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Ocean-going passenger vessels are engaged in maritime commerce, and where the conduct giving rise to the suit "occur[s] aboard a cruise ship in navigable waters, [the] cause of action contains the traditional nexus for maritime torts." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "306 F.3d 827, 831-32, 840-41",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress after her husband fell overboard and ship's master told her that her husband had probably been \"chopped up\" by the propellers and his body would never be recovered",
"sentence": "Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 129, 132 (3d Cir.2002) (where child burned the soles of his feet on a hot ship’s deck, maritime jurisdiction appropriate); Friedman v. Cunard Line Ltd., 996 F.Supp. 303, 307 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“maritime nexus ... is established by the role that ocean-going cruise ships play in maritime commerce”); see also Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 831-32, 840-41 (9th Cir.2002) (plaintiff sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress after her husband fell overboard and ship’s master told her that her husband had probably been “chopped up” by the propellers and his body would never be recovered); Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 72, 73 (3d Cir.1996) (slip and fall in cruise ship bathtub had nexus to traditional maritime activity)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "996 F.Supp. 303, 307",
"parenthetical": "\"maritime nexus ... is established by the role that ocean-going cruise ships play in maritime commerce\"",
"sentence": "Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 129, 132 (3d Cir.2002) (where child burned the soles of his feet on a hot ship’s deck, maritime jurisdiction appropriate); Friedman v. Cunard Line Ltd., 996 F.Supp. 303, 307 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“maritime nexus ... is established by the role that ocean-going cruise ships play in maritime commerce”); see also Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 831-32, 840-41 (9th Cir.2002) (plaintiff sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress after her husband fell overboard and ship’s master told her that her husband had probably been “chopped up” by the propellers and his body would never be recovered); Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 72, 73 (3d Cir.1996) (slip and fall in cruise ship bathtub had nexus to traditional maritime activity)."
} | 3,503,521 | b |
Ocean-going passenger vessels are engaged in maritime commerce, and where the conduct giving rise to the suit "occur[s] aboard a cruise ship in navigable waters, [the] cause of action contains the traditional nexus for maritime torts." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "996 F.Supp. 303, 307",
"parenthetical": "\"maritime nexus ... is established by the role that ocean-going cruise ships play in maritime commerce\"",
"sentence": "Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 129, 132 (3d Cir.2002) (where child burned the soles of his feet on a hot ship’s deck, maritime jurisdiction appropriate); Friedman v. Cunard Line Ltd., 996 F.Supp. 303, 307 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“maritime nexus ... is established by the role that ocean-going cruise ships play in maritime commerce”); see also Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 831-32, 840-41 (9th Cir.2002) (plaintiff sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress after her husband fell overboard and ship’s master told her that her husband had probably been “chopped up” by the propellers and his body would never be recovered); Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 72, 73 (3d Cir.1996) (slip and fall in cruise ship bathtub had nexus to traditional maritime activity)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "82 F.3d 69, 72, 73",
"parenthetical": "slip and fall in cruise ship bathtub had nexus to traditional maritime activity",
"sentence": "Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 129, 132 (3d Cir.2002) (where child burned the soles of his feet on a hot ship’s deck, maritime jurisdiction appropriate); Friedman v. Cunard Line Ltd., 996 F.Supp. 303, 307 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“maritime nexus ... is established by the role that ocean-going cruise ships play in maritime commerce”); see also Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 831-32, 840-41 (9th Cir.2002) (plaintiff sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress after her husband fell overboard and ship’s master told her that her husband had probably been “chopped up” by the propellers and his body would never be recovered); Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 72, 73 (3d Cir.1996) (slip and fall in cruise ship bathtub had nexus to traditional maritime activity)."
} | 3,503,521 | a |
Interpreting this constitutional provision, "[t]his court has held that two statutes, OCGA SSSS 40-13-30 and 17-4-23 (a), . . . authorize [county] police officers to arrest persons for traffic offenses in other jurisdictions. [Cits.]" | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "242 Ga. App. 384, 386",
"parenthetical": "\"An officer has authority to arrest a person accused of violating any law or ordinance governing the operation of a vehicle where the offense is committed in his presence regardless of territorial limitations.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Heredia, 252 Ga. App. 89, 90 (1) (555 SE2d 91) (2001) (Cobb County police officer could pull over defendant in the city limits of Kennesaw for traffic violation committed in Kennesaw); see State v. Gehris, 242 Ga. App. 384, 386 (528 SE2d 300) (2000) (“An officer has authority to arrest a person accused of violating any law or ordinance governing the operation of a vehicle where the offense is committed in his presence regardless of territorial limitations.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted); see also Page v. State, 250 Ga. App. 795, 797 (553 SE2d 176) (2001); City of Winterville v. Strickland, 127 Ga. App. 716, 718-719 (2) (194 SE2d 623) (1972)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "252 Ga. App. 89, 90",
"parenthetical": "Cobb County police officer could pull over defendant in the city limits of Kennesaw for traffic violation committed in Kennesaw",
"sentence": "State v. Heredia, 252 Ga. App. 89, 90 (1) (555 SE2d 91) (2001) (Cobb County police officer could pull over defendant in the city limits of Kennesaw for traffic violation committed in Kennesaw); see State v. Gehris, 242 Ga. App. 384, 386 (528 SE2d 300) (2000) (“An officer has authority to arrest a person accused of violating any law or ordinance governing the operation of a vehicle where the offense is committed in his presence regardless of territorial limitations.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted); see also Page v. State, 250 Ga. App. 795, 797 (553 SE2d 176) (2001); City of Winterville v. Strickland, 127 Ga. App. 716, 718-719 (2) (194 SE2d 623) (1972)."
} | 1,076,222 | b |
P 80. The view that we adopt today is shared by numerous other state and federal courts, as the failure of a defendant to demonstrate how an abstract question regarding the availability of sexually explicit materials relates to the material for which prosecution is being sought. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the absence of any connection between the willingness, the lack of willingness, or the indifference of a group to the sale of sexually explicit magazines of the showing of sexually explicit films and whether the particular sexual conduct involved in the case was depicted in a patently offensive manner made the survey evidence irrelevant",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 N.E.2d 1216 (Mass. 1978) (the absence of any connection between the willingness, the lack of willingness, or the indifference of a group to the sale of sexually explicit magazines of the showing of sexually explicit films and whether the particular sexual conduct involved in the case was depicted in a patently offensive manner made the survey evidence irrelevant); see also State v. Roland, 362 S.E.2d 800, 804 (N.C. App. 1987) (evidence of survey responses following questions dealing primarily with public tolerance of sexually explicit materials in general, rather than with acceptance of the materials under scrutiny, was properly disallowed as being irrelevant); State v. Williams, 598 N.E.2d 1250, 1257 (Ohio App. 1991) (\"On the issue of relevance, the poll must be relevant to a determination of both community standards in general and the community's acceptance of viewing the particular film in question.\" (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "362 S.E.2d 800, 804",
"parenthetical": "evidence of survey responses following questions dealing primarily with public tolerance of sexually explicit materials in general, rather than with acceptance of the materials under scrutiny, was properly disallowed as being irrelevant",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 N.E.2d 1216 (Mass. 1978) (the absence of any connection between the willingness, the lack of willingness, or the indifference of a group to the sale of sexually explicit magazines of the showing of sexually explicit films and whether the particular sexual conduct involved in the case was depicted in a patently offensive manner made the survey evidence irrelevant); see also State v. Roland, 362 S.E.2d 800, 804 (N.C. App. 1987) (evidence of survey responses following questions dealing primarily with public tolerance of sexually explicit materials in general, rather than with acceptance of the materials under scrutiny, was properly disallowed as being irrelevant); State v. Williams, 598 N.E.2d 1250, 1257 (Ohio App. 1991) (\"On the issue of relevance, the poll must be relevant to a determination of both community standards in general and the community's acceptance of viewing the particular film in question.\" (emphasis supplied))."
} | 11,532,770 | a |
P 80. The view that we adopt today is shared by numerous other state and federal courts, as the failure of a defendant to demonstrate how an abstract question regarding the availability of sexually explicit materials relates to the material for which prosecution is being sought. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the absence of any connection between the willingness, the lack of willingness, or the indifference of a group to the sale of sexually explicit magazines of the showing of sexually explicit films and whether the particular sexual conduct involved in the case was depicted in a patently offensive manner made the survey evidence irrelevant",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 N.E.2d 1216 (Mass. 1978) (the absence of any connection between the willingness, the lack of willingness, or the indifference of a group to the sale of sexually explicit magazines of the showing of sexually explicit films and whether the particular sexual conduct involved in the case was depicted in a patently offensive manner made the survey evidence irrelevant); see also State v. Roland, 362 S.E.2d 800, 804 (N.C. App. 1987) (evidence of survey responses following questions dealing primarily with public tolerance of sexually explicit materials in general, rather than with acceptance of the materials under scrutiny, was properly disallowed as being irrelevant); State v. Williams, 598 N.E.2d 1250, 1257 (Ohio App. 1991) (\"On the issue of relevance, the poll must be relevant to a determination of both community standards in general and the community's acceptance of viewing the particular film in question.\" (emphasis supplied))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "598 N.E.2d 1250, 1257",
"parenthetical": "\"On the issue of relevance, the poll must be relevant to a determination of both community standards in general and the community's acceptance of viewing the particular film in question.\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 N.E.2d 1216 (Mass. 1978) (the absence of any connection between the willingness, the lack of willingness, or the indifference of a group to the sale of sexually explicit magazines of the showing of sexually explicit films and whether the particular sexual conduct involved in the case was depicted in a patently offensive manner made the survey evidence irrelevant); see also State v. Roland, 362 S.E.2d 800, 804 (N.C. App. 1987) (evidence of survey responses following questions dealing primarily with public tolerance of sexually explicit materials in general, rather than with acceptance of the materials under scrutiny, was properly disallowed as being irrelevant); State v. Williams, 598 N.E.2d 1250, 1257 (Ohio App. 1991) (\"On the issue of relevance, the poll must be relevant to a determination of both community standards in general and the community's acceptance of viewing the particular film in question.\" (emphasis supplied))."
} | 11,532,770 | a |
The basis for implied trusts -- indeed, their most evident difference from express trusts -- is the absence of any expressed words evincing the intent of the would-be settlor to create a trust for the would-be beneficiary. The existence of such words obviates a claim for a resulting trust (where the settlor designated one person as the beneficiary but, the claimant argues, meant for someone else to be the beneficiary) or a constructive trust (where the settlor designated one person but, the claimant argues, equity demands a different beneficiary). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"[t]he statute of frauds ... do[es] not apply to constructive trusts, which are implied by operation of law\"",
"sentence": "See Hertz, supra, 374 A.2d at 873 (holding that “the operative facts” of a constructive trust “can be proved by parol”); see also Starzec v. Kida, 183 Conn. 41, 438 A.2d 1157, 1160 n. 2 (1981) (holding “[t]he statute of frauds ... do[es] not apply to constructive trusts, which are implied by operation of law”); cf. Edwards v. Woods, 385 A.2d 780, 784 n. 5 (D.C.1978) (“It is true that the Statute of Frauds does not apply to resulting trusts."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "374 A.2d 873, 873",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the operative facts\" of a constructive trust \"can be proved by parol\"",
"sentence": "See Hertz, supra, 374 A.2d at 873 (holding that “the operative facts” of a constructive trust “can be proved by parol”); see also Starzec v. Kida, 183 Conn. 41, 438 A.2d 1157, 1160 n. 2 (1981) (holding “[t]he statute of frauds ... do[es] not apply to constructive trusts, which are implied by operation of law”); cf. Edwards v. Woods, 385 A.2d 780, 784 n. 5 (D.C.1978) (“It is true that the Statute of Frauds does not apply to resulting trusts."
} | 8,347,156 | b |
The basis for implied trusts -- indeed, their most evident difference from express trusts -- is the absence of any expressed words evincing the intent of the would-be settlor to create a trust for the would-be beneficiary. The existence of such words obviates a claim for a resulting trust (where the settlor designated one person as the beneficiary but, the claimant argues, meant for someone else to be the beneficiary) or a constructive trust (where the settlor designated one person but, the claimant argues, equity demands a different beneficiary). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "374 A.2d 873, 873",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the operative facts\" of a constructive trust \"can be proved by parol\"",
"sentence": "See Hertz, supra, 374 A.2d at 873 (holding that “the operative facts” of a constructive trust “can be proved by parol”); see also Starzec v. Kida, 183 Conn. 41, 438 A.2d 1157, 1160 n. 2 (1981) (holding “[t]he statute of frauds ... do[es] not apply to constructive trusts, which are implied by operation of law”); cf. Edwards v. Woods, 385 A.2d 780, 784 n. 5 (D.C.1978) (“It is true that the Statute of Frauds does not apply to resulting trusts."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"[t]he statute of frauds ... do[es] not apply to constructive trusts, which are implied by operation of law\"",
"sentence": "See Hertz, supra, 374 A.2d at 873 (holding that “the operative facts” of a constructive trust “can be proved by parol”); see also Starzec v. Kida, 183 Conn. 41, 438 A.2d 1157, 1160 n. 2 (1981) (holding “[t]he statute of frauds ... do[es] not apply to constructive trusts, which are implied by operation of law”); cf. Edwards v. Woods, 385 A.2d 780, 784 n. 5 (D.C.1978) (“It is true that the Statute of Frauds does not apply to resulting trusts."
} | 8,347,156 | a |
Finally, if the defendant satisfies this burden of production, the plaintiff again has the burden of showing, through more than mere temporal proximity, that "more likely than not the employer's decision was motivated, at least in part, by an intent to retaliate against him." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "375 F.3d 206, 221",
"parenthetical": "noting that the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate by competent evidence that \"the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "El Sayed, 627 F.3d at 933 (“The temporal proximity of events may give rise to an inference of retaliation for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, but without more, such temporal proximity is insufficient to satisfy appellant’s burden to bring forward some evidence of pretext.”); see Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 221 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate by competent evidence that “the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 933, 933",
"parenthetical": "\"The temporal proximity of events may give rise to an inference of retaliation for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, but without more, such temporal proximity is insufficient to satisfy appellant's burden to bring forward some evidence of pretext.\"",
"sentence": "El Sayed, 627 F.3d at 933 (“The temporal proximity of events may give rise to an inference of retaliation for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, but without more, such temporal proximity is insufficient to satisfy appellant’s burden to bring forward some evidence of pretext.”); see Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 221 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate by competent evidence that “the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.”)."
