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Since In re Complaint of Dammers, the Fifth Circuit has upheld stipulations that mirror the stipulation approved above. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "943 F.2d 576, 578",
"parenthetical": "holding that even in a multiple claimant situation, a court can lift the stay and allow state court suits if the claimants enter a stipulation that the court determines will adequately protect the limitation plaintiff under the Limitation Act, including a stipulation that will protect the limitation plaintiff against third party indemnification claims",
"sentence": "See In re Two “R” Drilling Co., Inc., 943 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir.1991)(holding that even in a multiple claimant situation, a court can lift the stay and allow state court suits if the claimants enter a stipulation that the court determines will adequately protect the limitation plaintiff under the Limitation Act, including a stipulation that will protect the limitation plaintiff against third party indemnification claims); see also,; Kattelman v. Otis Eng’g Corp., 696 F.Supp. 1111, 1116 (E.D.La.1988) (finding sufficient a stipulation that prevented third party cross-claims for indemnification or contribution from being in excess of the limitation fund)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "696 F.Supp. 1111, 1116",
"parenthetical": "finding sufficient a stipulation that prevented third party cross-claims for indemnification or contribution from being in excess of the limitation fund",
"sentence": "See In re Two “R” Drilling Co., Inc., 943 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir.1991)(holding that even in a multiple claimant situation, a court can lift the stay and allow state court suits if the claimants enter a stipulation that the court determines will adequately protect the limitation plaintiff under the Limitation Act, including a stipulation that will protect the limitation plaintiff against third party indemnification claims); see also,; Kattelman v. Otis Eng’g Corp., 696 F.Supp. 1111, 1116 (E.D.La.1988) (finding sufficient a stipulation that prevented third party cross-claims for indemnification or contribution from being in excess of the limitation fund)."
} | 9,463,186 | a |
Since the second indictment has yet to be made public, the speedy trial clock may not have begun again with the issuance of the second indictment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "510 F.Supp. 206, 209",
"parenthetical": "\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "599 F.2d 1149, 1156",
"parenthetical": "[T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | 7,834,918 | b |
Since the second indictment has yet to be made public, the speedy trial clock may not have begun again with the issuance of the second indictment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "599 F.2d 1149, 1156",
"parenthetical": "[T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "791 F.2d 317, 322",
"parenthetical": "holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | 7,834,918 | a |
Since the second indictment has yet to be made public, the speedy trial clock may not have begun again with the issuance of the second indictment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "[T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "510 F.Supp. 206, 209",
"parenthetical": "\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | 7,834,918 | a |
Since the second indictment has yet to be made public, the speedy trial clock may not have begun again with the issuance of the second indictment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "[T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "791 F.2d 317, 322",
"parenthetical": "holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | 7,834,918 | a |
Since the second indictment has yet to be made public, the speedy trial clock may not have begun again with the issuance of the second indictment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "510 F.Supp. 206, 209",
"parenthetical": "\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "[T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | 7,834,918 | b |
Since the second indictment has yet to be made public, the speedy trial clock may not have begun again with the issuance of the second indictment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "791 F.2d 317, 322",
"parenthetical": "holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "[T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | 7,834,918 | b |
Since the second indictment has yet to be made public, the speedy trial clock may not have begun again with the issuance of the second indictment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "510 F.Supp. 206, 209",
"parenthetical": "\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "[T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | 7,834,918 | b |
Since the second indictment has yet to be made public, the speedy trial clock may not have begun again with the issuance of the second indictment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "791 F.2d 317, 322",
"parenthetical": "holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "[T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | 7,834,918 | b |
Since the second indictment has yet to be made public, the speedy trial clock may not have begun again with the issuance of the second indictment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "510 F.Supp. 206, 209",
"parenthetical": "\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "[T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | 7,834,918 | b |
Since the second indictment has yet to be made public, the speedy trial clock may not have begun again with the issuance of the second indictment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "791 F.2d 317, 322",
"parenthetical": "holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "[T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | 7,834,918 | b |
Since the second indictment has yet to be made public, the speedy trial clock may not have begun again with the issuance of the second indictment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "510 F.Supp. 206, 209",
"parenthetical": "\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "[T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | 7,834,918 | b |
Since the second indictment has yet to be made public, the speedy trial clock may not have begun again with the issuance of the second indictment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "[T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "791 F.2d 317, 322",
"parenthetical": "holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | 7,834,918 | a |
Since the second indictment has yet to be made public, the speedy trial clock may not have begun again with the issuance of the second indictment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "791 F.2d 317, 322",
"parenthetical": "holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "510 F.Supp. 206, 209",
"parenthetical": "\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (\"The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs\") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired)."
