to block those but not
* invalid URIs.
*/
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_URI_FRAGMENT, NULL);
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->entityDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->entityDecl(ctxt->userData, name,
XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY,
literal, URI, NULL);
}
xmlFreeURI(uri);
}
}
}
} else {
if ((RAW == '"') || (RAW == '\'')) {
value = xmlParseEntityValue(ctxt, &orig);
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX) && (ctxt->sax->entityDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->entityDecl(ctxt->userData, name,
XML_INTERNAL_GENERAL_ENTITY,
NULL, NULL, value);
/*
* For expat compatibility in SAX mode.
*/
if ((ctxt->myDoc == NULL) ||
(xmlStrEqual(ctxt->myDoc->version, SAX_COMPAT_MODE))) {
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
ctxt->myDoc = xmlNewDoc(SAX_COMPAT_MODE);
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "New Doc failed");
return;
}
ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
}
if (ctxt->myDoc->intSubset == NULL)
ctxt->myDoc->intSubset = xmlNewDtd(ctxt->myDoc,
BAD_CAST "fake", NULL, NULL);
xmlSAX2EntityDecl(ctxt, name, XML_INTERNAL_GENERAL_ENTITY,
NULL, NULL, value);
}
} else {
URI = xmlParseExternalID(ctxt, &literal, 1);
if ((URI == NULL) && (literal == NULL)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_VALUE_REQUIRED, NULL);
}
if (URI) {
xmlURIPtr uri;
uri = xmlParseURI((const char *)URI);
if (uri == NULL) {
xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_URI,
"Invalid URI: %s\n", URI);
/*
* This really ought to be a well formedness error
* but the XML Core WG decided otherwise c.f. issue
* E26 of the XML erratas.
*/
} else {
if (uri->fragment != NULL) {
/*
* Okay this is foolish to block those but not
* invalid URIs.
*/
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_URI_FRAGMENT, NULL);
}
xmlFreeURI(uri);
}
}
if ((RAW != '>') && (!IS_BLANK_CH(CUR))) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required before 'NDATA'\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CMP5(CUR_PTR, 'N', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A')) {
SKIP(5);
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after 'NDATA'\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
ndata = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->unparsedEntityDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->unparsedEntityDecl(ctxt->userData, name,
literal, URI, ndata);
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX) && (ctxt->sax->entityDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->entityDecl(ctxt->userData, name,
XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY,
literal, URI, NULL);
/*
* For expat compatibility in SAX mode.
* assuming the entity repalcement was asked for
*/
if ((ctxt->replaceEntities != 0) &&
((ctxt->myDoc == NULL) ||
(xmlStrEqual(ctxt->myDoc->version, SAX_COMPAT_MODE)))) {
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
ctxt->myDoc = xmlNewDoc(SAX_COMPAT_MODE);
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "New Doc failed");
return;
}
ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
}
if (ctxt->myDoc->intSubset == NULL)
ctxt->myDoc->intSubset = xmlNewDtd(ctxt->myDoc,
BAD_CAST "fake", NULL, NULL);
xmlSAX2EntityDecl(ctxt, name,
XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY,
literal, URI, NULL);
}
}
}
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (RAW != '>') {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_NOT_FINISHED,
"xmlParseEntityDecl: entity %s not terminated\n", name);
} else {
if (input != ctxt->input) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Entity declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n");
}
NEXT;
}
if (orig != NULL) {
/*
* Ugly mechanism to save the raw entity value.
*/
xmlEntityPtr cur = NULL;
if (isParameter) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity != NULL))
cur = ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->getEntity != NULL))
cur = ctxt->sax->getEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if ((cur == NULL) && (ctxt->userData==ctxt)) {
cur = xmlSAX2GetEntity(ctxt, name);
}
}
if (cur != NULL) {
if (cur->orig != NULL)
xmlFree(orig);
else
cur->orig = orig;
} else
xmlFree(orig);
}
if (value != NULL) xmlFree(value);
if (URI != NULL) xmlFree(URI);
if (literal != NULL) xmlFree(literal);
}
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ValidateBrowserAllocations(base::Value* dump_json) {
SCOPED_TRACE("Validating Browser Allocations");
base::Value* heaps_v2 =
FindHeapsV2(base::Process::Current().Pid(), dump_json);
if (GetParam() == switches::kMemlogModeAll ||
GetParam() == switches::kMemlogModeBrowser ||
GetParam() == switches::kMemlogModeMinimal) {
ASSERT_TRUE(heaps_v2);
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
ValidateDump(heaps_v2, kBrowserAllocSize * kBrowserAllocCount,
kBrowserAllocCount, "malloc", nullptr));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
ValidateDump(heaps_v2, total_variadic_allocations_,
kBrowserAllocCount, "malloc", nullptr));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(ValidateDump(
heaps_v2, kPartitionAllocSize * kPartitionAllocCount,
kPartitionAllocCount, "partition_alloc", kPartitionAllocTypeName));
} else {
ASSERT_FALSE(heaps_v2) << "There should be no heap dump for the browser.";
}
EXPECT_EQ(1, NumProcessesWithName(dump_json, "Browser"));
}
Commit Message: [Reland #1] Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
The original CL added a javatest and its dependencies to the apk_under_test.
This causes the dependencies to be stripped from the instrumentation_apk, which
causes issue. This CL updates the build configuration so that the javatest and
its dependencies are only added to the instrumentation_apk.
This is a reland of e0b4355f0651adb1ebc2c513dc4410471af712f5
Original change's description:
> Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
>
> This CL has three components:
> 1) The bulk of the logic in OOP HP was refactored into ProfilingTestDriver.