} | 3,582,340 | b |
First, the court in that case found that the evidence in dispute was "highly probative." Here, in contrast,' the government also offered testimony that Colon had admitted that he had a gun on the night in question. While the Face testimony does supply a motive for possession, motive is of little probative value when a flat-out confession is offered into evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "519 U.S. 172, 185",
"parenthetical": "the probative value of a piece of evidence should be evaluated in comparison to the probative value of \"evi-dentiary alternatives\"",
"sentence": "See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (the probative value of a piece of evidence should be evaluated in comparison to the probative value of “evi-dentiary alternatives”); cf. United States v. Universal Rehabilitation Servs., 205 F.3d 657, 667 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc) (deciding against Rule 403 exclusion in part because alternative evidence was not equally probative with the evidence in dispute)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "205 F.3d 657, 667",
"parenthetical": "deciding against Rule 403 exclusion in part because alternative evidence was not equally probative with the evidence in dispute",
"sentence": "See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (the probative value of a piece of evidence should be evaluated in comparison to the probative value of “evi-dentiary alternatives”); cf. United States v. Universal Rehabilitation Servs., 205 F.3d 657, 667 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc) (deciding against Rule 403 exclusion in part because alternative evidence was not equally probative with the evidence in dispute)."
} | 3,920,726 | a |
First, the court in that case found that the evidence in dispute was "highly probative." Here, in contrast,' the government also offered testimony that Colon had admitted that he had a gun on the night in question. While the Face testimony does supply a motive for possession, motive is of little probative value when a flat-out confession is offered into evidence. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "205 F.3d 657, 667",
"parenthetical": "deciding against Rule 403 exclusion in part because alternative evidence was not equally probative with the evidence in dispute",
"sentence": "See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (the probative value of a piece of evidence should be evaluated in comparison to the probative value of “evi-dentiary alternatives”); cf. United States v. Universal Rehabilitation Servs., 205 F.3d 657, 667 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc) (deciding against Rule 403 exclusion in part because alternative evidence was not equally probative with the evidence in dispute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the probative value of a piece of evidence should be evaluated in comparison to the probative value of \"evi-dentiary alternatives\"",
"sentence": "See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (the probative value of a piece of evidence should be evaluated in comparison to the probative value of “evi-dentiary alternatives”); cf. United States v. Universal Rehabilitation Servs., 205 F.3d 657, 667 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc) (deciding against Rule 403 exclusion in part because alternative evidence was not equally probative with the evidence in dispute)."
} | 3,920,726 | b |
First, the court in that case found that the evidence in dispute was "highly probative." Here, in contrast,' the government also offered testimony that Colon had admitted that he had a gun on the night in question. While the Face testimony does supply a motive for possession, motive is of little probative value when a flat-out confession is offered into evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the probative value of a piece of evidence should be evaluated in comparison to the probative value of \"evi-dentiary alternatives\"",
"sentence": "See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (the probative value of a piece of evidence should be evaluated in comparison to the probative value of “evi-dentiary alternatives”); cf. United States v. Universal Rehabilitation Servs., 205 F.3d 657, 667 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc) (deciding against Rule 403 exclusion in part because alternative evidence was not equally probative with the evidence in dispute)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "205 F.3d 657, 667",
"parenthetical": "deciding against Rule 403 exclusion in part because alternative evidence was not equally probative with the evidence in dispute",
"sentence": "See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (the probative value of a piece of evidence should be evaluated in comparison to the probative value of “evi-dentiary alternatives”); cf. United States v. Universal Rehabilitation Servs., 205 F.3d 657, 667 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc) (deciding against Rule 403 exclusion in part because alternative evidence was not equally probative with the evidence in dispute)."
} | 3,920,726 | a |
Unlike the doctrine of implied contract, which provides for restitution in the absence of an enforceable agreement, promissory estoppel makes promises enforceable. Essentially, the doctrine of promissory estoppel, like consideration, serves as a contract-validating device. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "294 Pa.Super. 503, 512",
"parenthetical": "noting that promissory estop-pel has been characterized as a species of or a substitute for consideration",
"sentence": "Murray, supra, at 286. See Thatcher’s Drug Store of West Goshen, Inc. v. Consolidated Supermarkets, Inc., 535 Pa. 469, 476, 636 A.2d 156, 160 (1994)(noting that a promise unsupported by consideration is generally not enforceable, but may be enforceable under promissory estoppel); Shoemaker v. Commonwealth Bank, 700 A.2d 1003, 1006 (Pa.Super.1997)(same); see also Robert Mattery Lumber Corp. v. B. & F. Assoc., Inc., 294 Pa.Super. 503, 512, 440 A.2d 579, 583 (1982)(noting that promissory estop-pel has been characterized as a species of or a substitute for consideration); Cardamone v. University of Pittsburgh, 253 Pa.Super. 65, 74 n. 9, 384 A.2d 1228, 1233 n. 9 (1978)(same). A party seeking to establish a cause of action based on promissory estoppel must establish that: “(1) the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected would induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; (2) the promisee actually took action or refrained from taking action in reliance on the promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise.”"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "535 Pa. 469, 476",
"parenthetical": "noting that a promise unsupported by consideration is generally not enforceable, but may be enforceable under promissory estoppel",
"sentence": "Murray, supra, at 286. See Thatcher’s Drug Store of West Goshen, Inc. v. Consolidated Supermarkets, Inc., 535 Pa. 469, 476, 636 A.2d 156, 160 (1994)(noting that a promise unsupported by consideration is generally not enforceable, but may be enforceable under promissory estoppel); Shoemaker v. Commonwealth Bank, 700 A.2d 1003, 1006 (Pa.Super.1997)(same); see also Robert Mattery Lumber Corp. v. B. & F. Assoc., Inc., 294 Pa.Super. 503, 512, 440 A.2d 579, 583 (1982)(noting that promissory estop-pel has been characterized as a species of or a substitute for consideration); Cardamone v. University of Pittsburgh, 253 Pa.Super. 65, 74 n. 9, 384 A.2d 1228, 1233 n. 9 (1978)(same). A party seeking to establish a cause of action based on promissory estoppel must establish that: “(1) the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected would induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; (2) the promisee actually took action or refrained from taking action in reliance on the promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise.”"
} | 11,882,292 | b |
Unlike the doctrine of implied contract, which provides for restitution in the absence of an enforceable agreement, promissory estoppel makes promises enforceable. Essentially, the doctrine of promissory estoppel, like consideration, serves as a contract-validating device. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "440 A.2d 579, 583",
"parenthetical": "noting that promissory estop-pel has been characterized as a species of or a substitute for consideration",
"sentence": "Murray, supra, at 286. See Thatcher’s Drug Store of West Goshen, Inc. v. Consolidated Supermarkets, Inc., 535 Pa. 469, 476, 636 A.2d 156, 160 (1994)(noting that a promise unsupported by consideration is generally not enforceable, but may be enforceable under promissory estoppel); Shoemaker v. Commonwealth Bank, 700 A.2d 1003, 1006 (Pa.Super.1997)(same); see also Robert Mattery Lumber Corp. v. B. & F. Assoc., Inc., 294 Pa.Super. 503, 512, 440 A.2d 579, 583 (1982)(noting that promissory estop-pel has been characterized as a species of or a substitute for consideration); Cardamone v. University of Pittsburgh, 253 Pa.Super. 65, 74 n. 9, 384 A.2d 1228, 1233 n. 9 (1978)(same). A party seeking to establish a cause of action based on promissory estoppel must establish that: “(1) the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected would induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; (2) the promisee actually took action or refrained from taking action in reliance on the promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise.”"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "535 Pa. 469, 476",
"parenthetical": "noting that a promise unsupported by consideration is generally not enforceable, but may be enforceable under promissory estoppel",
"sentence": "Murray, supra, at 286. See Thatcher’s Drug Store of West Goshen, Inc. v. Consolidated Supermarkets, Inc., 535 Pa. 469, 476, 636 A.2d 156, 160 (1994)(noting that a promise unsupported by consideration is generally not enforceable, but may be enforceable under promissory estoppel); Shoemaker v. Commonwealth Bank, 700 A.2d 1003, 1006 (Pa.Super.1997)(same); see also Robert Mattery Lumber Corp. v. B. & F. Assoc., Inc., 294 Pa.Super. 503, 512, 440 A.2d 579, 583 (1982)(noting that promissory estop-pel has been characterized as a species of or a substitute for consideration); Cardamone v. University of Pittsburgh, 253 Pa.Super. 65, 74 n. 9, 384 A.2d 1228, 1233 n. 9 (1978)(same). A party seeking to establish a cause of action based on promissory estoppel must establish that: “(1) the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected would induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; (2) the promisee actually took action or refrained from taking action in reliance on the promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise.”"
} | 11,882,292 | b |
Unlike the doctrine of implied contract, which provides for restitution in the absence of an enforceable agreement, promissory estoppel makes promises enforceable. Essentially, the doctrine of promissory estoppel, like consideration, serves as a contract-validating device. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "636 A.2d 156, 160",
"parenthetical": "noting that a promise unsupported by consideration is generally not enforceable, but may be enforceable under promissory estoppel",
"sentence": "Murray, supra, at 286. See Thatcher’s Drug Store of West Goshen, Inc. v. Consolidated Supermarkets, Inc., 535 Pa. 469, 476, 636 A.2d 156, 160 (1994)(noting that a promise unsupported by consideration is generally not enforceable, but may be enforceable under promissory estoppel); Shoemaker v. Commonwealth Bank, 700 A.2d 1003, 1006 (Pa.Super.1997)(same); see also Robert Mattery Lumber Corp. v. B. & F. Assoc., Inc., 294 Pa.Super. 503, 512, 440 A.2d 579, 583 (1982)(noting that promissory estop-pel has been characterized as a species of or a substitute for consideration); Cardamone v. University of Pittsburgh, 253 Pa.Super. 65, 74 n. 9, 384 A.2d 1228, 1233 n. 9 (1978)(same). A party seeking to establish a cause of action based on promissory estoppel must establish that: “(1) the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected would induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; (2) the promisee actually took action or refrained from taking action in reliance on the promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "294 Pa.Super. 503, 512",
"parenthetical": "noting that promissory estop-pel has been characterized as a species of or a substitute for consideration",
"sentence": "Murray, supra, at 286. See Thatcher’s Drug Store of West Goshen, Inc. v. Consolidated Supermarkets, Inc., 535 Pa. 469, 476, 636 A.2d 156, 160 (1994)(noting that a promise unsupported by consideration is generally not enforceable, but may be enforceable under promissory estoppel); Shoemaker v. Commonwealth Bank, 700 A.2d 1003, 1006 (Pa.Super.1997)(same); see also Robert Mattery Lumber Corp. v. B. & F. Assoc., Inc., 294 Pa.Super. 503, 512, 440 A.2d 579, 583 (1982)(noting that promissory estop-pel has been characterized as a species of or a substitute for consideration); Cardamone v. University of Pittsburgh, 253 Pa.Super. 65, 74 n. 9, 384 A.2d 1228, 1233 n. 9 (1978)(same). A party seeking to establish a cause of action based on promissory estoppel must establish that: “(1) the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected would induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; (2) the promisee actually took action or refrained from taking action in reliance on the promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise.”"
} | 11,882,292 | a |
Unlike the doctrine of implied contract, which provides for restitution in the absence of an enforceable agreement, promissory estoppel makes promises enforceable. Essentially, the doctrine of promissory estoppel, like consideration, serves as a contract-validating device. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "636 A.2d 156, 160",
"parenthetical": "noting that a promise unsupported by consideration is generally not enforceable, but may be enforceable under promissory estoppel",
"sentence": "Murray, supra, at 286. See Thatcher’s Drug Store of West Goshen, Inc. v. Consolidated Supermarkets, Inc., 535 Pa. 469, 476, 636 A.2d 156, 160 (1994)(noting that a promise unsupported by consideration is generally not enforceable, but may be enforceable under promissory estoppel); Shoemaker v. Commonwealth Bank, 700 A.2d 1003, 1006 (Pa.Super.1997)(same); see also Robert Mattery Lumber Corp. v. B. & F. Assoc., Inc., 294 Pa.Super. 503, 512, 440 A.2d 579, 583 (1982)(noting that promissory estop-pel has been characterized as a species of or a substitute for consideration); Cardamone v. University of Pittsburgh, 253 Pa.Super. 65, 74 n. 9, 384 A.2d 1228, 1233 n. 9 (1978)(same). A party seeking to establish a cause of action based on promissory estoppel must establish that: “(1) the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected would induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; (2) the promisee actually took action or refrained from taking action in reliance on the promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "440 A.2d 579, 583",
"parenthetical": "noting that promissory estop-pel has been characterized as a species of or a substitute for consideration",
"sentence": "Murray, supra, at 286. See Thatcher’s Drug Store of West Goshen, Inc. v. Consolidated Supermarkets, Inc., 535 Pa. 469, 476, 636 A.2d 156, 160 (1994)(noting that a promise unsupported by consideration is generally not enforceable, but may be enforceable under promissory estoppel); Shoemaker v. Commonwealth Bank, 700 A.2d 1003, 1006 (Pa.Super.1997)(same); see also Robert Mattery Lumber Corp. v. B. & F. Assoc., Inc., 294 Pa.Super. 503, 512, 440 A.2d 579, 583 (1982)(noting that promissory estop-pel has been characterized as a species of or a substitute for consideration); Cardamone v. University of Pittsburgh, 253 Pa.Super. 65, 74 n. 9, 384 A.2d 1228, 1233 n. 9 (1978)(same). A party seeking to establish a cause of action based on promissory estoppel must establish that: “(1) the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected would induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; (2) the promisee actually took action or refrained from taking action in reliance on the promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise.”"
