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(Countercl. PP 201, 227, 236.) Such allegations, without more, are inadequate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"plaintiffs' bare allegations of malice do not suffice, particularly where such allegations are contradicted by plaintiffs' own claims that defendants' actions were financially [motivated]\"",
"sentence": "See Rather v. CBS Corp., 68 A.D.3d 49, 886 N.Y.S.2d 121, 128 (N.Y.App.Div., 1st Dep’t, 2009) (finding “bare allegations of malice” to be insufficient “to bring the [tortious interference] claim under an exception to the economic interest rule”); see also Ruha v. Guior, 277 A.D.2d 116, 717 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (N.Y.App. Div., 1st Dep’t, 2000) (holding that “plaintiffs’ bare allegations of malice do not suffice, particularly where such allegations are contradicted by plaintiffs’ own claims that defendants’ actions were financially [motivated]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding \"bare allegations of malice\" to be insufficient \"to bring the [tortious interference] claim under an exception to the economic interest rule\"",
"sentence": "See Rather v. CBS Corp., 68 A.D.3d 49, 886 N.Y.S.2d 121, 128 (N.Y.App.Div., 1st Dep’t, 2009) (finding “bare allegations of malice” to be insufficient “to bring the [tortious interference] claim under an exception to the economic interest rule”); see also Ruha v. Guior, 277 A.D.2d 116, 717 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (N.Y.App. Div., 1st Dep’t, 2000) (holding that “plaintiffs’ bare allegations of malice do not suffice, particularly where such allegations are contradicted by plaintiffs’ own claims that defendants’ actions were financially [motivated]”)."
} | 3,585,608 | b |
(Countercl. PP 201, 227, 236.) Such allegations, without more, are inadequate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "717 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"plaintiffs' bare allegations of malice do not suffice, particularly where such allegations are contradicted by plaintiffs' own claims that defendants' actions were financially [motivated]\"",
"sentence": "See Rather v. CBS Corp., 68 A.D.3d 49, 886 N.Y.S.2d 121, 128 (N.Y.App.Div., 1st Dep’t, 2009) (finding “bare allegations of malice” to be insufficient “to bring the [tortious interference] claim under an exception to the economic interest rule”); see also Ruha v. Guior, 277 A.D.2d 116, 717 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (N.Y.App. Div., 1st Dep’t, 2000) (holding that “plaintiffs’ bare allegations of malice do not suffice, particularly where such allegations are contradicted by plaintiffs’ own claims that defendants’ actions were financially [motivated]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding \"bare allegations of malice\" to be insufficient \"to bring the [tortious interference] claim under an exception to the economic interest rule\"",
"sentence": "See Rather v. CBS Corp., 68 A.D.3d 49, 886 N.Y.S.2d 121, 128 (N.Y.App.Div., 1st Dep’t, 2009) (finding “bare allegations of malice” to be insufficient “to bring the [tortious interference] claim under an exception to the economic interest rule”); see also Ruha v. Guior, 277 A.D.2d 116, 717 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (N.Y.App. Div., 1st Dep’t, 2000) (holding that “plaintiffs’ bare allegations of malice do not suffice, particularly where such allegations are contradicted by plaintiffs’ own claims that defendants’ actions were financially [motivated]”)."
} | 3,585,608 | b |
(Countercl. PP 201, 227, 236.) Such allegations, without more, are inadequate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"plaintiffs' bare allegations of malice do not suffice, particularly where such allegations are contradicted by plaintiffs' own claims that defendants' actions were financially [motivated]\"",
"sentence": "See Rather v. CBS Corp., 68 A.D.3d 49, 886 N.Y.S.2d 121, 128 (N.Y.App.Div., 1st Dep’t, 2009) (finding “bare allegations of malice” to be insufficient “to bring the [tortious interference] claim under an exception to the economic interest rule”); see also Ruha v. Guior, 277 A.D.2d 116, 717 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (N.Y.App. Div., 1st Dep’t, 2000) (holding that “plaintiffs’ bare allegations of malice do not suffice, particularly where such allegations are contradicted by plaintiffs’ own claims that defendants’ actions were financially [motivated]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "886 N.Y.S.2d 121, 128",
"parenthetical": "finding \"bare allegations of malice\" to be insufficient \"to bring the [tortious interference] claim under an exception to the economic interest rule\"",
"sentence": "See Rather v. CBS Corp., 68 A.D.3d 49, 886 N.Y.S.2d 121, 128 (N.Y.App.Div., 1st Dep’t, 2009) (finding “bare allegations of malice” to be insufficient “to bring the [tortious interference] claim under an exception to the economic interest rule”); see also Ruha v. Guior, 277 A.D.2d 116, 717 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (N.Y.App. Div., 1st Dep’t, 2000) (holding that “plaintiffs’ bare allegations of malice do not suffice, particularly where such allegations are contradicted by plaintiffs’ own claims that defendants’ actions were financially [motivated]”)."
} | 3,585,608 | b |
(Countercl. PP 201, 227, 236.) Such allegations, without more, are inadequate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "886 N.Y.S.2d 121, 128",
"parenthetical": "finding \"bare allegations of malice\" to be insufficient \"to bring the [tortious interference] claim under an exception to the economic interest rule\"",
"sentence": "See Rather v. CBS Corp., 68 A.D.3d 49, 886 N.Y.S.2d 121, 128 (N.Y.App.Div., 1st Dep’t, 2009) (finding “bare allegations of malice” to be insufficient “to bring the [tortious interference] claim under an exception to the economic interest rule”); see also Ruha v. Guior, 277 A.D.2d 116, 717 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (N.Y.App. Div., 1st Dep’t, 2000) (holding that “plaintiffs’ bare allegations of malice do not suffice, particularly where such allegations are contradicted by plaintiffs’ own claims that defendants’ actions were financially [motivated]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "717 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"plaintiffs' bare allegations of malice do not suffice, particularly where such allegations are contradicted by plaintiffs' own claims that defendants' actions were financially [motivated]\"",
"sentence": "See Rather v. CBS Corp., 68 A.D.3d 49, 886 N.Y.S.2d 121, 128 (N.Y.App.Div., 1st Dep’t, 2009) (finding “bare allegations of malice” to be insufficient “to bring the [tortious interference] claim under an exception to the economic interest rule”); see also Ruha v. Guior, 277 A.D.2d 116, 717 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (N.Y.App. Div., 1st Dep’t, 2000) (holding that “plaintiffs’ bare allegations of malice do not suffice, particularly where such allegations are contradicted by plaintiffs’ own claims that defendants’ actions were financially [motivated]”)."
} | 3,585,608 | a |
Not only did Green fail to renew his motion for a change of venue once the court took it under advisement, he also implicitly consented to the seating of the jury in this case. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "263 Va. 298, 304",
"parenthetical": "holding defendant implicitly consented to trial court's declaration of a mistrial",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Washington, 263 Va. 298, 304, 559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002) (holding defendant implicitly consented to trial court’s declaration of a mistrial); but cf. King v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 576, 577-78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (holding defendant did not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not object to a jury instruction covering the same issue)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "264 Va. 576, 577-78",
"parenthetical": "holding defendant did not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not object to a jury instruction covering the same issue",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Washington, 263 Va. 298, 304, 559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002) (holding defendant implicitly consented to trial court’s declaration of a mistrial); but cf. King v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 576, 577-78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (holding defendant did not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not object to a jury instruction covering the same issue)."
} | 622,350 | a |
Not only did Green fail to renew his motion for a change of venue once the court took it under advisement, he also implicitly consented to the seating of the jury in this case. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64",
"parenthetical": "holding defendant did not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not object to a jury instruction covering the same issue",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Washington, 263 Va. 298, 304, 559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002) (holding defendant implicitly consented to trial court’s declaration of a mistrial); but cf. King v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 576, 577-78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (holding defendant did not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not object to a jury instruction covering the same issue)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "263 Va. 298, 304",
"parenthetical": "holding defendant implicitly consented to trial court's declaration of a mistrial",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Washington, 263 Va. 298, 304, 559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002) (holding defendant implicitly consented to trial court’s declaration of a mistrial); but cf. King v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 576, 577-78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (holding defendant did not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not object to a jury instruction covering the same issue)."
} | 622,350 | b |
Not only did Green fail to renew his motion for a change of venue once the court took it under advisement, he also implicitly consented to the seating of the jury in this case. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "264 Va. 576, 577-78",
"parenthetical": "holding defendant did not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not object to a jury instruction covering the same issue",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Washington, 263 Va. 298, 304, 559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002) (holding defendant implicitly consented to trial court’s declaration of a mistrial); but cf. King v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 576, 577-78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (holding defendant did not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not object to a jury instruction covering the same issue)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "559 S.E.2d 636, 639",
"parenthetical": "holding defendant implicitly consented to trial court's declaration of a mistrial",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Washington, 263 Va. 298, 304, 559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002) (holding defendant implicitly consented to trial court’s declaration of a mistrial); but cf. King v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 576, 577-78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (holding defendant did not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not object to a jury instruction covering the same issue)."
} | 622,350 | b |
Not only did Green fail to renew his motion for a change of venue once the court took it under advisement, he also implicitly consented to the seating of the jury in this case. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64",
"parenthetical": "holding defendant did not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not object to a jury instruction covering the same issue",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Washington, 263 Va. 298, 304, 559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002) (holding defendant implicitly consented to trial court’s declaration of a mistrial); but cf. King v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 576, 577-78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (holding defendant did not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not object to a jury instruction covering the same issue)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "559 S.E.2d 636, 639",
"parenthetical": "holding defendant implicitly consented to trial court's declaration of a mistrial",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Washington, 263 Va. 298, 304, 559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002) (holding defendant implicitly consented to trial court’s declaration of a mistrial); but cf. King v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 576, 577-78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (holding defendant did not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not object to a jury instruction covering the same issue)."
} | 622,350 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 U.S. 41, 46",
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "209 W.Va. 25, 31",
"parenthetical": "stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "209 W.Va. 25, 31",
"parenthetical": "stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "209 W.Va. 25, 31",
"parenthetical": "stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "24 F.3d 618, 623",
"parenthetical": "describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "209 W.Va. 25, 31",
"parenthetical": "stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "209 W.Va. 25, 31",
"parenthetical": "stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "940 F.2d 95, 98",
"parenthetical": "describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | a |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 U.S. 41, 46",
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "543 S.E.2d 306, 312",
"parenthetical": "stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "543 S.E.2d 306, 312",
"parenthetical": "stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "543 S.E.2d 306, 312",
"parenthetical": "stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | a |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "24 F.3d 618, 623",
"parenthetical": "describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "543 S.E.2d 306, 312",
"parenthetical": "stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "543 S.E.2d 306, 312",
"parenthetical": "stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "940 F.2d 95, 98",
"parenthetical": "describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | a |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 U.S. 41, 46",
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "180 W.Va. 186, 189-90",
"parenthetical": "discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "180 W.Va. 186, 189-90",
"parenthetical": "discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "180 W.Va. 186, 189-90",
"parenthetical": "discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "180 W.Va. 186, 189-90",
"parenthetical": "discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "24 F.3d 618, 623",
"parenthetical": "describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | a |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "180 W.Va. 186, 189-90",
"parenthetical": "discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "940 F.2d 95, 98",
"parenthetical": "describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | a |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 U.S. 41, 46",
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22",
"parenthetical": "discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22",
"parenthetical": "discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | a |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22",
"parenthetical": "discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "24 F.3d 618, 623",
"parenthetical": "describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22",
"parenthetical": "discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22",
"parenthetical": "discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "940 F.2d 95, 98",
"parenthetical": "describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | a |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 U.S. 41, 46",
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "46 W.Va. 480, 486",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to \"supply certainty as to the land intended to be given\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "46 W.Va. 480, 486",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to \"supply certainty as to the land intended to be given\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "46 W.Va. 480, 486",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to \"supply certainty as to the land intended to be given\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | a |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "46 W.Va. 480, 486",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to \"supply certainty as to the land intended to be given\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "24 F.3d 618, 623",
"parenthetical": "describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | a |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "940 F.2d 95, 98",
"parenthetical": "describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "46 W.Va. 480, 486",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to \"supply certainty as to the land intended to be given\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 U.S. 41, 46",
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "33 S.E. 310, 312",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to \"supply certainty as to the land intended to be given\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "33 S.E. 310, 312",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to \"supply certainty as to the land intended to be given\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "33 S.E. 310, 312",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to \"supply certainty as to the land intended to be given\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing a fence as \"evidence of the fact of occupancy\" in an adverse possession case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | a |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "24 F.3d 618, 623",
"parenthetical": "describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "33 S.E. 310, 312",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to \"supply certainty as to the land intended to be given\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | b |
Both parties have submitted that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of "fence" should control. After exploring the meaning of fence in our case law and the case law of other jurisdictions, we find that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition accurately reflects the plain meaning of the word "fence." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "33 S.E. 310, 312",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to \"supply certainty as to the land intended to be given\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "940 F.2d 95, 98",
"parenthetical": "describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Williams, 209 W.Va. 25, 31, 543 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2000) (stating that remnants of a fence can be introduced as evidence for use in determining the location of a property line); Dustin v. Miller, 180 W.Va. 186, 189-90, 375 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (1988) (discussing whether a strand of barbed wire strung between trees, described in the ease as a fence, created a notorious boundary line); Crim v. England, 46 W.Va. 480, 486, 33 S.E. 310, 312 (1899) (explaining that the purpose of the fence built in the case was to “supply certainty as to the land intended to be given”); see also Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 46, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) (describing a fence as “evidence of the fact of occupancy” in an adverse possession case); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 623 (4th Cir.1994) (describing a four feet high physical perimeter barrier as a fence); Burke v. Ski Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1991) (describing plastic webbing as a fence, the purpose of which is to warn skiers of stones and trees, not to provide a protective barrier)."