} | 7,834,918 | b |
Even though the offense said to be the basis for Reid's arrest - "disorderly gambling" - is not a crime, that probable cause existed to arrest him for any crime is sufficient to render the arrest lawful. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "517 U.S. 806, 813",
"parenthetical": "\"Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer”); Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82, 86 (D.C.Cir.1958) (“The question is not what name the officer attached to his action; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had reasonable ground to believe a felony had been committed”); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C.Cir.2002) (probable cause when “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense”). Because the search about which Reid complains was incident to a lawful arrest, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), irrespective of the arresting officers’ mistaken belief that “disorderly gambling” is a crime in the District of Columbia."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 558, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer”); Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82, 86 (D.C.Cir.1958) (“The question is not what name the officer attached to his action; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had reasonable ground to believe a felony had been committed”); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C.Cir.2002) (probable cause when “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense”). Because the search about which Reid complains was incident to a lawful arrest, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), irrespective of the arresting officers’ mistaken belief that “disorderly gambling” is a crime in the District of Columbia."
} | 635,805 | b |
Even though the offense said to be the basis for Reid's arrest - "disorderly gambling" - is not a crime, that probable cause existed to arrest him for any crime is sufficient to render the arrest lawful. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 558, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer”); Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82, 86 (D.C.Cir.1958) (“The question is not what name the officer attached to his action; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had reasonable ground to believe a felony had been committed”); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C.Cir.2002) (probable cause when “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense”). Because the search about which Reid complains was incident to a lawful arrest, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), irrespective of the arresting officers’ mistaken belief that “disorderly gambling” is a crime in the District of Columbia."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer”); Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82, 86 (D.C.Cir.1958) (“The question is not what name the officer attached to his action; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had reasonable ground to believe a felony had been committed”); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C.Cir.2002) (probable cause when “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense”). Because the search about which Reid complains was incident to a lawful arrest, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), irrespective of the arresting officers’ mistaken belief that “disorderly gambling” is a crime in the District of Columbia."
} | 635,805 | a |
Even though the offense said to be the basis for Reid's arrest - "disorderly gambling" - is not a crime, that probable cause existed to arrest him for any crime is sufficient to render the arrest lawful. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer”); Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82, 86 (D.C.Cir.1958) (“The question is not what name the officer attached to his action; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had reasonable ground to believe a felony had been committed”); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C.Cir.2002) (probable cause when “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense”). Because the search about which Reid complains was incident to a lawful arrest, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), irrespective of the arresting officers’ mistaken belief that “disorderly gambling” is a crime in the District of Columbia."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 558, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer”); Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82, 86 (D.C.Cir.1958) (“The question is not what name the officer attached to his action; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had reasonable ground to believe a felony had been committed”); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C.Cir.2002) (probable cause when “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense”). Because the search about which Reid complains was incident to a lawful arrest, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), irrespective of the arresting officers’ mistaken belief that “disorderly gambling” is a crime in the District of Columbia."