> 2) Adds a java instrumentation test, along with a JNI shim that forwards into
> ProfilingTestDriver.
> 3) Creates a new apk: chrome_public_apk_for_test that contains the same
> content as chrome_public_apk, as well as native files needed for (2).
> chrome_public_apk_test now targets chrome_public_apk_for_test instead of
> chrome_public_apk.
>
> Other ideas, discarded:
> * Originally, I attempted to make the browser_tests target runnable on
> Android. The primary problem is that native test harness cannot fork
> or spawn processes. This is difficult to solve.
>
> More details on each of the components:
> (1) ProfilingTestDriver
> * The TracingController test was migrated to use ProfilingTestDriver, but the
> write-to-file test was left as-is. The latter behavior will likely be phased
> out, but I'll clean that up in a future CL.
> * gtest isn't supported for Android instrumentation tests. ProfilingTestDriver
> has a single function RunTest that returns a 'bool' indicating success. On
> failure, the class uses LOG(ERROR) to print the nature of the error. This will
> cause the error to be printed out on browser_test error. On instrumentation
> test failure, the error will be forwarded to logcat, which is available on all
> infra bot test runs.
> (2) Instrumentation test
> * For now, I only added a single test for the "browser" mode. Furthermore, I'm
> only testing the start with command-line path.
> (3) New apk
> * libchromefortest is a new shared library that contains all content from
> libchrome, but also contains native sources for the JNI shim.
> * chrome_public_apk_for_test is a new apk that contains all content from
> chrome_public_apk, but uses a single shared library libchromefortest rather
> than libchrome. This also contains java sources for the JNI shim.
> * There is no way to just add a second shared library to chrome_public_apk
> that just contains the native sources from the JNI shim without causing ODR
> issues.
> * chrome_public_test_apk now has apk_under_test = chrome_public_apk_for_test.
> * There is no way to add native JNI sources as a shared library to
> chrome_public_test_apk without causing ODR issues.
>
> Finally, this CL drastically increases the timeout to wait for native
> initialization. The previous timeout was 2 *
> CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL, which flakily failed for this test.
> This suggests that this step/timeout is generally flaky. I increased the timeout
> to 20 * CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL.
>
> Bug: 753218
> Change-Id: Ic224b7314fff57f1770a4048aa5753f54e040b55
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/770148
> Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: John Budorick <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Brett Wilson <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517541}
Bug: 753218
TBR: [email protected]
Change-Id: Ic6aafb34c2467253f75cc85da48200d19f3bc9af
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/777697
Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Budorick <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517850}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 150,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_spki_verify)
{
size_t spkstr_len;
int i = 0, spkstr_cleaned_len = 0;
char *spkstr = NULL, * spkstr_cleaned = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &spkstr, &spkstr_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
if (spkstr == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unable to use supplied SPKAC");
goto cleanup;
}
spkstr_cleaned = emalloc(spkstr_len + 1);
spkstr_cleaned_len = (int)(spkstr_len - openssl_spki_cleanup(spkstr, spkstr_cleaned));
if (spkstr_cleaned_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Invalid SPKAC");
goto cleanup;
}
spki = NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(spkstr_cleaned, spkstr_cleaned_len);
if (spki == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unable to decode supplied SPKAC");
goto cleanup;
}
pkey = X509_PUBKEY_get(spki->spkac->pubkey);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unable to acquire signed public key");
goto cleanup;
}
i = NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(spki, pkey);
goto cleanup;
cleanup:
if (spki != NULL) {
NETSCAPE_SPKI_free(spki);
}
if (pkey != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
if (spkstr_cleaned != NULL) {
efree(spkstr_cleaned);
}
if (i > 0) {
RETVAL_TRUE;
} else {
php_openssl_store_errors();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_f_raise(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
mrb_value a[2], exc;
mrb_int argc;
argc = mrb_get_args(mrb, "|oo", &a[0], &a[1]);
switch (argc) {
case 0:
mrb_raise(mrb, E_RUNTIME_ERROR, "");
break;
case 1:
if (mrb_string_p(a[0])) {
a[1] = a[0];
argc = 2;
a[0] = mrb_obj_value(E_RUNTIME_ERROR);
}
/* fall through */
default:
exc = mrb_make_exception(mrb, argc, a);
mrb_exc_raise(mrb, exc);
break;
}
return mrb_nil_value(); /* not reached */
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 82,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void qeth_set_allowed_threads(struct qeth_card *card, unsigned long threads,
int clear_start_mask)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&card->thread_mask_lock, flags);
card->thread_allowed_mask = threads;
if (clear_start_mask)
card->thread_start_mask &= threads;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&card->thread_mask_lock, flags);
wake_up(&card->wait_q);
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void php_http_params_separator_free(php_http_params_token_t **separator)
{
php_http_params_token_t **sep = separator;
if (sep) {
while (*sep) {
PTR_FREE((*sep)->str);
efree(*sep);
++sep;
}
efree(separator);
}
}
Commit Message: fix bug #73055
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 93,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string DevToolsAgentHost::GetProtocolVersion() {