} | 3,847,670 | a |
Plaintiffs seek to invoke the Marsh analysis, however, by relying on a long history, over one hundred years, of including an invocation and benediction at the Onawa graduation ceremonies. Nevertheless, a practice, however long maintained, does not automatically bring a case into the Marsh exception. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "463 U.S. 790, 790",
"parenthetical": "\"standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guaran-tees_\"",
"sentence": "See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790, 103 S.Ct. at 3335 (“standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guaran-tees_”); see also Jager v. Douglas County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir.1989) (“because Marsh was based on more than two hundred years of the ‘unique history’ of legislative invocations, it has no application to the case at bar.”); Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 857 F.2d 448, 453 (8th Cir.1988) (“nor is Broad-lawns’ evidence of relatively long-standing practices in Iowa sufficient to win the day under Marsh, since Marsh made it clear that the mere fact that a practice has been carrying on for a long time is not determi-native_”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 824, 828",
"parenthetical": "\"because Marsh was based on more than two hundred years of the 'unique history' of legislative invocations, it has no application to the case at bar.\"",
"sentence": "See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790, 103 S.Ct. at 3335 (“standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guaran-tees_”); see also Jager v. Douglas County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir.1989) (“because Marsh was based on more than two hundred years of the ‘unique history’ of legislative invocations, it has no application to the case at bar.”); Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 857 F.2d 448, 453 (8th Cir.1988) (“nor is Broad-lawns’ evidence of relatively long-standing practices in Iowa sufficient to win the day under Marsh, since Marsh made it clear that the mere fact that a practice has been carrying on for a long time is not determi-native_”)."
} | 7,396,729 | a |
Plaintiffs seek to invoke the Marsh analysis, however, by relying on a long history, over one hundred years, of including an invocation and benediction at the Onawa graduation ceremonies. Nevertheless, a practice, however long maintained, does not automatically bring a case into the Marsh exception. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "463 U.S. 790, 790",
"parenthetical": "\"standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guaran-tees_\"",
"sentence": "See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790, 103 S.Ct. at 3335 (“standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guaran-tees_”); see also Jager v. Douglas County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir.1989) (“because Marsh was based on more than two hundred years of the ‘unique history’ of legislative invocations, it has no application to the case at bar.”); Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 857 F.2d 448, 453 (8th Cir.1988) (“nor is Broad-lawns’ evidence of relatively long-standing practices in Iowa sufficient to win the day under Marsh, since Marsh made it clear that the mere fact that a practice has been carrying on for a long time is not determi-native_”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "857 F.2d 448, 453",
"parenthetical": "\"nor is Broad-lawns' evidence of relatively long-standing practices in Iowa sufficient to win the day under Marsh, since Marsh made it clear that the mere fact that a practice has been carrying on for a long time is not determi-native_\"",
"sentence": "See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790, 103 S.Ct. at 3335 (“standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guaran-tees_”); see also Jager v. Douglas County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir.1989) (“because Marsh was based on more than two hundred years of the ‘unique history’ of legislative invocations, it has no application to the case at bar.”); Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 857 F.2d 448, 453 (8th Cir.1988) (“nor is Broad-lawns’ evidence of relatively long-standing practices in Iowa sufficient to win the day under Marsh, since Marsh made it clear that the mere fact that a practice has been carrying on for a long time is not determi-native_”)."
} | 7,396,729 | a |
Plaintiffs seek to invoke the Marsh analysis, however, by relying on a long history, over one hundred years, of including an invocation and benediction at the Onawa graduation ceremonies. Nevertheless, a practice, however long maintained, does not automatically bring a case into the Marsh exception. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "103 S.Ct. 3335, 3335",
"parenthetical": "\"standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guaran-tees_\"",
"sentence": "See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790, 103 S.Ct. at 3335 (“standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guaran-tees_”); see also Jager v. Douglas County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir.1989) (“because Marsh was based on more than two hundred years of the ‘unique history’ of legislative invocations, it has no application to the case at bar.”); Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 857 F.2d 448, 453 (8th Cir.1988) (“nor is Broad-lawns’ evidence of relatively long-standing practices in Iowa sufficient to win the day under Marsh, since Marsh made it clear that the mere fact that a practice has been carrying on for a long time is not determi-native_”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 824, 828",
"parenthetical": "\"because Marsh was based on more than two hundred years of the 'unique history' of legislative invocations, it has no application to the case at bar.\"",
"sentence": "See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790, 103 S.Ct. at 3335 (“standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guaran-tees_”); see also Jager v. Douglas County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir.1989) (“because Marsh was based on more than two hundred years of the ‘unique history’ of legislative invocations, it has no application to the case at bar.”); Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 857 F.2d 448, 453 (8th Cir.1988) (“nor is Broad-lawns’ evidence of relatively long-standing practices in Iowa sufficient to win the day under Marsh, since Marsh made it clear that the mere fact that a practice has been carrying on for a long time is not determi-native_”)."
} | 7,396,729 | a |
Plaintiffs seek to invoke the Marsh analysis, however, by relying on a long history, over one hundred years, of including an invocation and benediction at the Onawa graduation ceremonies. Nevertheless, a practice, however long maintained, does not automatically bring a case into the Marsh exception. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "103 S.Ct. 3335, 3335",
"parenthetical": "\"standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guaran-tees_\"",
"sentence": "See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790, 103 S.Ct. at 3335 (“standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guaran-tees_”); see also Jager v. Douglas County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir.1989) (“because Marsh was based on more than two hundred years of the ‘unique history’ of legislative invocations, it has no application to the case at bar.”); Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 857 F.2d 448, 453 (8th Cir.1988) (“nor is Broad-lawns’ evidence of relatively long-standing practices in Iowa sufficient to win the day under Marsh, since Marsh made it clear that the mere fact that a practice has been carrying on for a long time is not determi-native_”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "857 F.2d 448, 453",
"parenthetical": "\"nor is Broad-lawns' evidence of relatively long-standing practices in Iowa sufficient to win the day under Marsh, since Marsh made it clear that the mere fact that a practice has been carrying on for a long time is not determi-native_\"",
"sentence": "See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790, 103 S.Ct. at 3335 (“standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guaran-tees_”); see also Jager v. Douglas County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir.1989) (“because Marsh was based on more than two hundred years of the ‘unique history’ of legislative invocations, it has no application to the case at bar.”); Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 857 F.2d 448, 453 (8th Cir.1988) (“nor is Broad-lawns’ evidence of relatively long-standing practices in Iowa sufficient to win the day under Marsh, since Marsh made it clear that the mere fact that a practice has been carrying on for a long time is not determi-native_”)."
} | 7,396,729 | a |
Defendants maintain that we should join those circuits that have held that this testimony now is sufficiently reliable in general to go to the jury, but which decide on the particular facts of the case whether or not to admit the evidence. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "adheres to view that this type of testimony is unreliable",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1311-13 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 791 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc) (although this type of testimony was formally considered inadmissible, it now is appropriate for consideration by the jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242-43 (3d Cir.1985) (even if the admission of this testimony otherwise satisfies Rule 702 (which should be determined after an on-the-record detailed proffer), it still can be excluded under Rule 403); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868, 105 S.Ct. 213, 83 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984) (although this type of testimony was formally considered inadmissible, it now is appropriate for consideration by the jury; however, exclusion of this testimony in this case was harmless error); but see United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir.1987) (adheres to view that this type of testimony is unreliable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 F.2d 1308, 1311-13",
"parenthetical": "although this type of testimony was formally considered inadmissible, it now is appropriate for consideration by the jury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1311-13 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 791 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc) (although this type of testimony was formally considered inadmissible, it now is appropriate for consideration by the jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242-43 (3d Cir.1985) (even if the admission of this testimony otherwise satisfies Rule 702 (which should be determined after an on-the-record detailed proffer), it still can be excluded under Rule 403); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868, 105 S.Ct. 213, 83 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984) (although this type of testimony was formally considered inadmissible, it now is appropriate for consideration by the jury; however, exclusion of this testimony in this case was harmless error); but see United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir.1987) (adheres to view that this type of testimony is unreliable)."
} | 11,360,602 | b |
Defendants maintain that we should join those circuits that have held that this testimony now is sufficiently reliable in general to go to the jury, but which decide on the particular facts of the case whether or not to admit the evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although this type of testimony was formally considered inadmissible, it now is appropriate for consideration by the jury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1311-13 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 791 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc) (although this type of testimony was formally considered inadmissible, it now is appropriate for consideration by the jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242-43 (3d Cir.1985) (even if the admission of this testimony otherwise satisfies Rule 702 (which should be determined after an on-the-record detailed proffer), it still can be excluded under Rule 403); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868, 105 S.Ct. 213, 83 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984) (although this type of testimony was formally considered inadmissible, it now is appropriate for consideration by the jury; however, exclusion of this testimony in this case was harmless error); but see United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir.1987) (adheres to view that this type of testimony is unreliable)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "adheres to view that this type of testimony is unreliable",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1311-13 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 791 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc) (although this type of testimony was formally considered inadmissible, it now is appropriate for consideration by the jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242-43 (3d Cir.1985) (even if the admission of this testimony otherwise satisfies Rule 702 (which should be determined after an on-the-record detailed proffer), it still can be excluded under Rule 403); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868, 105 S.Ct. 213, 83 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984) (although this type of testimony was formally considered inadmissible, it now is appropriate for consideration by the jury; however, exclusion of this testimony in this case was harmless error); but see United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir.1987) (adheres to view that this type of testimony is unreliable)."