} | 11,882,292 | a |
. In summarizing these facts relating to costs and attorney's fees, the undersigned uses the affidavits and documents that were submitted with Plaintiffs motion for default judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "873 F.2d 38, 40",
"parenthetical": "holding that court did not have to hold a hearing to determine attorney's fees where detailed affidavit was provided",
"sentence": "See S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1232 n. 13 (11th Cir.2005) (noting that a hearing on damages is unnecessary where essential evidence is in the record); see also Fustok v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 873 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir.1989) (holding that court did not have to hold a hearing to determine attorney's fees where detailed affidavit was provided); cf. Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.1988) (\"[T]he district court traditionally has had the power to make an [attorney's fee] award without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing...."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that a hearing on damages is unnecessary where essential evidence is in the record",
"sentence": "See S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1232 n. 13 (11th Cir.2005) (noting that a hearing on damages is unnecessary where essential evidence is in the record); see also Fustok v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 873 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir.1989) (holding that court did not have to hold a hearing to determine attorney's fees where detailed affidavit was provided); cf. Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.1988) (\"[T]he district court traditionally has had the power to make an [attorney's fee] award without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing...."
} | 4,196,193 | b |
The weight of authority runs contrary to petitioner's claim that a rule of "harmful per se" should be applied to Miranda violations. Although the Supreme Court has never ruled definitively on this specific issue, petitioner has provided no compelling reason to treat testimony admitted despite the lack of an adequate waiver of Miranda rights differently from testimony obtained in contravention of other constitutional principles. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "harmless error rule applied to prosecutor's comments at trial on defendant's post-arrest silence",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Espinosa-Orlando, 710 F.2d 535 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124 (2d Cir.1981); Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735, 743 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 877, 95 S.Ct. 140, 42 L.Ed.2d 116 (1974); cf. United States v. Cummiskey, 728 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.1984) (harmless error rule applied to prosecutor’s comments at trial on defendant’s post-arrest silence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "harmless error rule applied to prosecutor's comments and judge's instruction to jury concerning defendant's failure to testify",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (admission of statements elicited in violation of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel; harmless error rule applied); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (harmless error rule applied to prosecutor’s comments and judge’s instruction to jury concerning defendant’s failure to testify). There is ample protection of the rights of the accused, and sufficient symmetry with the goals of the exclusionary rule, under the majority view which upholds a conviction obtained in the face of a Miranda violation only if the remaining evidence is “not only sufficient to support the verdict but so overwhelmingly so as to establish guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.”"
} | 3,720,206 | b |
The weight of authority runs contrary to petitioner's claim that a rule of "harmful per se" should be applied to Miranda violations. Although the Supreme Court has never ruled definitively on this specific issue, petitioner has provided no compelling reason to treat testimony admitted despite the lack of an adequate waiver of Miranda rights differently from testimony obtained in contravention of other constitutional principles. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "harmless error rule applied to prosecutor's comments at trial on defendant's post-arrest silence",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Espinosa-Orlando, 710 F.2d 535 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124 (2d Cir.1981); Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735, 743 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 877, 95 S.Ct. 140, 42 L.Ed.2d 116 (1974); cf. United States v. Cummiskey, 728 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.1984) (harmless error rule applied to prosecutor’s comments at trial on defendant’s post-arrest silence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "harmless error rule applied to prosecutor's comments and judge's instruction to jury concerning defendant's failure to testify",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (admission of statements elicited in violation of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel; harmless error rule applied); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (harmless error rule applied to prosecutor’s comments and judge’s instruction to jury concerning defendant’s failure to testify). There is ample protection of the rights of the accused, and sufficient symmetry with the goals of the exclusionary rule, under the majority view which upholds a conviction obtained in the face of a Miranda violation only if the remaining evidence is “not only sufficient to support the verdict but so overwhelmingly so as to establish guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.”"
} | 3,720,206 | b |
The weight of authority runs contrary to petitioner's claim that a rule of "harmful per se" should be applied to Miranda violations. Although the Supreme Court has never ruled definitively on this specific issue, petitioner has provided no compelling reason to treat testimony admitted despite the lack of an adequate waiver of Miranda rights differently from testimony obtained in contravention of other constitutional principles. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "harmless error rule applied to prosecutor's comments and judge's instruction to jury concerning defendant's failure to testify",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (admission of statements elicited in violation of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel; harmless error rule applied); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (harmless error rule applied to prosecutor’s comments and judge’s instruction to jury concerning defendant’s failure to testify). There is ample protection of the rights of the accused, and sufficient symmetry with the goals of the exclusionary rule, under the majority view which upholds a conviction obtained in the face of a Miranda violation only if the remaining evidence is “not only sufficient to support the verdict but so overwhelmingly so as to establish guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.”"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "harmless error rule applied to prosecutor's comments at trial on defendant's post-arrest silence",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Espinosa-Orlando, 710 F.2d 535 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124 (2d Cir.1981); Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735, 743 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 877, 95 S.Ct. 140, 42 L.Ed.2d 116 (1974); cf. United States v. Cummiskey, 728 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.1984) (harmless error rule applied to prosecutor’s comments at trial on defendant’s post-arrest silence)."
} | 3,720,206 | a |
"If the trial court's decision was within the range of legally correct discretionary choices and produced a permissible, legally correct outcome, then the trial court did not abuse its discretion." Where, however, a trial court's purported exercise of discretion flows from a mistaken legal premise, its decision does not fall within the range of legally correct choices and does not produce a permissible, legally correct outcome. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "226 Or App 285, 289",
"parenthetical": "holding that, under Mayfield, the exercise of discretion based on a mistaken premise of law can be a failure to properly exercise discretion",
"sentence": "See State v. Mayfield, 302 Or 631, 645, 733 P2d 438 (1987) (explaining that, in some circumstances, a trial court can err if it “fails to exercise discretion, refuses to exercise discretion[,] or fails to make a record which reflects an exercise of discretion”); see also State v. Pemberton, 226 Or App 285, 289, 203 P3d 326 (2009) (holding that, under Mayfield, the exercise of discretion based on a mistaken premise of law can be a failure to properly exercise discretion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "302 Or 631, 645",
"parenthetical": "explaining that, in some circumstances, a trial court can err if it \"fails to exercise discretion, refuses to exercise discretion[,] or fails to make a record which reflects an exercise of discretion\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Mayfield, 302 Or 631, 645, 733 P2d 438 (1987) (explaining that, in some circumstances, a trial court can err if it “fails to exercise discretion, refuses to exercise discretion[,] or fails to make a record which reflects an exercise of discretion”); see also State v. Pemberton, 226 Or App 285, 289, 203 P3d 326 (2009) (holding that, under Mayfield, the exercise of discretion based on a mistaken premise of law can be a failure to properly exercise discretion)."
} | 4,205,985 | b |
By analogy, many courts have adopted intermediate scrutiny when evaluating restrictions on gun possession by particular people or in particular places. In Laurent, for example, the court considered a Second Amendment challenge to a ban on receipt of fire arms by a person who is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-32",
"parenthetical": "applying strict scrutiny to a statute banning persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from possessing firearms",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-32 (D. Utah 2009) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute banning persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from possessing firearms); Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041,1044-45 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to determine what type of heighted scrutiny applies to laws that substantially burden Second Amendment rights); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting rational basis as the appropriate standard but otherwise avoiding “the levels of scrutiny’ quagmire”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 801, 801, 802",
"parenthetical": "considering under intermediate scrutiny a law prohibiting possession of a firearm by a person subject to a domestic protection order",
"sentence": "Id.', see also Reese, 627 F.3d at 801, 802 (considering under intermediate scrutiny a law prohibiting possession of a firearm by a person subject to a domestic protection order); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (reviewing under intermediate scrutiny a former federal regulation that prohibited carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle within national park areas)."
} | 4,033,677 | b |
By analogy, many courts have adopted intermediate scrutiny when evaluating restrictions on gun possession by particular people or in particular places. In Laurent, for example, the court considered a Second Amendment challenge to a ban on receipt of fire arms by a person who is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "681 F.3d 1041, 1044-45",
"parenthetical": "declining to determine what type of heighted scrutiny applies to laws that substantially burden Second Amendment rights",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-32 (D. Utah 2009) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute banning persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from possessing firearms); Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041,1044-45 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to determine what type of heighted scrutiny applies to laws that substantially burden Second Amendment rights); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting rational basis as the appropriate standard but otherwise avoiding “the levels of scrutiny’ quagmire”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 801, 801, 802",
"parenthetical": "considering under intermediate scrutiny a law prohibiting possession of a firearm by a person subject to a domestic protection order",
"sentence": "Id.', see also Reese, 627 F.3d at 801, 802 (considering under intermediate scrutiny a law prohibiting possession of a firearm by a person subject to a domestic protection order); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (reviewing under intermediate scrutiny a former federal regulation that prohibited carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle within national park areas)."
} | 4,033,677 | b |
By analogy, many courts have adopted intermediate scrutiny when evaluating restrictions on gun possession by particular people or in particular places. In Laurent, for example, the court considered a Second Amendment challenge to a ban on receipt of fire arms by a person who is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 801, 801, 802",
"parenthetical": "considering under intermediate scrutiny a law prohibiting possession of a firearm by a person subject to a domestic protection order",
"sentence": "Id.', see also Reese, 627 F.3d at 801, 802 (considering under intermediate scrutiny a law prohibiting possession of a firearm by a person subject to a domestic protection order); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (reviewing under intermediate scrutiny a former federal regulation that prohibited carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle within national park areas)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "614 F.3d 638, 641-42",
"parenthetical": "rejecting rational basis as the appropriate standard but otherwise avoiding \"the levels of scrutiny' quagmire\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-32 (D. Utah 2009) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute banning persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from possessing firearms); Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041,1044-45 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to determine what type of heighted scrutiny applies to laws that substantially burden Second Amendment rights); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting rational basis as the appropriate standard but otherwise avoiding “the levels of scrutiny’ quagmire”)."
} | 4,033,677 | a |
By analogy, many courts have adopted intermediate scrutiny when evaluating restrictions on gun possession by particular people or in particular places. In Laurent, for example, the court considered a Second Amendment challenge to a ban on receipt of fire arms by a person who is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-32",
"parenthetical": "applying strict scrutiny to a statute banning persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from possessing firearms",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-32 (D. Utah 2009) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute banning persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from possessing firearms); Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041,1044-45 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to determine what type of heighted scrutiny applies to laws that substantially burden Second Amendment rights); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting rational basis as the appropriate standard but otherwise avoiding “the levels of scrutiny’ quagmire”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "638 F.3d 458, 471",
"parenthetical": "reviewing under intermediate scrutiny a former federal regulation that prohibited carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle within national park areas",
"sentence": "Id.', see also Reese, 627 F.3d at 801, 802 (considering under intermediate scrutiny a law prohibiting possession of a firearm by a person subject to a domestic protection order); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (reviewing under intermediate scrutiny a former federal regulation that prohibited carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle within national park areas)."
} | 4,033,677 | b |
By analogy, many courts have adopted intermediate scrutiny when evaluating restrictions on gun possession by particular people or in particular places. In Laurent, for example, the court considered a Second Amendment challenge to a ban on receipt of fire arms by a person who is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "638 F.3d 458, 471",
"parenthetical": "reviewing under intermediate scrutiny a former federal regulation that prohibited carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle within national park areas",
"sentence": "Id.', see also Reese, 627 F.3d at 801, 802 (considering under intermediate scrutiny a law prohibiting possession of a firearm by a person subject to a domestic protection order); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (reviewing under intermediate scrutiny a former federal regulation that prohibited carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle within national park areas)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "681 F.3d 1041, 1044-45",
"parenthetical": "declining to determine what type of heighted scrutiny applies to laws that substantially burden Second Amendment rights",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-32 (D. Utah 2009) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute banning persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from possessing firearms); Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041,1044-45 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to determine what type of heighted scrutiny applies to laws that substantially burden Second Amendment rights); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting rational basis as the appropriate standard but otherwise avoiding “the levels of scrutiny’ quagmire”)."
} | 4,033,677 | a |
By analogy, many courts have adopted intermediate scrutiny when evaluating restrictions on gun possession by particular people or in particular places. In Laurent, for example, the court considered a Second Amendment challenge to a ban on receipt of fire arms by a person who is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "638 F.3d 458, 471",
"parenthetical": "reviewing under intermediate scrutiny a former federal regulation that prohibited carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle within national park areas",
"sentence": "Id.', see also Reese, 627 F.3d at 801, 802 (considering under intermediate scrutiny a law prohibiting possession of a firearm by a person subject to a domestic protection order); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (reviewing under intermediate scrutiny a former federal regulation that prohibited carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle within national park areas)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "614 F.3d 638, 641-42",
"parenthetical": "rejecting rational basis as the appropriate standard but otherwise avoiding \"the levels of scrutiny' quagmire\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-32 (D. Utah 2009) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute banning persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from possessing firearms); Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041,1044-45 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to determine what type of heighted scrutiny applies to laws that substantially burden Second Amendment rights); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting rational basis as the appropriate standard but otherwise avoiding “the levels of scrutiny’ quagmire”)."
} | 4,033,677 | a |
Danoff contends that the IRS should be equitably estopped from denying his refund claim because a IRS agents told him during a telephone inquiry that he had four years to file his tax return. Section 6511, however, is not subject to equitable exceptions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a time limit is jurisdictional, it is not subject to the defenses of waiver, equitable tolling or equitable estoppel, although there may still be exceptions based on 'unique circumstances' \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 354, 117 S.Ct. 849, 136 L.Ed.2d 818 (1997), (“Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the statute that it wrote.”); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir.2001) (“[I]f a time limit is jurisdictional, it is not subject to the defenses of waiver, equitable tolling or equitable estoppel, although there may still be exceptions based on ‘unique circumstances’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "519 U.S. 347, 354",
"parenthetical": "\"Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, 'equitable' exceptions into the statute that it wrote.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 354, 117 S.Ct. 849, 136 L.Ed.2d 818 (1997), (“Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the statute that it wrote.”); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir.2001) (“[I]f a time limit is jurisdictional, it is not subject to the defenses of waiver, equitable tolling or equitable estoppel, although there may still be exceptions based on ‘unique circumstances’ ”)."