return "1.3";
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hub_port_status(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1,
u16 *status, u16 *change)
{
int ret;
mutex_lock(&hub->status_mutex);
ret = get_port_status(hub->hdev, port1, &hub->status->port);
if (ret < 4) {
if (ret != -ENODEV)
dev_err(hub->intfdev,
"%s failed (err = %d)\n", __func__, ret);
if (ret >= 0)
ret = -EIO;
} else {
*status = le16_to_cpu(hub->status->port.wPortStatus);
*change = le16_to_cpu(hub->status->port.wPortChange);
ret = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&hub->status_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cac_process_ACA(sc_card_t *card, cac_private_data_t *priv)
{
int r;
u8 *val = NULL;
size_t val_len;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
/* Assuming ACA is already selected */
r = cac_get_acr(card, CAC_ACR_SERVICE, &val, &val_len);
if (r < 0)
goto done;
r = cac_parse_ACA_service(card, priv, val, val_len);
if (r == SC_SUCCESS) {
priv->aca_path = malloc(sizeof(sc_path_t));
if (!priv->aca_path) {
r = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
memcpy(priv->aca_path, &cac_ACA_Path, sizeof(sc_path_t));
}
done:
if (val)
free(val);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lvs_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_force_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
int res = true;
if (!strvec)
return;
if (vector_size(strvec) >= 2) {
res = check_true_false(strvec_slot(strvec,1));
if (res < 0) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Invalid value '%s' for global lvs_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_force specified", FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
return;
}
}
global_data->lvs_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_force = res;
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 75,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TEE_Result tee_svc_obj_generate_key_ecc(
struct tee_obj *o, const struct tee_cryp_obj_type_props *type_props,
uint32_t key_size __unused,
const TEE_Attribute *params, uint32_t param_count)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct ecc_keypair *tee_ecc_key;
/* Copy the present attributes into the obj before starting */
res = tee_svc_cryp_obj_populate_type(o, type_props, params,
param_count);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
tee_ecc_key = (struct ecc_keypair *)o->attr;
res = crypto_acipher_gen_ecc_key(tee_ecc_key);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
/* Set bits for the generated public and private key */
set_attribute(o, type_props, TEE_ATTR_ECC_PRIVATE_VALUE);
set_attribute(o, type_props, TEE_ATTR_ECC_PUBLIC_VALUE_X);
set_attribute(o, type_props, TEE_ATTR_ECC_PUBLIC_VALUE_Y);
set_attribute(o, type_props, TEE_ATTR_ECC_CURVE);
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sc_pkcs15emu_sc_hsm_add_cd(sc_pkcs15_card_t * p15card, u8 id) {
sc_card_t *card = p15card->card;
sc_pkcs15_cert_info_t *cert_info;
sc_pkcs15_object_t obj;
u8 fid[2];
u8 efbin[512];
const u8 *ptr;
size_t len;
int r;
fid[0] = CD_PREFIX;
fid[1] = id;
/* Try to select a related EF containing the PKCS#15 description of the data */
len = sizeof efbin;
r = read_file(p15card, fid, efbin, &len, 1);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Skipping optional EF.DCOD");
ptr = efbin;
memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
r = sc_pkcs15_decode_cdf_entry(p15card, &obj, &ptr, &len);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Skipping optional EF.CDOD");
cert_info = (sc_pkcs15_cert_info_t *)obj.data;
r = sc_pkcs15emu_add_x509_cert(p15card, &obj, cert_info);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Could not add data object to framework");
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SplashCoord *Splash::getMatrix() {
return state->matrix;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Resource::WillAddClientOrObserver() {
if (!HasClientsOrObservers()) {
is_alive_ = true;
}
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_uuidusmt_tag(AVIOContext *pb, AVFormatContext *s)
{
AVDictionaryEntry *title = av_dict_get(s->metadata, "title", NULL, 0);
int64_t pos, pos2;
if (title) {
pos = avio_tell(pb);
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size placeholder*/
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "uuid");
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "USMT");
avio_wb32(pb, 0x21d24fce); /* 96 bit UUID */
avio_wb32(pb, 0xbb88695c);
avio_wb32(pb, 0xfac9c740);
pos2 = avio_tell(pb);
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size placeholder*/
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "MTDT");
avio_wb16(pb, 4);
avio_wb16(pb, 0x0C); /* size */
avio_wb32(pb, 0x0B); /* type */
avio_wb16(pb, language_code("und")); /* language */
avio_wb16(pb, 0x0); /* ? */
avio_wb16(pb, 0x021C); /* data */
if (!(s->flags & AVFMT_FLAG_BITEXACT))
mov_write_psp_udta_tag(pb, LIBAVCODEC_IDENT, "eng", 0x04);
mov_write_psp_udta_tag(pb, title->value, "eng", 0x01);
mov_write_psp_udta_tag(pb, "2006/04/01 11:11:11", "und", 0x03);
update_size(pb, pos2);
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reds_link_free(RedLinkInfo *link)
{
reds_stream_free(link->stream);
link->stream = NULL;
free(link->link_mess);
link->link_mess = NULL;
BN_free(link->tiTicketing.bn);
link->tiTicketing.bn = NULL;
if (link->tiTicketing.rsa) {
RSA_free(link->tiTicketing.rsa);
link->tiTicketing.rsa = NULL;
}
free(link);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t deserialize_gw_speed(uint8_t value) {
uint32_t speed;
uint32_t exp;
if (!value) {
return 0;
}
if (value == UINT8_MAX) {
/* maximum value: also return maximum value */
return MAX_SMARTGW_SPEED;
}
speed = (value >> 3) + 1;
exp = value & 7;
while (exp-- > 0) {
speed *= 10;
}
return speed;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13688/OLSR: Do bounds checks before we fetch data.