} | 11,360,602 | a |
Defendants maintain that we should join those circuits that have held that this testimony now is sufficiently reliable in general to go to the jury, but which decide on the particular facts of the case whether or not to admit the evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "753 F.2d 1224, 1242-43",
"parenthetical": "even if the admission of this testimony otherwise satisfies Rule 702 (which should be determined after an on-the-record detailed proffer",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1311-13 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 791 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc) (although this type of testimony was formally considered inadmissible, it now is appropriate for consideration by the jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242-43 (3d Cir.1985) (even if the admission of this testimony otherwise satisfies Rule 702 (which should be determined after an on-the-record detailed proffer), it still can be excluded under Rule 403); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868, 105 S.Ct. 213, 83 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984) (although this type of testimony was formally considered inadmissible, it now is appropriate for consideration by the jury; however, exclusion of this testimony in this case was harmless error); but see United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir.1987) (adheres to view that this type of testimony is unreliable)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "adheres to view that this type of testimony is unreliable",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1311-13 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 791 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc) (although this type of testimony was formally considered inadmissible, it now is appropriate for consideration by the jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242-43 (3d Cir.1985) (even if the admission of this testimony otherwise satisfies Rule 702 (which should be determined after an on-the-record detailed proffer), it still can be excluded under Rule 403); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868, 105 S.Ct. 213, 83 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984) (although this type of testimony was formally considered inadmissible, it now is appropriate for consideration by the jury; however, exclusion of this testimony in this case was harmless error); but see United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir.1987) (adheres to view that this type of testimony is unreliable)."
} | 11,360,602 | a |
If the conduct of a defendant that supports personal jurisdiction is related to a stated cause of action, personal jurisdiction is known as "specific jurisdiction." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 213, 216",
"parenthetical": "\"It is well settled that specific jurisdiction may arise without the nonresident defendant's ever stepping foot upon the forum state's soil\"",
"sentence": "Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (holding that a defendant establishes minimum contacts by purposely engaging in conduct directed toward the forum state “such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there”); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239-40, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); see also Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir.1990) (“It is well settled that specific jurisdiction may arise without the nonresident defendant’s ever stepping foot upon the forum state’s soil”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "471 U.S. 462, 475",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant establishes minimum contacts by purposely engaging in conduct directed toward the forum state \"such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there\"",
"sentence": "Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (holding that a defendant establishes minimum contacts by purposely engaging in conduct directed toward the forum state “such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there”); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239-40, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); see also Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir.1990) (“It is well settled that specific jurisdiction may arise without the nonresident defendant’s ever stepping foot upon the forum state’s soil”)."
} | 11,497,017 | b |
If the conduct of a defendant that supports personal jurisdiction is related to a stated cause of action, personal jurisdiction is known as "specific jurisdiction." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 213, 216",
"parenthetical": "\"It is well settled that specific jurisdiction may arise without the nonresident defendant's ever stepping foot upon the forum state's soil\"",
"sentence": "Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (holding that a defendant establishes minimum contacts by purposely engaging in conduct directed toward the forum state “such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there”); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239-40, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); see also Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir.1990) (“It is well settled that specific jurisdiction may arise without the nonresident defendant’s ever stepping foot upon the forum state’s soil”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant establishes minimum contacts by purposely engaging in conduct directed toward the forum state \"such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there\"",
"sentence": "Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (holding that a defendant establishes minimum contacts by purposely engaging in conduct directed toward the forum state “such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there”); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239-40, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); see also Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir.1990) (“It is well settled that specific jurisdiction may arise without the nonresident defendant’s ever stepping foot upon the forum state’s soil”)."
} | 11,497,017 | b |
If the conduct of a defendant that supports personal jurisdiction is related to a stated cause of action, personal jurisdiction is known as "specific jurisdiction." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 213, 216",
"parenthetical": "\"It is well settled that specific jurisdiction may arise without the nonresident defendant's ever stepping foot upon the forum state's soil\"",
"sentence": "Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (holding that a defendant establishes minimum contacts by purposely engaging in conduct directed toward the forum state “such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there”); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239-40, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); see also Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir.1990) (“It is well settled that specific jurisdiction may arise without the nonresident defendant’s ever stepping foot upon the forum state’s soil”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant establishes minimum contacts by purposely engaging in conduct directed toward the forum state \"such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there\"",
"sentence": "Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (holding that a defendant establishes minimum contacts by purposely engaging in conduct directed toward the forum state “such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there”); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239-40, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); see also Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir.1990) (“It is well settled that specific jurisdiction may arise without the nonresident defendant’s ever stepping foot upon the forum state’s soil”)."
} | 11,497,017 | b |
The PCOA filed a Reply to the FHCSD's Objections to the R & R, again emphasizing any award of attorneys' fees is wholly discretionary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "214 F.3d 1115, 1119, 1121-22",
"parenthetical": "an Americans With Disabilities Act case confirming the court can award \"low fees or no fees\" without reciting the twelve Kerr factors, but concluding in that case the plaintiff obtained more than a \"technical victory,\" and so was entitled to a fee award the court should have computed as a lodestar figure",
"sentence": "Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566 (affirming denial of any attorneys’ fee award under the civil rights statute where plaintiffs sought millions in compensatory damages and recovered nominal damages of one dollar, confirming the court has discretion to award no fees without reciting the several factors bearing on reasonableness); see also Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119, 1121-22 (9th Cir.2000) (an Americans With Disabilities Act case confirming the court can award “low fees or no fees” without reciting the twelve Kerr factors, but concluding in that case the plaintiff obtained more than a “technical victory,” and so was entitled to a fee award the court should have computed as a lodestar figure)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "506 U.S. 115, 115",
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of any attorneys' fee award under the civil rights statute where plaintiffs sought millions in compensatory damages and recovered nominal damages of one dollar, confirming the court has discretion to award no fees without reciting the several factors bearing on reasonableness",
"sentence": "Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566 (affirming denial of any attorneys’ fee award under the civil rights statute where plaintiffs sought millions in compensatory damages and recovered nominal damages of one dollar, confirming the court has discretion to award no fees without reciting the several factors bearing on reasonableness); see also Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119, 1121-22 (9th Cir.2000) (an Americans With Disabilities Act case confirming the court can award “low fees or no fees” without reciting the twelve Kerr factors, but concluding in that case the plaintiff obtained more than a “technical victory,” and so was entitled to a fee award the court should have computed as a lodestar figure)."
} | 5,583,596 | b |
The PCOA filed a Reply to the FHCSD's Objections to the R & R, again emphasizing any award of attorneys' fees is wholly discretionary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "214 F.3d 1115, 1119, 1121-22",
"parenthetical": "an Americans With Disabilities Act case confirming the court can award \"low fees or no fees\" without reciting the twelve Kerr factors, but concluding in that case the plaintiff obtained more than a \"technical victory,\" and so was entitled to a fee award the court should have computed as a lodestar figure",
"sentence": "Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566 (affirming denial of any attorneys’ fee award under the civil rights statute where plaintiffs sought millions in compensatory damages and recovered nominal damages of one dollar, confirming the court has discretion to award no fees without reciting the several factors bearing on reasonableness); see also Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119, 1121-22 (9th Cir.2000) (an Americans With Disabilities Act case confirming the court can award “low fees or no fees” without reciting the twelve Kerr factors, but concluding in that case the plaintiff obtained more than a “technical victory,” and so was entitled to a fee award the court should have computed as a lodestar figure)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of any attorneys' fee award under the civil rights statute where plaintiffs sought millions in compensatory damages and recovered nominal damages of one dollar, confirming the court has discretion to award no fees without reciting the several factors bearing on reasonableness",
"sentence": "Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566 (affirming denial of any attorneys’ fee award under the civil rights statute where plaintiffs sought millions in compensatory damages and recovered nominal damages of one dollar, confirming the court has discretion to award no fees without reciting the several factors bearing on reasonableness); see also Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119, 1121-22 (9th Cir.2000) (an Americans With Disabilities Act case confirming the court can award “low fees or no fees” without reciting the twelve Kerr factors, but concluding in that case the plaintiff obtained more than a “technical victory,” and so was entitled to a fee award the court should have computed as a lodestar figure)."
} | 5,583,596 | b |
This conclusion is supported by recent decisions applying the reasoning of BFP to state tax foreclosure sales. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applies BFP rule to find that purchase price in New Jersey tax foreclosure sale was \"reasonably equivalent value\" for the debtor's interest in the property under 11 U.S.C. SS 548(a",
"sentence": "See In re McGrath, 170 B.R. 78 (Bankr.D.N.J.1994) (applies BFP rule to find that purchase price in New Jersey tax foreclosure sale was “reasonably equivalent value” for the debtor’s interest in the property under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A)); In re T.F. Stone Companies, Inc., 170 B.R. 884 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1994) (BFP rationale is likewise compelling in concluding that price obtained at properly-conducted, noncollusive tax foreclosure sale presumptively meets the “present fair equivalent value” standard in § 549(c)); but see In re Butler, 171 B.R. 321 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1994) (notwithstanding BFP, adherence to state law procedures with respect to a tax sale does not preclude an investigation as to whether the debtor received less than “reasonably equivalent value” for her property)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "notwithstanding BFP, adherence to state law procedures with respect to a tax sale does not preclude an investigation as to whether the debtor received less than \"reasonably equivalent value\" for her property",
"sentence": "See In re McGrath, 170 B.R. 78 (Bankr.D.N.J.1994) (applies BFP rule to find that purchase price in New Jersey tax foreclosure sale was “reasonably equivalent value” for the debtor’s interest in the property under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A)); In re T.F. Stone Companies, Inc., 170 B.R. 884 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1994) (BFP rationale is likewise compelling in concluding that price obtained at properly-conducted, noncollusive tax foreclosure sale presumptively meets the “present fair equivalent value” standard in § 549(c)); but see In re Butler, 171 B.R. 321 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1994) (notwithstanding BFP, adherence to state law procedures with respect to a tax sale does not preclude an investigation as to whether the debtor received less than “reasonably equivalent value” for her property)."
} | 6,449,804 | a |
This conclusion is supported by recent decisions applying the reasoning of BFP to state tax foreclosure sales. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "notwithstanding BFP, adherence to state law procedures with respect to a tax sale does not preclude an investigation as to whether the debtor received less than \"reasonably equivalent value\" for her property",
"sentence": "See In re McGrath, 170 B.R. 78 (Bankr.D.N.J.1994) (applies BFP rule to find that purchase price in New Jersey tax foreclosure sale was “reasonably equivalent value” for the debtor’s interest in the property under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A)); In re T.F. Stone Companies, Inc., 170 B.R. 884 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1994) (BFP rationale is likewise compelling in concluding that price obtained at properly-conducted, noncollusive tax foreclosure sale presumptively meets the “present fair equivalent value” standard in § 549(c)); but see In re Butler, 171 B.R. 321 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1994) (notwithstanding BFP, adherence to state law procedures with respect to a tax sale does not preclude an investigation as to whether the debtor received less than “reasonably equivalent value” for her property)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "BFP rationale is likewise compelling in concluding that price obtained at properly-conducted, noncollusive tax foreclosure sale presumptively meets the \"present fair equivalent value\" standard in SS 549(c",
"sentence": "See In re McGrath, 170 B.R. 78 (Bankr.D.N.J.1994) (applies BFP rule to find that purchase price in New Jersey tax foreclosure sale was “reasonably equivalent value” for the debtor’s interest in the property under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A)); In re T.F. Stone Companies, Inc., 170 B.R. 884 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1994) (BFP rationale is likewise compelling in concluding that price obtained at properly-conducted, noncollusive tax foreclosure sale presumptively meets the “present fair equivalent value” standard in § 549(c)); but see In re Butler, 171 B.R. 321 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1994) (notwithstanding BFP, adherence to state law procedures with respect to a tax sale does not preclude an investigation as to whether the debtor received less than “reasonably equivalent value” for her property)."