} | 1,151,276 | b |
Danoff contends that the IRS should be equitably estopped from denying his refund claim because a IRS agents told him during a telephone inquiry that he had four years to file his tax return. Section 6511, however, is not subject to equitable exceptions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a time limit is jurisdictional, it is not subject to the defenses of waiver, equitable tolling or equitable estoppel, although there may still be exceptions based on 'unique circumstances' \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 354, 117 S.Ct. 849, 136 L.Ed.2d 818 (1997), (“Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the statute that it wrote.”); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir.2001) (“[I]f a time limit is jurisdictional, it is not subject to the defenses of waiver, equitable tolling or equitable estoppel, although there may still be exceptions based on ‘unique circumstances’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, 'equitable' exceptions into the statute that it wrote.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 354, 117 S.Ct. 849, 136 L.Ed.2d 818 (1997), (“Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the statute that it wrote.”); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir.2001) (“[I]f a time limit is jurisdictional, it is not subject to the defenses of waiver, equitable tolling or equitable estoppel, although there may still be exceptions based on ‘unique circumstances’ ”)."
} | 1,151,276 | b |
Danoff contends that the IRS should be equitably estopped from denying his refund claim because a IRS agents told him during a telephone inquiry that he had four years to file his tax return. Section 6511, however, is not subject to equitable exceptions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, 'equitable' exceptions into the statute that it wrote.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 354, 117 S.Ct. 849, 136 L.Ed.2d 818 (1997), (“Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the statute that it wrote.”); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir.2001) (“[I]f a time limit is jurisdictional, it is not subject to the defenses of waiver, equitable tolling or equitable estoppel, although there may still be exceptions based on ‘unique circumstances’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a time limit is jurisdictional, it is not subject to the defenses of waiver, equitable tolling or equitable estoppel, although there may still be exceptions based on 'unique circumstances' \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 354, 117 S.Ct. 849, 136 L.Ed.2d 818 (1997), (“Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the statute that it wrote.”); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir.2001) (“[I]f a time limit is jurisdictional, it is not subject to the defenses of waiver, equitable tolling or equitable estoppel, although there may still be exceptions based on ‘unique circumstances’ ”)."
} | 1,151,276 | a |
A federal district court "can only conduct a 'de novo review' of those [SOX whistleblower] claims that have been administratively exhausted." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2004 WL 1774575, *6",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs failure to raise a claim in an administrative complaint with OSHA precluded pursuing that claim in district court",
"sentence": "Willis v. Vie Fin. Grp., No. 04-435, 2004 WL 1774575, *6 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 6, 2004) (holding that plaintiffs failure to raise a claim in an administrative complaint with OSHA precluded pursuing that claim in district court); see also Hanna v. WCI Cmts., 348 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1324, 1329 (S.D.Fl.2004) (under the “de novo review” provided by SOX, “district courts are able to consider the merits of a plaintiffs whistle-blower [administrative] complaint as if it had not been decided previously”) (internal quotation omitted); Murray v. TXU Corp., 279 F.Supp.2d 799, 802 (N.D.Tex.2003) (stating that district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Section 806 claim if plaintiff has failed to comply with administrative procedures)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "348 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1324, 1329",
"parenthetical": "under the \"de novo review\" provided by SOX, \"district courts are able to consider the merits of a plaintiffs whistle-blower [administrative] complaint as if it had not been decided previously\"",
"sentence": "Willis v. Vie Fin. Grp., No. 04-435, 2004 WL 1774575, *6 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 6, 2004) (holding that plaintiffs failure to raise a claim in an administrative complaint with OSHA precluded pursuing that claim in district court); see also Hanna v. WCI Cmts., 348 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1324, 1329 (S.D.Fl.2004) (under the “de novo review” provided by SOX, “district courts are able to consider the merits of a plaintiffs whistle-blower [administrative] complaint as if it had not been decided previously”) (internal quotation omitted); Murray v. TXU Corp., 279 F.Supp.2d 799, 802 (N.D.Tex.2003) (stating that district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Section 806 claim if plaintiff has failed to comply with administrative procedures)."
} | 4,182,834 | a |
A federal district court "can only conduct a 'de novo review' of those [SOX whistleblower] claims that have been administratively exhausted." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "279 F.Supp.2d 799, 802",
"parenthetical": "stating that district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Section 806 claim if plaintiff has failed to comply with administrative procedures",
"sentence": "Willis v. Vie Fin. Grp., No. 04-435, 2004 WL 1774575, *6 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 6, 2004) (holding that plaintiffs failure to raise a claim in an administrative complaint with OSHA precluded pursuing that claim in district court); see also Hanna v. WCI Cmts., 348 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1324, 1329 (S.D.Fl.2004) (under the “de novo review” provided by SOX, “district courts are able to consider the merits of a plaintiffs whistle-blower [administrative] complaint as if it had not been decided previously”) (internal quotation omitted); Murray v. TXU Corp., 279 F.Supp.2d 799, 802 (N.D.Tex.2003) (stating that district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Section 806 claim if plaintiff has failed to comply with administrative procedures)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2004 WL 1774575, *6",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs failure to raise a claim in an administrative complaint with OSHA precluded pursuing that claim in district court",
"sentence": "Willis v. Vie Fin. Grp., No. 04-435, 2004 WL 1774575, *6 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 6, 2004) (holding that plaintiffs failure to raise a claim in an administrative complaint with OSHA precluded pursuing that claim in district court); see also Hanna v. WCI Cmts., 348 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1324, 1329 (S.D.Fl.2004) (under the “de novo review” provided by SOX, “district courts are able to consider the merits of a plaintiffs whistle-blower [administrative] complaint as if it had not been decided previously”) (internal quotation omitted); Murray v. TXU Corp., 279 F.Supp.2d 799, 802 (N.D.Tex.2003) (stating that district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Section 806 claim if plaintiff has failed to comply with administrative procedures)."
} | 4,182,834 | b |
Mr. Stevens moved to Maine on January 17, 2007. He does not, therefore, argue that SORNA cannot apply to him because he traveled before SOR-NA's effective date. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "551 F.3d 578, 583",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"applying the Act to persons who crossed state lines before its enactment does not violate [the Ex Post Facto ] clause\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir.2008) (requiring that a sex offender’s interstate travel occur after SORNA’s effective date); United States v. Rusted, 545 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir.2008) (same); but see United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir.2008) (stating that “applying the Act to persons who crossed state lines before its enactment does not violate [the Ex Post Facto ] clause”). Instead, he argues that SORNA cannot apply to him because he traveled before February 28, 2007, the date the Attorney General promulgated a regulation (the Interim Rule) clarifying that SORNA applies to all sex offenders, including those who committed sex offenses prior to SORNA’s enactment."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 F.3d 912, 920",
"parenthetical": "requiring that a sex offender's interstate travel occur after SORNA's effective date",
"sentence": "See United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir.2008) (requiring that a sex offender’s interstate travel occur after SORNA’s effective date); United States v. Rusted, 545 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir.2008) (same); but see United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir.2008) (stating that “applying the Act to persons who crossed state lines before its enactment does not violate [the Ex Post Facto ] clause”). Instead, he argues that SORNA cannot apply to him because he traveled before February 28, 2007, the date the Attorney General promulgated a regulation (the Interim Rule) clarifying that SORNA applies to all sex offenders, including those who committed sex offenses prior to SORNA’s enactment."
} | 3,348,583 | b |
The Former Wife raises several arguments regarding the propriety of the trial court's award of attorney's fees and costs. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction her challenge to the award because, not only is the amended final judgment ambiguous regarding entitlement, the trial court reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees to be awarded. Because the amount has not been determined, that portion of the amended final judgment is nonfinal and nonappealable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "644 So.2d 612, 612",
"parenthetical": "holding that an order that determines only the right to attorney's fees without setting the amount is a nonap-pealable, nonfinal order",
"sentence": "See McIlveen v. McIlveen, 644 So.2d 612, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that an order that determines only the right to attorney’s fees without setting the amount is a nonap-pealable, nonfinal order); see also Zuberer v. Zuberer, 28 So.3d 993, 993-94 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (affirming the amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage but dismissing as premature the trial court’s ruling only determining entitlement to fees because the issue was “not ripe for appeal” until the trial court determined the amount of the fees to be awarded)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "28 So.3d 993, 993-94",
"parenthetical": "affirming the amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage but dismissing as premature the trial court's ruling only determining entitlement to fees because the issue was \"not ripe for appeal\" until the trial court determined the amount of the fees to be awarded",
"sentence": "See McIlveen v. McIlveen, 644 So.2d 612, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that an order that determines only the right to attorney’s fees without setting the amount is a nonap-pealable, nonfinal order); see also Zuberer v. Zuberer, 28 So.3d 993, 993-94 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (affirming the amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage but dismissing as premature the trial court’s ruling only determining entitlement to fees because the issue was “not ripe for appeal” until the trial court determined the amount of the fees to be awarded)."
} | 6,998,139 | a |
In effect, the certification is doubly removed from a right of confrontation. It constitutes a nontestimonial authentication of records of nontestimonial information. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "459 Mass. 775, 784",
"parenthetical": "record certifying the working condition of police breathalyzer machinery \"rather than reflecting 'judgment and discretion' or 'expressions of opinion' of . . . [a] technician, merely signifies that the . . . procedures prescribed by regulation were satisfactorily performed\"",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Zein-inger, 459 Mass. 775, 784 (2011) (record certifying the working condition of police breathalyzer machinery “rather than reflecting ‘judgment and discretion’ or ‘expressions of opinion’ of . . . [a] technician, merely signifies that the . . . procedures prescribed by regulation were satisfactorily performed”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "460 F.3d 920, 927",
"parenthetical": "\"[gjiven [that hospital] records themselves do not fall within the constitutional guarantee provided by the Confrontation Clause, it would be odd to hold that the foundational evidence authenticating the [hospital] records do[es]\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 927 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[gjiven [that hospital] records themselves do not fall within the constitutional guarantee provided by the Confrontation Clause, it would be odd to hold that the foundational evidence authenticating the [hospital] records do[es]”)."
} | 3,842,123 | b |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "988 F.2d 1494, 1501",
"parenthetical": "holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 174, 177-78",
"parenthetical": "holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | a |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "33 F.3d 415, 419",
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "988 F.2d 1494, 1501",
"parenthetical": "holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | b |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "988 F.2d 1494, 1501",
"parenthetical": "holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | b |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "988 F.2d 1494, 1501",
"parenthetical": "holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | b |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "988 F.2d 1494, 1501",
"parenthetical": "holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | b |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "988 F.2d 1494, 1501",
"parenthetical": "holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 1047, 1049",
"parenthetical": "defendant who pled guilty to possession of AK-47 and Uzi in course of drug crime-in violation of 924(c",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Taffe, 36 F.3d 1047, 1049 (11th Cir.1994) (defendant who pled guilty to possession of AK-47 and Uzi in course of drug crime-in violation of 924(c)-could not later assert at sentencing that crime was possession of AK-47 alone); United States v. Johnson, 888 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir.1989) (defendant who pled guilty to indictment alleging conspiracy to distribute cocaine, LSD, and mushrooms could not later assert that he only knew about cocaine)."
} | 285,175 | a |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "988 F.2d 1494, 1501",
"parenthetical": "holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "888 F.2d 1255, 1256",
"parenthetical": "defendant who pled guilty to indictment alleging conspiracy to distribute cocaine, LSD, and mushrooms could not later assert that he only knew about cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Taffe, 36 F.3d 1047, 1049 (11th Cir.1994) (defendant who pled guilty to possession of AK-47 and Uzi in course of drug crime-in violation of 924(c)-could not later assert at sentencing that crime was possession of AK-47 alone); United States v. Johnson, 888 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir.1989) (defendant who pled guilty to indictment alleging conspiracy to distribute cocaine, LSD, and mushrooms could not later assert that he only knew about cocaine)."
} | 285,175 | a |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 174, 177-78",
"parenthetical": "holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | b |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "33 F.3d 415, 419",
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | a |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | a |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | a |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | a |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 1047, 1049",
"parenthetical": "defendant who pled guilty to possession of AK-47 and Uzi in course of drug crime-in violation of 924(c",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Taffe, 36 F.3d 1047, 1049 (11th Cir.1994) (defendant who pled guilty to possession of AK-47 and Uzi in course of drug crime-in violation of 924(c)-could not later assert at sentencing that crime was possession of AK-47 alone); United States v. Johnson, 888 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir.1989) (defendant who pled guilty to indictment alleging conspiracy to distribute cocaine, LSD, and mushrooms could not later assert that he only knew about cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | b |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "888 F.2d 1255, 1256",
"parenthetical": "defendant who pled guilty to indictment alleging conspiracy to distribute cocaine, LSD, and mushrooms could not later assert that he only knew about cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Taffe, 36 F.3d 1047, 1049 (11th Cir.1994) (defendant who pled guilty to possession of AK-47 and Uzi in course of drug crime-in violation of 924(c)-could not later assert at sentencing that crime was possession of AK-47 alone); United States v. Johnson, 888 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir.1989) (defendant who pled guilty to indictment alleging conspiracy to distribute cocaine, LSD, and mushrooms could not later assert that he only knew about cocaine)."
} | 285,175 | a |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 174, 177-78",
"parenthetical": "holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | b |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "33 F.3d 415, 419",
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | a |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | a |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | b |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | b |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 1047, 1049",
"parenthetical": "defendant who pled guilty to possession of AK-47 and Uzi in course of drug crime-in violation of 924(c",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Taffe, 36 F.3d 1047, 1049 (11th Cir.1994) (defendant who pled guilty to possession of AK-47 and Uzi in course of drug crime-in violation of 924(c)-could not later assert at sentencing that crime was possession of AK-47 alone); United States v. Johnson, 888 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir.1989) (defendant who pled guilty to indictment alleging conspiracy to distribute cocaine, LSD, and mushrooms could not later assert that he only knew about cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | b |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "888 F.2d 1255, 1256",
"parenthetical": "defendant who pled guilty to indictment alleging conspiracy to distribute cocaine, LSD, and mushrooms could not later assert that he only knew about cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Taffe, 36 F.3d 1047, 1049 (11th Cir.1994) (defendant who pled guilty to possession of AK-47 and Uzi in course of drug crime-in violation of 924(c)-could not later assert at sentencing that crime was possession of AK-47 alone); United States v. Johnson, 888 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir.1989) (defendant who pled guilty to indictment alleging conspiracy to distribute cocaine, LSD, and mushrooms could not later assert that he only knew about cocaine)."