While we're at it, clean up some other bounds checks, so we check that
we have a complete IPv4 message header if it's IPv4 and a complete IPv6
message header if it's IPv6.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestOfflineLoadPage::NotifyBlockingPageComplete(bool proceed) {
test_page_->OnBlockingPageComplete(proceed);
}
Commit Message: Disable crashing OfflineLoadPageTest
[email protected]
BUG=113219
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9358027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120977 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 107,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool megasas_use_queue64(MegasasState *s)
{
return s->flags & MEGASAS_MASK_USE_QUEUE64;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_spnego_options(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx)
{
spnego_ctx->optionStr = gssint_get_modOptions(
(const gss_OID)&spnego_oids[0]);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 36,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vhost_scsi_exit(void)
{
vhost_scsi_deregister_configfs();
vhost_scsi_deregister();
destroy_workqueue(vhost_scsi_workqueue);
};
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void webkit_web_view_set_zoom_level(WebKitWebView* webView, gfloat zoomLevel)
{
g_return_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView));
webkit_web_view_apply_zoom_level(webView, zoomLevel);
g_object_notify(G_OBJECT(webView), "zoom-level");
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: float WebLocalFrameImpl::PrintPage(int page, cc::PaintCanvas* canvas) {
DCHECK(print_context_);
DCHECK_GE(page, 0);
DCHECK(GetFrame());
DCHECK(GetFrame()->GetDocument());
return print_context_->SpoolSinglePage(canvas, page);
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltNumberFormatGetAnyLevel(xsltTransformContextPtr context,
xmlNodePtr node,
xsltCompMatchPtr countPat,
xsltCompMatchPtr fromPat,
double *array,
xmlDocPtr doc,
xmlNodePtr elem)
{
int amount = 0;
int cnt = 0;
xmlNodePtr cur;
/* select the starting node */
switch (node->type) {
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
cur = node;
break;
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
cur = ((xmlAttrPtr) node)->parent;
break;
case XML_TEXT_NODE:
case XML_PI_NODE:
case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
cur = node->parent;
break;
default:
cur = NULL;
break;
}
while (cur != NULL) {
/* process current node */
if (countPat == NULL) {
if ((node->type == cur->type) &&
/* FIXME: must use expanded-name instead of local name */
xmlStrEqual(node->name, cur->name)) {
if ((node->ns == cur->ns) ||
((node->ns != NULL) &&
(cur->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(node->ns->href,
cur->ns->href) )))
cnt++;
}
} else {
if (xsltTestCompMatchList(context, cur, countPat))
cnt++;
}
if ((fromPat != NULL) &&
xsltTestCompMatchList(context, cur, fromPat)) {
break; /* while */
}
/* Skip to next preceding or ancestor */
if ((cur->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
#ifdef LIBXML_DOCB_ENABLED
(cur->type == XML_DOCB_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
#endif
(cur->type == XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE))
break; /* while */
while ((cur->prev != NULL) && ((cur->prev->type == XML_DTD_NODE) ||
(cur->prev->type == XML_XINCLUDE_START) ||
(cur->prev->type == XML_XINCLUDE_END)))
cur = cur->prev;
if (cur->prev != NULL) {
for (cur = cur->prev; cur->last != NULL; cur = cur->last);
} else {
cur = cur->parent;
}
}
array[amount++] = (double) cnt;
return(amount);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetCryptohomeLibrary(
CryptohomeLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->crypto_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 170,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void coroutine_fn virtfs_co_reset(void *opaque)
{
VirtfsCoResetData *data = opaque;
virtfs_reset(&data->pdu);
data->done = true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillDialogViews::InputEditedOrActivated(ServerFieldType type,
const gfx::Rect& bounds,
bool was_edit) {
DCHECK_NE(UNKNOWN_TYPE, type);
ExpandingTextfield* textfield = TextfieldForType(type);
views::Combobox* combobox = ComboboxForType(type);
if (!combobox && !textfield)
return;
DCHECK_NE(!!combobox, !!textfield);
DetailsGroup* group = textfield ? GroupForView(textfield) :
GroupForView(combobox);
base::string16 text = textfield ?
textfield->GetText() :
combobox->model()->GetItemAt(combobox->selected_index());
DCHECK(group);
delegate_->UserEditedOrActivatedInput(group->section,
type,
GetWidget()->GetNativeView(),
bounds,
text,
was_edit);
if (textfield && textfield->invalid() && was_edit) {
SetValidityForInput(
textfield,
delegate_->InputValidityMessage(
group->section, type, textfield->GetText()));
if (!textfield->invalid())
ValidateGroup(*group, VALIDATE_EDIT);
}
if (delegate_->FieldControlsIcons(type))
SetIconsForSection(group->section);
SetEditabilityForSection(group->section);
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 109,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int function_stat_cmp(void *p1, void *p2)
{
struct ftrace_profile *a = p1;
struct ftrace_profile *b = p2;
if (a->time < b->time)
return -1;
if (a->time > b->time)
return 1;
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long insn_get_seg_base(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx)
{
struct desc_struct *desc;
short sel;
sel = get_segment_selector(regs, seg_reg_idx);
if (sel < 0)
return -1L;
if (v8086_mode(regs))
/*
* Base is simply the segment selector shifted 4
* bits to the right.
*/
return (unsigned long)(sel << 4);
if (user_64bit_mode(regs)) {
/*
* Only FS or GS will have a base address, the rest of
* the segments' bases are forced to 0.
*/
unsigned long base;
if (seg_reg_idx == INAT_SEG_REG_FS)
rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, base);
else if (seg_reg_idx == INAT_SEG_REG_GS)
/*
* swapgs was called at the kernel entry point. Thus,
* MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE will have the user-space GS base.