} | 6,449,804 | b |
Rather, the Fix only presents the State with a simple choice: either enforce the ACA's market requirements or don't-- the very same choice put to the states by the ACA itself. But merely being put a choice does not give rise to a legally cognizable injury. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "456 U.S. 742, 765-66",
"parenthetical": "requiring a state merely to \"consider\" federal proposals does \"not threaten the States' 'separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair' the ability of the States 'to function effectively in a federal system' \"",
"sentence": "See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480, 482, 43 S.Ct. 597 (finding no “justiciable controversy” where the statute did not “require the states to do or to yield anything”); cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982) (requiring a state merely to “consider” federal proposals does “not threaten the States’ ’separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair’ the ability of the States ’to function effectively in a federal system’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "262 U.S. 480, 480, 482",
"parenthetical": "finding no \"justiciable controversy\" where the statute did not \"require the states to do or to yield anything\"",
"sentence": "See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480, 482, 43 S.Ct. 597 (finding no “justiciable controversy” where the statute did not “require the states to do or to yield anything”); cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982) (requiring a state merely to “consider” federal proposals does “not threaten the States’ ’separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair’ the ability of the States ’to function effectively in a federal system’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,264,082 | b |
Rather, the Fix only presents the State with a simple choice: either enforce the ACA's market requirements or don't-- the very same choice put to the states by the ACA itself. But merely being put a choice does not give rise to a legally cognizable injury. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring a state merely to \"consider\" federal proposals does \"not threaten the States' 'separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair' the ability of the States 'to function effectively in a federal system' \"",
"sentence": "See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480, 482, 43 S.Ct. 597 (finding no “justiciable controversy” where the statute did not “require the states to do or to yield anything”); cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982) (requiring a state merely to “consider” federal proposals does “not threaten the States’ ’separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair’ the ability of the States ’to function effectively in a federal system’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "262 U.S. 480, 480, 482",
"parenthetical": "finding no \"justiciable controversy\" where the statute did not \"require the states to do or to yield anything\"",
"sentence": "See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480, 482, 43 S.Ct. 597 (finding no “justiciable controversy” where the statute did not “require the states to do or to yield anything”); cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982) (requiring a state merely to “consider” federal proposals does “not threaten the States’ ’separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair’ the ability of the States ’to function effectively in a federal system’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,264,082 | b |
Rather, the Fix only presents the State with a simple choice: either enforce the ACA's market requirements or don't-- the very same choice put to the states by the ACA itself. But merely being put a choice does not give rise to a legally cognizable injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "262 U.S. 480, 480, 482",
"parenthetical": "finding no \"justiciable controversy\" where the statute did not \"require the states to do or to yield anything\"",
"sentence": "See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480, 482, 43 S.Ct. 597 (finding no “justiciable controversy” where the statute did not “require the states to do or to yield anything”); cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982) (requiring a state merely to “consider” federal proposals does “not threaten the States’ ’separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair’ the ability of the States ’to function effectively in a federal system’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring a state merely to \"consider\" federal proposals does \"not threaten the States' 'separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair' the ability of the States 'to function effectively in a federal system' \"",
"sentence": "See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480, 482, 43 S.Ct. 597 (finding no “justiciable controversy” where the statute did not “require the states to do or to yield anything”); cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982) (requiring a state merely to “consider” federal proposals does “not threaten the States’ ’separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair’ the ability of the States ’to function effectively in a federal system’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,264,082 | a |
Rather, the Fix only presents the State with a simple choice: either enforce the ACA's market requirements or don't-- the very same choice put to the states by the ACA itself. But merely being put a choice does not give rise to a legally cognizable injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no \"justiciable controversy\" where the statute did not \"require the states to do or to yield anything\"",
"sentence": "See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480, 482, 43 S.Ct. 597 (finding no “justiciable controversy” where the statute did not “require the states to do or to yield anything”); cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982) (requiring a state merely to “consider” federal proposals does “not threaten the States’ ’separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair’ the ability of the States ’to function effectively in a federal system’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "456 U.S. 742, 765-66",
"parenthetical": "requiring a state merely to \"consider\" federal proposals does \"not threaten the States' 'separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair' the ability of the States 'to function effectively in a federal system' \"",
"sentence": "See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480, 482, 43 S.Ct. 597 (finding no “justiciable controversy” where the statute did not “require the states to do or to yield anything”); cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982) (requiring a state merely to “consider” federal proposals does “not threaten the States’ ’separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair’ the ability of the States ’to function effectively in a federal system’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,264,082 | a |
Rather, the Fix only presents the State with a simple choice: either enforce the ACA's market requirements or don't-- the very same choice put to the states by the ACA itself. But merely being put a choice does not give rise to a legally cognizable injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no \"justiciable controversy\" where the statute did not \"require the states to do or to yield anything\"",
"sentence": "See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480, 482, 43 S.Ct. 597 (finding no “justiciable controversy” where the statute did not “require the states to do or to yield anything”); cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982) (requiring a state merely to “consider” federal proposals does “not threaten the States’ ’separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair’ the ability of the States ’to function effectively in a federal system’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring a state merely to \"consider\" federal proposals does \"not threaten the States' 'separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair' the ability of the States 'to function effectively in a federal system' \"",
"sentence": "See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480, 482, 43 S.Ct. 597 (finding no “justiciable controversy” where the statute did not “require the states to do or to yield anything”); cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982) (requiring a state merely to “consider” federal proposals does “not threaten the States’ ’separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair’ the ability of the States ’to function effectively in a federal system’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,264,082 | a |
Rather, the Fix only presents the State with a simple choice: either enforce the ACA's market requirements or don't-- the very same choice put to the states by the ACA itself. But merely being put a choice does not give rise to a legally cognizable injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no \"justiciable controversy\" where the statute did not \"require the states to do or to yield anything\"",
"sentence": "See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480, 482, 43 S.Ct. 597 (finding no “justiciable controversy” where the statute did not “require the states to do or to yield anything”); cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982) (requiring a state merely to “consider” federal proposals does “not threaten the States’ ’separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair’ the ability of the States ’to function effectively in a federal system’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring a state merely to \"consider\" federal proposals does \"not threaten the States' 'separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair' the ability of the States 'to function effectively in a federal system' \"",
"sentence": "See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480, 482, 43 S.Ct. 597 (finding no “justiciable controversy” where the statute did not “require the states to do or to yield anything”); cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982) (requiring a state merely to “consider” federal proposals does “not threaten the States’ ’separate and independent existence! and [does] not impair’ the ability of the States ’to function effectively in a federal system’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,264,082 | a |
"However, such language does not mean the matter is committed exclusively to agency discretion." "[L]anguage allowing for discretion does not create unlimited discretion____ Thus, courts routinely conclude that judicial review is available notwithstanding statutory language that seemingly allows for unlimited discretion." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "398 U.S. 410, 415",
"parenthetical": "\"Though the language of 32 CFR SS 1625.2 is permissive, it does not follow that a board may arbitrarily refuse to reopen a registrant's classification.\"",
"sentence": "Inova Alexandria Hosp. v. Shalala, 244 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir.2001) (citation omitted) (finding regulation providing that the Provider Reimbursement Review Board “may dismiss” an appeal was reviewable); cf. Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 415, 90 S.Ct. 1766, 26 L.Ed.2d 362 (1970) (“Though the language of 32 CFR § 1625.2 is permissive, it does not follow that a board may arbitrarily refuse to reopen a registrant’s classification.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "244 F.3d 342, 348",
"parenthetical": "finding regulation providing that the Provider Reimbursement Review Board \"may dismiss\" an appeal was reviewable",
"sentence": "Inova Alexandria Hosp. v. Shalala, 244 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir.2001) (citation omitted) (finding regulation providing that the Provider Reimbursement Review Board “may dismiss” an appeal was reviewable); cf. Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 415, 90 S.Ct. 1766, 26 L.Ed.2d 362 (1970) (“Though the language of 32 CFR § 1625.2 is permissive, it does not follow that a board may arbitrarily refuse to reopen a registrant’s classification.”)."
} | 4,228,110 | b |
"However, such language does not mean the matter is committed exclusively to agency discretion." "[L]anguage allowing for discretion does not create unlimited discretion____ Thus, courts routinely conclude that judicial review is available notwithstanding statutory language that seemingly allows for unlimited discretion." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Though the language of 32 CFR SS 1625.2 is permissive, it does not follow that a board may arbitrarily refuse to reopen a registrant's classification.\"",
"sentence": "Inova Alexandria Hosp. v. Shalala, 244 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir.2001) (citation omitted) (finding regulation providing that the Provider Reimbursement Review Board “may dismiss” an appeal was reviewable); cf. Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 415, 90 S.Ct. 1766, 26 L.Ed.2d 362 (1970) (“Though the language of 32 CFR § 1625.2 is permissive, it does not follow that a board may arbitrarily refuse to reopen a registrant’s classification.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "244 F.3d 342, 348",
"parenthetical": "finding regulation providing that the Provider Reimbursement Review Board \"may dismiss\" an appeal was reviewable",
"sentence": "Inova Alexandria Hosp. v. Shalala, 244 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir.2001) (citation omitted) (finding regulation providing that the Provider Reimbursement Review Board “may dismiss” an appeal was reviewable); cf. Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 415, 90 S.Ct. 1766, 26 L.Ed.2d 362 (1970) (“Though the language of 32 CFR § 1625.2 is permissive, it does not follow that a board may arbitrarily refuse to reopen a registrant’s classification.”)."
} | 4,228,110 | b |
"However, such language does not mean the matter is committed exclusively to agency discretion." "[L]anguage allowing for discretion does not create unlimited discretion____ Thus, courts routinely conclude that judicial review is available notwithstanding statutory language that seemingly allows for unlimited discretion." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Though the language of 32 CFR SS 1625.2 is permissive, it does not follow that a board may arbitrarily refuse to reopen a registrant's classification.\"",
"sentence": "Inova Alexandria Hosp. v. Shalala, 244 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir.2001) (citation omitted) (finding regulation providing that the Provider Reimbursement Review Board “may dismiss” an appeal was reviewable); cf. Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 415, 90 S.Ct. 1766, 26 L.Ed.2d 362 (1970) (“Though the language of 32 CFR § 1625.2 is permissive, it does not follow that a board may arbitrarily refuse to reopen a registrant’s classification.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "244 F.3d 342, 348",
"parenthetical": "finding regulation providing that the Provider Reimbursement Review Board \"may dismiss\" an appeal was reviewable",
"sentence": "Inova Alexandria Hosp. v. Shalala, 244 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir.2001) (citation omitted) (finding regulation providing that the Provider Reimbursement Review Board “may dismiss” an appeal was reviewable); cf. Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 415, 90 S.Ct. 1766, 26 L.Ed.2d 362 (1970) (“Though the language of 32 CFR § 1625.2 is permissive, it does not follow that a board may arbitrarily refuse to reopen a registrant’s classification.”)."
} | 4,228,110 | b |
Under Skilling, bribery remains a basis for honest services fraud. It is apparent from the jury's findings regarding bribery that the Defendants would have been convicted on the bribery theory of honest services fraud by itself. The references to the invalidated conflict of interest theory in the jury instructions and the government's argument at trial therefore did not prejudice Defendants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "560 U.S. 258, 262",
"parenthetical": "explaining that prejudice requires a \"reasonable probability\" that the error in the instructions \"affected the outcome of the trial\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 544 (9th Cir.2011) (holding that “the jury’s guilty verdict on the separate substantive count of bribery [under federal law] confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted [the defendant] of honest services fraud if the court’s definition had been limited to the bribery basis that Skilling expressly approved”); see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (explaining that prejudice requires a “reasonable probability” that the error in the instructions “affected the outcome of the trial”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "662 F.3d 524, 544",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the jury's guilty verdict on the separate substantive count of bribery [under federal law] confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted [the defendant] of honest services fraud if the court's definition had been limited to the bribery basis that Skilling expressly approved\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 544 (9th Cir.2011) (holding that “the jury’s guilty verdict on the separate substantive count of bribery [under federal law] confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted [the defendant] of honest services fraud if the court’s definition had been limited to the bribery basis that Skilling expressly approved”); see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (explaining that prejudice requires a “reasonable probability” that the error in the instructions “affected the outcome of the trial”)."