} | 635,805 | b |
Even though the offense said to be the basis for Reid's arrest - "disorderly gambling" - is not a crime, that probable cause existed to arrest him for any crime is sufficient to render the arrest lawful. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 558, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer”); Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82, 86 (D.C.Cir.1958) (“The question is not what name the officer attached to his action; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had reasonable ground to believe a felony had been committed”); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C.Cir.2002) (probable cause when “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense”). Because the search about which Reid complains was incident to a lawful arrest, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), irrespective of the arresting officers’ mistaken belief that “disorderly gambling” is a crime in the District of Columbia."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "293 F.3d 541, 545",
"parenthetical": "probable cause when \"facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer”); Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82, 86 (D.C.Cir.1958) (“The question is not what name the officer attached to his action; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had reasonable ground to believe a felony had been committed”); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C.Cir.2002) (probable cause when “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense”). Because the search about which Reid complains was incident to a lawful arrest, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), irrespective of the arresting officers’ mistaken belief that “disorderly gambling” is a crime in the District of Columbia."
} | 635,805 | a |
Even though the offense said to be the basis for Reid's arrest - "disorderly gambling" - is not a crime, that probable cause existed to arrest him for any crime is sufficient to render the arrest lawful. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 558, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer”); Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82, 86 (D.C.Cir.1958) (“The question is not what name the officer attached to his action; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had reasonable ground to believe a felony had been committed”); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C.Cir.2002) (probable cause when “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense”). Because the search about which Reid complains was incident to a lawful arrest, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), irrespective of the arresting officers’ mistaken belief that “disorderly gambling” is a crime in the District of Columbia."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "395 U.S. 752, 763",
"parenthetical": "probable cause when \"facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer”); Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82, 86 (D.C.Cir.1958) (“The question is not what name the officer attached to his action; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had reasonable ground to believe a felony had been committed”); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C.Cir.2002) (probable cause when “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense”). Because the search about which Reid complains was incident to a lawful arrest, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), irrespective of the arresting officers’ mistaken belief that “disorderly gambling” is a crime in the District of Columbia."
} | 635,805 | a |
Even though the offense said to be the basis for Reid's arrest - "disorderly gambling" - is not a crime, that probable cause existed to arrest him for any crime is sufficient to render the arrest lawful. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "probable cause when \"facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer”); Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82, 86 (D.C.Cir.1958) (“The question is not what name the officer attached to his action; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had reasonable ground to believe a felony had been committed”); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C.Cir.2002) (probable cause when “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense”). Because the search about which Reid complains was incident to a lawful arrest, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), irrespective of the arresting officers’ mistaken belief that “disorderly gambling” is a crime in the District of Columbia."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 558, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer”); Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82, 86 (D.C.Cir.1958) (“The question is not what name the officer attached to his action; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had reasonable ground to believe a felony had been committed”); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C.Cir.2002) (probable cause when “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense”). Because the search about which Reid complains was incident to a lawful arrest, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), irrespective of the arresting officers’ mistaken belief that “disorderly gambling” is a crime in the District of Columbia."
} | 635,805 | b |
Even though the offense said to be the basis for Reid's arrest - "disorderly gambling" - is not a crime, that probable cause existed to arrest him for any crime is sufficient to render the arrest lawful. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "probable cause when \"facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer”); Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82, 86 (D.C.Cir.1958) (“The question is not what name the officer attached to his action; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had reasonable ground to believe a felony had been committed”); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C.Cir.2002) (probable cause when “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense”). Because the search about which Reid complains was incident to a lawful arrest, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), irrespective of the arresting officers’ mistaken belief that “disorderly gambling” is a crime in the District of Columbia."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 558, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“an arrest will be upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the arresting officer”); Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82, 86 (D.C.Cir.1958) (“The question is not what name the officer attached to his action; it is whether, in the situation in which he found himself, he had reasonable ground to believe a felony had been committed”); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C.Cir.2002) (probable cause when “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense”). Because the search about which Reid complains was incident to a lawful arrest, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), irrespective of the arresting officers’ mistaken belief that “disorderly gambling” is a crime in the District of Columbia."