*/
rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, base);
else
base = 0;
return base;
}
/* In protected mode the segment selector cannot be null. */
if (!sel)
return -1L;
desc = get_desc(sel);
if (!desc)
return -1L;
return get_desc_base(desc);
}
Commit Message: x86/insn-eval: Fix use-after-free access to LDT entry
get_desc() computes a pointer into the LDT while holding a lock that
protects the LDT from being freed, but then drops the lock and returns the
(now potentially dangling) pointer to its caller.
Fix it by giving the caller a copy of the LDT entry instead.
Fixes: 670f928ba09b ("x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 169,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pppol2tp_next_tunnel(struct net *net, struct pppol2tp_seq_data *pd)
{
for (;;) {
pd->tunnel = l2tp_tunnel_find_nth(net, pd->tunnel_idx);
pd->tunnel_idx++;
if (pd->tunnel == NULL)
break;
/* Ignore L2TPv3 tunnels */
if (pd->tunnel->version < 3)
break;
}
}
Commit Message: net/l2tp: don't fall back on UDP [get|set]sockopt
The l2tp [get|set]sockopt() code has fallen back to the UDP functions
for socket option levels != SOL_PPPOL2TP since day one, but that has
never actually worked, since the l2tp socket isn't an inet socket.
As David Miller points out:
"If we wanted this to work, it'd have to look up the tunnel and then
use tunnel->sk, but I wonder how useful that would be"
Since this can never have worked so nobody could possibly have depended
on that functionality, just remove the broken code and return -EINVAL.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: James Chapman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Phil Turnbull <[email protected]>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::OnDragTargetDrop(const gfx::Point& client_point,
const gfx::Point& screen_point) {
webview()->dragTargetDrop(client_point, screen_point);
Send(new DragHostMsg_TargetDrop_ACK(routing_id_));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tracing_time_stamp_mode_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct trace_array *tr = inode->i_private;
int ret;
if (tracing_disabled)
return -ENODEV;
if (trace_array_get(tr))
return -ENODEV;
ret = single_open(file, tracing_time_stamp_mode_show, inode->i_private);
if (ret < 0)
trace_array_put(tr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vfio_intx_set_signal(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int fd)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev;
unsigned long irqflags = IRQF_SHARED;
struct eventfd_ctx *trigger;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
if (vdev->ctx[0].trigger) {
free_irq(pdev->irq, vdev);
kfree(vdev->ctx[0].name);
eventfd_ctx_put(vdev->ctx[0].trigger);
vdev->ctx[0].trigger = NULL;
}
if (fd < 0) /* Disable only */
return 0;
vdev->ctx[0].name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "vfio-intx(%s)",
pci_name(pdev));
if (!vdev->ctx[0].name)
return -ENOMEM;
trigger = eventfd_ctx_fdget(fd);
if (IS_ERR(trigger)) {
kfree(vdev->ctx[0].name);
return PTR_ERR(trigger);
}
vdev->ctx[0].trigger = trigger;
if (!vdev->pci_2_3)
irqflags = 0;
ret = request_irq(pdev->irq, vfio_intx_handler,
irqflags, vdev->ctx[0].name, vdev);
if (ret) {
vdev->ctx[0].trigger = NULL;
kfree(vdev->ctx[0].name);
eventfd_ctx_put(trigger);
return ret;
}
/*
* INTx disable will stick across the new irq setup,
* disable_irq won't.
*/
spin_lock_irqsave(&vdev->irqlock, flags);
if (!vdev->pci_2_3 && vdev->ctx[0].masked)
disable_irq_nosync(pdev->irq);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vdev->irqlock, flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 48,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n)
{
buf_pos_t pos;
buf_pos_init(buf, &pos);
while (buf_find_pos_of_char(*s, &pos) >= 0) {
if (buf_matches_at_pos(&pos, s, n)) {
tor_assert(pos.chunk_pos + pos.pos < INT_MAX);
return (int)(pos.chunk_pos + pos.pos);
} else {
if (buf_pos_inc(&pos)<0)
return -1;
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int exif_process_user_comment(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char **pszInfoPtr, char **pszEncoding, char *szValuePtr, int ByteCount TSRMLS_DC)
{
int a;
char *decode;
size_t len;;
*pszEncoding = NULL;
/* Copy the comment */
if (ByteCount>=8) {
if (!memcmp(szValuePtr, "UNICODE\0", 8)) {
*pszEncoding = estrdup((const char*)szValuePtr);
szValuePtr = szValuePtr+8;
ByteCount -= 8;
/* First try to detect BOM: ZERO WIDTH NOBREAK SPACE (FEFF 16)
* since we have no encoding support for the BOM yet we skip that.