} | 4,341,174 | b |
Under Skilling, bribery remains a basis for honest services fraud. It is apparent from the jury's findings regarding bribery that the Defendants would have been convicted on the bribery theory of honest services fraud by itself. The references to the invalidated conflict of interest theory in the jury instructions and the government's argument at trial therefore did not prejudice Defendants. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "662 F.3d 524, 544",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the jury's guilty verdict on the separate substantive count of bribery [under federal law] confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted [the defendant] of honest services fraud if the court's definition had been limited to the bribery basis that Skilling expressly approved\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 544 (9th Cir.2011) (holding that “the jury’s guilty verdict on the separate substantive count of bribery [under federal law] confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted [the defendant] of honest services fraud if the court’s definition had been limited to the bribery basis that Skilling expressly approved”); see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (explaining that prejudice requires a “reasonable probability” that the error in the instructions “affected the outcome of the trial”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that prejudice requires a \"reasonable probability\" that the error in the instructions \"affected the outcome of the trial\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 544 (9th Cir.2011) (holding that “the jury’s guilty verdict on the separate substantive count of bribery [under federal law] confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted [the defendant] of honest services fraud if the court’s definition had been limited to the bribery basis that Skilling expressly approved”); see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (explaining that prejudice requires a “reasonable probability” that the error in the instructions “affected the outcome of the trial”)."
} | 4,341,174 | a |
Under Skilling, bribery remains a basis for honest services fraud. It is apparent from the jury's findings regarding bribery that the Defendants would have been convicted on the bribery theory of honest services fraud by itself. The references to the invalidated conflict of interest theory in the jury instructions and the government's argument at trial therefore did not prejudice Defendants. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "662 F.3d 524, 544",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the jury's guilty verdict on the separate substantive count of bribery [under federal law] confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted [the defendant] of honest services fraud if the court's definition had been limited to the bribery basis that Skilling expressly approved\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 544 (9th Cir.2011) (holding that “the jury’s guilty verdict on the separate substantive count of bribery [under federal law] confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted [the defendant] of honest services fraud if the court’s definition had been limited to the bribery basis that Skilling expressly approved”); see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (explaining that prejudice requires a “reasonable probability” that the error in the instructions “affected the outcome of the trial”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that prejudice requires a \"reasonable probability\" that the error in the instructions \"affected the outcome of the trial\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 544 (9th Cir.2011) (holding that “the jury’s guilty verdict on the separate substantive count of bribery [under federal law] confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted [the defendant] of honest services fraud if the court’s definition had been limited to the bribery basis that Skilling expressly approved”); see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (explaining that prejudice requires a “reasonable probability” that the error in the instructions “affected the outcome of the trial”)."
} | 4,341,174 | a |
Edwards. Courts have held, however, that where a party can demonstrate an agent's "actual authority," it is not necessary for that party to have known of it or relied on it when dealing with the agent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding evidence also established bank's reliance on existing power of attorney",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Crocker First Nat’l Bank, 107 Cal.App. 685, 291 P. 221, 222-23 (1930) (holding evidence also established bank’s reliance on existing power of attorney); see also Milliken Group, Inc. v. Hays Nissan, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (“If an agent acts with actual authority, then he may bind the principal in contract regardless of whether the third party is actually aware of that authority at the time of the transaction.”); St. Gaudens v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 559 So.2d 1259, 1260-61 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (agreeing it is irrelevant whether third-party relied on or knew about existence of the power of attorney because third-party reliance is a relevant consideration only in cases of apparent authority, not actual authority); Myers v. Stephens, 233 Cal.App.2d 104, 43 CaLRptr. 420, 429 (1965) (“Where the agent acts within the scope of his actual authority, it is immaterial whether or not an inquiry into the extent of the authority has been made by a person dealing with the agent.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "86 S.W.3d 564, 567",
"parenthetical": "\"If an agent acts with actual authority, then he may bind the principal in contract regardless of whether the third party is actually aware of that authority at the time of the transaction.\"",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Crocker First Nat’l Bank, 107 Cal.App. 685, 291 P. 221, 222-23 (1930) (holding evidence also established bank’s reliance on existing power of attorney); see also Milliken Group, Inc. v. Hays Nissan, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (“If an agent acts with actual authority, then he may bind the principal in contract regardless of whether the third party is actually aware of that authority at the time of the transaction.”); St. Gaudens v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 559 So.2d 1259, 1260-61 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (agreeing it is irrelevant whether third-party relied on or knew about existence of the power of attorney because third-party reliance is a relevant consideration only in cases of apparent authority, not actual authority); Myers v. Stephens, 233 Cal.App.2d 104, 43 CaLRptr. 420, 429 (1965) (“Where the agent acts within the scope of his actual authority, it is immaterial whether or not an inquiry into the extent of the authority has been made by a person dealing with the agent.”)."
} | 8,244,488 | a |
Edwards. Courts have held, however, that where a party can demonstrate an agent's "actual authority," it is not necessary for that party to have known of it or relied on it when dealing with the agent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where the agent acts within the scope of his actual authority, it is immaterial whether or not an inquiry into the extent of the authority has been made by a person dealing with the agent.\"",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Crocker First Nat’l Bank, 107 Cal.App. 685, 291 P. 221, 222-23 (1930) (holding evidence also established bank’s reliance on existing power of attorney); see also Milliken Group, Inc. v. Hays Nissan, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (“If an agent acts with actual authority, then he may bind the principal in contract regardless of whether the third party is actually aware of that authority at the time of the transaction.”); St. Gaudens v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 559 So.2d 1259, 1260-61 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (agreeing it is irrelevant whether third-party relied on or knew about existence of the power of attorney because third-party reliance is a relevant consideration only in cases of apparent authority, not actual authority); Myers v. Stephens, 233 Cal.App.2d 104, 43 CaLRptr. 420, 429 (1965) (“Where the agent acts within the scope of his actual authority, it is immaterial whether or not an inquiry into the extent of the authority has been made by a person dealing with the agent.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding evidence also established bank's reliance on existing power of attorney",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Crocker First Nat’l Bank, 107 Cal.App. 685, 291 P. 221, 222-23 (1930) (holding evidence also established bank’s reliance on existing power of attorney); see also Milliken Group, Inc. v. Hays Nissan, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (“If an agent acts with actual authority, then he may bind the principal in contract regardless of whether the third party is actually aware of that authority at the time of the transaction.”); St. Gaudens v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 559 So.2d 1259, 1260-61 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (agreeing it is irrelevant whether third-party relied on or knew about existence of the power of attorney because third-party reliance is a relevant consideration only in cases of apparent authority, not actual authority); Myers v. Stephens, 233 Cal.App.2d 104, 43 CaLRptr. 420, 429 (1965) (“Where the agent acts within the scope of his actual authority, it is immaterial whether or not an inquiry into the extent of the authority has been made by a person dealing with the agent.”)."
} | 8,244,488 | b |
Edwards. Courts have held, however, that where a party can demonstrate an agent's "actual authority," it is not necessary for that party to have known of it or relied on it when dealing with the agent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "86 S.W.3d 564, 567",
"parenthetical": "\"If an agent acts with actual authority, then he may bind the principal in contract regardless of whether the third party is actually aware of that authority at the time of the transaction.\"",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Crocker First Nat’l Bank, 107 Cal.App. 685, 291 P. 221, 222-23 (1930) (holding evidence also established bank’s reliance on existing power of attorney); see also Milliken Group, Inc. v. Hays Nissan, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (“If an agent acts with actual authority, then he may bind the principal in contract regardless of whether the third party is actually aware of that authority at the time of the transaction.”); St. Gaudens v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 559 So.2d 1259, 1260-61 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (agreeing it is irrelevant whether third-party relied on or knew about existence of the power of attorney because third-party reliance is a relevant consideration only in cases of apparent authority, not actual authority); Myers v. Stephens, 233 Cal.App.2d 104, 43 CaLRptr. 420, 429 (1965) (“Where the agent acts within the scope of his actual authority, it is immaterial whether or not an inquiry into the extent of the authority has been made by a person dealing with the agent.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "291 P. 221, 222-23",
"parenthetical": "holding evidence also established bank's reliance on existing power of attorney",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Crocker First Nat’l Bank, 107 Cal.App. 685, 291 P. 221, 222-23 (1930) (holding evidence also established bank’s reliance on existing power of attorney); see also Milliken Group, Inc. v. Hays Nissan, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (“If an agent acts with actual authority, then he may bind the principal in contract regardless of whether the third party is actually aware of that authority at the time of the transaction.”); St. Gaudens v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 559 So.2d 1259, 1260-61 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (agreeing it is irrelevant whether third-party relied on or knew about existence of the power of attorney because third-party reliance is a relevant consideration only in cases of apparent authority, not actual authority); Myers v. Stephens, 233 Cal.App.2d 104, 43 CaLRptr. 420, 429 (1965) (“Where the agent acts within the scope of his actual authority, it is immaterial whether or not an inquiry into the extent of the authority has been made by a person dealing with the agent.”)."
} | 8,244,488 | b |
Edwards. Courts have held, however, that where a party can demonstrate an agent's "actual authority," it is not necessary for that party to have known of it or relied on it when dealing with the agent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "291 P. 221, 222-23",
"parenthetical": "holding evidence also established bank's reliance on existing power of attorney",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Crocker First Nat’l Bank, 107 Cal.App. 685, 291 P. 221, 222-23 (1930) (holding evidence also established bank’s reliance on existing power of attorney); see also Milliken Group, Inc. v. Hays Nissan, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (“If an agent acts with actual authority, then he may bind the principal in contract regardless of whether the third party is actually aware of that authority at the time of the transaction.”); St. Gaudens v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 559 So.2d 1259, 1260-61 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (agreeing it is irrelevant whether third-party relied on or knew about existence of the power of attorney because third-party reliance is a relevant consideration only in cases of apparent authority, not actual authority); Myers v. Stephens, 233 Cal.App.2d 104, 43 CaLRptr. 420, 429 (1965) (“Where the agent acts within the scope of his actual authority, it is immaterial whether or not an inquiry into the extent of the authority has been made by a person dealing with the agent.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where the agent acts within the scope of his actual authority, it is immaterial whether or not an inquiry into the extent of the authority has been made by a person dealing with the agent.\"",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Crocker First Nat’l Bank, 107 Cal.App. 685, 291 P. 221, 222-23 (1930) (holding evidence also established bank’s reliance on existing power of attorney); see also Milliken Group, Inc. v. Hays Nissan, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (“If an agent acts with actual authority, then he may bind the principal in contract regardless of whether the third party is actually aware of that authority at the time of the transaction.”); St. Gaudens v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 559 So.2d 1259, 1260-61 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (agreeing it is irrelevant whether third-party relied on or knew about existence of the power of attorney because third-party reliance is a relevant consideration only in cases of apparent authority, not actual authority); Myers v. Stephens, 233 Cal.App.2d 104, 43 CaLRptr. 420, 429 (1965) (“Where the agent acts within the scope of his actual authority, it is immaterial whether or not an inquiry into the extent of the authority has been made by a person dealing with the agent.”)."
} | 8,244,488 | a |
Plaintiffs assertion that he satisfied the exhaustion requirement by sending supplemental letters to Kielt is unpersuasive. Indeed, "[c]ourts have rejected the argument that allegations made to EEOC officers but not included in the actual charge should be deemed 'reason ably related' to the charge." Further, because only the charge is forwarded to the employer, "courts will not consider" claims presented in separate documents when determining whether administrative remedies have been exhausted. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 F.3d 699, 702",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies where the EEOC charge did not include the claim, even though the claim was described in an EEOC intake questionnaire",
"sentence": "Sussle v. Sirina Prot. Sys. Corp., 269 F.Supp.2d 285, 315 (S.D.N.Y.2003); see also Novitsky v. Am. Consulting Eng’rs, LLC, 196 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.1999) (plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies where the EEOC charge did not include the claim, even though the claim was described in an EEOC intake questionnaire); cf. Morris v. David Lerner Assocs., 680 F.Supp.2d 430, 437 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (allegations in letter physically attached to the EEOC charge were reasonably related to subsequent claims brought in federal court as evidenced by EEOC’s explicit reference to these allegations in the right to sue letter)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "680 F.Supp.2d 430, 437",
"parenthetical": "allegations in letter physically attached to the EEOC charge were reasonably related to subsequent claims brought in federal court as evidenced by EEOC's explicit reference to these allegations in the right to sue letter",
"sentence": "Sussle v. Sirina Prot. Sys. Corp., 269 F.Supp.2d 285, 315 (S.D.N.Y.2003); see also Novitsky v. Am. Consulting Eng’rs, LLC, 196 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.1999) (plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies where the EEOC charge did not include the claim, even though the claim was described in an EEOC intake questionnaire); cf. Morris v. David Lerner Assocs., 680 F.Supp.2d 430, 437 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (allegations in letter physically attached to the EEOC charge were reasonably related to subsequent claims brought in federal court as evidenced by EEOC’s explicit reference to these allegations in the right to sue letter)."