} | 285,175 | a |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "33 F.3d 415, 419",
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 174, 177-78",
"parenthetical": "holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | b |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 174, 177-78",
"parenthetical": "holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | a |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 174, 177-78",
"parenthetical": "holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | a |
We are aware that decisions in other circuits have on occasion treated guilty pleas as admitting factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government's proof of the offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 174, 177-78",
"parenthetical": "holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1501 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that plea to multi-defendant conspiracy charge bars defendant from denying his involvement from the date of commencement of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment); United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1988) (holding, without citation of authority, that guilty plea to indictment charging mail fraud scheme involving 135 victims precluded defendant from claiming at sentencing that fewer victims were involved) with United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1,000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea); see also United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that where indictment and plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing); cf. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S.Ct. 949, 130 L.Ed.2d 892 (1995) (finding no clear error where court relied at sentencing on loss amount in Bill of Information rather than inconsistent figures offered by defendant at hearing). The defendant is, of course, bound at sentencing by factual allegations that establish an element of the crime which he has admitted on pleading guilty."
} | 285,175 | a |
Because the carpenter was white, the entries were relevant to establish Griffin's culpable mental state and to rebut her assertion that she had acted accidentally or in reasonable self-defense. This theory of relevance does not depend on the inference that Griffin acted in conformity with her bad character generally. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 P.3d 998, 998-1000",
"parenthetical": "writings and drawings evidencing a hatred of women were proper evidence of motive",
"sentence": "See Masters, 58 P.3d at 998-1000 (writings and drawings evidencing a hatred of women were proper evidence of motive); People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365, 372-73 (Colo.App.2007) (other act evidence was admissible to show motive by demonstrating the defendant's antipathy toward women); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal.3d 551, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, 906-07 (1991) (writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife); State v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879, 882 (1994) (written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"); see also State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864-65 (Me.1986) (recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "513 A.2d 862, 864-65",
"parenthetical": "recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder",
"sentence": "See Masters, 58 P.3d at 998-1000 (writings and drawings evidencing a hatred of women were proper evidence of motive); People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365, 372-73 (Colo.App.2007) (other act evidence was admissible to show motive by demonstrating the defendant's antipathy toward women); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal.3d 551, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, 906-07 (1991) (writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife); State v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879, 882 (1994) (written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"); see also State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864-65 (Me.1986) (recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder)."
} | 6,994,095 | a |
Because the carpenter was white, the entries were relevant to establish Griffin's culpable mental state and to rebut her assertion that she had acted accidentally or in reasonable self-defense. This theory of relevance does not depend on the inference that Griffin acted in conformity with her bad character generally. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "513 A.2d 862, 864-65",
"parenthetical": "recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder",
"sentence": "See Masters, 58 P.3d at 998-1000 (writings and drawings evidencing a hatred of women were proper evidence of motive); People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365, 372-73 (Colo.App.2007) (other act evidence was admissible to show motive by demonstrating the defendant's antipathy toward women); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal.3d 551, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, 906-07 (1991) (writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife); State v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879, 882 (1994) (written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"); see also State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864-65 (Me.1986) (recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "181 P.3d 365, 372-73",
"parenthetical": "other act evidence was admissible to show motive by demonstrating the defendant's antipathy toward women",
"sentence": "See Masters, 58 P.3d at 998-1000 (writings and drawings evidencing a hatred of women were proper evidence of motive); People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365, 372-73 (Colo.App.2007) (other act evidence was admissible to show motive by demonstrating the defendant's antipathy toward women); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal.3d 551, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, 906-07 (1991) (writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife); State v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879, 882 (1994) (written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"); see also State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864-65 (Me.1986) (recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder)."
} | 6,994,095 | b |
Because the carpenter was white, the entries were relevant to establish Griffin's culpable mental state and to rebut her assertion that she had acted accidentally or in reasonable self-defense. This theory of relevance does not depend on the inference that Griffin acted in conformity with her bad character generally. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife",
"sentence": "See Masters, 58 P.3d at 998-1000 (writings and drawings evidencing a hatred of women were proper evidence of motive); People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365, 372-73 (Colo.App.2007) (other act evidence was admissible to show motive by demonstrating the defendant's antipathy toward women); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal.3d 551, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, 906-07 (1991) (writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife); State v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879, 882 (1994) (written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"); see also State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864-65 (Me.1986) (recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "513 A.2d 862, 864-65",
"parenthetical": "recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder",
"sentence": "See Masters, 58 P.3d at 998-1000 (writings and drawings evidencing a hatred of women were proper evidence of motive); People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365, 372-73 (Colo.App.2007) (other act evidence was admissible to show motive by demonstrating the defendant's antipathy toward women); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal.3d 551, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, 906-07 (1991) (writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife); State v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879, 882 (1994) (written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"); see also State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864-65 (Me.1986) (recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder)."
} | 6,994,095 | a |
Because the carpenter was white, the entries were relevant to establish Griffin's culpable mental state and to rebut her assertion that she had acted accidentally or in reasonable self-defense. This theory of relevance does not depend on the inference that Griffin acted in conformity with her bad character generally. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife",
"sentence": "See Masters, 58 P.3d at 998-1000 (writings and drawings evidencing a hatred of women were proper evidence of motive); People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365, 372-73 (Colo.App.2007) (other act evidence was admissible to show motive by demonstrating the defendant's antipathy toward women); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal.3d 551, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, 906-07 (1991) (writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife); State v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879, 882 (1994) (written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"); see also State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864-65 (Me.1986) (recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "513 A.2d 862, 864-65",
"parenthetical": "recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder",
"sentence": "See Masters, 58 P.3d at 998-1000 (writings and drawings evidencing a hatred of women were proper evidence of motive); People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365, 372-73 (Colo.App.2007) (other act evidence was admissible to show motive by demonstrating the defendant's antipathy toward women); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal.3d 551, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, 906-07 (1991) (writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife); State v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879, 882 (1994) (written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"); see also State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864-65 (Me.1986) (recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder)."
} | 6,994,095 | a |
Because the carpenter was white, the entries were relevant to establish Griffin's culpable mental state and to rebut her assertion that she had acted accidentally or in reasonable self-defense. This theory of relevance does not depend on the inference that Griffin acted in conformity with her bad character generally. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "513 A.2d 862, 864-65",
"parenthetical": "recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder",
"sentence": "See Masters, 58 P.3d at 998-1000 (writings and drawings evidencing a hatred of women were proper evidence of motive); People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365, 372-73 (Colo.App.2007) (other act evidence was admissible to show motive by demonstrating the defendant's antipathy toward women); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal.3d 551, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, 906-07 (1991) (writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife); State v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879, 882 (1994) (written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"); see also State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864-65 (Me.1986) (recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "817 P.2d 893, 906-07",
"parenthetical": "writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife",
"sentence": "See Masters, 58 P.3d at 998-1000 (writings and drawings evidencing a hatred of women were proper evidence of motive); People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365, 372-73 (Colo.App.2007) (other act evidence was admissible to show motive by demonstrating the defendant's antipathy toward women); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal.3d 551, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, 906-07 (1991) (writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife); State v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879, 882 (1994) (written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"); see also State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864-65 (Me.1986) (recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder)."
} | 6,994,095 | b |
Because the carpenter was white, the entries were relevant to establish Griffin's culpable mental state and to rebut her assertion that she had acted accidentally or in reasonable self-defense. This theory of relevance does not depend on the inference that Griffin acted in conformity with her bad character generally. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "513 A.2d 862, 864-65",
"parenthetical": "recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder",
"sentence": "See Masters, 58 P.3d at 998-1000 (writings and drawings evidencing a hatred of women were proper evidence of motive); People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365, 372-73 (Colo.App.2007) (other act evidence was admissible to show motive by demonstrating the defendant's antipathy toward women); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal.3d 551, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, 906-07 (1991) (writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife); State v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879, 882 (1994) (written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"); see also State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864-65 (Me.1986) (recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"",
"sentence": "See Masters, 58 P.3d at 998-1000 (writings and drawings evidencing a hatred of women were proper evidence of motive); People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365, 372-73 (Colo.App.2007) (other act evidence was admissible to show motive by demonstrating the defendant's antipathy toward women); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal.3d 551, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, 906-07 (1991) (writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife); State v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879, 882 (1994) (written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"); see also State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864-65 (Me.1986) (recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder)."
} | 6,994,095 | b |
Because the carpenter was white, the entries were relevant to establish Griffin's culpable mental state and to rebut her assertion that she had acted accidentally or in reasonable self-defense. This theory of relevance does not depend on the inference that Griffin acted in conformity with her bad character generally. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "649 A.2d 879, 882",
"parenthetical": "written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"",
"sentence": "See Masters, 58 P.3d at 998-1000 (writings and drawings evidencing a hatred of women were proper evidence of motive); People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365, 372-73 (Colo.App.2007) (other act evidence was admissible to show motive by demonstrating the defendant's antipathy toward women); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal.3d 551, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, 906-07 (1991) (writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife); State v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879, 882 (1994) (written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"); see also State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864-65 (Me.1986) (recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "513 A.2d 862, 864-65",
"parenthetical": "recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder",
"sentence": "See Masters, 58 P.3d at 998-1000 (writings and drawings evidencing a hatred of women were proper evidence of motive); People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365, 372-73 (Colo.App.2007) (other act evidence was admissible to show motive by demonstrating the defendant's antipathy toward women); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal.3d 551, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, 906-07 (1991) (writings evidencing extreme dislike of religion were admissible to prove the defendant's mental state in murdering his religious ex-wife); State v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879, 882 (1994) (written evidence of racial animus was \"powerful evidence of a motive which helps to explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence\" and \"tends to cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's self-serving statement that [the victim] initiated the confrontation\"); see also State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864-65 (Me.1986) (recording of the defendant's belief in Satanism was relevant to show motive, which was probative of identity and intent in a prosecution for murder)."
} | 6,994,095 | a |
. Nor does Adler's allegation of political motivation create a judicial estoppel that bars him from asserting that his wife's law suit was the sole motivation for his discharge. In this Circuit, judicial estoppel applies only when a tribunal in a prior separate proceeding has relied on a party's inconsistent factual representations and rendered a favorable decision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 622, 628",
"parenthetical": "applying judicial es-toppel analysis to position taken in New York State Supreme Court proceeding",
"sentence": "See Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 71-72 (2d Cir.1997) (applying judicial estop-pel to employment discrimination claim based on position taken in prior Social Security Administration disability adjudication); see also AXA Marine & Aviation Insurance (UK) Ltd. v. Seajet Industries Inc., 84 F.3d 622, 628 (2d Cir.1996) (applying judicial es-toppel analysis to position taken in New York State Supreme Court proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "128 F.3d 68, 71-72",
"parenthetical": "applying judicial estop-pel to employment discrimination claim based on position taken in prior Social Security Administration disability adjudication",
"sentence": "See Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 71-72 (2d Cir.1997) (applying judicial estop-pel to employment discrimination claim based on position taken in prior Social Security Administration disability adjudication); see also AXA Marine & Aviation Insurance (UK) Ltd. v. Seajet Industries Inc., 84 F.3d 622, 628 (2d Cir.1996) (applying judicial es-toppel analysis to position taken in New York State Supreme Court proceeding)."
} | 11,583,073 | b |
Further, casinos by nature attract many customers even when their GTR is less than $500 million. As a result, a single casino is likely to generate significant local effects such as increased vehicular traffic, the presence of a large number of patrons, and the concomitant potential for substantial consumption of municipal resources such as fire and police services. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "507 Pa. 317, 322",
"parenthetical": "describing differences in us age of municipal services as a \"significant\" factor for tax classification purposes",
"sentence": "See Shelly Funeral Home, 618 Pa. at 476, 57 A.3d at 1140 (observing that “businesses with high gross receipts tend to be larger and more likely than small ones to consume municipal resources”); cf. Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 317, 322, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985) (describing differences in us age of municipal services as a “significant” factor for tax classification purposes)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "618 Pa. 476, 476",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"businesses with high gross receipts tend to be larger and more likely than small ones to consume municipal resources\"",
"sentence": "See Shelly Funeral Home, 618 Pa. at 476, 57 A.3d at 1140 (observing that “businesses with high gross receipts tend to be larger and more likely than small ones to consume municipal resources”); cf. Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 317, 322, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985) (describing differences in us age of municipal services as a “significant” factor for tax classification purposes)."
} | 12,315,645 | b |
Further, casinos by nature attract many customers even when their GTR is less than $500 million. As a result, a single casino is likely to generate significant local effects such as increased vehicular traffic, the presence of a large number of patrons, and the concomitant potential for substantial consumption of municipal resources such as fire and police services. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "618 Pa. 476, 476",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"businesses with high gross receipts tend to be larger and more likely than small ones to consume municipal resources\"",
"sentence": "See Shelly Funeral Home, 618 Pa. at 476, 57 A.3d at 1140 (observing that “businesses with high gross receipts tend to be larger and more likely than small ones to consume municipal resources”); cf. Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 317, 322, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985) (describing differences in us age of municipal services as a “significant” factor for tax classification purposes)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "489 A.2d 1349, 1352",
"parenthetical": "describing differences in us age of municipal services as a \"significant\" factor for tax classification purposes",
"sentence": "See Shelly Funeral Home, 618 Pa. at 476, 57 A.3d at 1140 (observing that “businesses with high gross receipts tend to be larger and more likely than small ones to consume municipal resources”); cf. Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 317, 322, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985) (describing differences in us age of municipal services as a “significant” factor for tax classification purposes)."
} | 12,315,645 | a |
Further, casinos by nature attract many customers even when their GTR is less than $500 million. As a result, a single casino is likely to generate significant local effects such as increased vehicular traffic, the presence of a large number of patrons, and the concomitant potential for substantial consumption of municipal resources such as fire and police services. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "57 A.3d 1140, 1140",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"businesses with high gross receipts tend to be larger and more likely than small ones to consume municipal resources\"",
"sentence": "See Shelly Funeral Home, 618 Pa. at 476, 57 A.3d at 1140 (observing that “businesses with high gross receipts tend to be larger and more likely than small ones to consume municipal resources”); cf. Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 317, 322, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985) (describing differences in us age of municipal services as a “significant” factor for tax classification purposes)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "507 Pa. 317, 322",
"parenthetical": "describing differences in us age of municipal services as a \"significant\" factor for tax classification purposes",
"sentence": "See Shelly Funeral Home, 618 Pa. at 476, 57 A.3d at 1140 (observing that “businesses with high gross receipts tend to be larger and more likely than small ones to consume municipal resources”); cf. Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 317, 322, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985) (describing differences in us age of municipal services as a “significant” factor for tax classification purposes)."