*/
if (!memcmp(szValuePtr, "\xFE\xFF", 2)) {
decode = "UCS-2BE";
szValuePtr = szValuePtr+2;
ByteCount -= 2;
} else if (!memcmp(szValuePtr, "\xFF\xFE", 2)) {
decode = "UCS-2LE";
szValuePtr = szValuePtr+2;
ByteCount -= 2;
} else if (ImageInfo->motorola_intel) {
decode = ImageInfo->decode_unicode_be;
} else {
decode = ImageInfo->decode_unicode_le;
}
/* XXX this will fail again if encoding_converter returns on error something different than SIZE_MAX */
if (zend_multibyte_encoding_converter(
(unsigned char**)pszInfoPtr,
&len,
(unsigned char*)szValuePtr,
ByteCount,
zend_multibyte_fetch_encoding(ImageInfo->encode_unicode TSRMLS_CC),
zend_multibyte_fetch_encoding(decode TSRMLS_CC)
TSRMLS_CC) == (size_t)-1) {
len = exif_process_string_raw(pszInfoPtr, szValuePtr, ByteCount);
}
return len;
} else if (!memcmp(szValuePtr, "ASCII\0\0\0", 8)) {
*pszEncoding = estrdup((const char*)szValuePtr);
szValuePtr = szValuePtr+8;
ByteCount -= 8;
} else if (!memcmp(szValuePtr, "JIS\0\0\0\0\0", 8)) {
/* JIS should be tanslated to MB or we leave it to the user - leave it to the user */
*pszEncoding = estrdup((const char*)szValuePtr);
szValuePtr = szValuePtr+8;
ByteCount -= 8;
/* XXX this will fail again if encoding_converter returns on error something different than SIZE_MAX */
if (zend_multibyte_encoding_converter(
(unsigned char**)pszInfoPtr,
&len,
(unsigned char*)szValuePtr,
ByteCount,
zend_multibyte_fetch_encoding(ImageInfo->encode_jis TSRMLS_CC),
zend_multibyte_fetch_encoding(ImageInfo->motorola_intel ? ImageInfo->decode_jis_be : ImageInfo->decode_jis_le TSRMLS_CC)
TSRMLS_CC) == (size_t)-1) {
len = exif_process_string_raw(pszInfoPtr, szValuePtr, ByteCount);
}
return len;
} else if (!memcmp(szValuePtr, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8)) {
/* 8 NULL means undefined and should be ASCII... */
*pszEncoding = estrdup("UNDEFINED");
szValuePtr = szValuePtr+8;
ByteCount -= 8;
}
}
/* Olympus has this padded with trailing spaces. Remove these first. */
if (ByteCount>0) {
for (a=ByteCount-1;a && szValuePtr[a]==' ';a--) {
(szValuePtr)[a] = '\0';
}
}
/* normal text without encoding */
exif_process_string(pszInfoPtr, szValuePtr, ByteCount TSRMLS_CC);
return strlen(*pszInfoPtr);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
V8PerContextData* contextData = V8PerContextData::from(info.GetIsolate()->GetCurrentContext());
if (contextData && contextData->activityLogger()) {
Vector<v8::Handle<v8::Value> > loggerArgs = toNativeArguments<v8::Handle<v8::Value> >(info, 0);
contextData->activityLogger()->log("TestObject.activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldMethod", info.Length(), loggerArgs.data(), "Method");
}
TestObjectV8Internal::activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_wddx_push_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name, const XML_Char **atts)
{
st_entry ent;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
if (!strcmp(name, EL_PACKET)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i=0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_VERSION)) {
/* nothing for now */
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING)) {
ent.type = ST_STRING;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent.data) = STR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
Z_STRLEN_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
ent.type = ST_BINARY;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent.data) = STR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
Z_STRLEN_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_CHAR)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_CHAR_CODE) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
char tmp_buf[2];
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "%c", (char)strtol(atts[i+1], NULL, 16));
php_wddx_process_data(user_data, tmp_buf, strlen(tmp_buf));
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER)) {
ent.type = ST_NUMBER;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_LONG;
Z_LVAL_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_VALUE) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
ent.type = ST_BOOLEAN;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_BOOL;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
php_wddx_process_data(user_data, atts[i+1], strlen(atts[i+1]));
break;
}
} else {
ent.type = ST_BOOLEAN;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ZVAL_FALSE(&ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_NULL)) {
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_NULL)) {
ent.type = ST_NULL;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
ZVAL_NULL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY)) {
ent.type = ST_ARRAY;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT)) {
ent.type = ST_STRUCT;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_NAME) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
if (stack->varname) efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = estrdup(atts[i+1]);
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET)) {
int i;
ent.type = ST_RECORDSET;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], "fieldNames") && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
zval *tmp;
char *key;
char *p1, *p2, *endp;
i++;
endp = (char *)atts[i] + strlen(atts[i]);
p1 = (char *)atts[i];
while ((p2 = php_memnstr(p1, ",", sizeof(",")-1, endp)) != NULL) {
key = estrndup(p1, p2 - p1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
array_init(tmp);
add_assoc_zval_ex(ent.data, key, p2 - p1 + 1, tmp);
p1 = p2 + sizeof(",")-1;
efree(key);
}
if (p1 <= endp) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
array_init(tmp);
add_assoc_zval_ex(ent.data, p1, endp - p1 + 1, tmp);
}
break;
}
}
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
int i;
st_entry ent;
ent.type = ST_FIELD;
ent.varname = NULL;
ent.data = NULL;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_NAME) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
st_entry *recordset;
zval **field;
if (wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&recordset) == SUCCESS &&
recordset->type == ST_RECORDSET &&
zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(recordset->data), (char*)atts[i+1], strlen(atts[i+1])+1, (void**)&field) == SUCCESS) {
ent.data = *field;
}
break;
}
}
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
ent.type = ST_DATETIME;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_LONG;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-502 | 1 | 164,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _asn1_error_description_tag_error (asn1_node node, char *ErrorDescription)
{
Estrcpy (ErrorDescription, ":: tag error near element '");
_asn1_hierarchical_name (node, ErrorDescription + strlen (ErrorDescription),
ASN1_MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_SIZE - 40);
Estrcat (ErrorDescription, "'");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewViews::SaveStateToTab(content::WebContents* tab) {
DCHECK(tab);
if (IsIMEComposing()) {
ConfirmCompositionText();
GetInputMethod()->CancelComposition(this);
}
OmniboxEditModel::State state = model()->GetStateForTabSwitch();
tab->SetUserData(OmniboxState::kKey, std::make_unique<OmniboxState>(
state, GetSelectedRange(),
saved_selection_for_focus_change_));
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
[email protected]
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 142,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *dest, int destlen,
int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_tipc *dst = (struct sockaddr_tipc *)dest;
struct msghdr m = {NULL,};
unsigned int timeout;
int res;
lock_sock(sk);
/* For now, TIPC does not allow use of connect() with DGRAM/RDM types */
if (sock->state == SS_READY) {
res = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto exit;
}
/*
* Reject connection attempt using multicast address
*
* Note: send_msg() validates the rest of the address fields,
* so there's no need to do it here
*/
if (dst->addrtype == TIPC_ADDR_MCAST) {
res = -EINVAL;
goto exit;
}
timeout = (flags & O_NONBLOCK) ? 0 : tipc_sk(sk)->conn_timeout;
switch (sock->state) {
case SS_UNCONNECTED:
/* Send a 'SYN-' to destination */
m.msg_name = dest;
m.msg_namelen = destlen;
/* If connect is in non-blocking case, set MSG_DONTWAIT to
* indicate send_msg() is never blocked.