} | 3,583,539 | a |
With one exception, the courts not allowing felony murder to be based on assault-motivated - burglaries - construed - differently phrased statutes. Those statutes required that death occur both in the course of and in furtherance of the burglary. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "818 A.2d 913, 913",
"parenthetical": "\"the murder, although 'in the course of the burglary, was not carried out 'in furtherance of it\"",
"sentence": "Williams, 818 A.2d at 913 (\"the murder, although 'in the course of the burglary, was not carried out 'in furtherance of it\"); Sellers, 749 S.W.2d at 671 (similar); cf. People v. Cahill, 2 N.Y.3d 14, 777 N.Y.S.2d 332, 809 N.E.2d 561, 587-90 (2008) (relying on conjunctive statutory language to hold that burglary committed with intent to murder cannot elevate intentional murder to capital murder)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on conjunctive statutory language to hold that burglary committed with intent to murder cannot elevate intentional murder to capital murder",
"sentence": "Williams, 818 A.2d at 913 (\"the murder, although 'in the course of the burglary, was not carried out 'in furtherance of it\"); Sellers, 749 S.W.2d at 671 (similar); cf. People v. Cahill, 2 N.Y.3d 14, 777 N.Y.S.2d 332, 809 N.E.2d 561, 587-90 (2008) (relying on conjunctive statutory language to hold that burglary committed with intent to murder cannot elevate intentional murder to capital murder)."
} | 6,985,906 | a |
With one exception, the courts not allowing felony murder to be based on assault-motivated - burglaries - construed - differently phrased statutes. Those statutes required that death occur both in the course of and in furtherance of the burglary. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "818 A.2d 913, 913",
"parenthetical": "\"the murder, although 'in the course of the burglary, was not carried out 'in furtherance of it\"",
"sentence": "Williams, 818 A.2d at 913 (\"the murder, although 'in the course of the burglary, was not carried out 'in furtherance of it\"); Sellers, 749 S.W.2d at 671 (similar); cf. People v. Cahill, 2 N.Y.3d 14, 777 N.Y.S.2d 332, 809 N.E.2d 561, 587-90 (2008) (relying on conjunctive statutory language to hold that burglary committed with intent to murder cannot elevate intentional murder to capital murder)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on conjunctive statutory language to hold that burglary committed with intent to murder cannot elevate intentional murder to capital murder",
"sentence": "Williams, 818 A.2d at 913 (\"the murder, although 'in the course of the burglary, was not carried out 'in furtherance of it\"); Sellers, 749 S.W.2d at 671 (similar); cf. People v. Cahill, 2 N.Y.3d 14, 777 N.Y.S.2d 332, 809 N.E.2d 561, 587-90 (2008) (relying on conjunctive statutory language to hold that burglary committed with intent to murder cannot elevate intentional murder to capital murder)."
} | 6,985,906 | a |
With one exception, the courts not allowing felony murder to be based on assault-motivated - burglaries - construed - differently phrased statutes. Those statutes required that death occur both in the course of and in furtherance of the burglary. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "809 N.E.2d 561, 587-90",
"parenthetical": "relying on conjunctive statutory language to hold that burglary committed with intent to murder cannot elevate intentional murder to capital murder",
"sentence": "Williams, 818 A.2d at 913 (\"the murder, although 'in the course of the burglary, was not carried out 'in furtherance of it\"); Sellers, 749 S.W.2d at 671 (similar); cf. People v. Cahill, 2 N.Y.3d 14, 777 N.Y.S.2d 332, 809 N.E.2d 561, 587-90 (2008) (relying on conjunctive statutory language to hold that burglary committed with intent to murder cannot elevate intentional murder to capital murder)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "818 A.2d 913, 913",
"parenthetical": "\"the murder, although 'in the course of the burglary, was not carried out 'in furtherance of it\"",
"sentence": "Williams, 818 A.2d at 913 (\"the murder, although 'in the course of the burglary, was not carried out 'in furtherance of it\"); Sellers, 749 S.W.2d at 671 (similar); cf. People v. Cahill, 2 N.Y.3d 14, 777 N.Y.S.2d 332, 809 N.E.2d 561, 587-90 (2008) (relying on conjunctive statutory language to hold that burglary committed with intent to murder cannot elevate intentional murder to capital murder)."
} | 6,985,906 | b |
In conclusion, there is no evidence that Stephens intentionally interfered with McGarr's relationship with Deskovic (as distinguished from intentionally violating Deskovic's rights), and anything less than conduct intentionally directed at the familjal relationship was not clearly established as unlawful within the Second Circuit at the time of Stephens' behavior in 1990. The Court therefore holds that Stephens is entitled to qualified immunity on McGarr's familial association claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "182 F.3d 107, 107",
"parenthetical": "noting, in context of abuse investigation, that there is a difference between evaluating the appropriateness of a case worker's actions, which \"depends on the facts and events of a particular case,\" and \"evaluating whether it was objectively reasonable for a case worker to believe\" that his or her actions were lawful, which \"depends on the clarity of existing law at the time of those events\"",
"sentence": "See Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 107. n. 10 (noting, in context of abuse investigation, that there is a difference between evaluating the appropriateness of a case worker’s actions, which “depends on the facts and events of a particular case,” and “evaluating whether it was objectively reasonable for a case worker to believe” that his or her actions were lawful, which “depends on the clarity of existing law at the time of those events”); see also Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 585 (holding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for actions taken in 1983, as “any right to familial association was not sufficiently clear such that the defendants reasonably could have understood they were violating it,” because “[njeither the Supreme Court nor this court has clearly held wrongful prosecution and incarceration of a family member violates a right to familial association”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "447 F.3d 585, 585",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for actions taken in 1983, as \"any right to familial association was not sufficiently clear such that the defendants reasonably could have understood they were violating it,\" because \"[njeither the Supreme Court nor this court has clearly held wrongful prosecution and incarceration of a family member violates a right to familial association\"",
"sentence": "See Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 107. n. 10 (noting, in context of abuse investigation, that there is a difference between evaluating the appropriateness of a case worker’s actions, which “depends on the facts and events of a particular case,” and “evaluating whether it was objectively reasonable for a case worker to believe” that his or her actions were lawful, which “depends on the clarity of existing law at the time of those events”); see also Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 585 (holding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for actions taken in 1983, as “any right to familial association was not sufficiently clear such that the defendants reasonably could have understood they were violating it,” because “[njeither the Supreme Court nor this court has clearly held wrongful prosecution and incarceration of a family member violates a right to familial association”)."
} | 4,279,500 | a |
Even if an individual chooses to file suit in the Court of Federal Claims without first applying to the BCNR for the correction of his military records, the court has the authority to remand the ease to the BCNR. When the purpose of the remand is to permit the BCNR to revisit a prior decision of the Secretary of the Navy, the decision of the BCNR becomes the final agency action subject to judicial review. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing a correction board decision that had been issued pursuant to a remand order",
"sentence": "See 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(4) (providing that corrections of military records by correction boards are “final and conclusive on all officers of the United States”); Strickland v. United States, 423 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed.Cir.2005) (noting that “the correction board process provides for a single final agency action in every case” and that the decision of the Secretary of the Navy — made through the BCNR — “is plainly the final agency action”); see also RCFC 52.2(f)(1)(A) (requiring the parties to file notices “after the filing of the final decision or other action on remand” that indicate “whether the final decision or other action on remand affords a satisfactory basis for disposition of the case”); Sokol v. United States, 120 Fed.Cl. 144 (2015) (reviewing a correction board decision that had been issued pursuant to a remand order); Johnson v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 267, 268-69 (2011) (“The Court remanded the matter to the BCNR for further proceedings because of perceived errors in the board’s initial decision ____ The Court must examine whether the BCNR’s remand decision ‘affords a satisfactory basis for disposition of the case’ under Rule 52.2(f)(1)(A).”), ajfd, 467 Fed.Appx. 883 (Fed.Cir.2012)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "423 F.3d 1335, 1339",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the correction board process provides for a single final agency action in every case\" and that the decision of the Secretary of the Navy -- made through the BCNR -- \"is plainly the final agency action\"",
"sentence": "See 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(4) (providing that corrections of military records by correction boards are “final and conclusive on all officers of the United States”); Strickland v. United States, 423 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed.Cir.2005) (noting that “the correction board process provides for a single final agency action in every case” and that the decision of the Secretary of the Navy — made through the BCNR — “is plainly the final agency action”); see also RCFC 52.2(f)(1)(A) (requiring the parties to file notices “after the filing of the final decision or other action on remand” that indicate “whether the final decision or other action on remand affords a satisfactory basis for disposition of the case”); Sokol v. United States, 120 Fed.Cl. 144 (2015) (reviewing a correction board decision that had been issued pursuant to a remand order); Johnson v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 267, 268-69 (2011) (“The Court remanded the matter to the BCNR for further proceedings because of perceived errors in the board’s initial decision ____ The Court must examine whether the BCNR’s remand decision ‘affords a satisfactory basis for disposition of the case’ under Rule 52.2(f)(1)(A).”), ajfd, 467 Fed.Appx. 883 (Fed.Cir.2012)."
} | 3,999,514 | b |
Even if an individual chooses to file suit in the Court of Federal Claims without first applying to the BCNR for the correction of his military records, the court has the authority to remand the ease to the BCNR. When the purpose of the remand is to permit the BCNR to revisit a prior decision of the Secretary of the Navy, the decision of the BCNR becomes the final agency action subject to judicial review. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "423 F.3d 1335, 1339",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the correction board process provides for a single final agency action in every case\" and that the decision of the Secretary of the Navy -- made through the BCNR -- \"is plainly the final agency action\"",
"sentence": "See 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(4) (providing that corrections of military records by correction boards are “final and conclusive on all officers of the United States”); Strickland v. United States, 423 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed.Cir.2005) (noting that “the correction board process provides for a single final agency action in every case” and that the decision of the Secretary of the Navy — made through the BCNR — “is plainly the final agency action”); see also RCFC 52.2(f)(1)(A) (requiring the parties to file notices “after the filing of the final decision or other action on remand” that indicate “whether the final decision or other action on remand affords a satisfactory basis for disposition of the case”); Sokol v. United States, 120 Fed.Cl. 144 (2015) (reviewing a correction board decision that had been issued pursuant to a remand order); Johnson v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 267, 268-69 (2011) (“The Court remanded the matter to the BCNR for further proceedings because of perceived errors in the board’s initial decision ____ The Court must examine whether the BCNR’s remand decision ‘affords a satisfactory basis for disposition of the case’ under Rule 52.2(f)(1)(A).”), ajfd, 467 Fed.Appx. 883 (Fed.Cir.2012)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 Fed.Cl. 267, 268-69",
"parenthetical": "\"The Court remanded the matter to the BCNR for further proceedings because of perceived errors in the board's initial decision ____ The Court must examine whether the BCNR's remand decision 'affords a satisfactory basis for disposition of the case' under Rule 52.2(f)(1)(A).\"",
"sentence": "See 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(4) (providing that corrections of military records by correction boards are “final and conclusive on all officers of the United States”); Strickland v. United States, 423 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed.Cir.2005) (noting that “the correction board process provides for a single final agency action in every case” and that the decision of the Secretary of the Navy — made through the BCNR — “is plainly the final agency action”); see also RCFC 52.2(f)(1)(A) (requiring the parties to file notices “after the filing of the final decision or other action on remand” that indicate “whether the final decision or other action on remand affords a satisfactory basis for disposition of the case”); Sokol v. United States, 120 Fed.Cl. 144 (2015) (reviewing a correction board decision that had been issued pursuant to a remand order); Johnson v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 267, 268-69 (2011) (“The Court remanded the matter to the BCNR for further proceedings because of perceived errors in the board’s initial decision ____ The Court must examine whether the BCNR’s remand decision ‘affords a satisfactory basis for disposition of the case’ under Rule 52.2(f)(1)(A).”), ajfd, 467 Fed.Appx. 883 (Fed.Cir.2012)."