} | 12,315,645 | a |
Further, casinos by nature attract many customers even when their GTR is less than $500 million. As a result, a single casino is likely to generate significant local effects such as increased vehicular traffic, the presence of a large number of patrons, and the concomitant potential for substantial consumption of municipal resources such as fire and police services. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "489 A.2d 1349, 1352",
"parenthetical": "describing differences in us age of municipal services as a \"significant\" factor for tax classification purposes",
"sentence": "See Shelly Funeral Home, 618 Pa. at 476, 57 A.3d at 1140 (observing that “businesses with high gross receipts tend to be larger and more likely than small ones to consume municipal resources”); cf. Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 317, 322, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985) (describing differences in us age of municipal services as a “significant” factor for tax classification purposes)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "57 A.3d 1140, 1140",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"businesses with high gross receipts tend to be larger and more likely than small ones to consume municipal resources\"",
"sentence": "See Shelly Funeral Home, 618 Pa. at 476, 57 A.3d at 1140 (observing that “businesses with high gross receipts tend to be larger and more likely than small ones to consume municipal resources”); cf. Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 317, 322, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985) (describing differences in us age of municipal services as a “significant” factor for tax classification purposes)."
} | 12,315,645 | b |
This Court has consistently rejected determinations by Commerce that include the costs related to the purchase and resale of traded goods in the denominator of the SG&A ratio when Commerce could not show how expenses related to these goods affected production of the subject merchandise. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "185 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1357",
"parenthetical": "granting Commerce's request for a voluntary remand to remove expenses related to traded goods from the denominator for the calculation of the overhead ratio",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhodia, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 1357 (granting Commerce’s request for a voluntary remand to remove expenses related to traded goods from the denominator for the calculation of the overhead ratio); see also Timken, 23 CIT at_, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1379 (remanding to Commerce to exclude purchases of traded goods from SG&A, since it “failed to demonstrate how these already manufactured goods constitute a material cost incurred in manufacturing the subject merchandise.”); Luoyang Bearing Factory v. United States, 26 CIT_,_, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1305 (remanding to Commerce to “exclude ‘consumption of traded goods’ from Commerce’s overhead, SG & A and profit rate calculations and to recalculate the dumping margins accordingly. . . .”). In like manner, any amount of selling and administrative costs related to such goods should be excluded from the ratio’s numerator."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "59 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1379",
"parenthetical": "remanding to Commerce to exclude purchases of traded goods from SG&A, since it \"failed to demonstrate how these already manufactured goods constitute a material cost incurred in manufacturing the subject merchandise.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhodia, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 1357 (granting Commerce’s request for a voluntary remand to remove expenses related to traded goods from the denominator for the calculation of the overhead ratio); see also Timken, 23 CIT at_, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1379 (remanding to Commerce to exclude purchases of traded goods from SG&A, since it “failed to demonstrate how these already manufactured goods constitute a material cost incurred in manufacturing the subject merchandise.”); Luoyang Bearing Factory v. United States, 26 CIT_,_, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1305 (remanding to Commerce to “exclude ‘consumption of traded goods’ from Commerce’s overhead, SG & A and profit rate calculations and to recalculate the dumping margins accordingly. . . .”). In like manner, any amount of selling and administrative costs related to such goods should be excluded from the ratio’s numerator."
} | 8,363,709 | a |
This Court has consistently rejected determinations by Commerce that include the costs related to the purchase and resale of traded goods in the denominator of the SG&A ratio when Commerce could not show how expenses related to these goods affected production of the subject merchandise. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "185 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1357",
"parenthetical": "granting Commerce's request for a voluntary remand to remove expenses related to traded goods from the denominator for the calculation of the overhead ratio",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhodia, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 1357 (granting Commerce’s request for a voluntary remand to remove expenses related to traded goods from the denominator for the calculation of the overhead ratio); see also Timken, 23 CIT at_, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1379 (remanding to Commerce to exclude purchases of traded goods from SG&A, since it “failed to demonstrate how these already manufactured goods constitute a material cost incurred in manufacturing the subject merchandise.”); Luoyang Bearing Factory v. United States, 26 CIT_,_, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1305 (remanding to Commerce to “exclude ‘consumption of traded goods’ from Commerce’s overhead, SG & A and profit rate calculations and to recalculate the dumping margins accordingly. . . .”). In like manner, any amount of selling and administrative costs related to such goods should be excluded from the ratio’s numerator."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "240 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1305",
"parenthetical": "remanding to Commerce to \"exclude 'consumption of traded goods' from Commerce's overhead, SG & A and profit rate calculations and to recalculate the dumping margins accordingly. . . .\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rhodia, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 1357 (granting Commerce’s request for a voluntary remand to remove expenses related to traded goods from the denominator for the calculation of the overhead ratio); see also Timken, 23 CIT at_, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1379 (remanding to Commerce to exclude purchases of traded goods from SG&A, since it “failed to demonstrate how these already manufactured goods constitute a material cost incurred in manufacturing the subject merchandise.”); Luoyang Bearing Factory v. United States, 26 CIT_,_, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1305 (remanding to Commerce to “exclude ‘consumption of traded goods’ from Commerce’s overhead, SG & A and profit rate calculations and to recalculate the dumping margins accordingly. . . .”). In like manner, any amount of selling and administrative costs related to such goods should be excluded from the ratio’s numerator."
} | 8,363,709 | a |
Vaughn's appeal complains that the post-conviction court applied the wrong standard because Harbor held that there is no requirement that the new factor "frustrate" the sentence in order to justify modification of that sentence. The post-sentencing court may still, however, consider whether the new factor frustrates the original sentencing scheme. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2011 WI 33, ¶ 89",
"parenthetical": "\"In determining whether to exercise its discretion to modify a sentence on the basis of a new factor, the circuit court may, but is not required to, consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the original sentence.\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶ 89, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 384, 797 N.W.2d 451, 476 (\"In determining whether to exercise its discretion to modify a sentence on the basis of a new factor, the circuit court may, but is not required to, consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the original sentence.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WI 28, ¶ 50",
"parenthetical": "\"A circuit court might conclude that its entire approach to sentencing would have been different had it been aware of a fact that is 'highly relevant to the imposition of sentence.' Even so, the court may not be able to conclude that the new fact, which would have changed its entire approach to sentencing, necessarily frustrates the purpose of the original sentence it imposed.\"",
"sentence": "See id., 2011 WI 28, ¶ 50, 333 Wis. 2d at 78, 797 N.W2d at 840 (\"A circuit court might conclude that its entire approach to sentencing would have been different had it been aware of a fact that is 'highly relevant to the imposition of sentence.' Even so, the court may not be able to conclude that the new fact, which would have changed its entire approach to sentencing, necessarily frustrates the purpose of the original sentence it imposed.\") (quoted source omitted)."
} | 4,031,370 | b |
Vaughn's appeal complains that the post-conviction court applied the wrong standard because Harbor held that there is no requirement that the new factor "frustrate" the sentence in order to justify modification of that sentence. The post-sentencing court may still, however, consider whether the new factor frustrates the original sentencing scheme. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WI 28, ¶ 50",
"parenthetical": "\"A circuit court might conclude that its entire approach to sentencing would have been different had it been aware of a fact that is 'highly relevant to the imposition of sentence.' Even so, the court may not be able to conclude that the new fact, which would have changed its entire approach to sentencing, necessarily frustrates the purpose of the original sentence it imposed.\"",
"sentence": "See id., 2011 WI 28, ¶ 50, 333 Wis. 2d at 78, 797 N.W2d at 840 (\"A circuit court might conclude that its entire approach to sentencing would have been different had it been aware of a fact that is 'highly relevant to the imposition of sentence.' Even so, the court may not be able to conclude that the new fact, which would have changed its entire approach to sentencing, necessarily frustrates the purpose of the original sentence it imposed.\") (quoted source omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "333 Wis. 2d 335, 384",
"parenthetical": "\"In determining whether to exercise its discretion to modify a sentence on the basis of a new factor, the circuit court may, but is not required to, consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the original sentence.\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶ 89, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 384, 797 N.W.2d 451, 476 (\"In determining whether to exercise its discretion to modify a sentence on the basis of a new factor, the circuit court may, but is not required to, consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the original sentence.\")."
} | 4,031,370 | a |
Vaughn's appeal complains that the post-conviction court applied the wrong standard because Harbor held that there is no requirement that the new factor "frustrate" the sentence in order to justify modification of that sentence. The post-sentencing court may still, however, consider whether the new factor frustrates the original sentencing scheme. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WI 28, ¶ 50",
"parenthetical": "\"A circuit court might conclude that its entire approach to sentencing would have been different had it been aware of a fact that is 'highly relevant to the imposition of sentence.' Even so, the court may not be able to conclude that the new fact, which would have changed its entire approach to sentencing, necessarily frustrates the purpose of the original sentence it imposed.\"",
"sentence": "See id., 2011 WI 28, ¶ 50, 333 Wis. 2d at 78, 797 N.W2d at 840 (\"A circuit court might conclude that its entire approach to sentencing would have been different had it been aware of a fact that is 'highly relevant to the imposition of sentence.' Even so, the court may not be able to conclude that the new fact, which would have changed its entire approach to sentencing, necessarily frustrates the purpose of the original sentence it imposed.\") (quoted source omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "797 N.W.2d 451, 476",
"parenthetical": "\"In determining whether to exercise its discretion to modify a sentence on the basis of a new factor, the circuit court may, but is not required to, consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the original sentence.\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶ 89, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 384, 797 N.W.2d 451, 476 (\"In determining whether to exercise its discretion to modify a sentence on the basis of a new factor, the circuit court may, but is not required to, consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the original sentence.\")."
} | 4,031,370 | a |
Vaughn's appeal complains that the post-conviction court applied the wrong standard because Harbor held that there is no requirement that the new factor "frustrate" the sentence in order to justify modification of that sentence. The post-sentencing court may still, however, consider whether the new factor frustrates the original sentencing scheme. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2011 WI 33, ¶ 89",
"parenthetical": "\"In determining whether to exercise its discretion to modify a sentence on the basis of a new factor, the circuit court may, but is not required to, consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the original sentence.\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶ 89, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 384, 797 N.W.2d 451, 476 (\"In determining whether to exercise its discretion to modify a sentence on the basis of a new factor, the circuit court may, but is not required to, consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the original sentence.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "333 Wis. 2d 78, 78",
"parenthetical": "\"A circuit court might conclude that its entire approach to sentencing would have been different had it been aware of a fact that is 'highly relevant to the imposition of sentence.' Even so, the court may not be able to conclude that the new fact, which would have changed its entire approach to sentencing, necessarily frustrates the purpose of the original sentence it imposed.\"",
"sentence": "See id., 2011 WI 28, ¶ 50, 333 Wis. 2d at 78, 797 N.W2d at 840 (\"A circuit court might conclude that its entire approach to sentencing would have been different had it been aware of a fact that is 'highly relevant to the imposition of sentence.' Even so, the court may not be able to conclude that the new fact, which would have changed its entire approach to sentencing, necessarily frustrates the purpose of the original sentence it imposed.\") (quoted source omitted)."
} | 4,031,370 | b |
Vaughn's appeal complains that the post-conviction court applied the wrong standard because Harbor held that there is no requirement that the new factor "frustrate" the sentence in order to justify modification of that sentence. The post-sentencing court may still, however, consider whether the new factor frustrates the original sentencing scheme. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "333 Wis. 2d 78, 78",
"parenthetical": "\"A circuit court might conclude that its entire approach to sentencing would have been different had it been aware of a fact that is 'highly relevant to the imposition of sentence.' Even so, the court may not be able to conclude that the new fact, which would have changed its entire approach to sentencing, necessarily frustrates the purpose of the original sentence it imposed.\"",
"sentence": "See id., 2011 WI 28, ¶ 50, 333 Wis. 2d at 78, 797 N.W2d at 840 (\"A circuit court might conclude that its entire approach to sentencing would have been different had it been aware of a fact that is 'highly relevant to the imposition of sentence.' Even so, the court may not be able to conclude that the new fact, which would have changed its entire approach to sentencing, necessarily frustrates the purpose of the original sentence it imposed.\") (quoted source omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "333 Wis. 2d 335, 384",
"parenthetical": "\"In determining whether to exercise its discretion to modify a sentence on the basis of a new factor, the circuit court may, but is not required to, consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the original sentence.\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶ 89, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 384, 797 N.W.2d 451, 476 (\"In determining whether to exercise its discretion to modify a sentence on the basis of a new factor, the circuit court may, but is not required to, consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the original sentence.\")."
} | 4,031,370 | a |
Vaughn's appeal complains that the post-conviction court applied the wrong standard because Harbor held that there is no requirement that the new factor "frustrate" the sentence in order to justify modification of that sentence. The post-sentencing court may still, however, consider whether the new factor frustrates the original sentencing scheme. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "797 N.W.2d 451, 476",
"parenthetical": "\"In determining whether to exercise its discretion to modify a sentence on the basis of a new factor, the circuit court may, but is not required to, consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the original sentence.\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶ 89, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 384, 797 N.W.2d 451, 476 (\"In determining whether to exercise its discretion to modify a sentence on the basis of a new factor, the circuit court may, but is not required to, consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the original sentence.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "333 Wis. 2d 78, 78",
"parenthetical": "\"A circuit court might conclude that its entire approach to sentencing would have been different had it been aware of a fact that is 'highly relevant to the imposition of sentence.' Even so, the court may not be able to conclude that the new fact, which would have changed its entire approach to sentencing, necessarily frustrates the purpose of the original sentence it imposed.\"",
"sentence": "See id., 2011 WI 28, ¶ 50, 333 Wis. 2d at 78, 797 N.W2d at 840 (\"A circuit court might conclude that its entire approach to sentencing would have been different had it been aware of a fact that is 'highly relevant to the imposition of sentence.' Even so, the court may not be able to conclude that the new fact, which would have changed its entire approach to sentencing, necessarily frustrates the purpose of the original sentence it imposed.\") (quoted source omitted)."