} | 635,805 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "531 U.S. 326, 336",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 318, 340",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "531 U.S. 326, 336",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "531 U.S. 326, 336",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 1235, 1241",
"parenthetical": "small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of \"serious crime\" to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "531 U.S. 326, 336",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "531 U.S. 326, 336",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "531 U.S. 326, 336",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "531 U.S. 326, 336",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "531 U.S. 326, 336",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "765 N.E.2d 330, 332",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 946, 952",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 318, 340",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 946, 952",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 946, 952",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 1235, 1241",
"parenthetical": "small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of \"serious crime\" to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 946, 952",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 946, 952",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 946, 952",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 946, 952",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 946, 952",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "765 N.E.2d 330, 332",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 318, 340",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 1235, 1241",
"parenthetical": "small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of \"serious crime\" to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "765 N.E.2d 330, 332",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between \"jailable\" and \"nonjailable\" offenses when determining importance of law enforcement's need to preserve evidence of those crimes",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "925 F.2d 776, 778",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 318, 340",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "925 F.2d 776, 778",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "925 F.2d 776, 778",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "925 F.2d 776, 778",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 1235, 1241",
"parenthetical": "small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of \"serious crime\" to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "925 F.2d 776, 778",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "925 F.2d 776, 778",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "925 F.2d 776, 778",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "925 F.2d 776, 778",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "765 N.E.2d 330, 332",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.\"",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 318, 340",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.\"",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.\"",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 1235, 1241",
"parenthetical": "small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of \"serious crime\" to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.\"",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.\"",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.\"",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.\"",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.\"",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "765 N.E.2d 330, 332",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 318, 340",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 1235, 1241",
"parenthetical": "small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of \"serious crime\" to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "765 N.E.2d 330, 332",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 318, 340",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "605 S.E.2d 297, 305",
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "605 S.E.2d 297, 305",
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "605 S.E.2d 297, 305",
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "605 S.E.2d 297, 305",
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 1235, 1241",
"parenthetical": "small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of \"serious crime\" to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "605 S.E.2d 297, 305",
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "605 S.E.2d 297, 305",
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "605 S.E.2d 297, 305",
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "605 S.E.2d 297, 305",
"parenthetical": "police officer's warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "765 N.E.2d 330, 332",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 318, 340",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 1235, 1241",
"parenthetical": "small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of \"serious crime\" to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 318, 340",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 318, 340",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 318, 340",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 318, 340",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "765 N.E.2d 330, 332",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 1235, 1241",
"parenthetical": "small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of \"serious crime\" to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | 8,980,389 | b |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550",
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "765 N.E.2d 330, 332",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 1235, 1241",
"parenthetical": "small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of \"serious crime\" to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
The fact that conviction of misdemeanor crimes may result in the loss of one's freedom for as much as one year belies the contention that such crimes are "minor." As this case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Welsh, supra, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the imminent destruction of misdemeanor crime evidence is not sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 952, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing between “jailable” and “nonjailable” offenses when determining importance of law enforcement’s need to preserve evidence of those crimes); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir.1999) (“Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense ‘for which no imprisonment is possible,’ the offense is ‘minor.’”); United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.1991) (exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry into motel room where police smelled burning marijuana while standing outside); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex.App.2004) (“[I]f an offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony, is punishable by confinement and there are exigent circumstances, then it is serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of a constitutionally protected area.”); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 305 (2004) (police officer’s warrantless entry into residence based on exigent circumstances after smelling burning marijuana was reasonable, even though marijuana possession was only a misdemeanor offense); see also, KRS 431.005(1)(d) (authorizing peace officers to make warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1550, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (noting that bulk of state and federal law permits warrantless arrests of persons committing misdemeanors in their presence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "765 N.E.2d 330, 332",
"parenthetical": "exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons",
"sentence": "But see, United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.2004) (small quantity of marijuana does not rise to the level of “serious crime” to justify warrantless entry into home on the basis of exigent circumstances); State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 726 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1999) (exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to misdemeanor crime involving no violence or weapons), reasoning overruled to some extent by City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002)."