*/
if (!timeout)
m.msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT;
res = send_msg(NULL, sock, &m, 0);
if ((res < 0) && (res != -EWOULDBLOCK))
goto exit;
/* Just entered SS_CONNECTING state; the only
* difference is that return value in non-blocking
* case is EINPROGRESS, rather than EALREADY.
*/
res = -EINPROGRESS;
break;
case SS_CONNECTING:
res = -EALREADY;
break;
case SS_CONNECTED:
res = -EISCONN;
break;
default:
res = -EINVAL;
goto exit;
}
if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTING) {
if (!timeout)
goto exit;
/* Wait until an 'ACK' or 'RST' arrives, or a timeout occurs */
release_sock(sk);
res = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(*sk_sleep(sk),
sock->state != SS_CONNECTING,
timeout ? (long)msecs_to_jiffies(timeout)
: MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT);
lock_sock(sk);
if (res <= 0) {
if (res == 0)
res = -ETIMEDOUT;
else
; /* leave "res" unchanged */
goto exit;
}
}
if (unlikely(sock->state == SS_DISCONNECTING))
res = sock_error(sk);
else
res = 0;
exit:
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix info leaks via msg_name in recv_msg/recv_stream
The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union
is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() --
the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the
msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c.
Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update
the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e.
"success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will
lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with
memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it
will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Cc: Allan Stephens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnImeConfirmComposition(
const string16& text, const ui::Range& replacement_range) {
if (pepper_delegate_.IsPluginFocused()) {
pepper_delegate_.OnImeConfirmComposition(text);
} else {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (focused_plugin_id_ >= 0) {
std::set<WebPluginDelegateProxy*>::iterator it;
for (it = plugin_delegates_.begin();
it != plugin_delegates_.end(); ++it) {
(*it)->ImeCompositionCompleted(text, focused_plugin_id_);
}
return;
}
#endif
if (replacement_range.IsValid() && webview()) {
if (WebFrame* frame = webview()->focusedFrame()) {
WebRange webrange = WebRange::fromDocumentRange(
frame, replacement_range.start(), replacement_range.length());
if (!webrange.isNull())
frame->setSelectionToRange(webrange);
}
}
RenderWidget::OnImeConfirmComposition(text, replacement_range);
}
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t GetAcceptedSocketCount() const { return sockets_.size(); }
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void usb_set_lpm_mel(struct usb_device *udev,
struct usb3_lpm_parameters *udev_lpm_params,
unsigned int udev_exit_latency,
struct usb_hub *hub,
struct usb3_lpm_parameters *hub_lpm_params,
unsigned int hub_exit_latency)
{
unsigned int total_mel;
unsigned int device_mel;
unsigned int hub_mel;
/*
* Calculate the time it takes to transition all links from the roothub
* to the parent hub into U0. The parent hub must then decode the
* packet (hub header decode latency) to figure out which port it was
* bound for.
*
* The Hub Header decode latency is expressed in 0.1us intervals (0x1
* means 0.1us). Multiply that by 100 to get nanoseconds.
*/
total_mel = hub_lpm_params->mel +
(hub->descriptor->u.ss.bHubHdrDecLat * 100);
/*
* How long will it take to transition the downstream hub's port into
* U0? The greater of either the hub exit latency or the device exit
* latency.
*
* The BOS U1/U2 exit latencies are expressed in 1us intervals.
* Multiply that by 1000 to get nanoseconds.