} | 4,031,370 | b |
Discussion. An attorney has a duty to exert his best efforts to ensure that his client's decisions are based on correct information as to the applicable law. Counsel's erroneous advice to Garcia that community supervision was still available if he chose to go to the judge for sentencing fell below an objective standard of reasonably professional judgment and foreclosed him from receiving community supervision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "818 S.W.2d 814, 815",
"parenthetical": "counsel's erroneous advice to defendant to elect court to assess punishment was based on counsel's mistaken belief that defendant was eligible for shock probation and deprived defendant of opportunity for jury to assess probation, and thus fell below standard of reasonable representation",
"sentence": "See Gallegos, 756 S.W.2d at 48 (counsel who failed to inform defendant his jury waiver at punishment phase precluded him from receiving probation was ineffective, where the error was not an exercise of reasonable professional judgment and prejudiced defendant); see also Ex parte Canedo, 818 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (counsel’s erroneous advice to defendant to elect court to assess punishment was based on counsel’s mistaken belief that defendant was eligible for shock probation and deprived defendant of opportunity for jury to assess probation, and thus fell below standard of reasonable representation); Ex parte Battle, 817 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (defendant’s election to plead guilty, based on counsel’s erroneous advice that he was eligible for court-ordered probation, was not done voluntarily and knowingly); Medeiros v. State, 733 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1987, no pet.) (attorney’s admitted lack of knowledge of probation laws cannot supply basis for informed decision concerning assessment of punishment)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "756 S.W.2d 48, 48",
"parenthetical": "counsel who failed to inform defendant his jury waiver at punishment phase precluded him from receiving probation was ineffective, where the error was not an exercise of reasonable professional judgment and prejudiced defendant",
"sentence": "See Gallegos, 756 S.W.2d at 48 (counsel who failed to inform defendant his jury waiver at punishment phase precluded him from receiving probation was ineffective, where the error was not an exercise of reasonable professional judgment and prejudiced defendant); see also Ex parte Canedo, 818 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (counsel’s erroneous advice to defendant to elect court to assess punishment was based on counsel’s mistaken belief that defendant was eligible for shock probation and deprived defendant of opportunity for jury to assess probation, and thus fell below standard of reasonable representation); Ex parte Battle, 817 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (defendant’s election to plead guilty, based on counsel’s erroneous advice that he was eligible for court-ordered probation, was not done voluntarily and knowingly); Medeiros v. State, 733 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1987, no pet.) (attorney’s admitted lack of knowledge of probation laws cannot supply basis for informed decision concerning assessment of punishment)."
} | 7,322,657 | b |
Discussion. An attorney has a duty to exert his best efforts to ensure that his client's decisions are based on correct information as to the applicable law. Counsel's erroneous advice to Garcia that community supervision was still available if he chose to go to the judge for sentencing fell below an objective standard of reasonably professional judgment and foreclosed him from receiving community supervision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 S.W.2d 81, 83",
"parenthetical": "defendant's election to plead guilty, based on counsel's erroneous advice that he was eligible for court-ordered probation, was not done voluntarily and knowingly",
"sentence": "See Gallegos, 756 S.W.2d at 48 (counsel who failed to inform defendant his jury waiver at punishment phase precluded him from receiving probation was ineffective, where the error was not an exercise of reasonable professional judgment and prejudiced defendant); see also Ex parte Canedo, 818 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (counsel’s erroneous advice to defendant to elect court to assess punishment was based on counsel’s mistaken belief that defendant was eligible for shock probation and deprived defendant of opportunity for jury to assess probation, and thus fell below standard of reasonable representation); Ex parte Battle, 817 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (defendant’s election to plead guilty, based on counsel’s erroneous advice that he was eligible for court-ordered probation, was not done voluntarily and knowingly); Medeiros v. State, 733 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1987, no pet.) (attorney’s admitted lack of knowledge of probation laws cannot supply basis for informed decision concerning assessment of punishment)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "756 S.W.2d 48, 48",
"parenthetical": "counsel who failed to inform defendant his jury waiver at punishment phase precluded him from receiving probation was ineffective, where the error was not an exercise of reasonable professional judgment and prejudiced defendant",
"sentence": "See Gallegos, 756 S.W.2d at 48 (counsel who failed to inform defendant his jury waiver at punishment phase precluded him from receiving probation was ineffective, where the error was not an exercise of reasonable professional judgment and prejudiced defendant); see also Ex parte Canedo, 818 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (counsel’s erroneous advice to defendant to elect court to assess punishment was based on counsel’s mistaken belief that defendant was eligible for shock probation and deprived defendant of opportunity for jury to assess probation, and thus fell below standard of reasonable representation); Ex parte Battle, 817 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (defendant’s election to plead guilty, based on counsel’s erroneous advice that he was eligible for court-ordered probation, was not done voluntarily and knowingly); Medeiros v. State, 733 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1987, no pet.) (attorney’s admitted lack of knowledge of probation laws cannot supply basis for informed decision concerning assessment of punishment)."
} | 7,322,657 | b |
. Under proper circumstances, both doctrines apply not only to the protection of human life or to avoid serious injury, but also to the protection of property interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "9 F.3d 506, 510",
"parenthetical": "finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to \"prevent the loss or destruction of the owner's property\" where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in progress",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises); see also United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir.1993) (finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to \"prevent the loss or destruction of the owner’s property” where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in progress); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267 (4th Cir.1984) (upholding initial warrantless entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "436 U.S. 499, 509",
"parenthetical": "concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises); see also United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir.1993) (finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to \"prevent the loss or destruction of the owner’s property” where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in progress); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267 (4th Cir.1984) (upholding initial warrantless entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open)."
} | 1,167,986 | b |
. Under proper circumstances, both doctrines apply not only to the protection of human life or to avoid serious injury, but also to the protection of property interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "747 F.2d 263, 267",
"parenthetical": "upholding initial warrantless entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises); see also United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir.1993) (finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to \"prevent the loss or destruction of the owner’s property” where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in progress); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267 (4th Cir.1984) (upholding initial warrantless entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "436 U.S. 499, 509",
"parenthetical": "concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises); see also United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir.1993) (finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to \"prevent the loss or destruction of the owner’s property” where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in progress); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267 (4th Cir.1984) (upholding initial warrantless entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open)."
} | 1,167,986 | b |
. Under proper circumstances, both doctrines apply not only to the protection of human life or to avoid serious injury, but also to the protection of property interests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50",
"parenthetical": "concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises); see also United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir.1993) (finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to \"prevent the loss or destruction of the owner’s property” where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in progress); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267 (4th Cir.1984) (upholding initial warrantless entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "9 F.3d 506, 510",
"parenthetical": "finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to \"prevent the loss or destruction of the owner's property\" where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in progress",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises); see also United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir.1993) (finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to \"prevent the loss or destruction of the owner’s property” where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in progress); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267 (4th Cir.1984) (upholding initial warrantless entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open)."
} | 1,167,986 | a |
. Under proper circumstances, both doctrines apply not only to the protection of human life or to avoid serious injury, but also to the protection of property interests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50",
"parenthetical": "concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises); see also United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir.1993) (finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to \"prevent the loss or destruction of the owner’s property” where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in progress); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267 (4th Cir.1984) (upholding initial warrantless entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "747 F.2d 263, 267",
"parenthetical": "upholding initial warrantless entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises); see also United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir.1993) (finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to \"prevent the loss or destruction of the owner’s property” where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in progress); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267 (4th Cir.1984) (upholding initial warrantless entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open)."
} | 1,167,986 | a |
. Under proper circumstances, both doctrines apply not only to the protection of human life or to avoid serious injury, but also to the protection of property interests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises); see also United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir.1993) (finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to \"prevent the loss or destruction of the owner’s property” where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in progress); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267 (4th Cir.1984) (upholding initial warrantless entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "9 F.3d 506, 510",
"parenthetical": "finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to \"prevent the loss or destruction of the owner's property\" where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in progress",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises); see also United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir.1993) (finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to \"prevent the loss or destruction of the owner’s property” where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in progress); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267 (4th Cir.1984) (upholding initial warrantless entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open)."
} | 1,167,986 | a |
. Under proper circumstances, both doctrines apply not only to the protection of human life or to avoid serious injury, but also to the protection of property interests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises); see also United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir.1993) (finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to \"prevent the loss or destruction of the owner’s property” where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in progress); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267 (4th Cir.1984) (upholding initial warrantless entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "747 F.2d 263, 267",
"parenthetical": "upholding initial warrantless entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (concluding the need to protect property may justify a warrantless entry of premises); see also United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir.1993) (finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to \"prevent the loss or destruction of the owner’s property” where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in progress); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267 (4th Cir.1984) (upholding initial warrantless entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open)."
} | 1,167,986 | a |
. We find no merit to the Secretary's additional assertions that Plaintiffs' complaint raises a non-justiciable question, or that it is barred by the doctrine of laches. Specifically with regard to laches, our Court has heretofore indicated that, because of the paramount importance of the manner in which a proposed constitutional amendment is presented to the people for consideration, the doctrine of laches was not a bar to our Court's consideration of such matters. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Because of the intense importance to the people of the commonwealth of matters affecting the amendment of their fundamental law, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to prevent the determination of the propriety of the submission of an amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See Tausig v. Lawrence, 328 Pa. 408, 197 A. 235, 239 (1938) (\"Because of the intense importance to the people of the commonwealth of matters affecting the amendment of their fundamental law, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to prevent the determination of the propriety of the submission of an amendment.”); see also Sprague v. Casey, 520 Pa. 38, 550 A.2d 184, 188 (1988) (rejecting reliance on laches defense in constitutional challenge to scheduling of judicial election in non-municipal election year)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting reliance on laches defense in constitutional challenge to scheduling of judicial election in non-municipal election year",
"sentence": "See Tausig v. Lawrence, 328 Pa. 408, 197 A. 235, 239 (1938) (\"Because of the intense importance to the people of the commonwealth of matters affecting the amendment of their fundamental law, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to prevent the determination of the propriety of the submission of an amendment.”); see also Sprague v. Casey, 520 Pa. 38, 550 A.2d 184, 188 (1988) (rejecting reliance on laches defense in constitutional challenge to scheduling of judicial election in non-municipal election year)."
} | 12,280,349 | a |
. We find no merit to the Secretary's additional assertions that Plaintiffs' complaint raises a non-justiciable question, or that it is barred by the doctrine of laches. Specifically with regard to laches, our Court has heretofore indicated that, because of the paramount importance of the manner in which a proposed constitutional amendment is presented to the people for consideration, the doctrine of laches was not a bar to our Court's consideration of such matters. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Because of the intense importance to the people of the commonwealth of matters affecting the amendment of their fundamental law, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to prevent the determination of the propriety of the submission of an amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See Tausig v. Lawrence, 328 Pa. 408, 197 A. 235, 239 (1938) (\"Because of the intense importance to the people of the commonwealth of matters affecting the amendment of their fundamental law, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to prevent the determination of the propriety of the submission of an amendment.”); see also Sprague v. Casey, 520 Pa. 38, 550 A.2d 184, 188 (1988) (rejecting reliance on laches defense in constitutional challenge to scheduling of judicial election in non-municipal election year)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "550 A.2d 184, 188",
"parenthetical": "rejecting reliance on laches defense in constitutional challenge to scheduling of judicial election in non-municipal election year",
"sentence": "See Tausig v. Lawrence, 328 Pa. 408, 197 A. 235, 239 (1938) (\"Because of the intense importance to the people of the commonwealth of matters affecting the amendment of their fundamental law, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to prevent the determination of the propriety of the submission of an amendment.”); see also Sprague v. Casey, 520 Pa. 38, 550 A.2d 184, 188 (1988) (rejecting reliance on laches defense in constitutional challenge to scheduling of judicial election in non-municipal election year)."
} | 12,280,349 | a |
. We find no merit to the Secretary's additional assertions that Plaintiffs' complaint raises a non-justiciable question, or that it is barred by the doctrine of laches. Specifically with regard to laches, our Court has heretofore indicated that, because of the paramount importance of the manner in which a proposed constitutional amendment is presented to the people for consideration, the doctrine of laches was not a bar to our Court's consideration of such matters. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting reliance on laches defense in constitutional challenge to scheduling of judicial election in non-municipal election year",
"sentence": "See Tausig v. Lawrence, 328 Pa. 408, 197 A. 235, 239 (1938) (\"Because of the intense importance to the people of the commonwealth of matters affecting the amendment of their fundamental law, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to prevent the determination of the propriety of the submission of an amendment.”); see also Sprague v. Casey, 520 Pa. 38, 550 A.2d 184, 188 (1988) (rejecting reliance on laches defense in constitutional challenge to scheduling of judicial election in non-municipal election year)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "197 A. 235, 239",
"parenthetical": "\"Because of the intense importance to the people of the commonwealth of matters affecting the amendment of their fundamental law, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to prevent the determination of the propriety of the submission of an amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See Tausig v. Lawrence, 328 Pa. 408, 197 A. 235, 239 (1938) (\"Because of the intense importance to the people of the commonwealth of matters affecting the amendment of their fundamental law, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to prevent the determination of the propriety of the submission of an amendment.”); see also Sprague v. Casey, 520 Pa. 38, 550 A.2d 184, 188 (1988) (rejecting reliance on laches defense in constitutional challenge to scheduling of judicial election in non-municipal election year)."