} | 8,980,389 | a |
Nor can the Court say that the alleged injury is merely "conjectural or hypothetical." Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' theory of economic harm is merely speculative, pointing to a line of privacy cases involving the alleged disclosure of personal information that have been dismissed for failure to show injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "628 F.3d 1139, 1143",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs \"alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,\" which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | 4,123,713 | a |
Nor can the Court say that the alleged injury is merely "conjectural or hypothetical." Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' theory of economic harm is merely speculative, pointing to a line of privacy cases involving the alleged disclosure of personal information that have been dismissed for failure to show injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant's collection and publication of \"highly sensitive personal information,\" including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs' personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | 4,123,713 | a |
Nor can the Court say that the alleged injury is merely "conjectural or hypothetical." Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' theory of economic harm is merely speculative, pointing to a line of privacy cases involving the alleged disclosure of personal information that have been dismissed for failure to show injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs' mere \"general allegations\" about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as \"lost opportunity costs\" and \"value-for-value exchanges\" were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "628 F.3d 1139, 1143",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs \"alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,\" which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | 4,123,713 | a |
Nor can the Court say that the alleged injury is merely "conjectural or hypothetical." Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' theory of economic harm is merely speculative, pointing to a line of privacy cases involving the alleged disclosure of personal information that have been dismissed for failure to show injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs' mere \"general allegations\" about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as \"lost opportunity costs\" and \"value-for-value exchanges\" were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant's collection and publication of \"highly sensitive personal information,\" including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs' personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | 4,123,713 | a |
Nor can the Court say that the alleged injury is merely "conjectural or hypothetical." Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' theory of economic harm is merely speculative, pointing to a line of privacy cases involving the alleged disclosure of personal information that have been dismissed for failure to show injury. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "628 F.3d 1139, 1143",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs \"alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,\" which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327",
"parenthetical": "rejecting plaintiffs' attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline's privacy policy",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | 4,123,713 | b |
Nor can the Court say that the alleged injury is merely "conjectural or hypothetical." Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' theory of economic harm is merely speculative, pointing to a line of privacy cases involving the alleged disclosure of personal information that have been dismissed for failure to show injury. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant's collection and publication of \"highly sensitive personal information,\" including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs' personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327",
"parenthetical": "rejecting plaintiffs' attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline's privacy policy",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | 4,123,713 | b |
Nor can the Court say that the alleged injury is merely "conjectural or hypothetical." Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' theory of economic harm is merely speculative, pointing to a line of privacy cases involving the alleged disclosure of personal information that have been dismissed for failure to show injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "628 F.3d 1139, 1143",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs \"alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,\" which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | 4,123,713 | a |
Nor can the Court say that the alleged injury is merely "conjectural or hypothetical." Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' theory of economic harm is merely speculative, pointing to a line of privacy cases involving the alleged disclosure of personal information that have been dismissed for failure to show injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant's collection and publication of \"highly sensitive personal information,\" including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs' personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence",
"sentence": "See Low, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4-6 (plaintiffs general allegation that the data collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on its own, to establish standing in the absence of “some particularized example of their application in this case” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the loss of the economic value of their personal information as a contract damage where airline disclosed their personal data to a third-party data mining company in violation of airline’s privacy policy); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (rejecting argument that the economic value of the collection of demographic consumer data is an economic loss to the individual consumer); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data,” which included their names, addresses, and social security numbers); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1109-11 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendant’s collection and publication of “highly sensitive personal information,” including credit card numbers, social security numbers, financial account numbers, and information regarding plaintiffs’ personal issues, including sexuality, mental illness, alcoholism, incest, rape, and domestic violence)."
} | 4,123,713 | a |
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