*/
device_mel = udev_exit_latency * 1000;
hub_mel = hub_exit_latency * 1000;
if (device_mel > hub_mel)
total_mel += device_mel;
else
total_mel += hub_mel;
udev_lpm_params->mel = total_mel;
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nf_tables_dump_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
const struct nft_set *set;
struct nft_set_dump_args args;
struct nft_ctx ctx;
struct nlattr *nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_MAX + 1];
struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct nlattr *nest;
u32 portid, seq;
int event, err;
err = nlmsg_parse(cb->nlh, sizeof(struct nfgenmsg), nla,
NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_MAX, nft_set_elem_list_policy);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = nft_ctx_init_from_elemattr(&ctx, cb->skb, cb->nlh, (void *)nla,
false);
if (err < 0)
return err;
set = nf_tables_set_lookup(ctx.table, nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_SET]);
if (IS_ERR(set))
return PTR_ERR(set);
if (set->flags & NFT_SET_INACTIVE)
return -ENOENT;
event = NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM;
event |= NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES << 8;
portid = NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid;
seq = cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, sizeof(struct nfgenmsg),
NLM_F_MULTI);
if (nlh == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
nfmsg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
nfmsg->nfgen_family = ctx.afi->family;
nfmsg->version = NFNETLINK_V0;
nfmsg->res_id = htons(ctx.net->nft.base_seq & 0xffff);
if (nla_put_string(skb, NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_TABLE, ctx.table->name))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_string(skb, NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_SET, set->name))
goto nla_put_failure;
nest = nla_nest_start(skb, NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_ELEMENTS);
if (nest == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
args.cb = cb;
args.skb = skb;
args.iter.skip = cb->args[0];
args.iter.count = 0;
args.iter.err = 0;
args.iter.fn = nf_tables_dump_setelem;
set->ops->walk(&ctx, set, &args.iter);
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
if (args.iter.err && args.iter.err != -EMSGSIZE)
return args.iter.err;
if (args.iter.count == cb->args[0])
return 0;
cb->args[0] = args.iter.count;
return skb->len;
nla_put_failure:
return -ENOSPC;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 57,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: be4(const unsigned char *p)
{
return ((((int64_t)p[0]) << 24) + (p[1] << 16) + (p[2] << 8) + (p[3]));
}
Commit Message: Reject cpio symlinks that exceed 1MB
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 52,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void dousers(void) {
struct passwd *pw;
struct group *gr;
gchar* str;
if(rungroup) {
gr=getgrnam(rungroup);
if(!gr) {
str = g_strdup_printf("Invalid group name: %s", rungroup);
err(str);
}
if(setgid(gr->gr_gid)<0) {
err("Could not set GID: %m");
}
}
if(runuser) {
pw=getpwnam(runuser);
if(!pw) {
str = g_strdup_printf("Invalid user name: %s", runuser);
err(str);
}
if(setuid(pw->pw_uid)<0) {
err("Could not set UID: %m");
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int cpu,
struct task_struct *task,
struct perf_event *group_leader,
struct perf_event *parent_event,
perf_overflow_handler_t overflow_handler,
void *context, int cgroup_fd)
{
struct pmu *pmu;
struct perf_event *event;
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
long err = -EINVAL;
if ((unsigned)cpu >= nr_cpu_ids) {
if (!task || cpu != -1)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
event = kzalloc(sizeof(*event), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!event)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
/*
* Single events are their own group leaders, with an
* empty sibling list:
*/
if (!group_leader)
group_leader = event;
mutex_init(&event->child_mutex);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&event->child_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&event->group_entry);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&event->event_entry);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&event->sibling_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&event->rb_entry);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&event->active_entry);
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&event->hlist_entry);
init_waitqueue_head(&event->waitq);
init_irq_work(&event->pending, perf_pending_event);
mutex_init(&event->mmap_mutex);
atomic_long_set(&event->refcount, 1);
event->cpu = cpu;
event->attr = *attr;
event->group_leader = group_leader;
event->pmu = NULL;
event->oncpu = -1;
event->parent = parent_event;
event->ns = get_pid_ns(task_active_pid_ns(current));
event->id = atomic64_inc_return(&perf_event_id);
event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE;
if (task) {
event->attach_state = PERF_ATTACH_TASK;
/*
* XXX pmu::event_init needs to know what task to account to
* and we cannot use the ctx information because we need the
* pmu before we get a ctx.
*/
event->hw.target = task;
}
event->clock = &local_clock;
if (parent_event)
event->clock = parent_event->clock;
if (!overflow_handler && parent_event) {
overflow_handler = parent_event->overflow_handler;
context = parent_event->overflow_handler_context;
}
event->overflow_handler = overflow_handler;
event->overflow_handler_context = context;
perf_event__state_init(event);
pmu = NULL;
hwc = &event->hw;
hwc->sample_period = attr->sample_period;
if (attr->freq && attr->sample_freq)
hwc->sample_period = 1;
hwc->last_period = hwc->sample_period;
local64_set(&hwc->period_left, hwc->sample_period);
/*
* we currently do not support PERF_FORMAT_GROUP on inherited events
*/
if (attr->inherit && (attr->read_format & PERF_FORMAT_GROUP))
goto err_ns;
if (!has_branch_stack(event))
event->attr.branch_sample_type = 0;
if (cgroup_fd != -1) {
err = perf_cgroup_connect(cgroup_fd, event, attr, group_leader);
if (err)
goto err_ns;
}
pmu = perf_init_event(event);
if (!pmu)
goto err_ns;
else if (IS_ERR(pmu)) {
err = PTR_ERR(pmu);
goto err_ns;
}
err = exclusive_event_init(event);
if (err)
goto err_pmu;
if (!event->parent) {
if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN) {
err = get_callchain_buffers();
if (err)
goto err_per_task;
}
}
return event;
err_per_task:
exclusive_event_destroy(event);
err_pmu:
if (event->destroy)
event->destroy(event);
module_put(pmu->module);
err_ns:
if (is_cgroup_event(event))
perf_detach_cgroup(event);
if (event->ns)
put_pid_ns(event->ns);
kfree(event);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,060 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t do_sock_write(struct msghdr *msg, struct kiocb *iocb,
struct file *file, const struct iovec *iov,
unsigned long nr_segs)
{
struct socket *sock = file->private_data;
size_t size = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_segs; i++)
size += iov[i].iov_len;
msg->msg_name = NULL;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
msg->msg_control = NULL;
msg->msg_controllen = 0;
msg->msg_iov = (struct iovec *)iov;
msg->msg_iovlen = nr_segs;
msg->msg_flags = (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) ? MSG_DONTWAIT : 0;
if (sock->type == SOCK_SEQPACKET)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
return __sock_sendmsg(iocb, sock, msg, size);
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,653 |
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