} | 12,280,349 | b |
. We find no merit to the Secretary's additional assertions that Plaintiffs' complaint raises a non-justiciable question, or that it is barred by the doctrine of laches. Specifically with regard to laches, our Court has heretofore indicated that, because of the paramount importance of the manner in which a proposed constitutional amendment is presented to the people for consideration, the doctrine of laches was not a bar to our Court's consideration of such matters. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "197 A. 235, 239",
"parenthetical": "\"Because of the intense importance to the people of the commonwealth of matters affecting the amendment of their fundamental law, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to prevent the determination of the propriety of the submission of an amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See Tausig v. Lawrence, 328 Pa. 408, 197 A. 235, 239 (1938) (\"Because of the intense importance to the people of the commonwealth of matters affecting the amendment of their fundamental law, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to prevent the determination of the propriety of the submission of an amendment.”); see also Sprague v. Casey, 520 Pa. 38, 550 A.2d 184, 188 (1988) (rejecting reliance on laches defense in constitutional challenge to scheduling of judicial election in non-municipal election year)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "550 A.2d 184, 188",
"parenthetical": "rejecting reliance on laches defense in constitutional challenge to scheduling of judicial election in non-municipal election year",
"sentence": "See Tausig v. Lawrence, 328 Pa. 408, 197 A. 235, 239 (1938) (\"Because of the intense importance to the people of the commonwealth of matters affecting the amendment of their fundamental law, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to prevent the determination of the propriety of the submission of an amendment.”); see also Sprague v. Casey, 520 Pa. 38, 550 A.2d 184, 188 (1988) (rejecting reliance on laches defense in constitutional challenge to scheduling of judicial election in non-municipal election year)."
} | 12,280,349 | a |
While the court referenced the omitted factor of promoting respect for the law, it tempered this reference by subsequently referring to the disrespect Black had specifically shown the probation office. Therefore, the district court primarily based the revocation sentence on permissible factors, rendering the resulting sentence not plainly unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "498 F.3d 393, 399-400",
"parenthetical": "rejecting a per se rule that consideration of SS 3553(a",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 399-400 (6th Cir.2007) (rejecting a per se rule that consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A) results in an unreasonable sentence, plainly or otherwise, and instead interpreting § 3583(e) as requiring consideration of the enumerated factors in § 3553(a) without forbidding consideration of other relevant factors), pet. for cert. filed, — U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Apr. 11, 2008) (No. 07-1295); United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 47-48 (2d Cir.2006) (same); cf. United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182-83 (9th Cir.2006) (stating in dicta that while it did “not suggest that a mere reference to promoting respect for the law would in itself render a sentence unreasonable,” it could result in reversible error if the record failed to establish that permissible factors were properly considered and formed the basis of the sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "444 F.3d 1173, 1182-83",
"parenthetical": "stating in dicta that while it did \"not suggest that a mere reference to promoting respect for the law would in itself render a sentence unreasonable,\" it could result in reversible error if the record failed to establish that permissible factors were properly considered and formed the basis of the sentence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 399-400 (6th Cir.2007) (rejecting a per se rule that consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A) results in an unreasonable sentence, plainly or otherwise, and instead interpreting § 3583(e) as requiring consideration of the enumerated factors in § 3553(a) without forbidding consideration of other relevant factors), pet. for cert. filed, — U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Apr. 11, 2008) (No. 07-1295); United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 47-48 (2d Cir.2006) (same); cf. United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182-83 (9th Cir.2006) (stating in dicta that while it did “not suggest that a mere reference to promoting respect for the law would in itself render a sentence unreasonable,” it could result in reversible error if the record failed to establish that permissible factors were properly considered and formed the basis of the sentence)."
} | 3,822,470 | a |
Where a statutory provision does not define a standard of care but merely imposes an administrative requirement, such as the requirement to obtain a license or to file a report to support a regulatory scheme, violation of such requirement will not support a negligence per se claim. Even if the regulatory scheme as a whole is designed to protect the public or to promote safety, the licensing duty itself is not a standard of care, but an administrative requirement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[i]n a majority of accident cases, the violation of a licensing statute by a driver is not held relevant to the determination of fault\"",
"sentence": "See Ridge v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 117 F.3d 126, 131 (4th Cir.1997) (holding that federal regulations making a pilot responsible for operation of his aircraft and requiring- him, upon request, to submit a written report to the government whenever he deviates from an aviation rule in an emergency provide for “general standards of conduct,” but do “not impose a particular duty,” and thus their violation was not negligence per se in Virginia); see also Duncan v. Hixon, 223 Va. 373, 288 S.E.2d 494, 495 (1982) (observing that “[i]n a majority of accident cases, the violation of a licensing statute by a driver is not held relevant to the determination of fault”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "117 F.3d 126, 131",
"parenthetical": "holding that federal regulations making a pilot responsible for operation of his aircraft and requiring- him, upon request, to submit a written report to the government whenever he deviates from an aviation rule in an emergency provide for \"general standards of conduct,\" but do \"not impose a particular duty,\" and thus their violation was not negligence per se in Virginia",
"sentence": "See Ridge v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 117 F.3d 126, 131 (4th Cir.1997) (holding that federal regulations making a pilot responsible for operation of his aircraft and requiring- him, upon request, to submit a written report to the government whenever he deviates from an aviation rule in an emergency provide for “general standards of conduct,” but do “not impose a particular duty,” and thus their violation was not negligence per se in Virginia); see also Duncan v. Hixon, 223 Va. 373, 288 S.E.2d 494, 495 (1982) (observing that “[i]n a majority of accident cases, the violation of a licensing statute by a driver is not held relevant to the determination of fault”)."
} | 844,283 | b |
Where a statutory provision does not define a standard of care but merely imposes an administrative requirement, such as the requirement to obtain a license or to file a report to support a regulatory scheme, violation of such requirement will not support a negligence per se claim. Even if the regulatory scheme as a whole is designed to protect the public or to promote safety, the licensing duty itself is not a standard of care, but an administrative requirement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "288 S.E.2d 494, 495",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[i]n a majority of accident cases, the violation of a licensing statute by a driver is not held relevant to the determination of fault\"",
"sentence": "See Ridge v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 117 F.3d 126, 131 (4th Cir.1997) (holding that federal regulations making a pilot responsible for operation of his aircraft and requiring- him, upon request, to submit a written report to the government whenever he deviates from an aviation rule in an emergency provide for “general standards of conduct,” but do “not impose a particular duty,” and thus their violation was not negligence per se in Virginia); see also Duncan v. Hixon, 223 Va. 373, 288 S.E.2d 494, 495 (1982) (observing that “[i]n a majority of accident cases, the violation of a licensing statute by a driver is not held relevant to the determination of fault”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "117 F.3d 126, 131",
"parenthetical": "holding that federal regulations making a pilot responsible for operation of his aircraft and requiring- him, upon request, to submit a written report to the government whenever he deviates from an aviation rule in an emergency provide for \"general standards of conduct,\" but do \"not impose a particular duty,\" and thus their violation was not negligence per se in Virginia",
"sentence": "See Ridge v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 117 F.3d 126, 131 (4th Cir.1997) (holding that federal regulations making a pilot responsible for operation of his aircraft and requiring- him, upon request, to submit a written report to the government whenever he deviates from an aviation rule in an emergency provide for “general standards of conduct,” but do “not impose a particular duty,” and thus their violation was not negligence per se in Virginia); see also Duncan v. Hixon, 223 Va. 373, 288 S.E.2d 494, 495 (1982) (observing that “[i]n a majority of accident cases, the violation of a licensing statute by a driver is not held relevant to the determination of fault”)."
} | 844,283 | b |
Therefore, without determining whether Defendants have breached the express warranty, I conclude that Plaintiff has available a contractual remedy through the breach of express warranty claim. Critically, Plaintiff fails to allege that this contractual remedy is inadequate, as required to state a claim for unjust enrichment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "156 F.Supp.2d 1335, 1341",
"parenthetical": "denying motion to dismiss unjust enrichment claim because plaintiff alleged \"no adequate legal remedy exists to compensate Plaintiff.\"",
"sentence": "See Nautica Int’l, Inc., 5 F.Supp.2d at 1342 (dismissing unjust enrichment claim because the plaintiff failed to allege that an adequate remedy at law does not exist); Kraft Co., Inc. v. J & H Marsh & McLennan of Florida, Inc., No. 04-2359-CIV, 2006 WL 1876995, at *3 (M.D.Fla.2006) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim because claim arose out of performance of an express contract, and express contract provides legal remedy); cf. Wilson v. De Angelis, 156 F.Supp.2d 1335, 1341 (S.D.Fla.2001) (denying motion to dismiss unjust enrichment claim because plaintiff alleged “no adequate legal remedy exists to compensate Plaintiff.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "5 F.Supp.2d 1342, 1342",
"parenthetical": "dismissing unjust enrichment claim because the plaintiff failed to allege that an adequate remedy at law does not exist",
"sentence": "See Nautica Int’l, Inc., 5 F.Supp.2d at 1342 (dismissing unjust enrichment claim because the plaintiff failed to allege that an adequate remedy at law does not exist); Kraft Co., Inc. v. J & H Marsh & McLennan of Florida, Inc., No. 04-2359-CIV, 2006 WL 1876995, at *3 (M.D.Fla.2006) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim because claim arose out of performance of an express contract, and express contract provides legal remedy); cf. Wilson v. De Angelis, 156 F.Supp.2d 1335, 1341 (S.D.Fla.2001) (denying motion to dismiss unjust enrichment claim because plaintiff alleged “no adequate legal remedy exists to compensate Plaintiff.”)."
} | 3,712,575 | b |
Therefore, without determining whether Defendants have breached the express warranty, I conclude that Plaintiff has available a contractual remedy through the breach of express warranty claim. Critically, Plaintiff fails to allege that this contractual remedy is inadequate, as required to state a claim for unjust enrichment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2006 WL 1876995, at *3",
"parenthetical": "dismissing unjust enrichment claim because claim arose out of performance of an express contract, and express contract provides legal remedy",
"sentence": "See Nautica Int’l, Inc., 5 F.Supp.2d at 1342 (dismissing unjust enrichment claim because the plaintiff failed to allege that an adequate remedy at law does not exist); Kraft Co., Inc. v. J & H Marsh & McLennan of Florida, Inc., No. 04-2359-CIV, 2006 WL 1876995, at *3 (M.D.Fla.2006) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim because claim arose out of performance of an express contract, and express contract provides legal remedy); cf. Wilson v. De Angelis, 156 F.Supp.2d 1335, 1341 (S.D.Fla.2001) (denying motion to dismiss unjust enrichment claim because plaintiff alleged “no adequate legal remedy exists to compensate Plaintiff.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "156 F.Supp.2d 1335, 1341",
"parenthetical": "denying motion to dismiss unjust enrichment claim because plaintiff alleged \"no adequate legal remedy exists to compensate Plaintiff.\"",
"sentence": "See Nautica Int’l, Inc., 5 F.Supp.2d at 1342 (dismissing unjust enrichment claim because the plaintiff failed to allege that an adequate remedy at law does not exist); Kraft Co., Inc. v. J & H Marsh & McLennan of Florida, Inc., No. 04-2359-CIV, 2006 WL 1876995, at *3 (M.D.Fla.2006) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim because claim arose out of performance of an express contract, and express contract provides legal remedy); cf. Wilson v. De Angelis, 156 F.Supp.2d 1335, 1341 (S.D.Fla.2001) (denying motion to dismiss unjust enrichment claim because plaintiff alleged “no adequate legal remedy exists to compensate Plaintiff.”)."
} | 3,712,575 | a |
The purpose of the arbitration, however, was to determine the liabilities of the parties. Even if the arbitrators erroneously applied South Carolina corporate law, they did not exceed the scope of their powers. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if the arbitrators resolved the very issue presented to them, they did not exceed their powers, even assuming factual and legal errors",
"sentence": "Batten, 300 S.C. 545, 389 S.E.2d 170 (if the arbitrators resolved the very issue presented to them, they did not exceed their powers, even assuming factual and legal errors)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if the issues presented to the arbitrators are within the scope of the arbitration agreement, they do not exceed their powers when attempting to resolve those issues",
"sentence": "See also Trident Technical College, 286 S.C. 98, 333 S.E.2d 781 (if the issues presented to the arbitrators are within the scope of the arbitration agreement, they do not exceed their powers when attempting to resolve those issues)."
} | 529,170 | a |
The purpose of the arbitration, however, was to determine the liabilities of the parties. Even if the arbitrators erroneously applied South Carolina corporate law, they did not exceed the scope of their powers. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if the arbitrators resolved the very issue presented to them, they did not exceed their powers, even assuming factual and legal errors",
"sentence": "Batten, 300 S.C. 545, 389 S.E.2d 170 (if the arbitrators resolved the very issue presented to them, they did not exceed their powers, even assuming factual and legal errors)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if the issues presented to the arbitrators are within the scope of the arbitration agreement, they do not exceed their powers when attempting to resolve those issues",
"sentence": "See also Trident Technical College, 286 S.C. 98, 333 S.E.2d 781 (if the issues presented to the arbitrators are within the scope of the arbitration agreement, they do not exceed their powers when attempting to resolve those issues)."
} | 529,170 | a |
The purpose of the arbitration, however, was to determine the liabilities of the parties. Even if the arbitrators erroneously applied South Carolina corporate law, they did not exceed the scope of their powers. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if the arbitrators resolved the very issue presented to them, they did not exceed their powers, even assuming factual and legal errors",
"sentence": "Batten, 300 S.C. 545, 389 S.E.2d 170 (if the arbitrators resolved the very issue presented to them, they did not exceed their powers, even assuming factual and legal errors)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if the issues presented to the arbitrators are within the scope of the arbitration agreement, they do not exceed their powers when attempting to resolve those issues",
"sentence": "See also Trident Technical College, 286 S.C. 98, 333 S.E.2d 781 (if the issues presented to the arbitrators are within the scope of the arbitration agreement, they do not exceed their powers when attempting to resolve those issues)."
} | 529,170 | a |
The purpose of the arbitration, however, was to determine the liabilities of the parties. Even if the arbitrators erroneously applied South Carolina corporate law, they did not exceed the scope of their powers. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if the issues presented to the arbitrators are within the scope of the arbitration agreement, they do not exceed their powers when attempting to resolve those issues",
"sentence": "See also Trident Technical College, 286 S.C. 98, 333 S.E.2d 781 (if the issues presented to the arbitrators are within the scope of the arbitration agreement, they do not exceed their powers when attempting to resolve those issues)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if the arbitrators resolved the very issue presented to them, they did not exceed their powers, even assuming factual and legal errors",
"sentence": "Batten, 300 S.C. 545, 389 S.E.2d 170 (if the arbitrators resolved the very issue presented to them, they did not exceed their powers, even assuming factual and legal errors)."
} | 529,170 | b |
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