} | 3,999,514 | a |
Even if an individual chooses to file suit in the Court of Federal Claims without first applying to the BCNR for the correction of his military records, the court has the authority to remand the ease to the BCNR. When the purpose of the remand is to permit the BCNR to revisit a prior decision of the Secretary of the Navy, the decision of the BCNR becomes the final agency action subject to judicial review. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Court remanded the matter to the BCNR for further proceedings because of perceived errors in the board's initial decision ____ The Court must examine whether the BCNR's remand decision 'affords a satisfactory basis for disposition of the case' under Rule 52.2(f",
"sentence": "See 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(4) (providing that corrections of military records by correction boards are “final and conclusive on all officers of the United States”); Strickland v. United States, 423 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed.Cir.2005) (noting that “the correction board process provides for a single final agency action in every case” and that the decision of the Secretary of the Navy — made through the BCNR — “is plainly the final agency action”); see also RCFC 52.2(f)(1)(A) (requiring the parties to file notices “after the filing of the final decision or other action on remand” that indicate “whether the final decision or other action on remand affords a satisfactory basis for disposition of the case”); Sokol v. United States, 120 Fed.Cl. 144 (2015) (reviewing a correction board decision that had been issued pursuant to a remand order); Johnson v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 267, 268-69 (2011) (“The Court remanded the matter to the BCNR for further proceedings because of perceived errors in the board’s initial decision ____ The Court must examine whether the BCNR’s remand decision ‘affords a satisfactory basis for disposition of the case’ under Rule 52.2(f)(1)(A).”), ajfd, 467 Fed.Appx. 883 (Fed.Cir.2012)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "423 F.3d 1335, 1339",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the correction board process provides for a single final agency action in every case\" and that the decision of the Secretary of the Navy -- made through the BCNR -- \"is plainly the final agency action\"",
"sentence": "See 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(4) (providing that corrections of military records by correction boards are “final and conclusive on all officers of the United States”); Strickland v. United States, 423 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed.Cir.2005) (noting that “the correction board process provides for a single final agency action in every case” and that the decision of the Secretary of the Navy — made through the BCNR — “is plainly the final agency action”); see also RCFC 52.2(f)(1)(A) (requiring the parties to file notices “after the filing of the final decision or other action on remand” that indicate “whether the final decision or other action on remand affords a satisfactory basis for disposition of the case”); Sokol v. United States, 120 Fed.Cl. 144 (2015) (reviewing a correction board decision that had been issued pursuant to a remand order); Johnson v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 267, 268-69 (2011) (“The Court remanded the matter to the BCNR for further proceedings because of perceived errors in the board’s initial decision ____ The Court must examine whether the BCNR’s remand decision ‘affords a satisfactory basis for disposition of the case’ under Rule 52.2(f)(1)(A).”), ajfd, 467 Fed.Appx. 883 (Fed.Cir.2012)."
} | 3,999,514 | b |
As a preliminary matter, we are satisfied that the class definition Plaintiffs propose is sufficiently definite. Several courts, including this Court in Bowers, have certified similar classes in litigation regarding prison conditions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1560156, at *2",
"parenthetical": "certifying class consisting of \"all persons who are now or will become incarcerated at [Passaic County Jail] during the pendency of this lawsuit\"",
"sentence": "See Bowers I, 2006 WL 2818501, at *8 (certifying a class consisting of “[a]ll persons who have been or will in the future be held post-preliminary arraignment in the custody of the Philadelphia Police Department, including its districts or the Police Administration Building, or anywhere in the Philadelphia Prison System, pending intake/admissions processing, at the Philadelphia Prison System, who have been or will in the future be subjected to the conditions of confinement as set forth in Plaintiffs’ Complaint”); Harris v. Pernsley, 654 F.Supp. 1042, 1045 (E.D.Pa.1987) (approving settlement that required certification of a class consisting of “all individuals who are, or who have been, inmates of the Philadelphia prison system since April 30, 1980 and all future inmates of the Philadelphia prison system during the time the court retains jurisdiction over the ease”); see also Colon v. Passaic County, No. 08-4439, 2009 WL 1560156, at *2 (D.N.J. May 27, 2009) (certifying class consisting of “all persons who are now or will become incarcerated at [Passaic County Jail] during the pendency of this lawsuit”); Vandehey v. Vallario, No. 06-1405, 2008 WL 697428, at *21 (D.Colo."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2006 WL 2818501, at *8",
"parenthetical": "certifying a class consisting of \"[a]ll persons who have been or will in the future be held post-preliminary arraignment in the custody of the Philadelphia Police Department, including its districts or the Police Administration Building, or anywhere in the Philadelphia Prison System, pending intake/admissions processing, at the Philadelphia Prison System, who have been or will in the future be subjected to the conditions of confinement as set forth in Plaintiffs' Complaint\"",
"sentence": "See Bowers I, 2006 WL 2818501, at *8 (certifying a class consisting of “[a]ll persons who have been or will in the future be held post-preliminary arraignment in the custody of the Philadelphia Police Department, including its districts or the Police Administration Building, or anywhere in the Philadelphia Prison System, pending intake/admissions processing, at the Philadelphia Prison System, who have been or will in the future be subjected to the conditions of confinement as set forth in Plaintiffs’ Complaint”); Harris v. Pernsley, 654 F.Supp. 1042, 1045 (E.D.Pa.1987) (approving settlement that required certification of a class consisting of “all individuals who are, or who have been, inmates of the Philadelphia prison system since April 30, 1980 and all future inmates of the Philadelphia prison system during the time the court retains jurisdiction over the ease”); see also Colon v. Passaic County, No. 08-4439, 2009 WL 1560156, at *2 (D.N.J. May 27, 2009) (certifying class consisting of “all persons who are now or will become incarcerated at [Passaic County Jail] during the pendency of this lawsuit”); Vandehey v. Vallario, No. 06-1405, 2008 WL 697428, at *21 (D.Colo."
} | 4,273,466 | b |
As a preliminary matter, we are satisfied that the class definition Plaintiffs propose is sufficiently definite. Several courts, including this Court in Bowers, have certified similar classes in litigation regarding prison conditions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1560156, at *2",
"parenthetical": "certifying class consisting of \"all persons who are now or will become incarcerated at [Passaic County Jail] during the pendency of this lawsuit\"",
"sentence": "See Bowers I, 2006 WL 2818501, at *8 (certifying a class consisting of “[a]ll persons who have been or will in the future be held post-preliminary arraignment in the custody of the Philadelphia Police Department, including its districts or the Police Administration Building, or anywhere in the Philadelphia Prison System, pending intake/admissions processing, at the Philadelphia Prison System, who have been or will in the future be subjected to the conditions of confinement as set forth in Plaintiffs’ Complaint”); Harris v. Pernsley, 654 F.Supp. 1042, 1045 (E.D.Pa.1987) (approving settlement that required certification of a class consisting of “all individuals who are, or who have been, inmates of the Philadelphia prison system since April 30, 1980 and all future inmates of the Philadelphia prison system during the time the court retains jurisdiction over the ease”); see also Colon v. Passaic County, No. 08-4439, 2009 WL 1560156, at *2 (D.N.J. May 27, 2009) (certifying class consisting of “all persons who are now or will become incarcerated at [Passaic County Jail] during the pendency of this lawsuit”); Vandehey v. Vallario, No. 06-1405, 2008 WL 697428, at *21 (D.Colo."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "654 F.Supp. 1042, 1045",
"parenthetical": "approving settlement that required certification of a class consisting of \"all individuals who are, or who have been, inmates of the Philadelphia prison system since April 30, 1980 and all future inmates of the Philadelphia prison system during the time the court retains jurisdiction over the ease\"",
"sentence": "See Bowers I, 2006 WL 2818501, at *8 (certifying a class consisting of “[a]ll persons who have been or will in the future be held post-preliminary arraignment in the custody of the Philadelphia Police Department, including its districts or the Police Administration Building, or anywhere in the Philadelphia Prison System, pending intake/admissions processing, at the Philadelphia Prison System, who have been or will in the future be subjected to the conditions of confinement as set forth in Plaintiffs’ Complaint”); Harris v. Pernsley, 654 F.Supp. 1042, 1045 (E.D.Pa.1987) (approving settlement that required certification of a class consisting of “all individuals who are, or who have been, inmates of the Philadelphia prison system since April 30, 1980 and all future inmates of the Philadelphia prison system during the time the court retains jurisdiction over the ease”); see also Colon v. Passaic County, No. 08-4439, 2009 WL 1560156, at *2 (D.N.J. May 27, 2009) (certifying class consisting of “all persons who are now or will become incarcerated at [Passaic County Jail] during the pendency of this lawsuit”); Vandehey v. Vallario, No. 06-1405, 2008 WL 697428, at *21 (D.Colo."
} | 4,273,466 | b |
Furthermore, even if admission of the evidence was error, it was harmless. Our de novo review shows us without this evidence the juvenile court had more than enough proof to support its decision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "461 N.W.2d 478, 480-81",
"parenthetical": "evidence of parent's past actions which formed basis of prior CINA proceedings may be considered in new CINA proceeding as long as there is other clear and convincing evidence as basis of new CINA proceeding",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re T.C., 492 N.W.2d 425, 429-30 (Iowa 1992) (in termination proceeding, admission of evidence of father’s juvenile criminal record was error, but the error was harmless); see also In re N.M.W., 461 N.W.2d 478, 480-81 (Iowa App.1990) (evidence of parent’s past actions which formed basis of prior CINA proceedings may be considered in new CINA proceeding as long as there is other clear and convincing evidence as basis of new CINA proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "492 N.W.2d 425, 429-30",
"parenthetical": "in termination proceeding, admission of evidence of father's juvenile criminal record was error, but the error was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re T.C., 492 N.W.2d 425, 429-30 (Iowa 1992) (in termination proceeding, admission of evidence of father’s juvenile criminal record was error, but the error was harmless); see also In re N.M.W., 461 N.W.2d 478, 480-81 (Iowa App.1990) (evidence of parent’s past actions which formed basis of prior CINA proceedings may be considered in new CINA proceeding as long as there is other clear and convincing evidence as basis of new CINA proceeding)."
} | 10,725,721 | b |
Evidence introduced at trial established that the appellants were members of the Aryan Nations organization, sometimes referred to as "Aryan Warriors." Because the term "Aryan Warrior" was relevant to background material, and referred to in testimony and other evidence presented to the jury, it was not improper for the prosecutor to mention it when questioning Nelson. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "600 F.2d 742, 749",
"parenthetical": "not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell's Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099",
"parenthetical": "the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | 10,522,390 | a |
Evidence introduced at trial established that the appellants were members of the Aryan Nations organization, sometimes referred to as "Aryan Warriors." Because the term "Aryan Warrior" was relevant to background material, and referred to in testimony and other evidence presented to the jury, it was not improper for the prosecutor to mention it when questioning Nelson. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "600 F.2d 742, 749",
"parenthetical": "not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell's Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | 10,522,390 | a |
Evidence introduced at trial established that the appellants were members of the Aryan Nations organization, sometimes referred to as "Aryan Warriors." Because the term "Aryan Warrior" was relevant to background material, and referred to in testimony and other evidence presented to the jury, it was not improper for the prosecutor to mention it when questioning Nelson. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell's Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099",
"parenthetical": "the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | 10,522,390 | a |
Evidence introduced at trial established that the appellants were members of the Aryan Nations organization, sometimes referred to as "Aryan Warriors." Because the term "Aryan Warrior" was relevant to background material, and referred to in testimony and other evidence presented to the jury, it was not improper for the prosecutor to mention it when questioning Nelson. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell's Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | 10,522,390 | b |
Evidence introduced at trial established that the appellants were members of the Aryan Nations organization, sometimes referred to as "Aryan Warriors." Because the term "Aryan Warrior" was relevant to background material, and referred to in testimony and other evidence presented to the jury, it was not improper for the prosecutor to mention it when questioning Nelson. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099",
"parenthetical": "the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell's Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | 10,522,390 | b |
Evidence introduced at trial established that the appellants were members of the Aryan Nations organization, sometimes referred to as "Aryan Warriors." Because the term "Aryan Warrior" was relevant to background material, and referred to in testimony and other evidence presented to the jury, it was not improper for the prosecutor to mention it when questioning Nelson. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell's Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | 10,522,390 | b |
Evidence introduced at trial established that the appellants were members of the Aryan Nations organization, sometimes referred to as "Aryan Warriors." Because the term "Aryan Warrior" was relevant to background material, and referred to in testimony and other evidence presented to the jury, it was not improper for the prosecutor to mention it when questioning Nelson. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099",
"parenthetical": "the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell's Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | 10,522,390 | b |
Evidence introduced at trial established that the appellants were members of the Aryan Nations organization, sometimes referred to as "Aryan Warriors." Because the term "Aryan Warrior" was relevant to background material, and referred to in testimony and other evidence presented to the jury, it was not improper for the prosecutor to mention it when questioning Nelson. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell's Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried",
"sentence": "See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1979) (not misconduct for prosecutor to mention connection between defendant and Hell’s Angels because evidence showed defendant stated he sold drugs to them), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980); United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Dawson v. Delaware, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (the first amendment prevents employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried)."
} | 10,522,390 | a |
. The district court seems more comfortable with sentencing Andrews based on Dante's levels of hell, but such a sentencing scheme has not been accepted as the law in this or any other federal circuit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "301 F.Supp.2d 609, 609",
"parenthetical": "stating that the \"Eighth Circle\" would be appropriate for Andrews's co-conspirator",
"sentence": "See Andrews, 301 F.Supp.2d at 609 (stating that the \"Eighth Circle” would be appropriate for Andrews's co-conspirator); see also id. at 612 (stating that the \"Fourth Circle” is appropriate for those who prey on the elderly); but cf. United States v. Winters, 117 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming denial of a downward departure despite district court's feeling that defendant belonged on a lower level of hell, citing Dante's Inferno)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "117 F.3d 346, 348",
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of a downward departure despite district court's feeling that defendant belonged on a lower level of hell, citing Dante's Inferno",
"sentence": "See Andrews, 301 F.Supp.2d at 609 (stating that the \"Eighth Circle” would be appropriate for Andrews's co-conspirator); see also id. at 612 (stating that the \"Fourth Circle” is appropriate for those who prey on the elderly); but cf. United States v. Winters, 117 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming denial of a downward departure despite district court's feeling that defendant belonged on a lower level of hell, citing Dante's Inferno)."
} | 9,143,016 | a |
In Books, the Seventh Circuit held that "the placement of the American Eagle gripping the national colors at the top of the [Ten Commandments] monument hardly detracts from the message of endorsement; rather, it specifically links religion ... and civil government." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "259 F.3d 773, 773",
"parenthetical": "holding that display consisting of Bill of Rights, Preamble to Indiana Constitution and Ten Commandments would signal to the reasonable observer \"that the state approved of such a link, and was sending a message of endorsement\"",
"sentence": "See Indiana Civil Liberties Union, 259 F.3d at 773 (holding that display consisting of Bill of Rights, Preamble to Indiana Constitution and Ten Commandments would signal to the reasonable observer “that the state approved of such a link, and was sending a message of endorsement”) (citing Books, 235 F.3d at 307)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "235 F.3d 307, 307",
"parenthetical": "agreeing with the Seventh Circuit's holding in Books that \"the inclusion of an American eagle gripping the national colors at the top of the monument, serves to heighten the appearance of government endorsement of religion\"",
"sentence": "Books, 235 F.3d at 307. See also Adland, 307 F.3d at 486-87 (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Books that “the inclusion of an American eagle gripping the national colors at the top of the monument, serves to heighten the appearance of government endorsement of religion”). Here, the same can be said of Defendants’ transparent attempt to “secularize” the displays by surrounding the Ten Commandments with other patriotic documents and symbols, such as the Bill of Rights and the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution."
} | 9,295,726 | b |
In Books, the Seventh Circuit held that "the placement of the American Eagle gripping the national colors at the top of the [Ten Commandments] monument hardly detracts from the message of endorsement; rather, it specifically links religion ... and civil government." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "259 F.3d 773, 773",
"parenthetical": "holding that display consisting of Bill of Rights, Preamble to Indiana Constitution and Ten Commandments would signal to the reasonable observer \"that the state approved of such a link, and was sending a message of endorsement\"",
"sentence": "See Indiana Civil Liberties Union, 259 F.3d at 773 (holding that display consisting of Bill of Rights, Preamble to Indiana Constitution and Ten Commandments would signal to the reasonable observer “that the state approved of such a link, and was sending a message of endorsement”) (citing Books, 235 F.3d at 307)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "307 F.3d 486, 486-87",
"parenthetical": "agreeing with the Seventh Circuit's holding in Books that \"the inclusion of an American eagle gripping the national colors at the top of the monument, serves to heighten the appearance of government endorsement of religion\"",
"sentence": "Books, 235 F.3d at 307. See also Adland, 307 F.3d at 486-87 (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Books that “the inclusion of an American eagle gripping the national colors at the top of the monument, serves to heighten the appearance of government endorsement of religion”). Here, the same can be said of Defendants’ transparent attempt to “secularize” the displays by surrounding the Ten Commandments with other patriotic documents and symbols, such as the Bill of Rights and the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution."
} | 9,295,726 | b |
The record does not reflect whether Dr. Nadel agreed to testify for defendants. If Dr. Nadel had been unwilling to do so, defendants could not have compelled his testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "126 N.J. 361, 369",
"parenthetical": "noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "234 N.J.Super. 375, 380",
"parenthetical": "holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert's wishes",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | 2,948,419 | a |
The record does not reflect whether Dr. Nadel agreed to testify for defendants. If Dr. Nadel had been unwilling to do so, defendants could not have compelled his testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "126 N.J. 361, 369",
"parenthetical": "noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert's wishes",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | 2,948,419 | a |
The record does not reflect whether Dr. Nadel agreed to testify for defendants. If Dr. Nadel had been unwilling to do so, defendants could not have compelled his testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert's wishes",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "126 N.J. 361, 369",
"parenthetical": "noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | 2,948,419 | b |
The record does not reflect whether Dr. Nadel agreed to testify for defendants. If Dr. Nadel had been unwilling to do so, defendants could not have compelled his testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert's wishes",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "126 N.J. 361, 369",
"parenthetical": "noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | 2,948,419 | b |
The record does not reflect whether Dr. Nadel agreed to testify for defendants. If Dr. Nadel had been unwilling to do so, defendants could not have compelled his testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "234 N.J.Super. 375, 380",
"parenthetical": "holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert's wishes",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | 2,948,419 | b |
The record does not reflect whether Dr. Nadel agreed to testify for defendants. If Dr. Nadel had been unwilling to do so, defendants could not have compelled his testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert's wishes",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | 2,948,419 | b |
The record does not reflect whether Dr. Nadel agreed to testify for defendants. If Dr. Nadel had been unwilling to do so, defendants could not have compelled his testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert's wishes",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | 2,948,419 | a |
The record does not reflect whether Dr. Nadel agreed to testify for defendants. If Dr. Nadel had been unwilling to do so, defendants could not have compelled his testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert's wishes",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against expert’s wishes), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 (1989)."
} | 2,948,419 | b |
Ocean-going passenger vessels are engaged in maritime commerce, and where the conduct giving rise to the suit "occur[s] aboard a cruise ship in navigable waters, [the] cause of action contains the traditional nexus for maritime torts." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "314 F.3d 125, 129, 132",
"parenthetical": "where child burned the soles of his feet on a hot ship's deck, maritime jurisdiction appropriate",
"sentence": "Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 129, 132 (3d Cir.2002) (where child burned the soles of his feet on a hot ship’s deck, maritime jurisdiction appropriate); Friedman v. Cunard Line Ltd., 996 F.Supp. 303, 307 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“maritime nexus ... is established by the role that ocean-going cruise ships play in maritime commerce”); see also Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 831-32, 840-41 (9th Cir.2002) (plaintiff sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress after her husband fell overboard and ship’s master told her that her husband had probably been “chopped up” by the propellers and his body would never be recovered); Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 72, 73 (3d Cir.1996) (slip and fall in cruise ship bathtub had nexus to traditional maritime activity)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "306 F.3d 827, 831-32, 840-41",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress after her husband fell overboard and ship's master told her that her husband had probably been \"chopped up\" by the propellers and his body would never be recovered",
"sentence": "Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 129, 132 (3d Cir.2002) (where child burned the soles of his feet on a hot ship’s deck, maritime jurisdiction appropriate); Friedman v. Cunard Line Ltd., 996 F.Supp. 303, 307 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“maritime nexus ... is established by the role that ocean-going cruise ships play in maritime commerce”); see also Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 831-32, 840-41 (9th Cir.2002) (plaintiff sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress after her husband fell overboard and ship’s master told her that her husband had probably been “chopped up” by the propellers and his body would never be recovered); Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 72, 73 (3d Cir.1996) (slip and fall in cruise ship bathtub had nexus to traditional maritime activity)."
} | 3,503,521 | a |
Ocean-going passenger vessels are engaged in maritime commerce, and where the conduct giving rise to the suit "occur[s] aboard a cruise ship in navigable waters, [the] cause of action contains the traditional nexus for maritime torts." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "314 F.3d 125, 129, 132",
"parenthetical": "where child burned the soles of his feet on a hot ship's deck, maritime jurisdiction appropriate",
"sentence": "Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 129, 132 (3d Cir.2002) (where child burned the soles of his feet on a hot ship’s deck, maritime jurisdiction appropriate); Friedman v. Cunard Line Ltd., 996 F.Supp. 303, 307 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“maritime nexus ... is established by the role that ocean-going cruise ships play in maritime commerce”); see also Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 831-32, 840-41 (9th Cir.2002) (plaintiff sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress after her husband fell overboard and ship’s master told her that her husband had probably been “chopped up” by the propellers and his body would never be recovered); Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 72, 73 (3d Cir.1996) (slip and fall in cruise ship bathtub had nexus to traditional maritime activity)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "82 F.3d 69, 72, 73",
"parenthetical": "slip and fall in cruise ship bathtub had nexus to traditional maritime activity",
"sentence": "Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 129, 132 (3d Cir.2002) (where child burned the soles of his feet on a hot ship’s deck, maritime jurisdiction appropriate); Friedman v. Cunard Line Ltd., 996 F.Supp. 303, 307 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“maritime nexus ... is established by the role that ocean-going cruise ships play in maritime commerce”); see also Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 831-32, 840-41 (9th Cir.2002) (plaintiff sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress after her husband fell overboard and ship’s master told her that her husband had probably been “chopped up” by the propellers and his body would never be recovered); Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 72, 73 (3d Cir.1996) (slip and fall in cruise ship bathtub had nexus to traditional maritime activity)."
} | 3,503,521 | a |
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